diff options
Diffstat (limited to '18755.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 18755.txt | 79870 |
1 files changed, 79870 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/18755.txt b/18755.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c969855 --- /dev/null +++ b/18755.txt @@ -0,0 +1,79870 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda +Secundae), by Thomas Aquinas + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) + +Author: Thomas Aquinas + +Translator: Fathers of the English Dominican Province + +Release Date: July 4, 2006 [EBook #18755] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SUMMA THEOLOGICA, PART II-II *** + + + + +Produced by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and +supplementation by David McClamrock + + + + + + +SUMMA THEOLOGICA + +PART II-II ("Secunda Secundae") + +Translated by +Fathers of the English Dominican Province + +BENZIGER BROTHERS +NEW YORK +________________________ + +DEDICATION + +To the Blessed Virgin +Mary Immaculate +Seat of Wisdom +________________________ + +NOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION + +The text of this electronic edition was originally produced by Sandra +K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian +Classics Ethereal Library <http://www.ccel.org>. I have eliminated +unnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in +transcription, and added the dedication, tables of contents, +Prologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they +appeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers. +Each article is now designated by part, question number, and article +number in brackets, like this: + +> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2] + +> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil? + +In a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger +Brothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text +of the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in +brackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first +sentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: "Not only is it +impossible that anything should be created by God...." By reference +to the Latin, "non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari" +(emphasis added), this has been corrected to "Not only is it [not] +impossible that anything should be created by God...." + +This electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers +edition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the +original page numbers and headers): + +* The repetitive expression "We proceed thus to the [next] Article" +does not appear directly below the title of each article. + +* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end, +_like this._ Quotations and other "quotable" matter, however, are +ordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this +edition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they +were set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers +edition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear +in the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in +parentheses. + +* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated +by colons, like this: "Dan. 7:10"--not like this: "Dan. vii. 10." +Small roman numerals have been retained where they appear in +citations to books other than the Bible. + +* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers +edition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the +footnote mark appeared. + +* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration. + +* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines. + +* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and +at certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line +for each topic. + +* Titles of questions are in all caps. + +Anything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to +the content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a +defect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock). + +________________________ + +CONTENTS + +SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (QQ. 1-189) + +Question + +1. Of Faith +2. Of the Act of Faith +3. Of the Outward Act of Faith +4. Of the Virtue Itself of Faith +5. Of Those Who Have Faith +6. Of the Cause of Faith +7. Of the Effects of Faith +8. Of the Gift of Understanding +9. Of the Gift of Knowledge +10. Of Unbelief in General +11. Of Heresy +12. Of Apostasy +13. Of the Sin of Blasphemy, in General +14. Of Blasphemy Against the Holy Ghost +15. Of the Vices Opposed to Knowledge and Understanding +16. Of the Precepts of Faith, Knowledge, and Understanding +17. Of Hope, Considered in Itself +18. Of the Subject of Hope +19. Of the Gift of Fear +20. Of Despair +21. Of Presumption +22. Of the Precepts Relating to Hope and Fear +23. Of Charity, Considered in Itself +24. Of the Subject of Charity +25. Of the Object of Charity +26. Of the Order of Charity +27. Of the Principal Act of Charity, Which Is to Love +28. Of Joy +29. Of Peace +30. Of Mercy +31. Of Beneficence +32. Of Almsdeeds +33. Of Fraternal Correction +34. Of Hatred +35. Of Sloth +36. Of Envy +37. Of Discord, Which Is Contrary to Peace +38. Of Contention +39. Of Schism +40. Of War +41. Of Strife +42. Of Sedition +43. Of Scandal +44. Of the Precepts of Charity +45. Of the Gift of Wisdom +46. Of Folly Which Is Opposed to Wisdom + +TREATISE ON PRUDENCE AND JUSTICE + +47. Of Prudence Considered in Itself +48. Of the Parts of Prudence +49. Of Each Quasi-integral Part of Prudence +50. Of the Subjective Parts of Prudence +51. Of the Virtues Which Are Connected with Prudence +52. Of the Gift of Counsel +53. Of Imprudence +54. Of Negligence +55. Of Vices Opposed to Prudence by Way of Resemblance +56. Of the Precepts Relating to Prudence +57. Of Right +58. Of Justice +59. Of Injustice +60. Of Judgment +61. Of the Parts of Justice +62. Of Restitution +63. Of Respect of Persons +64. Of Murder +65. Of Injuries Committed on the Person +66. Of Theft and Robbery +67. Of the Injustice of a Judge, in Judging +68. Of Matters Concerning Unjust Accusation +69. Of Sins Committed Against Justice on the Part of the Defendant +70. Of Injustice with Regard to the Person of the Witness +71. Of Injustice in Judgment on the Part of Counsel +72. Of Reviling +73. Of Backbiting +74. Of Tale-Bearing +75. Of Derision +76. Of Cursing +77. Of Cheating, Which Is Committed in Buying and Selling +78. Of the Sin of Usury +79. Of the Quasi-integral Parts of Justice +80. Of the Potential Parts of Justice +81. Of Religion +82. Of Devotion +83. Of Prayer +84. Of Adoration +85. Of Sacrifice +86. Of Oblations and First-fruits +87. Of Tithes +88. Of Vows +89. Of Oaths +90. Of the Taking of God's Name by Way of Adjuration +91. Of Taking the Divine Name for the Purpose of Invoking It by + Means of Praise +92. Of Superstition +93. Of Superstition Consisting in Undue Worship of the True God +94. Of Idolatry +95. Of Superstition in Divinations +96. Of Superstition in Observances +97. Of the Temptation of God +98. Of Perjury +99. Of Sacrilege +100. On Simony +101. Of Piety +102. Of Observance, Considered in Itself, and of Its Parts +103. Of Dulia +104. Of Obedience +105. Of Disobedience +106. Of Thankfulness or Gratitude +107. Of Ingratitude +108. Of Vengeance +109. Of Truth +110. Of the Vices Opposed to Truth, and First of Lying +111. Of Dissimulation and Hypocrisy +112. Of Boasting +113. Of Irony +114. Of the Friendliness Which Is Called Affability +115. Of Flattery +116. Of Quarreling +117. Of Liberality +118. Of the Vices Opposed to Liberality, and in the First Place, + of Covetousness +119. Of Prodigality +120. Of "Epikeia" or Equity +121. Of Piety +122. Of the Precepts of Justice + +TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE + +123. Of Fortitude +124. Of Martyrdom +125. Of Fear +126. Of Fearlessness +127. Of Daring +128. Of the Parts of Fortitude +129. Of Magnanimity +130. Of Presumption +131. Of Ambition +132. Of Vainglory +133. Of Pusillanimity +134. Of Magnificence +135. Of Meanness +136. Of Patience +137. Of Perseverance +138. Of the Vices Opposed to Perseverance +139. Of the Gift of Fortitude +140. Of the Precepts of Fortitude +141. Of Temperance +142. Of the Vices Opposed to Temperance +143. Of the Parts of Temperance, in General +144. Of Shamefacedness +145. Of Honesty +146. Of Abstinence +147. Of Fasting +148. Of Gluttony +149. Of Sobriety +150. Of Drunkenness +151. Of Chastity +152. Of Virginity +153. Of Lust +154. Of the Parts of Lust +155. Of Continence +156. Of Incontinence +157. Of Clemency and Meekness +158. Of Anger +159. Of Cruelty +160. Of Modesty +161. Of Humility +162. Of Pride +163. Of the First Man's Sin +164. Of the Punishments of the First Man's Sin +165. Of Our First Parents' Temptation +166. Of Studiousness +167. Of Curiosity +168. Of Modesty as Consisting in the Outward Movements of the Body +169. Of Modesty in the Outward Apparel +170. Of the Precepts of Temperance + +TREATISE ON ACTS WHICH PERTAIN ESPECIALLY TO CERTAIN MEN + +171. Of Prophecy +172. Of the Cause of Prophecy +173. Of the Manner in Which Prophetic Knowledge Is Conveyed +174. Of the Division of Prophecy +175. Of Rapture +176. Of the Grace of Tongues +177. Of the Gratuitous Grace Consisting in Words +178. Of the Grace of Miracles +179. Of the Division of Life into Active and Contemplative +180. Of the Contemplative Life +181. Of the Active Life +182. Of the Active Life in Comparison with the Contemplative Life +183. Of Man's Various Duties and States in General +184. Of the State of Perfection in General +185. Of Things Pertaining to the Episcopal State +186. Of Those Things in Which the Religious State Properly Consists +187. Of Those Things That Are Competent to Religious +188. Of the Different Kinds of Religious Life +189. Of the Entrance into Religious Life +_______________________ + +SUMMA THEOLOGICA + +SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART +["II-II," "Secunda Secundae"] +_______________________ + +TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ. 1-46) +_______________________ + +QUESTION 1 + +OF FAITH (In Ten Articles) + +Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with +Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity. + +The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of +the corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the +opposite vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue. + +About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; +(3) the habit of faith. + +Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth? + +(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, +i.e. whether it is a thing or a proposition? + +(3) Whether anything false can come under faith? + +(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen? + +(5) Whether it can be anything known? + +(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a +certain number of articles? + +(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times? + +(8) Of the number of articles; + +(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol; + +(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 1] + +Whether the Object of Faith Is the First Truth? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First +Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is +proposed to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the +Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but +also things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of +the Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of +faith is not only the First Truth. + +Obj. 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they +are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things +contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is +considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things +contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning +man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only +the First Truth, but also created truth. + +Obj. 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the +sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith +is not only the First Truth. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is +about the simple and everlasting truth." Now this is the First Truth. +Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth. + +_I answer that,_ The object of every cognitive habit includes two +things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material +object, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is +the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the +conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of +the science is the mean of demonstration, through which the +conclusions are known. + +Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the +object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of +which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it +is revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the +Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which +faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things, +which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as +bearing some relation to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain +effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards +the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the +object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing +comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of +the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation +to health. + +Reply Obj. 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the +sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under +faith, in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much +as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth. + +The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all +things contained in Holy Writ. + +Reply Obj. 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so +that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further +on (Q. 25, A. 1). +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 2] + +Whether the Object of Faith Is Something Complex, by Way of a +Proposition? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something +complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First +Truth, as stated above (A. 1). Now the First Truth is something +simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex. + +Obj. 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol. +Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is +not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God . . . +almighty." Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a +thing. + +Obj. 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor. +13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to +face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known." +But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is +the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also. + +_On the contrary,_ Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now +the mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science +and opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise +about propositions; so that its object is something complex. + +_I answer that,_ The thing known is in the knower according to the +mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to +know the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the First Part +(Q. 85, A. 5). Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known +by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the +other hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, +things that are complex in themselves. + +Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First, +as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of +faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we +have faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this +respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a +proposition. + +Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount +of truth. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the object of faith on the part +of the thing believed. + +Reply Obj. 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in +so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is +evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the +believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as +in science we do not form propositions, except in order to have +knowledge about things through their means, so is it in faith. + +Reply Obj. 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the First +Truth seen in itself, according to 1 John 3:2: "We know that when He +shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He +is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way +of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not +apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison +fails. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 3] + +Whether Anything False Can Come Under Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith. +For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can +come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not +obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as +being good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false +can be the object of faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born, +according to John 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might +see My day: he saw it, and was glad." But after the time of Abraham, +God might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed +that He did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have +been false. Therefore the object of faith can be something false. + +Obj. 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ, +and many continued so to believe, until they heard the preaching of +the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He began to +preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore +something false can come under faith. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe +that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the +altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly +consecrated, and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but +only bread. Therefore something false can come under faith. + +_On the contrary,_ No virtue that perfects the intellect is related +to the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the +Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that +perfects the intellect, as we shall show further on (Q. 4, AA. 2, 5). +Therefore nothing false can come under it. + +_I answer that,_ Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by +means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen +except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save +through the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated (A. 1) +that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so +that nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under +the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can +non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows +therefore that nothing false can come under faith. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of +the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect the +intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the +nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other +hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not +entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance +with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what +one is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas +hope and charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between +them fails. + +Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man +hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would +be an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he +perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly. + +In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be; +so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual +whom we love for God's sake. + +Reply Obj. 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in itself +was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it stands in +God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as +explained in the First Part (Q. 14, AA. 13, 15): and it is thus that +it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it +cannot be false. + +Reply Obj. 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to believe +in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time, +wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human +conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion +through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false +opinion to be the outcome of faith. + +Reply Obj. 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such and +such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ +is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly +consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not +follow that anything false comes under faith. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 4] + +Whether the Object of Faith Can Be Something Seen? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something +seen. For Our Lord said to Thomas (John 20:29): "Because thou hast +seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed." Therefore vision and faith +regard the same object. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of +faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark +manner." Therefore what is believed is seen. + +Obj. 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen +under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen. + +Obj. 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine +states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard, +according to Rom. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing." Therefore +faith is of things seen. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the +evidence of things that appear not." + +_I answer that,_ Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which +is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First, +through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known +either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held +by the habit of understanding), or through something else already +known (as in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of +science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through +being sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but +through an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side +rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear +of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be +certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith. + +Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the +intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident +that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the +senses or by the intellect. + +Reply Obj. 1: Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another" [*St. +Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to +be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my God." + +Reply Obj. 2: Those things which come under faith can be considered +in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and +believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that +is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are +seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the +evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to +be believed. + +Reply Obj. 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For +just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is +becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith, +the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming +to a right faith, and not to assent to others. + +Reply Obj. 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but +not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not +follow that these things are seen. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 5] + +Whether Those Things That Are of Faith Can Be an Object of Science +[*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through +its demonstration]? + +Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be +an object of science. For where science is lacking there is +ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not +in ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of +such things savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it +ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore things that are of faith can be an +object of science. + +Obj. 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers +employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore such +things can be an object of science. + +Obj. 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of +science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces +science." Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the +philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth. +Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science. + +Obj. 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since +faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and +science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster. +i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a +thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of +perception." Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of +perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of +perception. Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an +object of science. + +_I answer that,_ All science is derived from self-evident and +therefore "seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must +needs be, in a fashion, seen. + +Now as stated above (A. 4), it is impossible that one and the same +thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is +equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of +science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, +that a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is +believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now +believe about the Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now +through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face": which +vision the angels possess already; so that what we believe, they see. +In like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or +scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer, +is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it +by demonstration. + +Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is +equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things +which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not +about the same things. + +Reply Obj. 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of +faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do +they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know +them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes +them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A. 4, ad +2, 3). + +Reply Obj. 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that +are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive +arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not +impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of +faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares +(Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well +proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from +self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology +is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work (P. I, Q. 1, A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are +reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed +simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to +matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by +demonstration must know them first of all by faith. + +Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and +opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as +we have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for +one and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing +relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same +respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the +same object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like +manner, one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, +by faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, +about the same object, and in the same respect, science is +incompatible with either opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. +Because science is incompatible with opinion about the same object +simply, for the reason that science demands that its object should be +deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to +opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be otherwise. +Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of +faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why +science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same +respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas +the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 6] + +Whether Those Things That Are of Faith Should Be Divided into Certain +Articles? + +Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should +not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in +Holy Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their +multitude, cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems +superfluous to distinguish certain articles of faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely, +and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal +aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated above +(A. 1), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be +distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice +should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into +articles. + +Obj. 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of Auxerre, +Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, +exacting [arctans] our belief." Now belief is a voluntary act, since, +as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), "no man believes against +his will." Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be +divided into articles. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine +truth, tending thereto." Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth +by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in +our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into +articles. + +_I answer that,_ the word "article" is apparently derived from the +Greek; for the Greek _arthron_ [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] +which the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of +distinct parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit +together are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the +Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which are affixed to +words to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, +articles are parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says +(Rhet. iv) that an article is composed of words each pronounced +singly and separately, thus: "Your passion, your voice, your look, +have struck terror into your foes." + +Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct +articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. +Now the object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as +stated above (A. 4). Consequently any matter that, for a special +reason, is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters +are known or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to +distinguish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in +seeing that God suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again +from the dead, wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct +from the article of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was +buried, present the same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is +not difficult to accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one +article. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in +themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but +only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions +are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in +order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith +consists in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb. +11:2: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows +that those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly +to eternal life. Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God +[*The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of +God, etc.], the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and +these are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand certain +things in Holy Writ are proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their +own account, but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for +instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again at +the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like, which are related in Holy +Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or the +Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct +articles. + +Reply Obj. 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken +in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there +is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth: +and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles. +Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered +from our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of +faith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of view +there are various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above. + +Reply Obj. 3: This definition of an article is taken from an +etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in +accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it +does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that +although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since +belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of +end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and +"without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle +declares (Heb. 11:6). +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 7] + +Whether the Articles of Faith Have Increased in Course of Time? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not +increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb. +11:1), "faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Now the +same things are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all +times, the same things are to be believed. + +Obj. 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised +by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered +them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of +faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as +stated in Eph. 2:8: "It is the gift of God." Since then there can be +no lack of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of +faith was perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time +went on. + +Obj. 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion +no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a +beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii). +Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with +perfect things, so that those who were the first to deliver the +faith, knew it most perfectly. + +Obj. 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us +through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of +faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later, +according to Deut. 32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to +thee." Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the +mysteries, for "they received them more fully than others, even as +they received them earlier," as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23: "Ourselves +also who have the first fruits of the Spirit." Therefore it seems +that knowledge of matters of faith has not increased as time went on. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that "the +knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the +nearer they were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they +receive the mysteries of salvation." + +_I answer that,_ The articles of faith stand in the same relation to +the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based +on natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, +so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles +are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same +thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," as the +Philosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the +articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of +faith, such as God's existence, and His providence over the salvation +of man, according to Heb. 11: "He that cometh to God, must believe +that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." For the +existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God +eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His +providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for +man's salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: and in this +way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are +contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes +belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth. + +Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the +articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went +on: since whatever those who lived later have believed, was +contained, albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who +preceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articles +believed explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some +were known explicitly which were not known explicitly by those who +lived before them. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2, 3): "I am +the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg.: 'I am +the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob'] . . . and +My name Adonai I did not show them": David also said (Ps. 118:100): +"I have had understanding above ancients": and the Apostle says (Eph. +3:5) that the mystery of Christ, "in other generations was not known, +as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets." + +Reply Obj. 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped for +from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through +Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time, +the further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the +Apostle says (Heb. 11:13): "All these died according to faith, not +having received the promises, but beholding them afar off." Now the +further off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore +those who were nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge +of the good things to be hoped for. + +Reply Obj. 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the +part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in +knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that +takes place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the +learner; thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does +not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for +he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the +disciple's capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this +way that men made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on. +Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament +to childhood. + +Reply Obj. 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation can +take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the active +cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature +makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not +brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in +existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the +imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the +imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is +the active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while +man is likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action. +Hence, among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from +imperfection to perfection; and, although some men have been after +the manner of active causes, through being doctors of faith, +nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for +the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of +faith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith, +so far as was necessary at the time for the instruction of the +people, either openly or in figures. + +Reply Obj. 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by +Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of +fulness [*Vulg.: 'fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were +nearest to Christ, whether before, like John the Baptist, or after, +like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith; +for even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of +manhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more +perfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his +youth. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 8] + +Whether the Articles of Faith Are Suitably Formulated? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably +formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do +not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above +(A. 5). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God; +hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many +other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there +is one God" should not be set down as an article of faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should +believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to +be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points +some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention +should have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His +omnipotence. + +Obj. 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know +the Son, according to John 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father +also." Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father +and Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the +Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several +articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the +Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about +the Person of the Father. + +Obj. 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of +the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too +is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His +Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work +appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work +appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets." +Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated +to the Son in respect of His Godhead. + +Obj. 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special +difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should +have been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems +that there is not a sufficient number of articles. + +On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the +articles thus. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 4, 6), to faith those things in +themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, +and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are +proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the +Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of +Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the +sons of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written (John 17:3): +"This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, +and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Wherefore the first +distinction in matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of +the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of Christ's human +nature, which is the "mystery of godliness" (1 Tim. 3:16). + +Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are +proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the +first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which +three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and +thirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers +to the order of nature, in relation to which the article about the +creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, +in relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man +are included in one article; while the third refers to the order of +glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us +concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus +there are seven articles referring to the Godhead. + +In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven +articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or +conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His +Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the +fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, +to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen +articles. + +Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the +Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the +three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the +three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of +glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the +glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity +into one article. + +Reply Obj. 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the +philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance +His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped, +all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching +over things, as stated in the First Part (Q. 13, A. 8). Now in beings +having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and +knowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal +knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills +in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His +providence over them. + +Reply Obj. 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and Holy +Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article +refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the +relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way, +include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not +a Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of +view, there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one +article to the three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each +Person, certain points have to be observed, about which some happen +to fall into error, looking at it in this way, we may distinguish +three articles about the three Persons. For Arius believed in the +omnipotence and eternity of the Father, but did not believe the Son +to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for +an article about the Person of the Son in order to settle this point. +In like manner it was necessary to appoint a third article about the +Person of the Holy Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way +Christ's conception and birth, just as the resurrection and life +everlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one +article, in so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from +another point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as +each one separately presents a special difficulty. + +Reply Obj. 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent to +sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be +believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons +of the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is +never sent, as we stated in the First Part (Q. 43, A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its +consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which +is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which +is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by +appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to +the Holy Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of the +Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this +respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other +is that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it +is included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which +are ascribed to God's almighty power. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 9] + +Whether It Is Suitable for the Articles of Faith to Be Embodied in a +Symbol? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of +faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of +faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, +since it is written (Deut. 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that +I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it +was unlawful to make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy +Writ had once been published. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but +"one faith." Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it +is not fitting that there should be more than one symbol. + +Obj. 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in the +symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all +competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith. +Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed +in the words: "I believe in one God." + +Obj. 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of +faith, as stated above (A. 8). But the descent into hell is not +mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is +expressed inadequately. + +Obj. 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the +passage, "You believe in God, believe also in Me" (John 14:1) says: +"We believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God." +Since then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems +unfitting to say: "In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church." + +Obj. 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of faith. +Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly. +Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be +sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of +faith in a symbol. + +_On the contrary,_ The universal Church cannot err, since she is +governed by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was +Our Lord's promise to His disciples (John 16:13): "When He, the +Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth." Now the +symbol is published by the authority of the universal Church. +Therefore it contains nothing defective. + +_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), "he that cometh to +God, must believe that He is." Now a man cannot believe, unless the +truth be proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for +the truth of faith to be collected together, so that it might the more +easily be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth +through ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of +maxims of faith that the symbol [*The Greek _symballein_] takes its +name. + +Reply Obj. 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ, +diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes +obscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy +Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by +all those who require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have +no time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was +necessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings of +Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This indeed was no +addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it. + +Reply Obj. 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the +symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about +the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of +simple-minded persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave +rise to the necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise +differ from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy of +heretics, one contains more explicitly what another contains +implicitly. + +Reply Obj. 3: The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol in the +person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united together by +faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since such is +the faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not only +outwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is +expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living +faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they +should endeavor to acquire it. + +Reply Obj. 4: No error about the descent into hell had arisen among +heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that +point. For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the +Fathers, but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the +Apostles. For a subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; +rather does it expound it, as stated above (ad 2). + +Reply Obj. 5: If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this must +be taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the Holy +Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe in +the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church." But it is better and more in +keeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the +holy Catholic Church," as Pope Leo [*Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.] +observes. + +Reply Obj. 6: Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of +the symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was +already spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it +is sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the +Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the +faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as +though it were against the darkness of past and future errors. +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 10] + +Whether It Belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to Draw Up a Symbol of +Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign +Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol +becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as +stated above (A. 9). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith +were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth +of faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as +stated above (A. 7). Since then this reason ceased with the advent of +the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more +and more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the +authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the +symbol. + +Obj. 2: Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden under +pain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden under +pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of +the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first* council of +Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council +had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to +utter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined +by the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and +this under pain of anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by +Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as +the "Latrocinium" and condemned by the Pope.] The same was repeated +in the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it +seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new +edition of the symbol. + +Obj. 3: Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but +patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung +in the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign +Pontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of +the symbol. + +_On the contrary,_ The symbol was drawn up by a general council. Now +such a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of +the Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. +4, 5]. Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff +to draw up a symbol. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Obj. 1), a new edition of the +symbol becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may +arise. Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to +that authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally, +so that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs +to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more +important and more difficult questions that arise in the Church are +referred," as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence +our Lord said to Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff (Luke 22:32): +"I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not, and thou, +being once converted, confirm thy brethren." The reason of this is +that there should be but one faith of the whole Church, according to +1 Cor. 1:10: "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no +schisms among you": and this could not be secured unless any question +of faith that may arise be decided by him who presides over the whole +Church, so that the whole Church may hold firmly to his decision. +Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign +Pontiff to publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other +matters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke a general +council and so forth. + +Reply Obj. 1: The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the +teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Pet. +3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic +teaching and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction, +it was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly +against the errors which arose. + +Reply Obj. 2: This prohibition and sentence of the council was +intended for private individuals, who have no business to decide +matters of faith: for this decision of the general council did not +take away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new +edition of the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the +same faith with greater explicitness. For every council has taken +into account that a subsequent council would expound matters more +fully than the preceding council, if this became necessary through +some heresy arising. Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign +Pontiff, by whose authority the council is convoked, and its +decision confirmed. + +Reply Obj. 3: Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not under +the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine, +as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly +the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the +Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith. Since +it contained briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the +authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule +of faith. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 2 + +OF THE ACT OF FAITH +(In Ten Articles) + +We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; +(2) the external act. + +Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: + +(1) What is "to believe," which is the internal act of faith? + +(2) In how many ways is it expressed? + +(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything +above natural reason? + +(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are +attainable by natural reason? + +(5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things +explicitly? + +(6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith? + +(7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for +salvation? + +(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity +explicitly? + +(9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious? + +(10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 1] + +Whether to Believe Is to Think with Assent? + +Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not to think with +assent. Because the Latin word "cogitatio" [thought] implies a +research, for "cogitare" [to think] seems to be equivalent to +"coagitare," i.e. "to discuss together." Now Damascene says (De Fide +Orth. iv) that faith is "an assent without research." Therefore +thinking has no place in the act of faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show +further on (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to think is an act of the cogitative +power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the +First Part (Q. 78, A. 4). Therefore thought has nothing to do with +faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its +object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect, +but of the will, even as consent is, as stated above (I-II, Q. 15, A. +1, ad 3). Therefore to believe is not to think with assent. + +_On the contrary,_ This is how "to believe" is defined by Augustine +(De Praedest. Sanct. ii). + +_I answer that,_ "To think" can be taken in three ways. First, in a +general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as +Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): "By understanding I mean now +the faculty whereby we understand when thinking." Secondly, "to +think" is more strictly taken for that consideration of the +intellect, which is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which +precedes the intellect's arrival at the stage of perfection that +comes with the certitude of sight. In this sense Augustine says (De +Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of God is not called the Thought, but the +Word of God. When our thought realizes what we know and takes form +therefrom, it becomes our word. Hence the Word of God must be +understood without any thinking on the part of God, for there is +nothing there that can take form, or be unformed." In this way +thought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while yet +deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth. +Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one of +deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the +intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to +the sensitive part, hence it is that "to think" is taken secondly for +an act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the +cogitative power. + +Accordingly, if "to think" be understood broadly according to the +first sense, then "to think with assent," does not express completely +what is meant by "to believe": since, in this way, a man thinks with +assent even when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is +certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its +demonstration.], or understands. If, on the other hand, "to think" be +understood in the second way, then this expresses completely the +nature of the act of believing. For among the acts belonging to the +intellect, some have a firm assent without any such kind of thinking, +as when a man considers the things that he knows by science, or +understands, for this consideration is already formed. But some acts +of the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent, +whether they incline to neither side, as in one who "doubts"; or +incline to one side rather than the other, but on account of some +slight motive, as in one who "suspects"; or incline to one side yet +with fear of the other, as in one who "opines." But this act "to +believe," cleaves firmly to one side, in which respect belief has +something in common with science and understanding; yet its knowledge +does not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with +doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence it is proper to the believer to +think with assent: so that the act of believing is distinguished from +all the other acts of the intellect, which are about the true or the +false. + +Reply Obj. 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason which +demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things +whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance that such things +have been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles. + +Reply Obj. 2: "To think" is not taken here for the act of the +cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The intellect of the believer is determined to one +object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken +here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the +will. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 2] + +Whether the Act of Faith Is Suitably Distinguished As Believing God, +Believing in a God and Believing in God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably +distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in +God. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is +one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three +acts of faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should not +be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now "to believe +God" is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the +First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from +certain other acts of faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be +called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a +God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith. + +Obj. 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose +object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the +will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe in God," which +implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species +of that act. + +_On the contrary_ is the authority of Augustine who makes this +distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi--Tract. xxix in Joan.). + +_I answer that,_ The act of any power or habit depends on the relation +of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be +considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the +intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above +(A. 1, ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part +of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect. + +If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can +be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). One +of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of +faith is "to believe in a God"; because, as stated above (ibid.) +nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is +referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it +is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point +of faith; and thus an act of faith is "to believe God," since, as +stated above (ibid.) the formal object of faith is the First Truth, +to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent for Its sake to +whatever he believes. + +Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the +intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in +God." For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the +aspect of an end. + +Reply Obj. 1: These three do not denote different acts of faith, but +one and the same act having different relations to the object of +faith. + +This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: Unbelievers cannot be said "to believe in a God" as +we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not +believe that God exists under the conditions that faith determines; +hence they do not truly imply believe in a God, since, as the +Philosopher observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know simple things +defectively is not to know them at all." + +Reply Obj. 4: As stated above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 1) the will moves the +intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in this +respect an act of faith is "to believe in God." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 3] + +Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Anything Above the +Natural Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe +anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of +a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now +matters of faith, surpass man's natural reason, since they are things +unseen as stated above (Q. 1, A. 4). Therefore to believe seems +unnecessary for salvation. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters, +wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true +or false, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words?" +Now a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, +since he cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our +judgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such +matters. Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation. + +Obj. 3: Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to Ps. +36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord." Now "the +invisible things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood by the +things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according +to Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the +understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not +necessary for man's salvation, that he should believe certain things. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is +impossible to please God." + +_I answer that,_ Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we +find that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower +nature, one of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement, +while the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature. +Thus water by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the +earth), while according to the movement of the moon, it moves round +the centre by ebb and flow. In like manner the planets have their +proper movements from west to east, while in accordance with the +movement of the first heaven, they have a movement from east to west. +Now the created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to +God, since other creatures do not attain to the universal, but only +to something particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness +either in _being_ only, as inanimate things, or also in _living,_ and +in _knowing singulars,_ as plants and animals; whereas the rational +nature, in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and +being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being. + +Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not +only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that +which it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine +goodness. Hence it was said above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8) that man's +ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which +vision man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to +John 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned +cometh to Me." Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed +all at once, but by little and little, according to the mode of his +nature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in order +that he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the +Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it behooves a +learner to believe." + +Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly +happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes +the master who is teaching him. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher nature, +natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some +supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural +light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of +virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this +way, by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to +matters of faith and not to those which are against faith. +Consequently "there is no" danger or "condemnation to them that are +in Christ Jesus," and whom He has enlightened by faith. + +Reply Obj. 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things +of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to God +from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): "Many things +are shown to thee above the understandings of man." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Necessary to Believe Those Things Which Can Be Proved +by Natural Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which +can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's +works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is +superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices. +Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that +can be known by natural reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the object +of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as +stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Since therefore all things that can be +known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there +is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is +certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its +demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of +them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the +others should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is +not necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural +reason. + +_On the contrary,_ It is necessary to believe that God is one and +incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason. + +_I answer that,_ It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only +things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by +reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may +arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the +science to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, +is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it +presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by until late +in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of God. The second +reason is, in order that the knowledge of God may be more general. +For many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either +through dullness of mind, or through having a number of occupations, +and temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom +would be altogether deprived of the knowledge of God, unless Divine +things were brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The +third reason is for the sake of certitude. For human reason is very +deficient in things concerning God. A sign of this is that +philosophers in their researches, by natural investigation, into +human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among +themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge +of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine +matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, +as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie. + +Reply Obj. 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind +for the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved +by reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed. + +Reply Obj. 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and +about the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can +be an object of faith for another, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 5). + +Reply Obj. 3: Although all things that can be known by science are +of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to +beatitude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 5] + +Whether Man Is Bound to Believe Anything Explicitly? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything +explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it +is not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written +(Rom. 10:14, 15): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not +heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they +preach unless they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe +anything explicitly. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we +by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity, and +it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the +precept of Our Lord (Matt. 5:39): "If one strike thee on one [Vulg.: +'thy right'] cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others of the +same kind, according to Augustine's exposition (De Serm. Dom. in +Monte xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything +explicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God +proposes to be believed. + +Obj. 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according +to Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Now the +virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed +precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according +to Ps. 118:60: "I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy +commandments." Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man +should be ready to believe whatever God may propose, without his +believing anything explicitly. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God, +must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." + +_I answer that,_ The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to +fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining +salvation. Now an act of virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5) +depends on the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things +may be considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is +the proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is +accidental and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it +belongs properly and directly to the object of fortitude, to face the +dangers of death, and to charge at the foe with danger to oneself, +for the sake of the common good: yet that, in a just war, a man be +armed, or strike another with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to +the object of fortitude, but indirectly. + +Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of +a precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate +in its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the +fulfilment of the precept does not require that a virtuous act should +terminate in those things which have an accidental or secondary +relation to the proper and direct object of that virtue, except in +certain places and at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the +direct object of faith is that whereby man is made one of the +Blessed, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8): while the indirect and +secondary object comprises all things delivered by God to us in Holy +Writ, for instance that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son +of Jesse, and so forth. + +Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is +bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to +other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, +but only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he +is prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine +Scriptures. Then alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly, +when it is clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of +faith. + +Reply Obj. 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a man's +power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound +to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing +grace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe +the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for +this help "to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully +given; and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a +punishment of a previous, or at least of original, sin," as Augustine +states (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi [*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct. +viii.]). + +Reply Obj. 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable things +which are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely, God +and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity +which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly speaking, +in the will; hence promptness of the will subject to authority, +suffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper and +direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental +or consequent to that proper and direct object. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 6] + +Whether All Are Equally Bound to Have Explicit Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all are equally bound to have +explicit faith. For all are bound to those things which are necessary +for salvation, as is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is +necessary for salvation that certain things should be believed +explicitly. Therefore all are equally bound to have explicit faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he is +not bound to believe. But simple persons are sometimes tested in +reference to the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are +bound to believe everything explicitly. + +Obj. 3: Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but +only implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the faith +of the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the +learned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have +explicit faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have +explicit faith. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 1:14): "The oxen were +ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them," because, as Gregory +expounds this passage (Moral. ii, 17), the simple, who are signified +by the asses, ought, in matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who +are denoted by the oxen. + +_I answer that,_ The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of +Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural reason. Now +Divine revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are +over them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the +angels, and to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius +explains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding +of faith must needs reach men of lower degree through those of higher +degree. Consequently, just as the higher angels, who enlighten those +who are below them, have a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the +lower angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of +higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under +obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to +believe them more explicitly. + +Reply Obj. 1: The unfolding of the articles of faith is not equally +necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher degree, +whose duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe explicitly +more things than others are. + +Reply Obj. 2: Simple persons should not be put to the test about +subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been +corrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple +people in such questions. If, however, it is found that they are free +from obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to +their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs. + +Reply Obj. 3: The simple have no faith implied in that of the +learned, except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine +teaching. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of +me, as I also am of Christ." Hence it is not human knowledge, but the +Divine truth that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned +stray from this rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple ones, +who think that the learned believe aright; unless the simple hold +obstinately to their individual errors, against the faith of the +universal Church, which cannot err, since Our Lord said (Luke 22:32): +"I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not." +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 7] + +Whether It Is Necessary for the Salvation of All, That They Should +Believe Explicitly in the Mystery of Christ? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for the salvation +of all that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ. +For man is not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are +ignorant about: since the unfolding of faith is the result of Divine +revelation, which reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above +(A. 6; I, Q. 111, A. 1). Now even the angels were in ignorance of the +mystery of the Incarnation: hence, according to the commentary of +Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they who ask (Ps. 23:8): "Who is +this king of glory?" and (Isa. 63:1): "Who is this that cometh from +Edom?" Therefore men were not bound to believe explicitly in the +mystery of Christ's Incarnation. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is evident that John the Baptist was one of the +teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him (Matt. 11:11) that +"there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater +than" he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to have known the +mystery of Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (Matt. 11:3): +"Art Thou He that art to come, or look we for another?" Therefore +even the teachers were not bound to explicit faith in Christ. + +Obj. 3: Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the +ministry of the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it +would seem that the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith +in Christ, since they received no revelation. Therefore it seems that +it was not necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly +in the mystery of Christ. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vii; Ep. cxc): +"Our faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young is +delivered from the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except +by the one Mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5; Q. 1, A. 8), the object of +faith includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man +obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and +Passion is the way by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written +(Acts 4:12): "There is no other name under heaven given to men, +whereby we must be saved." Therefore belief of some kind in the +mystery of Christ's Incarnation was necessary at all times and for +all persons, but this belief differed according to differences of +times and persons. The reason of this is that before the state of +sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ's Incarnation, in so far as +it was intended for the consummation of glory, but not as it was +intended to deliver man from sin by the Passion and Resurrection, +since man had no foreknowledge of his future sin. He does, however, +seem to have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from the +fact that he said (Gen. 2:24): "Wherefore a man shall leave father +and mother, and shall cleave to his wife," of which the Apostle says +(Eph. 5:32) that "this is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the +Church," and it is incredible that the first man was ignorant about +this sacrament. + +But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the +Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the +human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else, +have foreshadowed Christ's Passion by certain sacrifices both before +and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the +learned explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those +sacrifices, believed them to be ordained by God in reference to +Christ's coming, and thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so +to speak. And, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7), the nearer they were to +Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ's mysteries. + +After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound +to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards +those which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly +proclaimed, such as the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of +which we have spoken above (Q. 1, A. 8). As to other minute points in +reference to the articles of the Incarnation, men have been bound to +believe them more or less explicitly according to each one's state +and office. + +Reply Obj. 1: The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not entirely +hidden from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v, 19), +yet certain aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ +revealed them to them. + +Reply Obj. 2: It was not through ignorance that John the Baptist +inquired of Christ's advent in the flesh, since he had clearly +professed his belief therein, saying: "I saw, and I gave testimony, +that this is the Son of God" (John 1:34). Hence he did not say: "Art +Thou He that hast come?" but "Art Thou He that art to come?" thus +saying about the future, not about the past. Likewise it is not to be +believed that he was ignorant of Christ's future Passion, for he had +already said (John 1:39): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who +taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world," thus foretelling +His future immolation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as +may be seen especially in Isaias 53. We may therefore say with +Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked this question, being in +ignorance as to whether Christ would descend into hell in His own +Person. But he did not ignore the fact that the power of Christ's +Passion would be extended to those who were detained in Limbo, +according to Zech. 9:11: "Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament +hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no +water"; nor was he bound to believe explicitly, before its +fulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither Himself. + +It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on +Luke 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from +devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he +inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his +disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the +latter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing +to the signs of His works. + +Reply Obj. 3: Many of the gentiles received revelations of Christ, as +is clear from their predictions. Thus we read (Job 19:25): "I know +that my Redeemer liveth." The Sibyl too foretold certain things about +Christ, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we +read in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine +Augustus and his mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a +man on whose breast was a golden plate with the inscription: "Christ +shall be born of a virgin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the +lifetime of Irene and Constantine, thou shalt see me again" [*Cf. +Baron, Annal., A.D. 780]. If, however, some were saved without +receiving any revelation, they were not saved without faith in a +Mediator, for, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they +did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in Divine +providence, since they believed that God would deliver mankind in +whatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the revelation of +the Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: "Who +teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth." +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 8] + +Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Explicitly in the +Trinity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to +believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): +"He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to +them that seek Him." Now one can believe this without believing in the +Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the +Trinity. + +Obj. 2: Further our Lord said (John 17:5, 6): "Father, I have +manifested Thy name to men," which words Augustine expounds (Tract. +cvi) as follows: "Not the name by which Thou art called God, but the +name whereby Thou art called My Father," and further on he adds: "In +that He made this world, God is known to all nations; in that He is +not to be worshipped together with false gods, 'God is known in +Judea'; but, in that He is the Father of this Christ, through Whom He +takes away the sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name +of His, which hitherto they knew not." Therefore before the coming of +Christ it was not known that Paternity and Filiation were in the +Godhead: and so the Trinity was not believed explicitly. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of God +is the object of heavenly happiness. Now the object of heavenly +happiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in +God, without any distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not +necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity. + +_On the contrary,_ In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is +expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is +written in manifestation of the Trinity: "Let us make man to Our image +and likeness" (Gen. 1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was +necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity. + +_I answer that,_ It is impossible to believe explicitly in the +mystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of +Christ includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the +world through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He was +conceived by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the +mystery of Christ was believed explicitly by the learned, but +implicitly and under a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too was +it with the mystery of the Trinity. And consequently, when once grace +had been revealed, all were bound to explicit faith in the mystery of +the Trinity: and all who are born again in Christ, have this bestowed +on them by the invocation of the Trinity, according to Matt. 28:19: +"Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of +the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." + +Reply Obj. 1: Explicit faith in those two things was necessary at all +times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times and +for all people. + +Reply Obj. 2: Before Christ's coming, faith in the Trinity lay hidden +in the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles it +was shown to the world. + +Reply Obj. 3: God's sovereign goodness as we understand it now +through its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of +Persons: but as understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it +cannot be understood without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the +mission of the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 9] + +Whether to Believe Is Meritorious? + +Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not meritorious. For +the principle of all merit is charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 114, +A. 4). Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore, +just as an act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by +our natural gifts, so neither is an act of faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific +knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known +[*Science is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through +its demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not +meritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is +not meritorious. + +Obj. 3: Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a +sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a +sufficient motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any +merit on his part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to +believe: whereas if he has not a sufficient motive for believing, +this is a mark of levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: "He that is +hasty to give credit, is light of heart," so that, seemingly, he +gains no merit thereby. Therefore to believe is by no means +meritorious. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the saints "by +faith . . . obtained promises," which would not be the case if they +did not merit by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, AA. 3, 4), our +actions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will +moved with grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from +the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the +act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine +truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that +it is subject to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently +the act of faith can be meritorious. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nature is compared to charity which is the principle of +merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to charity as the +disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that +the subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the form, nor +can a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but after +the advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding +disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the chief principle +of action, even as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial +form of fire. Accordingly neither nature nor faith can, without +charity, produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity, +the act of faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of +nature, and a natural act of the free-will. + +Reply Obj. 2: Two things may be considered in science: namely the +scientist's assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of that +fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will, because +the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration, +wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual +consideration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to his +free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to consider. +Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred +to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the good of our +neighbor. On the other hand, in the case of faith, both these things +are subject to the free-will so that in both respects the act of +faith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion, there is no +firm assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes +(Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a perfect +act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the assent, it does +not appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards the +actual consideration. + +Reply Obj. 3: The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for +he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by +miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine +invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however, +sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose +the merit. +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 10] + +Whether Reasons in Support of What We Believe Lessen the Merit of +Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe +lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) +that "there is no merit in believing what is shown by reason." If, +therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith +is altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human +reasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes the merit of +believing. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens +the amount of merit, since "happiness is the reward of virtue," as +the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to +diminish the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential +to faith to be about the unseen, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). +Now the more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it unseen. +Therefore human reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the +merit of faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an +inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether +it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a +man to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so. +Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 3:15): "Being ready always to +satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg.: 'Of +that hope which is in you.' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken +from Bede.] and hope which is in you." Now the Apostle would not give +this advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith. +Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9), the act of faith can be +meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to +the use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of +what we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the +believer. First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance, +when a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, +unless he be moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason +diminishes the merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above +(I-II, Q. 24, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 77, A. 6, ad 2) that, in moral virtues, +a passion which precedes choice makes the virtuous act less +praiseworthy. For just as a man ought to perform acts of moral +virtue, on account of the judgment of his reason, and not on account +of a passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not on account +of human reason, but on account of the Divine authority. Secondly, +human reasons may be consequent to the will of the believer. For when +a man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he +thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support +thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude the merit of +faith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again, in moral virtues a +consequent passion is the sign of a more prompt will, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 24, A. 3, ad 1). We have an indication of this in the words +of the Samaritans to the woman, who is a type of human reason: "We +now believe, not for thy saying" (John 4:42). + +Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has no +will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons. +But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the +authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration +of some of them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith +is not, for that reason, lost or diminished. + +Reply Obj. 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support of +the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring +intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not +cease to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing +that what faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do +not diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand, +though demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith +[*The Leonine Edition reads: 'in support of matters of faith which +are however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,' etc.], +but not of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith, +since they make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not +diminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready to +believe them, even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit +is not diminished. + +Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it consist +in a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the merit +of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and firm +in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through not +renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise have +greater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on account +of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in +opposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to +faith, do not always diminish the promptness of the will to believe, +and therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 3 + +OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith: +under which head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether confession is an act of faith? + +(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 3, Art. 1] + +Whether Confession Is an Act of Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith. +For the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession +belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act +of faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of +confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph. +6:19) asks for prayers that it may be granted him "with confidence, +to make known the mystery of the gospel." Now it belongs to +fortitude, which moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from +doing good on account of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that +confession is not an act of faith, but rather of fortitude or +constancy. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess one's +faith outwardly, so does it make one do other external good works, +for it is written (Gal. 5:6) that "faith . . . worketh by charity." +But other external works are not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore +neither is confession an act of faith. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss explains the words of 2 Thess. 1:11, "and +the work of faith in power" as referring to "confession which is a +work proper to faith." + +_I answer that,_ Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to +whose end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred +specifically to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh, +and consequently it is an act of abstinence. + +Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred +specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according +to 2 Cor. 4:13: "Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe, +and therefore we speak also." For the outward utterance is intended +to signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought +of matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the +outward confession of them. + +Reply Obj. 1: A threefold confession is commended by the Scriptures. +One is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a proper act +of faith, since it is referred to the end of faith as stated above. +Another is the confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is an +act of "latria," for its purpose is to give outward honor to God, +which is the end of "latria." The third is the confession of sins, +which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is the end of +penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs. + +Reply Obj. 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct, but an +indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4). Hence +fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith, viz. +fear or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession, but +an indirect cause so to speak. + +Reply Obj. 3: Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all +outward acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding, +but not eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession +as its proper act, without the help of any other virtue. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 3, Art. 2] + +Whether Confession of Faith Is Necessary for Salvation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary +for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if +it is a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of +faith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can +be realized without any outward confession. Therefore confession of +faith is not necessary for salvation. + +Obj. 2: Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his +faith to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have +to instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple +folk are not bound to confess the faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb others, +is not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:32): +"Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church +of God." Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance among +unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 10:10): "With the heart we +believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto +salvation." + +_I answer that,_ Things that are necessary for salvation come under +the precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is +something affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept. +Hence its necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an +affirmative precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as +stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 5, ad 3; I-II, Q. 88, A. 1, ad 2) do +not bind for always, although they are always binding; but they bind +as to place and time according to other due circumstances, in respect +of which human acts have to be regulated in order to be acts of +virtue. + +Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at +all times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain +times, when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of +due honor, or our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him: +for instance, if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to +remain silent, so as to make people believe either that he is without +faith, or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others away from +the faith; for in such cases as these, confession of faith is +necessary for salvation. + +Reply Obj. 1: The end of faith, even as of the other virtues, must +be referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and our +neighbor. Consequently when God's honor and our neighbor's good +demand, man should not be contented with being united by faith to +God's truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly. + +Reply Obj. 2: In cases of necessity where faith is in danger, every +one is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good +example and encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check +the attacks of unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty +of all the faithful to instruct others in the faith. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is nothing commendable in making a public +confession of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among +unbelievers, without any profit either to the faith or to the +faithful. Hence Our Lord said (Matt. 7:6): "Give not that which is +holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine . . . lest +turning upon you, they tear you." Yet, if there is hope of profit to +the faith, or if there be urgency, a man should disregard the +disturbance of unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it +is written (Matt. 15:12) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord +that "the Pharisee, when they heard this word, were scandalized," He +answered: "Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 4 + +OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first +place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the +cause of faith; fourthly, its effects. + +Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) What is faith? + +(2) In what power of the soul does it reside? + +(3) Whether its form is charity? + +(4) Whether living (_formata_) faith and lifeless (_informis_) faith +are one identically? + +(5) Whether faith is a virtue? + +(6) Whether it is one virtue? + +(7) Of its relation to the other virtues; + +(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the +intellectual virtues. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 1] + +Whether This Is a Fitting Definition of Faith: "Faith Is the +Substance of Things to Be Hoped For, the Evidence of Things That +Appear Not?" + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting +definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance +of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." +For no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it +is a theological virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). +Therefore it is not a substance. + +Obj. 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things +to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should not be +included in a definition of faith, as though they were its object. + +Obj. 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope, +since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on (A. +3). Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing +to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for. + +Obj. 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different +genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and +neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to +state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence." + +Obj. 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which +it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is +already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to +speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is +unfittingly defined. + +_On the contrary,_ The authority of the Apostle suffices. + +_I answer that,_ Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are +not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this +definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith +can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the +form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles +of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form. + +In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are +known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit, +should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object. +Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 2, 3), +which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the +will's command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object +of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the +intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a +theological virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 2), has one same +thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity, be +in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Q. 1, +AA. 1, 4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and +whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under +the aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the +act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to +the Apostle (Rom. 8:25): "We hope for that which we see not": because +to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has +already, but for what one has not, as stated above (I-II, Q. 67, A. +4). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is +the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the +substance of things to be hoped for." For we are wont to call by the +name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when +the whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first +beginning; for instance, we might say that the first self-evident +principles are the substance of science, because, to wit, these +principles are in us the first beginnings of science, the whole of +which is itself contained in them virtually. In this way then faith +is said to be the "substance of things to be hoped for," for the +reason that in us the first beginning of things to be hoped for is +brought about by the assent of faith, which contains virtually all +things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through +seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made +evident when we were speaking of happiness (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8; I-II, +Q. 4, A. 3). + +The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect, +considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words, +"evidence of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for +the result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere +to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the +non-apparent truth of faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another +reading has "conviction," because to wit, the intellect of the +believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it +sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to +the form of a definition, he may say that "faith is a habit of the +mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect +assent to what is non-apparent." + +In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to +the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish +it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect +adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that +appear not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the +object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the +substance of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of +faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the +beatitude we hope for. + +Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of +this one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in +Joan.: QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we +believe what we do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. +iv, 11) that "faith is an assent without research," and when others +say that "faith is that certainty of the mind about absent things +which surpasses opinion but falls short of science," these all amount +to the same as the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear +not"; and when Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid +foundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing +forth the truth in him," comes to the same as "substance of things to +be hoped for." + +Reply Obj. 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme genus +condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance +which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus +contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by +the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of +those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope, as we +shall prove further on (Q. 18, A. 1). For this reason the definition +of faith includes the object of hope. + +Reply Obj. 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the +present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so +adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of +the absent and the unseen. + +Reply Obj. 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the +definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor +different acts, but different relationships of one act to different +objects, as is clear from what has been said. + +Reply Obj. 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing, +make[s] it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority +does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence +referred to in the definition of faith. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 2] + +Whether Faith Resides in the Intellect? + +Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the +intellect. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith +resides in the believer's will." Now the will is a power distinct +from the intellect. Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect. + +Obj. 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds +from the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its +praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is +in the will, and not in the intellect. + +Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical. +Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not +concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in _De +Anima_ iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas +"faith . . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is +it in the practical intellect, the object of which is some true, +contingent thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith +is the Eternal Truth, as was shown above (Q. 1, A. 1). Therefore +faith does not reside in the intellect. + +_On the contrary,_ Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision, +according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark +manner; but then face to face." Now vision is in the intellect. +Therefore faith is likewise. + +_I answer that,_ Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be +perfect. Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active +principles, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not +possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the +art, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the +soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to act well +is a habit, as stated above (I-II, Q. 49, A. 4, ad 1, 2, 3). +Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected +by a habit residing in each of them. Again, it has been stated above +(Q. 2, AA. 1, 2) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch +as the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will +and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be +perfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be +perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the +intellect: even as there needs to be the habit of prudence in the +reason, besides the habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty, +in order that the act of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is +immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of that act +is "the true," which pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently +faith, which is the proper principle of that act, must needs reside +in the intellect. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which is +described as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his +intellect assents to matters of faith at the command of the will. + +Reply Obj. 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey but +also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command of +the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed +in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be a +habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the +assenting intellect. + +Reply Obj. 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as +evidenced by its object. But since this object, which is the First +Truth, is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves +(De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just as +"the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension" (De Anima +iii, 10). +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 3] + +Whether Charity Is the Form of Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith. +For each thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two +things are opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of +the other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of +a division, as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore +charity is not the form of faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are in +one subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in the +intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not the +form of faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now +obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of +believing, on the part of the will, according to Rom. 1:5: "For +obedience to the faith in all nations." Therefore obedience rather +than charity, is the form of faith. + +_On the contrary,_ Each thing works through its form. Now faith works +through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith. + +_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (I-II, Q. +1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 6), voluntary acts take their species from +their end which is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing +its species, is after the manner of a form in natural things. +Wherefore the form of any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to +which that act is directed, both because it takes its species +therefrom, and because the mode of an action should correspond +proportionately to the end. Now it is evident from what has been said +(A. 1), that the act of faith is directed to the object of the will, +i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which is the end of +faith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper object of charity. +Therefore charity is called the form of faith in so far as the act +of faith is perfected and formed by charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens +the act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being quickened by +different habits, so as to be reduced to various species in a certain +order, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2) +when we were treating of human acts in general. + +Reply Obj. 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But it is +not thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that it +quickens the act of faith, as explained above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other +virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity, as +we shall show further on (Q. 23, A. 8), and consequently charity is +spoken of as the form of faith. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 4] + +Whether Lifeless Faith Can Become Living, or Living Faith, Lifeless? + +Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become +living, or living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10, +"when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be +done away." Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living +faith. Therefore when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done +away, so that they are not one identical habit. + +Obj. 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now +lifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: "Faith without works +is dead." Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living. + +Obj. 3: Further, God's grace, by its advent, has no less effect in a +believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it +causes the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who +hitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of +faith in him. + +Obj. 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), "accidents +cannot be altered." Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same +faith cannot be at one time living, and at another, lifeless. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words, "Faith without works is dead" +(James 2:20) adds, "by which it lives once more." Therefore faith +which was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and +living. + +_I answer that,_ There have been various opinions on this question. +For some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that +living and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living +faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner, +when a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of +lifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting +that grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and +that a gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal +sin. + +Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have +said that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but +that, all the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless +faith is not taken away, and that it remains together with the habit +of living faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable +that the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person +having living faith. + +We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are +one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated +by that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a +perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which +pertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not +pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit +of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in +respect of something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in +respect of something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and +lifeless faith are not distinct habits. + +Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those imperfect +things from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when the +perfect comes the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the +advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially +"of the things that appear not." When, however, imperfection is not +inseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical thing which +was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man +and consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes +a man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental +thereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes +living. + +Reply Obj. 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an +animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul: +consequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living +and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which +gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith. +Hence there is no comparison. + +Reply Obj. 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to +be in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said +above (I, Q. 104, A. 1; I-II, Q. 109, A. 9) that God is always +working man's justification, even as the sun is always lighting up +the air. Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a +believer than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith +in both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter +by creating it anew. + +We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the +disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one +who has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin +does not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a +previous mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not +changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith +without charity, and at another time, with charity. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 5] + +Whether Faith Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue +is directed to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject +good," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is +directed to the true. Therefore faith is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue. +Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among the +acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, +3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species, as +stated above (A. 4). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since it is +not connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living +faith a virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct +from the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces +(1 Cor. 12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore +faith is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Man is justified by the virtues, since "justice +is all virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is +justified by faith according to Rom. 5:1: "Being justified therefore +by faith let us have peace," etc. Therefore faith is a virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As shown above, it is by human virtue that human +acts are rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle +of a good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living +faith. For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to +the truth at the command of the will, two things are required that +this act may be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should +infallibly tend to its object, which is the true; while the other is +that the will should be infallibly directed to the last end, on +account of which it assents to the true: and both of these are to be +found in the act of living faith. For it belongs to the very essence +of faith that the intellect should ever tend to the true, since +nothing false can be the object of faith, as proved above (Q. 1, A. +3): while the effect of charity, which is the form of faith, is that +the soul ever has its will directed to a good end. Therefore living +faith is a virtue. + +On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though +the act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the +intellect, it has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as +if temperance be in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the +rational part, temperance is not a virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. +65, A. 1), because the act of temperance requires both an act of +reason, and an act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of +faith requires an act of the will, and an act of the intellect. + +Reply Obj. 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it +is its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to some good +in so far as it directs the intellect to the true. Furthermore, it +has a relation to the good considered as the object of the will, +inasmuch as it is formed by charity. + +Reply Obj. 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on +human reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of necessity, +from its premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence such like +faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are +speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and +consequently its object cannot be anything false; so that faith of +this kind can be a virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically, +as though they belonged to different species. But they differ as +perfect and imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless faith, +being imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue, +for "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 18). + +Reply Obj. 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the +gratuitous graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason, +since the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are +not common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle +says: "There are diversities of graces," and again, "To one is given" +this grace and "to another" that. Now lifeless faith is common to all +members of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part of its +substance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must, +therefore, say that in that passage, faith denotes a certain +excellency of faith, for instance, "constancy in faith," according +to a gloss, or the "word of faith." + +Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain +pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss +on the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are +enumerated, explains faith as being "certainty about the unseen." +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 6] + +Whether Faith Is One Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith +is a gift of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge +are numbered among God's gifts according to Isa. 11:2. Now wisdom and +knowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and +knowledge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, +14, 15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and also about +some temporal things, it seems that faith is not one virtue, but +divided into several parts. + +Obj. 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q. +3, A. 1). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for all: +since what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet +to come, as appears from Isa. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive." +Therefore faith is not one. + +Obj. 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But one +accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one +faith. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): "One Lord, one faith." + +_I answer that,_ If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in +two ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one +faith. Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by +adhering to which we believe whatever is contained in the faith. +Secondly, on the part of the subject, and thus faith is +differentiated according as it is in various subjects. Now it is +evident that faith, just as any other habit, takes its species from +the formal aspect of its object, but is individualized by its +subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit whereby we believe, it +is one specifically, but differs numerically according to its various +subjects. + +If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed, +then, again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one +same thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in +believing, be diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to +one. + +Reply Obj. 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do +not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to something +eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). Hence +there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is +different with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and +eternal matters under their respective aspects. + +Reply Obj. 2: This difference of past and future arises, not from +any difference in the thing believed, but from the different +relationships of believers to the one thing believed, as also we +have mentioned above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 4; I-II, Q. 107, A. 1, ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of faith. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 7] + +Whether Faith Is the First of the Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues. +For a gloss on Luke 12:4, "I say to you My friends," says that +fortitude is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that +which is founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the +virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, "Be not emulous," says that hope +"leads on to faith." Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state further +on (Q. 17, A. 1). Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, it was stated above (A. 2) that the intellect of the +believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent to matters of +faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is not the +first virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation, as +a gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.]. +Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it +is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is +the foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the +first part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith. + +Obj. 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of acts. +Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected by +charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by +faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity +precedes faith. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the +substance of things to be hoped for." Now the substance of a thing is +that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues. + +_I answer that,_ One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by +its very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature, +precedes all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in +matters of action, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 3; I-II, Q. 34, +A. 4, ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last +end, must needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of +necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the +will, since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far +as it is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is +present in the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by +faith, the first of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith, +because natural knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly +bliss, which is the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards +Him. + +On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For +an accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which +removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the +Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be +said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove +obstacles to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that +hinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to +submit himself to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some +other virtues, although there are no real virtues, unless faith be +presupposed, as Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3). + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one cannot +hope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this possible, +since hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above (I-II, Q. +40, A. 1). It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to +persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this +sense that hope is said to lead to faith. + +Reply Obj. 3: Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes the +inclination of the will to fulfil God's commandments. In this way it +is not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue; +since all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law, +as stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 2); and thus it is requisite for +faith. In another way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the +commandments considered as a duty. In this way it is a special +virtue, and a part of justice: for a man does his duty by his +superior when he obeys him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby +man knows that God is his superior, Whom he must obey. + +Reply Obj. 4: To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come +first, but also to be connected with the other parts of the building: +since the building would not be founded on it unless the other parts +adhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is +charity, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things have charity +which is the bond of perfection." Consequently faith without charity +cannot be the foundation: and yet it does not follow that charity +precedes faith. + +Reply Obj. 5: Some act of the will is required before faith, but not +an act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes +faith, because the will cannot tend to God with perfect love, unless +the intellect possesses right faith about Him. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 8] + +Whether Faith Is More Certain Than Science and the Other Intellectual +Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than +science and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to +certitude, wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain, +through being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less +it has of an admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also +wisdom are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the +believer may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about +matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the +intellectual virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But "faith is +through hearing" according to Rom. 10:17; whereas understanding, +science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore +science and understanding are more certain than faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more +perfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than +faith, since faith is the way to understanding, according to another +version [*The Septuagint] of Isa. 7:9: "If you will not believe, you +shall not understand [Vulg.: 'continue']": and Augustine says (De +Trin. xiv, 1) that "faith is strengthened by science." Therefore it +seems that science or understanding is more certain than faith. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): "When you had +received of us the word of the hearing," i.e. by faith . . . "you +received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word +of God." Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore +science is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4, ad 2) two of the +intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and +art; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of +its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change, +whereas the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science +[*In English the corresponding 'gift' is called knowledge] and +understanding, are about necessary things, as stated above (I-II, Q. +57, A. 5, ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and +understanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual +virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2, 3); secondly, +for the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first +way, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First, +on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain +cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than +those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth, +whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason. +Secondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and +thus the more a man's intellect lays hold of a thing, the more +certain it is. In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of +faith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the +aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged +simply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with respect to a +disposition on the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more +certain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e. +for us. Likewise if these three be taken as gifts received in this +present life, they are related to faith as to their principle which +they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith is more certain. + +Reply Obj. 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith, +but on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith +with our intellect. + +Reply Obj. 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain than +hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear +greatly surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain +than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what +he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is +apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man +certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than +about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken. + +Reply Obj. 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more +perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater +clearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the +whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises +from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge +of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But in so far +as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they +are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the +certitude of God's word, on which faith is founded. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 5 + +OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are +four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their +original state? + +(2) Whether the demons have faith? + +(3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in +others? + +(4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 1] + +Whether There Was Faith in the Angels, or in Man, in Their Original +State? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there was no faith, either in the +angels, or in man, in their original state. For Hugh of S. Victor +says in his Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that "man cannot see God or +things that are in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation." +Now the angels, in their original state, before they were either +confirmed in grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes opened to +contemplation, since "they saw things in the Word," according to +Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Likewise the first man, while in the +state of innocence, seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for +Hugh St. Victor says (De Sacram. i, 6) that "in his original state +man knew his Creator, not by the mere outward perception of hearing, +but by inward inspiration, not as now believers seek an absent God by +faith, but by seeing Him clearly present to their contemplation." +Therefore there was no faith in the angels and man in their original +state. + +Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure, +according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "We see now through a glass in a dark +manner." Now in their original state there was not obscurity either +in the angels or in man, because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore +there could be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original +state. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 10:17) that "faith . . . +cometh by hearing." Now this could not apply to angels and man in +their original state; for then they could not hear anything from +another. Therefore, in that state, there was no faith either in man +or in the angels. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God, +must believe." Now the original state of angels and man was one of +approach to God. Therefore they had need of faith. + +_I answer that,_ Some say that there was no faith in the angels before +they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he +sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of +Divine things. Since, however, "faith is the evidence of things that +appear not," according to the Apostle (Heb. 11:2), and since "by faith +we believe what we see not," according to Augustine (Tract. xl in +Joan.; QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes +faith, which renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith. +Now the principal object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of +which gives the happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith. +Consequently, as the angels before their confirmation in grace, and +man before sin, did not possess the happiness whereby God is seen in +His Essence, it is evident that the knowledge they possessed was not +such as to exclude faith. + +It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be +explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith. +And if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as +some [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29] hold, perhaps one might hold +that there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in +grace, or in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses +not only a man's but even an angel's natural knowledge about God. + +Since, however, we stated in the First Part (Q. 62, A. 3; Q. 95, A. +1) that man and the angels were created with the gift of grace, we +must needs say that there was in them a certain beginning of +hoped-for happiness, by reason of grace received but not yet +consummated, which happiness was begun in their will by hope and +charity, and in the intellect by faith, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 7). +Consequently we must hold that the angels had faith before they were +confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we must observe +that in the object of faith, there is something formal, as it were, +namely the First Truth surpassing all the natural knowledge of a +creature, and something material, namely, the thing to which we +assent while adhering to the First Truth. With regard to the former, +before obtaining the happiness to come, faith is common to all who +have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: whereas with +regard to the things which are proposed as the material object of +faith, some are believed by one, and known manifestly by another, +even in the present state, as we have shown above (Q. 1, A. 5; Q. 2, +A. 4, ad 2). In this respect, too, it may be said that the angels +before being confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest +knowledge about certain points in the Divine mysteries, which now we +cannot know except by believing them. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the words of Hugh of S. Victor are those of a +master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be said that +the contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly +contemplation, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence. +Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before they were +confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet their contemplation was +of a higher order than ours, for by its means they approached nearer +to God, and had manifest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and +mysteries than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them +so that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: since by the light +of wisdom He was more present to them than He is to us, although He +was not so present to them as He is to the Blessed by the light of +glory. + +Reply Obj. 2: There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the +original state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural +obscurity in the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every +creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine +light: and this obscurity suffices for faith. + +Reply Obj. 3: In the original state there was no hearing anything +from man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring +inwardly: thus the prophets heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9: +"I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 2] + +Whether in the Demons There Is Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the demons have no faith. For +Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith depends on the +believer's will": and this is a good will, since by it man wishes to +believe in God. Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good, +as stated above (I, Q. 64, A. 2, ad 5), it seems that in the demons +there is no faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to Eph. +2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the gift +of God." Now, according to a gloss on Osee 3:1, "They look to strange +gods, and love the husks of the grapes," the demons lost their gifts +of grace by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons +after they sinned. + +Obj. 3: Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins, as +Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on John 15:22, "If I had +not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they +have no excuse for their sin." Now the sin of unbelief is in some +men. Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty +of a sin graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable. +Therefore in the demons there is no faith. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . . +believe and tremble." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 4; Q. 2, A. 1), the +believer's intellect assents to that which he believes, not because +he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident +principles, but because his will commands his intellect to assent. +Now, that the will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two +causes. First, through the will being directed to the good, and in +this way, to believe is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, because the +intellect is convinced that it ought to believe what is said, though +that conviction is not based on objective evidence. Thus if a +prophet, while preaching the word of God, were to foretell something, +and were to give a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the +intellect of a witness would be convinced so as to recognize clearly +that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the thing itself +foretold would not be evident in itself, and consequently the essence +of faith would not be removed. + +Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in +the faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not in the demons, +but only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby +they recognize that the teaching of the Church is from God, although +they do not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for +instance that there are three Persons in God, and so forth. + +Reply Obj. 1: The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe, by the +evidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for their +belief. + +Reply Obj. 2: Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to +believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when +that faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have, +is not a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through +their natural intellectual acumen. + +Reply Obj. 3: The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident, +that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so +that their malice is by no means diminished by their belief. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 3] + +Whether a Man Who Disbelieves One Article of Faith, Can Have Lifeless +Faith in the Other Articles? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article +of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the +natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a +catholic. Now a catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift of +faith in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it +seems that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the +gift of lifeless faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one +science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may +possess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, +and yet be ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe +some articles of faith without believing the others. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of +faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a +man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can +believe some articles, and disbelieve others. + +_On the contrary,_ Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is +disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does +not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does +faith, after a man disbelieves one article. + + _I answer that,_ Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a +heretic who disbelieves one article of faith. + +The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the +formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit +cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as +manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds +from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an +infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which +proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the +habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by +faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion +without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but +merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to +the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to +whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by +the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he +chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church +as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident +that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is +not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but +if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error. +Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article +has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in +accordance with his own will. + +Reply Obj. 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith, +about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful +does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order +to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds +the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment. + +Reply Obj. 2: The various conclusions of a science have their +respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without +another, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without +knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the +articles of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First +Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the +Church who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever +abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith. + +Reply Obj. 3: The various precepts of the Law may be referred either +to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept +without another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect +obedience to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one +commandment, according to James 2:10: "Whosoever shall . . . offend +in one point is become guilty of all." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 4] + +Whether Faith Can Be Greater in One Man Than in Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man +than in another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its +object. Now whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith, +since by failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as +stated above (A. 3). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater +in one than in another. + +Obj. 2: Further, those things which consist in something supreme +cannot be "more" or "less." Now faith consists in something supreme, +because it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above +all things. Therefore faith cannot be "more" or "less." + +Obj. 3: Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding +of principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of faith +are the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above +(Q. 1, A. 7). Now the understanding of principles is possessed in +equal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree +by all the faithful. + +_On the contrary,_ Wherever we find great and little, there we find +more or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little, +for Our Lord said to Peter (Matt. 14:31): "O thou of little faith, +why didst thou doubt?" And to the woman he said (Matt. 15: 28): "O +woman, great is thy faith!" Therefore faith can be greater in one +than in another. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 52, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 112, +A. 4), the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of +view: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of its +participation by the subject. + +Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in +respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material +object which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of +faith is one and simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above (Q. +1, A. 1). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among +believers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above (Q. 4, +A. 6). But the things which are proposed as the matter of our belief +are many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in this +respect one man can believe explicitly more things than another, so +that faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more +explicit. + +If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of +its participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the +act of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as +stated above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2; Q. 4, A. 2). Consequently a man's faith +may be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his +intellect, on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in +another way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater +promptitude, devotion, or confidence. + +Reply Obj. 1: A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of +faith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly +believe all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. In +this respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the part of +the object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is essential to faith that one should give the first +place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit to +it with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way +faith is greater in one than in another. + +Reply Obj. 3: The understanding of principles results from man's very +nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from +the gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above +(I-II, Q. 112, A. 4). Hence the comparison fails. + +Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to +another, according to the greater capacity of intellect. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 6 + +OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are +two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether faith is infused into man by God? + +(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 1] + +Whether Faith Is Infused into Man by God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God. +For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us, +and nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which +science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. +Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion. + +Obj. 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing, +seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by +seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is +written (John 4:53): "The father . . . knew that it was at the same +hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, +and his whole house"; and (Rom. 10:17) it is said that "faith is +through hearing." Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which depends on a man's will can be acquired +by him. But "faith depends on the believer's will," according to +Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired +by man. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 2:8, 9): "By grace you are +saved through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man +may glory . . . for it is the gift of God." + +_I answer that,_ Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the +things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is +necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second +thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things +which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of +these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are +of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man's +knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed +by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the +apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in +sending preachers of the faith, according to Rom. 10:15: "How shall +they preach, unless they be sent?" + +As regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of +faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, +such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace +the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who +see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and +some do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves +man inwardly to assent to matters of faith. + +The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's +free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is +from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready +to assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of +faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. +But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, +is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some +supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. +Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of +faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace. + +Reply Obj. 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of +external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper +cause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument again refers to the cause that +proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to +believe by words or deeds. + +Reply Obj. 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the +believer: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in +order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as +stated above (Q. 2, A. 3). +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 2] + +Whether Lifeless Faith Is a Gift of God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God. +For it is written (Deut. 32:4) that "the works of God are perfect." Now +lifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of +God. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through +lacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless (_informis_) +when it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not +from God, as stated above (I-II, Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore +neither is lifeless faith from God. + +Obj. 3: Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is +written (John 7:23): "If a man receive circumcision on the +sabbath-day, that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry +at Me because I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?" Now +faith heals man from unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God +the gift of faith, is at the same time healed from all his sins. But +this is not done except by living faith. Therefore living faith alone +is a gift of God: and consequently lifeless faith is not from God. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on 1 Cor. 13:2 says that "the faith which +lacks charity is a gift of God." Now this is lifeless faith. +Therefore lifeless faith is a gift of God. + +_I answer that,_ Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted +that privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas +sometimes it is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of +its proper species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the +humors is essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not +essential to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since, +therefore, when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign +the cause of that thing as existing in its proper species, it follows +that what is not the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the +cause of the thing to which that privation belongs as being essential +to its species. For we cannot assign as the cause of a sickness, +something which is not the cause of a disturbance in the humors: +though we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something which +is not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the +diaphanous body. + +Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of +faith, since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic +form, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 4). Consequently the cause of lifeless +faith is that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this +is God, as stated above (A. 1). It follows, therefore, that +lifeless faith is a gift of God. + +Reply Obj. 1: Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with +the perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a +perfection that suffices for the essential notion of faith. + +Reply Obj. 2: The deformity of an act is essential to the act's +species, considered as a moral act, as stated above (I, Q. 48, A. 1, +ad 2; I-II, Q. 18, A. 5): for an act is said to be deformed through +being deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of +the act's circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of +a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though He +is the cause of the act as such. + +We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a +due form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is +compared to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the +deformed act is not from God, so neither is a false faith; and as +lifeless faith is from God, so too, acts that are good generically, +though not quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in +sinners, are from God. + +Reply Obj. 3: He who receives faith from God without charity, is +healed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous +unbelief is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing +from committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that +a man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to +desist, without desisting from another act of sin, through the +instigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is +granted by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the +gift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like, is given +to some without charity. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 7 + +OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there +are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether fear is an effect of faith? + +(2) Whether the heart is purified by faith? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 7, Art. 1] + +Whether Fear Is an Effect of Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith. For +an effect does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for it +is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him." +Therefore fear is not an effect of faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. Now +fear and hope are contraries, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2): +and faith begets hope, as a gloss observes on Matt. 1:2. Therefore +fear is not an effect of faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, one contrary does not cause another. Now the object +of faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object of +fear is an evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 1). Again, acts +take their species from the object, according to what was stated +above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . . +believe and tremble." + +_I answer that,_ Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 41, A. 1). Now the principle of all appetitive +movements is the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the +principle of fear and of every appetitive movement must be an +apprehension. Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension +of certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with the +Divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of the fear +whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and this is servile fear. + +It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be +separated from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself to +Him, and holds Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate +God as an unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the +greatest evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of +the first fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith is the cause, while +living faith is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it +makes man adhere to God and to be subject to Him by charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith, because if +we knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and +punishments, concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear +Him. If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain +articles of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then +reverential fear follows, the result of which is that man submits his +intellect to God, so as to believe in all the Divine promises. Hence +the text quoted continues: "And your reward shall not be made void." + +Reply Obj. 2: The same thing in respect of contraries can be the +cause of contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith begets +hope, in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which God +awards to the just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it +makes us appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on +sinners. + +Reply Obj. 3: The primary and formal object of faith is the good +which is the First Truth; but the material object of faith includes +also certain evils; for instance, that it is an evil either not to +submit to God, or to be separated from Him, and that sinners will +suffer penal evils from God: in this way faith can be the cause of +fear. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 7, Art. 2] + +Whether Faith Has the Effect of Purifying the Heart? + +Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For +purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith +is in the intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying +the heart. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible with +impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may be +seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not +purify the heart. + +Obj. 3: Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any way, +it would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not purify +the intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge. +Therefore faith nowise purifies the heart. + +_On the contrary,_ Peter said (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their hearts by +faith." + +_I answer that,_ A thing is impure through being mixed with baser +things: for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which +betters it, but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that +the rational creature is more excellent than all transient and +corporeal creatures; so that it becomes impure through subjecting +itself to transient things by loving them. From this impurity the +rational creature is purified by means of a contrary movement, +namely, by tending to that which is above it, viz. God. The first +beginning of this movement is faith: since "he that cometh to God +must believe that He is," according to Heb. 11:6. Hence the first +beginning of the heart's purifying is faith; and if this be perfected +through being quickened by charity, the heart will be perfectly +purified thereby. + +Reply Obj. 1: Things that are in the intellect are the principles of +those which are in the appetite, in so far as the apprehended good +moves the appetite. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity which +is contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the +human intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself, +through wishing to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible +objects. But when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible +with any kind of impurity, because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov. +10:12). + +Reply Obj. 3: The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity +of sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect, +according to the present state of life. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 8 + +OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider the gifts of understanding and knowledge, which +respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of +understanding there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost? + +(2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person? + +(3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is +only speculative, or practical also? + +(4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of +understanding? + +(5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace? + +(6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other +gifts. + +(7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift? + +(8) Which of the fruits? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 1] + +Whether Understanding Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost? + +Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the +Holy Ghost. For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of +nature, since they are given in addition to the latter. Now +understanding is a natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident +principles are known, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 6. Therefore it should +not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures according +to their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now +the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a +sign of understanding), but discursively (which is a sign of reason), +as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine knowledge +which is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason rather +than a gift of understanding. + +Obj. 3: Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is +condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9, 10). Now no gift of the Holy +Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost +should receive the name of understanding. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord +shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding." + +_I answer that,_ Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for +"intelligere" [to understand] is the same as "intus legere" [to read +inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference +between intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned +with external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge +penetrates into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the +intellect is "what a thing is," as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 6. + +Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find +which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under +the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under +words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the +truth they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is +enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is +perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and +vice versa. Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all +these things. + +Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things +as it were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the +understanding, the further can it penetrate into the heart of things. +Now the natural light of our understanding is of finite power; +wherefore it can reach to a certain fixed point. Consequently man +needs a supernatural light in order to penetrate further still so +as to know what it cannot know by its natural light: and this +supernatural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift of +understanding. + +Reply Obj. 1: The natural light instilled within us, manifests only +certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since man +is ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q. 2, A. 3; +I-II, Q. 3, A. 8), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for +which he requires the gift of understanding. + +Reply Obj. 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an +understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by +proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of +reason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we +ignored. Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something +previously understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the +light of nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore +this addition is not called "reason" but "understanding," since the +additional light is in comparison with what we know supernaturally, +what the natural light is in regard to those things which we know +from the first. + +Reply Obj. 3: "Will" denotes simply a movement of the appetite +without indicating any excellence; whereas "understanding" denotes a +certain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of +things. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding +rather than after the will. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 2] + +Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Compatible with Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is +incompatible with faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15) +that "the thing which is understood is bounded by the comprehension +of him who understands it." But the thing which is believed is not +comprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippians +3:12: "Not as though I had already comprehended [Douay: 'attained'], +or were already perfect." Therefore it seems that faith and +understanding are incompatible in the same subject. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is understood is seen by the understanding. +But faith is of things that appear not, as stated above (Q. 1, A. +4; Q. 4, A. 1). Therefore faith is incompatible with understanding +in the same subject. + +Obj. 3: Further, understanding is more certain than science. But +science and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated +above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Much less, therefore, can understanding +and faith be in the same subject. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding +enlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard." Now one who +has faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard; +thus it is written (Luke 24:27, 32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures +to His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore +understanding is compatible with faith. + +_I answer that,_ We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on +the side of faith, the other on the part of understanding. + +On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain +things, of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery +to three Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son; +whereas other things come under faith, through being subordinate, in +one way or another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that +is contained in the Divine Scriptures. + +On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that +there are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way, +we understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the +essence of the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in +itself of the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the +state of faith lasts, we cannot understand those things which are the +direct object of faith: although certain other things that are +subordinate to faith can be understood even in this way. + +In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of +a thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity +or mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward +appearances, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we +understand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the +sake of things that appear externally. In this way, even during the +state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those +things which are the direct object of faith. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three +argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to +the understanding of matters subordinate to faith. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 3] + +Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Merely Speculative or Also +Practical? + +Objection 1: It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of +the Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according +to Gregory (Moral. i, 32), "understanding penetrates certain more +exalted things." But the practical intellect is occupied, not with +exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions +are concerned. Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not +practical. + +Obj. 2: Further, the gift of understanding is something more +excellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the +intellectual virtue of understanding is concerned with none but +necessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much +more, therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but +necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about necessary +things, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and +which may result from man's activity. Therefore the gift of +understanding is not practical. + +Obj. 3: Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in +matters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with +which the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural +reason, which is the directing principle in matters of action, as was +made clear above (I-II, Q. 58, A. 2; I-II, Q. 71, A. 6). Therefore +the gift of understanding is not practical. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 110:10): "A good understanding +to all that do it." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the gift of understanding is +not only about those things which come under faith first and +principally, but also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good +actions have a certain relationship to faith: since "faith worketh +through charity," according to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift +of understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though these +were its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our actions +is the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by +the gift of understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting +it, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7). + +Reply Obj. 1: The things with which human actions are concerned are +not surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred +to the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness, +they are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding. + +Reply Obj. 2: The excellence of the gift of understanding consists +precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not only +as they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is +the more excellent, according to the greater extent of its object. + +Reply Obj. 3: The rule of human actions is the human reason and the +eternal law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6). Now the eternal law +surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as +ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and requires +the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 4] + +Whether the Gift of Understanding Is in All Who Are in a State of +Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in +all who are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) +that "the gift of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness +of mind." Now many who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of +mind. Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a +state of grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, of all the things that are connected with knowledge, +faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by faith +Christ dwells in our hearts, according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift of +understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who +have faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says +(De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not +necessary for salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in +a state of grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, those things which are common to all who are in a +state of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of +understanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself +profitably, for, at times, "when the mind is puffed up with +understanding sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base +and vile things," as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the +gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 81:5): "They have not known or +understood, they walk on in darkness." But no one who is in a state +of grace walks in darkness, according to John 8:12: "He that +followeth Me, walketh not in darkness." Therefore no one who is in a +state of grace is without the gift of understanding. + +_I answer that,_ In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs +be rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man's will for good, +according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will +cannot be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some +knowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good +understood, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy +Ghost directs man's will by the gift of charity, so as to move it +directly to some supernatural good; so also, by the gift of +understanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that it knows some +supernatural truth, to which the right will needs to tend. + +Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have +sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer dulness of +mind with regard to things that are not necessary for salvation; but +with regard to those that are necessary for salvation, they are +sufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 John 2:27: +"His unction teacheth you of all things." + +Reply Obj. 2: Although not all who have faith understand fully the +things that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that +they ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate +from them. + +Reply Obj. 3: With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift +of understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in order +that they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes +with regard to other things, so that their mind is unable to +penetrate all things clearly. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 5] + +Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Found Also in Those Who Have Not +Sanctifying Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is found +also in those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in +expounding the words of Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for +Thy justifications," says: "Understanding flies ahead, and man's will +is weak and slow to follow." But in all who have sanctifying grace, +the will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of +understanding can be in those who have not sanctifying grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of +understanding in a" prophetic "vision," so that, seemingly, there is +no prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be +prophecy without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Matt. 7:22, where +those who say: "We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg.: 'Have we not +prophesied in Thy name?']," are answered with the words: "I never knew +you." Therefore the gift of understanding can be without sanctifying +grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue +of faith, according to Isa. 7:9, following another reading [*The +Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand." +Now faith can be without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of +understanding can be without it. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 6:45): "Every one that hath +heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now it is by +the intellect, as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn +or understand what we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of +understanding, cometh to Christ, which is impossible without +sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be +without sanctifying grace. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2) the gifts of +the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the +motion of the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of +grace is called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's +understanding is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of +which movement depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore +unless the human intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to +have a right estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of +understanding, however much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in +regard to other truths that are preambles to the faith. + +Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in +error about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest +good: and no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in +moral matters a man has a right estimate about the end through a habit +of virtue. Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without +sanctifying grace. + +Reply Obj. 1: By understanding Augustine means any kind of +intellectual light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions +of a gift, unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a +right estimate about the end. + +Reply Obj. 2: The understanding that is requisite for prophecy, is a +kind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things revealed +to the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind with +regard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs to the +gift of understanding. + +Reply Obj. 3: Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed but +understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which +perception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard +the end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between +understanding and faith. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 6] + +Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Distinct from the Other Gifts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not +distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between +things whose opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to +folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to +rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states +(Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference between +folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does +understanding differ from the other gifts. + +Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs +from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be +about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not +about any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first +principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally +self-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as +are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first +principles in supernatural knowledge, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7). +Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other +intellectual gifts. + +Obj. 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or +practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as +stated above (A. 3). Therefore it is not distinct from the other +intellectual gifts, but comprises them all. + +_On the contrary,_ When several things are enumerated together they +must be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction +is the origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated +together with the other gifts, as appears from Isa. 11:2. Therefore +the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts. + +_I answer that,_ The difference between the gift of understanding and +three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident, +since the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while +the three belong to the appetitive power. + +But the difference between this gift of understanding and the +remaining three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also +belong to the cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William +of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of +understanding differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in +that these two belong to practical knowledge, while the gift of +understanding belongs to speculative knowledge; and that it differs +from the gift of wisdom, which also belongs to speculative knowledge, +in that wisdom is concerned with judgment, while understanding +renders the mind apt to grasp the things that are proposed, and to +penetrate into their very heart. And in this sense we have assigned +the number of the gifts, above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4). + +But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is +concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters, +as stated above (A. 3), and likewise, the gift of knowledge regards +both matters, as we shall show further on (Q. 9, A. 3), and +consequently, we must take their distinction in some other way. For +all these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which, +in us, takes its foundation from faith. Now "faith is through +hearing" (Rom. 10:17). Hence some things must be proposed to be +believed by man, not as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by +faith. But faith, first and principally, is about the First Truth, +secondarily, about certain considerations concerning creatures, and +furthermore extends to the direction of human actions, in so far as +it works through charity, as appears from what has been said above +(Q. 4, A. 2, ad 3). + +Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief, +two things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated +or grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of +understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these +things aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these +things, and to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with +regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard +to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its +application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel. + +Reply Obj. 1: The foregoing difference between those four gifts is +clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which +Gregory assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to +sharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp, +when it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are +proposed to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind +unable to pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a +fool if he judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore +folly is properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright +about the universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind, +even about any particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to +knowledge, which gives man a right judgment about particular causes, +viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to counsel, whereby +man does not proceed to action before deliberating with his reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: The gift of understanding is about the first principles +of that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise than +faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it +belongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the +things that are said. + +Reply Obj. 3: The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of +knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment, +but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 7] + +Whether the Sixth Beatitude, "Blessed Are the Clean of Heart," etc., +Responds to the Gift of Understanding? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the +clean of heart, for they shall see God," does not respond to the gift +of understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly +to the appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the +appetite, but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the +aforesaid beatitude does not respond to the gift of understanding. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their +hearts by faith." Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart +being purified. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is related to +the virtue of faith rather than to the gift of understanding. + +Obj. 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the +present state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the +present life, since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed, +as stated above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8). Therefore the sixth beatitude +which comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of +understanding. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The +sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to +the clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye +hath not seen." + +_I answer that,_ Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as +also in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the +other by way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 69, AA. 2, 4), and each of these, in some way, responds +to the gift of understanding. + +For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to +seeing God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of inordinate +affections: and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and +gifts belonging to the appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart +is a kind of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of +the mind that is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the +truths which are proposed to it about God, no longer by way of +corporeal phantasms, nor infected with heretical misrepresentations: +and this cleanness is the result of the gift of understanding. + +Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God's +Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though we see not +what God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more +perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He +surpasses all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God +belongs to the gift of understanding; the first, to the gift of +understanding in its state of perfection, as possessed in heaven; the +second, to the gift of understanding in its state of inchoation, as +possessed by wayfarers. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two +arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while the third refers +to the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in +this life by way of inchoation, and will be fulfilled, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 69, A. 2). +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 8] + +Whether Faith, Among the Fruits, Responds to the Gift of +Understanding? + +Objection 1: It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not +respond to the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit +of faith, since it is written (Isa. 7:9) according to another reading +[*The Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not +understand," where our version has: "If you will not believe, you +shall not continue." Therefore fruit is not the fruit of +understanding. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what +follows. But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the +foundation of the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above (Q. 4, +AA. 1, 7). Therefore faith is not the fruit of understanding. + +Obj. 3: Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the +appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect; +namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite. +Therefore faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more +than to wisdom, knowledge or counsel. + +_On the contrary,_ The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of +understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith, +which certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says +that the "faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen." +Therefore faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of +understanding. + +_I answer that,_ The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above (I-II, Q. +70, A. 1), when we were discussing them, are so called because they +are something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of +the Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an +end, which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that +which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be, +after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to +the other powers. + +Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a +power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same +power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will. +In this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to +the gift of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while +the fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the +will. + +Reply Obj. 1: Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a virtue. +But we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind of +certitude of faith, to which man attains by the gift of understanding. + +Reply Obj. 2: Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it +would be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to be +believed, without understanding it in some way. However, the +perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith: which +perfection of understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty +of faith. + +Reply Obj. 3: The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist in that +very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for its own +sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand, +speculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is +the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which +belongs only to practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of +its own: while the gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge, +which can belongs also to speculative knowledge, have but one +corresponding fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith. +The reason why there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive +faculty, is because, as already stated, the character of end, which +the word fruit implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the +intellective part. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 9 + +OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are +four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether knowledge is a gift? + +(2) Whether it is about Divine things? + +(3) Whether it is speculative or practical? + +(4) Which beatitude responds to it? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 1] + +Whether Knowledge Is a Gift? + +Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the +gifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge +implies an effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says +(Poster. i, 2) that a "demonstration is a syllogism which produces +knowledge." Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy +persons, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 4; I-II, Q. 68, A. 5). Now +Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful lack +knowledge though they have faith." Therefore knowledge is not a gift. + +Obj. 3: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Therefore one gift suffices for +the perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds +to the virtue of faith, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 2). Therefore the +gift of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear +to which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are +perfections of virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2), it +seems that knowledge is not a gift. + +_On the contrary,_ Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Isa. +11:2). + +_I answer that,_ Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore, +does not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature. +Now, when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to +some truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth: +first, because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure +judgment on it. + +Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human +intellect may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of +these is that he should have a sound grasp of the things that are +proposed to be believed, and this pertains to the gift of +understanding, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 6): while the other is that +he should have a sure and right judgment on them, so as to discern +what is to be believed, from what is not to be believed, and for this +the gift of knowledge is required. + +Reply Obj. 1: Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures, +according to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms +a sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his +reason: and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative +reasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of +truth, without any discursive process, by simple intuition, as was +stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 7); wherefore God's knowledge is +not discursive, or argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which +that knowledge is likened which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it +is a participated likeness thereof. + +Reply Obj. 2: A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief. +One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning +things to be believed from things not to be believed: in this way +knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a +knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what +one ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to +induce others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This +knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not +given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted, +adds: "It is one thing for a man merely to know what he ought to +believe, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to the +godly, and to defend it against the ungodly." + +Reply Obj. 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and +intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the +theological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the +perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is +not unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological +virtue. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 2] + +Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is About Divine Things? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine +things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets, +nourishes and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things, +because its object is the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). +Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things. + +Obj. 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than +acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine +things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore +is the gift of knowledge about Divine things. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to Rom. 1:20, "the invisible things of God +. . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are +made." If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems +that there is also knowledge of Divine things. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge +of Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of +human affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge." + +_I answer that,_ A sure judgment about a thing is formed chiefly from +its cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the +order of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the +second, so ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed +through the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first +cause through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed +through the first cause, is the first and most perfect judgment. + +Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common +name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short +of the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most +perfect thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of +convertible terms, that which signifies "what a thing is," is given +the special name of "definition," but the convertible terms which +fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called "proper" +terms. + +Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment +as stated above (A. 1), if this certitude of the judgment is derived +from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is +wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows +the highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of +all matters by that cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who +knows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the +knowledge of Divine things is called "wisdom," while the knowledge +of human things is called "knowledge," this being the common name +denoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment +which is formed through second causes. Accordingly, if we take +knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom, +so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or created things. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet +faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence +to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge, +but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of +union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of +wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to God. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic +acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special +gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through +created things. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), every cognitive habit +regards formally the mean through which things are known, and +materially, the things that are known through the mean. And since +that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those +sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from +mathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical +sciences, though, as to their matter they have more in common with +physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated in _Phys._ ii, 2 +that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man knows God +through His creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to which +it belongs formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs +materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to +Divine things, this pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 3] + +Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is Practical Knowledge? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered +among the gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin. +xii, 14) that "knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we +make use of external things." But the knowledge which is concerned +about actions is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is +practical. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought if +it hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it +lacks the discernment of knowledge." Now it follows from this +authority that knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a +speculative science. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not +speculative but practical. + +Obj. 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the +righteous, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 5). But speculative knowledge +can be also in the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: "To +him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a +sin." Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but +practical. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge on her own +day prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in +the mind." Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds +of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of +knowledge is both speculative and practical. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 9, A. 8), the gift of knowledge, +like the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of +faith. Now faith consists primarily and principally in speculation, +in as much as it is founded on the First Truth. But since the First +Truth is also the last end for the sake of which our works are done, +hence it is that faith extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6: +"Faith . . . worketh by charity." + +The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and +principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what +he ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works, +since we are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of +faith, and of conclusions drawn therefrom. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge, in so +far as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge, yet +not action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety. + +Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. + +Reply Obj. 3: As we have already stated (Q. 8, A. 5) about the gift +of understanding, not everyone who understands, has the gift of +understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of grace: +and so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that +they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about matters +of faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as never +to wander from the straight path of justice. This is the knowledge of +holy things, according to Wis. 10:10: "She conducted the just . . . +through the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of holy +things." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 4] + +Whether the Third Beatitude, "Blessed Are They That Mourn," etc. +Corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the third beatitude, "Blessed are they +that mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even +as evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy. +Now knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter +is known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and +the crooked line" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude +does not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge. + +Obj. 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now +there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there +joy, since it is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no +bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness." +Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with +the gift of knowledge. + +Obj. 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation, +before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, +sorrow does not correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is +not concerned about things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii, +9). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to +correspond with the gift of knowledge. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): +"Knowledge befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been +mastered by the evil which he coveted as though it were good." + +_I answer that,_ Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to +knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God +is occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: "Creatures . . . are turned +to an abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of +those, namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they +deem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing +their last end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a +right judgment of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of +which they may be the occasion), which judgment he exercises through +the gift of knowledge. + +Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of +knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in +so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper +cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy +correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of +knowledge there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past +errors, and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right +judgment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this reason +sorrow is set forth in this beatitude, as the merit, and the +resulting consolation, as the reward; which is begun in this life, +and is perfected in the life to come. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he +may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers: +it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it +consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in +considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude +does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in +well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the +beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is +not ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are +about Divine things. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 10 + +OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL +(In Twelve Articles) + +In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief, +which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to +confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which +are contrary to knowledge and understanding. + +As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; +(2) heresy; (3) apostasy from the faith. + +Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether unbelief is a sin? + +(2) What is its subject? + +(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? + +(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin? + +(5) Of the species of unbelief; + +(6) Of their comparison, one with another; + +(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers? + +(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith? + +(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them? + +(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians? + +(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated? + +(12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against +their parents' will? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 1] + +Whether Unbelief Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin +is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now +unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De +Praedest. Sanct. v) that "to be capable to having faith, just as to be +capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have +faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful." +Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a +sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every +sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid unbelief, +for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says +(Rom. 10:14): "How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not +heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?" Therefore +unbelief does not seem to be a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), there are seven +capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not +seem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a +sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue, +and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of +pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because +he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of +opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the +faith, or despises it, according to Isa. 53:1: "Who hath believed our +report?" It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is +in this sense that unbelief is a sin. + +If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in +those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, +not of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine +things is a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like +unbelievers are damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot +be taken away without faith, but not on account of their sin of +unbelief. Hence Our Lord said (John 15:22) "If I had not come, and +spoken to them, they would not have sin"; which Augustine expounds +(Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as "referring to the sin whereby they +believed not in Christ." + +Reply Obj. 1: To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it +is part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his inner +instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way, +unbelief is contrary to nature. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure +negation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride, +through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules +of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence +Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumptuous innovations arise +from vainglory." + +It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not +reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices +opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital +vices. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 2] + +Whether Unbelief Is in the Intellect As Its Subject? + +Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as +its subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De +Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above (A. 1). +Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect. + +Obj. 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching +of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore unbelief +is in the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Cor. +11:14 "Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light," says +that if "a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for +a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does +or says what is becoming to a good angel." This seems to be because +of the rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel, +since his intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin +of unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and, +consequently, it does not reside in the intellect. + +_On the contrary,_ Things which are contrary to one another are in +the same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in +the intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2), sin is said +to be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a +sinful act may have two principles: one is its first and universal +principle, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will, +because every sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act +is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act: +thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and lust, +wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now +dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the +intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as assent is. + +Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate +subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which +way every sin is said to be in the will. + +Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear. + +Reply Obj. 2: The will's contempt causes the intellect's dissent, +which completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of unbelief +is in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one, does +not dissent from a matter of faith, because "his bodily senses are +deceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and right +judgment" as the gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But, +according to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to +invite one to his abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is not without +sin. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 3] + +Whether Unbelief Is the Greatest of Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins. +For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): "I should hesitate +to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a +heretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact +that he is a heretic." But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we +ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not, +seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes +sin: for the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12, 13): "I . . . before was a +blasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . . +mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore +unbelief is not the greatest of sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment, +according to Deut. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall +the measure also of the stripes be." Now a greater punishment is due +to believers than to unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much +more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden +under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the +testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?" Therefore unbelief is +not the greatest of sins. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine, commenting on John 15:22, "If I had not +come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin," says (Tract. +lxxxix in Joan.): "Under the general name, He refers to a singularly +great sin. For this," viz. infidelity, "is the sin to which all others +may be traced." Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins. + +_I answer that,_ Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3). Hence the more a +sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever +separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true +knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not +approach Him, but is severed from Him. + +Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know +Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God. +Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any +sin that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to +the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall +state further on (Q. 20, A. 3; Q. 34, A. 2, ad 2; Q. 39, A. 2, ad 3). + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus +from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence +Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic +not sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more +grave generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and +conversely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be +aggravated. + +Reply Obj. 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory +thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter +respect it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this +ignorance, it has a certain reason for excuse, especially when a +man sins not from malice, as was the case with the Apostle. + +Reply Obj. 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of +unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider +the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery, +committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other +things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on +account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account +of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and +which he insults by committing sin. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 4] + +Whether Every Act of an Unbeliever Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin. +Because a gloss on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," +says: "The whole life of unbelievers is a sin." Now the life of +unbelievers consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an +unbeliever is a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no +good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among +unbelievers, no action can be good. + +Obj. 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which +follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of +all the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in +unbelievers, they can do no good work, but sin in every action of +theirs. + +_On the contrary,_ It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever +(Acts 10:4, 31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not +every action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are +good. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 85, AA. 2, 4) mortal sin +takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of +nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are +without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them. +Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works +which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a +certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature +suffices. + +Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but +whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For +even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or +even mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an +unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to +the end of his unbelief. + +Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the +life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is +taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence +the same authority adds: "Because every one that lives or acts +according to his unbelief, sins grievously." + +Reply Obj. 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the +supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can +direct the intention in respect of a connatural good. + +Reply Obj. 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in +unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them, +whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With +regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not +an unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, +whom none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the +truth of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent +to him to give him fuller instruction in the faith. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 5] + +Whether There Are Several Species of Unbelief? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of +unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another, +they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is +the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter +contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also +is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves +are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends +not on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not +several species of unbelief, according to the various points which +the unbeliever disbelieves. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in +an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of +unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to +follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and +consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of +our consideration. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different species. +Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different points +of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of +species of unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief. + +_On the contrary,_ Several species of vice are opposed to each +virtue, because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways," +according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, +6). Now faith is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are +opposed to it. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4; I-II, Q. 64, A. +1), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge +or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter, +whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices +are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are +opposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with +regard to their different relations to the virtue: and in this way +there are determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to +a moral virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and +another, by falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of +vices opposed to one virtue may be considered in respect of the +corruption of the various conditions required for that virtue. In +this way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g. +temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in +which the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that +the rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans +held evil to be infinite. + +Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison +to faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in +number. For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the +faith, this may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted +before it has been accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or +heathens; or the Christian faith is resisted after it has been +accepted, and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of +the Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and such is the +unbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way, reckon these +three as species of unbelief. + +If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to +the various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not +determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied +indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus). + +Reply Obj. 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two +ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case +the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin, +and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be +considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is +the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its +species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must +therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth +considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect, +considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that +it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives +its various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it +adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of +vice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by +turning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various +inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through +adhering to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of +unbelief, because unbelievers follow many false opinions. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the various species of unbelief +according to various points in which errors occur. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many things +in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things, +be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing +hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as +one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily +diseases. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 6] + +Whether the Unbelief of Pagans or Heathens Is Graver Than Other Kinds? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is +graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver +according as it endangers the health of a more important member of +the body, so does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed +to that which holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which +is most important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which +the heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their +unbelief is the gravest of all. + +Obj. 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which +contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important +points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more +detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ +from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in +more numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since +they do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the +gravest. + +Obj. 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good +in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from +God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New +Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who +receive neither Testament. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 2:21): "It had been better +for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have +known it, to turn back." Now the heathens have not known the way of +justice, whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing +it in some way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), two things may be considered +in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this +point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more +grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having +accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, +sins more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way +the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and +resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that +of the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since, +however, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which +they corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more +grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not +accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all. + +The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of +matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points +than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of +heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of +the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of +the Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens +do. + +Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point +of view of guilt; since, as stated above (A. 1) unbelief has the +character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the +mere absence of faith, for the latter as was stated (A. 1) seems +rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking +absolutely, the unbelief of heretics is the worst. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 7] + +Whether One Ought to Dispute with Unbelievers in Public? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with +unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend +not in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the +hearers." But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly +without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute +publicly with unbelievers. + +Obj. 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the +canons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus: +"It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if +anyone ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which +have once been judged and disposed of." Now all matters of faith have +been decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the +councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public +about matters of faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments. +But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: +whereas things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be +a matter of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about +matters of faith. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 9:22, 29) that "Saul +increased much more in strength, and confounded the Jews," and that +"he spoke . . . to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks." + +_I answer that,_ In disputing about the faith, two things must be +observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of +his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his +intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about +the faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as +though he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would +sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other +hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to +confute errors, or for practice. + +On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear +the disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and +wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith, +there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their +presence. But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; +because either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for +instance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith +in them, or else they are not subject to provocation in this matter, +as in those countries where there are no unbelievers. In the first +case it is necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided +there be those who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting +errors; since in this way simple people are strengthened in the +faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to deceive, +while if those who ought to withstand the perverters of the truth of +faith were silent, this would tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory +says (Pastor. ii, 4): "Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to +error, so does an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might +have been instructed." On the other hand, in the second case it is +dangerous to dispute in public about the faith, in the presence of +simple people, whose faith for this very reason is more firm, that +they have never heard anything differing from what they believe. +Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have to +say against the faith. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but +such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than +of sound speeches. + +Reply Obj. 2: That law forbade those public disputations about the +faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are +for the safeguarding thereof. + +Reply Obj. 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as +though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known, +and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is +necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by +defending the faith, according to 1 Pet. 3:15: "Being ready always +to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith +which is in you [*Vulg.: 'Of that hope which is in you'; St. Thomas' +reading is apparently taken from Bede]." Sometimes again, it is +necessary, in order to convince those who are in error, according to +Titus 1:9: "That he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to +convince the gainsayers." +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 8] + +Whether Unbelievers Ought to Be Compelled to the Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be +compelled to the faith. For it is written (Matt. 13:28) that the +servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, +asked him: "Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?" and that he +answered: "No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the +wheat also together with it": on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom. +xlvi in Matth.): "Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of +men. For it is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will +necessarily slay many innocent persons." Therefore it seems that for +the same reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De +Judaeis): "The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that +for the future, none are to be compelled to believe." Therefore, in +like manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that "it is +possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot +believe unless he is willing." Therefore it seems that unbelievers +ought not to be compelled to the faith. + +Obj. 4: It is said in God's person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]): "I +desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: 'of him that dieth']." Now +we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 19, AA. 9, 10). Therefore we should not even wish +unbelievers to be put to death. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 14:23): "Go out into the +highways and hedges; and compel them to come in." Now men enter into +the house of God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some +ought to be compelled to the faith. + +_I answer that,_ Among unbelievers there are some who have never +received the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are +by no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may +believe, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they +should be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so +that they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their +evil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this +reason that Christ's faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not +indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even if +they were to conquer them, and take them prisoners, they should still +leave them free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent +them from hindering the faith of Christ. + +On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have +accepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all +apostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that +they may fulfil what they have promised, and hold what they, at one +time, received. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid, +not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from +the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii) +of himself: "It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to +union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with +arguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of +contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law +was so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has +broken our chains asunder." Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's +words, "Suffer both to grow until the harvest," must be gathered from +those which precede, "lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root +the wheat also together with it." For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. +Parmen. iii, 2) "these words show that when this is not to be feared, +that is to say, when a man's crime is so publicly known, and so +hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as might cause +a schism, the severity of discipline should not slacken." + +Reply Obj. 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought +not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have +received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in +the same chapter. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a +vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter +of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received +it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled +to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep. +clxxxv): "What do these people mean by crying out continually: 'We +may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ +compel?' They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and +afterwards taught Him." + +Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, "none of us +wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve +to have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war +which he had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church +gathers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the +sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations." +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 9] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Communicate with Unbelievers? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with +unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:27): "If any of them that +believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything +that is set before you." And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad +Heb.): "If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without +any reservation." Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate +with him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do +to judge them that are without?" Now unbelievers are without. When, +therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with +certain people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to +communicate with unbelievers. + +Obj. 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he +communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his +servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews, +or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully +communicate with them. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 7:2, 3): "Thou shalt make no +league with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make +marriages with them": and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, "The woman who at +the return of the month," etc. says: "It is so necessary to shun +idolatry, that we should not come in touch with idolaters or their +disciples, nor have any dealings with them." + +_I answer that,_ Communication with a particular person is forbidden to +the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with +whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of +those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can +be gathered from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had +pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know +you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump?" and afterwards +he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the +sentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge +them that are within?" + +Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful +to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the +Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the +right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal +judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are +guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some +temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a +punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those +unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by +corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the +faith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of +excommunication on both. + +With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish +according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and +time. For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that +their communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of +the latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith. +These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have +not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be +some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people +and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared +as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with +unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or +to communicate with them without necessity. + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against +unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them: +but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of +temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church, +for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication +with certain unbelievers. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is more probability that a servant who is ruled +by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his +master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so +the faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, +however, the master were in danger, through communicating with such +a servant, he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command +(Matt. 18:8): "If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and +cast it from thee." + +With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition +gives this solution before the Reply Obj. 2] sense the reply is that +the Lord gave this command in reference to those nations into whose +territory the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined +to idolatry, so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent +dealings with those nations, they should be estranged from the faith: +hence the text goes on (Deut. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son +from following Me." +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 10] + +Whether Unbelievers May Have Authority or Dominion Over the Faithful? + +Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or +dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1): +"Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters +worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of +unbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing +masters, let them not despise them." Moreover it is written (1 Pet. +2:18): "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to +the good and gentle, but also to the froward." Now this command would +not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could +have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers +can have authority over the faithful. + +Obj. 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his +subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving +princes' households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians +(4:22): "All the saints salute you, especially they that are of +Caesar's household," referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. +Therefore unbelievers can have authority over the faithful. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a slave +is his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life, even +as a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning the +working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject +to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore +unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion. + +_On the contrary,_ Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment +on those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce +judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): "Dare any +of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the +unjust," i.e. unbelievers, "and not before the saints?" Therefore it +seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful. + +_I answer that,_ That this question may be considered in two ways. +First, we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the +faithful as of a thing to be established for the first time. This +ought by no means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and +endanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their +superiors to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of +great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they +see the faithful fall away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to +go to law before an unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether +forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over believers, or to have +authority over them in any capacity whatever. + +Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force: +and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions +of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers +arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of +grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural +reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers, +considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of +unbelievers over the faithful. + +Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done +away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the +authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief +deserve to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted +into children of God. + +This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those +unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church +and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew +became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without +paying any price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i.e. born in +slavery; and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought +for his service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he +should be offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church +harm them in this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to +the Church, she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular +princes have enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in +favor of liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the +above law to those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her +members, in temporal matters, although she has the right to do so: +and this, in order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Matt. +17:25, 26) that He could be excused from paying the tribute, because +"the children are free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in +order to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that +servants should honor their masters, adds, "lest the name of the +Lord and His doctrine be blasphemed." + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction of +faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the +conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that +there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor's household, +that they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed +Sebastian encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and, +the while, remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace +of Diocletian. + +Reply Obj. 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their whole +lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything: whereas +the craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special works. +Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have dominion or +authority over the faithful, than that they should be allowed to +employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits Christians to +work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail their living +together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send +master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6. Yet, if +there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by such +communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden. +_______________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 11] + +Whether the Rites of Unbelievers Ought to Be Tolerated? + +Objection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be +tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their +rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent +therein, as a gloss observes on Rom. 1:32: "Not only they that do +them, but they also that consent to them that do them." Therefore it +is a sin to tolerate their rites. + +Obj. 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry, +because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, "Be not held again under the yoke of +bondage," says: "The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of +idolatry." But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the +rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the +temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as +Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that +even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated. + +Obj. 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above +(A. 3). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not +tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the +rites of unbelievers to be tolerated. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist. +xlv, can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be +allowed to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their +fathers have for ages observed them." + +_I answer that,_ Human government is derived from the Divine +government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful +and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take +place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, +greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly +in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly +tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain +greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): "If +you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust." +Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, +either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of +some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their +rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we +hold, there follows this good--that our very enemies bear witness to +our faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to +speak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their +rites. + +On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither +truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except +perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance +that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if +they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For +this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of +heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 12] + +Whether the Children of Jews and Other Unbelievers Ought to Be +Baptized Against Their Parents' Will? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other +unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the +bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority +over children, since the right of parental authority can be made to +cease, when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot +be severed by man, according to Matt. 19:6: "What . . . God hath +joined together let no man put asunder." And yet the marriage bond is +broken on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15): +"If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is +not under servitude in such cases": and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima, +and Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if the unbelieving partner is +unwilling to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator, +then the other partner is not bound to cohabitation." Much more, +therefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents' +authority over their children: and consequently their children may be +baptized against their parents' will. + +Obj. 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger +of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death. +Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death +and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and +other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they be +left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it +seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and +instructed in the faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen, +and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings +and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings +and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children. +Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against +their parents' wishes. + +Obj. 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his +soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore +it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents, +and consecrated to God in Baptism. + +Obj. 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching +does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt +of punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue +through not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, +according to the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who "sees the +sword coming and sounds not the trumpet." Much more therefore, if +Jewish children are lost through not being baptized are they +accounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not. + +_On the contrary,_ Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would +be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against +their will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority +over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these +should not be baptized against their parents' will. + +_I answer that,_ The custom of the Church has very great authority +and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very +doctrine of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. +Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by +that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it +was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of the +Jews against the will of their parents, although at times past there +have been many very powerful catholic princes like Constantine and +Theodosius, with whom most holy bishops have been on most friendly +terms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, +who would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from them if +it had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat +this assertion, that the children of Jews should be baptized against +their parents' wishes, in contradiction to the Church's custom +observed hitherto. + +There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger +to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of +reason, afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be +persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly +embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith. + +The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child +is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct +from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its +mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of +its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is +like a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, +he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a +horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use +them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the +natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his +father's care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a +child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from +its parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents' +wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its +free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after +itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then +it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace +the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even +against its parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of +reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that +they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given +to understand that it is the parents' duty to look after the +salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use +of reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the +use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the +other's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes +to the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child +has come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted. + +Reply Obj. 2: No one should be snatched from natural death against +the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the +judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: +hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a +child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from +the danger of everlasting death. + +Reply Obj. 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which +does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law. + +Reply Obj. 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can +know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the +natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason, +under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose +of the child in all matters relating to God. + +Reply Obj. 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching, +threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching. +Hence it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made thee a +watchman to the children [Vulg.: 'house'] of Israel." On the other +hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of +unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the +danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their +children fail to obtain salvation. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 11 + +OF HERESY +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief? + +(2) Of the matter about which it is; + +(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated? + +(4) Whether converts should be received? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 1] + +Whether Heresy Is a Species of Unbelief? + +Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief. +For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 2). +Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather +to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf. +Decretals xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] "The works of the flesh are +manifest: Heresy is derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby +a man makes choice of that school which he deems best." But choice is +an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1). +Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief. + +Obj. 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end; hence +the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery that +he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer." Now the end of +heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which +belong to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De +Util. Credendi i) that "a heretic is one who either devises or +follows false and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit, +especially that he may lord and be honored above others." Therefore +heresy is a species of pride rather than of unbelief. + +Obj. 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would +seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of +the flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh +are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness," and among the +others, he adds, "dissensions, sects," which are the same as +heresies. Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief. + +_On the contrary,_ Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is +one who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is +opposed to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it +is a species of unbelief. + +_I answer that,_ The word heresy as stated in the first objection +denotes a choosing. Now choice as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 3) is +about things directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in +matters of faith, the will assents to some truth, as to its proper +good, as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 3): wherefore that which is the +chief truth, has the character of last end, while those which are +secondary truths, have the character of being directed to the end. + +Now, whoever believes, assents to someone's words; so that, in every +form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to +hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by +holding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place. +Consequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his +will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong to His doctrine. + +Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the +rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to +assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in +respect of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in +pagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to +Christ, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents +to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the +suggestions of his own mind. + +Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who +profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas. + +Reply Obj. 1: Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the will +regards faith, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Vices take their species from their proximate end, +while, from their remote end, they take their genus and cause. Thus +in the case of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is the +species of adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the +ultimate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result of the +theft, and is included under it, as an effect under its cause, or a +species under its genus, as appears from what we have said about acts +in general (I-II, Q. 18, A. 7). Wherefore, as to the case in point +also, the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one's own false +opinion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote end +reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or covetousness. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as heresy is so called from its being a choosing +[*From the Greek _hairein_, to cut off], so does sect derive its name +from its being a cutting off (_secando_), as Isidore states (Etym. +viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing, and each +belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the act +itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by reason +of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in which way +it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second +objection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to +error, as the Philosopher states in _Metaph._ iv; _Ed. Did._ iii, 5), +for this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, in as much +as its act is independent on a bodily organ. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 2] + +Whether Heresy Is Properly About Matters of Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters +of faith. For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians, +so were there among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes +(Etym. viii, 3, 4, 5). Now their dissensions were not about matters +of faith. Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though +they were its proper matter. + +Obj. 2: Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now +heresy is not only about things, but also about works, and about +interpretations of Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that +"whoever expounds the Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy +Ghost by Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though he +may not have left the Church": and elsewhere he says that "heresies +spring up from words spoken amiss." [*St. Thomas quotes this saying +elsewhere, in Sent. iv, D, 13, and III, Q. 16, A. 8, but it is +not to be found in St. Jerome's works.] Therefore heresy is not +properly about the matter of faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about +matters pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on +the question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet +this was without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not +properly about the matter of faith. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ. +Dei xviii, 51]: "In Christ's Church, those are heretics, who hold +mischievous and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may +think soundly and rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing +to mend their pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending +them." Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which +are contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby "the just man liveth" +(Rom. 1:17). Therefore heresy is about matters of faith, as about its +proper matter. + +_I answer that,_ We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a +corruption of the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption +of the Christian faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that +are not of faith, for instance, in questions of geometry and so +forth, which cannot belong to the faith by any means; but only when a +person has a false opinion about things belonging to the faith. + +Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above (I, Q. +32, A. 4; I-II, Q. 1, A. 6, ad 1; I-II, Q. 2, A. 5), in one way, +directly and principally, e.g. the articles of faith; in another way, +indirectly and secondarily, e.g. those matters, the denial of which +leads to the corruption of some article of faith; and there may be +heresy in either way, even as there can be faith. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees were +about opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies +among Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another sense +than that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the meaning +of Holy Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has +revealed. Hence it is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets: +"They have persisted to confirm what they have said," viz. by false +interpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by +the words that he utters, since confession is an act of faith, as +stated above (Q. 3, A. 1). Wherefore inordinate words about matters +of faith may lead to corruption of the faith; and hence it is that +Pope Leo says in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: "The +enemies of Christ's cross lie in wait for our every deed and word, so +that, if we but give them the slightest pretext, they may accuse us +mendaciously of agreeing with Nestorius." + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it stated +in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): "By no means +should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse +their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek +the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when +they have found the truth," because, to wit, they do not make a +choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly, +certain doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding +of which in this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is +concerned, or even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined +by the Church; although if anyone were obstinately to deny them after +they had been defined by the authority of the universal Church, he +would be deemed a heretic. This authority resides chiefly in the +Sovereign Pontiff. For we read [*Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]: +"Whenever a question of faith is in dispute, I think, that all our +brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the matter to none other +than Peter, as being the source of their name and honor, against +whose authority neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of the holy +doctors defended their opinion." Hence Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol +[*Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]): "This, most blessed +Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in the Catholic Church. +If anything therein has been incorrectly or carelessly expressed, we +beg that it may be set aright by you who hold the faith and see of +Peter. If however this, our profession, be approved by the judgment +of your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that he himself +is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic but a heretic." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 3] + +Whether Heretics Ought to Be Tolerated? + +Objection 1: It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the +Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:24, 25): "The servant of the Lord must not +wrangle . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if +peradventure God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they +may recover themselves from the snares of the devil." Now if heretics +are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of +repentance. Therefore it seems contrary to the Apostle's command. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be +tolerated. Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle +says (1 Cor. 11:19): "There must be . . . heresies, that they . . . +who are reproved, may be manifest among you." Therefore it seems that +heretics should be tolerated. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Master commanded his servants (Matt. 13:30) to +suffer the cockle "to grow until the harvest," i.e. the end of the +world, as a gloss explains it. Now holy men explain that the cockle +denotes heretics. Therefore heretics should be tolerated. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Titus 3:10, 11): "A man that is a +heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that +he, that is such an one, is subverted." + +_I answer that,_ With regard to heretics two points must be observed: +one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On +their own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be +separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed +from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt +the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which +supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other +evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, +much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted +of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death. + +On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the +conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but +"after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs: +after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for +his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating +him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him +to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by +death. For Jerome commenting on Gal. 5:9, "A little leaven," says: +"Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest +the whole house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock, +burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as +that spark was not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by +its flame." + +Reply Obj. 1: This very modesty demands that the heretic should be +admonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to +retract, he must be reckoned as already "subverted," as we may gather +from the words of the Apostle quoted above. + +Reply Obj. 2: The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the +intention of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the +faithful being put to the test, and "makes us shake off our +sluggishness, and search the Scriptures more carefully," as Augustine +states (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the +corruption of the faith, which is to inflict very great harm indeed. +Consequently we should consider what they directly intend, and expel +them, rather than what is beside their intention, and so, tolerate +them. + +Reply Obj. 3: According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can. Notandum), +"to be excommunicated is not to be uprooted." A man is +excommunicated, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his "spirit may +be saved in the day of Our Lord." Yet if heretics be altogether +uprooted by death, this is not contrary to Our Lord's command, which +is to be understood as referring to the case when the cockle cannot +be plucked up without plucking up the wheat, as we explained above +(Q. 10, A. 8, ad 1), when treating of unbelievers in general. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 4] + +Whether the Church Should Receive Those Who Return from Heresy? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to +receive those who return from heresy. For it is written (Jer. 3:1) in +the person of the Lord: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; +nevertheless return to Me saith the Lord." Now the sentence of the +Church is God's sentence, according to Deut. 1:17: "You shall hear the +little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man's +person, because it is the judgment of God." Therefore even those who +are guilty of the prostitution of unbelief which is spiritual +prostitution, should be received all the same. + +Obj. 2: Further, Our Lord commanded Peter (Matt. 18:22) to forgive +his offending brother "not" only "till seven times, but till seventy +times seven times," which Jerome expounds as meaning that "a man +should be forgiven, as often as he has sinned." Therefore he ought to +be received by the Church as often as he has sinned by falling back +into heresy. + +Obj. 3: Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other unbelievers +who wish to be converted are received by the Church. Therefore +heretics also should be received. + +_On the contrary,_ The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix) +says that "those who are found to have relapsed into the error which +they had already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal." +Therefore they should not be received by the Church. + +_I answer that,_ In obedience to Our Lord's institution, the Church +extends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who +persecute her, according to Matt. 5:44: "Love your enemies; do good +to them that hate you." Now it is part of charity that we should both +wish and work our neighbor's good. Again, good is twofold: one is +spiritual, namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the +object of charity, since it is this chiefly that we should wish for +one another. Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who +return after falling no matter how often, are admitted by the Church +to Penance whereby the way of salvation is opened to them. + +The other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz. +temporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions, good +repute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by +charity to wish others this good, except in relation to the eternal +salvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of +these goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eternal +salvation in many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a +good to that person, rather should we desire him to be without it, +both because eternal salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and +because the good of the many is to be preferred to the good of one. +Now if heretics were always received on their return, in order to +save their lives and other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial +to the salvation of others, both because they would infect others if +they relapsed again, and because, if they escaped without punishment, +others would feel more assured in lapsing into heresy. For it is +written (Eccles. 8:11): "For because sentence is not speedily +pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without +any fear." + +For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who +return from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their +lives, and sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the +ecclesiastical dignities which they may have had before, should their +conversion appear to be sincere: we read of this as having frequently +been done for the good of peace. But when they fall again, after +having been received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in +faith, wherefore when they return again, they are admitted to +Penance, but are not delivered from the pain of death. + +Reply Obj. 1: In God's tribunal, those who return are always +received, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who +return in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for +she presumes that those who relapse after being once received, are +not sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the +way of salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence +of death. + +Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed +against oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and +spare our brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied +to sins committed against one's neighbor or against God, for it is +not left to our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says +on Matt. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend against thee." Yet even +in this matter the law prescribes limits according as God's honor or +our neighbor's good demands. + +Reply Obj. 3: When other unbelievers, who have never received the +faith are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy +in faith, as relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 12 + +OF APOSTASY +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief? + +(2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are +absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 12, Art. 1] + +Whether Apostasy Pertains to Unbelief? + +Objection 1: It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to +unbelief. For that which is the origin of all sins, does not, +seemingly, pertain to unbelief, since many sins there are without +unbelief. Now apostasy seems to be the origin of every sin, for it +is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of man is +apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God," and further on, (Ecclus. +10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." Therefore apostasy +does not pertain to unbelief. + +Obj. 2: Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas +apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance, +or even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (Prov. +6:12-14): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh +with a perverse mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the +foot, speaketh with the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil, +and at all times he soweth discord." Moreover if anyone were to have +himself circumcised, or to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would +be deemed an apostate. Therefore apostasy does not pertain to +unbelief. + +Obj. 3: Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a +determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to +unbelief, it would follow that it is a determinate species of +unbelief, which does not seem to agree with what has been said +(Q. 10, A. 5). Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 6:67): "Many of his disciples +went back," i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously +(John 6:65): "There are some of you that believe not." Therefore +apostasy pertains to unbelief. + +_I answer that,_ Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may +happen in various ways according to the different kinds of union +between man and God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by +faith; secondly, by having his will duly submissive in obeying His +commandments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to +supererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or +Holy Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that which +precedes, remains, but the converse does not hold. Accordingly a man +may apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the religious life to +which he was bound by profession, or from the Holy Order which he +had received: and this is called "apostasy from religious life" or +"Orders." A man may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in his +mind against the Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize +in both the above ways, he may still remain united to God by faith. + +But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God +altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that +whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called "apostasy of +perfidy." In this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to +unbelief. + +Reply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the second kind of apostasy, +which denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's +commandments, an act that is to be found in every mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to faith not only that the heart should +believe, but also that external words and deeds should bear witness +to the inward faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this way +too, certain external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far +as they are signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said +itself to be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be +understood as referring to every kind of apostate, yet it applies +most truly to an apostate from the faith. For since faith is the +first foundation of things to be hoped for, and since, without faith +it is "impossible to please God"; when once faith is removed, man +retains nothing that may be useful for the obtaining of eternal +salvation, for which reason it is written (Prov. 6:12): "A man that +is an apostate, an unprofitable man": because faith is the life of +the soul, according to Rom. 1:17: "The just man liveth by faith." +Therefore, just as when the life of the body is taken away, man's +every member and part loses its due disposition, so when the life of +justice, which is by faith, is done away, disorder appears in all +his members. First, in his mouth, whereby chiefly his mind stands +revealed; secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of +movement; fourthly, in his will, which tends to evil. The result is +that "he sows discord," endeavoring to sever others from the faith +even as he severed himself. + +Reply Obj. 3: The species of a quality or form are not diversified by +the fact of its being the term _wherefrom_ or _whereto_ of movement: +on the contrary, it is the movement that takes its species from the +terms. Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term _whereto_ of the +movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not +imply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance +thereof, according to 2 Pet. 2:21: "It had been better for them not +to know the truth [Vulg.: 'the way of justice'], than after they had +known it, to turn back." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 12, Art. 2] + +Whether a Prince Forfeits His Dominion Over His Subjects, on Account +of Apostasy from the Faith, So That They No Longer Owe Him Allegiance? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his +dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, +that they no longer owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine, +Super Ps. 124:3] says that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate, +nevertheless had under him Christian soldiers, who when he said to +them, "Fall into line for the defense of the republic," were bound to +obey. Therefore subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to +their prince on account of his apostasy. + +Obj. 2: Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now we +find that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph +served Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served +Assuerus. Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects +from allegiance to their sovereign. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns away +from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of apostasy +from the faith, princes were to lose their right to command those of +their subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it on +account of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we +ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his +apostatizing from the faith. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): "Holding to +the institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic +authority, absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or +through the sacred bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated +persons: and we absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance +to such persons, until these shall have made amends." Now apostates +from the faith, like heretics, are excommunicated, according to the +Decretal [*Extra, De Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam]. Therefore +princes should not be obeyed when they have apostatized from the +faith. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 10, A. 10), unbelief, in itself, +is not inconsistent with dominion, since dominion is a device of the +law of nations which is a human law: whereas the distinction between +believers and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not annul +human right. Nevertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced +to the loss of his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on account +of other sins. + +Now it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief +in those who have never received the faith, according to the saying +of the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do to judge them that +are without?" She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the +unbelief of those who have received the faith: and it is fitting that +they should be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their +subjects: for this same allegiance might conduce to great corruption +of the faith, since, as was stated above (A. 1, Obj. 2), "a man that +is an apostate . . . with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and . . . +soweth discord," in order to sever others from the faith. +Consequently, as soon as sentence of excommunication is passed on a +man on account of apostasy from the faith, his subjects are "ipso +facto" absolved from his authority and from the oath of allegiance +whereby they were bound to him. + +Reply Obj. 1: At that time the Church was but recently instituted, +and had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes; and so she +allowed the faithful to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that +were not contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet +greater danger. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated in the article, it is not a question of those +unbelievers who have never received the faith. + +Reply Obj. 3: Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether, +as stated above (A. 1), which is not the case in any other sin. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 13 + +OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the +confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy +which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith? + +(2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin? + +(3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin? + +(4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 1] + +Whether Blasphemy Is Opposed to the Confession of Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the +confession of faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or +insult against the Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God +rather than to unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the +confession of faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, on Eph. 4:31, "Let blasphemy . . . be put away from +you," a gloss says, "that which is committed against God or the +saints." But confession of faith, seemingly, is not about other +things than those pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith. +Therefore blasphemy is not always opposed to the confession of faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to some, there are three kinds of +blasphemy. The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed +of God; the second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and +the third, when something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, so +that, seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His +creatures. Now the object of faith is God. Therefore blasphemy is not +opposed to confession of faith. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12, 13): "I . . . +before was a blasphemer and a persecutor," and afterwards, "I did it +ignorantly in" my "unbelief." Hence it seems that blasphemy pertains +to unbelief. + +_I answer that,_ The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement +of some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as +Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness. +Hence whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does +not befit Him, is far removed from the perfection of goodness which is +His Essence. Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting +God, or affirms anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine +goodness. + +Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it may happen +merely in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the second way +this opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections, +even as, on the other hand, faith in God is perfected by love of Him. +Accordingly this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in +the intellect alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought +only, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself +outwardly in speech it is blasphemy of the tongue. It is in this +sense that blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith. + +Reply Obj. 1: He that speaks against God, with the intention of +reviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of +the falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness +of his will, whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due +to God, and this is perfect blasphemy. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as +praise is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does +blasphemy against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God. + +Reply Obj. 3: Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in this +way divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things, or +to deny fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and +negation. For this diversity does not cause distinct species of +habits, since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made +known by the same knowledge, and it is the same ignorance which errs +in either way, since negatives are proved by affirmatives, according +to Poster. i, 25. Again to ascribe to creatures things that are +proper to God, seems to amount to the same as affirming something +unfitting of Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and +to ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God, is to assert +that God is the same as a creature. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 2] + +Whether Blasphemy Is Always a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin. +Because a gloss on the words, "Now lay you also all away," etc. (Col. +3:8) says: "After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins": +and yet among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy +is comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts +of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to any of +them. Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not mortal: +hence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede the +deliberation of the reason, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 3, +10). Now blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the +reason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 24:16): "He that blasphemeth +the name of the Lord, dying let him die." Now the death punishment +is not inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a +mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 5), a mortal sin +is one whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual +life, which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever +things are contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their +genus. Now blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity, +because, as stated above (A. 1), it disparages the Divine goodness, +which is the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal +sin, by reason of its genus. + +Reply Obj. 1: This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all +the sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those +mentioned previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned +afterwards are less grievous; and yet among the latter some more +grievous sins are included. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since, as stated above (A. 1), blasphemy is contrary +to the confession of faith, its prohibition is comprised under the +prohibition of unbelief, expressed by the words: "I am the Lord thy +God," etc. (Ex. 20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: "Thou +shalt not take the name of . . . God in vain" (Ex. 20:7). Because he +who asserts something false about God, takes His name in vain even +more than he who uses the name of God in confirmation of a falsehood. + +Reply Obj. 3: There are two ways in which blasphemy may occur +unawares and without deliberation. In the first way, by a man failing +to advert to the blasphemous nature of his words, and this may happen +through his being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out into +words suggested by his imagination, without heeding to the meaning of +those words: this is a venial sin, and is not a blasphemy properly so +called. In the second way, by adverting to the meaning of his words, +and to their blasphemous nature: in which case he is not excused from +mortal sin, even as neither is he who, in a sudden movement of anger, +kills one who is sitting beside him. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 3] + +Whether the Sin of Blasphemy Is the Greatest Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of blasphemy is not the +greatest sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing +is said to be evil because it does harm. Now the sin of murder, since +it destroys a man's life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy, +which can do no harm to God. Therefore the sin of murder is more +grievous than that of blasphemy. + +Obj. 2: Further, a perjurer calls upon God to witness to a falsehood, +and thus seems to assert that God is false. But not every blasphemer +goes so far as to say that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more +grievous sin than blasphemy. + +Obj. 3: Further, on Ps. 74:6, "Lift not up your horn on high," a +gloss says: "To excuse oneself for sin is the greatest sin of all." +Therefore blasphemy is not the greatest sin. + +_On the contrary,_ On Isa. 18:2, "To a terrible people," etc. a gloss +says: "In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), blasphemy is opposed to the +confession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief: +while the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added +thereto, and yet more, if it breaks out into words, even as love +and confession add to the praise of faith. + +Therefore, since, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 3), unbelief is the +greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy +also is a very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as +unbelief and being an aggravated form of that sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the +objects of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin +committed directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a +sin against one's neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them in +respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for +murder does more harm to one's neighbor, than blasphemy does to God. +Since, however, the gravity of a sin depends on the intention of the +evil will, rather than on the effect of the deed, as was shown above +(I-II, Q. 73, A. 8), it follows that, as the blasphemer intends to do +harm to God's honor, absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously +that the murderer. Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to +punishment, among sins committed against our neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 2: A gloss on the words, "Let . . . blasphemy be put away +from you" (Eph. 4:31) says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury." The +reason is that the perjurer does not say or think something false +about God, as the blasphemer does: but he calls God to witness to a +falsehood, not that he deems God a false witness, but in the hope, as +it were, that God will not testify to the matter by some evident sign. + +Reply Obj. 3: To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that +aggravates every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the +most grievous sin, for as much as it makes every sin more grievous. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 4] + +Whether the Damned Blaspheme? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not blaspheme. Because +some wicked men are deterred from blaspheming now, on account of the +fear of future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these +punishments, so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more +are they restrained from blaspheming. + +Obj. 2: Further, since blasphemy is a most grievous sin, it is most +demeritorious. Now in the life to come there is no state of meriting +or demeriting. Therefore there will be no place for blasphemy. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Eccles. 11:3) that "the tree . . . in +what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be": whence it +clearly follows that, after this life, man acquires neither merit nor +sin, which he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be +damned who were not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore, +will they blaspheme in the life to come. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Apoc. 16:9): "The men were scorched +with great heat, and they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power +over these plagues," and a gloss on these words says that "those who +are in hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will +nevertheless complain that God is so powerful as to torture them +thus." Now this would be blasphemy in their present state: and +consequently it will also be in their future state. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3), detestation of the Divine +goodness is a necessary condition of blasphemy. Now those who are in +hell retain their wicked will which is turned away from God's +justice, since they love the things for which they are punished, +would wish to use them if they could, and hate the punishments +inflicted on them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins +which they have committed, not because they hate them, but because +they are punished for them. Accordingly this detestation of the +Divine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy of the heart: and +it is credible that after the resurrection they will blaspheme God +with the tongue, even as the saints will praise Him with their voices. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy +through fear of punishment which they think they can escape: whereas, +in hell, the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they +are borne towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them. + +Reply Obj. 2: Merit and demerit belong to the state of a wayfarer, +wherefore good is meritorious in them, while evil is demeritorious. +In the blessed, on the other hand, good is not meritorious, but is +part of their blissful reward, and, in like manner, in the damned, +evil is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will that +detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in +this respect there can be blasphemy in him. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 14 + +OF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost: +under which head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same +as the sin committed through certain malice? + +(2) Of the species of this sin; + +(3) Whether it can be forgiven? + +(4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost +before committing other sins? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 1] + +Whether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Is the Same As the Sin +Committed Through Certain Malice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not +the same as the sin committed through certain malice. Because the sin +against the Holy Ghost is the sin of blasphemy, according to Matt. +12:32. But not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of +blasphemy: since many other kinds of sin may be committed through +certain malice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the +same as the sin committed through certain malice. + +Obj. 2: Further, the sin committed through certain malice is +condivided with sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed +through weakness: whereas the sin against the Holy Ghost is +condivided with the sin against the Son of Man (Matt. 12:32). +Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin +committed through certain malice, since things whose opposites +differ, are themselves different. + +Obj. 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is itself a generic +sin, having its own determinate species: whereas sin committed +through certain malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition +or general circumstance of sin, which can affect any kind of sin at +all. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the +sin committed through certain malice. + +_On the contrary,_ The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43) that "to sin +against the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in the malice of sin for +its own sake." Now this is to sin through certain malice. Therefore +it seems that the sin committed through certain malice is the same +as the sin against the Holy Ghost. + +_I answer that,_ Three meanings have been given to the sin against +the Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz. Athanasius (Super +Matth. xii, 32), Hilary (Can. xii in Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc. +xii, 10), Jerome (Super Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in +Matth.), say that the sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to +utter a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit we +understand the essential name applicable to the whole Trinity, each +Person of which is a Spirit and is holy, or the personal name of one +of the Persons of the Trinity, in which sense blasphemy against the +Holy Ghost is distinct from the blasphemy against the Son of Man +(Matt. 12:32), for Christ did certain things in respect of His human +nature, by eating, drinking, and such like actions, while He did +others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out devils, raising the +dead, and the like: which things He did both by the power of His own +Godhead and by the operation of the Holy Ghost, of Whom He was full, +according to his human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking +blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Matt. 11:19) that +He was "a glutton . . . a wine drinker," and a "friend of publicans": +but afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, when they +ascribed to the prince of devils those works which Christ did by the +power of His own Divine Nature and by the operation of the Holy Ghost. + +Augustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi), says that blasphemy +or the sin against the Holy Ghost, is final impenitence when, namely, +a man perseveres in mortal sin until death, and that it is not +confined to utterance by word of mouth, but extends to words in +thought and deed, not to one word only, but to many. Now this word, +in this sense, is said to be uttered against the Holy Ghost, because +it is contrary to the remission of sins, which is the work of the +Holy Ghost, Who is the charity both of the Father and of the Son. Nor +did Our Lord say this to the Jews, as though they had sinned against +the Holy Ghost, since they were not yet guilty of final impenitence, +but He warned them, lest by similar utterances they should come to +sin against the Holy Ghost: and it is in this sense that we are to +understand Mark 3:29, 30, where after Our Lord had said: "But he that +shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost," etc. the Evangelist adds, +"because they said: He hath an unclean spirit." + +But others understand it differently, and say that the sin of +blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is a sin committed against that +good which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost: because goodness is +appropriated to the Holy Ghost, just a power is appropriated to the +Father, and wisdom to the Son. Hence they say that when a man sins +through weakness, it is a sin "against the Father"; that when he sins +through ignorance, it is a sin "against the Son"; and that when he +sins through certain malice, i.e. through the very choosing of evil, +as explained above (I-II, Q. 78, AA. 1, 3), it is a sin "against the +Holy Ghost." + +Now this may happen in two ways. First by reason of the very +inclination of a vicious habit which we call malice, and, in this +way, to sin through malice is not the same as to sin against the Holy +Ghost. In another way it happens that by reason of contempt, that +which might have prevented the choosing of evil, is rejected or +removed; thus hope is removed by despair, and fear by presumption, +and so on, as we shall explain further on (QQ. 20, 21). Now all these +things which prevent the choosing of sin are effects of the Holy +Ghost in us; so that, in this sense, to sin through malice is to sin +against the Holy Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as the confession of faith consists in a +protestation not only of words but also of deeds, so blasphemy +against the Holy Ghost can be uttered in word, thought and deed. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the third interpretation, blasphemy +against the Holy Ghost is condivided with blasphemy against the Son +of Man, forasmuch as He is also the Son of God, i.e. the "power of +God and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). Wherefore, in this sense, +the sin against the Son of Man will be that which is committed +through ignorance, or through weakness. + +Reply Obj. 3: Sin committed through certain malice, in so far as it +results from the inclination of a habit, is not a special sin, but a +general condition of sin: whereas, in so far as it results from a +special contempt of an effect of the Holy Ghost in us, it has the +character of a special sin. According to this interpretation the sin +against the Holy Ghost is a special kind of sin, as also according to +the first interpretation: whereas according to the second, it is not +a species of sin, because final impenitence may be a circumstance of +any kind of sin. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Fitting to Distinguish Six Kinds of Sin Against the +Holy Ghost? + +Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish six kinds of sin +against the Holy Ghost, viz. despair, presumption, impenitence, +obstinacy, resisting the known truth, envy of our brother's spiritual +good, which are assigned by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to deny +God's justice or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a man +rejects God's mercy, and by presumption, His justice. Therefore each +of these is a kind of unbelief rather than of the sin against the +Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 2: Further, impenitence, seemingly, regards past sins, while +obstinacy regards future sins. Now past and future time do not +diversify the species of virtues or vices, since it is the same faith +whereby we believe that Christ was born, and those of old believed +that He would be born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not +be reckoned as two species of sin against the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 3: Further, "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (John 1:17). +Therefore it seem that resistance of the known truth, and envy of a +brother's spiritual good, belong to blasphemy against the Son rather +than against the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 4: Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et Praecept. xi) that "to +refuse to obey is to resist the Holy Ghost." Moreover a gloss on Lev. +10:16, says that "a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the +Holy Ghost." Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to the +Holy Ghost by Whom the Church is united together. Therefore it seems +that the species of sins against the Holy Ghost are insufficiently +enumerated. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] (De Fide ad Petrum iii) +says that "those who despair of pardon for their sins, or who without +merits presume on God's mercy, sin against the Holy Ghost," and +(Enchiridion lxxxiii) that "he who dies in a state of obstinacy is +guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost," and (De Verb. Dom., Serm. +lxxi) that "impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost," and (De +Serm. Dom. in Monte xxii), that "to resist fraternal goodness with +the brands of envy is to sin against the Holy Ghost," and in his book +De unico Baptismo (De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 35) he says that "a man +who spurns the truth, is either envious of his brethren to whom the +truth is revealed, or ungrateful to God, by Whose inspiration the +Church is taught," and therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy +Ghost. + +_I answer that,_ The above species are fittingly assigned to the sin +against the Holy Ghost taken in the third sense, because they are +distinguished in respect of the removal or contempt of those things +whereby a man can be prevented from sinning through choice. These +things are either on the part of God's judgment, or on the part of +His gifts, or on the part of sin. For, by consideration of the Divine +judgment, wherein justice is accompanied with mercy, man is hindered +from sinning through choice, both by hope, arising from the +consideration of the mercy that pardons sins and rewards good deeds, +which hope is removed by "despair"; and by fear, arising from the +consideration of the Divine justice that punishes sins, which fear is +removed by "presumption," when, namely, a man presumes that he can +obtain glory without merits, or pardon without repentance. + +God's gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are two: one is the +acknowledgment of the truth, against which there is the "resistance of +the known truth," when, namely, a man resists the truth which he has +acknowledged, in order to sin more freely: while the other is the +assistance of inward grace, against which there is "envy of a +brother's spiritual good," when, namely, a man is envious not only of +his brother's person, but also of the increase of Divine grace in the +world. + +On the part of sin, there are two things which may withdraw man +therefrom: one is the inordinateness and shamefulness of the act, the +consideration of which is wont to arouse man to repentance for the +sin he has committed, and against this there is "impenitence," not as +denoting permanence in sin until death, in which sense it was taken +above (for thus it would not be a special sin, but a circumstance of +sin), but as denoting the purpose of not repenting. The other thing +is the smallness or brevity of the good which is sought in sin, +according to Rom. 6:21: "What fruit had you therefore then in those +things, of which you are now ashamed?" The consideration of this is +wont to prevent man's will from being hardened in sin, and this is +removed by "obstinacy," whereby man hardens his purpose by clinging +to sin. Of these two it is written (Jer. 8:6): "There is none that +doth penance for his sin, saying: What have I done?" as regards the +first; and, "They are all turned to their own course, as a horse +rushing to the battle," as regards the second. + +Reply Obj. 1: The sins of despair and presumption consist, not in +disbelieving in God's justice and mercy, but in contemning them. + +Reply Obj. 2: Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only in respect of +past and future time, but also in respect of certain formal aspects +by reason of the diverse consideration of those things which may be +considered in sin, as explained above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Grace and truth were the work of Christ through the +gifts of the Holy Ghost which He gave to men. + +Reply Obj. 4: To refuse to obey belongs to obstinacy, while a feigned +repentance belongs to impenitence, and schism to the envy of a +brother's spiritual good, whereby the members of the Church are +united together. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 3] + +Whether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Can Be Forgiven? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost can be +forgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi): "We should +despair of no man, so long as Our Lord's patience brings him back to +repentance." But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would be possible +to despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost +can be forgiven. + +Obj. 2: Further, no sin is forgiven, except through the soul being +healed by God. But "no disease is incurable to an all-powerful +physician," as a gloss says on Ps. 102:3, "Who healeth all thy +diseases." Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven. + +Obj. 3: Further, the free-will is indifferent to either good or evil. +Now, so long as man is a wayfarer, he can fall away from any virtue, +since even an angel fell from heaven, wherefore it is written (Job +4:18, 19): "In His angels He found wickedness: how much more shall +they that dwell in houses of clay?" Therefore, in like manner, a man +can return from any sin to the state of justice. Therefore the sin +against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 12:32): "He that shall speak +against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this +world, nor in the world to come": and Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in +Monte i, 22) that "so great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot +submit to the humiliation of asking for pardon." + +_I answer that,_ According to the various interpretations of the sin +against the Holy Ghost, there are various ways in which it may be said +that it cannot be forgiven. For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost +we understand final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable, since +in no way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a man +perseveres until death will not be forgiven in the life to come, since +it was not remitted by repentance in this life. + +According to the other two interpretations, it is said to be +unpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven, but because, +considered in itself, it deserves not to be pardoned: and this in two +ways. First, as regards the punishment, since he that sins through +ignorance or weakness, deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins +through certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his +punishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the Son of Man +before His Godhead was revealed, could have some excuse, on account +of the weakness of the flesh which they perceived in Him, and hence, +they deserved less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against +His very Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works of the Holy +Ghost, had no excuse in diminution of their punishment. Wherefore, +according to Chrysostom's commentary (Hom. xlii in Matth.), the Jews +are said not to be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in +the world to come, because they were punished for it, both in the +present life, through the Romans, and in the life to come, in the +pains of hell. Thus also Athanasius adduces the example of their +forefathers who, first of all, wrangled with Moses on account of the +shortage of water and bread; and this the Lord bore with patience, +because they were to be excused on account of the weakness of the +flesh: but afterwards they sinned more grievously when, by ascribing +to an idol the favors bestowed by God Who had brought them out of +Egypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against the Holy Ghost, saying +(Ex. 32:4): "These are thy gods, O Israel, that have brought thee out +of the land of Egypt." Therefore the Lord both inflicted temporal +punishment on them, since "there were slain on that day about three +and twenty thousand men" (Ex. 32:28), and threatened them with +punishment in the life to come, saying, (Ex. 32:34): "I, in the day +of revenge, will visit this sin . . . of theirs." + +Secondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt: thus a disease +is said to be incurable in respect of the nature of the disease, which +removes whatever might be a means of cure, as when it takes away the +power of nature, or causes loathing for food and medicine, although +God is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the Holy +Ghost is said to be unpardonable, by reason of its nature, in so far +as it removes those things which are a means towards the pardon of +sins. This does not, however, close the way of forgiveness and healing +to an all-powerful and merciful God, Who, sometimes, by a miracle, so +to speak, restores spiritual health to such men. + +Reply Obj. 1: We should despair of no man in this life, considering +God's omnipotence and mercy. But if we consider the circumstances of +sin, some are called (Eph. 2:2) "children of despair" [*_Filios +diffidentiae,_ which the Douay version renders "children of +unbelief."]. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the question on the part of +God's omnipotence, not on that of the circumstances of sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: In this life the free-will does indeed ever remain +subject to change: yet sometimes it rejects that whereby, so far as +it is concerned, it can be turned to good. Hence considered in itself +this sin is unpardonable, although God can pardon it. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 4] + +Whether a Man Can Sin First of All Against the Holy Ghost? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot sin first of all against +the Holy Ghost, without having previously committed other sins. For +the natural order requires that one should be moved to perfection from +imperfection. This is evident as regards good things, according to +Prov. 4:18: "The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards +and increases even to perfect day." Now, in evil things, the perfect +is the greatest evil, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. v, text. 21). +Since then the sin against the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it +seems that man comes to commit this sin through committing lesser +sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through +certain malice, or through choice. Now man cannot do this until he has +sinned many times; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6, 9) that +"although a man is able to do unjust deeds, yet he cannot all at once +do them as an unjust man does," viz. from choice. Therefore it seems +that the sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be committed except after +other sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, repentance and impenitence are about the same +object. But there is no repentance, except about past sins. Therefore +the same applies to impenitence which is a species of the sin against +the Holy Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost presupposes +other sins. + +_On the contrary,_ "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to +make a poor man rich" (Ecclus. 11:23). Therefore, conversely, it is +possible for a man, according to the malice of the devil who tempts +him, to be led to commit the most grievous of sins which is that +against the Holy Ghost. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), in one way, to sin against +the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice. Now one may sin +through certain malice in two ways, as stated in the same place: +first, through the inclination of a habit; but this is not, properly +speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to +commit this sin all at once, in as much as sinful acts must precede +so as to cause the habit that induces to sin. Secondly, one may sin +through certain malice, by contemptuously rejecting the things +whereby a man is withdrawn from sin. This is, properly speaking, to +sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (A. 1); and this also, +for the most part, presupposes other sins, for it is written (Prov. +18:3) that "the wicked man, when he is come into the depth of sins, +contemneth." + +Nevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sinful act, to +sin against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both on account of his +free-will, and on account of the many previous dispositions, or +again, through being vehemently moved to evil, while but feebly +attached to good. Hence never or scarcely ever does it happen that +the perfect sin all at once against the Holy Ghost: wherefore Origen +says (Peri Archon. i, 3): "I do not think that anyone who stands on +the highest step of perfection, can fail or fall suddenly; this can +only happen by degrees and bit by bit." + +The same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be taken literally +for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For such blasphemy as Our Lord +speaks of, always proceeds from contemptuous malice. + +If, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) we understand +the sin against the Holy Ghost to denote final impenitence, it does +not regard the question in point, because this sin against the Holy +Ghost requires persistence in sin until the end of life. + +Reply Obj. 1: Movement both in good and in evil is made, for the most +part, from imperfect to perfect, according as man progresses in good +or evil: and yet in both cases, one man can begin from a greater +(good or evil) than another man does. Consequently, that from which a +man begins can be perfect in good or evil according to its genus, +although it may be imperfect as regards the series of good or evil +actions whereby a man progresses in good or evil. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the sin which is committed +through certain malice, when it proceeds from the inclination of a +habit. + +Reply Obj. 3: If by impenitence we understand with Augustine (De +Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) persistence in sin until the end, it is clear +that it presupposes sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we +take it for habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a sin against +the Holy Ghost, it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is +possible for a man who has never sinned to have the purpose either +of repenting or of not repenting, if he should happen to sin. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 15 + +OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING +(In Three Articles) + +We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and +understanding. Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which +is opposed to knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins +(I-II, Q. 76), we must now inquire about blindness of mind and +dulness of sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding; +and under this head there are three points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin? + +(2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of +mind? + +(3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 1] + +Whether Blindness of Mind Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind is not a sin. +Because, seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin. +Now blindness of mind excuses from sin; for it is written (John +9:41): "If you were blind, you should not have sin." Therefore +blindness of mind is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, punishment differs from guilt. But blindness of mind +is a punishment as appears from Isa. 6:10, "Blind the heart of this +people," for, since it is an evil, it could not be from God, were it +not a punishment. Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De +Vera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary, since, as +Augustine says (Confess. x), "all love to know the resplendent +truth," and as we read in Eccles. 11:7, "the light is sweet and it is +delightful for the eyes to see the sun." Therefore blindness of mind +is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons blindness of +mind among the vices arising from lust. + +_I answer that,_ Just as bodily blindness is the privation of the +principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the privation of +the principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has a +threefold principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light, +since it pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never +forfeit from the soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented from +exercising its proper act, through being hindered by the lower powers +which the human intellect needs in order to understand, for instance +in the case of imbeciles and madmen, as stated in the First Part (Q. +84, AA. 7, 8). + +Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual light +superadded to the natural light of reason, which light is sometimes +forfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a +punishment, in so far as the privation of the light of grace is a +punishment. Hence it is written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): "Their +own malice blinded them." + +A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible principle, +through which a man understands other things; to which principle a +man may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens +in two ways. Sometimes it is due to the fact that a man's will is +deliberately turned away from the consideration of that principle, +according to Ps. 35:4, "He would not understand, that he might do +well": whereas sometimes it is due to the mind being more busy about +things which it loves more, so as to be hindered thereby from +considering this principle, according to Ps. 57:9, "Fire," i.e. of +concupiscence, "hath fallen on them and they shall not see the sun." +In either of these ways blindness of mind is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: The blindness that excuses from sin is that which +arises from the natural defect of one who cannot see. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the second kind of blindness +which is a punishment. + +Reply Obj. 3: To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by all; +and yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a +man is hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 2] + +Whether Dulness of Sense Is a Sin Distinct from Blindness of Mind? + +Objection 1: It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin +from blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now +dulness is opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory +(Moral. ii, 49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding +denotes a principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same +as blindness of mind. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking of dulness +describes it as "dulness of sense in respect of understanding." Now +dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as +a defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind. +Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind. + +Obj. 3: Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be chiefly in the +fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated above (A. 1), +while dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural defect is +not a sin: so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would not be a sin, +which is contrary to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he +reckons it among the sins arising from gluttony. + +_On the contrary,_ Different causes produce different effects. Now +Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from +gluttony, and that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these +others are different vices. Therefore those are different vices also. + +_I answer that,_ Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be +sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through +being obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of +metaphor, is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its +object from a distance or is able by penetration as it were to +perceive the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence +in corporeal things the senses are said to be acute when they can +perceive a sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing, or scent, +while on the other hand they are said to be dull, through being +unable to perceive, except sensible objects that are near at hand, or +of great power. + +Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in +connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect of +certain primals and extremes, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, even as the +senses are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of +knowledge. Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does +not perceive its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but +through certain other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a +thing's essence through a property thereof, and the cause through its +effect. Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in +connection with his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a +property or effect of a thing, he understands the nature or the thing +itself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its slightest details: +whereas a man is said to have a dull sense in connection with his +understanding, if he cannot arrive at knowing the truth about a +thing, without many explanations; in which case, moreover, he is +unable to obtain a perfect perception of everything pertaining to the +nature of that thing. + +Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes +a certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual +goods; while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the +knowledge of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of +understanding, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehending +them, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost nature. This +dulness has the character of sin, just as blindness of mind has, that +is, in so far as it is voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to +his affection for carnal things, dislikes or neglects the careful +consideration of spiritual things. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 3] + +Whether Blindness of Mind and Dulness of Sense Arise from Sins of the +Flesh? + +Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind and dulness of +sense do not arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine (Retract. i, +4) retracts what he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, "God Who didst +wish none but the clean to know the truth," and says that one might +reply that "many, even those who are unclean, know many truths." Now +men become unclean chiefly by sins of the flesh. Therefore blindness +of mind and dulness of sense are not caused by sins of the flesh. + +Obj. 2: Further, blindness of mind and dulness of sense are defects +in connection with the intellective part of the soul: whereas carnal +sins pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does not +act on the soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the +flesh do not cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense. + +Obj. 3: Further, all things are more passive to what is near them +than to what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer the mind than +carnal vices are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense +are caused by spiritual rather than by carnal vices. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of +sense arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust. + +_I answer that,_ The perfect intellectual operation in man consists in +an abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the more a man's +intellect is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly will it +be able to consider things intelligible, and to set in order all +things sensible. Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to +be "detached" in order to command, and that the agent must have power +over matter, in order to be able to move it. Now it is evident that +pleasure fixes a man's attention on that which he takes pleasure in: +wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4, 5) that we all do best +that which we take pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do +them either not at all, or in a faint-hearted fashion. + +Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with +pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most +impetuous of all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices +cause man's attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so +that in consequence man's operation in regard to intelligible things +is weakened, more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as +sexual pleasures are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore +lust gives rise to blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely +the knowledge of spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from +gluttony, which makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible +things. On the other hand, the contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and +chastity, dispose man very much to the perfection of intellectual +operation. Hence it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to these children" on +account of their abstinence and continency, "God gave knowledge and +understanding in every book, and wisdom." + +Reply Obj. 1: Although some who are the slaves of carnal vices are at +times capable of subtle considerations about intelligible things, on +account of the perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit +superadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the pleasures of the +body, it must needs happen that their attention is frequently +withdrawn from this subtle contemplation: wherefore the unclean can +know some truths, but their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 2: The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not by +altering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid +manner. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are +further removed from the mind, that they distract the mind's +attention to more remote things, so that they hinder the mind's +contemplation all the more. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 16 + +OF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and +under this head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) The precepts concerning faith; + +(2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 16, Art. 1] + +Whether in the Old Law There Should Have Been Given Precepts of Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that, in the Old Law, there should have +been given precepts of faith. Because a precept is about something due +and necessary. Now it is most necessary for man that he should +believe, according to Heb. 11:6, "Without faith it is impossible to +please God." Therefore there was very great need for precepts of faith +to be given. + +Obj. 2: Further, the New Testament is contained in the Old, as the +reality in the figure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 107, A. 3). Now the +New Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance John +14:1: "You believe in God; believe also in Me." Therefore it seems +that some precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law +also. + +Obj. 3: Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the same +as to forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many +precepts forbidding unbelief: thus (Ex. 20:3): "Thou shalt not have +strange gods before Me," and (Deut. 13:1-3) they were forbidden to +hear the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them +away from their faith in God. Therefore precepts of faith should have +been given in the Old Law also. + +Obj. 4: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above +(Q. 3, A. 1). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the confession +and the promulgation of faith: for they were commanded (Ex. 12:27) +that, when their children should ask them, they should tell them the +meaning of the paschal observance, and (Deut. 13:9) they were +commanded to slay anyone who disseminated doctrine contrary to faith. +Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith. + +Obj. 5: Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained in +the Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said (John 15:25) that it was written +in the Law: "They have hated Me without cause," although this is +found written in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye +that fear the Lord, believe Him." Therefore the Old Law should have +contained precepts of faith. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (Rom. 3:27) calls the Old Law the "law +of works" which he contrasts with the "law of faith." Therefore the +Old Law ought not to have contained precepts of faith. + +_I answer that,_ A master does not impose laws on others than his +subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone +who receives the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the +primary subjection of man to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: +"He that cometh to God, must believe that He is." Hence faith is +presupposed to the precepts of the Law: for which reason (Ex. 20:2) +that which is of faith, is set down before the legal precepts, in the +words, "I am the Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of +Egypt," and, likewise (Deut. 6:4), the words, "Hear, O Israel, the +Lord thy [Vulg.: 'our'] God is one," precede the recording of the +precepts. + +Since, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith +whereby we believe that God is, which is the first and chief of all +articles of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 1, 7), it follows that, +if we presuppose faith in God, whereby man's mind is subjected to +Him, it is possible for precepts to be given about other articles of +faith. Thus Augustine expounding the words: "This is My commandment" +(John 15:12) says (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.) that we have received +many precepts of faith. In the Old Law, however, the secret things of +faith were not to be set before the people, wherefore, presupposing +their faith in one God, no other precepts of faith were given in the +Old Law. + +Reply Obj. 1: Faith is necessary as being the principle of spiritual +life, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the Law. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of faith, +namely belief in one God, when He said: "You believe in God," and +commanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one +Person is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs to the faith +of the New Testament, wherefore He added: "Believe also in Me." + +Reply Obj. 3: The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which corrupt +virtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 4, ad 3; I-II, Q. 19, A. 6, ad 1, A. 7, ad 3). +Therefore faith in one God being presupposed, prohibitive precepts +had to be given in the Old Law, so that men might be warned off those +particular defects whereby their faith might be corrupted. + +Reply Obj. 4: Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also +presuppose man's submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law +could contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of +faith, rather than to faith itself. + +Reply Obj. 5: In this passage again that faith is presupposed whereby +we believe that God is; hence it begins, "Ye that fear the Lord," +which is not possible without faith. The words which follow--"believe +Him"--must be referred to certain special articles of faith, chiefly +to those things which God promises to them that obey Him, wherefore +the passage concludes--"and your reward shall not be made void." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 16, Art. 2] + +Whether the Precepts Referring to Knowledge and Understanding Were +Fittingly Set Down in the Old Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts referring to knowledge +and understanding were unfittingly set down in the Old Law. For +knowledge and understanding pertain to cognition. Now cognition +precedes and directs action. Therefore the precepts referring to +knowledge and understanding should precede the precepts of the Law +referring to action. Since, then, the first precepts of the Law are +those of the decalogue, it seems that precepts of knowledge and +understanding should have been given a place among the precepts of +the decalogue. + +Obj. 2: Further, learning precedes teaching, for a man must learn +from another before he teaches another. Now the Old Law contains +precepts about teaching--both affirmative precepts as, for example, +(Deut. 4:9), "Thou shalt teach them to thy sons"--and prohibitive +precepts, as, for instance, (Deut. 4:2), "You shall not add to the +word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." +Therefore it seems that man ought to have been given also some +precepts directing him to learn. + +Obj. 3: Further, knowledge and understanding seem more necessary to a +priest than to a king, wherefore it is written (Malachi 2:7): "The +lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law +at his mouth," and (Osee 4:6): "Because thou hast rejected knowledge, +I will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood +to Me." Now the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law +(Deut. 17:18, 19). Much more therefore should the Law have commanded +the priests to learn the Law. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is not possible while asleep to meditate on +things pertaining to knowledge and understanding: moreover it is +hindered by extraneous occupations. Therefore it is unfittingly +commanded (Deut. 6:7): "Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy +house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising." Therefore +the precepts relating to knowledge and understanding are unfittingly +set down in the Law. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:6): "That, hearing all +these precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and understanding people." + +_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in relation to +knowledge and understanding: first, the reception thereof; secondly, +the use; and thirdly, their preservation. Now the reception of +knowledge or understanding, is by means of teaching and learning, and +both are prescribed in the Law. For it is written (Deut. 6:6): "These +words which I command thee . . . shall be in thy heart." This refers +to learning, since it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind to +what is said, while the words that follow--"and thou shalt tell them +to thy children"--refer to teaching. + +The use of knowledge and understanding is the meditation on those +things which one knows or understands. In reference to this, the text +goes on: "thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house," etc. + +Their preservation is effected by the memory, and, as regards this, +the text continues--"and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand, +and they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt +write them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house." Thus the +continual remembrance of God's commandments is signified, since it +is impossible for us to forget those things which are continually +attracting the notice of our senses, whether by touch, as those +things we hold in our hands, or by sight, as those things which are +ever before our eyes, or to which we are continually returning, for +instance, to the house door. Moreover it is clearly stated (Deut. +4:9): "Forget not the words that thy eyes have seen and let them +not go out of thy heart all the days of thy life." + +We read of these things also being commanded more notably in the New +Testament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in that of the +apostles. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to Deut. 4:6, "this is your wisdom and +understanding in the sight of the nations." By this we are given to +understand that the wisdom and understanding of those who believe in +God consist in the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the +Law had to be given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know +and understand them, and so it was not fitting that the aforesaid +precepts should be placed among the precepts of the decalogue which +take the first place. + +Reply Obj. 2: There are also in the Law precepts relating to +learning, as stated above. Nevertheless teaching was commanded more +expressly than learning, because it concerned the learned, who were +not under any other authority, but were immediately under the law, +and to them the precepts of the Law were given. On the other hand +learning concerned the people of lower degree, and these the +precepts of the Law have to reach through the learned. + +Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge of the Law is so closely bound up with the +priestly office that being charged with the office implies being +charged to know the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts +to be given about the training of the priests. On the other hand, the +doctrine of God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office, +because a king is placed over his people in temporal matters: hence +it is especially commanded that the king should be instructed by the +priests about things pertaining to the law of God. + +Reply Obj. 4: That precept of the Law does not mean that man should +meditate on God's law by sleeping, but during sleep, i.e. that he +should meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep, +because this leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so +far as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of +sleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). In like manner we +are commanded to meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not +that we are bound to be always actually thinking about the Law, but +that we should regulate all our actions according to it. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 17 + +OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF +(In Eight Articles) + +After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; +(2) the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding +precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold +consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject. + +Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether hope is a virtue? + +(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness? + +(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's +happiness? + +(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man? + +(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue? + +(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues? + +(7) Of its relation to faith; + +(8) Of its relation to charity. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 1] + +Whether Hope Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man +makes ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, +18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope, +like the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore +hope is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works +virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. +xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the +Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing" +(Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But hope is the disposition of an +imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have. +Therefore hope is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three +daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and +charity. Therefore hope is a virtue. + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the +virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work +good likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it +must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and +ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say +that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its +proper measurement. But, as we stated above (Q. 8, A. 3, ad 3) human +acts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. +the reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God: +wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or God +Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For, +as we have already stated (I-II, Q. 40, A. 1), when we were treating +of the passion of hope, the object of hope is a future good, +difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in +two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as +stated in _Ethic._ iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything +as being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our hope +attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident +that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to +attain its due rule. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right +reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue. +Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's +attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot +make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill +use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus +is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we +speak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show +further on (A. 5; Q. 18, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing +hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace +and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of +hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our +merits, but from grace alone. + +Reply Obj. 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that +which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in +so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help +he leans. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 2] + +Whether Eternal Happiness Is the Proper Object of Hope? + +Objection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper +object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses +every movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the +soul. Now eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human +soul, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not "entered +into the heart of man." Therefore happiness is not the proper object +of hope. + +Obj. 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written +(Ps. 36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He +will do it." Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for +eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and +spiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's +Prayer, to be delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal +happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of +hope. + +Obj. 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many +things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore +eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope +"which entereth in," i.e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil," +i.e. into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of +a gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal +happiness. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the hope of which we speak +now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped +for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore +the good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is +the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine +helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an +infinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the +enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing +less than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things +to His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper +and principal object of hope is eternal happiness. + +Reply Obj. 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man +perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its +nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect +good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in +this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the +Apostle says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within +the veil," because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to +speak. + +Reply Obj. 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in +reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness +chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards +secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith +regards God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are +referred to God, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser +things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness, +nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, +as compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things +besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such +things in reference to its principal object. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 3] + +Whether One Man May Hope for Another's Eternal Happiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal +happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this +very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect +it unto the day of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will +be eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's +eternal happiness. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him. +But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to +James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore +we can hope for another's eternal happiness. + +Obj. 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it +is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine +would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we +should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can +also hope for another's eternal salvation. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is +only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for +them." + +_I answer that,_ We can hope for something in two ways: first, +absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous +and pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for +something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way +its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to +explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that +love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a +movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous +good. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can +directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, +looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always +towards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved. +Therefore hope regards directly one's own good, and not that which +pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with +another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as +for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another's eternal +life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the +same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his +neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes +for himself and for another. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 4] + +Whether a Man Can Lawfully Hope in Man? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the +object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain +eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says +(Dial. i, 8) that "predestination is furthered by the saints' +prayers." Therefore one may hope in man. + +Obj. 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not +to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in +him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4: +"Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in +any brother of his." Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man. + +Obj. 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above +(A. 2, Obj. 2). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something. +Therefore it is lawful to trust in him. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that +trusteth in man." + +_I answer that,_ Hope, as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7), +regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the +help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes +to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which +one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient +cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a +secondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the +secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the +principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary +efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope +regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance +as the first cause leading to happiness. + +Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save +happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final +happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any +creature, as though it were the first cause of movement towards +happiness. It is, however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as +being the secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is helped +to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way +that we turn to the saints, and that we ask men also for certain +things; and for this reason some are blamed in that they cannot be +trusted to give help. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 5] + +Whether Hope Is a Theological Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For +a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has +for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to +obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two +vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 4). But hope is a mean +between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological +virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a +species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it +seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it +belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the +arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith +and charity, which are theological virtues. + +_I answer that,_ Since specific differences, by their very nature, +divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place +hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue. + +Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that hope has the character of +virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human +actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as +much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in +as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is +evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a +virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one +that has God for its object, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 1), it +is evident that hope is a theological virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it +in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause, +as stated above (A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the +measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is +excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the +rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes. +Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and +these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to +follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a +theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by +another rule, and that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not +proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to +follow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with +regard to something that is referred to its principal object. Thus +faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the +First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on +the part of the things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for +instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has +no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is +impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may +have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to +obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or +despairs of things of which he is capable. + +Reply Obj. 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of +hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to +longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether +that which we hope for be delayed or not. + +Reply Obj. 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of +obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper +object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a +theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by +another's help, as stated above (A. 1). +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 6] + +Whether Hope Is Distinct from the Other Theological Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other +theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, +as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the object of hope is the +same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not +distinct from the other theological virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession +of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life +of the world to come." Now expectation of future happiness belongs to +hope, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore hope is not distinct from +faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly +to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity. + +_On the contrary,_ There cannot be number without distinction. Now +hope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says +(Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity. +Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues. + +_I answer that,_ A virtue is said to be theological from having God +for the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in +two ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else +is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for +His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love. + +On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a +principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from +God both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness. +Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we +derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells +us is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence +we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to +the Divine assistance for obtaining happiness. + +Reply Obj. 1: God is the object of these virtues under different +aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the object +suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, +A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as +though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope +presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on (A. 7). +Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained +finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity, +properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to +Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 7] + +Whether Hope Precedes Faith? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss +on Ps. 36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the +entrance to faith and the beginning of salvation." But salvation is +by faith whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should +precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in +the definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of +things to be hoped for." Therefore hope precedes faith. + +Obj. 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle +says (1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to +receive fruit." But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope +precedes faith. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac," +i.e. "Faith begot hope," according to a gloss. + +_I answer that,_ Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the +object of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In +order, therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of +hope to be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in +one way, eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine +assistance, as explained above (A. 2; A. 6, ad 3): and both of these +are proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able +to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine +assistance is ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh +to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek +Him." Therefore it is evident that faith precedes hope. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is called +"the entrance" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope +we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called +the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be established +and perfected in faith. + +Reply Obj. 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition +of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not +apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a +circumlocution by something resulting from faith. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it +suffices for it to accompany or follow it. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 8] + +Whether Charity Precedes Hope? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose +says on Luke 27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard +seed," etc.: "Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity." But +faith precedes charity. Therefore charity precedes hope. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good +emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity." Now to +hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul. +Therefore it flows from charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope +proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but +also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by +charity. Therefore charity precedes hope. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the +commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience," +i.e. "from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes +charity. + +_I answer that,_ Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and +of matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: +the other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which +the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first +order hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that +hope and all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 4; I-II, Q. 28, A. 6, ad 2; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7) +in the treatise on the passions. + +Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that +whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person +some good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect +love is that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but +that he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he +desires. The first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to +God for His own sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since +he that hopes, intends to obtain possession of something for himself. + +Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as +a man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for +his sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so +too, hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be +rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments. +On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally +precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made +more perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this +sense that Ambrose states (Obj. 1) that charity flows from hope: so +that this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from +some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every +kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living +hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a +friend. + +Reply Obj. 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is +naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 18 + +OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are +four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject? + +(2) Whether it is in the blessed? + +(3) Whether it is in the damned? + +(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 1] + +Whether Hope Is in the Will As Its Subject? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its +subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above +(Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1). Now the arduous is the object, not +of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will +but in the irascible. + +Obj. 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another. +Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the +most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the +same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things +simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act +of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the +will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: +so that, therefore, hope is not in the will. + +_On the contrary,_ The soul is not apprehensive of God save as +regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine +declares (De Trin. xiv, 3, 6). Now hope is a theological virtue +having God for its object. Since therefore it is neither in the +memory, nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, +it follows that it is in the will as its subject. + +_I answer that,_ As shown above (I, Q. 87, A. 2), habits are known by +their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive +faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold +appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into +irascible and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called +the will, as stated in the First Part (Q. 82, A. 5), those movements +which occur in the lower appetite, are with passion, while those in +the higher appetite are without passion, as shown above (I, Q. 87, A. +2, ad 1; I-II, Q. 22, A. 3, ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope +cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the +principal object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. +Therefore hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and +not in the lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part. + +Reply Obj. 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible: +whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible, +or rather superintelligible. + +Reply Obj. 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to +one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required +in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of +hoping. + +Reply Obj. 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity are +mutually related, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8). Hence there is no +reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the +same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the +same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the First +Part (Q. 85, A. 4). +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 2] + +Whether in the Blessed There Is Hope? + +Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For +Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His +conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words +of Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person. +Therefore in the blessed there can be hope. + +Obj. 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous +good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men +hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can +hope to continue in its possession. + +Obj. 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness, +not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above (Q. 17, A. +3). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of +others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there can be +hope in them. + +Obj. 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory +of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the saints +in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10; +Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can +be hope. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, +why doth he hope for?" Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God. +Therefore hope has no place in them. + +_I answer that,_ If what gives a thing its species be removed, the +species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as +when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same +specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object, +even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q. 17, AA. 5, 6; +I-II, Q. 54, A. 2): and its principal object is eternal happiness as +being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above +(Q. 17, A. 2). + +Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope +except in so far as it is something future, it follows that when +happiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with +the virtue of hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in +heaven, and neither of them can be in the blessed. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore +blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same +time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He +was still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the +glory of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to have the +virtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the +body but the enjoyment of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal life, +because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were, of +God's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of +happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future. +Hence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness +(for as regards this there is no future), but are in actual +possession thereof. + +Reply Obj. 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same +hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of others. +But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their +own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not +by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he +that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor, +without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love. + +Reply Obj. 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having God for its +object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which consists +in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Moreover, +although the glory of the body is something arduous in comparison +with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the glory of the +soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small thing as +compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has the +glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of +the body. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 3] + +Whether Hope Is in the Damned? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the +devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Matt. 25:41: +"Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared +for the devil and his angels." But the devil has hope, according to +Job 40:28, "Behold his hope shall fail him." Therefore it seems that +the damned have hope. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope. +But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according to +James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and tremble." Therefore it +seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned. + +Obj. 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit +that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, "If the tree fall +to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, +there shall it be." Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and +never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also. + +_On the contrary,_ Hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12, +"Rejoicing in hope." Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and +grief, according to Isa. 65:14, "My servants shall praise for +joyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall +howl for grief of spirit." Therefore no hope is in the damned. + +_I answer that,_ Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will +should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that +what is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that +which is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will: +wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could +not be perfectly happy in their first state before their +confirmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no +foreknowledge of what would happen to them. For perfect and true +happiness requires that one should be certain of being happy for +ever, else the will would not rest. + +In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary +condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly +penal unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible +if they were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation. +Hence it belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should +know that they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain +happiness. Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): "He believeth not +that he may return from darkness to light." It is, therefore, evident +that they cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither +can the blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is +no hope either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand, +hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, +because in either case they apprehend happiness as a future possible +thing. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said of the +devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it +be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby +he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just before +(Job 40:18): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth": +this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is about +things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or +another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and +concerning oneself." Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in +the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them +future possible things, but far removed from them. + +Reply Obj. 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their +demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase +their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their +respective states. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 4] + +Whether There Is Certainty in the Hope of a Wayfarer? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of +a wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not +to the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in +hope. + +Obj. 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated above +(Q. 17, A. 1). Now it is impossible in this life to know for certain +that we are in a state of grace, as stated above (I-II, Q. 112, A. +5). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer. + +Obj. 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may fail. +Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore +wayfarer's hope has no certainty. + +_On the contrary,_ "Hope is the certain expectation of future +happiness," as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be +gathered from 2 Tim. 1:12, "I know Whom I have believed, and I am +certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed to Him." + +_I answer that,_ Certainty is found in a thing in two ways, +essentially and by participation. It is found essentially in the +cognitive power; by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to +its end by the cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works +with certainty, since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves +everything with certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral +virtues are said to work with greater certainty than art, in as much +as, like a second nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason: +and thus too, hope tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing +in the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive faculty. + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received, +but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not +grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has +faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy. + +Reply Obj. 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is +due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but +not to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places +its trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 19 + +OF THE GIFT OF FEAR +(In Twelve Articles) + +We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether God is to be feared? + +(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly; + +(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil? + +(4) Whether servile fear is good? + +(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear? + +(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes? + +(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom? + +(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear? + +(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost? + +(10) Whether it grows when charity grows? + +(11) Whether it remains in heaven? + +(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 1] + +Whether God Can Be Feared? + +Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object +of fear is a future evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 41, AA. 2, 3). +But God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore +God cannot be feared. + +Obj. 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God. +Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time. + +Obj. 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear +those things whence evil comes to us." But evil comes to us, not from +God, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy +own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me." Therefore God is not to be +feared. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 10:7): "Who shall not fear +Thee, O King of nations?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where +is My fear?" + +_I answer that,_ Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the +future good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is +someone's help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes +for, so, too, fear may have two objects, one of which is the very +evil which a man shrinks from, while the other is that from which the +evil may come. Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness +itself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can be an object of fear +in the second way, in so far as there may come to us some evil either +from Him or in relation to Him. + +From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not +absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good. +Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an +end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the +order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of +fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in +so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely +speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end. + +In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be +separated from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared. + +Reply Obj. 1: This objection considers the object of fear as being +the evil which a man shuns. + +Reply Obj. 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in respect of +which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which +He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to +fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that, +accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under +different aspects. + +Reply Obj. 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author but +from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment +is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good, +since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly; +although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is +written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked +with works and words have called it to them." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 2] + +Whether Fear Is Fittingly Divided into Filial, Initial, Servile and +Worldly Fear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into +filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De +Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness, +shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above (I-II, Q. 41, A. +4), and which are not mentioned in the division in question. +Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting. + +Obj. 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But +there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good, +since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . . +believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to +Mk. 14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy." Therefore the +aforesaid division of fear is insufficient. + +Obj. 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of +wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now +filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, +is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in +comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be +that of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be +distinguished from all these other fears. + +Obj. 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial +and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between +them. + +Obj. 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear +about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the desire +for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the +flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore +"worldly fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct +from "human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person. + +On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34). + +_I answer that,_ We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes +us turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object +of fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man +withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes, +on account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him. +This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of +fault. + +Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of +punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear +of committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child +to fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both, +it will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to +whether it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has +been treated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 3) when we were considering the +passion of fear. + +Reply Obj. 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul: +whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as +explained above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while +moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all +the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now +natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not +numbered among these kinds of fear. + +Reply Obj. 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the power +which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the +contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her +husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he +submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to +whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste +fear amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes +our Father, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of +adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)"; and by this same +charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have +espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste +virgin to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these, +since it does not include charity in its definition. + +Reply Obj. 4: These three fears regard punishment but in different +ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which turns man +away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or threaten: +whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby men are +drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God. Servile +fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it +secondarily. + +Reply Obj. 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away from God +through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of +forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to +the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although +they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of +different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins, +all of which alike however lead man away from God. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 3] + +Whether Worldly Fear Is Always Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil. +Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are +blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge +of whom we read (Luke 18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded +man." Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil. + +Obj. 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the +punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments +incite us to good actions, according to Rom. 13:3, "Wilt thou not be +afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have +praise from the same." Therefore worldly fear is not always evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not evil, +since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to +fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby +the present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear +is not always evil. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them +that kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but +what is evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil. + +_I answer that,_ As shown above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 1; +I-II, Q. 54, A. 2) moral acts and habits take their name and species +from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's movement +is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement +is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone were +to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on account +of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the +covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he +seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the +desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly +love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the +world as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is +born of love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine +states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises +from worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear +is always evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in so +far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of +grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in +this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one +may have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is +praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias +or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince." + +Reply Obj. 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in order to +withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister, according to +Rom. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath +upon him that doth evil." To fear the secular power in this way is +part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his +own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that +account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says +(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, +which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse +than to suffer any punishment whatever. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 4] + +Whether Servile Fear Is Good? + +Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the +use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of +servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "if a man +do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well +done." Therefore servile fear is not good. + +Obj. 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile fear +grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11, "Why +did I not die in the womb?" Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a man +dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer +loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of +pride, not of humility." Therefore servile fear is evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of +charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But +mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also. + +_On the contrary,_ Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear +is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "You have not +received the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit +that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear." Therefore +servile fear is not evil. + +_I answer that,_ It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be +evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free +is cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as +cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever +does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it +is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is +contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from +love. Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so +that if servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil +simply, even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it +contrary to charity belongs to its very species. + +This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile +fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless +faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the +object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by +accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary, +is loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is +feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid +of charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and +that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is +the case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not +destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end. +Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is +evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who +does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not +justice, and fears nothing but the punishment. + +Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride, +but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to +subject his affections to the yoke of justice. + +Reply Obj. 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the +sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity, +so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its +substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be +feared as the principal evil. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 5] + +Whether Servile Fear Is Substantially the Same As Filial Fear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the +same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same +apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is +accompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and +lifeless faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and +filial fear are substantially the same. + +Obj. 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the +same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they +both fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially +the same. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain favors +from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be punished +by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to +receive other favors from Him, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 2, ad 2). +Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the +same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says +that there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear. + +_I answer that,_ The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts +and habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, Q. +54, A. 2), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear +correspond to different kinds of evil. + +Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs +specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown +above (A. 2). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear are +not the same substantially but differ specifically. + +Reply Obj. 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards the +object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but in +respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of +charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand, +servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the +comparison fails. + +Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God +in the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the +infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as +the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks +to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz. +God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural +movements differ specifically according to their different +relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not +specifically the same as movement towards whiteness. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of +the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This +cannot be said of fear; and so there is no comparison. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6] + +Whether Servile Fear Remains with Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with +charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that +"when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had +prepared a place for it." + +Obj. 2: Further, "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, +by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Now "where the +Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then +freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away +when charity comes. + +Obj. 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as +punishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of God drives away +self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine +testifies (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "the love of God unto the +contempt of self builds up the city of God." Therefore it seems that +servile fear is driven out when charity comes. + +_On the contrary,_ Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as +stated above (A. 4). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not +forfeited through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost +dwells in us. Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity +comes. + +_I answer that,_ Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is +fear of punishment which is detrimental to one's own good. Hence the +fear of punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as +self-love is: because it comes to the same that a man love his own +good and that he fear to be deprived of it. + +Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In +one way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the +love of his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when +a man loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way, +it is indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as +when a man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet +not so as to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have +another special love for one's neighbor, besides the love of charity +which is founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness, +consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is +referable to charity. + +Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity, +because separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns +exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it +is contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that +is opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in +opposition to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear +of punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of +punishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when, +to wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from +God, but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not +place his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil +as being the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent +with charity; but it is not called servile, except when punishment is +dreaded as a principal evil, as explained above (AA. 2, 4). Hence +fear considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the +substance of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love +can remain with charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as servile: +and such is the sense of the two other objections. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6] + +Whether Fear Is the Beginning of Wisdom? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom. +For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a +part of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while +wisdom is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the +beginning of wisdom. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of the +Lord, that is wisdom," according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems +that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom. + +Obj. 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something is +prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that +fear is not the beginning of wisdom. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Ps. 110:10: "The fear of the +Lord is the beginning of wisdom." + +_I answer that,_ A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two +ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to +its essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of +an art as to its essence consists in the principles from which that +art proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that +wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the +beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is +where the builder begins his work. + +Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall +state further on (Q. 45, A. 1), it is considered by us in one way, +and in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is +ordained to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according +to a participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through +grace, wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being +cognizant of God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as +directing human conduct; since this is directed not only by the human +law, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii, +14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists +in the first principles of wisdom, i.e. the articles of faith, and in +this sense faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as +regards the effect, the beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom +begins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet +servile fear in one way, and filial fear, in another. For servile +fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in +so far as he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is +thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom, according to Ecclus. 1:27, +"The fear of the Lord driveth out sin." On the other hand, chaste or +filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of +wisdom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the Divine law +belongs to wisdom, in order to make a beginning, man must first of +all fear God and submit himself to Him: for the result will be that +in all things he will be ruled by God. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that fear is not the beginning of +wisdom as to the essence of wisdom. + +Reply Obj. 2: The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life that +is ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is +written (Ecclus. 1:25): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for +[Vulg.: 'and'] the branches thereof are longlived." Consequently, as +the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said +to be wisdom. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of +wisdom in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus. +25:16): "The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning +of faith is to be fast joined to it." +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 7] + +Whether Initial Fear Differs Substantially from Filial Fear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially +from filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear +is the beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, "The fear of +God is the beginning of love." Therefore initial fear is distinct +from filial fear. + +Obj. 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the object +of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to be +the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore +initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear. + +Obj. 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the +extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial +fear. Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear. + +_On the contrary,_ Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the +substance of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect +of perfection and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In +prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ +substantially from filial fear. + +_I answer that,_ Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning +(_initium_). Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in +some way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way, +initial. + +It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial +fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in +the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in +whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning +of charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial +fear, because they have not yet attained to the perfection of +charity. Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to +filial fear as imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and +imperfect charity differ, not as to essence but as to state. +Therefore we must conclude that initial fear, as we understand it +here, does not differ essentially from filial fear. + +Reply Obj. 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile fear, +which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces the +thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if +it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of +love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity. + +Reply Obj. 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its proper +object, but as having something of servile fear connected with it: +for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with +charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with +imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not +only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment, +though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which +"casteth out fear," according to 1 John 4:18. + +Reply Obj. 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear, +not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect is +a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in +_Metaph._ ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being, +while it differs altogether from non-being. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 9] + +Whether Fear Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. +For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also +from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to +Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore +fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God for +its object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is +feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a +theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue, +being connected with the same matter, as it were. + +Obj. 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is bestowed +as a remedy against pride." But the virtue of humility is opposed to +pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue. + +Obj. 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since +they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says (Moral. +ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, +while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should not +be said that fear is a gift. + +_On the contrary,_ The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven +gifts of the Holy Ghost (Isa. 11:3). + +_I answer that,_ Fear is of several kinds, as stated above (A. 2). +Now it is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib. +Arb. xviii), "that is a gift of God"--for it was by this fear that +Peter denied Christ--but that fear of which it was said (Matt. +10:28): "Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell." + +Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the +Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De +Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas +the gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as +they are inseparable from charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. +5). + +It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among +the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it +was stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 3) that the gifts of the Holy +Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby +these are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as, +by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to +the motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of +a certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a +non-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the +movable subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what +filial or chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid +separating ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De +Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it +were, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and +the last place, in the descending order. + +Reply Obj. 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope: since +thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain by +God's help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore +filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another. + +Reply Obj. 2: The proper and principal object of fear is the evil +shunned, and in this way, as stated above (A. 1), God cannot be an +object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and the +other theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust in +God's help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to +obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies +to the other theological virtues. + +Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it does +not follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from charity +which is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the +emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of +different emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is, +because love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed by +reason of its own nature, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4); +for which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear +principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes, +wherefore it is something less than a theological virtue. + +Reply Obj. 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride +of man is to fall off from God," that is to refuse submission to God, +and this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear cuts +off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a remedy +against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the +virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the +Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4), while the theological virtues are +the origin of the gifts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 69, A. 4, ad 3). + +This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection. +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 10] + +Whether Fear Decreases When Charity Increases? + +Objection 1: It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For +Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): "The more charity +increases, the more fear decreases." + +Obj. 2: Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity +increases when hope increases, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 8). +Therefore fear decreases when charity increases. + +Obj. 3: Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies separation. +Now separation decreases when union increases. Therefore fear +decreases when the love of charity increases. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "the +fear of God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love +God above all things, and our neighbor as ourselves." + +_I answer that,_ Fear is twofold, as stated above (AA. 2, 4); one is +filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be +separated from him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears +punishment. + +Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as +an effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one +loves a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated +from him. + +On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely +cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains +as to its substance, as stated above (A. 6). This fear decreases as +charity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man +loves God, the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks +less of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly, +because, the faster he clings, the more confident he is of the +reward, and, consequently the less fearful of punishment. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope +increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases, +because the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by +another's help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated +from him. + +Reply Obj. 3: Filial fear does not imply separation from God, but +submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet, in +a way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal +oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be +observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than +himself and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of +charity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of +fear. +_______________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 11] + +Whether Fear Remains in Heaven? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For +it is written (Prov. 1:33): "He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without +fear of evils," which is to be understood as referring to those who +already enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is +about some evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above +(AA. 2, 5; I-II, Q. 42, A. 1). Therefore there will be no fear in +heaven. + +Obj. 2: Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according to +1 John 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." But God +fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear. + +Obj. 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards +good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore +neither will there be fear in heaven. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The fear of the Lord +is holy, enduring for ever and ever." + +_I answer that,_ Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no +means be in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security +which is essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above (I-II, +Q. 5, A. 4). + +But with regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of +charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in +heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now. + +In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object +of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a +possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of +avoidance, fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for +little evils inspire no fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its +staying in its own order, so a thing's evil consists in forsaking its +order. Again, the order of a rational creature is that it should be +under God and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for +a rational creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too +is it an evil for it, if it submit not to God, but presumptuously +revolt against Him or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a +rational creature considered as to its nature on account of the +natural flexibility of the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it +becomes impossible, by reason of the perfection of glory. Therefore +the avoidance of this evil that consists in non-subjection to God, +and is possible to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss, will +be in heaven; while in this life there is avoidance of this evil as +of something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, expounding the words +of Job (26:11), "The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His +beck," says (Moral. xvii, 29): "The heavenly powers that gaze on Him +without ceasing, tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it +should be of a penal nature, is one not of fear but of wonder," +because, to wit, they wonder at God's supereminence and +incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) in this +sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the question +doubtful. "If," he says, "this chaste fear that endureth for ever and +ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that is +afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds +fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which +we have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is +allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because +chaste fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we +avoid sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and +possess ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no +kind of fear is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for +ever and ever, because that which fear will lead us to, will be +everlasting." + +Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the fear +that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear +which is accompanied by security. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) "the same things are +both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable +imitation of the Inimitable"--that is, because, so far as they can, +they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly--"they are unlike +because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short +infinitely and immeasurably." Hence, if there be no fear in God +(since there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not +follow that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in +perfect subjection to God. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hope implies a certain defect, namely the futurity of +happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas fear +implies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is infinitely +distant from God, and this defect will remain even in heaven. Hence +fear will not be cast out altogether. +_______________________ + +TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 12] + +Whether Poverty of Spirit Is the Beatitude Corresponding to the Gift +of Fear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the +beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the +beginning of the spiritual life, as explained above (A. 7): whereas +poverty belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to +Matt. 19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and +give to the poor." Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to +the gift of fear. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120): "Pierce Thou my flesh +with Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear to +restrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong +rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of +mourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude +of poverty. + +Obj. 3: Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of hope, +as stated above (A. 9, ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is, +"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children +of God," seems above all to correspond to hope, because according to +Rom. 5:2, "we . . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of +God." Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear, +rather than poverty of spirit. + +Obj. 4: Further, it was stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 2) that the +fruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits +correspond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the +beatitudes. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The +fear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed +are the poor in spirit." + +_I answer that,_ Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. +Because, since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and +submission to God, whatever results from this submission belongs to +the gift of fear. Now from the very fact that a man submits to God, +it follows that he ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in +another but seeks it only in God. For that would be inconsistent with +perfect subjection to God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8): "Some +trust in chariots and some in horses; but we will call upon the name +of . . . our God." It follows that if a man fear God perfectly, he +does not, by pride, seek greatness either in himself or in external +goods, viz. honors and riches. In either case, this proceeds from +poverty of spirit, in so far as the latter denotes either the voiding +of a puffed up and proud spirit, according to Augustine's +interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the renunciation of +worldly goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one's own will, +through the instigation of the Holy Spirit, according to the +expounding of Ambrose on Luke 6:20 and Jerome on Matt. 5:3. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue, all the +beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this +perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a +perfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly +goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts. +Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of +temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial +fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent +with the perfection of wisdom, as stated above (AA. 7, 10). + +Reply Obj. 2: The undue exaltation of man either in himself or in +another is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is +the result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in +consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject +to Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless, +pleasure is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous +character of a thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of +poverty corresponds to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning, +consequently. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of +tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation +of withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the +term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of +ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal +from external things which hinder submission to God, fittingly +corresponds to fear. + +Reply Obj. 4: As regards the fruits, it seems that those things +correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of +temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty, +continency and chastity. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 20 + +OF DESPAIR +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption. +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether despair is a sin? + +(2) Whether it can be without unbelief? + +(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? + +(4) Whether it arises from sloth? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 1] + +Whether Despair Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin +includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from +the immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But +despair includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not +a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no +sin, because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Matt. +7:18). Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God, +or from horror at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore despair +is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for +the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault +but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to +wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be +a sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the +Apostle says of certain men (Eph. 4:19): "Who, despairing, have given +themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness +and [Vulg.: 'unto'] covetousness." Therefore despair is not only a +sin but also the origin of other sins. + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2) +affirmation and negation in the intellect correspond to search and +avoidance in the appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect +correspond to good and evil in the appetite. Consequently every +appetitive movement which is conformed to a true intellect, is good +in itself, while every appetitive movement which is conformed to a +false intellect is evil in itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of +the intellect about God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind, +and pardon to sinners, according to Ezech. 18:23, "I desire not the +death of the sinner, but that he should be converted, and live" +[*Vulg.: 'Is it My will that a sinner should die . . . and not that +he should be converted and live?' Cf. Ezech. 33:11]: while it is a +false opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that +He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace. Therefore, +just as the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true +opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the contrary movement of +despair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is +vicious and sinful. + +Reply Obj. 1: In every mortal sin there is, in some way, aversion +from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but not +always in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have +God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as +hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion +from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to +a mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God, +must necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist +principally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in +aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not +to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which +is that he departs from God. + +Reply Obj. 2: A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two ways: +first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an act +proceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a +virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii, +18, 19) that "no man makes evil use of virtue." Secondly, a thing +proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and +in this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus +sometimes men pride themselves of their virtues, according to +Augustine (Ep. ccxi): "Pride lies in wait for good works that they +may die." In this way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may +lead to despair, in so far as man makes evil use of those good +things, by allowing them to be an occasion of despair. + +Reply Obj. 3: The damned are outside the pale of hope on account of +the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not imputed +to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their damnation. Even +so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of obtaining that +which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which was not due +to be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to despair +of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever +becoming rich. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 2] + +Whether There Can Be Despair Without Unbelief? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no despair without +unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so +long as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a +man cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his +faith be removed. + +Obj. 2: Further, to prefer one's own guilt to God's mercy and +goodness, is to deny the infinity of God's goodness and mercy, and so +savors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to +the Divine mercy and goodness, according to Gen. 4:13: "My iniquity +is greater than that I may deserve pardon." Therefore whoever +despairs, is an unbeliever. + +Obj. 3: Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an +unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned +heresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon +for sins after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is +an unbeliever. + +_On the contrary,_ If we remove that which follows, that which +precedes remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above (Q. 17, A. +7). Therefore when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not +everyone who despairs, is an unbeliever. + +_I answer that,_ Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to +the appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the +appetite is moved in connection with particulars, since the +appetitive movement is from the soul towards things, which, in +themselves, are particular. Now it may happen that a man, while +having a right opinion in the universal, is not rightly disposed as +to his appetitive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a +particular matter, because, in order to pass from the universal +opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is necessary to +have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just as it is +impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal +proposition, except through the holding of a particular proposition. +Hence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal, +fails in an appetitive movement, in regard to some particular, his +particular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as +the fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this +particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular matter, +although he retains the true universal estimate according to faith, +viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In the same way, a man while +retaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, viz. that +there is in the Church the power of forgiving sins, may suffer a +movement of despair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state, +there is no hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a +particular matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there +can be other mortal sins, without belief. + +Reply Obj. 1: The effect is done away, not only when the first cause +is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence the +movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the +universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of +the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular +estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were. + +Reply Obj. 2: If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God's mercy +is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs +judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some +particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy. + +The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians +denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 3] + +Whether Despair Is the Greatest of Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins. +For there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above (A. 2). +But unbelief is the greatest of sins because it overthrows the +foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair is not the +greatest of sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as the +Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than +hope, according to 1 Cor. 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater +sin than despair. + +Obj. 3: Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but +inordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only +inordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion. +Therefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than other +sins. + +_On the contrary,_ An incurable sin seems to be most grievous, +according to Jer. 30:12: "Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very +grievous." Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jer. +15:18: "My wound is desperate so as to refuse to be healed." [*Vulg.: +"Why is my wound," etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin. + +_I answer that,_ Those sins which are contrary to the theological +virtues are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since +the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are +opposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now +every mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact +of its turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a +mutable good, even inordinately, without turning away from God, it +would not be a mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its +very nature, includes aversion from God, is most grievous among +mortal sins. + +Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the +theological virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God and +unbelief to despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in +respect of their proper species, they are more grievous. For unbelief +is due to a man not believing God's own truth; while the hatred of +God arises from man's will being opposed to God's goodness itself; +whereas despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share of +God's goodness. Hence it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are +against God as He is in Himself, while despair is against Him, +according as His good is partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly +speaking it is a more grievous sin to disbelieve God's truth, or to +hate God, than not to hope to receive glory from Him. + +If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point +of view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope withdraws us from +evils and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is +given up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good +works. Wherefore a gloss on Prov. 24:10, "If thou lose hope being +weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished," +says: "Nothing is more hateful than despair, for the man that has it +loses his constancy both in the every day toils of this life, and, +what is worse, in the battle of faith." And Isidore says (De Sum. +Bono ii, 14): "To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair +is to fall into hell." + +[And from this the response to the objections is evident.] +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 4] + +Whether Despair Arises from Sloth? + +Objection 1: It would seem that despair does not arise from sloth. +Because different causes do not give rise to one same effect. Now +despair of the future life arises from lust, according to Gregory +(Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it does not arise from sloth. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as despair is contrary to hope, so is sloth +contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy arises from hope, +according to Rom. 12:12, "rejoicing in hope." Therefore sloth arises +from despair, and not vice versa. + +Obj. 3: Further, contrary effects have contrary causes. Now hope, the +contrary of which is despair, seems to proceed from the consideration +of Divine favors, especially the Incarnation, for Augustine says (De +Trin. xiii, 10): "Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope, than +that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now what greater proof +could we have of this than that God's Son should deign to unite +Himself to our nature?" Therefore despair arises rather from the +neglect of the above consideration than from sloth. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons despair among +the effects of sloth. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1), +the object of hope is a good, difficult but possible to obtain by +oneself or by another. Consequently the hope of obtaining happiness +may be lacking in a person in two ways: first, through his not +deeming it an arduous good; secondly, through his deeming it +impossible to obtain either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact +that spiritual goods taste good to us no more, or seem to be goods of +no great account, is chiefly due to our affections being infected +with the love of bodily pleasures, among which, sexual pleasures hold +the first place: for the love of those pleasures leads man to have a +distaste for spiritual things, and not to hope for them as arduous +goods. In this way despair is caused by lust. + +On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good +impossible to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due to his +being over downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his +affections, it seems to him that he will never be able to rise to any +good. And since sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in +this way despair is born of sloth. + +Now this is the proper object of hope--that the thing is possible, +because the good and the arduous regard other passions also. Hence +despair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise +from lust, for the reason given above. + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11), just as +hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater hope: +and, accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily into +despair, according to 2 Cor. 2:7: "Lest . . . such an one be +swallowed up by overmuch sorrow." Yet, since the object of hope is +good, to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, not +naturally but only on account of some supervening obstacle, it +follows that, more directly, hope gives birth to joy, while on the +contrary despair is born of sorrow. + +Reply Obj. 3: This very neglect to consider the Divine favors arises +from sloth. For when a man is influenced by a certain passion he +considers chiefly the things which pertain to that passion: so that a +man who is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful +things, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he turn his +thoughts away from sadness. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 21 + +OF PRESUMPTION +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) What is the object in which presumption trusts? + +(2) Whether presumption is a sin? + +(3) To what is it opposed? + +(4) From what vice does it arise? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 1] + +Whether Presumption Trusts in God or in Our Own Power? + +Objection 1: It would seem that presumption, which is a sin against +the Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but in our own power. For the +lesser the power, the more grievously does he sin who trusts in it +too much. But man's power is less than God's. Therefore it is a more +grievous sin to presume on human power than to presume on the power +of God. Now the sin against the Holy Ghost is most grievous. +Therefore presumption, which is reckoned a species of sin against the +Holy Ghost, trusts to human rather than to Divine power. + +Obj. 2: Further, other sins arise from the sin against the Holy +Ghost, for this sin is called malice which is a source from which +sins arise. Now other sins seem to arise from the presumption whereby +man presumes on himself rather than from the presumption whereby he +presumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, according to +Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it seems that presumption +which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, relies chiefly on human power. + +Obj. 3: Further, sin arises from the inordinate conversion to a +mutable good. Now presumption is a sin. Therefore it arises from +turning to human power, which is a mutable good, rather than from +turning to the power of God, which is an immutable good. + +_On the contrary,_ Just as, through despair, a man despises the +Divine mercy, on which hope relies, so, through presumption, he +despises the Divine justice, which punishes the sinner. Now justice +is in God even as mercy is. Therefore, just as despair consists in +aversion from God, so presumption consists in inordinate conversion +to Him. + +_I answer that,_ Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. Now the +object of hope is an arduous possible good: and a thing is possible +to a man in two ways: first by his own power; secondly, by the power +of God alone. With regard to either hope there may be presumption +owing to lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man relies on +his own power, there is presumption if he tends to a good as though +it were possible to him, whereas it surpasses his powers, according +to Judith 6:15: "Thou humblest them that presume of themselves." This +presumption is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to +the mean in this kind of hope. + +But as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there +may be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that a man tends +to some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of +God, whereas it is not possible, for instance, if a man hope to +obtain pardon without repenting, or glory without merits. This +presumption is, properly, the sin against the Holy Ghost, because, to +wit, by presuming thus a man removes or despises the assistance of +the Holy Spirit, whereby he is withdrawn from sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 20, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3) a sin +which is against God is, in its genus, graver than other sins. Hence +presumption whereby a man relies on God inordinately, is a more +grievous sin than the presumption of trusting in one's own power, +since to rely on the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to +God, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident that it is +a graver sin to detract from the Divine power than to exaggerate +one's own. + +Reply Obj. 2: The presumption whereby a man presumes inordinately on +God, includes self-love, whereby he loves his own good inordinately. +For when we desire a thing very much, we think we can easily procure +it through others, even though we cannot. + +Reply Obj. 3: Presumption on God's mercy implies both +conversion to a mutable good, in so far as it arises from an +inordinate desire of one's own good, and aversion from the immutable +good, in as much as it ascribes to the Divine power that which is +unbecoming to it, for thus man turns away from God's power. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 2] + +Whether Presumption Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is not a sin. For no sin +is a reason why man should be heard by God. Yet, through presumption +some are heard by God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): "Hear me a +poor wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy." +Therefore presumption on God's mercy is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, presumption denotes excessive hope. But there cannot +be excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and mercy are +infinite. Therefore it seems that presumption is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is a sin does not excuse from sin: for +the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) that "Adam sinned less, because he +sinned in the hope of pardon," which seems to indicate presumption. +Therefore presumption is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy +Ghost. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 20, A. 1) with regard to +despair, every appetitive movement that is conformed to a false +intellect, is evil in itself and sinful. Now presumption is an +appetitive movement, since it denotes an inordinate hope. Moreover it +is conformed to a false intellect, just as despair is: for just as it +is false that God does not pardon the repentant, or that He does not +turn sinners to repentance, so is it false that He grants forgiveness +to those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory to +those who cease from good works: and it is to this estimate that the +movement of presumption is conformed. + +Consequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than despair, +since, on account of His infinite goodness, it is more proper to God +to have mercy and to spare, than to punish: for the former becomes +God in Himself, the latter becomes Him by reason of our sins. + +Reply Obj. 1: Presumption sometimes stands for hope, because even the +right hope which we have in God seems to be presumption, if it be +measured according to man's estate: yet it is not, if we look at the +immensity of the goodness of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as though +man hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from God +something unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too little +in Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power; as stated above +(A. 1, ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: To sin with the intention of persevering in sin and +through the hope of being pardoned, is presumptuous, and this does +not diminish, but increases sin. To sin, however, with the hope of +obtaining pardon some time, and with the intention of refraining from +sin and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes sin, +because this seems to indicate a will less hardened in sin. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 3] + +Whether Presumption Is More Opposed to Fear Than to Hope? + +Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear +than to hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now +presumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written +(Wis. 17:10): "A troubled conscience always presumes [Douay: +'forecasteth'] grievous things," and (Wis. 17:11) that "fear is a +help to presumption [*Vulg.: 'Fear is nothing else but a yielding up +of the succours from thought.']." Therefore presumption is opposed to +fear rather than to hope. + +Obj. 2: Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now +presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because +presumption implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas +fear denotes movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is contrary +to fear rather than to hope. + +Obj. 3: Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it +does not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope. +Since therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that +presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope. + +_On the contrary,_ When two vices are opposed to one another they are +contrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to +fortitude. Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of +despair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that +presumption also is more directly opposed to hope. + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "every +virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as +temerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice, +alike, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning +is opposed to prudence." This agrees with the Philosopher who says +(Ethic. ii, 8) that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of +the contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with +insensibility, and fortitude with audacity. + +Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear, +especially servile fear, which looks at the punishment arising from +God's justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a +kind of false likeness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes +an inordinate hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed +when they belong to the same genus, than when they belong to +different genera, it follows that presumption is more directly +opposed to hope than to fear. For they both regard and rely on the +same object, hope inordinately, presumption inordinately. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and +properly applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in +this way that inordinate fear is called presumption. + +Reply Obj. 2: Contraries are things that are most distant from one +another within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a +movement of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or +inordinate. Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than +to fear, since it is opposed to hope in respect of its specific +difference, as an inordinate thing to an ordinate one, whereas it is +opposed to fear, in respect of its generic difference, which is the +movement of hope. + +Reply Obj. 3: Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic +contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety. +Hence presumption excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas +it does not exclude hope except by reason of its difference, by +excluding its ordinateness. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 4] + +Whether Presumption Arises from Vainglory? + +Objection 1: It would seem that presumption does not arise from +vainglory. For presumption seems to rely most of all on the Divine +mercy. Now mercy (_misericordia_) regards unhappiness (_miseriam_) +which is contrary to glory. Therefore presumption does not arise from +vainglory. + +Obj. 2: Further, presumption is opposed to despair. Now despair +arises from sorrow, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 4, ad 2). Since +therefore opposites have opposite causes, presumption would seem to +arise from pleasure, and consequently from sins of the flesh, which +give the most absorbing pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, the vice of presumption consists in tending to some +impossible good, as though it were possible. Now it is owing to +ignorance that one deems an impossible thing to be possible. +Therefore presumption arises from ignorance rather than from +vainglory. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumption +of novelties is a daughter of vainglory." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), presumption is twofold; one +whereby a man relies on his own power, when he attempts something +beyond his power, as though it were possible to him. Such like +presumption clearly arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great +desire for glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power, and +especially novelties which call for greater admiration. Hence Gregory +states explicitly that presumption of novelties is a daughter of +vainglory. + +The other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Divine mercy or +power, consisting in the hope of obtaining glory without merits, or +pardon without repentance. Such like presumption seems to arise +directly from pride, as though man thought so much of himself as to +esteem that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory, +however much he might be a sinner. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 22 + +OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under +which head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) The precepts relating to hope; + +(2) The precepts relating to fear. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 22, Art. 1] + +Whether There Should Be a Precept of Hope? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given relating +to the virtue of hope. For when an effect is sufficiently procured by +one cause, there is no need to induce it by another. Now man is +sufficiently induced by his natural inclination to hope for good. +Therefore there is no need of a precept of the Law to induce him to +do this. + +Obj. 2: Further, since precepts are given about acts of virtue, the +chief precepts are about the acts of the chief virtues. Now the chief +of all the virtues are the three theological virtues, viz. hope, +faith and charity. Consequently, as the chief precepts of the Law are +those of the decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3), it seems that if any precept of hope were +given, it should be found among the precepts of the decalogue. But it +is not to be found there. Therefore it seems that the Law should +contain no precept of hope. + +Obj. 3: Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is equivalent to a +prohibition of the act of the opposite vice. Now no precept is to be +found forbidding despair which is contrary to hope. Therefore it +seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says on John 15:12, "This is My +commandment, that you love one another" (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.): +"How many things are commanded us about faith! How many relating to +hope!" Therefore it is fitting that some precepts should be given +about hope. + +_I answer that,_ Among the precepts contained in Holy Writ, some +belong to the substance of the Law, others are preambles to the Law. +The preambles to the Law are those without which no law is possible: +such are the precepts relating to the act of faith and the act of +hope, because the act of faith inclines man's mind so that he +believes the Author of the Law to be One to Whom he owes submission, +while, by the hope of a reward, he is induced to observe the +precepts. The precepts that belong to the substance of the Law are +those which relate to right conduct and are imposed on man already +subject and ready to obey: wherefore when the Law was given these +precepts were set forth from the very outset under the form of a +command. + +Yet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given under the +form of a command, since, unless man already believed and hoped, it +would be useless to give him the Law: but, just as the precept of +faith had to be given under the form of an announcement or reminder, +as stated above (Q. 16, A. 1), so too, the precept of hope, in the +first promulgation of the Law, had to be given under the form of a +promise. For he who promises rewards to them that obey him, by that +very fact, urges them to hope: hence all the promises contained in +the Law are incitements to hope. + +Since, however, when once the Law has been given, it is for a wise +man to induce men not only to observe the precepts, but also, and +much more, to safeguard the foundation of the Law, therefore, after +the first promulgation of the Law, Holy Writ holds out to man many +inducements to hope, even by way of warning or command, and not +merely by way of promise, as in the Law; for instance, in the Ps. +61:9: "Hope [Douay: 'Trust'] in Him all ye congregation of the +people," and in many other passages of the Scriptures. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nature inclines us to hope for the good which is +proportionate to human nature; but for man to hope for a supernatural +good he had to be induced by the authority of the Divine law, partly +by promises, partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless there +was need for precepts of the Divine law to be given even for those +things to which natural reason inclines us, such as the acts of the +moral virtues, for sake of insuring a greater stability, especially +since the natural reason of man was clouded by the lusts of sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: The precepts of the law of the decalogue belong to the +first promulgation of the Law: hence there was no need for a precept +of hope among the precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough to +induce men to hope by the inclusion of certain promises, as in the +case of the first and fourth commandments. + +Reply Obj. 3: In those observances to which man is bound as under a +duty, it is enough that he receive an affirmative precept as to what +he has to do, wherein is implied the prohibition of what he must +avoid doing: thus he is given a precept concerning the honor due to +parents, but not a prohibition against dishonoring them, except by +the law inflicting punishment on those who dishonor their parents. +And since in order to be saved it is man's duty to hope in God, he +had to be induced to do so by one of the above ways, affirmatively, +so to speak, wherein is implied the prohibition of the opposite. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 22, Art. 2] + +Whether There Should Have Been Given a Precept of Fear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that, in the Law, there should not have +been given a precept of fear. For the fear of God is about things +which are a preamble to the Law, since it is the "beginning of +wisdom." Now things which are a preamble to the Law do not come under +a precept of the Law. Therefore no precept of fear should be given in +the Law. + +Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect is also given. Now love +is the cause of fear, since "every fear proceeds from some kind of +love," as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Therefore given the +precept of love, it would have been superfluous to command fear. + +Obj. 3: Further, presumption, in a way, is opposed to fear. But the +Law contains no prohibition against presumption. Therefore it seems +that neither should any precept of fear have been given. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 10:12): "And now, Israel, +what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the +Lord thy God?" But He requires of us that which He commands us to do. +Therefore it is a matter of precept that man should fear God. + +_I answer that,_ Fear is twofold, servile and filial. Now just as man +is induced, by the hope of rewards, to observe precepts of law, so +too is he induced thereto by the fear of punishment, which fear is +servile. + +And just as according to what has been said (A. 1), in the +promulgation of the Law there was no need for a precept of the act of +hope, and men were to be induced thereto by promises, so neither was +there need for a precept, under form of command, of fear which +regards punishment, and men were to be induced thereto by the threat +of punishment: and this was realized both in the precepts of the +decalogue, and afterwards, in due sequence, in the secondary precepts +of the Law. + +Yet, just as wise men and the prophets who, consequently, strove to +strengthen man in the observance of the Law, delivered their teaching +about hope under the form of admonition or command, so too did they +in the matter of fear. + +On the other hand filial fear which shows reverence to God, is a sort +of genus in respect of the love of God, and a kind of principle of +all observances connected with reverence for God. Hence precepts of +filial fear are given in the Law, even as precepts of love, because +each is a preamble to the external acts prescribed by the Law and to +which the precepts of the decalogue refer. Hence in the passage +quoted in the argument _On the contrary,_ man is required "to have +fear, to walk in God's ways," by worshipping Him, and "to love Him." + +Reply Obj. 1: Filial fear is a preamble to the Law, not as though it +were extrinsic thereto, but as being the beginning of the Law, just +as love is. Hence precepts are given of both, since they are like +general principles of the whole Law. + +Reply Obj. 2: From love proceeds filial fear as also other good works +that are done from charity. Hence, just as after the precept of +charity, precepts are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the +same time precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity, just +as, in demonstrative sciences, it is not enough to lay down the first +principles, unless the conclusions also are given which follow from +them proximately or remotely. + +Reply Obj. 3: Inducement to fear suffices to exclude presumption, +even as inducement to hope suffices to exclude despair, as stated +above (A. 1, ad 3). +_______________________ + +QUESTION 23 + +OF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF +(In Eight Articles) + +In proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself; +(2) the corresponding gift of wisdom. The first consideration will be +fivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its +acts; (4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating thereto. + +The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity, +considered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in its relation +to its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether charity is friendship? + +(2) Whether it is something created in the soul? + +(3) Whether it is a virtue? + +(4) Whether it is a special virtue? + +(5) Whether it is one virtue? + +(6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues? + +(7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it? + +(8) Whether it is the form of the virtues? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 1] + +Whether Charity Is Friendship? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not friendship. For +nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's +friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is +of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay: +'conversation'] is not with men" (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is +not friendship. + +Obj. 2: Further, there is no friendship without return of love +(Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies, +according to Matt. 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is +not friendship. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there +are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the +delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the +friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his +letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the +Bible: "True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn +together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence, +not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the +study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it friendship for the +virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship +based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii). +Therefore charity is not friendship. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 15:15): "I will not now call +you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by +reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship. + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2, 3) not +every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is +together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to +wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, +but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a +horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of +concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship +for wine or for a horse. + +Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain +mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and +friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of +communication. + +Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, +inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of +friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which +it is written (1 Cor. 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called +unto the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this +communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is +the friendship of man for God. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in +respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to +this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God +or the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect of his +mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and +both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of +life, wherefore it is written (Phil. 3:20): "Our conversation is in +heaven." But this "conversation" will be perfected in heaven, when +"His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face" (Apoc. +22:3, 4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected +in heaven. + +Reply Obj. 2: Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in +respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to +one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, +as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he +loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected +with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for +their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate +us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to +our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom +the friendship of charity is chiefly directed. + +Reply Obj. 3: The friendship that is based on the virtuous is +directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for +his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not +virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on +the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for +God's sake. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 2] + +Whether Charity Is Something Created in the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not something created in +the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his +neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is love. +Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he +says (De Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: God is Charity, even as it was +said: God is a Spirit." Therefore charity is not something created in +the soul, but is God Himself. + +Obj. 2: Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the +soul is the life of the body, according to Deut. 30:20: "He is thy +life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God +quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity, +according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that we have passed from death to +life, because we love the brethren." Therefore God is charity itself. + +Obj. 3: Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the +contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed +it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings +the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not +something created in the soul. + +On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By +charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God +for His own sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in +the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul. + +_I answer that,_ The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q. +17 of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something +created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the +mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we +love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from +the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous +acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues, +for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and +this he said on account of the excellence of charity. + +But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary, +detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind +the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a +way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle +of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive +power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose +principle needs to be in itself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 6, A. 1): +so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which +involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an +act of the will. + +Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will +in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an +instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, +nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again +the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has +been stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4) that the love of charity is +the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy +Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should +be the efficient cause of that act. + +Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be +connatural to that power by reason of some form which is the +principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to +their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is +inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He +"ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the +act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so +that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power, +inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect +than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it +be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue, +since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity +has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure. +Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of +charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the +natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and +causing it to act with ease and pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is +wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with +the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God +(since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation +of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a +share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love +our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of +speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines +Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to +some an occasion of error. + +Reply Obj. 2: God is effectively the life both of the soul by +charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the +life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body. +Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is +immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul. + +Reply Obj. 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form +depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore +it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an +infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God, +this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of +charity. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 3] + +Whether Charity Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity +is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a +virtue, as may be gathered from _Ethic._ viii, 1; nor is it numbered +among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, +is charity a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo et +Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies +rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a +virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace. + +Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is +not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the +soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject. +Therefore charity is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is +a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us +to God, for by it we love Him." + +_I answer that,_ Human acts are good according as they are regulated +by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the +principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of +human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), viz. +human reason and God. + +Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with +right reason," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, so too, the nature of +virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to +faith, (Q. 4, A. 5) and hope (Q. 17, A. 1). Wherefore, it follows +that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites +us to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that +friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a virtue or +with a virtue." For we might say that it is a moral virtue about +works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect +from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another +person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship +considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of +a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13). +Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of +itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and +virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit, +as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident +from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous, +as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore +friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather +than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it +is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the +goodness of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to +rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 25, A. 2) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love +is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love. +And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean +that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of +excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty. + +Reply Obj. 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider +its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has +its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident +which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its +subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an +accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is +superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher +nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way +charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation +of the Holy Ghost. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 4] + +Whether Charity Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For +Jerome says: "Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby +we love God" [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and +Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that +"virtue is the order of love." Now no special virtue is included in +the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a +special virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be +a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue, +according to 1 Cor. 13:4: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed +it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: "Let all +your things be done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special +virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now +Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, "Thou shalt love" +is "a general commandment," and "Thou shalt not covet," "a general +prohibition." Therefore charity is a general virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Nothing general is enumerated together with what +is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues, +viz. hope and faith, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "And now there remain +faith, hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special +virtue. + +_I answer that,_ Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as +shown above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper +object of love is the good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 1), so +that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special +kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of +happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of +charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love. +Therefore charity is a special virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Charity is included in the definition of every virtue, +not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue +depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on (AA. 7, 8). In +this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues, +as explained in _Ethic._ ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on +prudence. + +Reply Obj. 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the last +end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other +ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of +horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object +the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows +that it extends to the acts of a man's whole life, by commanding +them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: The precept of love is said to be a general command, +because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end, +according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is charity." +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 5] + +Whether Charity Is One Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits +are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of +charity--God and our neighbor--which are infinitely distant from one +another. Therefore charity is not one virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit, +even though that object be one in reality, as shown above (Q. 17, A. +6; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which +God is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by +reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But +the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii, +3, 11, 12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into +a number of various species. + +_On the contrary,_ Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the +object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of +the Divine truth, according to Eph. 4:5: "One faith." Therefore +charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine +goodness. + +_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (A. 1) is a kind of +friendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship +are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end, +and in this way there are three species of friendship, namely +friendship for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous; +secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which +friendships are based; thus there is one species of friendship +between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow +travellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter +on civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the +Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12). + +Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its +end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of +everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also +one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not +divided into several species. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were +equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the +principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of +charity for God's sake. + +Reply Obj. 2: God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore +charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely +God's goodness, which is His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: "Give +glory to the Lord for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us with +love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary +and result from the first. + +Reply Obj. 3: Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has +various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to +charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 6] + +Whether Charity Is the Most Excellent of the Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of +the virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as +it has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will, +since it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the +intellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, the thing by which another works seems the less +excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is +beneath his master. Now "faith . . . worketh by charity," according +to Gal. 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to +be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something +additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the +object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent +than charity. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): "The greater of +these is charity." + +_I answer that,_ Since good, in human acts, depends on their being +regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which +is a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human +acts. Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above (A. 3), +namely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby, +even human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological +virtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since their +object is God, are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual +virtues, which consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that +among the theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to +that which attains God most. + +Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by +another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive +from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas +charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that +something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent +than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues, +just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent +than the other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it +appoints the mean in human operations or passions. + +Reply Obj. 1: The operation of the intellect is completed by the +thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the +excellence of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the +measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the +will and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of +the appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of +the appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is +the object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the +soul are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves, +because a thing is contained according to the mode of the container +(De Causis xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul, +are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul. +Consequently it is better to know than to love the things that are +beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to +the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7, 8): +whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of God, +ranks before the knowledge of such things. Therefore charity is more +excellent than faith. + +Reply Obj. 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by +his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not +prove. + +Reply Obj. 3: The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but +charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance +therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous, +as hope does, since what is already united has not the character of +arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 7] + +Whether Any True Virtue Is Possible Without Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there can be true virtue without +charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those +who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the +naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is +possible without charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it +comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now, +in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their +concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore +true virtue is possible without charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, science and art are virtues, according to _Ethic._ +vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore +true virtue can be without charity. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should +distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body +to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." And yet +true virtue is very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth +temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such +things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore no +true virtue is possible without charity. + +_I answer that,_ Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things +directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the +end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the +proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and +universal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and +principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps. +72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to God," and to this good man is +ordered by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were, particular good +may be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it +can be directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while +the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away +from the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true +virtue is that which is directed to man's principal good; thus also +the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the +disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best": and in this +way no true virtue is possible without charity. + +If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end, +then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as +it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good +is not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is +ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as +Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser, +whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the +miser's justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through +fear of severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he +curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude, +whereby as Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he +goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty'" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, +45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for +instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a +true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final +and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible +without charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one +is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something +that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is +always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the +actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always +sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and +directs it to his unbelief as end. + +There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in +accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his +possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even +his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as +stated above (Q. 10, A. 4; I-II, Q. 85, A. 2). In this way it is +possible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not +perfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the +principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly +true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable +principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or +chastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by +charity, however rightly a man may be affected about other matters. + +Reply Obj. 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a relation +to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life, +as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 56, A. 3). Hence the comparison fails. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 8] + +Whether Charity Is the Form of the Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the true form of the +virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential. +Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it +would follow that the other virtues are of the same species as +charity: nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since +then it would not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way +the form of the virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their +root and foundation, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in +charity." Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the +matter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making. +Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not coincide +with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end and the +mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that +charity is the form of the virtues. + +_I answer that,_ In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from +the end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is +the will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the +form of an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently, +in morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs +give the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has +been said (A. 7), that it is charity which directs the acts of all +other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives +the form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this +sense that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are +called virtues in relation to "informed" acts. + +Reply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as +being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of +efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the +aforesaid manner. + +Reply Obj. 2: Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far +as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom, +and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the character +of a material cause. + +Reply Obj. 3: Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because +it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is +one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called +the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it +conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last +end. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 24 + +OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY +(In Twelve Articles) + +We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which +head there are twelve points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject? + +(2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine +infusion? + +(3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural +gifts? + +(4) Whether it increases in the person who has it? + +(5) Whether it increases by addition? + +(6) Whether it increases by every act? + +(7) Whether it increases indefinitely? + +(8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect? + +(9) Of the various degrees of charity; + +(10) Whether charity can diminish? + +(11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed? + +(12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 1] + +Whether the Will Is the Subject of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of +charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the +Philosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part. +Therefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated +above (Q. 23, A. 6). But the reason is the subject of virtue. +Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1 +Cor. 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity." Now the +principle of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that +charity is chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the +will. + +_On the contrary,_ The object of charity is the good, which is also +the object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its +subject. + +_I answer that,_ Since, as stated in the First Part (Q. 80, A. 2), +the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective +which is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in +different ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good +apprehended by sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite +or will is good under the universal aspect of good, according as it +can be apprehended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not +a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect +alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the +intellective appetite, i.e. the will. + +Reply Obj. 1: The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of +the intellective appetite, as proved in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2): +wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of +sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good +which is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the +concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9), the +will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from +the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not +by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom, and +transcends the rule of human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: "The +charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Hence it is not +in the reason, either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its +rule, like justice and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship +of the will to the reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 4), the +free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not +in the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose. +For choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of +the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence charity, whose object is the +last end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in +the free-will. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 2] + +Whether Charity Is Caused in Us by Infusion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not caused in us by +infusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man +naturally. Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the "Divine +good," which is the object of charity, "is for all an object of +dilection and love." Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by +infusion. + +Obj. 2: Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to love +it. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good. +Therefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no +infused habit in order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do +we need one in order to love God. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the +commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and +an unfeigned faith." Now these three have reference to human acts. +Therefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from +infusion. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God +is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), charity is a +friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting +happiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of +gratuitous gifts, for, according to Rom. 6:23, "the grace of God is +life everlasting": wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural +facilities. Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be +natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect +does not transcend its cause. + +Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through +acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy +Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the +participation of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above (Q. +23, A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which is +founded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all +naturally. On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural +fellowship, so the comparison fails. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet not to +us, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on sensible +things, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much as He +is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable to us in +this way, on account of the inclination of our appetite towards +visible goods. Hence it is evident that for us to love God above all +things in this way, it is necessary that charity be infused into our +hearts. + +Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that in us charity proceeds from "a +pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith," this must +be referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these things. +Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to +receive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the +saying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): "Fear leads to +charity," and of a gloss on Matt. 1:2: "Faith begets hope, and hope +charity." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 3] + +Whether Charity Is Infused According to the Capacity of Our Natural +Gifts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity is infused according to the +capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written (Matt. 25:15) that +"He gave to every one according to his own virtue [Douay: 'proper +ability']." Now, in man, none but natural virtue precedes charity, +since there is no virtue without charity, as stated above (Q. 23, A. +7). Therefore God infuses charity into man according to the measure +of his natural virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, among things ordained towards one another, the +second is proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things +that the form is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous +gifts, that glory is proportionate to grace. Now, since charity is a +perfection of nature, it is compared to the capacity of nature as +second to first. Therefore it seems that charity is infused according +to the capacity of nature. + +Obj. 3: Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to the +same measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to Matt. +22:30 and Luke 20:36. Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are +bestowed on the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the +Master teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently +applies to man. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 3:8): "The Spirit breatheth +where He will," and (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things one and the +same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will." +Therefore charity is given, not according to our natural capacity, +but according as the Spirit wills to distribute His gifts. + +_I answer that,_ The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause +of that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater +effect. Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature, +as stated above (A. 2) it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on +the sole grace of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the +quantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on +the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy +Ghost Who "divides" His gifts "according as He will." Hence the +Apostle says (Eph. 4:7): "To every one of us is given grace according +to the measure of the giving of Christ." + +Reply Obj. 1: The virtue in accordance with which God gives His gifts +to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort of +the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this +disposition or effort, by moving man's mind either more or less, +according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:12): "Who +hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in +light." + +Reply Obj. 2: The form does not surpass the proportion of the matter. +In like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus, for +grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity +and nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison +fails. + +Reply Obj. 3: The angel's is an intellectual nature, and it is +consistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly +whithersoever he is borne, as stated in the First Part (Q. 61, A. 6). +Hence there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good +in those who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and +consequently those of the higher angels who remained steadfast became +better than the others, and those who fell became worse. But man's is +a rational nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in +potentiality and sometimes in act: so that it is not necessarily +borne wholly whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater +natural gifts there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the +comparison fails. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 4] + +Whether Charity Can Increase? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing +increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely +dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a +spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in +respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest +charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore +charity does not increase. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme receives no +increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the +greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good. +Therefore charity cannot increase. + +Obj. 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore wherever +there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase of +essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of +essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity +cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or +corrupted, which is unreasonable. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [*Cf. Ep. +clxxxv.] that "charity merits increase that by increase it may merit +perfection." + +_I answer that,_ The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are +called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the +last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to +God, Who is approached, "not by steps of the body but by the +affections of the soul" [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and +this approach is the result of charity, since it unites man's mind to +God. Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that +it can increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the +way would cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he +says (1 Cor. 12:31): "I show unto you yet a more excellent way." + +Reply Obj. 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to +virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of +objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater +excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a +thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual +quantity of charity increases. + +Reply Obj. 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its +object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it +follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not +every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the +act. + +Reply Obj. 3: Some have said that charity does not increase in its +essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according +to its fervor. + +But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since +charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an +essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet +more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its +subject. Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to +act, so that an essential increase of charity implies ability to +produce an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases +essentially, not by beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject, +as the objection imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in +its subject. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 5] + +Whether Charity Increases by Addition? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases by addition. For +just as increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be +according to virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity +results from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that +"increase is addition to pre-existing magnitude." Therefore the +increase of charity which is according to virtual quantity is by +addition. + +Obj. 2: Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul, +according to 1 John 2:10: "He that loveth his brother abideth in the +light." Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in +a house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also +increases in the soul by addition. + +Obj. 3: Further, the increase of charity is God's work, even as the +causing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10: "He will increase the growth +of the fruits of your justice." Now when God first infuses charity, +He puts something in the soul that was not there before. Therefore +also, when He increases charity, He puts something there which was +not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition. + +_On the contrary,_ Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater +results from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved +in _Phys._ iii, text. 59, and _Metaph._ ii, 4. Therefore charity does +not increase by addition. + +_I answer that,_ Every addition is of something to something else: so +that in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things +added together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if +charity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as +distinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a +distinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For +God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which +did not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which +magnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless +capable of being distinguished from the quantity to which it is +added. Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose +the distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other. + +Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric. +Specific distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while +numeric distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a +habit may receive increase through extending to objects to which it +did not extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one +who acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored +hitherto. But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest +charity extends to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the +addition which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as +though the added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically +from that to which it is added. + +It follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must +presuppose a numerical distinction between them, which follows a +distinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one +white thing is added to another, although such an increase does not +make a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in +point, since the subject of charity is none other than the rational +mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only take place +by one rational mind being added to another; which is impossible. +Moreover, even if it were possible, the result would be a greater +lover, but not a more loving one. It follows, therefore, that charity +can by no means increase by addition of charity to charity, as some +have held to be the case. + +Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of +charity more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of +increase in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a +form consists wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently, +since the magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a +form is greater is the same as to say that it is more in its subject, +and not that another form is added to it: for this would be the case +if the form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with +its subject. Therefore charity increases by being intensified in its +subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not +by charity being added to charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and +something else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity, +it is distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this +way we have the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in +animals. But in so far as it is an accidental form, it is +distinguishable only in respect of its subject, and in this way it +has its proper increase, like other accidental forms, by way of +intensity in its subject, for instance in things subject to +rarefaction, as is proved in _Phys._ iv, 9. In like manner science, +as a habit, has its quantity from its objects, and accordingly it +increases by addition, when a man knows more things; and again, as an +accidental form, it has a certain quantity through being in its +subject, and in this way it increases in a man who knows the same +scientific truths with greater certainty now than before. In the same +way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that which it +has from its object, it does not increase, as stated above: hence it +follows that it increases solely by being intensified. + +Reply Obj. 2: The addition of light to light can be understood +through the light being intensified in the air on account of there +being several luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not +apply to the case in point, since there is but one luminary shedding +forth the light of charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: The infusion of charity denotes a change to the state +of _having_ charity from the state of _not having it,_ so that +something must needs come which was not there before. On the other +hand, the increase of charity denotes a change to _more having_ from +_less having,_ so that there is need, not for anything to be there +that was not there before, but for something to be more there that +previously was less there. This is what God does when He increases +charity, that is He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and +the likeness of the Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by +the soul. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE + +Whether Charity Increases Through Every Act of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases through every act +of charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less. +But every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more +than a simple addition of charity, since it includes the perfection +of charity. Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase +charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are engendered +by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act of +charity. Now each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of virtue. +Therefore also each virtuous act of charity conduces to the increase +of charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory [*St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif.] +says that "to stand still in the way to God is to go back." Now no +man goes back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore +whoever is moved by an act of charity goes forward in the way to God. +Therefore charity increases through every act of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ The effect does not surpass the power of its +cause. But an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or +slackness. Therefore it does not conduce to a more excellent charity, +rather does it dispose one to a lower degree. + +_I answer that,_ The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like +the increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is +not a continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so +much in so much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part +of that time, as happens in local movement; but for a certain space +of time nature works by disposing for the increase, without causing +any actual increase, and afterwards brings into effect that to which +it had disposed, by giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In +like manner charity does not actually increase through every act of +charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity, +in so far as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again +according to charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out +into an act of more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity, +and then his charity increases actually. + +Reply Obj. 1: Every act of charity merits everlasting life, which, +however, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper +time. In like manner every act of charity merits an increase of +charity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when we +strive for that increase. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered, each +act does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces +towards that effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is +the most perfect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it, +reduces the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a +stone. + +Reply Obj. 3: Man advances in the way to God, not merely by actual +increase of charity, but also by being disposed to that increase. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 7] + +Whether Charity Increases Indefinitely? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not increase +indefinitely. For every movement is towards some end and term, as +stated in _Metaph._ ii, text. 8, 9. But the increase of charity is a +movement. Therefore it tends to an end and term. Therefore charity +does not increase indefinitely. + +Obj. 2: Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject. But +the capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity +is finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely. + +Obj. 3: Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase, +attain to the quantity of another finite thing however much greater, +unless the amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the +Philosopher states (Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an +indefinite number of parts, and take these parts away and add them +indefinitely to another line, we shall never arrive at any definite +quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one from which we +subtracted and the one to which we added what was subtracted. But +this does not occur in the case in point: because there is no need +for the second increase of charity to be less than the first, since +rather is it probable that it would be equal or greater. As, +therefore, the charity of the blessed is something finite, if the +charity of the wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow +that the charity of the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is +absurd. Therefore the wayfarer's charity cannot increase indefinitely. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I +had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if +I may, by any means apprehend," on which words a gloss says: "Even if +he has made great progress, let none of the faithful say: 'Enough.' +For whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his +destination." Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more +and more. + +_I answer that,_ A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in +three ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed +measure, and when this has been reached it is no longer possible to +go any further in that form, but if any further advance is made, +another form is attained. An example of this is paleness, the bounds +of which may, by continual alteration, be passed, either so that +whiteness ensues, or so that blackness results. Secondly, on the part +of the agent, whose power does not extend to a further increase of +the form in its subject. Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which +is not capable of ulterior perfection. + +Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of +man's charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity +itself considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a +participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In +like manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is +possessed of infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject, +no limit to this increase can be determined, because whenever charity +increases, there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a +further increase. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to +fix any limits to the increase of charity in this life. + +Reply Obj. 1: The increase of charity is directed to an end, which is +not in this, but in a future life. + +Reply Obj. 2: The capacity of the rational creature is increased by +charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according to 2 Cor. +6:11: "Our heart is enlarged"; so that it still remains capable of +receiving a further increase. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds good in those things which have the +same kind of quantity, but not in those which have different kinds: +thus however much a line may increase it does not reach the quantity +of a superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer's charity which +follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the +quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows open vision. +Hence the argument does not prove. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 8] + +Whether Charity Can Be Perfect in This Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this +life. For this would have been the case with the apostles before all +others. Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not +as though I had already attained, or were already perfect." Therefore +charity cannot be perfect in this life. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "whatever +kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is perfect, +cupidity is done away altogether." But this cannot be in this world, +wherein it is impossible to live without sin, according to 1 John +1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now all +sin arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be +perfect in this life. + +Obj. 3: Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any +more. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above +(A. 7). Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v) +"Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been +brought to perfection, it exclaims, 'I desire to be dissolved and to +be with Christ.'" Now this is possible in this life, as in the case +of Paul. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life. + +_I answer that,_ The perfection of charity may be understood in two +ways: first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to +the person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is +perfect, if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is +as lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He +is infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since +all created power is finite. Consequently no creature's charity can +be perfect in this way; the charity of God alone can, whereby He +loves Himself. + +On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he +loves as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a +man's whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the +perfection of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this +life, wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is +impossible to think always actually of God, and to be moved by love +towards Him. Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give +his time to God and Divine things, while scorning other things except +in so far as the needs of the present life demand. This is the +perfection of charity that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not +common to all who have charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his +whole heart to God habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring +anything contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common +to all who have charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of +heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that "he was a +perfect wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which +the way leads." + +Reply Obj. 2: This is said on account of venial sins, which are +contrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are +incompatible, not with the perfection of the way, but with that of +heaven. + +Reply Obj. 3: The perfection of the way is not perfection simply, +wherefore it can always increase. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 9] + +Whether Charity Is Rightly Distinguished into Three Degrees, +Beginning, Progress, and Perfection? + +Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of +charity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many +degrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection. +Therefore it is not right to put only one. + +Obj. 2: Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins to +be. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as +progressing and as beginning. + +Obj. 3: Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity may +be, it can increase, as stated above (A. 7). Now for charity to +increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be +distinguished from progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees +are unsuitably assigned to charity. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v) +"As soon as charity is born it takes food," which refers to +beginners, "after taking food, it waxes strong," which refers to +those who are progressing, "and when it has become strong it is +perfected," which refers to the perfect. Therefore there are three +degrees of charity. + +_I answer that,_ The spiritual increase of charity may be considered +in respect of a certain likeness to the growth of the human body. For +although this latter growth may be divided into many parts, yet it +has certain fixed divisions according to those particular actions or +pursuits to which man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak +of a man being an infant until he has the use of reason, after which +we distinguish another state of man wherein he begins to speak and to +use his reason, while there is again a third state, that of puberty +when he begins to acquire the power of generation, and so on until he +arrives at perfection. + +In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distinguished +according to the different pursuits to which man is brought by the +increase of charity. For at first it is incumbent on man to occupy +himself chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting his concupiscences, +which move him in opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in +whom charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the +second place man's chief pursuit is to aim at progress in good, and +this is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief aim is to +strengthen their charity by adding to it: while man's third pursuit +is to aim chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God: this belongs to +the perfect who "desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ." + +In like manner we observe in local motion that at first there is +withdrawal from one term, then approach to the other term, and +thirdly, rest in this term. + +Reply Obj. 1: All these distinct degrees which can be discerned in +the increase of charity, are comprised in the aforesaid three, even +as every division of continuous things is included in these +three--the beginning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher +states (De Coelo i, 1). + +Reply Obj. 2: Although those who are beginners in charity may +progress, yet the chief care that besets them is to resist the sins +which disturb them by their onslaught. Afterwards, however, when they +come to feel this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection +with greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and with the +other holding the sword as related in 2 Esdr. 4:17 about those who +built up Jerusalem. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even the perfect make progress in charity: yet this is +not their chief care, but their aim is principally directed towards +union with God. And though both the beginner and the proficient seek +this, yet their solicitude is chiefly about other things, with the +beginner, about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing +in virtue. +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 10] + +Whether Charity Can Decrease? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity can decrease. For contraries +by their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease +are contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above (A. 4), +it seems that it can also decrease. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) "He +loves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee": and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. +36) he says that "what kindles charity quenches cupidity." From this +it seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity +quenches charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides +God, can increase in man. Therefore charity can decrease. + +Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) "God makes +the just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the man +turns away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine +operation." From this we may gather that when God preserves charity +in man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity +into him. Now at the first infusion of charity God infuses less +charity into him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in +preserving charity, He preserves less charity in him that prepares +himself less. Therefore charity can decrease. + +_On the contrary,_ In Scripture, charity is compared to fire, +according to Cant 8:6: "The lamps thereof," i.e. of charity, "are +fire and flames." Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts. +Therefore as long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot +descend, i.e. decrease. + +_I answer that,_ The quantity which charity has in comparison with +its proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase, +as stated above (A. 4, ad 2). + +Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in +comparison with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it +can decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be +either through an act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true +that virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease +altogether through cessation from act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 53, +A. 3). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to friendship +(Ethic. viii, 5) "that want of intercourse," i.e. the neglect to call +upon or speak with one's friends, "has destroyed many a friendship." +Now this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on its cause, +and the cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when human acts +cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last ceases +altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, because it is not the +result of human acts, but is caused by God alone, as stated above (A. +2). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it does not for +this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the cessation +involves a sin. + +The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except +either by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by +God, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace +in punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by +way of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin. + +It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this +decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But +mortal sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but +destroys it entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is +contrary to charity, as we shall state further on (A. 12), and by way +of merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against +charity, he deserves that God should withdraw charity from him. + +In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either +effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not +touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial +sin is a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man's love +for the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act +as regards the things directed to the end. Thus sick people +sometimes, though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to +their diet: and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false +opinions that are derived from the principles, do not diminish the +certitude of the principles. So too, venial sin does not merit +diminution of charity; for when a man offends in a small matter he +does not deserve to be mulcted in a great matter. For God does not +turn away from man, more than man turns away from Him: wherefore he +that is out of order in respect of things directed to the end, does +not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby he is ordered to the +last end. + +The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we +speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption +may be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are +venial sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of +charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: Contraries affect the same subject when that subject +stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in equal +relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of +increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument +does not prove. + +Reply Obj. 2: Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his end in +creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its poison, +as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e. +less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by diminishing +charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we must +understand the saying: "He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside +Thee," for he adds these words, "which he loveth not for Thee." This +does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that +which we love in venial sin, is loved for God's sake habitually +though not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin, +which is always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot +diminish charity, for the reason given above. + +Reply Obj. 3: A movement of the free-will is requisite in the +infusion of charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 3). Wherefore +that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces +dispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the +other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the +safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain in us while we +sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an obstacle on +the part of the intensity of the free-will's movement. +_______________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 11] + +Whether We Can Lose Charity When Once We Have It? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we +have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who +has charity cannot sin, for it is written (1 John 3:9): "Whosoever is +born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he +cannot sin, because he is born of God." But none save the children of +God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes "the children of +God from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, +17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love be +not true, it should not be called love." Now, as he says again in a +letter to Count Julian, "charity which can fail was never true." +[*The quotation is from _De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam +comitem,_ vii., among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly +known as Paul the Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino.] Therefore it was +no charity at all. Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot +lose it. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. +xxx) that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to +work it is not charity." Now no man loses charity by doing great +things. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost. + +Obj. 4: Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by some +motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning, +both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity +cannot be lost. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Apoc. 2:4): "I have somewhat +against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity." + +_I answer that,_ The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown +above (A. 2; QQ. 23, 24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in +three ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul +to love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin +through the power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He +wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true +at the same time--that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain +man to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose +charity. For the gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings +of God whereby "whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered," +as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De +Dono Persev. xiv). + +Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable +of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin +at all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, +as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24). + +Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which +is changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be +compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of +form in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view +of habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be +in its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not +entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the +forms of things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such +things receives one form in such a way, that it retains the +potentiality to another form, as though its potentiality were not +completely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be +lost by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a +celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter, +so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form, +is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of the +blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational +mind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is +possessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the +wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because +the latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is +not actually directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is +lost. + +It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs +to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem +good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste +judges of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human +mind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual +disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as +a man is, so does the end appear to him." Accordingly charity is +inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains to charity +cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God +is seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodness. +Therefore the charity of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity +of the way can, because in this state God is not seen in His Essence, +which is the essence of goodness. + +Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the +power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills +to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills. + +Reply Obj. 2: The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no +true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only +for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent +with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the +changeableness of the subject, and against the purpose of charity +included in its act, this is not contrary to true charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: The love of God ever works great things in its purpose, +which is essential to charity; but it does not always work great +things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject. + +Reply Obj. 4: Charity by reason of its act excludes every motive for +sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting +actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for +sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity. +_______________________ + +TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 12] + +Whether Charity Is Lost Through One Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not lost through one +mortal sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "When a man who has +mounted to the stage of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that +he will become empty or fall away suddenly; but he must needs do so +gradually and by little and little." But man falls away by losing +charity. Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (lx) addresses +Peter thus: "Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not an +averted love, but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never +failed, and the words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the +fount of charity." From this Bernard [*William of St. Thierry, De +Nat. et Dig. Amoris. vi.] drew his assertion that "charity in Peter +was not quenched, but cooled." But Peter sinned mortally in denying +Christ. Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now a +habit of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful act. +Much less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor. Now, +seemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love of +God and one's neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things +directed to the end, does not remove the love for the end, as stated +above (A. 10). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there +be a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some temporal +good. + +Obj. 5: Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last end. +Now the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not +done away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless. +Therefore charity can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin +has been committed. + +_On the contrary,_ By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal +death, according to Rom. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death." On the +other hand whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it +is written (John 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My +Father: and I will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him," in +which manifestation everlasting life consists, according to John +17:3: "This is eternal life; that they may know Thee the . . . true +God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Now no man can be worthy, +at the same time, of eternal life and of eternal death. Therefore it +is impossible for a man to have charity with a mortal sin. Therefore +charity is destroyed by one mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ That one contrary is removed by the other contrary +supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very +nature, which consists in man's loving God above all things, and +subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to +God. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God +as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the +rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His +commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its +very nature is capable of destroying charity. + +If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of +its subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin, +for act is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the +endurance of a habit in its subject does not require the endurance of +its act, so that when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is +not at once done away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends +on the action of God Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the +infusion and safekeeping of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion +of light in the air, as stated above (A. 10, Obj. 3). Consequently, +just as the light would cease at once in the air, were an obstacle +placed to its being lit up by the sun, even so charity ceases at once +to be in the soul through the placing of an obstacle to the +outpouring of charity by God into the soul. + +Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to +God's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of +charity, since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to +God's friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it +follows that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal +sin. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "man is +enlightened by God's presence, but he is darkened at once by God's +absence, because distance from Him is effected not by change of place +but by aversion of the will." + +Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Origen may be understood, in one way, +that a man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go so +far as to commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some +previous negligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be +dispositions to mortal sin, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 3). +Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one mortal sin +if he commits it. + +Since, however, he adds: "If some slight slip should occur, and he +recover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether," we +may reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied +and falling away altogether, he means one who falls so as to sin +through malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once. + +Reply Obj. 2: Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly, by +actual contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity. +Secondly, indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity, +through some passion of desire or fear; it was by sinning against +charity in this way, that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered +it. + +The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said. + +Reply Obj. 4: Not every inordinate affection for things directed to +the end, i.e., for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin, but only +such as is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the +inordinate affection is contrary to charity, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 5: Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and hope +do not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as stated +above (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every mortal sin is +contrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain +determinate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even +as charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that +charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form +regarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above (Q. 23, A. +8). +_______________________ + +QUESTION 25 + +OF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES) + +We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will +be twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The +order in which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there +are twelve points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we +love our neighbor also? + +(2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity? + +(3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity? + +(4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity? + +(5) Whether one's own body? + +(6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity? + +(7) Whether sinners love themselves? + +(8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity? + +(9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship? + +(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity? + +(11) Whether we ought to love the demons? + +(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 1] + +Whether the Love of Charity Stops at God, or Extends to Our Neighbor? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and +does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe +Him fear, according Deut. 10:12: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord +thy God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him?" Now +the fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is +distinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either +servile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q. +10, A. 2). Therefore also the love with which we love God, is +distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that "to be +loved is to be honored." Now the honor due to God, which is known as +_latria,_ is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as +_dulia._ Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct +from that with which we love our neighbor. + +Obj. 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Matt. 1:2. +Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man, +according to Jer. 17:5: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man." +Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:21): "This commandment we +have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 6; Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q. +54, A. 3) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of +different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the +same habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its +object, considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity +that it is specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the +object, and that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is +specifically the same visual act whereby we see the light, and +whereby we see the color under the aspect of light. + +Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since +what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence +it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God, +and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity +extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our +neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love him, in +two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him, as +when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by +reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human +fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love. +Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of +God; as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising +the ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for +its justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God, +as neither is such like love. + +Reply Obj. 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor regards the +honored person's own good, for it is given to a person in recognition +of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated specifically on +account of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so +long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas honor is +distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals. +Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity, +in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which +is God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according +to each one's own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular +honor of latria on account of His singular virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the +principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us +ministerially under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man +loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he +loved him for God's sake; and this is what charity does. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 2] + +Whether We Should Love Charity Out of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity need not be loved out of +charity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in +the two precepts of charity (Matt. 22:37-39): and neither of them +includes charity, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor. +Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of happiness, +as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). But charity cannot participate in +happiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above +(Q. 23, A. 1). But no man can have friendship for charity or for an +accident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is +essential to friendship, as stated in _Ethic._ viii. Therefore +charity need not be loved out of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): "He that loves +his neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself." But we love +our neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also +is loved out of charity. + +_I answer that,_ Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature +of the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for +since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the +aspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to +will is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the +intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands, +because this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason +of its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is +a spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved, wherefore +from the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love. + +Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as +stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Now by friendship a thing is loved in two +ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom +we wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend. +It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved +out of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all +those whom we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and +to the other virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: God and our neighbor are those with whom we are +friends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we +love both God and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and +our neighbor to love God, and this is to love charity. + +Reply Obj. 2: Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual life, +whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good which +we desire for all whom we love out of charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers friendship as referred to those +with whom we are friends. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 3] + +Whether Irrational Creatures Also Ought to Be Loved Out of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be +loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are +conformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity, +for He loves "all things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He +loves, He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should +love irrational creatures out of charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, charity is referred to God principally, and extends +to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational +creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance +of image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they +bear the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. I, Q. 45, A. 7]. Therefore +charity extends also to irrational creatures. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the +object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we +believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes +and birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that +walk, and plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to +irrational creatures. + +_On the contrary,_ The love of charity extends to none but God and +our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational +creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational +life. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures. + +_I answer that,_ According to what has been stated above (Q. 13, A. +1) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is +twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our +friendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which +we desire for our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational +creature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of +these reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which cannot have +an irrational creature for its object: first because friendship is +towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we +cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not +competent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to +the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of +its disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says +(Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or evil befalling such +like things, except metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship +is based on some fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to +friendship as to live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. +viii, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human +life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational +creatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third +reason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship +of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot +attain. Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an +irrational creature. + +Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we +regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far, +to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's +use; thus too does God love them out of charity. + +Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident. + +Reply Obj. 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the +capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does: +and so the comparison fails. + +Reply Obj. 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true, +whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have +a natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison +fails. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 4] + +Whether a Man Ought to Love Himself Out of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man is [not] bound to love himself +out of charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that +there "can be no charity between less than two." Therefore no man has +charity towards himself. + +Obj. 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual love +and equality (Ethic. viii, 2, 7), which cannot be of one man towards +himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Q. 23, +A. 1). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards himself. + +Obj. 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be blameworthy, +since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 23:4). Now a man +deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2 Tim. +3:1, 2): "In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be +lovers of themselves." Therefore a man cannot love himself out of +charity. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy +friend as thyself." Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore +we should love ourselves too out of charity. + +_I answer that,_ Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated +above (Q. 23, A. 1), we may consider charity from two standpoints: +first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we +must hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, +but something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for +Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas +a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another. +Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with +which a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if +we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do +unto ourselves, hence we read in _Ethic._ ix, 4, 8, that "the origin +of friendly relations with others lies in our relations to +ourselves." Thus too with regard to principles we have something +greater than science, namely understanding. + +Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature, +namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and, +consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man +himself who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he +loves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves also +himself out of charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks there of charity under the general +notion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the +same sense. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so far +as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which they +humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one's rational +nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which pertain to +the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is through +charity that a man loves himself. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 5] + +Whether a Man Ought to Love His Body Out of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out +of charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to +associate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body, +according to Rom. 7:24: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this +death?" and Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be +with Christ." Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship in +the enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that +enjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is towards +those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot love +us out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23, 26) that +there are four things that we should love out of charity, and among +them he reckons our own body. + +_I answer that,_ Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in +respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of +sin and its punishment. + +Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as +the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God's +service, according to Rom. 6:13: "Present . . . your members as +instruments of justice unto God." Consequently, out of the love of +charity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but +we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of +punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to long for +the removal of such things. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle did not shrink from the society of his +body, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he +was loth to be deprived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: "We would +not be unclothed, but clothed over." He did, however, wish to escape +from the taint of concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from +the corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to +hinder it from seeing God. Hence he says expressly: "From the body of +this death." + +Reply Obj. 2: Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by knowing +and loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body, we are +able to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the +enjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into the +body, viz., "the flush of health and incorruption," as Augustine +states (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a +fashion, a share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of +charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: Mutual love is found in the friendship which is for +another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in +respect of his soul, or in respect of his body. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 6] + +Whether We Ought to Love Sinners Out of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of +charity. For it is written (Ps. 118:113): "I have hated the unjust." +But David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated +rather than loved, out of charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, "love is proved by deeds" as Gregory says in a +homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the +unjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of +hate, according to Ps. 100:8: "In the morning I put to death all the +wicked of the land": and God commanded (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou +shalt not suffer to live." Therefore sinners should not be loved out +of charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire and +wish good things for one's friends. Now the saints, out of charity, +desire evil things for the wicked, according to Ps. 9:18: "May the +wicked be turned into hell [*Douay and A. V.: 'The wicked shall be,' +etc. See Reply to this Objection.]." Therefore sinners should not be +loved out of charity. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will the +same things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will, nor +to rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary. Therefore +sinners should not be loved out of charity. + +Obj. 5: Further, it is proper to friends to associate together, +according to _Ethic._ viii. But we ought not to associate with +sinners, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: "Go ye out from among them." +Therefore we should not love sinners out of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that +"when it is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that +we ought to look upon every man as our neighbor." Now sinners do not +cease to be men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought +to love sinners out of charity. + +_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in the sinner: his +nature and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, +he has a capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity +is based, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 23, AA. 1, 5), wherefore we ought +to love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature. + +On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle +to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are +opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or +mother or kindred, according to Luke 12:26. For it is our duty to +hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his +being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of +charity, for God's sake. + +Reply Obj. 1: The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the object +of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such hatred is +perfect, of which he himself says (Ps. 138:22): "I have hated them +with a perfect hatred." Now hatred of a person's evil is equivalent +to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs to +charity. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our +friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of +friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and +we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover +money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than +money to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great +wickedness, and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them +friendliness. It is for this reason that both Divine and human laws +command such like sinners to be put to death, because there is +greater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending +their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out of +hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of +which he prefers the public good to the life of the individual. +Moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, if he +be converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not +converted, it profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the +sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any more. + +Reply Obj. 3: Such like imprecations which we come across in Holy +Writ, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of prediction, +not by way of wish, so that the sense is: "May the wicked be," that +is, "The wicked shall be, turned into hell." Secondly, by way of +wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the +man's punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to +Ps. 57:11: "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge," +since, according to Wis. 1:13, not even God "hath pleasure in the +destruction of the wicked [Vulg.: 'living']" when He punishes them, +but He rejoices in His justice, according to Ps. 10:8: "The Lord is +just and hath loved justice." Thirdly, so that this desire is +referred to the removal of the sin, and not to the punishment itself, +to the effect, namely, that the sin be destroyed, but that the man +may live. + +Reply Obj. 4: We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will what +they will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make +them will what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is +written (Jer. 15:19): "They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt +not to be turned to them." + +Reply Obj. 5: The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on +account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them. +But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is +no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them. For +thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by Matt. +9:11-13. Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards +fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2 Cor. 6:17): "Go out +from among them . . . and touch not the unclean thing," i.e. by +consenting to sin. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 7] + +Whether Sinners Love Themselves? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sinners love themselves. For that +which is the principle of sin, is most of all in the sinner. Now love +of self is the principle of sin, since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei +xiv, 28) that it "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore sinners +most of all love themselves. + +Obj. 2: Further, sin does not destroy nature. Now it is in keeping +with nature that every man should love himself: wherefore even +irrational creatures naturally desire their own good, for instance, +the preservation of their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love +themselves. + +Obj. 3: Further, good is beloved by all, as Dionysius states (Div. +Nom. iv). Now many sinners reckon themselves to be good. Therefore +many sinners love themselves. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth +iniquity, hateth his own soul." + +_I answer that,_ Love of self is common to all, in one way; in +another way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to +the wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he +thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways: +first, in respect of his substance and nature, and, this way all +think themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and +body. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love +themselves, in so far as they love their own preservation. + +Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some +predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the +state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In +this way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. For the +reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive +and corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of which the +Apostle calls the "inward man," and the latter, the "outward man" (2 +Cor. 4:16). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the +inward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way +they think themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the +wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward +man, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not +themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what +they think themselves to be. But the good know themselves truly, and +therefore truly love themselves. + +The Philosopher proves this from five things that are proper to +friendship. For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to +be and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he +does good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company; +fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in +almost the same things. In this way the good love themselves, as to +the inward man, because they wish the preservation thereof in its +integrity, they desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods, +indeed they do their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in +entering into their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts +in the present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future good, +all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no +clashing of wills, since their whole soul tends to one thing. + +On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be preserved in the +integrity of the inward man, nor do they desire spiritual goods for +him, nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in +their own company by entering into their own hearts, because whatever +they find there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor +do they agree with themselves, on account of the gnawings of +conscience, according to Ps. 49:21: "I will reprove thee and set +before thy face." + +In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves, +as regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas the good do not +love themselves thus. + +Reply Obj. 1: The love of self which is the principle of sin is that +which is proper to the wicked, and reaches "to the contempt of God," +as stated in the passage quoted, because the wicked so desire +external goods as to despise spiritual goods. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although natural love is not altogether forfeited by +wicked men, yet it is perverted in them, as explained above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The wicked have some share of self-love, in so far as +they think themselves good. Yet such love of self is not true but +apparent: and even this is not possible in those who are very wicked. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 8] + +Whether Charity Requires That We Should Love Our Enemies? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not require us to love +our enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that "this great +good," namely, the love of our enemies, is "not so universal in its +application, as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive us +our trespasses." Now no one is forgiven sin without he have charity, +because, according to Prov. 10:12, "charity covereth all sins." +Therefore charity does not require that we should love our enemies. + +Obj. 2: Further, charity does not do away with nature. Now +everything, even an irrational being, naturally hates its contrary, +as a lamb hates a wolf, and water fire. Therefore charity does not +make us love our enemies. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity "doth nothing perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Now +it seems perverse to love one's enemies, as it would be to hate one's +friends: hence Joab upbraided David by saying (2 Kings 19:6): "Thou +lovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love thee." +Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 4:44): "Love your enemies." + +_I answer that,_ Love of one's enemies may be understood in three +ways. First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is +perverse, and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that +which is evil in another. + +Secondly love of one's enemies may mean that we love them as to their +nature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires that we +should love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor, +we should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbor +in general. + +Thirdly, love of one's enemies may be considered as specially +directed to them, namely, that we should have a special movement of +love towards our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely, +because it does not require that we should have a special movement of +love to every individual man, since this would be impossible. +Nevertheless charity does require this, in respect of our being +prepared in mind, namely, that we should be ready to love our enemies +individually, if the necessity were to occur. That man should +actually do so, and love his enemy for God's sake, without it being +necessary for him to do so, belongs to the perfection of charity. For +since man loves his neighbor, out of charity, for God's sake, the +more he loves God, the more does he put enmities aside and show love +towards his neighbor: thus if we loved a certain man very much, we +would love his children though they were unfriendly towards us. This +is the sense in which Augustine speaks in the passage quoted in the +First Objection, the Reply to which is therefore evident. + +Reply Obj. 2: Everything naturally hates its contrary as such. Now +our enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself +should be hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They +are not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness: +and it is as such that we are bound to love them. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is wrong to love one's enemies as such: charity does +not do this, as stated above. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 9] + +Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation That We Should Show Our Enemies +the Signs and Effects of Love? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his +enemy the signs or effects of love. For it is written (1 John 3:18): +"Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth." +Now a man loves in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects +of love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his enemies such +signs and effects of love. + +Obj. 2: Further, Our Lord said in the same breath (Matt. 5:44): "Love +your enemies," and, "Do good to them that hate you." Now charity +demands that we love our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we +should "do good to them." + +Obj. 3: Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object of +charity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx), +that "love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great +things, and if it ceases to work, it is no longer love." Hence +charity towards our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But +charity requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though he +be an enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the signs and +effects of love towards our enemies. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Matt. 5:44, "Do good to them that hate +you," says: "To do good to one's enemies is the height of perfection" +[*Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii]. Now charity does not require us to +do that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not +require us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies. + +_I answer that,_ The effects and signs of charity are the result of +inward love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely +necessary, for the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly +love our enemies in general, but not individually, except as regards +the mind being prepared to do so, as explained above (A. 8). + +We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and +signs of love. For some of the signs and favors of love are shown to +our neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or +for a whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on a whole +community: and the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should +show such like favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For if we +did not so, it would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to +what is written (Lev. 19:18): "Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of +the injury of thy citizens." But there are other favors or signs of +love, which one shows to certain persons in particular: and it is not +necessary for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors and +signs of love, except as regards being ready in our minds, for +instance to come to their assistance in a case of urgency, according +to Prov. 25:21: "If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he +thirst, give him . . . drink." Outside cases of urgency, to show such +like favors to an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity, whereby +we not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by evil, but +also wish to overcome evil by good [*Rom. 12:21], which belongs to +perfection: for then we not only beware of being drawn into hatred on +account of the hurt done to us, but purpose to induce our enemy to +love us on account of our kindliness. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 10] + +Whether We Ought to Love the Angels Out of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels +out of charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity +is a twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of +the angels is not contained in the love of God, since they are +created substances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of +our neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common species. +Therefore we are not bound to love them out of charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the +angels have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as we do. +But we have not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above (A. 3). +Neither, therefore, have we towards the angels. + +Obj. 3: Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship +with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our +companions; we cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give +them the friendship of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): "If the +name of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those +who pity us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our +neighbor includes also the holy angels from whom we receive many +merciful favors." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), the friendship of +charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in +which men share in common with the angels. For it is written (Matt. +22:30) that "in the resurrection . . . men shall be as the angels of +God in heaven." It is therefore evident that the friendship of +charity extends also to the angels. + +Reply Obj. 1: Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us in a +common species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the +blessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter +fellowship that the friendship of charity is founded. + +Reply Obj. 2: Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate +genus, by reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers +of everlasting happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of +our rational mind wherein we associate with the angels. + +Reply Obj. 3: The companionship of the angels does not consist +in outward fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive +nature; it consists in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in +this life, but perfect in heaven, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1). +_______________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 11] + +Whether We Are Bound to Love the Demons Out of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of +charity. For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their +fellowship with us in a rational mind. But the demons also share in +our fellowship thus, since natural gifts, such as life and +understanding, remain in them unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div. +Nom. iv). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the +matter of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man loves +the sinner out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also +out of charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our +neighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the +passage of Augustine quoted above (A. 9). Now the demons are useful +to us in many things, for "by tempting us they work crowns for us," +as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love +the demons out of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 28:18): "Your league with +death shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not +stand." Now the perfection of a peace and covenant is through +charity. Therefore we ought not to have charity for the demons who +live in hell and compass death. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), in the sinner, we are bound, +out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the name +of demon is given to designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore +demons should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying +stress on the word, the question as to whether the spirits called +demons ought to be loved out of charity, must be answered in +accordance with the statement made above (AA. 2, 3), that a thing may +be loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may be loved as +the person who is the object of friendship, and thus we cannot have +the friendship of charity towards the demons. For it is an essential +part of friendship that one should be a well-wisher towards one's +friend; and it is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the +good of everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those +spirits whom God has condemned eternally, since this would be in +opposition to our charity towards God whereby we approve of His +justice. + +Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be +enduring as another's good. In this way we love irrational creatures +out of charity, in as much as we wish them to endure, to give glory +to God and be useful to man, as stated above (A. 3): and in this way +too we can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as +much as we desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts, +unto God's glory. + +Reply Obj. 1: The possession of everlasting happiness is not +impossible for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon; +consequently the friendship of charity which is based on the +fellowship of everlasting life, rather than on the fellowship of +nature, is possible towards the angels, but not towards the demons. + +Reply Obj. 2: In this life, men who are in sin retain the possibility +of obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are lost in +hell, who, in this respect, are in the same case as the demons. + +Reply Obj. 3: That the demons are useful to us is due not to +their intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this +leads us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their +perverse intention to our profit. +_______________________ + +TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 12] + +Whether Four Things Are Rightly Reckoned As to Be Loved Out of +Charity, Viz. God, Our Neighbor, Our Body and Ourselves? + +Objection 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly +reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor, +our body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan. +lxxxiii), "he that loveth not God, loveth not himself." Hence love of +oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is +not distinct from the love of God. + +Obj. 2: Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole. +But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be +condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor. Since +then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct from +the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a man +loves his neighbor's body, ought to be distinct from the love with +which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not +rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): "There +are four things to be loved; one which is above us," namely God, +"another, which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us," namely +our neighbor, "and a fourth which is beneath us," namely our own body. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 5), the friendship of +charity is based on the fellowship of happiness. Now, in this +fellowship, one thing is considered as the principle from which +happiness flows, namely God; a second is that which directly partakes +of happiness, namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which +happiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human body. + +Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its +being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness, +can be an object of love for two reasons, either through being +identified with ourselves, or through being associated with us in +partaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to +be loved out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his +neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 1: The different relations between a lover and the various +things loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly, since +the relation between the human lover and God is different from his +relation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of +love, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other, +so that the former love being removed the latter is taken away. + +Reply Obj. 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind that can be +capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach +directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable +mind which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves +himself in one way, and his own body in another. + +Reply Obj. 3: Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and as to +his body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness. Wherefore, +on the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him; +and our neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special object of love. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 26 + +OF THE ORDER OF CHARITY +(In Thirteen Articles) + +We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are +thirteen points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there is an order in charity? + +(2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor? + +(3) Whether more than himself? + +(4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor? + +(5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body? + +(6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another? + +(7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one +who is more closely united to him? + +(8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or +one who is united to him by other ties? + +(9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his +father? + +(10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father? + +(11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother? + +(12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those +whom we are kind to? + +(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 1] + +Whether There Is Order in Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order in charity. For +charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues. +Neither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so +is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is +appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither, +therefore, ought there to be any order in charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs, +not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be +ascribed to charity. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Cant 2:4): "He brought me into the +cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me." + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the +terms "before" and "after" are used in reference to some principle. +Now order implies that certain things are, in some way, before or +after. Hence wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also +order of some kind. But it has been said above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 25, +A. 12) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of +happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is +based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved +out of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of +that love, which is God. + +Reply Obj. 1: Charity tends towards the last end considered as last +end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above (Q. +23, A. 6). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of +appetite and action, as was shown above (Q. 23, A. 7, ad 2; I-II, A. +1, ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the First +Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we find an order +in reference to the First Principle. + +Reply Obj. 2: Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation +depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand, +charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in the +soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in things +themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is +more appropriate to charity than to faith. + +And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly +about God, and secondarily about things referred to God. + +Reply Obj. 3: Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and +to the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is in +this way that order is stated to be in charity. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 2] + +Whether God Ought to Be Loved More Than Our Neighbor? + +Objection 1: It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than +our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 4:20): "He that loveth not +his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" +Whence it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more +lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to _Ethic._ +ix, 5, 12. Now God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is +less lovable, out of charity, than our neighbor. + +Obj. 2: Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: +"Every beast loveth its like." Now man bears more likeness to his +neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of +charity, more than he loves God. + +Obj. 3: Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God, according +to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22, 27). Now God is not greater in +Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be +loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to love +God more than our neighbor. + +_On the contrary,_ A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to +be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's +sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Luke +14:26: "If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, +and wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be +My disciple." Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more +than our neighbor. + +_I answer that,_ Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject +in which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that +friendship is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler +of the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends; +hence to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now +the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness, +which consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it +flows to all who are capable of happiness. + +Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of +charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our +neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness +from Him. + +Reply Obj. 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being +the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since +each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a +thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way +that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were +lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we +are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more +visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with +it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle's argument. +For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first +lovable object we meet with, because "the soul learns, from those +things it knows, to love what it knows not," as Gregory says in a +homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves +not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his neighbor +is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our +love: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness. + +Reply Obj. 2: The likeness we have to God precedes and causes the +likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we +share along with our neighbor in something received from God, we +become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we +ought to love God more than we love our neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 3: Considered in His substance, God is equally in +all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in +anything. And yet our neighbor does not possess God's goodness equally +with God, for God has it essentially, and our neighbor by +participation. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 3] + +Whether Out of Charity, Man Is Bound to Love God More Than Himself? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to +love God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8) +that "a man's friendly relations with others arise from his friendly +relations with himself." Now the cause is stronger than its effect. +Therefore man's friendship towards himself is greater than his +friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more +than God. + +Obj. 2: Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own good. +Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself +which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the +reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves +himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not +love God more than himself. + +Obj. 3: Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God. +But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since this +is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not +bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): "If thou +oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of +Him in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take +offense if him also thou lovest for God's sake." Now "the cause of a +thing being such is yet more so." Therefore man ought to love God +more than himself. + +_I answer that,_ The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of +nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods +bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of +which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves +God above all things and more than himself, but also every single +creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by +a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones +do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each +part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own +particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the +principal inclination of each part is towards common action conducive +to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues +whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own +property and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much +more is this realized with regard to the friendship of charity which +is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace. + +Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common +good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as in the +universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share +of that happiness. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations +towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of +friendship, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly +relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality. + +Reply Obj. 2: The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as +becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to +itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole. + +Reply Obj. 3: That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of +God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love of +friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the +Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying +Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 4] + +Whether Out of Charity, Man Ought to Love Himself More Than His +Neighbor? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to +love himself more than his neighbor. For the principal object of +charity is God, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 25, AA. 1, 12). Now +sometimes our neighbor is more closely united to God than we are +ourselves. Therefore we ought to love such a one more than ourselves. + +Obj. 2: Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid +injuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his +neighbor's sake, according to Prov. 12:26: "He that neglecteth a loss +for the sake of a friend, is just." Therefore a man ought, out of +charity, to love his neighbor more than himself. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:5) "charity seeketh not its +own." Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most. +Therefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than his +neighbor. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:39): "Thou +shalt love thy neighbor (Lev. 19:18: 'friend') as thyself." Whence it +seems to follow that man's love for himself is the model of his love +for another. But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of +charity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor. + +_I answer that,_ There are two things in man, his spiritual nature +and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason +of his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated +above (Q. 25, A. 7): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of +charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person. + +This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated +above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 12), God is loved as the principle of good, on +which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity, +loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid +good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that +good. Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain +union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union, +the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more +potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with +him in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love +himself more than his neighbor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to +give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of +happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: The love of charity takes its quantity not only from +its object which is God, but also from the lover, who is the man that +has charity, even as the quantity of any action depends in some way +on the subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to God, +yet because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this man +is to himself, it does not follow that a man is bound to love his +neighbor more than himself. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend's +sake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his +spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue, +which is a good of the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought +not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from +sin, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the saying, +"'charity seeks not her own,' means that it prefers the common to the +private good." Now the common good is always more lovable to the +individual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is +more lovable to the part, than the latter's own partial good, as +stated above (A. 3). +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 5] + +Whether a Man Ought to Love His Neighbor More Than His Own Body? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to love his +neighbor more than his own body. For his neighbor includes his +neighbor's body. If therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more +than his own body, it follows that he ought to love his neighbor's +body more than his own. + +Obj. 2: Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his +neighbor's, as stated above (A. 4). Now a man's own body is nearer to +his soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our body more +than our neighbor. + +Obj. 3: Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the sake +of what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil his own +body for his neighbor's safety: this belongs to the perfect, +according to John 15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a +man lay down his life for his friends." Therefore a man is not bound, +out of charity, to love his neighbor more than his own body. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "we +ought to love our neighbor more than our own body." + +_I answer that,_ Out of charity we ought to love more that which has +more fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above +(A. 2; Q. 25, A. 12). Now fellowship in the full participation of +happiness which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a greater +reason for loving, than the participation of happiness by way of +overflow, which is the reason for loving one's own body. Therefore, +as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more +than our own body. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing +seems to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say that +we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers to +his soul, which is his predominant part. + +Reply Obj. 2: Our body is nearer to our soul than our +neighbor, as regards the constitution of our own nature: but as +regards the participation of happiness, our neighbor's soul is more +closely associated with our own soul, than even our own body is. + +Reply Obj. 3: Every man is immediately concerned with the care +of his own body, but not with his neighbor's welfare, except perhaps +in cases of urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a +man to imperil his own body for his neighbor's welfare, except in a +case where he is under obligation to do so; and if a man of his own +accord offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection +of charity. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 6] + +Whether We Ought to Love One Neighbor More Than Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor +more than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "One +ought to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to +all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time +or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely +united to us." Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than +another. + +Obj. 2: Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving +several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and +the same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason is God, +as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to +love all our neighbors equally. + +Obj. 3: Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the +Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an +equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our +neighbors equally. + +_On the contrary,_ One's obligation to love a person is proportionate +to the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love. +Now it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain +neighbors, than against the love of others. Hence the commandment +(Lev. 10:9), "He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him +die," which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above. +Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others. + +_I answer that,_ There have been two opinions on this question: for +some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our +neighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the +outward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood +as applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who +are connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and +not to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all +including our enemies. + +But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the +inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite, +which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from +Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural +inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement +that is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the +inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it is +becoming to earth to be beneath water. Consequently the inclination +also of grace which is the effect of charity, must needs be +proportionate to those actions which have to be performed outwardly, +so that, to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense towards +those to whom we ought to behave with greater kindness. + +We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought +to love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the +principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be +that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to +one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above (A. 1), +wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to that +principle. + +Reply Obj. 1: Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of +the good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all men equally +out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good, +namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater +through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not +to love all equally. + +Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two +ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As +regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because +we cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not +to be thus unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some +more than others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter +inequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of +beneficence. + +Reply Obj. 2: Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some +are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we +ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to +Him. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the quantity of love on the +part of the good which we wish our friends. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 7] + +Whether We Ought to Love Those Who Are Better More Than Those Who Are +More Closely United Us? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love those who are better +more than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is +in no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for +some reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black +mixed with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for +some reason, according to Luke 14:26: "If any man come to Me, and +hate not his father," etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful +for any reason. Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who +are better more than those who are more closely connected with us. + +Obj. 2: Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But God +loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought +to love the better man more than one who is more closely united to +him. + +Obj. 3: Further, in every friendship, that ought to be loved most +which has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by +natural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by +nature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship +of charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has +more to do with better men than with those who are more closely +united to us. Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men +more than those who are more closely connected with us. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not +care of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied +the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now the inward affection of +charity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity +regards those who are nearer to us before those who are better. + +_I answer that,_ Every act should be proportionate both to its object +and to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while, +from the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus +movement has its species from the term to which it tends, while the +intensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved +and the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species from +its object, but its intensity is due to the lover. + +Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover. +Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance +with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his +relation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater +good to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity +wishes to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it +has various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it +belongs to charity to wish God's justice to be maintained, in +accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness. +And this regards the species of love; for there are different species +of love according to the different goods that we wish for those whom +we love. + +On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to +the man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more +closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he +wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater +good he wishes for them. + +Again a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors +are connected with us by their natural origin, a connection which +cannot be severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are. +But the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come +and go, increase and decrease, as was shown above (Q. 24, AA. 4, 10, +11). Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man +who is more closely united to one, to be better than another, and so +reach a higher degree of happiness. + +Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we +love more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love +them in more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us +we have no other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are +connected with us, we have certain other friendships, according to +the way in which they are connected. Now since the good on which +every other friendship of the virtuous is based, is directed, as to +its end, to the good on which charity is based, it follows that +charity commands each act of another friendship, even as the art +which is about the end commands the art which is about the means. +Consequently this very act of loving someone because he is akin or +connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or for any +like reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be commanded +by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we +love in more ways those who are more nearly connected with us. + +Reply Obj. 1: We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their +kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us and +God. In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according +to Micah 7:6: "A men's enemies are they of his own household." + +Reply Obj. 2: Charity conforms man to God proportionately, by making +man comport himself towards what is his, as God does towards what is +His. For we may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to +us which God does not will, because it becomes Him not to will them, +as stated above (I-II, Q. 19, A. 10), when we were treating of the +goodness of the will. + +Reply Obj. 3: Charity elicits the act of love not only as regards the +object, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The result is +that the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 8] + +Whether We Ought to Love More Those Who Are Connected with Us by Ties +of Blood? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love more those who +are more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written +(Prov. 18:24): "A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than +a brother." Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv +7): "The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to +the ties of blood." Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that +as to the latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract +the former by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we +ought not to love more than others those who are united to us by ties +of blood. + +Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): "I love not less +you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in +wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace." Surely we +ought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than +those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not +love our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us. + +Obj. 3: Further, "Love is proved by deeds," as Gregory states (Hom. +in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others than +our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather than +his father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of +all. + +_On the contrary,_ The commandments of the decalogue contain a +special precept about the honor due to our parents (Ex. 20:12). +Therefore we ought to love more specially those who are united to us +by ties of blood. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 7), we ought out of charity to +love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our +love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for +loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and +beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different +persons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is +more loved in matters touching that particular union in respect of +which he is loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should +compare one union with another. Accordingly we must say that +friendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by +natural origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic +fellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting side by side +on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to +nature we should love our kindred most, in matters concerning +relations between citizens, we should prefer our fellow-citizens, and +on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says +(Ethic. ix, 2) that "it is our duty to render to each class of people +such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact the +principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite our relations to a +wedding . . . It would seem to be a special duty to afford our +parents the means of living . . . and to honor them." + +The same applies to other kinds of friendship. + +If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union +arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all +others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas +other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the +friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be +stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them. + +Reply Obj. 1: In as much as the friendship of comrades originates +through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the +love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose, for +instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more +stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in +matters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in +the providing of necessaries. + +Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors +respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in +this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom +he has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom +he is bound to support in bodily sustenance. + +Reply Obj. 3: The fact that in the battle a man obeys his officer +rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less, not +simply [but] relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on +fellowship in battle. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 9] + +Whether a Man Ought, Out of Charity, to Love His Children More Than +His Father? + +Objection 1: It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his +children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to +whom we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good +to our children than to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. +12:14): "Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but +the parents for the children." Therefore a man ought to love his +children more than his parents. + +Obj. 2: Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love +their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states +(Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more +than his parents. + +Obj. 3: Further, man's affections are conformed to God by charity. +But God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also +ought to love our children more than our parents. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "We +ought to love God first, then our parents, then our children, and +lastly those of our household." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 1; A. 7), the degrees of +love may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the +object. In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to +God, the more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love +his father more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his +father as his principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good +and more like God. + +Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of +the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more +closely connected with him, in which way a man's children are more +lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. +viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of +themselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the +love of a father for his children, is more like a man's love for +himself. Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is +their child than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to +their parents, as being part of them, than their parents are to them +to whom they stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because +parents have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at +once, whereas the child begins to love his father after a lapse of +time; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to +Ecclus. 9:14: "Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be +like to him." + +Reply Obj. 1: The debt due to a principle is submission of respect +and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence and +care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in +honor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of +care. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is natural for a man as father to love his children +more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but if we +consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves his +father more. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God loves +us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is +related to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to +the father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to +be provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless +in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received +to provide for his parents before all. +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 10] + +Whether a Man Ought to Love His Mother More Than His Father? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more +than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i, +20), "the female produces the body in generation." Now man receives +his soul, not from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in +the First Part (Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 118). Therefore a man receives more +from his mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to +love her more than him. + +Obj. 2: Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due. +Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the +Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that "mothers have greater love for +their children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she +knows more surely than the father who are her children." + +Obj. 3: Further, love should be more fond towards those who have +labored for us more, according to Rom. 16:6: "Salute Mary, who hath +labored much among you." Now the mother labors more than the father +in giving birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written +(Ecclus. 7:29): "Forget not the groanings of thy mother." Therefore a +man ought to love his mother more than his father. + +_On the contrary,_ Jerome says on Ezech. 44:25 that "man ought to +love God the Father of all, and then his own father," and mentions +the mother afterwards. + +_I answer that,_ In making such comparisons as this, we must take the +answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether +the father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as +mother. The reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference +in such like matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed, +as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [*Origen, +Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "Good servants should be preferred to wicked +children." + +Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the +mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural +origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the +mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a +passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the +father is to be loved more. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the +formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through +the formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though +this power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the +matter of the body to receive that form. + +Reply Obj. 2: This applies to another kind of love. For the +friendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the +friendship between child and parent: while the friendship we are +speaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother +through being begotten of them. + +The Reply to the Third Objection is evident. +_______________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 11] + +Whether a Man Ought to Love His Wife More Than His Father and Mother? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more +than his father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another +unless he love the latter more. Now it is written (Gen. 2:24) that "a +man shell leave father and mother" on account of his wife. Therefore +a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:33) that a husband should +"love his wife as himself." Now a man ought to love himself more than +his parents. Therefore he ought to love his wife also more than his +parents. + +Obj. 2: Further, love should be greater where there are more reasons +for loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the friendship of +a man towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12) +that "in this friendship there are the motives of utility, pleasure, +and also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous." Therefore a +man's love for his wife ought to be greater than his love for his +parents. + +_On the contrary,_ According to Eph. 5:28, "men ought to love their +wives as their own bodies." Now a man ought to love his body less +than his neighbor, as stated above (A. 5): and among his neighbors he +should love his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents +more than his wife. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9), the degrees of love may be +taken from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those +who love. On the part of the good which is the object loved, a man +should love his parents more than his wife, because he loves them as +his principles and considered as a more exalted good. + +But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more, +because she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according to +Matt. 19:6: "Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh." +Consequently a man loves his wife more intensely, but his parents +with greater reverence. + +Reply Obj. 1: A man does not in all respects leave his father and +mother for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought to +succor his parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all +his kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal +connection and co-habitation. + +Reply Obj. 2: The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man ought +to love his wife equally with himself, but that a man's love for +himself is the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with +him. + +Reply Obj. 3: There are also several reasons for a man's love for his +father; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards good, are +more weighty than those for which a man loves his wife; although the +latter outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the union. + +As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in +the words quoted, the particle "as" denotes not equality of love but +the motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife +is her being united to him in the flesh. +_______________________ + +TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 12] + +Whether a Man Ought to Love More His Benefactor Than One He Has +Benefited? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor +more than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. +iv): "Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love +him first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses +to love, but declines to return love already given." Now a man's +benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore +we ought to love our benefactors above all. + +Obj. 2: Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a man +or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is a +more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against +him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly +actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those +to whom we are kind. + +Obj. 3: Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most, and +then one's father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25]. +Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should +be loved above all others. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that +"benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather +than vice versa." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 9, 11), a thing is loved more +in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent +good, secondly by reason of a closer connection. In the first way we +ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle +of good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more +excellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father (A. 9). + +In the second way, however, we love those more who have received +benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by +four arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the +handiwork of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: "He +was made by so and so." Now it is natural to a man to love his own +work (thus it is to be observed that poets love their own poems): and +the reason is that we love _to be_ and _to live,_ and these are made +manifest in our _action._ Secondly, because we all naturally love +that in which we see our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor +has some good of his in the recipient of his benefaction, and the +recipient some good in the benefactor; but the benefactor sees his +virtuous good in the recipient, while the recipient sees his useful +good in the benefactor. Now it gives more pleasure to see one's +virtuous good than one's useful good, both because it is more +enduring,--for usefulness quickly flits by, and the pleasure of +calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of having it +present--and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous goods +than the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is it +the lover's part to act, since he wills and works the good of the +beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so +that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love +is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more +difficult to give than to receive favors: and we are most fond of +things which have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what +comes easy to us. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is some thing in the benefactor that incites the +recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient, +not through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of +his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do +through another. + +Reply Obj. 2: The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is more +of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other +hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more +spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act. + +Reply Obj. 3: God also loves us more than we love Him, and parents +love their children more than these love them. Yet it does not follow +that we love all who have received good from us, more than any of our +benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our parents, +from whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on whom we +have bestowed lesser benefits. +_______________________ + +THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 13] + +Whether the Order of Charity Endures in Heaven? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity does not endure +in heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): "Perfect +charity consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods +less." Now charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will +love those who are better more than either himself or those who are +connected with him. + +Obj. 2: Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good. Now +each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more +good, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God's +will: and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in +heaven each one loves more those who are better, and consequently he +loves others more than himself, and one who is not connected with +him, more than one who is. + +Obj. 3: Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God's sake, for +then will be fulfilled the words of 1 Cor. 15:28: "That God may be +all in all." Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so +that a man will love a better man more than himself, and one who is +not connected with him, more than one who is. + +_On the contrary,_ Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory. +Now the order of charity given above (AA. 2, 3, 4) is derived from +nature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others. +Therefore this order of charity will endure in heaven. + +_I answer that,_ The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as +regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized +simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order +between man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be +necessary, because, as we stated above (AA. 7, 9), the degrees of +love may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man +desires for another, or according to the intensity of love itself. In +the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those +who are less good, less than himself: because, by reason of the +perfect conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the +blessed will desire everyone to have what is due to him according to +Divine justice. Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of +merit to a yet greater reward, as happens now while it is possible +for a man to desire both the virtue and the reward of a better man, +whereas then the will of each one will rest within the limits +determined by God. But in the second way a man will love himself more +than even his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of +love arises on the part of the person who loves, as stated above (AA. +7, 9). Moreover it is for this that the gift of charity is bestowed +by God on each one, namely, that he may first of all direct his mind +to God, and this pertains to a man's love for himself, and that, in +the second place, he may wish other things to be directed to God, and +even work for that end according to his capacity. + +As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply +love those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because +the entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to +God, wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with +respect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be +nearer to himself those who are nearer to God. For then one man will +no longer succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein +each man has to succor those who are closely connected with him +rather than those who are not, no matter what be the nature of their +distress: hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of +charity, loves more those who are more closely united to him, for he +is under a greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of +charity. It will however be possible in heaven for a man to love in +several ways one who is connected with him, since the causes of +virtuous love will not be banished from the mind of the blessed. Yet +all these reasons are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken +from nighness to God. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument should be granted as to those who are +connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love +himself so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect, +since perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man's charity +directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as +stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the order of charity in respect +of the degree of good one wills the person one loves. + +Reply Obj. 3: God will be to each one the entire reason of his love, +for God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible +supposition that God were not man's good, He would not be man's +reason for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should +love himself more than all else after God. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 27 + +OF THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of +charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow +from that act. + +Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved? + +(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as +goodwill? + +(3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake? + +(4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life? + +(5) Whether God can be loved wholly? + +(6) Whether the love of God is according to measure? + +(7) Which is the better, to love one's friend, or one's enemy? + +(8) Which is the better, to love God, or one's neighbor? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 1] + +Whether to Be Loved Is More Proper to Charity Than to Love? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be +loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those +who are themselves better. But those who are better should be more +loved. Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems to +be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now, as +the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "many would rather be loved +than love, and lovers of flattery always abound." Therefore it is +better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in +keeping with charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, "the cause of anything being such is yet more so." +Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De Catech. +Rud. iv) that "nothing incites another more to love you than that you +love him first." Therefore charity consists in being loved rather +than in loving. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that +friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity +is a kind of friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than +in being loved. + +_I answer that,_ To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since +charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its +proper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the +person loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent +to him as coming under the common notion of good, in so far as +another tends towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is +clear that to love is more proper to charity than to be loved: for +that which befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more +competent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason of +something else. This can be exemplified in two ways. First, in the +fact that friends are more commended for loving than for being loved, +indeed, if they be loved and yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly, +because a mother, whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love +than to be loved: for "some women," as the Philosopher observes +(Ethic. viii, 8) "entrust their children to a nurse; they do love +them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they happen not +to be loved." + +Reply Obj. 1: A better man, through being better, is more lovable; +but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves more, +however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man does +not love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved: +whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much +as he ought to be loved. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "men wish to +be loved in as much as they wish to be honored." For just as honor is +bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which is in +him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since good +alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be honored, +for the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good which is +in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity seek +to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good +of charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue's good. +Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be +loved. + +Reply Obj. 3: Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be +loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way +leading a man to love. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 2] + +Whether to Love Considered As an Act of Charity Is the Same As +Goodwill? + +Objection 1: It would seem that to love, considered as an act of +charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says +(Rhet. ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is +goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill. + +Obj. 2: Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit. +Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above +(Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the +will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the +act of charity is nothing else than goodwill. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to +friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should +wish his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and +to live; the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the +fourth, that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth, +that he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain +to goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill +is neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship." Now +charity is friendship, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Therefore +goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity. + +_I answer that,_ Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will +whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs +from actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive +appetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For +the love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every +passion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of +love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration +of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the +difference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says +(Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire, +that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the +sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again +such like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill +sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a +boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win. But the love, +which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill, +because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover +and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as +somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards +him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby +we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union +of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an +act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds +union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) +that "goodwill is a beginning of friendship." + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does not +describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in +which the act of love is chiefly manifested. + +Reply Obj. 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the +good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is +not denoted by goodwill. + +Reply Obj. 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to +friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he +says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in +respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this +belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 3] + +Whether Out of Charity God Ought to Be Loved for Himself? + +Objection 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for +Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a +homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to +love those it knows not," where by things unknown he means the +intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the +objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of +something else. + +Obj. 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through +something else, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God +are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." +Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for +Himself. + +Obj. 3: Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Matt. 1:1, +and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his commentary +on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. +ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear +shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it seems +that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some +evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself. + +_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to +enjoy is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be +enjoyed" as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved +for Himself. + +_I answer that,_ The preposition "for" denotes a relation of +causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal, +efficient, and material, to which a material disposition also is to +be reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According +to these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for +another. In respect of the final cause, we love medicine, for +instance, for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man +for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good +and therefore lovable; in respect of the efficient cause, we love +certain men because, for instance, they are the sons of such and such +a father; and in respect of the disposition which is reducible to the +genus of a material cause, we speak of loving something for that +which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for the favors +received from him, although after we have begun to love our friend, +we no longer love him for his favors, but for his virtue. +Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love God, not for +anything else, but for Himself. For He is not directed to anything +else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor +does He require to receive any form in order to be good, for His very +substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other +good things; nor again does goodness accrue to Him from aught else, +but from Him to all other things. In the fourth way, however, He can +be loved for something else, because we are disposed by certain +things to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by +Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the +punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him. + +Reply Obj. 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love what +it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason for +its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or +efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man +to love the unknown. + +Reply Obj. 2: Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other +things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, +but through Himself, according to John 4:42: "We now believe, not for +thy saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is +indeed the Saviour of the world." + +Reply Obj. 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain +disposition, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8; Q. 19, AA. 4, 7, 10). +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 4] + +Whether God Can Be Loved Immediately in This Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in +this life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De +Trin. x, 1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since +"we see now through a glass, in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). +Neither, therefore, do we love Him immediately. + +Obj. 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is +more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who is +joined" to God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. 6:17). But +man cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him +immediately. + +Obj. 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Isa. +59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Now +sin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is +less able to love God immediately than to know Him immediately. + +_On the contrary,_ Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said +to be "enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor. +13:12. But charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage +(1 Cor. 13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God +immediately. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 3; Q. 84, A. 7), the +act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the +knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the +appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows +that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in +respect of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power +follows the mode of the knower. + +Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable +and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness +itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to +us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things +are knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term +of knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses. + +Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the +appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and +flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves +God immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand, +with regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God +through other things, either as a cause through its effects, or by +way of pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf. +I, Q. 12, A. 12). + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not +follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love, +since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin +at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is +known through another thing. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since to love God is something greater than to know +Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God +presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not +rest in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love +begins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular +movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to +God, and love begins with God as the last end, and passes on to +creatures. + +Reply Obj. 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin, is +removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by +loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of +spiritual union. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 5] + +Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q. 184, A. 2] + +Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love +follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this +would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved +by us. + +Obj. 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div. +Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God, +because "God is greater than our heart" (1 John 3:20). Therefore God +cannot be loved wholly. + +Obj. 3: Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be loved +wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves +Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly +loved by a creature. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the +Lord thy God with thy whole heart." + +_I answer that,_ Since love may be considered as something between +lover and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the +question may be understood in three ways, first so that the +qualification "wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God +is to be loved wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God. + +Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the +lover: and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought +to love God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love +of God, according to Deut. 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God +with thy whole heart." + +Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to +the thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the +thing loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in +proportion to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His +goodness is infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely, +because all power of creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is +finite. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first +three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the +last takes it in the second sense. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 6] + +Whether in Loving God We Ought to Observe Any Mode? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in +loving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and +order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love +of God is the best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above +all . . . things, have charity." Therefore there ought to be a +mode of the love of God. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee, +tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the +desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought." But it would +be useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were +one. Therefore there is a mode of the love of God. + +Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the measure +which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode." Now the measure of +the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore +just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the +exterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: "Your reasonable +service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode. + +_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the +cause of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure." + +_I answer that,_ As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above +(Obj. 3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which +determination is to be found both in the measure and in the thing +measured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure +essentially, because a measure is of itself the determining and +modifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is +found relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure. +Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the +thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure, +whether by deficiency or by excess. + +Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end, +because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be +taken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9). +Therefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means take their +mode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the +Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), "in every art, the desire for the end is +endless and unlimited," whereas there is a limit to the means: thus +the physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as perfect +as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, for he does not +give as much medicine as he can, but according as health demands so +that if he give too much or too little, the medicine would be +immoderate. + +Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of +God, whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above +(Q. 23, A. 6), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be +taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little, +but as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where +the more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we +love God the better our love is. + +Reply Obj. 1: That which is so by its essence takes precedence of +that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the +measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the +goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something +else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands +before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine adds in the same passage, "the measure of +our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart," that is to +love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode +which is proper to the measure. + +Reply Obj. 3: An affection, whose object is subject to +reason's judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the +Divine love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore +it is not measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity +between the interior act and external acts of charity. For the +interior act of charity has the character of an end, since man's +ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God, according to Ps. +72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to my God"; whereas the exterior +acts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both +according to charity and according to reason. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 7] + +Whether It Is More Meritorious to Love an Enemy Than to Love a Friend? + +Objection 1: It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to +love a friend. For it is written (Matt. 5:46): "If you love them that +love you, what reward shall you have?" Therefore it is not deserving +of reward to love one's friend: whereas, as the same passage proves, +to love one's enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more +meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend. + +Obj. 2: Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding +from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God +to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity +love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's +enemy than to love one's friend. + +Obj. 3: Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems to +be more merit, since "every man shall receive his own reward +according to his own labor" (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a +greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it +is more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one's +enemy than to love one's friend. + +_On the contrary,_ The better an action is, the more meritorious it +is. Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love +a better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy +who hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's friend +than to love one's enemy. + +_I answer that,_ God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of +charity, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). When therefore it is asked +which is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or one's +enemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the +part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the +reason for which we love him. + +In the first way, love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy, +because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so +that he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of +love that passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its +opposite is worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy. + +In the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than +one's friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible +to love one's friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the +only reason for loving one's enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose +that both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the +stronger through carrying a man's affections to things which are +furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the +power of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it +throws its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is +proved to be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the +things we accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so +much the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable +matter. + +Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near +than on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor +those who are united to us than those who are far removed; and in +this respect the love of friends, considered in itself, is more +ardent and better than the love of one's enemy. + +Reply Obj. 1: The words of Our Lord must be taken in their strict +sense: because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in God's +sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and this +would seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way that +we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends is +meritorious, if we love them for God's sake, and not merely because +they are our friends. + +The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said +in the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the +reason for loving, while the last considers the question on the part +of those who are loved. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 8] + +Whether It Is More Meritorious to Love One's Neighbor Than to Love +God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's +neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem +to be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love +of our neighbor to the love of God, according to Rom. 9:3: "I wished +myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren." Therefore it +is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God. + +Obj. 2: Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious +to love one's friend, as stated above (A. 7). Now God is our chief +friend, since "He hath first loved us" (1 John 4:10). Therefore it +seems less meritorious to love God. + +Obj. 3: Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more virtuous +and meritorious since "virtue is about that which is difficult and +good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one's +neighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because +there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's +neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor +than to love God. + +_On the contrary,_ That on account of which a thing is such, is yet +more so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by +reason of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God +is more meritorious than the love of our neighbor. + +_I answer that,_ This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by +considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love +of God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its +own sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom +the movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to +him that loves God (John 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved +of My Father, and I will . . . manifest Myself to him." Secondly, the +comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on +the one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the +other. In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while +love of God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the +comparison will be between perfect love of God, extending also to our +neighbor, and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this +commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his +brother" (1 John 4:21). + +Reply Obj. 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire +this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he was in +a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state +of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect. + +We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in +Ep. ad Rom.] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his +neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For +he wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which +pertains to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in +his neighbor, which pertains to the love of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man's love for his friends is sometimes less +meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall +short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God. +Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit, +but is the entire reason for merit. + +Reply Obj. 3: The _good_ has, more than the _difficult,_ to do +with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that +whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more +difficult, and at the same time better. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 28 + +OF JOY +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the effects which result from the principal act +of charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the +exterior effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered: +(1) Joy, (2) Peace, (3) Mercy. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity? + +(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow? + +(3) Whether this joy can be full? + +(4) Whether it is a virtue? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 1] + +Whether Joy Is Effected in Us by Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity. +For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But +God, Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in +this state of life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent +from the Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us +rather than joy. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit +happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among +those things whereby we merit happiness, according to Matt. 5:5: +"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore +sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown +above (Q. 17, A. 6). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to Rom. +12:12: "Rejoicing in hope." Therefore it is not the effect of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is +poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." +But joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 14:17: +"The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and +joy in the Holy Ghost." Therefore charity is a cause of joy. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2, 3), when we +were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but +in contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the +presence of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing +loved exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in +the love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of +his friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from +love, either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the +loved object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or +afflicted with some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is +unchangeable, since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that +He is loved, He is in those who love Him by His most excellent +effect, according to 1 John 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, +abideth in God, and God in him." Therefore spiritual joy, which is +about God, is caused by charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be +"absent from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He +is present to some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle +goes on to say (2 Cor. 5:6): "For we walk by faith and not by sight." +Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him, +by the indwelling of His grace. + +Reply Obj. 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about those +things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to the +same that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy about +God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to +grieve for things that are contrary to it. + +Reply Obj. 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways. +First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself; +secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. +The former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: +while the latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward +to enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether +perfect or imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's +charity. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 2] + +Whether the Spiritual Joy, Which Results from Charity, Is Compatible +with an Admixture of Sorrow? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from +charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to +charity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, +6: "Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the +truth." But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, +according to Rom. 12:15: "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with +them that weep." Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible +with an admixture of sorrow. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv), +"penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again +those we have deplored." But there is no true penance without +charity. Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with +Christ according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and +to be with Christ." Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain +sadness, according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is +prolonged!" Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of +sorrow. + +_On the contrary,_ The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. +Now such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: +"Her conversation hath no bitterness." Therefore the joy of charity +is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), a twofold joy in God +arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; +and with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. +This joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even +as the good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of +evil: hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord +always." + +The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good +as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything +contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is +compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves +for that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either +in us or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves. + +Reply Obj. 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of some +evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the sovereign +good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he +is hindered from participating in the Divine good. + +Reply Obj. 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to Isa. +59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins, +or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from +participating in the Divine good. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate, after a +fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the +unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in +the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for +the delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a +participation of the Divine good. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 3] + +Whether the Spiritual Joy Which Proceeds from Charity, Can Be Filled? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from +charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is +our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it +is meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is +infinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy +in God can never be filled. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the +joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is +greater than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a +creature. + +Obj. 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the +fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature +is finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be +comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God +can be filled. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said to His disciples (John 15:11): "That +My joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled." + +_I answer that,_ Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, +on the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as +much as it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy +alone in Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is +condignly due to the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any +creature must needs be finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be +understood on the part of the one who rejoices. Now joy is compared +to desire, as rest to movement, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, +2), when we were treating of the passions: and rest is full when +there is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when there remains +nothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the +movement of desire does not cease in us, because it still remains +possible for us to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown +above (Q. 24, AA. 4, 7). When once, however, perfect happiness has +been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because then there +will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain whatever he +had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to Ps. 102:5: +"Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Hence desire will be at +rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so that the +joy of the blessed is full to perfection--indeed over-full, since +they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for +"neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath +prepared for them that love Him" (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant +by the words of Luke 6:38: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken +together, and running over shall they give into your bosom." Yet, +since no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it +follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on +the contrary, man enters into it, according to Matt. 25:21: "Enter +into the joy of thy Lord." + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to +the thing in which we rejoice. + +Reply Obj. 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach the +term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further +will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, +some will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy +will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully +set at rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account +of a fuller participation of the Divine happiness. + +Reply Obj. 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect +of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There +is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as +we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That you +may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and +spiritual understanding." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 4] + +Whether Joy Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary +to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth +and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which +is _good,_ so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be +virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. +But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4: +"Rejoice in the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is not numbered among the theological virtues, +nor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is +evident from what has been said above (I-II, QQ. 57, 60, 62). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 2, 4), virtue is +an operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an +inclination to a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same +habit there proceed several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of +which follows from another. And since the subsequent acts do not +proceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act, +hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in reference to that +preceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the +virtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about the passions +(I-II, Q. 25, AA. 2, 4) that love is the first affection of the +appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the +same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good, +and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these +acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but +from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct +from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it +is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22). + +Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate +self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of +the vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 77, A. 4); so that it was +necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices, +because they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On +the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely +charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated +above (here and A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but +hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz. +_difficult,_ and _possible to obtain;_ for which reason it is +accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love +any special aspect, that might cause a special virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of +charity, albeit not its first act. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 29 + +OF PEACE (Four Articles) + +We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether peace is the same as concord? + +(2) Whether all things desire peace? + +(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity? + +(4) Whether peace is a virtue? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 1] + +Whether Peace Is the Same As Concord? + +Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For +Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well +ordered concord." Now we are speaking here of no other peace than +that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord. + +Obj. 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace +consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that +peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the +same as concord. + +Obj. 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves +identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace, +viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): "God is not the +God of dissension but of peace." Therefore peace is the same as +concord. + +_On the contrary,_ There can be concord in evil between wicked men. +But "there is no peace to the wicked" (Isa. 48:22). Therefore peace +is not the same as concord. + +_I answer that,_ Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. +Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, +wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning. + +For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so +far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to +the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to +diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the +diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends +sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite, +according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit." +Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to +diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same +time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the +appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace, +because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he +wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for +him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other +hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord +denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace +denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even +in one man. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is +between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord, +not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, +through one man agreeing with another in respect of something +befitting to both of them. For if one man concord with another, not +of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear +of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace, +because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is +disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises +that "peace is tranquillity of order," which tranquillity consists in +all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together. + +Reply Obj. 2: If one man consent to the same thing together with +another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to +himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in +agreement. + +Reply Obj. 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely +dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man +and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 2] + +Whether All Things Desire Peace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For, +according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But +there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of +knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace. + +Obj. 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the +same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do +not desire peace. + +Obj. 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain +peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Matt. +10:34): "I came not to send peace." Therefore all things do not +desire peace. + +Obj. 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign +good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it +is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command +(Mk. 9:49): "Have peace among you." Therefore all things do not +desire peace. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12, 14) that "all +things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi). + +_I answer that,_ From the very fact that a man desires a certain +thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in +consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining +it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by +a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are +removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that +whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires +anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance, +to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which +Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order." + +Reply Obj. 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or +rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which +consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence +Dionysius says that "peace is the cause of consent and of +connaturalness," where "consent" denotes the union of appetites +proceeding from knowledge, and "connaturalness," the union of natural +appetites. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing +but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated +above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter +to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to +break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that +they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence +all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that +which they had heretofore. + +Reply Obj. 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as +the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good +apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can +be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is +truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so +as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many +defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed. +Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace +of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore +it is written (Wis. 14:22): "Whereas they lived in a great war of +ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace." + +Reply Obj. 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as the true +good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is +a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the +perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires +by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the +rational creature, according to Ps. 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in +thy borders." The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this +world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, +yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the +peace. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 3] + +Whether Peace Is the Proper Effect of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of +charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But +some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens +sometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its +contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is +contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even +holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of +their opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from +one another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the +effect of charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of different +things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Isa. 32:17: +"And the work of justice shall be peace." Therefore it is not the +effect of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they +that love Thy Law." + +_I answer that,_ Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above (A. +1). The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to +one object; while the other results from one's own appetite being +united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is +effected by charity--the first, in so far as man loves God with his +whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires +tend to one object--the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as +ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's +will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of +friendship if people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4), +and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the same +things" (Sallust, Catilin.) + +Reply Obj. 1: Without sin no one falls from a state of +sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making +him place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not +cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. +Hence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely +apparentapparent. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends need not +agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and +especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small +matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those +who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an +obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which +precedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if +there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to +some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such +a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man +thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension, +belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks +that it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight +matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect +peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire +fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the +wayfarer. + +Reply Obj. 3: Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so +far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of +charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes +peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): +and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 4] + +Whether Peace Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a +matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are +precepts about keeping peace, for example: "Have peace among you" +(Mk. 9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is +meritorious to keep peace, according to Matt. 5:9: "Blessed are the +peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Therefore +peace is a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which +are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. 5:20). +Therefore peace is a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto. +But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei +xix, 11). Therefore peace is not a virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 28, A. 4), when a number of acts +all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other, +they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue +from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For, +though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not +two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction: +and fire produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction. + +Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God +and of our neighbor, as shown above (A. 3), there is no other virtue +except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in +reference to joy (Q. 28, A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 1: We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of +charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is +placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 69, AA. 1, 3). It is also numbered among the +fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness. + +This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of +its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in +respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect +of joy, and dissension in respect of peace. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 30 + +OF MERCY* [*The one Latin word "misericordia" signifies either pity +or mercy. The distinction between these two is that pity may stand +either for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for +the virtue.] +(In Four Articles) + +We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person +pitied? + +(2) To whom does it belong to pity? + +(3) Whether mercy is a virtue? + +(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 1] + +Whether Evil Is Properly the Motive of Mercy? + +Objection 1: It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the +motive of mercy. For, as shown above (Q. 19, A. 1; I-II, Q. 79, A. 1, +ad 4; I, Q. 48, A. 6), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now +fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not +excite mercy. + +Obj. 2: Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now +the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call for +pity but drives it away." Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive +of mercy. + +Obj. 3: Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of +evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8). +Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is +a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is +the motive of mercy. + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is +heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him +if we can. For mercy takes its name _misericordia_ from denoting a +man's compassionate heart (_miserum cor_) for another's unhappiness. +Now unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to +beatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for, +according to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), "happy is he who has +whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." Hence, on the other +hand, it belongs to unhappiness that a man should suffer what he +wishes not. + +Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural +appetite; thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a +man wishes a thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a +thing, not in itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat +what is bad for him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill. + +Accordingly the motive of _mercy,_ being something pertaining to +_misery,_ is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's +natural appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the +contrary of which man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher +says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether +corruptive or distressing." Secondly, such like evils are yet more +provocative of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice, +wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our +pity "when it is the result of an accident, as when something turns +out ill, whereas we hoped well of it." Thirdly, they cause yet +greater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as when evil +befalls a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the +Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "we pity most the distress of one +who suffers undeservedly." + +Reply Obj. 1: It is essential to fault that it be voluntary; and in +this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since, +however, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having +something connected with it that is against the sinner's will, it +may, in this respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we +pity and commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in +Evang. xxxiv) that "true godliness is not disdainful but +compassionate," and again it is written (Matt. 9:36) that Jesus +"seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them: because they were +distressed, and lying like sheep that have no shepherd." + +Reply Obj. 2: Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it is +directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself, +except figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered +to have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus. +30:24): "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God" [*Cf. Q. 106, A. 3, +ad 1]. + +Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself, +but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in +ourselves, so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to +us, as to be part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents, +we do not pity their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in +which sense the Philosopher says that "harshness drives pity away." + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of +good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the +recollection of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are +present to the senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so +far as they represent as present, the evil that excites our pity. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 2] + +Whether the Reason for Taking Pity Is a Defect in the Person Who Pities? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a +defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be +merciful, wherefore it is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies +are over all His works." But there is no defect in God. Therefore a +defect cannot be the reason for taking pity. + +Obj. 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in +whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is +false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in +a desperate state are pitiless." Therefore it seems that the reason +for taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities. + +Obj. 3: Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But +the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to +contumely are pitiless." Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not +a defect in the person who pities. + +_On the contrary,_ Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the +reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to +sorrow more easily, as we shall say further on (Q. 35, A. 1, ad 2). +Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself. + +_I answer that,_ Since pity is grief for another's distress, as +stated above (A. 1), from the very fact that a person takes pity on +anyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since +sorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for +another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as +one's own. + +Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections, +which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks +upon his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his +own, so that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt +himself. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with +one's friend" as being one of the signs of friendship, and the +Apostle says (Rom. 12:15): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with +them that weep." + +Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's +evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the +Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to +them, and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may +happen to themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who +consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and +timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem +themselves happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no +danger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity. + +Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either +because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being +united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering +in the same way. + +Reply Obj. 1: God takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as +He loves us as belonging to Him. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear +to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like manner this +applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent +on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of +others. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through +having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are +incited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the +human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man think +that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while +they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Prov. +27:4: "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." For the +same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others, +and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering +deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. +xxxiv) that "false godliness," i.e. of the proud, "is not +compassionate but disdainful." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 3] + +Whether Mercy Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief +part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5). +Now choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled" +(Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called +a virtue. But mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of +Sallust (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of +doubt, should be free from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the +mind does not easily see aright, when these things stand in the way." +Therefore mercy is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But +nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, +9), and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore +mercy is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they +result from charity, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 4; Q. 29, A. 4). Now +mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we +weep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice. +Therefore mercy is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is +not an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its object, +neither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral +virtue, because neither is it about operations, for this belongs to +justice; nor is it about passions, since it is not reduced to one of +the twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7). +Therefore mercy is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "Cicero in +praising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at +once more humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when +he says: 'Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful +than thy mercy.'" Therefore mercy is a virtue. + +_I answer that,_ Mercy signifies grief for another's distress. Now +this grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive +appetite, in which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas, +in another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective +appetite, in as much as one person's evil is displeasing to another. +This movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in +accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of +the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. +Dei ix, 5) that "this movement of the mind" (viz. mercy) "obeys the +reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is +safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant." +And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the +soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 59, +AA. 4, 5), it follows that mercy is a virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: The words of Sallust are to be understood as applying +to the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for thus it +impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis, +considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one +another on the part of their respective estimation of another's +evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to +suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it +esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well +with the undeserving: "both of these are praiseworthy and come from +the same disposition of character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking, +however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state +further on (Q. 36, A. 3). + +Reply Obj. 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which +is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other +virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect, +namely the misery of the person pitied. + +Reply Obj. 4: Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue +having relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called +nemesis, because "they both proceed from the same character" (Rhet. +ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but +as passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet +nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in +which case they assume the character of a virtue. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 4] + +Whether Mercy Is the Greatest of the Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues. +For the worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is +preferred before the worship of God, according to Osee 6:6 and Matt. +12:7: "I have desired mercy and not sacrifice." Therefore mercy is +the greatest virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8: "Godliness is profitable +to all things," a gloss says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule of +life consists in mercy and godliness." Now the Christian rule of life +embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is +contained in mercy. + +Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue is that which makes its subject good," +according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man +like God, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for +being more like God. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since +of God is it said (Ps. 144:9) that "His tender mercies are over all +His works," and (Luke 6:36) Our Lord said: "Be ye . . . merciful, as +your Father also is merciful." Therefore mercy is the greatest of +virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle after saying (Col. 3:12): "Put ye +on . . . as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy," etc., adds +(Col. 3:14): "Above all things have charity." Therefore mercy is not +the greatest of virtues. + +_I answer that,_ A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways: +first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In +itself, mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to +mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others +in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence +mercy is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His +omnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth +Sunday after Pentecost]. + +On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the +greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others, +surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone +above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to +supply the defect of that which is beneath. [*"The quality of mercy +is not strained./'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The +throned monarch better than his crown." Merchant of Venice, Act IV, +Scene i.]. Hence, as regards man, who has God above him, charity +which unites him to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies +the defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to +our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all +others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply +the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient. + +Reply Obj. 1: We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not +for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For +He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in +order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy, +whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to +Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being, +according to Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for +by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained." + +Reply Obj. 2: The sum total of the Christian religion consists in +mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity, +whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy +for our neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 3: Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the +bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as +regards similarity of works. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 31 + +OF BENEFICENCE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity, +(1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence, +(3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity? + +(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all? + +(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more +closely united to us? + +(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 1] + +Whether Beneficence Is an Act of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity. +For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit God, +according to Job 35:7: "What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He +receive of thy hand?" Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But +this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of +liberality and not of charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due, or +as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice +while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this +respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is +either an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an +act of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above +(Q. 23, A. 1). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of +friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) "doing good," i.e. being beneficent, "to +one's friends." Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to +others. + +_I answer that,_ Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This +good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of +good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of +friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love +includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated +above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 2). Now the will carries into effect if +possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, the result of +an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend. Therefore +beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of friendship or +charity. + +But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some +special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special +character and will belong to some special virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "love +moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the +inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the +superior to watch over the inferior:" and in this respect beneficence +is an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to +honor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to +bestow good things on us. + +Reply Obj. 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal of +gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward +passion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to +liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive +desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part +with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet +desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the +other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence +belongs in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract +from a man's friendship, if, through love, he give his friend +something he would like to keep for himself; rather does this prove +the perfection of his friendship. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the +benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see +therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of +distress or defect. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 2] + +Whether We Ought to Do Good to All? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all. +For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are unable to +do good to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to the +impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) "Give to the good, and +receive not a sinner." But many men are sinners. Therefore we need +not do good to all. + +Obj. 3: Further, "Charity dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Now +to do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were to +do good to an enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to +an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding +communion with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of +charity, we ought not to do good to all. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we have +time, let us work good to all men." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 1), beneficence is an +effect of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the +inferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels, +because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is superior +in one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since +the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should extend to +all, but according as time and place require: because all acts of +virtue must be modified with a view to their due circumstances. + +Reply Obj. 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to +every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be +bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds +us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind +to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a +good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to +all in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as +for the faithful. + +Reply Obj. 2: In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and his +nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the +maintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this +would be to do evil rather than good. + +Reply Obj. 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the common weal +are deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents them from +doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor +lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they be in +danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like +distress, unless this be according to the order of justice. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 3] + +Whether We Ought to Do Good to Those Rather Who Are More Closely +United to Us? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to those +rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Luke +14:12): "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, +nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen." Now these are the most closely +united to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those rather +who are more closely united to us, but preferably to strangers and to +those who are in want: hence the text goes on: "But, when thou makest +a feast, call the poor, the maimed," etc. + +Obj. 2: Further, to help another in the battle is an act of very +great goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help a +fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe. +Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the +preference to those who are most closely united to us. + +Obj. 3: Further, we should pay what is due before conferring +gratuitous favors. But it is a man's duty to be good to those who +have been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our +benefactors rather than to those who are closely united to us. + +Obj. 4: Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his +children, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 9). Yet a man ought to be more +beneficent to his children, since "neither ought the children to lay +up for the parents," according to 2 Cor. 12:14. Therefore we are not +bound to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to +us. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "Since +one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by +reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance +are more closely united to us." + +_I answer that,_ Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which +is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that +every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on +the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next +to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first +and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as +Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is +an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most +beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us. + +Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to +the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the +intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens +is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, +and so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various +ways according to these various connections, because we ought in +preference to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the +matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with +us. And yet this may vary according to the various requirements of +time, place, or matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought, +for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than +one's own father, if he is not in such urgent need. + +Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite our +friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they +may invite us in return, since that would be an act not of charity +but of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought rather +to invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must be +understood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor those +rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two, one be +more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not +possible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to +help rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want +as well as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a +prudent man. + +Reply Obj. 2: The common good of many is more Godlike than the good +of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to +endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the +temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage +together in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the +soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as +a private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country +as a whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be +preferred to one who is a blood relation. + +Reply Obj. 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is one which +should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather as +belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may +have another's goods, whether in money or in kind, either because he +has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or in +deposit or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what he +owes, rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless perchance +the case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take +another's property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet, +again, this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress: +in which case, however, the claims on either side would have to be +weighed with regard to such other conditions as a prudent man would +take into consideration, because, on account of the different +particular cases, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is +impossible to lay down a general rule. + +The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the +debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not +because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral +equity, as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor +confers a benefit equal to that which a man receives from his +parents: wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should give +the first place to our parents before all others, unless, on the +other side, there be such weightier motives, as need or some other +circumstance, for instance the common good of the Church or state. In +other cases we must take to account the connection and the benefit +received; and here again no general rule can laid down. + +Reply Obj. 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a parent's love +tends to conferring benefits, while the children's love tends to +honor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it +would be lawful to abandon one's children rather than one's parents, +to abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the +obligation we lie under towards them for the benefits we have +received from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14). +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 4] + +Whether Beneficence Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue. For +precepts are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make men +virtuous (Ethic. i 9, 13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are +prescribed as distinct from one another, for it is written (Matt. +4:44): "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you." Therefore +beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there are opposed +to beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on our +neighbor, for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore +beneficence is a special virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity is not divided into several species: whereas +there would seem to be several kinds of beneficence, according to the +various kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a distinct virtue +from charity. + +_On the contrary,_ The internal and the external act do not require +different virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as +external and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of +goodwill. Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from +charity, so neither is beneficence. + +_I answer that,_ Virtues differ according to the different aspects of +their objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of +beneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect +of good, as explained above (A. 1). Wherefore beneficence is not a +distinct virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: Precepts are given, not about habits but about acts of +virtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes distinction, not of +habits, but of acts. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even as all benefits conferred on our neighbor, if we +consider them under the common aspect of good, are to be traced to +love, so all hurts considered under the common aspect of evil, are to +be traced to hatred. But if we consider these same things under +certain special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to +certain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there are +various kinds of benefits. + +Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 32 + +OF ALMSDEEDS +(In Ten Articles) + +We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity? + +(2) Of the different kinds of alms; + +(3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal? + +(4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect? + +(5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept? + +(6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need? + +(7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods? + +(8) Who can give alms? + +(9) To whom should we give alms? + +(10) How should alms be given? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 1] + +Whether Almsgiving Is an Act of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity. +For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible +to give alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I +should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not +charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore almsgiving is not an act +of charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of satisfaction, +according to Dan. 4:24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Now +satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of +justice and not of charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of +religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according to +Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such +sacrifices God's favor is obtained." Therefore almsgiving is not an +act of charity, but of religion. + +Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that to give for +a good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially true +of almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written 2 John 3:17: "He that hath the +substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall +put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?" + +_I answer that,_ External acts belong to that virtue which regards +the motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to +relieve one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being +"a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion +and for God's sake," which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above +(Q. 30, AA. 1, 2). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly +speaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its very name, for in +Greek (_eleemosyne_) it is derived from having mercy (_eleein_) even +as the Latin _miseratio_ is. And since mercy is an effect of charity, +as shown above (Q. 30, A. 2, A. 3, Obj. 3), it follows that +almsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of mercy. + +Reply Obj. 1: An act of virtue may be taken in two ways: first +materially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and such an +act of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having +the habit of justice, do what is just, led by the natural light of +reason, or through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak +of a thing being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of +justice is to do what is just, in the same way as a just man, i.e. +with readiness and delight, and such an act of virtue cannot be +without the virtue. + +Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give +alms formally, i.e. for God's sake, with delight and readiness, and +altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity. + +Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of one virtue +being commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing it +to this other virtue's end. It is in this way that almsgiving is +reckoned among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in +distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far +as it is directed to placate God, it has the character of a +sacrifice, and thus it is commanded by religion. + +Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. + +Reply Obj. 4: Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so far as +liberality removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise from +excessive love of riches, the result of which is that one clings to +them more than one ought. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 2] + +Whether the Different Kinds of Almsdeeds Are Suitably Enumerated? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the different kinds of almsdeeds are +unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds, +namely, to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe +the naked, to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the +captive, to bury the dead; all of which are expressed in the +following verse: "To visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe, +harbor or bury." + +Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to instruct the +ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to +reprove the sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear with those who +trouble and annoy us, and to pray for all, which are all contained in +the following verse: "To counsel, reprove, console, to pardon, +forbear, and to pray," yet so that counsel includes both advice and +instruction. + +And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated. +For the purpose of almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor. But a dead +man profits nothing by being buried, else Our Lord would not have +spoken truly when He said (Matt. 10:28): "Be not afraid of them who +kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do." [*The +quotation is from Luke 12:4.] This explains why Our Lord, in +enumerating the works of mercy, made no mention of the burial of the +dead (Matt. 25:35, 36). Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are +unsuitably enumerated. + +Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1), the purpose of giving alms +is to relieve our neighbor's need. Now there are many needs of human +life other than those mentioned above, for instance, a blind man +needs a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man needs +riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated. + +Obj. 3: Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of +the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of mercy. +Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds. + +Obj. 4: Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a defect. +But no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or +other. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who +is ignorant of what he knows himself. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): "Let him that +hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him +that hath abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful +bounty; let him who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share +his skill and profit with his neighbor; let him who has an +opportunity of speaking with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned +for retaining his talent, if when he has the chance he plead not with +him the cause of the poor." Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are +suitably enumerated in respect of those things whereof men have +abundance or insufficiency. + +_I answer that,_ The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably +taken from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect +the soul, and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others +affect the body, and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal +need occurs either during this life or afterwards. If it occurs +during this life, it is either a common need in respect of things +needed by all, or it is a special need occurring through some +accident supervening. In the first case, the need is either internal +or external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved by solid +food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have _to feed the hungry;_ +while the other is relieved by liquid food, viz. thirst, and in +respect of this we have _to give drink to the thirsty._ The common +need with regard to external help is twofold; one in respect of +clothing, and as to this we have _to clothe the naked:_ while the +other is in respect of a dwelling place, and as to this we have _to +harbor the harborless._ Again if the need be special, it is either +the result of an internal cause, like sickness, and then we have _to +visit the sick,_ or it results from an external cause, and then we +have _to ransom the captive._ After this life we give _burial to the +dead._ + +In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two +ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this respect we have +_prayer,_ whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human +assistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to relieve a +deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in +the speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by _instructing,_ +and if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by +_counselling._ Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the +appetitive power, especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by +_comforting._ Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate +act; and this may be the subject of a threefold consideration. First, +in respect of the sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his +inordinate will, and thus the remedy takes the form of _reproof._ +Secondly, in respect of the person sinned against; and if the sin be +committed against ourselves, we apply the remedy by _pardoning the +injury,_ while, if it be committed against God or our neighbor, it is +not in our power to pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii, +15). Thirdly, in respect of the result of the inordinate act, on +account of which the sinner is an annoyance to those who live with +him, even beside his intention; in which case the remedy is applied +by _bearing with him,_ especially with regard to those who sin out +of weakness, according to Rom. 15:1: "We that are stronger, ought to +bear the infirmities of the weak," and not only as regards their +being infirm and consequently troublesome on account of their unruly +actions, but also by bearing any other burdens of theirs with them, +according to Gal. 6:2: "Bear ye one another's burdens." + +Reply Obj. 1: Burial does not profit a dead man as though his body +could be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord +said that those who kill the body "have no more that they can do"; +and for this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with +the other works of mercy, but those only which are more clearly +necessary. Nevertheless it does concern the deceased what is done +with his body: both that he may live in the memory of man whose +respect he forfeits if he remain without burial, and as regards a +man's fondness for his own body while he was yet living, a fondness +which kindly persons should imitate after his death. It is thus that +some are praised for burying the dead, as Tobias, and those who +buried Our Lord; as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii). + +Reply Obj. 2: All other needs are reduced to these, for blindness and +lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the blind, and to +support the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick. In like +manner to assist a man against any distress that is due to an +extrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the +wealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the +purpose of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason +for special mention of this particular need. + +Reply Obj. 3: The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of the +act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as to +the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the evil +of sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according to Prov. +27:6: "Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful kisses +of an enemy." + +Reply Obj. 4: Nescience is not always a defect, but only when it is +about what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to +supply this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should +observe the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in +other virtuous acts. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 3] + +Whether Corporal Alms Are of More Account Than Spiritual Alms? + +Objection 1: It would seem that corporal alms are of more account +than spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to +one who is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised +because it relieves one who is in need. Now the body which is +relieved by corporal alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit +which is relieved by spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of +more account. + +Obj. 2: Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if the +kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says (Luke 14:12): "When +thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are +rich, lest perhaps they also invite thee again." Now there is always +compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another, +profits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: "My prayer shall be turned +into my bosom": and he who teaches another, makes progress in +knowledge, which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore +corporal almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds. + +Obj. 3: Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is +comforted by it: wherefore it is written (Job 31:20): "If his sides +have not blessed me," and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7): +"The bowels of the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother." Now +a corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a +spiritual alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of more account than +spiritual almsdeeds. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on +the words, "Give to him that asketh of thee" (Matt. 5:42): "You +should give so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when +you refuse what another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of +justice, and send him away empty; at times indeed you will give what +is better than what is asked for, if you reprove him that asks +unjustly." Now reproof is a spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual +almsdeeds are preferable to corporal almsdeeds. + +_I answer that,_ There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds. +First, simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the +first place, for three reasons. First, because the offering is more +excellent, since it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal +gift, according to Prov. 4:2: "I will give you a good gift, forsake +not My Law." Secondly, on account of the object succored, because the +spirit is more excellent than the body, wherefore, even as a man in +looking after himself, ought to look to his soul more than to his +body, so ought he in looking after his neighbor, whom he ought to +love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the acts themselves by which our +neighbor is succored, because spiritual acts are more excellent than +corporal acts, which are, in a fashion, servile. + +Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case, +when some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a +man in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the +Philosopher observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man "money is +better than philosophy," although the latter is better simply. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is better to give to one who is in greater want, +other things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better, and +is in want of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is +thus in the case in point. + +Reply Obj. 2: Compensation does not detract from merit and praise if +it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended, does not +detract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.), that "the +less he sought fame, the more he became famous": and thus it is with +spiritual almsdeeds. + +Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not +detract from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods. + +Reply Obj. 3: The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in which the +will of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in which it +rests when it is inordinate. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 4] + +Whether Corporal Almsdeeds Have a Spiritual Effect? + +Objection 1: It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a +spiritual effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual +goods exceed corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no +spiritual effect. + +Obj. 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal +for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one +ought not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect. + +Obj. 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect. If +therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater +the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what +we read (Luke 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the +treasury, and in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . . all." +Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): "The alms of a man +. . . shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye." + +_I answer that,_ Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways. +First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have +merely a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's +corporal needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their +cause, in so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God +and his neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual +fruit, according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy +brother . . . place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most +High, and it shall bring thee more profit than gold." + +Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have +a spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a +corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the +above text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the +poor, and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil." + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to their +substance. + +Reply Obj. 2: He who gives an alms does not intend to buy a spiritual +thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual things +infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a +spiritual fruit through the love of charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in +proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence +corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 5] + +Whether Almsgiving Is a Matter of Precept? + +Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of +precept. For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now +almsgiving is a matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my +counsel be acceptable to the King; [Vulg.: 'to thee, and'] redeem +thou thy sins with alms." Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of +precept. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what is +his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is +lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter +of precept. + +Obj. 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the +transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because +positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if +almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to +some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave +an alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can +always be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in +some other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be +needful to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it +seems that almsgiving is not a matter of precept. + +Obj. 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of +the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving. +Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept. + +_On the contrary,_ No man is punished eternally for omitting to do +what is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for +omitting to give alms, as is clear from Matt. 25:41-43. Therefore +almsgiving is a matter of precept. + +_I answer that,_ As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, +whatever is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a +matter of precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that +not only should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his +well-doers, according to 1 John 3:18: "Let us not love in word, nor +in tongue, but in deed, and in truth." And in order to be a person's +well-wisher and well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done +by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept. + +Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that +all almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is +necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right +reason. Now right reason demands that we should take into +consideration something on the part of the giver, and something on +the part of the recipient. On the part of the giver, it must be noted +that he should give of his surplus, according to Luke 11:41: "That +which remaineth, give alms." This surplus is to be taken in reference +not only to himself, so as to denote what is unnecessary to the +individual, but also in reference to those of whom he has charge (in +which case we have the expression "necessary to the person" [*The +official necessities of a person in position] taking the word +"person" as expressive of dignity). Because each one must first of +all look after himself and then after those over whom he has charge, +and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others. Thus +nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for the +upkeep of one's own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the +formation of another by the power of generation. + +On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in +need, else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it +is not possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we +are not bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who +could not be succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases +the words of Ambrose apply, "Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou +hast not fed him, thou hast slain him" [*Cf. Canon _Pasce,_ dist. +lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are +bound to give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms to one whose +need is extreme: otherwise almsgiving, like any other greater good, +is a matter of counsel. + +Reply Obj. 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to God's +Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he did +not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been +speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter +of precept. + +Reply Obj. 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours as to +the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us alone +but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we have +over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii, +18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as coming +from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are +you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the +merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the +hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you +have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot, +the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you +injure as many as you might help." Ambrose expresses himself in the +same way. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit to give +alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is +evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored +otherwise--on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods, +which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge +with probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly +occur in the future, for this would be to think about the morrow, +which Our Lord forbade us to do (Matt. 6:34), but he should judge +what is superfluous and what necessary, according as things probably +and generally occur. + +Reply Obj. 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to the +precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle +interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay: +'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life +that now is, and of that which is to come," and he says this because +the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, "that +thou mayest be longlived upon the land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness +comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*_Pietas,_ whence our English +word "Piety." Cf. also inf. Q. 101, A. 2.] +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 6] + +Whether One Ought to Give Alms Out of What One Needs? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of +what one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only +as regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our +interior affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of +charity, because this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the +order of charity requires that a man should love himself more than +his neighbor, it seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of +what he needed, in order to succor his neighbor. + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself, squanders +his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done. +Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not +care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied +the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now if a man gives of what +he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from the +care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems +that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt be +perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Now he that +gives all he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but +also what he needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he +needs. + +_I answer that,_ A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because +without it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to +give alms out of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance, +if a man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had +merely sufficient to support himself and his children, or others +under his charge, he would be throwing away his life and that of +others if he were to give away in alms, what was then necessary to +him. Yet I say this without prejudice to such a case as might happen, +supposing that by depriving himself of necessaries a man might help a +great personage, and a support of the Church or State, since it would +be a praiseworthy act to endanger one's life and the lives of those +who are under our charge for the delivery of such a person, since the +common good is to be preferred to one's own. + +Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it +live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or +those of whom he has charge. The "necessary" considered thus is not +an invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's +property, and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one +might take much from him, and he would still have sufficient for the +decencies of life in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is +good to give alms of this kind of "necessary"; and it is a matter not +of precept but of counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive +oneself of one's own, in order to give to others to such an extent +that the residue would be insufficient for one to live in keeping +with one's station and the ordinary occurrences of life: for no man +ought to live unbecomingly. There are, however, three exceptions to +the above rule. The first is when a man changes his state of life, +for instance, by entering religion, for then he gives away all his +possessions for Christ's sake, and does the deed of perfection by +transferring himself to another state. Secondly, when that which he +deprives himself of, though it be required for the decencies of life, +can nevertheless easily be recovered, so that he does not suffer +extreme inconvenience. Thirdly, when he is in presence of extreme +indigence in an individual, or great need on the part of the common +weal. For in such cases it would seem praiseworthy to forego the +requirements of one's station, in order to provide for a greater need. + +The objections may be easily solved from what has been said. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 7] + +Whether One May Give Alms Out of Ill-gotten Goods? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten +goods. For it is written (Luke 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the +mammon of iniquity." Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is +lawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of +ill-gotten riches. + +Obj. 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the +profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden +(Deut. 23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God: +"Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house +of . . . thy God." In like manner gains from games of chance are +ill-gotten, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "we take +such like gains from our friends to whom we ought rather to give." +And most of all are the profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby +the Holy Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is +lawful to give alms. Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten +goods. + +Obj. 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser +evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property than to +commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who +is in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf. +Canon _Pasce_ dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken): +"Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast +slain him". Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of +ill-gotten goods. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): "Give alms +from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not +to hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from +interest and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the +Body of Christ." + +_I answer that,_ A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the +first place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from +whom it is gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained +possession of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of +such things a man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them. + +Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it, +and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it, +because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly. +This happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene +the justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not +to the giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar +cases of illegal giving and receiving. + +Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful, +but because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case +of a woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so +called, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the +Law of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in +taking the money. Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in +alms what is thus acquired by an unlawful action. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), "Some have +misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's +property and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are +fulfilling the commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be +amended. Yet all riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in +_De Quaest. Ev._ ii, 34, because "riches are not unjust save for +those who are themselves unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or, +according to Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 16:9, "Make unto +yourselves friends," etc., "He calls mammon unjust, because it draws +our affections by the various allurements of wealth." Or, because +"among the many ancestors whose property you inherit, there is one +who took the property of others unjustly, although you know nothing +about it," as Basil says in a homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all +riches are styled riches "of iniquity," i.e., of "inequality," +because they are not distributed equally among all, one being in +need, and another in affluence. + +Reply Obj. 2: We have already explained how alms may be given out of +the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not made +therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and through +reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out of +the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid, +indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of +chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary +to the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his +property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with +the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play, +and wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to +restitution, and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms. +Then again there would seem to be something unlawful as being against +the positive civil law, which altogether forbids any such profits. +Since, however, a civil law does not bind all, but only those who are +subject to that law, and moreover may be abrogated through desuetude, +it follows that all such as are bound by these laws are bound to make +restitution of such gains, unless perchance the contrary custom +prevail, or unless a man win from one who enticed him to play, in +which case he is not bound to restitution, because the loser does not +deserve to be paid back: and yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has +won, so long as that positive law is in force, wherefore in this case +he ought to give it away in alms. + +Reply Obj. 3: All things are common property in a case of extreme +necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take another's +goods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who is +willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain +what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take +something if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in +need. If however this be possible without danger, he must ask the +owner's consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme +necessity. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 8] + +Whether One Who Is Under Another's Power Can Give Alms? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power can +give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to +whom they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to +give alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as +Ambrose [*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index +to ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim. +4:8: "'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things': +The sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty +by all," and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms. +Therefore those who are in another's power can give alms. + +Obj. 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gen. 3:16). But +a wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it is +related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge +of her betrothed [*_Sponsus._ The matrimonial institutions of the +Romans were so entirely different from ours that _sponsus_ is no +longer accurately rendered either "husband" or "betrothed."] +Therefore a person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under +another's power. + +Obj. 3: Further, the subjection of children to their parents is +founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1): "Children, +obey your parents in the Lord." But, apparently, children may give +alms out of their parents' property. For it is their own, since they +are the heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily +use, it seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so as to +profit their souls. Therefore those who are under another's power can +give alms. + +Obj. 4: Further, servants are under their master's power, according +to Titus 2:9: "Exhort servants to be obedient to their masters." Now +they may lawfully do anything that will profit their masters: and +this would be especially the case if they gave alms for them. +Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms. + +_On the contrary,_ Alms should not be given out of another's +property; and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his +own labor as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who +are subject to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of +another's property. Therefore those who are under another's power +cannot give alms. + +_I answer that,_ Anyone who is under another's power must, as such, +be ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the +natural order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to +its superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is +subject to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the +superior's permission. + +Accordingly he that is under another's power must not give alms of +anything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in +so far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has +something in respect of which he is not under the power of his +superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being +independent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms +therefrom. + +Reply Obj. 1: If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned by +his superior, he can give alms from the property of his monastery, in +accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such +dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms +without his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some +probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would +be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor +does it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated +in _De Eccles. Dogm._ lxxi, "it is a good thing to give one's +property to the poor little by little, but it is better still to give +all at once in order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to +be needy with Christ." + +Reply Obj. 2: A wife, who has other property besides her dowry which +is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that property +be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means, can give +alms, out of that property, without asking her husband's permission: +yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too much she +impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms without +the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases of +necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply. +For though the wife be her husband's equal in the marriage act, yet +in matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the +Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a +betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her +mother's consent. + +Reply Obj. 3: What belongs to the children belongs also to the +father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small +quantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless, +perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any +particular property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to +the Fourth Objection is clear. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 9] + +Whether One Ought to Give Alms to Those Rather Who Are More Closely +United to Us? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those +rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus. +12:4, 6): "Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do +good to the humble and give not to the ungodly." Now it happens +sometimes that those who are closely united to us are sinful and +ungodly. Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to +others. + +Obj. 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive an eternal +reward in return, according to Matt. 6:18: "And thy Father Who seeth +in secret, will repay thee." Now the eternal reward is gained chiefly +by the alms which are given to the saints, according to Luke 16:9: +"Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall +fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings," which passage +Augustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have +everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that +shall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who +succor them in their needs?" Therefore alms should be given to the +more holy persons rather than to those who are more closely united to +us. + +Obj. 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man +cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound +to give alms to those who are most closely united to us. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have +not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath +denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "it +falls to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of +those who are more closely united to us." Nevertheless in this matter +we must employ discretion, according to the various degrees of +connection, holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one +who is much holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful +to the common weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to +us, especially if the latter be not very closely united, and has no +special claim on our care then and there, and who is not in very +urgent need. + +Reply Obj. 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by +encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature. + +Reply Obj. 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an eternal +reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this respect +an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order of +charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we should, in +preference, help those who are more closely connected with us. +Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "It is with commendable +liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be +in need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own +family, who would be ashamed to beg help from others." Secondly, +almsdeeds deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the +recipient, who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that +Augustine is speaking. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man does +not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of +comparison, as stated above (Q. 30, AA. 1, 2), so too, properly +speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another's +person; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take +something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when +he gives to others. +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 10] + +Whether Alms Should Be Given in Abundance? + +Objection 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in +abundance. For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most +closely connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a +way that they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says +(De Officiis i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to +others. + +Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "We should not +lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by +degrees." But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms +should not be given in abundance. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): "Not that others +should be eased," i.e. should live on you without working themselves, +"and you burthened," i.e. impoverished. But this would be the result +if alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms +abundantly. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:93): "If thou have much, +give abundantly." + +_I answer that,_ Alms may be considered abundant in relation either +to the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when +that which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give +thus is praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Luke 21:3, 4) commended the +widow because "of her want, she cast in all the living that she had." +Nevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid down +when we spoke of giving alms out of one's necessary goods (A. 9). + +On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways; +first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is +praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than +sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to +give to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. +13:3): "If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor," on which +words a gloss comments: "Thus we are warned to be careful in giving +alms, and to give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit +many." + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as exceeding +the needs of the recipient. + +Reply Obj. 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on the +part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to +lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of +life, wherefore he goes on to say: "Except we imitate Eliseus who +slew his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household +cares might keep him back" (3 Kings 19:21). + +Reply Obj. 3: In the passage quoted the words, "not that others +should be eased or refreshed," refer to that abundance of alms which +surpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not +that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief. +Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on +account of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more +daintily nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose +says (De Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms to a man, you should +take into consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the +shame which proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has +fallen from riches to indigence through no fault of his own." + +With regard to the words that follow, "and you burdened," they refer +to abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the +same passage, "he says this, not because it would be better to give +in abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes +them so to give that they lack not for themselves." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 33 + +OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are +eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity? + +(2) Whether it is a matter of precept? + +(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors? + +(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior? + +(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone? + +(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through +being corrected? + +(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement? + +(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 1] + +Whether Fraternal Correction Is an Act of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of +charity. For a gloss on Matt. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend +against thee," says that "a man should reprove his brother out of +zeal for justice." But justice is a distinct virtue from charity. +Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of +justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret admonition. +Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of prudence, for +a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore +fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue. Now +it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Gal. 6:2: +"Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of +Christ," which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the +correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with +him, is not an act of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed. +But almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 1). +Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity. + +_I answer that,_ The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which +should be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be +considered in two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner, +secondly as conducing to the harm of others, by hurting or +scandalizing them, or by being detrimental to the common good, the +justice of which is disturbed by that man's sin. + +Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which +applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner +himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is +directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone's +evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person's +good is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well. +Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because +thereby we drive out our brother's evil, viz. sin, the removal of +which pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external +loss, or of a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of +virtue is more akin to charity than the good of the body or of +external things. Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity +rather than the healing of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an +external bodily need. There is another correction which applies a +remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered as hurtful to others, +and especially to the common good. This correction is an act of +justice, whose concern it is to safeguard the rectitude of justice +between one man and another. + +Reply Obj. 1: This gloss speaks of the second correction which is an +act of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it +takes justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further +on (Q. 58, A. 5), in which sense again all "sin is iniquity" (1 John +3:4), through being contrary to justice. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), prudence +regulates whatever is directed to the end, about which things counsel +and choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by prudence, we +perform some action aright which is directed to the end of some +virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action belongs chiefly +to the virtue to whose end it is directed. Since, then, the +admonition which is given in fraternal correction is directed to the +removal of a brother's sin, which removal pertains to charity, it is +evident that this admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which +virtue commands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence, +which executes and directs the action. + +Reply Obj. 3: Fraternal correction is not opposed to forbearance with +the weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a man bears with a +sinner, in so far as he is not disturbed against him, and retains his +goodwill towards him: the result being that he strives to make him do +better. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 2] + +Whether Fraternal Correction Is a Matter of Precept? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter +of precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according +to the saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: "Accursed +be he who says that God has commanded anything impossible." Now it is +written (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can +correct whom He hath despised." Therefore fraternal correction is not +a matter of precept. + +Obj. 2: Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to +the precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not come +under any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of +precept. + +Obj. 3: Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin, +which has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are +found to omit fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei +i, 9): "Not only those of low degree, but also those of high +position, refrain from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity, +not by the claims of charity." Therefore fraternal correction is not +a matter of precept. + +Obj. 4: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due. +If, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it is due +to our brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man +owes anyone a material due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he +must not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek +him out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we should have to go +seeking for those who need correction, in order that we might correct +them; which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the great +number of sinners, for whose correction one man could not suffice, +and because religious would have to leave the cloister in order to +reprove men, which would be unbecoming. Therefore fraternal +correction is not a matter of precept. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): "You become +worse than the sinner if you fail to correct him." But this would not +be so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some precept. +Therefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept. + +_I answer that,_ Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We must +observe, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law forbid +sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now +sinful acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter +how, or when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature +they are connected with an evil end, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6: +wherefore negative precepts bind always and for all times. On the +other hand, acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing +the due circumstances, which are requisite in order that an act be +virtuous; namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be +done. And since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end +depends on the formal aspect of the end, the chief of these +circumstances of a virtuous act is this aspect of the end, which in +this case is the good of virtue. If therefore such a circumstance be +omitted from a virtuous act, as entirely takes away the good of +virtue, such an act is contrary to a precept. If, however, the +circumstance omitted from a virtuous act be such as not to destroy +the virtue altogether, though it does not perfectly attain the good +of virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. +ii, 9) says that if we depart but little from the mean, it is not +contrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much from the mean +virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction is directed +to a brother's amendment: so that it is a matter of precept, in so +far as it is necessary for that end, but not so as we have to correct +our erring brother at all places and times. + +Reply Obj. 1: In all good deeds man's action is not efficacious +without the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his +power. Hence Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): "Since we +ignore who is predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our +feelings, that we wish all to be saved." Consequently we ought to do +our brethren the kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God's +help. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 32, A. 5, ad 4), all the precepts +about rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the precept +about the honor due to parents. + +Reply Obj. 3: Fraternal correction may be omitted in three ways. + +First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct +someone. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "If a man refrains +from chiding and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable +time for so doing, or because he fears lest, if he does so, they may +become worse, or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others +who are weak and need to be instructed in a life of goodness and +virtue, this does not seem to result from covetousness, but to be +counselled by charity." + +Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one +commits a mortal sin, namely, "when" (as he says in the same passage) +"one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous +pain or death; provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by +such things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity." +This would seem to be the case when a man reckons that he might +probably withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so, +through fear or covetousness. + +Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or +covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults, and yet +not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw +him from sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through fear or +covetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to +these things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to +correct wrongdoers. + +Reply Obj. 4: We are bound to pay that which is due to some fixed and +certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good, without +waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to find +him. Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should seek +him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he that +has spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in +order to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound +to seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any +certain person, but to all our neighbors in general, whether those +favors be material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow +them when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine says (De +Doctr. Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance. +For this reason he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 1) that "Our Lord warns +us not to be listless in regard of one another's sins: not indeed by +being on the lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting +what we see": else we should become spies on the lives of others, +which is against the saying of Prov. 24:19: "Lie not in wait, nor +seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest." +It is evident from this that there is no need for religious to leave +their cloister in order to rebuke evil-doers. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 3] + +Whether Fraternal Correction Belongs Only to Prelates? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to +prelates alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.] says: "Let +priests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother +sin against thee,'" etc. Now prelates having charge of others were +usually designated under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that +fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone. + +Obj. 2: Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms. Now +corporal almsgiving belongs to those who are placed above others in +temporal matters, i.e. to the rich. Therefore fraternal correction +belongs to those who are placed above others in spiritual matters, +i.e. to prelates. + +Obj. 3: Further, when one man reproves another he moves him by his +rebuke to something better. Now in the physical order the inferior is +moved by the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which +follows the order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone to correct +inferiors. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, Can. Tam +Sacerdotes): "Both priests and all the rest of the faithful should be +most solicitous for those who perish, so that their reproof may +either correct their sinful ways, or, if they be incorrigible, cut +them off from the Church." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), correction is twofold. One +is an act of charity, which seeks in a special way the recovery of an +erring brother by means of a simple warning: such like correction +belongs to anyone who has charity, be he subject or prelate. + +But there is another correction which is an act of justice purposing +the common good, which is procured not only by warning one's brother, +but also, sometimes, by punishing him, that others may, through fear, +desist from sin. Such a correction belongs only to prelates, whose +business it is not only to admonish, but also to correct by means of +punishments. + +Reply Obj. 1: Even as regards that fraternal correction which is +common to all, prelates have a grave responsibility, as Augustine +says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "for just as a man ought to bestow temporal +favors on those especially of whom he has temporal care, so too ought +he to confer spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and the +like, on those who are entrusted to his spiritual care." Therefore +Jerome does not mean that the precept of fraternal correction +concerns priests only, but that it concerns them chiefly. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as he who has the means wherewith to give corporal +assistance is rich in this respect, so he whose reason is gifted with +a sane judgment, so as to be able to correct another's wrong-doing, +is, in this respect, to be looked on as a superior. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even in the physical order certain things act mutually +on one another, through being in some respect higher than one +another, in so far as each is somewhat in act, and somewhat in +potentiality with regard to another. In like manner one man can +correct another in so far as he has a sane judgment in a matter +wherein the other sins, though he is not his superior simply. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 4] + +Whether a Man Is Bound to Correct His Prelate? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no man is bound to correct his +prelate. For it is written (Ex. 19:12): "The beast that shall touch +the mount shall be stoned," [*Vulg.: 'Everyone that shall touch the +mount, dying he shall die.'] and (2 Kings 6:7) it is related that the +Lord struck Oza for touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark +signify our prelates. Therefore prelates should not be corrected by +their subjects. + +Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Gal. 2:11, "I withstood him to the face," +adds: "as an equal." Therefore, since a subject is not equal to his +prelate, he ought not to correct him. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) that "one ought not +to presume to reprove the conduct of holy men, unless one thinks +better of oneself." But one ought not to think better of oneself than +of one's prelate. Therefore one ought not to correct one's prelate. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in his Rule: "Show mercy not only +to yourselves, but also to him who, being in the higher position +among you, is therefore in greater danger." But fraternal correction +is a work of mercy. Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected. + +_I answer that,_ A subject is not competent to administer to his +prelate the correction which is an act of justice through the +coercive nature of punishment: but the fraternal correction which is +an act of charity is within the competency of everyone in respect of +any person towards whom he is bound by charity, provided there be +something in that person which requires correction. + +Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power extends to whatever +is contained under the object of that power or habit: thus vision +extends to all things comprised in the object of sight. Since, +however, a virtuous act needs to be moderated by due circumstances, +it follows that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do +so in a becoming manner, not with impudence and harshness, but with +gentleness and respect. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): "An +ancient man rebuke not, but entreat him as a father." Wherefore +Dionysius finds fault with the monk Demophilus (Ep. viii), for +rebuking a priest with insolence, by striking and turning him out of +the church. + +Reply Obj. 1: It would seem that a subject touches his prelate +inordinately when he upbraids him with insolence, as also when he +speaks ill of him: and this is signified by God's condemnation of +those who touched the mount and the ark. + +Reply Obj. 2: To withstand anyone in public exceeds the mode of +fraternal correction, and so Paul would not have withstood Peter +then, unless he were in some way his equal as regards the defense of +the faith. But one who is not an equal can reprove privately and +respectfully. Hence the Apostle in writing to the Colossians (4:17) +tells them to admonish their prelate: "Say to Archippus: Fulfil thy +ministry [*Vulg.: 'Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received +in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.' Cf. 2 Tim. 4:5]." It must be +observed, however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought +to rebuke his prelate even publicly. Hence Paul, who was Peter's +subject, rebuked him in public, on account of the imminent danger of +scandal concerning faith, and, as the gloss of Augustine says on Gal. +2:11, "Peter gave an example to superiors, that if at any time they +should happen to stray from the straight path, they should not +disdain to be reproved by their subjects." + +Reply Obj. 3: To presume oneself to be simply better than one's +prelate, would seem to savor of presumptuous pride; but there is no +presumption in thinking oneself better in some respect, because, in +this life, no man is without some fault. We must also remember that +when a man reproves his prelate charitably, it does not follow that +he thinks himself any better, but merely that he offers his help to +one who, "being in the higher position among you, is therefore in +greater danger," as Augustine observes in his Rule quoted above. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 5] + +Whether a Sinner Ought to Reprove a Wrongdoer? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a +wrongdoer. For no man is excused from obeying a precept by having +committed a sin. But fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as +stated above (A. 2). Therefore it seems that a man ought not to +forbear from such like correction for the reason that he has +committed a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account than +corporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain from +administering corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on account +of a previous sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 John 1:8): "If we say that we have +no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore if, on account of a sin, a +man is hindered from reproving his brother, there will be none to +reprove the wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is unreasonable: +therefore the former is also. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): "He that is +subject to vice should not correct the vices of others." Again it is +written (Rom. 2:1): "Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest +thyself. For thou dost the same things which thou judgest." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 2), to correct a wrongdoer +belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is gifted with right +judgment. Now sin, as stated above (I-II, Q. 85, AA. 1, 2), does not +destroy the good of nature so as to deprive the sinner's reason of +all right judgment, and in this respect he may be competent to find +fault with others for committing sin. Nevertheless a previous sin +proves somewhat of a hindrance to this correction, for three reasons. +First because this previous sin renders a man unworthy to rebuke +another; and especially is he unworthy to correct another for a +lesser sin, if he himself has committed a greater. Hence Jerome says +on the words, "Why seest thou the mote?" etc. (Matt. 7:3): "He is +speaking of those who, while they are themselves guilty of mortal +sin, have no patience with the lesser sins of their brethren." + +Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on account of the +scandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector's sin be well known, +because it would seem that he corrects, not out of charity, but more +for the sake of ostentation. Hence the words of Matt. 7:4, "How +sayest thou to thy brother?" etc. are expounded by Chrysostom [*Hom. +xvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] +thus: "That is--'With what object?' Out of charity, think you, that +you may save your neighbor?" No, "because you would look after your +own salvation first. What you want is, not to save others, but to +hide your evil deeds with good teaching, and to seek to be praised by +men for your knowledge." + +Thirdly, on account of the rebuker's pride; when, for instance, a man +thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart, sets himself +above his neighbor, judging the latter's sins with harsh severity, as +though he himself were a just man. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. +Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "To reprove the faults of others is the duty +of good and kindly men: when a wicked man rebukes anyone, his rebuke +is the latter's acquittal." And so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. +in Monte ii, 19): "When we have to find fault with anyone, we should +think whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then we must +remember that we are men, and might have been guilty of it; or that +we once had it on our conscience, but have it no longer: and then we +should bethink ourselves that we are all weak, in order that our +reproof may be the outcome, not of hatred, but of pity. But if we +find that we are guilty of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but +groan with him, and invite him to repent with us." It follows from +this that, if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, he does not +sin, nor does he bring a further condemnation on himself, although +thereby he proves himself deserving of condemnation, either in his +brother's or in his own conscience, on account of his previous sin. + +Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 6] + +Whether One Ought to Forbear from Correcting Someone, Through Fear +Lest He Become Worse? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to forbear from +correcting someone through fear lest he become worse. For sin is +weakness of the soul, according to Ps. 6:3: "Have mercy on me, O +Lord, for I am weak." Now he that has charge of a sick person, must +not cease to take care of him, even if he be fractious or +contemptuous, because then the danger is greater, as in the case of +madmen. Much more, therefore should one correct a sinner, no matter +how badly he takes it. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Jerome vital truths are not to be +foregone on account of scandal. Now God's commandments are vital +truths. Since, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of +precept, as stated above (A. 2), it seems that it should not be +foregone for fear of scandalizing the person to be corrected. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. 3:8) we should not do +evil that good may come of it. Therefore, in like manner, good should +not be omitted lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction is a good +thing. Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the person +corrected become worse. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 9:8): "Rebuke not a scorner +lest he hate thee," where a gloss remarks: "You must not fear lest +the scorner insult you when you rebuke him: rather should you bear in +mind that by making him hate you, you may make him worse." Therefore +one ought to forego fraternal correction, when we fear lest we may +make a man worse. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3) the correction of the +wrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, and is directed +to the common good, has coercive force. Such correction should not be +omitted lest the person corrected be disturbed, both because if he is +unwilling to amend his ways of his own accord, he should be made to +cease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be incorrigible, +the common good is safeguarded in this way, since the order of +justice is observed, and others are deterred by one being made an +example of. Hence a judge does not desist from pronouncing sentence +of condemnation against a sinner, for fear of disturbing him or his +friends. + +The other fraternal correction is directed to the amendment of the +wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely admonishes. +Consequently when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take +the warning, and will become worse, such fraternal correction should +be foregone, because the means should be regulated according to the +requirements of the end. + +Reply Obj. 1: The doctor uses force towards a madman, who is +unwilling to submit to his treatment; and this may be compared with +the correction administered by prelates, which has coercive power, +but not with simple fraternal correction. + +Reply Obj. 2: Fraternal correction is a matter of precept, in so far +as it is an act of virtue, and it will be a virtuous act in so far as +it is proportionate to the end. Consequently whenever it is a +hindrance to the end, for instance when a man becomes worse through +it, it is longer a vital truth, nor is it a matter of precept. + +Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is directed to an end, becomes good through +being directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal correction +hinders the end, namely the amendment of our brother, it is no longer +good, so that when such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted +lest evil should befall. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 7] + +Whether the Precept of Fraternal Correction Demands That a Private +Admonition Should Precede Denunciation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of fraternal correction +does not demand that a private admonition should precede +denunciation. For, in works of charity, we should above all follow +the example of God, according to Eph. 5:1, 2: "Be ye followers of +God, as most dear children, and walk in love." Now God sometimes +punishes a man for a sin, without previously warning him in secret. +Therefore it seems that there is no need for a private admonition to +precede denunciation. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn +from the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the +commandments of Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find +that a hidden sin is publicly denounced, without any previous +admonition in private. Thus we read (Gen. 37:2) that "Joseph accused +his brethren to his father of a most wicked crime": and (Acts 5:4, 9) +that Peter publicly denounced Ananias and Saphira who had secretly +"by fraud kept back the price of the land," without beforehand +admonishing them in private: nor do we read that Our Lord admonished +Judas in secret before denouncing him. Therefore the precept does not +require that secret admonition should precede public denunciation. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce. +Now one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without +previously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the +Decretal (Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that "nothing else +need precede accusation except inscription." [*The accuser was bound +by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The +effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound +himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same +punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.] +Therefore it seems that the precept does not require that a secret +admonition should precede public denunciation. + +Obj. 4: Further, it does not seem probable that the customs observed +by religious in general are contrary to the precepts of Christ. Now +it is customary among religious orders to proclaim this or that one +for a fault, without any previous secret admonition. Therefore it +seems that this admonition is not required by the precept. + +Obj. 5: Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a +prelate sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in +particular, to tell him if they know of anything that requires +correction. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to tell them +this, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the precept does +not require secret admonition before public denunciation. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the +words, "Rebuke him between thee and him alone" (Matt. 18:15): "Aiming +at his amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from +shame he might begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to +make a better man, you make worse." Now we are bound by the precept +of charity to beware lest our brother become worse. Therefore the +order of fraternal correction comes under the precept. + +_I answer that,_ With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is +necessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public or +secret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only for +the sinner, that he may become better, but also for others, who know +of his sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should +be denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 +Tim. 5:20): "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may +have fear," which is to be understood as referring to public sins, as +Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7). + +On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord +seem to apply (Matt. 18:15): "If thy brother shall offend against +thee," etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others, +he no longer sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he +disturbs. Since, however, a man's neighbor may take offense even at +his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further +distinction. For certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor +either in his body or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots +secretly to betray his country to its enemies, or when a heretic +secretly turns other men away from the faith. And since he that sins +thus in secret, sins not only against you in particular, but also +against others, it is necessary to take steps to denounce him at +once, in order to prevent him doing such harm, unless by chance you +were firmly persuaded that this evil result would be prevented by +admonishing him secretly. On the other hand there are other sins +which injure none but the sinner, and the person sinned against, +either because he alone is hurt by the sinner, or at least because he +alone knows about his sin, and then our one purpose should be to +succor our sinning brother: and just as the physician of the body +restores the sick man to health, if possible, without cutting off a +limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a limb which is least +indispensable, in order to preserve the life of the whole body, so +too he who desires his brother's amendment should, if possible, so +amend him as regards his conscience, that he keep his good name. + +For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not +only in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses, if he +lose his good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are +restrained from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man +finds his honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome +says on Matt. 18:15: "If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke +him in private, lest he persist in his sin if he should once become +shameless or unabashed." Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning +brother's good name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the +dishonor of others, according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad +pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii): "When a few of those who bear a name for +holiness are reported falsely or proved in truth to have done +anything wrong, people will seek by busily repeating it to make it +believed of all": and also because when one man's sin is made public +others are incited to sin likewise. + +Since, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a good name, +Our Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother and so +deliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his +good name. Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret +admonition to precede public denunciation. + +Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore hidden +sins are to the judgment of God, just what public sins are to the +judgment of man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by +secretly admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration, +either while they wake or while they sleep, according to Job +33:15-17: "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth +upon men . . . then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching +instructeth them in what they are to learn, that He may withdraw a +man from the things he is doing." + +Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though it were +public, wherefore He could have made it known at once. Yet He did +not, but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The sin +of Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God's +executor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to +Joseph it is probable that he warned his brethren, though Scripture +does not say so. Or we may say that the sin was public with regard to +his brethren, wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused +"his brethren." + +Reply Obj. 3: When there is danger to a great number of people, those +words of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not sin +against thee alone. + +Reply Obj. 4: Proclamations made in the chapter of religious are +about little faults which do not affect a man's good name, wherefore +they are reminders of forgotten faults rather than accusations or +denunciations. If, however, they should be of such a nature as to +injure our brother's good name, it would be contrary to Our Lord's +precept, to denounce a brother's fault in this manner. + +Reply Obj. 5: A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a Divine +precept, according to Acts 5:29: "We ought to obey God rather then +men." Therefore when a prelate commands anyone to tell him anything +that he knows to need correction, the command rightly understood +supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal correction, +whether the command be addressed to all in general, or to some +particular individual. If, on the other hand, a prelate were to issue +a command in express opposition to this order instituted by Our Lord, +both would sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as +disobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he ought not to be +obeyed, because a prelate is not the judge of secret things, but God +alone is, wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of +hidden matters, except in so far as they are made known through +certain signs, as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a +prelate can command just as a judge, whether secular or +ecclesiastical, can bind a man under oath to tell the truth. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 8] + +Whether Before the Public Denunciation Witnesses Ought to Be Brought +Forward? + +Objection 1: It would seem that before the public denunciation +witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not +to be made known to others, because by so doing "a man would betray +his brother's sins instead of correcting them," as Augustine says (De +Verb. Dom. xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known +a brother's sin to others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one +ought not to bring witnesses forward before the public denunciation. + +Obj. 2: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no man +brings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin. Neither therefore +ought one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our +brother. + +Obj. 3: Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove something. +But witnesses afford no proof in secret matters. Therefore it is +useless to bring witnesses forward in such cases. + +Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says in his Rule that "before bringing it +to the notice of witnesses . . . it should be put before the +superior." Now to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is to +tell the Church. Therefore witnesses should not be brought forward +before the public denunciation. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 18:16): "Take with thee one +or two more, that in the mouth of two," etc. + +_I answer that,_ The right way to go from one extreme to another is +to pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning +of fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects +another between this one and himself alone, while He wished the end +to be public, when such a one would be denounced to the Church. +Consequently it is befitting that a citation of witnesses should be +placed between the two extremes, so that at first the brother's sin +be indicated to a few, who will be of use without being a hindrance, +and thus his sin be amended without dishonoring him before the public. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some have understood the order of fraternal correction +to demand that we should first of all rebuke our brother secretly, +and that if he listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and his sin +be altogether hidden, they say that we should go no further in the +matter, whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of several +by various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter, according to Our +Lord's command. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in his +Rule that "we are bound to reveal" a brother's sin, if it "will cause +a worse corruption in the heart." Wherefore we must say otherwise +that when the secret admonition has been given once or several times, +as long as there is probable hope of his amendment, we must continue +to admonish him in private, but as soon as we are able to judge with +any probability that the secret admonition is of no avail, we must +take further steps, however secret the sin may be, and call +witnesses, unless perhaps it were thought probable that this would +not conduce to our brother's amendment, and that he would become +worse: because on that account one ought to abstain altogether from +correcting him, as stated above (A. 6). + +Reply Obj. 2: A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his own sin: +yet they may be necessary that we may amend a brother's sin. Hence +the comparison fails. + +Reply Obj. 3: There may be three reasons for citing witnesses. First, +to show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says: secondly, +to prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine says (loc. +cit.): thirdly, "to prove that the man who rebuked his brother, has +done what he could," as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth. lx). + +Reply Obj. 4: Augustine means that the matter ought to be made known +to the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as the +prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than +others, but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i.e. as +holding the position of judge. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 34 + +OF HATRED +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which +is opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy +of charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4) +offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal +correction. + +Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is possible to hate God? + +(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins? + +(3) Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin? + +(4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor? + +(5) Whether it is a capital sin? + +(6) From what capital sin does it arise? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 1] + +Whether It Is Possible for Anyone to Hate God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius +says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the first good and beautiful is an object +of love and dilection to all." But God is goodness and beauty itself. +Therefore He is hated by none. + +Obj. 2: Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36, 39 it is +written that "all things call upon truth . . . and (all men) do well +like of her works." Now God is the very truth according to John 14:6. +Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him. + +Obj. 3: Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to +Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore +none can hate Him. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that +hate Thee ascendeth continually," and (John 15:24): "But now they +have both seen and hated both Me and My Father." + +_I answer that,_ As shown above (I-II, Q. 29, A. 1), hatred is a +movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion +save by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in +two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence; +secondly, in His effects, when, to wit, "the invisible things" of God +. . . "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are +made" (Rom. 1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which +no man can hate--for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is +impossible for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him. + +Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be +contrary to the human will, since _to be, to live, to understand,_ +which are effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore +again God cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the +Author of such like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are +contrary to an inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment, +and the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are +repugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration +of them, God may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they +look upon Him as forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument is true of those who see God's Essence, +which is the very essence of goodness. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument is true in so far as God is apprehended +as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of all, among +which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men. + +Reply Obj. 3: God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the +source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to be +like God, Who is Being itself. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 2] + +Whether Hatred of God Is the Greatest of Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of +sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost, +since it cannot be forgiven, according to Matt. 12:32. Now hatred of +God is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy +Ghost, as may be seen from what has been said above (Q. 14, A. 2). +Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now an +unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further away +from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless knows +Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than the +sin of hatred against God. + +Obj. 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of those +of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which is +punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin. +Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The best is opposite to the worst, according to +the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to +the love of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God +is man's worst sin. + +_I answer that,_ The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God, +as stated above (Q. 10, A. 3): and this aversion would not have the +character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt +consists in a voluntary aversion from God. + +Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the +hatred of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly. +For just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it +directly shun what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is +directly averted from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for +instance, a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in +so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which +aversion from God is connected. Now that which is so by itself, +always takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore +hatred of God is more grievous than other sins. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one thing +not to do good things, and another to hate the giver of good things, +even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin +deliberately." This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good +things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy +Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin +against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost +denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the +kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found +in every kind of that sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary: +wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it +becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is +proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its +sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; +and hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of +God is a greater sin than unbelief. + +Reply Obj. 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God the +author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on +them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the +Divine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God +commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other +hand, to break out into hatred of God when He inflicts those +punishments, is to hate God's very justice, and that is a most +grievous sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes +it is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked +to hate justice than not to have done it." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 3] + +Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not +always a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according +to Prov. 8:8: "All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor +perverse in them." Now, it is written (Luke 14:26): "If any man come +to Me, and hate not his father and mother . . . he cannot be My +disciple." Therefore hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But it +is in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is written +(Rom. 1:30): "Detractors, hateful to God." Therefore it is possible +to hate certain people without committing a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a +"wandering away from what is according to nature," according to +Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a +thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing. +Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 2:9): "He that . . . hateth +his brother, is in darkness." Now spiritual darkness is sin. +Therefore there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin. + +_I answer that,_ Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above (I-II, Q. +29, A. 2); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of +that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of +what he holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not +in respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in +respect of sin and lack of justice. + +Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and +whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate +our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our +love for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in +him, since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his +evil. Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it +simply, is always sinful. + +Reply Obj. 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must honor our +parents--as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must hate them +in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection +of Divine justice. + +Reply Obj. 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his +nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which +they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we should +love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show +hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we +should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are +hostile to us. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 4] + +Whether Hatred of Our Neighbor Is the Most Grievous Sin Against Our +Neighbor? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most +grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 3:15): +"Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." Now murder is the most +grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also. + +Obj. 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we give +our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to love. +Therefore hatred is the worst. + +_On the contrary,_ A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as +Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a +man hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e.g. theft, murder and +adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin. + +Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely +ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Matt. 5:19, "He that +shall break one of these least commandments," says: "The commandments +of Moses, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count +for little in their reward, but they count for much if they be +disobeyed. On the other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou +shalt not be angry, Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in +their reward, but little in the transgression." Now hatred is an +internal movement like anger and desire. Therefore hatred of one's +brother is a less grievous sin than murder. + +_I answer that,_ Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two +counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins, +secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned +against. On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than +external actions that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder +of man's will, which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the +root of sin, so that if a man's outward actions were to be +inordinate, without any disorder in his will, they would not be +sinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through ignorance or +out of zeal for justice: and if there be anything sinful in a man's +outward sins against his neighbor, it is all to be traced to his +inward hatred. + +On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a +man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for +the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 5] + +Whether Hatred Is a Capital Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred +is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the +virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief +of the capital sins, and the origin of all others. + +Obj. 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations of +our passions, according to Rom. 7:5: "The passions of sins . . . did +work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now all other +passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown +above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned +one of the capital sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more +than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should be +reckoned a capital sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among +the seven capital sins. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital +vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is +contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and +when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it +is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail +in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all +in that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is +first in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first +and foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good, +and especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good. +Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but +the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and +therefore it is not a capital vice. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 18, "the virtue of +a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its +nature." Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first +and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the +foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be +first among the vices, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's +natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of +one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be +first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of +an already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good. + +Reply Obj. 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason +that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred of +such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is, +however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which, +namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on +account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil +must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 6] + +Whether Hatred Arises from Envy? + +Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy +is sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, +for, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate. +Therefore hatred does not arise from envy. + +Obj. 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor +is referred to our love of God, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26, +A. 2). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of +God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy +those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to +be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred +does not arise from envy. + +Obj. 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is +caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows +into hatred." Therefore hatred does not arise from envy. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy +cometh hatred." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), hatred of his neighbor is a +man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love +which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from +that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which +is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally +avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states +(Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so +does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love +whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it +assumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever +displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it assumes the +aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor's +good, it follows that our neighbor's good becomes hateful to us, so +that "out of envy cometh hatred." + +Reply Obj. 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive +power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of +circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so +according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement, +love gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has +obtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure +in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure +causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred. + +Reply Obj. 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for the +object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures, wherefore +love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor +afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place +in God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been +stated above (A. 1), that God is not an object of hatred, except in +so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and +consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed +to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred +of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred +towards God. + +Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in +various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger +and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks +upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore +hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at +first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a +certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of +vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes +so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is +part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy +formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by +anger. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 35 + +OF SLOTH +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy +is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or +about our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we +must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether sloth is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is a special vice? + +(3) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(4) Whether it is a capital sin? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 1] + +Whether Sloth Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are +neither praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a +kind of sorrow, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as +we stated above (I-II, Q. 35, A. 8). Therefore sloth is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a +sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x, +[*De Institutione Caenobiorum]): "The monk is troubled with sloth +chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and +inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at +regular and fixed intervals." Therefore sloth is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is, seemingly, +no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian says (De +Instit. Monast. x) that "sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at +being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other monasteries +and those which are a long way off are much better than the one we +dwell in": all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore sloth +is not a sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus. 21:2: +"Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent." Now Cassian says (De +Instit. Monast. x): "Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth is +not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance." +Therefore sloth is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now +such is sloth (_acedia_): for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): "Bow down +thy shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not +grieved (_acedieris_) with her bands." Therefore sloth is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) +is an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind, +that he wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence +sloth implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on +Ps. 106:18, "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the +definition of some who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind +which neglects to begin good." + +Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its +effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is +apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand, +pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, +in truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth, +sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow +also which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so +oppresses man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the +Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be "swallowed +up with overmuch sorrow." + +Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow +for spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in +point of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an +evil movement of the appetite, as appears from what has been said +above (Q. 10, A. 2; I-II, Q. 74, A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 1: Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they are +blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just as +they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good. +Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame: +whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for +good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in +this sense that sloth is said to be a sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: The passions of the sensitive appetite may +either be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal +sin. And since the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows +that on account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to +commit some particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may +become more insistent, through certain bodily transmutations occurring +at certain fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose +one to sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by +sloth towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and +to be parched by the sun's heat. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think +too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man +contemns the good things he has received from God, this, far from +being a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such +like contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we +reckon evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the +goods of others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have +received ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow. + +Reply Obj. 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of sin +should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance; +by flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin, +as in lust; for which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): "Fly +fornication"; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought +diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some +trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more +we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us, +and forthwith sloth dies away. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 2] + +Whether Sloth Is a Special Vice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that +which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of +vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite +spiritual good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of +continence, and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then +sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above (A. 1), it seems +that sloth is not a special sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed to +joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth +should not be reckoned a special vice. + +Obj. 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object, +which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special +virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now +nothing, seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this +be a special vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual +goods, is that they are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of +weariness: while dislike of toil, and love of bodily repose seem to +be due to the same cause, viz. idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing +but laziness, which seems untrue, for idleness is opposed to +carefulness, whereas sloth is opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not +a special vice. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from +the other vices. Therefore it is a special vice. + +_I answer that,_ Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take +spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice, +because, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 1), every vice shuns the +spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that +sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as +toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's +pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices, +whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure. + +Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual +goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each +virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good, +about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is +proper to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which +consists in its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to +have that spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In +like manner the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual +good which is in each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special +vice, but to every vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which +charity rejoices, belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth. +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 3] + +Whether Sloth Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every +mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth +seems contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the +precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less grievous +than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain in deed +from some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a +mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal +sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore +sloth is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man. But +sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit. +Caenob. x, l) that "sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a +most vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit." Therefore sloth is +not always a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): "The sorrow of the +world worketh death." But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow +"according to God," which is contrasted with sorrow of the world. +Therefore it is a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 88, AA. 1, 2), mortal sin +is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the +effect of charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which +by its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason +of its genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity +is joy in God, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 1), while sloth is sorrow +about spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore +sloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be +observed with regard to all sins that are mortal in respect of their +genus, that they are not mortal, save when they attain to their +perfection. Because the consummation of sin is in the consent of +reason: for we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human +acts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a +mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, without attaining to +the consent of reason, it is a venial sin on account of the +imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus of adultery, the +concupiscence that goes no further than the sensuality is a venial +sin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a mortal +sin. So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality +alone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and +then it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason, +which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of the Divine +good, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the spirit. In +this case it is evident that sloth is a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing the +Sabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept, +implicitly commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind +about the Divine good is contrary thereto. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any spiritual +good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged to +adhere. Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do +acts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of +sloth; but when he is sorry to have to do something for God's sake. + +Reply Obj. 3: Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in holy +men, but they do not reach to the consent of reason. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 4] + +Whether Sloth Should Be Accounted a Capital Vice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a +capital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful +acts, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 5). Now sloth does not move one to +action, but on the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it +should not be accounted a capital sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are +assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to +sloth, viz. "malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness +in regard to the commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful +things." Now these do not seem in reality to arise from sloth. For +"spite" is, seemingly the same as hatred, which arises from envy, as +stated above (Q. 34, A. 6); "malice" is a genus which contains all +vices, and, in like manner, a "wandering" of the mind after unlawful +things is to be found in every vice; "sluggishness" about the +commandments seems to be the same as sloth, while "faint-heartedness" +and "despair" may arise from any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly +accounted a capital sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the +vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as a man +shirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is +sorrow, and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth: +and of sorrow he says that it gives rise to "spite, +faint-heartedness, bitterness, despair," whereas he states that from +sloth seven things arise, viz. "idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of +the mind, restlessness of the body, instability, loquacity, +curiosity." Therefore it seems that either Gregory or Isidore has +wrongly assigned sloth as a capital sin together with its daughters. + +_On the contrary,_ The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that +sloth is a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital +vice is one which easily gives rise to others as being their final +cause. Now just as we do many things on account of pleasure, both in +order to obtain it, and through being moved to do something under the +impulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account of sorrow, +either that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing +something under pressure thereof. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of +sorrow, as stated above (A. 2; I-II, Q. 85, A. 8), it is fittingly +reckoned a capital sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from doing +things that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do +certain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such +as weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow. + +Reply Obj. 2: Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth. For +since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5, 6) "no man can +be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant," it +follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that +man shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other +things that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in +spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body, +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of +sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant +objects, and secondly he even struggles against such things as cause +sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of +sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of +"despair," while avoidance of those goods which are the means to the +end, in matters of difficulty which come under the counsels, is the +effect of "faint-heartedness," and in matters of common +righteousness, is the effect of "sluggishness about the +commandments." The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow +is sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is +called "spite"; and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods +themselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is +properly called "malice." In so far as a man has recourse to eternal +objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called "wandering after +unlawful things." From this it is clear how to reply to the +objections against each of the daughters: for "malice" does not +denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be +understood as explained. Nor is "spite" taken as synonymous with +hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same +applies to the others. + +Reply Obj. 3: This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also given +by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly +(Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated +above (A. 2), sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man +shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of +any other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is sorry on +account of the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to +sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in so far as it spurns the Divine +good. Moreover the things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth +and sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for +"bitterness" which Isidore states to be the result of sorrow, is an +effect of "spite." "Idleness" and "drowsiness" are reduced to +"sluggishness about the precepts": for some are idle and omit them +altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil them with negligence. +All the other five which he reckons as effects of sloth, belong to +the "wandering of the mind after unlawful things." This tendency to +wander, if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing +after various things without rhyme or reason, is called "uneasiness +of the mind," but if it pertains to the imaginative power, it is +called "curiosity"; if it affect the speech it is called "loquacity"; +and in so far as it affects a body that changes place, it is called +"restlessness of the body," when, to wit, a man shows the +unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of +his body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to +another, it is called "instability"; or "instability" may denote +changeableness of purpose. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 36 + +OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES) + +We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points +of inquiry: + +(1) What is envy? + +(2) Whether it is a sin? + +(3) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 1] + +Whether Envy Is a Kind of Sorrow? + +Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the +object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the +envious man that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which +is racked by the prosperity of another." Therefore envy is not a kind +of sorrow. + +Obj. 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of +pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says +(Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as are like them in genus, +in knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation." Therefore envy +is not a kind of sorrow. + +Obj. 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who +are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above (I-II, Q. +47, A. 3) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack +little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are +envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy +is not a kind of sorrow. + +Obj. 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects +have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection of +goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above (I-II, +Q. 32, A. 3) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of +envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "we envy those who +have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or which we +possessed at some time." Therefore sloth is not a kind of sorrow. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a +species of sorrow, and says that "envy is sorrow for another's good." + +_I answer that,_ The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it +may happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and +in this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in +two ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's good, in so far +as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man +grieves for his enemy's prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some +harm: such like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as +the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9). + +Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in +so far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or +excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good: +and consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name +consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the +Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10). + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from being +reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for +sorrow to be about good, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since envy is about another's good name in so far as it +diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a man +is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in +reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed +from one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors +to rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a +commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner +whom he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far +removed from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who +are near him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is +against our will that these should be in better repute than we are, +and that gives rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes +pleasure in so far as it is in agreement with the will. + +Reply Obj. 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters where he +is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses him in +such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to +him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort; +wherefore, if his effort fails through the other's reputation +surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love to be +honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are +envious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may +befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in +something great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the +little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that "we can envy those +only whom we think better in some respect than ourselves." + +Reply Obj. 4: Recollection of past goods in so far as we have had +them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes sorrow; +and in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that, above +all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says +(Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much +in order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending +little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that +others have acquired goods. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 2] + +Whether Envy Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to +Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): "Let her have +companions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and +be nettled when they are praised." But no one should be advised to +commit a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin. + +Objection 2: Further, "Envy is sorrow for another's good," as +Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes +praiseworthy: for it is written (Prov. 29:2): "When the wicked shall +bear rule, the people shall mourn." Therefore envy is not always a +sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good +zeal, according to Ps. 68:10: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me +up." Therefore envy is not always a sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is a +kind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "When the foul +sore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself +shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes +the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed, +while the limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is +gnashing with the teeth." Therefore envy is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made +desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), envy is sorrow for another's +good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First, when a man +grieves for another's good, through fear that it may cause harm +either to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy, +as stated above (A. 1), and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory says +(Moral. xxii, 11): "It very often happens that without charity being +lost, both the destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and again his +glory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he falls, we +believe that some are deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we +dread lest many suffer unjustly." + +Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it, +but because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly +speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this +zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor. +14:1: "Be zealous for spiritual gifts": while, if it be about +temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may +grieve over another's good, because he who happens to have that good +is unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by +virtuous goods, which make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher +states, is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the +worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow _nemesis_ [*The +nearest equivalent is "indignation." The use of the word "nemesis" to +signify "revenge" does not represent the original Greek.], saying +that it belongs to good morals. But he says this because he +considered temporal goods in themselves, in so far as they may seem +great to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to +the teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are +unworthy, are so disposed according to God's just ordinance, either +for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such +goods are as nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are +prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in +Holy Writ, according to Ps. 36:1: "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor +envy them that work iniquity," and elsewhere (Ps. 72:2, 3): "My steps +had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw +the prosperity of sinners [*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion +of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners']." Fourthly, we +grieve over a man's good, in so far as his good surpasses ours; this +is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the +Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over +what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor's good. + +Reply Obj. 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought to +strive to progress with those who are better than we are. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers sorrow for another's good in +the first sense given above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a +certain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil. + +Reply Obj. 4: Nothing hinders a sin from being penal accidentally, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 87, A. 2) when we were treating of sins. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 3] + +Whether Envy Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since +envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite. +Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason, +as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. I-II, Q. 74, A. 4]. +Therefore envy is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy can +be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I myself have seen and +known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and +looked bitterly on its foster-brother." Therefore envy is not a +mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But +envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to _nemesis_, which is a +passion, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy +is not a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the little +one." Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore +envy is a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For +the genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to +the aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul +derives its spiritual life, according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that +we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Now +the object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by +contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good, +while envy grieves over it, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is +evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. + +Nevertheless, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5, ad 1), +in every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in +the sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of +concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of +anger, in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find +sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are +venial sins. + +Reply Obj. 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion of +the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts, the +principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not a +mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have +not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is +manifest. + +Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is +contrary both to _nemesis_ and to pity, but for different reasons. +For it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being +contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his +neighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's +evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same +passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is +contrary to _nemesis_ on the part of the man whose good grieves the +envious man, for _nemesis_ is sorrow for the good of the undeserving +according to Ps. 72:3: "I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the +prosperity of sinners" [*Douay: "because I had a zeal on occasion of +the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners"], whereas the envious +grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is +clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now +pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is +contrary to pity and charity. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 4] + +Whether Envy Is a Capital Vice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the +capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the +daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that +"those who love honor and glory are more envious." Therefore envy is +not a capital vice. + +Obj. 2: Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than the +other vices which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, +45): "The leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived mind +under some kind of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the +soul to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their wild +outcry." Now envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for Gregory says +(Moral. v, 46): "Though in every evil thing that is done, the venom +of our old enemy is infused into the heart of man, yet in this +wickedness the serpent stirs his whole bowels and discharges the bane +of spite fitted to enter deep into the mind." Therefore envy is not a +capital sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly assigned +by Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who says that from envy arise "hatred, +tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor's misfortunes, and +grief for his prosperity." For joy at our neighbor's misfortunes and +grief for his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears from +what has been said above (A. 3). Therefore these should not be +assigned as daughters of envy. + +On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) who +states that envy is a capital sin and assigns the aforesaid daughters +thereto. + +_I answer that,_ Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual good, +so envy is grief for our neighbor's good. Now it has been stated +above (Q. 35, A. 4) that sloth is a capital vice for the reason that +it incites man to do certain things, with the purpose either of +avoiding sorrow or of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy is +accounted a capital vice for the same reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), "the capital vices +are so closely akin to one another that one springs from the other. +For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by corrupting +the mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves for the power +of an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should acquire +that power." Consequently the notion of a capital vice does not +exclude its originating from another vice, but it demands that it +should have some principal reason for being itself the origin of +several kinds of sin. However it is perhaps because envy manifestly +arises from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either +by Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. v, 1). + +Reply Obj. 2: It does not follow from the passage quoted that envy is +the greatest of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to envy, he +is enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart, for as +quoted further on in the same passage, "by the envy of the devil, +death came into the world" (Wis. 2:24). + +There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most +grievous sins, viz. envy of another's spiritual good, which envy is a +sorrow for the increase of God's grace, and not merely for our +neighbor's good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, +because thereby a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who +is glorified in His works. + +Reply Obj. 3: The number of envy's daughters may be understood for +the reason that in the struggle aroused by envy there is something by +way of beginning, something by way of middle, and something by way of +term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower another's +reputation, and this either secretly, and then we have +_tale-bearing,_ or openly, and then we have _detraction._ The middle +consists in the fact that when a man aims at defaming another, he is +either able to do so, and then we have _joy at another's misfortune,_ +or he is unable, and then we have _grief at another's prosperity._ +The term is hatred itself, because just as good which delights causes +love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 6). +Grief at another's prosperity is in one way the very same as envy, +when, to Wit, a man grieves over another's prosperity, in so far as +it gives the latter a good name, but in another way it is a daughter +of envy, in so far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper +notwithstanding his efforts to prevent it. On the other hand, _joy at +another's misfortune_ is not directly the same as envy, but is a +result thereof, because grief over our neighbor's good which is envy, +gives rise to joy in his evil. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 37 + +OF DISCORD, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO PEACE +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall +consider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention, which is +on the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz. +schism, quarrelling, war, and sedition. Under the first head there +are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether discord is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 37, Art. 1] + +Whether Discord Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a sin. For to +disaccord with man is to sever oneself from another's will. But this +does not seem to be a sin, because God's will alone, and not our +neighbor's, is the rule of our own will. Therefore discord is not a +sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever induces another to sin, sins also himself. +But it appears not to be a sin to incite others to discord, for it is +written (Acts 23:6) that Paul, knowing that the one part were +Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, cried out in the council: "Men +brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope +and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when he had +so said, there arose a dissension between the Pharisees and the +Sadducees." Therefore discord is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not to be found in a +holy man. But discord is to be found even among holy men, for it is +written (Acts 15:39): "There arose a dissension" between Paul and +Barnabas, "so that they departed one from another." Therefore discord +is not a sin, and least of all a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ "Dissensions," that is, discords, are reckoned +among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), of which it is said +afterwards (Gal. 5:21) that "they who do such things shall not obtain +the kingdom of God." Now nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from +the kingdom of God. Therefore discord is a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ Discord is opposed to concord. Now, as stated above +(Q. 29, AA. 1, 3) concord results from charity, in as much as charity +directs many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the +Divine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord +is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord. + +But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in +two ways: first, directly; secondly, accidentally. Now, human acts +and movements are said to be direct when they are according to one's +intention. Wherefore a man directly disaccords with his neighbor, +when he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and +his neighbor's good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal +sin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity, +although the first movements of such discord are venial sins by +reason of their being imperfect acts. + +The accidental in human acts is that which occurs beside the +intention. Hence when several intend a good pertaining to God's +honor, or our neighbor's profit, while one deems a certain thing +good, and another thinks contrariwise, the discord is in this case +accidentally contrary to the Divine good or that of our neighbor. +Such like discord is neither sinful nor against charity, unless it be +accompanied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by +undue obstinacy, since it has also been stated above (Q. 29, AA. 1, +3, ad 2) that the concord which is an effect of charity, is union of +wills not of opinions. It follows from this that discord is sometimes +the sin of one party only, for instance, when one wills a good which +the other knowingly resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both +parties, as when each dissents from the other's good, and loves his +own. + +Reply Obj. 1: One man's will considered in itself is not the rule of +another man's will; but in so far as our neighbor's will adheres to +God's will, it becomes in consequence, a rule regulated according to +its proper measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord with such a +will, because by that very fact one disaccords with the Divine rule. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as a man's will that adheres to God is a right +rule, to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man's will that is +opposed to God is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good. +Hence to cause a discord, whereby a good concord resulting from +charity is destroyed, is a grave sin: wherefore it is written (Prov. +6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh +His soul detesteth," which seventh is stated (Prov. 6:19) to be "him +that soweth discord among brethren." On the other hand, to arouse a +discord whereby an evil concord (i.e. concord in an evil will) is +destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to be commended for +sowing discord among those who concorded together in evil, because +Our Lord also said of Himself (Matt. 10:34): "I came not to send +peace, but the sword." + +Reply Obj. 3: The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental +and not direct: because each intended some good, yet the one thought +one thing good, while the other thought something else, which was +owing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not about things +necessary to salvation. Moreover all this was ordained by Divine +providence, on account of the good which would ensue. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 37, Art. 2] + +Whether Discord Is a Daughter of Vainglory? + +Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a daughter of +vainglory. For anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. Now discord +is apparently the daughter of anger, according to Prov. 15:18: "A +passionate man stirreth up strifes." Therefore it is not a daughter +of vainglory. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine expounding the words of John 7:39, "As yet +the Spirit was not given," says (Tract. xxxii) "Malice severs, +charity unites." Now discord is merely a separation of wills. +Therefore discord arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from +vainglory. + +Obj. 3: Further, whatever gives rise to many evils, would seem to be +a capital vice. Now such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on +Matt. 12:25, "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made +desolate," says: "Just as concord makes small things thrive, so +discord brings the greatest things to ruin." Therefore discord should +itself be reckoned a capital vice, rather than a daughter of +vainglory. + +On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). + +_I answer that,_ Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so +far, to wit, as one man's will holds fast to one thing, while the +other man's will holds fast to something else. Now if a man's will +holds fast to its own ground, this is due to the act that he prefers +what is his own to that which belongs to others, and if he do this +inordinately, it is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord, +whereby a man holds to his own way of thinking, and departs from that +of others, is reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory. + +Reply Obj. 1: Strife is not the same as discord, for strife consists +in external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should arise from +anger, which incites the mind to hurt one's neighbor; whereas discord +consists in a divergence in the movements of wills, which arises from +pride or vainglory, for the reason given above. + +Reply Obj. 2: In discord we may consider that which is the term +_wherefrom,_ i.e. another's will from which we recede, and in this +respect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is +the term _whither,_ i.e. something of our own to which we cling, and +in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment +the term _whither_ is more important than the term _wherefrom_ +(because the end is of more account than the beginning), discord is +accounted a daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may +arise from both for different reasons, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 3: The reason why concord makes small things thrive, while +discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because "the more united a +force is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the +weaker it becomes" (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is +part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills, +and in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as +though it were a capital vice. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 38 + +OF CONTENTION +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether contention is a mortal sin? + +(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 38, Art. 1] + +Whether Contention Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For +there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be +found in them, according to Luke 22:24: "And there was also a strife +amongst" the disciples of Jesus, "which of them should . . . be the +greatest." Therefore contention is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his +neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Phil. 1:17): +"Some out of contention preach Christ," and afterwards he says (Phil. +1:18): "In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice." Therefore +contention is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, it happens that people contend either in the courts +or in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a good +intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with +heretics. Hence a gloss on 1 Kings 14:1, "It came to pass one day," +etc. says: "Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless +they are first challenged to dispute." Therefore contention is not a +mortal sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to +Job 39:32: "Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily silenced?" +And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said of him +(Job 42:7): "You have not spoken the thing that is right before me, +as my servant Job hath." Therefore contention is not always a mortal +sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is against the precept of the Apostle who says +(2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words." Moreover (Gal. 5:20) +contention is included among the works of the flesh, and as stated +there (Gal. 5:21) "they who do such things shall not obtain the +kingdom of God." Now whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God +and is against a precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a +mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore +just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention +signifies contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts +various contrary things in a speech, this is called _contentio,_ +which Tully calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren. +iv), where he says that "it consists in developing a speech from +contrary things," for instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning, +and a most bitter end." + +Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with +regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with +regard to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must +consider whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be +blamed, or against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to +the manner, we must consider whether his manner of contending is in +keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would +be praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that +"contention is a sharp speech suitable for proof and refutation"--or +whether it exceeds the demands of the persons and matter in dispute, +in which case it is blameworthy. + +Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the +truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose +[*Cf. Gloss. Ord. in Rom. i, 29] defines contention: "Contention is a +disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence." If, however, +contention denote a disavowal of what is false, with the proper +measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a +disavowal of falsehood, together with an inordinate manner, it can be +a venial sin, unless the contention be conducted so inordinately, as +to give scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Tim. +2:14): "Contend not in words," adds, "for it is to no profit, but to +the subverting of the hearers." + +Reply Obj. 1: The disciples of Christ contended together, not with +the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for +what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their +contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought +not to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were +not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and +for this reason Our Lord checked them. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those who preached Christ "out of contention," were to +be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith, +but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that +they thought they would "raise affliction" to the Apostle who was +preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their +contention, but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that +Christ would be made known--since evil is sometimes the occasion of +good results. + +Reply Obj. 3: Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in +contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or in +a disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense +Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when, +whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e. in +respect of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 4: Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For Job +had said (13:3): "I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to +reason with God": yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to +defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be +inordinate in mind or in speech. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 38, Art. 2] + +Whether Contention Is a Daughter of Vainglory? + +Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a daughter of +vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (1 +Cor. 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and +contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men?" Now zeal +pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy. + +Obj. 2: Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the voice. +But the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares +(Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger. + +Obj. 3: Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the matter +of pride and vainglory, according to 1 Cor. 8:1: "Knowledge puffeth +up." Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by +knowledge we do not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore +contention is not a daughter of vainglory. + +On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 37, A. 2), discord is a daughter +of vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings to his +own opinion, rather than acquiesce with the other. Now it is proper +to pride and vainglory to seek one's own glory. And just as people +are discordant when they hold to their own opinion in their hearts, +so are they contentious when each defends his own opinion by words. +Consequently contention is reckoned a daughter of vainglory for the +same reason as discord. + +Reply Obj. 1: Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so far as +a man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or with +whom he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to +something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he +clings to his own opinion, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2, ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 2: The contention of which we are speaking puts on a loud +voice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not the +chief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention +arises from the same source as the raising of the voice. + +Reply Obj. 3: Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by goods +even those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is +proud of his humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does +so not directly but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one +contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why +the _per se_ and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not +result from the contraries of those things which are the occasion of +pride. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 39 + +OF SCHISM +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to +deeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first +place, then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether schism is a special sin? + +(2) Whether it is graver than unbelief? + +(3) Of the power exercised by schismatics; + +(4) Of the punishment inflicted on them. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 1] + +Whether Schism Is a Special Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that schism is not a special sin. For +"schism," as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad Victor. et Pancrat.), +"denotes a division." But every sin causes a division, according to +Isa. 59: "Your sins have divided between you and your God." Therefore +schism is not a special sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys the +Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the +Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) "is +disobedience against the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin +is a schism. + +Obj. 3: Further, heresy also divides a man from the unity of faith. +If, therefore, the word schism denotes a division, it would seem not +to differ, as a special sin, from the sin of unbelief. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; Contra Crescon. +ii, 4) distinguishes between schism and heresy, for he says that a +"schismatic is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same +worship, as others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the +community, whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that +of the Catholic Church." Therefore schism is not a generic sin. + +_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its +name "from being a scission of minds," and scission is opposed to +unity. Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and +essentially opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical +order, the species is not constituted by that which is accidental. +Now, in the moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and +that which results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental. +Hence the sin of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the +reason that the schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity +which is the effect of charity: because charity unites not only one +person to another with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole +Church in unity of spirit. + +Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully +and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church; +for this is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several +individuals among themselves is subordinate to the unity of the +Church, even as the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural +body is subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the unity of +the Church consists in two things; namely, in the mutual connection +or communion of the members of the Church, and again in the +subordination of all the members of the Church to the one head, +according to Col. 2:18, 19: "Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and +not holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands, +being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the +increase of God." Now this Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent +in the Church is the Sovereign Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are +those who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold +communion with those members of the Church who acknowledge his +supremacy. + +Reply Obj. 1: The division between man and God that results from sin +is not intended by the sinner: it happens beside his intention as a +result of his turning inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is +not schism properly so called. + +Reply Obj. 2: The essence of schism consists in rebelliously +disobeying the commandments: and I say "rebelliously," since a +schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church, +and refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do +this, wherefore not every sin is a schism. + +Reply Obj. 3: Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those +things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For heresy +is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed +to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith and +charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks +charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although +whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This +is what Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians +[*In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10]: "I consider the difference between schism +and heresy to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs +a man from the Church." Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is +the road to the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6: "From which +things," i.e. charity and the like, "some going astray, are turned +aside into vain babbling," so too, schism is the road to heresy. +Wherefore Jerome adds (In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that "at the outset it +is possible, in a certain respect, to find a difference between +schism and heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some +heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for +separating from the Church." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 2] + +Whether Schism Is a Graver Sin Than Unbelief? + +Objection 1: It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief. +For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Deut. +25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of +the stripes be." Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely +than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Ex. 32:28) +that some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of +idolatry: whereas of the sin of schism we read (Num. 16:30): "If the +Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them +down, and all things that belong to them, and they go down alive into +hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God." +Moreover the ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from +the rule of David were most severely punished (4 Kings 17). Therefore +the sin of schism is graver than the sin of unbelief. + +Obj. 2: Further, "The good of the multitude is greater and more +godlike than the good of the individual," as the Philosopher states +(Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude, +namely, ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the +particular good of one man, namely the faith of an individual. +Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief. + +Obj. 3: Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil, +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed +to charity, which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is +opposed, as shown above (Q. 10, A. 2; Q. 23, A. 6). Therefore schism +is a graver sin than unbelief. + +_On the contrary,_ That which results from an addition to something +else surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy +results from something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt +doctrine, as Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (A. 1, ad +3). Therefore schism is a less grievous sin than unbelief. + +_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways: +first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to +its circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in +number, so too they can be varied in an infinite number of ways: +wherefore if one were to ask in general which of two sins is the +graver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity +derived from the sin's genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is +taken from its object, as shown above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1; I-II, Q. +73, A. 3). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to the greater good is, +in respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance a sin committed +against God is graver than a sin committed against one's neighbor. + +Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God +Himself, according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith +is founded; whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which +is a participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore +it is manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous +than the sin of schism, although it may happen that a particular +schismatic sins more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either +because his contempt is greater, or because his sin is a source of +greater danger, or for some similar reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: It had already been declared to that people by the law +which they had received that there was one God, and that no other God +was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among +them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for those +who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be +punished in an unwonted manner: it was enough that they should be +punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well +known among them that Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it +behooved those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in a +miraculous and unwonted manner. + +We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more +severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to +seditions and schisms. For it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): "This city +since days gone by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and +wars were raised therein [*Vulg.: 'This city is a rebellious city, +and hurtful to the kings and provinces, and . . . wars were raised +therein of old']." Now sometimes a more severe punishment is +inflicted for an habitual sin (as stated above, I-II, Q. 105, A. 2, +ad 9), because punishments are medicines intended to keep man away +from sin: so that where there is greater proneness to sin, a more +severe punishment ought to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes, +they were punished not only for the sin of schism, but also for that +of idolatry as stated in the passage quoted. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the +good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic +good to which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank +in the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like +manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed, +is less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed. + +Reply Obj. 3: Charity has two objects; one is its principal object +and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object and is +our neighbor's good. Now schism and other sins against our neighbor, +are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good, which is +less than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these +sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred of +God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object, +is not less grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins +committed by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem +to be the greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of +the multitude. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 3] + +Whether Schismatics Have Any Power? + +Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics have some power. For +Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): "Just as those who come back to +the Church after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who +return after being ordained, are not ordained again." Now Order is a +kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power since they +retain their Orders. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt. [*De Bap. contra +Donat. vi, 5]): "One who is separated can confer a sacrament even as +he can have it." But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very +great power. Therefore schismatics who are separated from the Church, +have a spiritual power. + +Obj. 3: Further, Pope Urban II [*Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf. +Can. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1] says: "We command that persons +consecrated by bishops who were themselves consecrated according to +the Catholic rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the +Roman Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders +should be acknowledged, when they return to the unity of the Church, +provided they be of commendable life and knowledge." But this would +not be so, unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics. +Therefore schismatics have spiritual power. + +_On the contrary,_ Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu. +1, can. Novatianus): "He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the +concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church, +and from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power +or honor." + +_I answer that,_ Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the +other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is +conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of +the Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: as +appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated, +is not consecrated again unless it has been broken up. Consequently +such a power as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who has +received it by consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall +into schism or heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he +come back to the Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, however, +the lower power ought not to exercise its act, except in so far as it +is moved by the higher power, as may be seen also in the physical +order, it follows that such persons lose the use of their power, so +that it is not lawful for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this +power has its effect in sacramental acts, because therein man acts +only as God's instrument, so that sacramental effects are not +precluded on account of any fault whatever in the person who confers +the sacrament. + +On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is +conferred by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not +adhere to the recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in +heretics and schismatics; and consequently they neither absolve nor +excommunicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and +if they do, it is invalid. + +Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual +power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second +power, or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to +the essence of the power, but to its lawful use. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Right That Schismatics Should Be Punished with +Excommunication? + +Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished +with excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a +share in the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5) +that "Baptism can be received from a schismatic." Therefore it seems +that excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is the duty of Christ's faithful to lead back +those who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain +persons (Ezech. 34:4): "That which was driven away you have not +brought again, neither have you sought that which was lost." Now +schismatics are more easily brought back by such as may hold +communion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be +excommunicated. + +Obj. 3: Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and the +same sin, according to Nahum 1:9: "God will not judge the same twice" +[*Septuagint version]. Now some receive a temporal punishment for the +sin of schism, according to 23, qu. 5 [*Gratianus, Decretum, P. II, +causa XXIII, qu. 5, can. 44, Quali nos (RP I, 943)], where it is +stated: "Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who +are severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must +be punished by the secular power." Therefore they ought not to be +punished with excommunication. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Num. 16:26): "Depart from the tents +of these wicked men," those, to wit, who had caused the schism, "and +touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins." + +_I answer that,_ According to Wis. 11:11, "By what things a man +sinneth, by the same also he should be punished" [Vulg.: 'he is +tormented']. Now a schismatic, as shown above (A. 1), commits a +twofold sin: first by separating himself from communion with the +members of the Church, and in this respect the fitting punishment for +schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse +submission to the head of the Church, wherefore, since they are +unwilling to be controlled by the Church's spiritual power, it is +just that they should be compelled by the secular power. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a schismatic, +save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man to quit +this life, marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom he may +receive it, whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that +mark, which is bestowed in Baptism. + +Reply Obj. 2: Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse whereby +a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the +Church those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation +brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their +separation, they are sometimes led to do penance. + +Reply Obj. 3: The punishments of the present life are medicinal, and +therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel a man, +another is added: just as physicians employ several bod[il]y +medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when +excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs +the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment +suffices, another should not be employed. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 40 + +OF WAR +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether some kind of war is lawful? + +(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight? + +(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes? + +(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 1] + +Whether It Is Always Sinful to Wage War? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war. +Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who +wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to +Matt. 26:52: "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword." +Therefore all wars are unlawful. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. +But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Matt. +5:39): "But I say to you not to resist evil"; and (Rom. 12:19): "Not +revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath." +Therefore war is always sinful. + +Obj. 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of +virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as +is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take +place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are +slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. +Therefore it seems that war is a sin in itself. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the +centurion [*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: "If the Christian Religion +forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the +Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their arms, +and to give up soldiering altogether. _On the contrary,_ they were +told: 'Do violence to no man . . . and be content with your pay' +[*Luke 3:14]. If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he +did not forbid soldiering." + +_I answer that,_ In order for a war to be just, three things are +necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the +war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private +individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his +rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the +business of a private individual to summon together the people, which +has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is +committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to +watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject +to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the +sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, +when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle +(Rom. 13:4): "He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's +minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil"; so +too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in +defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said +to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor: and +deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner"; and for this reason +Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): "The natural order conducive +to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel +war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority." + +Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are +attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of +some fault. Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super +Jos.): "A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges +wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to +make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore +what it has seized unjustly." + +Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful +intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the +avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words +quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud. +Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]): "True religion looks upon as peaceful those +wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, +but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and +of uplifting the good." For it may happen that the war is declared by +the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered +unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra +Faust. xxii, 74): "The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst +for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of +revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are +rightly condemned in war." + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To take +the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone, +without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority." +On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private +person) by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public +person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak, +of God, is not to "take the sword," but to use it as commissioned by +another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those +who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword, +yet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they +repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword. + +Reply Obj. 2: Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De Serm. +Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so +that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from +resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes +for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of +those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad +Marcellin. cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish with a kindly +severity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will. +For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good +for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the +happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil +will, like an internal enemy." + +Reply Obj. 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are +not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord "came +not to send upon earth" (Matt. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad +Bonif. clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we +go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, +so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them +to the prosperity of peace." + +Reply Obj. 4: Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all +forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in +slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no +such danger, and hence they were called "exercises of arms" or +"bloodless wars," as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference +incorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i]. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful for Clerics and Bishops to Fight? + +Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight. +For, as stated above (A. 1), wars are lawful and just in so far as +they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at +the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of +prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): "The wolf comes upon +the sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are +faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and +was not, leaveth the sheep, and flieth, for he fears lest the wolf +hurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice." Therefore it +is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight. + +Obj. 2: Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur): "As +untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said +that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and +covertly; for which reason we commanded our people to gather +together, and ordered them to go down to the seashore." Therefore it +is lawful for bishops to fight. + +Obj. 3: Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man does +a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another, according +to Rom. 1:32: "They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not +only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do +them." Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce +others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce +others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that +Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of +Adrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight. + +Obj. 4: Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is +lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and +meritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni +timore) that if "a man die for the true faith, or to save his +country, or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly +reward." Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight. + +_On the contrary,_ It was said to Peter as representing bishops and +clerics (Matt. 16:52): "Put up again thy sword into the scabbard +[Vulg.: 'its place'] [*"Scabbard" is the reading in John 18:11]." +Therefore it is not lawful for them to fight. + +_I answer that,_ Several things are requisite for the good of a human +society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a +number of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, +1), while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another, +that they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore +those who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy +themselves with things of small importance. Thus according to human +laws, soldiers who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to +engage in commerce [*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.]. + +Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a +bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general +one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that +they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine +things, the praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong +to the duties of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enterprises +are forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so +too are warlike pursuits, according to 2 Tim. 2:4: "No man being a +soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business." The second +reason is a special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are +directed to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ +is represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor. 11:26: "As often as +you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the +death of the Lord, until He come." Wherefore it is unbecoming for +them to slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should +be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed +what they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been +decreed that those who shed blood, even without sin, become +irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully +do that which renders him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is +altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to +the shedding of blood. + +Reply Obj. 1: Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who +brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the +oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse +themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons, +according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): "The weapons of +our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God." Such are +salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, +the sentence of excommunication. + +Reply Obj. 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their +superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms +themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight +justly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual +helps. Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were +commanded to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this +purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the +front: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up +arms themselves. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 23, A. 4, ad 2) every power, art or +virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to +the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as +having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are +deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel +other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up +arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is +unbecoming their personality. + +Reply Obj. 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war, +nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their +being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act +may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who +have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q., 40, Art. 3] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Lay Ambushes in War? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in +war. For it is written (Deut. 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after +that which is just." But ambushes, since they are a kind of +deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to +lay ambushes even in a just war. + +Obj. 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to +faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith +with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states +(Contra Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with +one's enemy, as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems +that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 7:12): "Whatsoever you would +that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to +observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is +our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions +to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on +war by laying ambushes. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos): +"Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be +carried on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the +authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the +city of Hai (Joshua 8:2). + +_I answer that,_ The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive +the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two +ways. First, through being told something false, or through the +breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to +deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain "rights of war +and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies," as +Ambrose states (De Officiis i). + +Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do +not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always +bound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have +to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, +according to Matt. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy, to dogs." +Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the +enemy. For this reason among other things that a soldier has to learn +is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's +knowledge, as stated in the Book on _Strategy_ [*Stratagematum i, 1] +by Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush +which may be lawfully employed in a just war. + +Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they +contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have +an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide +anything from him. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Fight on Holy Days? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy +days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God. +Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex. +20:8: for "sabbath" is interpreted "rest." But wars are full of +unrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days. + +Obj. 2: Further, certain persons are reproached (Isa. 58:3) because +on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of +strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it +unlawful to fight on holy days. + +Obj. 3: Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal harm. +But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed. +Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of +avoiding temporal harm. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Mac. 2:41): The Jews rightly +determined . . . saying: "Whosoever shall come up against us to fight +on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him." + +_I answer that,_ The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those +things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body. +Hence Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (John 7:23): "Are you +angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?" +Hence physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days. +Now there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal +(whereby many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both +temporal and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an +individual. Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common +weal of the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days, +provided there be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt +God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain +from fighting. + +However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight +on a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the +Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 41 + +OF STRIFE +(In Two Articles) +[*Strife here denotes fighting between individuals] + +We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether strife is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is a daughter of anger? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 41, Art. 1] + +Whether Strife Is Always a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not always a sin. For +strife seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x) that +the word "rixosus [quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling [rictu] +of a dog, because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he +delights in brawling, and provokes contention." Now contention is not +always a sin. Neither, therefore, is strife. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is related (Gen. 26:21) that the servants of +Isaac "digged" another well, "and for that they quarrelled likewise." +Now it is not credible that the household of Isaac quarrelled +publicly, without being reproved by him, supposing it were a sin. +Therefore strife is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, strife seems to be a war between individuals. But +war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Strifes [*The Douay version has 'quarrels'] are +reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), and "they who do +such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Therefore strifes +are not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins. + +_I answer that,_ While contention implies a contradiction of words, +strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on +Gal. 5:20 says that "strifes are when persons strike one another +through anger." Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it +takes place between private persons, being declared not by public +authority, but rather by an inordinate will. Therefore strife is +always sinful. In fact it is a mortal sin in the man who attacks +another unjustly, for it is not without mortal sin that one inflicts +harm on another even if the deed be done by the hands. But in him who +defends himself, it may be without sin, or it may sometimes involve a +venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends on his +intention and on his manner of defending himself. For if his sole +intention be to withstand the injury done to him, and he defend +himself with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say +properly that there is strife on his part. But if, on the other hand, +his self-defense be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a +sin. It is a venial sin, if a slight movement of hatred or vengeance +obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed moderation in defending +himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes for his assailant with +the fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting grievous harm on +him. + +Reply Obj. 1: Strife is not just the same as contention: and there +are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which express +the inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is always +ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, "ever ready to +contradict," that is to say, whether the other man says or does well +or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the +passage proceeds, "and delights in brawling." Thirdly, "he" provokes +others to quarrel, wherefore it goes on, "and provokes contention." + +Reply Obj. 1: The sense of the text is not that the servants of Isaac +quarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country quarrelled with +them: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore +the calumny [*Cf. Gen. 26:20]. + +Reply Obj. 3: In order for a war to be just it must be declared by +authority of the governing power, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1); +whereas strife proceeds from a private feeling of anger or hatred. +For if the servants of a sovereign or judge, in virtue of their +public authority, attack certain men and these defend themselves, it +is not the former who are said to be guilty of strife, but those who +resist the public authority. Hence it is not the assailants in this +case who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those who defend +themselves inordinately. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 41, Art. 2] + +Whether Strife Is a Daughter of Anger? + +Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger. +For it is written (James 4:1): "Whence are wars and contentions? Are +they not . . . from your concupiscences, which war in your members?" +But anger is not in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a +daughter, not of anger, but of concupiscence. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth and +puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels." Now strife is apparently +the same as quarrel. Therefore it seems that strife is a daughter of +pride or vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 18:6): "The lips of a fool +intermeddle with strife." Now folly differs from anger, for it is +opposed, not to meekness, but to wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife +is not a daughter of anger. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): "Hatred stirreth up +strifes." But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. +xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger, but of envy. + +Obj. 5: Further, it is written (Prov. 17:19): "He that studieth +discords, soweth [Vulg.: 'loveth'] quarrels." But discord is a +daughter of vainglory, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2). Therefore +strife is also. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that "anger gives +rise to strife"; and it is written (Prov. 15:18; 29:22): "A +passionate man stirreth up strifes." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), strife denotes an antagonism +extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another. Now there +are two ways in which one man may intend to harm another. In one way +it is as though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which in +this case is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is +directed to the hurt of one's enemy either openly or secretly. In +another way a man intends to hurt another who knows and withstands +his intention. This is what we mean by strife, and belongs properly +to anger which is the desire of vengeance: for the angry man is not +content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him +to feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what +he has done, as may be seen from what has been said above about the +passion of anger (I-II, Q. 46, A. 6, ad 2). Therefore, properly +speaking, strife arises from anger. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2), all the +irascible passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty, so +that whatever is the immediate outcome of anger, arises also from +concupiscence as from its first root. + +Reply Obj. 2: Boasting and puffing up of self which are the result of +anger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional cause of +quarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being +preferred to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results in +quarrel and strife. + +Reply Obj. 3: Anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 48, A. 3) hinders the +judgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to folly. Hence +they have a common effect, since it is due to a defect in the reason +that a man designs to hurt another inordinately. + +Reply Obj. 4: Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is not +the proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it is +beside his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner, +since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees +himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel. +But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the proper effect of anger, for the +reason given above. + +Reply Obj. 5: Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the hearts +of those who are guilty of strife, and so he that "studies," i.e., +intends to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among +themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by +directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that +strife is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 42 + +OF SEDITION +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is a special sin? + +(2) Whether it is a mortal sin? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 42, Art. 1] + +Whether Sedition Is a Special Sin Distinct from Other Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not a special sin +distinct from other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a +seditious man is one who sows dissent among minds, and begets +discord." Now, by provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no +other kind of sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems +that sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord. + +Obj. 2: Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism +takes its name from scission, as stated above (Q. 39, A. 1). +Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that +of schism. + +Obj. 3: Further, every special sin that is distinct from other sins, +is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now +sedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those +vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where +both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a +special sin, distinct from other sins. + +_On the contrary,_ Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other +sins (2 Cor. 12:20). + +_I answer that,_ Sedition is a special sin, having something in +common with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has +something in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain +antagonism, and it differs from them in two points. First, because +war and strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas +sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, or the +preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on 2 Cor. 12:20 says +that "seditions are tumults tending to fight," when, to wit, a number +of people make preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly, +they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against +external foes, being as it were between one people and another, +whereas strife is between one individual and another, or between few +people on one side and few on the other side, while sedition, in its +proper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as +when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part. +Wherefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, +namely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: A seditious man is one who incites others to sedition, +and since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that a +seditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but +between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only +in him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one +another inordinately. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sedition differs from schism in two respects. First, +because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the multitude, +viz. ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to the +temporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city or +kingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a +material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dissent. + +Reply Obj. 3: Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord, +since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between +the parts of a multitude. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 42, Art. 2] + +Whether Sedition Is Always a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin. +For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the +gloss quoted above (A. 1). But fighting is not always a mortal sin, +indeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above (Q. 40, A. +1). Much more, therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above (A. +1, ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes +without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a +tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some +dissension in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to +retain the tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore +there can be sedition without mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle forbids seditions together with other +things that are mortal sins (2 Cor. 12:20). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), sedition is contrary +to the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom. +Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that "wise men understand the +word people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly +of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and +for the common good." Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which +sedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it +follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common +good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its +gravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it +assails surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife. + +Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors, +who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by +them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the +common good, and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves +seditious, even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because +he defends himself, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common +good, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1). But sedition runs counter to the +common good of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Discord from what is not evidently good, may be without +sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without sin: +and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity +of the multitude, which is a manifest good. + +Reply Obj. 3: A tyrannical government is not just, because it is +directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the +ruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; _Ethic._ viii, 10). +Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this +kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately, +that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance +than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather +that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition +among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for +this is tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler, +and to the injury of the multitude. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 43 + +OF SCANDAL +(In Eight Articles) + +It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to +beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice, +those, to wit, whereby one harms one's neighbor unjustly. But scandal +seems to be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here +consider scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) What is scandal? + +(2) Whether scandal is a sin? + +(3) Whether it is a special sin? + +(4) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized? + +(6) Whether they can give scandal? + +(7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal? + +(8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 1] + +Whether Scandal Is Fittingly Defined As Being Something Less Rightly +Said or Done That Occasions Spiritual Downfall? + +Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is unfittingly defined as +"something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual +downfall." For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on (A. 2). +Now, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), a sin is a +"word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God." Therefore the +definition given above is insufficient, since it omits "thought" or +"desire." + +Obj. 2: Further, since among virtuous or right acts one is more +virtuous or more right than another, that one alone which has perfect +rectitude would not seem to be a "less" right one. If, therefore, +scandal is something "less" rightly said or done, it follows that +every virtuous act except the best of all, is a scandal. + +Obj. 3: Further, an occasion is an accidental cause. But nothing +accidental should enter a definition, because it does not specify the +thing defined. Therefore it is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say +that it is an "occasion." + +Obj. 4: Further, whatever a man does may be the occasion of another's +spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are indeterminate. +Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions another's +spiritual downfall, any deed or word can be a scandal: and this seems +unreasonable. + +Obj. 5: Further, a man occasions his neighbor's spiritual downfall +when he offends or weakens him. Now scandal is condivided with +offense and weakness, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): "It is good +not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy +brother is offended or scandalized, or weakened." Therefore the +aforesaid definition of scandal is unfitting. + +_On the contrary,_ Jerome in expounding Matt. 15:12, "Dost thou know +that the Pharisees, when they heard this word," etc. says: "When we +read 'Whosoever shall scandalize,' the sense is 'Whosoever shall, by +deed or word, occasion another's spiritual downfall.'" + +_I answer that,_ As Jerome observes the Greek _skandalon_ may be +rendered offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For +when a body, while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it +may happen to stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such +an obstacle is a _skandalon_. + +In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be +disposed to a spiritual downfall by another's word or deed, in so +far, to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example, +moves another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called. + +Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall, +except that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly +right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his +downfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as "something less +rightly done or said, that occasions another's spiritual downfall." + +Reply Obj. 1: The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the heart, +wherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an obstacle +conducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come under the +head of scandal. + +Reply Obj. 2: A thing is said to be less right, not because something +else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack of +rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or +through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man +were to "sit at meat in the idol's temple" (1 Cor. 8:10), though this +is not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention, +yet, since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of +worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man's spiritual +downfall. Hence the Apostle says (1 Thess. 5:22): "From all +appearance of evil refrain yourselves." Scandal is therefore +fittingly described as something done "less rightly," so as to +comprise both whatever is sinful in itself, and all that has an +appearance of evil. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 75, AA. 2, 3; I-II, Q. 80, A. +1), nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man's spiritual downfall, +which is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another man's words or +deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that +downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a cause, but +an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an accidental +cause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions should not +make mention of things that are accidental, since what is accidental +to one, may be proper to something else: thus the accidental cause is +mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5). + +Reply Obj. 4: Another's words or deed may be the cause of another's +sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man +either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into +sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature +as to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly +commits a sin or does something that has an appearance of sin. In +this case he that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an +occasion of another's spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called +"active scandal." One man's word or deed is the accidental cause of +another's sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does +what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one, +through being ill-disposed, is led into sin, for instance, into envy +of another's good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not, +so far as he is concerned, afford an occasion of the other's +downfall, but it is this other one who takes the occasion according +to Rom. 7:8: "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me +all manner of concupiscence." Wherefore this is "passive," without +"active scandal," since he that acts rightly does not, for his own +part, afford the occasion of the other's downfall. Sometimes +therefore it happens that there is active scandal in the one together +with passive scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin being +induced thereto by another; sometimes there is active without passive +scandal, for instance when one, by word or deed, provokes another to +sin, and the latter does not consent; and sometimes there is passive +without active scandal, as we have already said. + +Reply Obj. 5: "Weakness" denotes proneness to scandal; while +"offense" signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin, +which resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and +"scandal" is the stumbling that results in downfall. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 2] + +Whether Scandal Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a sin. For sins do not +occur from necessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2). Now it is written (Matt. 18:7): "It must +needs be that scandals come." Therefore scandal is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no sin arises from a sense of dutifulness, because +"a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Matt. 7:18). But scandal +may come from a sense of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to Peter +(Matt. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal unto Me," in reference to which +words Jerome says that "the Apostle's error was due to his sense of +dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil." Therefore +scandal is not always a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. But he that stumbles +does not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall, +can be without sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Scandal is "something less rightly said or done." +Now anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. Therefore scandal is +always with sin. + +_I answer that,_ As already said (A. 1, ad 4), scandal is of two +kinds, passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal +in the person who gives scandal, and so occasions a spiritual +downfall. Accordingly passive scandal is always a sin in the person +scandalized; for he is not scandalized except in so far as he +succumbs to a spiritual downfall, and that is a sin. + +Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the part of the +person whose action has occasioned the scandal, as for instance, when +a person is scandalized at another's good deed. In like manner active +scandal is always a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either +what he does is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it +should always be left undone out of that love for our neighbor which +binds each one to be solicitous for his neighbor's spiritual welfare; +so that if he persist in doing it he acts against charity. + +Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person +scandalized, as stated above (A. 1, ad 4). + +Reply Obj. 1: These words, "It must needs be that scandals come," are +to be understood to convey, not the absolute, but the conditional +necessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that whatever +God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken +conjointly with such foreknowledge, as explained in the First Part +(Q. 14, A. 13, ad 3; Q. 23, A. 6, ad 2). + +Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring is a necessity +of end, because they are useful in order that "they . . . who are +reproved may be made manifest" (1 Cor. 11:19). + +Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of man who fails +to shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man +partaking of unsuitable food might say that such a man must needs +injure his health, which is to be understood on the condition that he +does not change his diet. In like manner it must needs be that +scandals come, so long as men fail to change their evil mode of +living. + +Reply Obj. 2: In that passage scandal denotes any kind of hindrance: +for Peter wished to hinder Our Lord's Passion out of a sense of +dutifulness towards Christ. + +Reply Obj. 3: No man stumbles spiritually, without being kept back +somewhat from advancing in God's way, and that is at least a venial +sin. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 3] + +Whether Scandal Is a Special Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. For +scandal is "something said or done less rightly." But this applies to +every kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and +consequently, scandal is not a special sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, every special kind of sin, or every special kind of +injustice, may be found separately from other kinds, as stated in +_Ethic._ v, 3, 5. But scandal is not to be found separately from +other sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is constituted by something which +specifies the moral act. But the notion of scandal consists in its +being something done in the presence of others: and the fact of a sin +being committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance, +does not seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal +is not a special sin. + +_On the contrary,_ A special virtue has a special sin opposed to it. +But scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is +written (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat, thy brother be +grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity." Therefore +scandal is a special sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), scandal is twofold, active +and passive. Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through +another's word or deed a man may fall into any kind of sin: and the +fact that a man takes occasion to sin from another's word or deed, +does not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply +a special deformity in opposition to a special virtue. + +On the other hand, active scandal may be understood in two ways, +directly and accidentally. The scandal is accidental when it is +beside the agent's intention, as when a man does not intend, by his +inordinate deed or word, to occasion another's spiritual downfall, +but merely to satisfy his own will. In such a case even active +scandal is not a special sin, because a species is not constituted by +that which is accidental. + +Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his inordinate word +or deed, to draw another into sin, and then it becomes a special kind +of sin on account of the intention of a special kind of end, because +moral actions take their species from their end, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6). Hence, just as theft and murder +are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention +of doing a special injury to one's neighbor: so too, scandal is a +special kind of sin, because thereby a man intends a special harm to +his neighbor, and it is directly opposed to fraternal correction, +whereby a man intends the removal of a special kind of harm. + +Reply Obj. 1: Any sin may be the matter of active scandal, but it may +derive the formal aspect of a special sin from the end intended, as +stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Active scandal can be found separate from other sins, +as when a man scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not a sin +in itself, but has an appearance of evil. + +Reply Obj. 3: Scandal does not derive the species of a special sin +from the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the end, +as stated above. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 4] + +Whether Scandal Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. For every +sin that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (Q. +24, A. 12; Q. 35, A. 3). But scandal is contrary to charity, as +stated above (AA. 2, 3). Therefore scandal is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves the punishment of +eternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal +damnation, according to Matt. 18:6: "He that shall scandalize one of +these little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a +mill-stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be +drowned in the depth of the sea." For, as Jerome says on this +passage, "it is much better to receive a brief punishment for a +fault, than to await everlasting torments." Therefore scandal is a +mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, every sin committed against God is a mortal sin, +because mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is a +sin against God, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:12): "When you wound +the weak conscience of the brethren [*Vulg.: 'When you sin thus +against the brethren and wound their weak conscience'], you sin +against Christ." Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It may be a venial sin to lead a person into +venial sin: and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal +may be a venial sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), scandal denotes a stumbling +whereby a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall. Consequently +passive scandal may sometimes be a venial sin, when it consists in a +stumbling and nothing more; for instance, when a person is disturbed +by a movement of venial sin occasioned by another's inordinate word +or deed: while sometimes it is a mortal sin, when the stumbling +results in a downfall, for instance, when a person goes so far as to +commit a mortal sin through another's inordinate word or deed. + +Active scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be a venial sin; +for instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a person either +commits a venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself, +but has some appearance of evil. On the other hand, it is sometimes a +mortal sin, either because a person commits a mortal sin, or because +he has such contempt for his neighbor's spiritual welfare that he +declines, for the sake of procuring it, to forego doing what he +wishes to do. But in the case of active direct scandal, as when a +person intends to lead another into sin, if he intends to lead him +into mortal sin, his own sin will be mortal; and in like manner if he +intends by committing a mortal sin himself, to lead another into +venial sin; whereas if he intends, by committing a venial sin, to +lead another into venial sin, there will be a venial sin of scandal. + +And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 5] + +Whether Passive Scandal May Happen Even to the Perfect? + +Objection 1: It would seem that passive scandal may happen even to +the perfect. For Christ was supremely perfect: and yet He said to +Peter (Matt. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal to Me." Much more therefore +can other perfect men suffer scandal. + +Obj. 2: Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a +person's spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their +progress along the spiritual way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: "We +would have come to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath +hindered us." Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal. + +Obj. 3: Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins, +according to 1 John 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive +ourselves." Now passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is +sometimes venial, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore passive scandal +may be found in perfect men. + +_On the contrary,_ Jerome, in commenting on Matt. 18:6, "He that +shall scandalize one of these little ones," says: "Observe that it is +the little one that is scandalized, for the elders do not take +scandal." + +_I answer that,_ Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person +who takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man +can be unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The +elders, i.e. the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is +unchangeable, for though they adhere to their superiors, they do so +only in so far as these adhere to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16: +"Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." Wherefore, however +much others may appear to them to conduct themselves ill in word or +deed, they themselves do not stray from their righteousness, +according to Ps. 124:1: "They that trust in the Lord shall be as +Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in +Jerusalem." Therefore scandal is not found in those who adhere to God +perfectly by love, according to Ps. 118:165: "Much peace have they +that love Thy law, and to them there is no stumbling-block +(_scandalum_)." + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 2, ad 2), in this passage, scandal +is used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance. Hence Our +Lord said to Peter: "Thou art a scandal to Me," because he was +endeavoring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion. + +Reply Obj. 2: Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of +external actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of +others, from tending to God in the internal acts of the will, +according to Rom. 8:38, 39: "Neither death, nor life . . . shall be +able to separate us from the love of God." + +Reply Obj. 3: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins through the +weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking scandal +in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although there +can be an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: "My +feet were almost moved." +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 6] + +Whether Active Scandal Can Be Found in the Perfect? + +Objection 1: It would seem that active scandal can be found in the +perfect. For passion is the effect of action. Now some are +scandalized passively by the words or deeds of the perfect, according +to Matt. 15:12: "Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard +this word, were scandalized?" Therefore active scandal can be found +in the perfect. + +Obj. 2: Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the +state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles: for +it is written (Gal. 2:14): "When I saw that they walked not uprightly +unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas," i.e. Peter, "before +them all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the +gentiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles +to live as do the Jews?" Therefore active scandal can be in the +perfect. + +Obj. 3: Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin. But venial +sins may be in perfect men. Therefore active scandal may be in +perfect men. + +_On the contrary,_ Active scandal is more opposed to perfection, than +passive scandal. But passive scandal cannot be in the perfect. Much +less, therefore, can active scandal be in them. + +_I answer that,_ Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a +man says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion +another's spiritual downfall, and that is only when what he says or +does is inordinate. Now it belongs to the perfect to direct all their +actions according to the rule of reason, as stated in 1 Cor. 14:40: +"Let all things be done decently and according to order"; and they +are careful to do this in those matters chiefly wherein not only +would they do wrong, but would also be to others an occasion of +wrongdoing. And if indeed they fail in this moderation in such words +or deeds as come to the knowledge of others, this has its origin in +human weakness wherein they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not +fall short so far as to stray far from the order of reason, but only +a little and in some slight matter: and this is not so grave that +anyone can reasonably take therefrom an occasion for committing sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Passive scandal is always due to some active scandal; +yet this active scandal is not always in another, but in the very +person who is scandalized, because, to wit, he scandalizes himself. + +Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of Augustine (Ep. xxviii, xl, lxxxii) +and of Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed, in withdrawing +from the gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the Jews, because +he did this somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles who had been +converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless Peter's action +was not so grave a sin as to give others sufficient ground for +scandal. Hence they were guilty of passive scandal, while there was +no active scandal in Peter. + +Reply Obj. 3: The venial sins of the perfect consist chiefly in +sudden movements, which being hidden cannot give scandal. If, +however, they commit any venial sins even in their external words or +deeds, these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to +give scandal. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 7] + +Whether Spiritual Goods Should Be Foregone on Account of Scandal? + +Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual goods ought to be foregone +on account of scandal. For Augustine (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) +teaches that "punishment for sin should cease, when the peril of +schism is feared." But punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since +it is an act of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone +on account of scandal. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing. Yet +one ought to desist therefrom on account of scandal, according to +Matt. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your +pearls before swine lest . . . turning upon you, they tear you." +Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal. + +Obj. 3: Further, since fraternal correction is an act of charity, it +is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity, in +order to avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes (De +Civ. Dei i, 9). Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on +account of scandal. + +Obj. 4: Further, Jerome [*Hugh de S. Cher., In Matth. xviii; in Luc. +xvii, 2] says that in order to avoid scandal we should forego +whatever it is possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold +truth, i.e. "the truth of life, of justice and of doctrine." Now the +observance of the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be +omitted without prejudice to the aforesaid threefold truth, else +whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and yet such +things are the greatest of spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works +should be omitted on account of scandal. + +Obj. 5: Further, the avoidance of any sin is a spiritual good, since +any sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that one +ought sometimes to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandalizing +one's neighbor, for instance, when by sinning venially, one would +prevent someone else from committing a mortal sin: because one is +bound to hinder the damnation of one's neighbor as much as one can +without prejudice to one's own salvation, which is not precluded by a +venial sin. Therefore one ought to forego a spiritual good in order +to avoid scandal. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech. vii): "If people +are scandalized at the truth, it is better to allow the birth of +scandal, than to abandon the truth." Now spiritual goods belong, +above all others, to the truth. Therefore spiritual goods are not to +be foregone on account of scandal. + +_I answer that,_ Whereas scandal is twofold, active and passive, the +present question does not apply to active scandal, for since active +scandal is "something said or done less rightly," nothing ought to be +done that implies active scandal. The question does, however, apply +to passive scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be +foregone in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction must be made in +spiritual goods. For some of them are necessary for salvation, and +cannot be foregone without mortal sin: and it is evident that no man +ought to commit a mortal sin, in order to prevent another from +sinning, because according to the order of charity, a man ought to +love his own spiritual welfare more than another's. Therefore one +ought not to forego that which is necessary for salvation, in order +to avoid giving scandal. + +Again a distinction seems necessary among spiritual things which are +not necessary for salvation: because the scandal which arises from +such things sometimes proceeds from malice, for instance when a man +wishes to hinder those spiritual goods by stirring up scandal. This +is the "scandal of the Pharisees," who were scandalized at Our Lord's +teaching: and Our Lord teaches (Matt. 15:14) that we ought to treat +such like scandal with contempt. Sometimes scandal proceeds from +weakness or ignorance, and such is the "scandal of little ones." In +order to avoid this kind of scandal, spiritual goods ought to be +either concealed, or sometimes even deferred (if this can be done +without incurring immediate danger), until the matter being explained +the scandal cease. If, however, the scandal continue after the matter +has been explained, it would seem to be due to malice, and then it +would no longer be right to forego that spiritual good in order to +avoid such like scandal. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the infliction of punishment it is not the +punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal +properties in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the +nature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident +that the infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and +more grievous sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will +no longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is +speaking, when, to wit, the excommunication of a few threatens to +bring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it would be +contrary to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication. + +Reply Obj. 2: With regard to a man's doctrine two points must be +considered, namely, the truth which is taught, and the act of +teaching. The first of these is necessary for salvation, to wit, that +he whose duty it is to teach should not teach what is contrary to the +truth, and that he should teach the truth according to the +requirements of times and persons: wherefore on no account ought he +to suppress the truth and teach error in order to avoid any scandal +that might ensue. But the act itself of teaching is one of the +spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2), and so the same +is to be said of it as of the other works of mercy, of which we shall +speak further on (ad 4). + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 33, A. 1), fraternal correction +aims at the correction of a brother, wherefore it is to be reckoned +among spiritual goods in so far as this end can be obtained, which is +not the case if the brother be scandalized through being corrected. +And so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid scandal, no +spiritual good is foregone. + +Reply Obj. 4: The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice +comprises not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also +whatever is a means of obtaining salvation more perfectly, according +to 1 Cor. 12:31: "Be zealous for the better gifts." Wherefore neither +the counsels nor even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted +in order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or +deferred, on account of the scandal of the little ones, as stated +above. Sometimes, however, the observance of the counsels and the +fulfilment of the works of mercy are necessary for salvation. This +may be seen in the case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels, +and of those whose duty it is to relieve the wants of others, either +in temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in spiritual +matters (as by instructing the ignorant), whether such duties arise +from their being enjoined as in the case of prelates, or from the +need on the part of the person in want; and then the same applies to +these things as to others that are necessary for salvation. + +Reply Obj. 5: Some have said that one ought to commit a venial sin in +order to avoid scandal. But this implies a contradiction, since if it +ought to be done, it is no longer evil or sinful, for a sin cannot be +a matter of choice. It may happen however that, on account of some +circumstance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be were +it not for that circumstance: thus an idle word is a venial sin, when +it is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered for a reasonable cause, +it is neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not deprive +a man of grace which is his means of salvation, yet, in so far as it +disposes him to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 8] + +Whether Temporal Goods Should Be Foregone on Account of Scandal? + +Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods should be foregone on +account of scandal. For we ought to love our neighbor's spiritual +welfare which is hindered by scandal, more than any temporal goods +whatever. But we forego what we love less for the sake of what we +love more. Therefore we should forego temporal goods in order to +avoid scandalizing our neighbor. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Jerome's rule [*Cf. A. 7, Obj. 4], +whatever can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth, +should be omitted in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can +be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth. Therefore they +should be foregone in order to avoid scandal. + +Obj. 3: Further, no temporal good is more necessary than food. But we +ought to forego taking food on account of scandal, according to Rom. +14:15: "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died." Much +more therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on account +of scandal. + +Obj. 4: Further, the most fitting way of safeguarding and recovering +temporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful to have +recourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues: for it is written +(Matt. 5:40): "If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take +away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him"; and (1 Cor. 6:7): +"Already indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have +lawsuits one with another. Why do you not rather take wrong? why do +you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore it seems +that we ought to forego temporal goods on account of scandal. + +Obj. 5: Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego least of all those +temporal goods which are connected with spiritual goods: and yet we +ought to forego them on account of scandal. For the Apostle while +sowing spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he +"should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ" as we read 1 Cor. +9:12. For a like reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain +countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much more, therefore, ought we +to forego other temporal goods in order to avoid scandal. + +_On the contrary,_ Blessed Thomas of Canterbury demanded the +restitution of Church property, notwithstanding that the king took +scandal from his doing so. + +_I answer that,_ A distinction must be made in temporal goods: for +either they are ours, or they are consigned to us to take care of +them for someone else; thus the goods of the Church are consigned to +prelates, and the goods of the community are entrusted to all such +persons as have authority over the common weal. In this latter case +the care of such things (as of things held in deposit) devolves of +necessity on those persons to whom they are entrusted, wherefore, +even as other things that are necessary for salvation, they are not +to be foregone on account of scandal. On the other hand, as regards +those temporalities of which we have the dominion, sometimes, on +account of scandal, we are bound to forego them, and sometimes we are +not so bound, whether we forego them by giving them up, if we have +them in our possession, or by omitting to claim them, if they are in +the possession of others. For if the scandal arise therefrom through +the ignorance or weakness of others (in which case, as stated above, +A. 7, it is scandal of the little ones) we must either forego such +temporalities altogether, or the scandal must be abated by some other +means, namely, by some kind of admonition. Hence Augustine says (De +Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20): "Thou shouldst give so as to injure +neither thyself nor another, as much as thou canst lend, and if thou +refusest what is asked, thou must yet be just to him, indeed thou +wilt give him something better than he asks, if thou reprove him that +asks unjustly." Sometimes, however, scandal arises from malice. This +is scandal of the Pharisees: and we ought not to forego temporal +goods for the sake of those who stir up scandals of this kind, for +this would both be harmful to the common good, since it would give +wicked men an opportunity of plunder, and would be injurious to the +plunderers themselves, who would remain in sin as long as they were +in possession of another's property. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, +13): "Sometimes we ought to suffer those who rob us of our +temporalities, while sometimes we should resist them, as far as +equity allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our +property, but also lest those who take what is not theirs may lose +themselves." + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: If it were permissible for wicked men to rob other +people of their property, this would tend to the detriment of the +truth of life and justice. Therefore we are not always bound to +forego our temporal goods in order to avoid scandal. + +Reply Obj. 3: The Apostle had no intention of counselling total +abstinence from food on account of scandal, because our welfare +requires that we should take food: but he intended to counsel +abstinence from a particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal, +according to 1 Cor. 8:13: "I will never eat flesh, lest I should +scandalize my brother." + +Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) +this precept of Our Lord is to be understood of the preparedness of +the mind, namely, that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to +suffer being harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But +sometimes it is not expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The same +applies to the saying of the Apostle. + +Reply Obj. 5: The scandal which the Apostle avoided, arose from an +error of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence it +behooved him to forego it for the time being, so that they might be +taught first of all that such a payment was a duty. For a like reason +the Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries where it +is not customary to pay them. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 44 + +OF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are +eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether precepts should be given about charity? + +(2) Whether there should be one or two? + +(3) Whether two suffice? + +(4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with +thy whole heart"? + +(5) Whether it is fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc.? + +(6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life? + +(7) Of the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"; + +(8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 1] + +Whether Any Precept Should Be Given About Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given about +charity. For charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it +is the form of the virtues as stated above (Q. 23, A. 8), while the +precepts are about the virtues themselves. Now, according to the +common saying, the mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no +precepts should be given about charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the +Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of the +Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that +arises from a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a +necessity. Therefore no precept should be given about charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to +which the precepts are directed, as shown above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2; +Q. 100, A. 9). If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity, +they should have a place among the chief precepts which are those of +the decalogue. But they have no place there. Therefore no precepts +should be given about charity. + +_On the contrary,_ Whatever God requires of us is included in a +precept. Now God requires that man should love Him, according to +Deut. 10:12. Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the +love of charity, which is the love of God. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 16, A. 1; I-II, Q. 99, A. 1), a +precept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a +matter of precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is +due in two ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something +else. In every affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake, +because it has the character of a good for its own sake: while that +which is directed to the end is due for the sake of something else: +thus for a physician, it is due for its own sake, that he should +heal, while it is due for the sake of something else that he should +give a medicine in order to heal. Now the end of the spiritual life +is that man be united to God, and this union is effected by charity, +while all things pertaining to the spiritual life are ordained to +this union, as to their end. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): +"The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good +conscience, and an unfeigned faith." For all the virtues, about whose +acts the precepts are given, are directed either to the freeing of +the heart from the whirl of the passions--such are the virtues that +regulate the passions--or at least to the possession of a good +conscience--such are the virtues that regulate operations--or to the +having of a right faith--such are those which pertain to the worship +of God: and these three things are required of man that he may love +God. For an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of +the passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience +gives man a horror for God's justice, through fear of His +punishments; and an untrue faith draws man's affections to an untrue +representation of God, and separates him from the truth of God. Now +in every genus that which is for its own sake takes precedence of +that which is for the sake of another, wherefore the greatest precept +is that of charity, as stated in Matt. 22:39. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 10) when we were +treating of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under +those precepts which are about the other acts of virtue: for +instance, this precept, "Honor thy father and thy mother," does not +prescribe that this should be done out of charity. The act of love +does, however, fall under special precepts. + +Reply Obj. 2: The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty, +except in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed, as +may be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But +the precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own will, +wherefore it is not opposed to charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the +love of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of +charity had not to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue, +since they are included in all of them. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 2] + +Whether There Should Have Been Given Two Precepts of Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been given two +precepts of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to +virtue, as stated above (A. 1, Obj. 3). Now charity is one virtue, as +shown above (Q. 33, A. 5). Therefore only one precept of charity +should have been given. + +Obj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22, 27), +charity loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently +directed to love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy +God." Therefore there was no need to add the precept about loving our +neighbor. + +Obj. 3: Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts. +But it is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided +we put not aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Luke 15:26): +"If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he +cannot be My disciple." Therefore the precept of the love of God is +not distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor. + +Obj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8): "He that loveth his +neighbor hath fulfilled the Law." But a law is not fulfilled unless +all its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included +in the love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the +love of our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two +precepts of charity. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:21): "This commandment we +have from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 91, A. 3; Q. 94, A. 2) +when we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to the +Law what propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these +latter, the conclusions are virtually contained in the first +principles. Hence whoever knows the principles as to their entire +virtual extent has no need to have the conclusions put separately +before him. Since, however, some who know the principles are unable +to consider all that is virtually contained therein, it is necessary, +for their sake, that scientific conclusions should be traced to their +principles. Now in practical matters wherein the precepts of the Law +direct us, the end has the character of principle, as stated above +(Q. 23, A. 7, ad 2; Q. 26, A. 1, ad 1): and the love of God is the +end to which the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it +behooved us to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also +of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are less +intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of these precepts +is included in the other. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts, +one of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are +given about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts +of charity. + +Reply Obj. 2: God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved in +that which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an +explicit precept about both, for the reason given above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The means derive their goodness from their relation to +the end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives its malice +from the same source and from no other. + +Reply Obj. 4: Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the end +is included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each +precept to be given explicitly, for the reason given above. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 3] + +Whether Two Precepts of Charity Suffice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that two precepts of charity do not +suffice. For precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are +distinguished by their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love +four things out of charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and +his own body, as shown above (Q. 25, A. 12; Q. 26), it seems that +there ought to be four precepts of charity, so that two are not +sufficient. + +Obj. 2: Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also joy, +peace and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts of +the virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice. + +Obj. 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also in +avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good, +and by the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to +have been not only positive, but also negative precepts about +charity; and so two precepts of charity are not sufficient. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 22:40): "On these two +commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets." + +_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), is a kind of +friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another, +wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity is not possible +between less than two": and it has been explained how one may love +oneself out of charity (Q. 25, A. 4). Now since good is the object of +dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is +fitting that there should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we +are induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to +love our neighbor for God's sake, as for the sake of our end. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23), "though +four things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need of a +precept as regards the second and fourth," i.e. love of oneself and +of one's own body. "For however much a man may stray from the truth, +the love of himself and of his own body always remains in him." And +yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that +he should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and +this is done by his loving God and his neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 28, A. 4; Q. 29, A. 3), the other +acts of charity result from the act of love as effects from their +cause. Hence the precepts of love virtually include the precepts +about the other acts. And yet we find that, for the sake of the +laggards, special precepts were given about each act--about joy +(Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always"--about peace (Heb. 12:14): +"Follow peace with all men"--about beneficence (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst +we have time, let us work good to all men"--and Holy Writ contains +precepts about each of the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by +anyone who considers the matter carefully. + +Reply Obj. 3: To do good is more than to avoid evil, and therefore +the positive precepts virtually include the negative precepts. +Nevertheless we find explicit precepts against the vices contrary to +charity: for, against hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17): "Thou shalt +not hate thy brother in thy heart"; against sloth (Ecclus. 6:26): "Be +not grieved with her bands"; against envy (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be +made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one +another"; against discord (1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the same +thing, and that there be no schisms among you"; and against scandal +(Rom. 14:13): "That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in +your brother's way." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Fittingly Commanded That Man Should Love God with His +Whole Heart? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man +should love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act +is not a matter of precept, as shown above (A. 1, ad 1; I-II, Q. 100, +A. 9). Now the words "with thy whole heart" signify the mode of the +love of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should +love God with his whole heart. + +Obj. 2: Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks nothing" +(Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that God be +loved with the whole heart, whoever does something not pertaining to +the love of God, acts counter to the precept, and consequently sins +mortally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God. +Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd. + +Obj. 3: Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to +perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64), +"to be whole is to be perfect." But that which belongs to perfection +is not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we +ought not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the +Lord thy God with thy whole heart." + +_I answer that,_ Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an +act is a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now +it is requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on +its own matter, but also that it should be endued with its due +circumstances, whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be +loved as the last end, to which all things are to be referred. +Therefore some kind of totality was to be indicated in connection +with the precept of the love of God. + +Reply Obj. 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue does +not prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and +higher virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its +own proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy +whole heart." + +Reply Obj. 2: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold +signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always +actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly, +in the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God, +so that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this +is the perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this +latter perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity, +since it does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the +use of charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels are +directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding +reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, +temporal things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the +mind and hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 5] + +Whether to the Words, "Thou Shalt Love the Lord Thy God with Thy +Whole Heart," It Was Fitting to Add "and with Thy Whole Soul, and +with Thy Whole Strength"? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou +shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with +thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength" (Deut. 6:5). For heart +does not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a +bodily action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual +sense. Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself +or part of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous to mention both +heart and soul. + +Obj. 2: Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal +depends on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the +Lord thy God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with +all thy strength." + +Obj. 3: Further, in Matt. 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which +words do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is +unfittingly worded in Deut. 6. + +On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture. + +_I answer that,_ This precept is differently worded in various +places: for, as we said in the first objection, in Deut. 6 three +points are mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole +soul," and "with thy whole strength." In Matt. 22 we find two of +these mentioned, viz. "with thy whole heart" and "with thy whole +soul," while "with thy whole strength" is omitted, but "with thy +whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark 12 we find all four, viz. "with thy +whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with thy whole mind," +and "with thy whole force" which is the same as "strength." Moreover, +these four are indicated in Luke 10, where in place of "strength" or +"force" we read "with all thy might." [*St. Thomas is explaining the +Latin text which reads "ex tota fortitudine tua" (Deut.), "ex tota +virtue tua" (Mk.), and "ex omnibus viribus tuis" (Luke), although the +Greek in all three cases has _ex holes tes ischyos_, which the Douay +renders "with thy whole strength."] + +Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one +of them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We +must therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here +denoted by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the +principle of all the movements of the body, so too the will, +especially as regards the intention of the last end which is the +object of charity, is the principle of all the movements of the soul. +Now there are three principles of action that are moved by the will, +namely, the intellect which is signified by "the mind," the lower +appetitive power, signified by "the soul"; and the exterior executive +power signified by "strength," "force" or "might." Accordingly we are +commanded to direct our whole intention to God, and this is signified +by the words "with thy whole heart"; to submit our intellect to God, +and this is expressed in the words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate +our appetite according to God, in the words "with thy whole soul"; +and to obey God in our external actions, and this is to love God with +our whole "strength," "force" or "might." + +Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished +work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in +Chrysostom's works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in +the contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers +"heart" to the thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to +the intellect. Again some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting +the intellect, "with thy whole soul" as signifying the will, "with +thy mind" as pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory +of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), "heart" signifies the vegetative soul, +"soul" the sensitive, and "mind" the intellective soul, because our +nourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to be referred by +us to God. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 6] + +Whether It Is Possible in This Life to Fulfil This Precept of the +Love of God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil +this precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius, +Exposit. Cath. Fid.] "accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded +anything impossible." But God gave this commandment, as is clear from +Deut. 6:5. Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this +life. + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally, +since according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than +"a transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly +commandments." If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by +wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal +sin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8): +"(Who also) will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Tim. +3:10): "Let them minister, having no crime." + +Obj. 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the way +of salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord is +lightsome, enlightening the eyes." Now it is useless to direct anyone +to what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this +precept in this life. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the +fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou +shalt love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal +concupiscence remains, that can be restrained by continence, man +cannot love God with all his heart. + +_I answer that,_ A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, +and imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end +intended by the author of the precept is reached; yet it is +fulfilled, imperfectly however, when although the end intended by its +author is not reached, nevertheless the order to that end is not +departed from. Thus if the commander of an army order his soldiers to +fight, his command will be perfectly obeyed by those who fight and +conquer the foe, which is the commander's intention; yet it is +fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those who fight without gaining the +victory, provided they do nothing contrary to military discipline. +Now God intends by this precept that man should be entirely united to +Him, and this will be realized in heaven, when God will be "all in +all," according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence this precept will be observed +fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though +imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one man will fulfil +it more perfectly than another, and so much the more, as he +approaches by some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that the precept can be fulfilled +after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately without +conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this, so too +he that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does nothing +against the love of God, does not sin mortally. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii), "why +should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man +attains it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows +whither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed it +out." +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 7] + +Whether the Precept of Love of Our Neighbor Is Fittingly Expressed? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our +neighbor is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to +all men, even to our enemies, as may be seen in Matt. 5:44. But the +word "neighbor" denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to +exist towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is +unfittingly expressed. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the +origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to +ourselves," whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin +of one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than +that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his +neighbor as himself. + +Obj. 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally. +Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love his +neighbor as himself. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 22:39): "The second" +commandment "is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as +thyself." + +_I answer that,_ This precept is fittingly expressed, for it +indicates both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason +for loving is indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason +why we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh +to us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity +for glory. Nor does it matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother" +according to 1 John 4:21, or "friend," according to Lev. 19:18, +because all these words express the same affinity. + +The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself." This does +not mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in +like manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the +end, namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as +he loves himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is +a _holy_ love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a +man should not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good +things, even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so +that his love for his neighbor may be a _righteous_ love. Thirdly, as +regards the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his +neighbor, not for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of +wishing his neighbor well, even as he wishes himself well, so that +his love for his neighbor may be a _true_ love: since when a man +loves his neighbor for his own profit or pleasure, he does not love +his neighbor truly, but loves himself. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 8] + +Whether the Order of Charity Is Included in the Precept? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity is not included +in the precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But +if man loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man +more, he wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept. +Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently +delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was +given above (Q. 26) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it +is not included in the precept. + +Obj. 3: Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the love +of our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the words, +"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore the order of +charity is not included in the precept. + +_On the contrary,_ Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches +us first of all by His Law, according to Jer. 31:33: "I will give My +Law in their heart [*Vulg.: 'in their bowels, and I will write it in +their heart']." Now God causes in us the order of charity, according +to Cant. 2:4: "He set in order charity in me." Therefore the order of +charity comes under the precept of the Law. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 1), the mode which is +essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which +prescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential +to the virtue, since it is based on the proportion of love to the +thing beloved, as shown above (Q. 25, A. 12; Q. 26, AA. 1, 2). It is +therefore evident that the order of charity must come under the +precept. + +Reply Obj. 1: A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so that +if he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to +gratify more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an +injustice to the one he ought to love more. + +Reply Obj. 2: The order of those four things we have to love out of +charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to love +God with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we must +love Him above all things. When we are commanded to love our neighbor +"as ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our neighbor. +In like manner where we are commanded (1 John 3:16) "to lay down our +souls," i.e. the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we are given +to understand that a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own +body; and again when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to "work good . . . +especially to those who are of the household of the faith," and when +a man is blamed (1 Tim. 5:8) if he "have not care of his own, and +especially of those of his house," it means that we ought to love +most those of our neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely +united to us. + +Reply Obj. 3: It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love thy +neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 45 + +OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity; +and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the +first head there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy +Ghost? + +(2) What is its subject? + +(3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical? + +(4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin? + +(5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace? + +(6) Which beatitude corresponds to it? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 1] + +Whether Wisdom Should Be Reckoned Among the Gifts of the Holy Ghost? + +Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among +the gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the +virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Now virtue is directed +to the good alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) +that "no man makes bad use of the virtues." Much more therefore are +the gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is +directed to evil also, for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain +wisdom is "earthly, sensual, devilish." Therefore wisdom should not +be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) "wisdom is +the knowledge of Divine things." Now that knowledge of Divine things +which man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the +wisdom which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural +knowledge of Divine things belongs to faith which is a theological +virtue, as explained above (Q. 4, A. 5; I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore +wisdom should be called a virtue rather than a gift. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): "Behold the fear of the +Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is +understanding." And in this passage according to the rendering of the +Septuagint which Augustine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we +read: "Behold piety, that is wisdom." Now both fear and piety are +gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned +among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as though it were distinct from +the others. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord +shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding." + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it +belongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that +cause we are able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, +and according thereto all things should be set in order. Now the +highest cause may be understood in two ways, either simply or in some +particular genus. Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any +particular genus, and by its means is able to judge and set in order +all the things that belong to that genus, is said to be wise in that +genus, for instance in medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor. +3:10: "As a wise architect, I have laid a foundation." On the other +hand, he who knows the cause that is simply the highest, which is +God, is said to be wise simply, because he is able to judge and set +in order all things according to Divine rules. + +Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1 +Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated +in the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), "the Spirit searcheth all things, +yea the deep things of God." Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a +gift of the Holy Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first in the +sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a kind +of likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or +a perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21). +And just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find +a highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by +knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things +something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to +a last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing, +according to Jer. 4:22: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good +they have no knowledge." Now whoever turns away from his due end, +must needs fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end. +Wherefore, if he fixes his end in external earthly things, his +"wisdom" is called "earthly," if in the goods of the body, it is +called "sensual wisdom," if in some excellence, it is called +"devilish wisdom" because it imitates the devil's pride, of which it +is written (Job 41:25): "He is king over all the children of pride." + +Reply Obj. 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost, +differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the +latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is "descending +from above" (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since +faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to +the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the +gift of wisdom presupposes faith, because "a man judges well what he +knows" (Ethic. i, 3). + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of God is a +manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of faith by +worshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this reason +piety is stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason, +because if a man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a right +judgment about Divine things. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 2] + +Whether Wisdom Is in the Intellect As Its Subject? + +Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its +subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity of +God." Now charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the +intellect, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore wisdom is not in +the intellect as its subject. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): "The wisdom of +doctrine is according to her name," for wisdom (_sapientia_) may be +described as "sweet-tasting science (_sapida scientia_)," and this +would seem to regard the appetite, to which it belongs to taste +spiritual pleasure or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite +rather than in the intellect. + +Obj. 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected by +the gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two +things where one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in +the intellect. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "wisdom is +contrary to folly." But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom +is also. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), wisdom denotes a certain +rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of +judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason, +secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about +which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after +inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt +the science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges +of such matters by a kind of connaturality. + +Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue +to pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made +its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to +judge aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus +Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine +things, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things." + +Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of +charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is +joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently wisdom which is a +gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has +its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 14, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause, whence +also wisdom (_sapientia_) takes its name, in so far as it denotes a +certain sweetness (_saporem_). Hence the Reply to the Second +Objection is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text +quoted. For, apparently this is not the case, because such an +exposition of the text would only fit the Latin word for wisdom, +whereas it does not apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other +languages. Hence it would seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands +for the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised by all. + +Reply Obj. 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and +judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of +wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of +knowledge, according to human ideas. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 3] + +Whether Wisdom Is Merely Speculative, or Practical Also? + +Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely +speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom +which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual +virtue, is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a +gift, speculative and not practical. + +Obj. 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of +operation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things +which are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation +we seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we labor under a +mighty bundle of wants." Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine +things, in which there is no toiling under a load, since according to +Wis. 8:16, "her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any +tediousness." Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and not +practical or active. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 4:5): "Walk with wisdom +towards them that are without." Now this pertains to action. +Therefore wisdom is not merely speculative, but also practical. + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher +part of the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is +the domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same +authority (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and +consultation of the heavenly," i.e. Divine, "types" [*Cf. I, Q. 79, +A. 9; I-II, Q. 74, A. 7]; it considers them, in so far as it +contemplates Divine things in themselves, and it consults them, in so +far as it judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs human +acts according to Divine rules. + +Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also +practical. + +Reply Obj. 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of +things to which it extends, as stated in _De Causis,_ prop. x, xvii. +Wherefore from the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more excellent +than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more +intimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to +direct us not only in contemplation but also in action. + +Reply Obj. 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in +themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are +the subject-matter of human actions. + +Reply Obj. 3: A thing is considered in itself before being compared +with something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all +contemplation which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards +the direction of human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from +the direction of wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in +human acts; on the contrary the result of wisdom is to make the +bitter sweet, and labor a rest. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 4] + +Whether Wisdom Can Be Without Grace, and with Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom can be without grace and with +mortal sin. For saints glory chiefly in such things as are +incompatible with mortal sin, according to 2 Cor. 1:12: "Our glory is +this, the testimony of our conscience." Now one ought not to glory in +one's wisdom, according to Jer. 9:23: "Let not the wise man glory in +his wisdom." Therefore wisdom can be without grace and with mortal +sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of Divine things, as stated +above (A. 1). Now one in mortal sin may have knowledge of the Divine +truth, according to Rom. 1:18: "(Those men that) detain the truth of +God in injustice." Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of +charity: "Nothing surpasses this gift of God, it is this alone that +divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of +eternal perdition." But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it +does not divide the children of the kingdom from the children of +perdition. Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter +into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins." + +_I answer that,_ The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as +stated above (A. 1), enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or +of other things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain +connaturalness or union with Divine things, which is the effect of +charity, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 23, A. 5). Hence the wisdom of +which we are speaking presupposes charity. Now charity is +incompatible with mortal sin, as shown above (Q. 24, A. 12). +Therefore it follows that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot +be together with mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: These words are to be understood as referring to +worldly wisdom, or to wisdom in Divine things acquired through human +reasons. In such wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov. +30:2: "The wisdom of men is not with Me": But they do glory in Divine +wisdom according to 1 Cor. 1:30: "(Who) of God is made unto us +wisdom." + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers, not the wisdom of which we +speak but that which is acquired by the study and research of reason, +and is compatible with mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although wisdom is distinct from charity, it +presupposes it, and for that very reason divides the children of +perdition from the children of the kingdom. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 5] + +Whether Wisdom Is in All Who Have Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in all who have grace. +For it is more to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. Now it is only for +the perfect to hear wisdom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: "We speak wisdom +among the perfect." Since then not all who have grace are perfect, it +seems that much less all who have grace have wisdom. + +Obj. 2: Further, "The wise man sets things in order," as the +Philosopher states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is written (James 3:17) +that the wise man "judges without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom +that is from above . . . is . . . without judging, without +dissimulation']". Now it is not for all that have grace, to judge, or +put others in order, but only for those in authority. Therefore +wisdom is not in all that have grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, "Wisdom is a remedy against folly," as Gregory says +(Moral. ii, 49). Now many that have grace are naturally foolish, for +instance madmen who are baptized or those who without being guilty of +mortal sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all that +have grace. + +_On the contrary,_ Whoever is without mortal sin, is beloved of God; +since he has charity, whereby he loves God, and God loves them that +love Him (Prov. 8:17). Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that "God loveth +none but him that dwelleth with wisdom." Therefore wisdom is in all +those who have charity and are without mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ The wisdom of which we are speaking, as stated above +(A. 4), denotes a certain rectitude of judgment in the contemplation +and consultation of Divine things, and as to both of these men obtain +various degrees of wisdom through union with Divine things. For the +measure of right judgment attained by some, whether in the +contemplation of Divine things or in directing human affairs +according to Divine rules, is no more than suffices for their +salvation. This measure is wanting to none who is without mortal sin +through having sanctifying grace, since if nature does not fail in +necessaries, much less does grace fail: wherefore it is written (1 +John 2:27): "(His) unction teacheth you of all things." + +Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of wisdom, both as +to the contemplation of Divine things (by both knowing more exalted +mysteries and being able to impart this knowledge to others) and as to +the direction of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being +able to direct not only themselves but also others according to those +rules). This degree of wisdom is not common to all that have +sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces, which +the Holy Ghost dispenses as He will, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: "To one +indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom," etc. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks there of wisdom, as extending +to the hidden mysteries of Divine things, as indeed he says himself (2 +Cor. 1:7): "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is +hidden." + +Reply Obj. 2: Although it belongs to those alone who are in +authority to direct and judge other men, yet every man is competent to +direct and judge his own actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad +Demophil.). + +Reply Obj. 3: Baptized idiots, like little children, have the +habit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not +the act, on account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of +reason in them. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 6] + +Whether the Seventh Beatitude Corresponds to the Gift of Wisdom? + +Objection 1: It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond +to the gift of wisdom. For the seventh beatitude is: "Blessed are the +peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Now both +these things belong to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps. +118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy law," and, as the +Apostle says (Rom. 5:5), "the charity of God is poured forth in our +hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," and Who is "the Spirit +of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]" (Rom. 8:15). +Therefore the seventh beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity +rather than to wisdom. + +Obj. 2: Further, a thing is declared by its proximate effect rather +than by its remote effect. Now the proximate effect of wisdom seems +to be charity, according to Wis. 7:27: "Through nations she conveyeth +herself into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and prophets": +whereas peace and the adoption of sons seem to be remote effects, +since they result from charity, as stated above (Q. 29, A. 3). +Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be determined +in respect of the love of charity rather than in respect of peace. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (James 3:17): "The wisdom, that is +from above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy to +be persuaded, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits, +judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'without judging, without +dissimulation']." Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom +should not refer to peace rather than to the other effects of +heavenly wisdom. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) that +"wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in whom there is no movement of +rebellion, but only obedience to reason." + +_I answer that,_ The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the +gift of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward. The merit +is denoted in the words, "Blessed are the peacemakers." Now a +peacemaker is one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others: +and in both cases this is the result of setting in due order those +things in which peace is established, for "peace is the tranquillity +of order," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). Now it +belongs to wisdom to set things in order, as the Philosopher declares +(Metaph. i, 2), wherefore peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to +wisdom. The reward is expressed in the words, "they shall be called +the children of God." Now men are called the children of God in so +far as they participate in the likeness of the only-begotten and +natural Son of God, according to Rom. 8:29, "Whom He foreknew . . . +to be made conformable to the image of His Son," Who is Wisdom +Begotten. Hence by participating in the gift of wisdom, man attains +to the sonship of God. + +Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it belongs to +wisdom to make peace by setting things in order. Likewise the Holy +Ghost is called the "Spirit of adoption" in so far as we receive from +Him the likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten Wisdom. + +Reply Obj. 2: These words refer to the Uncreated Wisdom, which in the +first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and +consequently reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is +infused wisdom. Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the +cause but the effect of charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 3) it belongs to wisdom, as a gift, +not only to contemplate Divine things, but also to regulate human +acts. Now the first thing to be effected in this direction of human +acts is the removal of evils opposed to wisdom: wherefore fear is +said to be "the beginning of wisdom," because it makes us shun evil, +while the last thing is like an end, whereby all things are reduced +to their right order; and it is this that constitutes peace. Hence +James said with reason that "the wisdom that is from above" (and this +is the gift of the Holy Ghost) "first indeed is chaste," because it +avoids the corruption of sin, and "then peaceable," wherein lies the +ultimate effect of wisdom, for which reason peace is numbered among +the beatitudes. As to the things that follow, they declare in +becoming order the means whereby wisdom leads to peace. For when a +man, by chastity, avoids the corruption of sin, the first thing he +has to do is, as far as he can, to be moderate in all things, and in +this respect wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly, in those matters +in which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be guided by the +advice of others, and as to this we are told further that wisdom is +"easy to be persuaded." These two are conditions required that man +may be at peace with himself. But in order that man may be at peace +with others it is furthermore required, first that he should not be +opposed to their good; this is what is meant by "consenting to the +good." Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor's deficiencies, +sympathy in his heart, and succor in his actions, and this is denoted +by the words "full of mercy and good fruits." Thirdly, he should +strive in all charity to correct the sins of others, and this is +indicated by the words "judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The +wisdom that is from above . . . is . . . without judging, without +dissimulation'," lest he should purpose to sate his hatred under +cover of correction. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 46 + +OF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM +(In Three Articles) + +We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this +head there are three points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom? + +(2) Whether folly is a sin? + +(3) To which capital sin is it reducible? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 46, Art. 1] + +Whether Folly Is Contrary to Wisdom? + +Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For +seemingly unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not +seem to be the same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about +Divine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine and human +things. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom. + +Obj. 2: Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the other. +But folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1 Cor. +3:18): "If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him +become a fool, that he may be wise." Therefore folly is not opposed +to wisdom. + +Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But +wisdom is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jer. 10:14): "Every +man is become a fool for knowledge," and wisdom is a kind of +knowledge. Moreover, it is written (Isa. 47:10): "Thy wisdom and thy +knowledge, this hath deceived thee." Now it belongs to folly to be +deceived. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom. + +Obj. 4: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that "a +fool is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is +unconcerned when he is injured." But this pertains to spiritual +wisdom, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not +opposed to wisdom. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of +wisdom is given as a remedy against folly." + +_I answer that,_ _Stultitia (Folly)_ seems to take its name from +_stupor;_ wherefore Isidore says (loc. cit.): "A fool is one who +through dullness (_stuporem_) remains unmoved." And folly differs +from fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that +folly implies apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while +fatuity denotes entire privation of the spiritual sense. Therefore +folly is fittingly opposed to wisdom. + +For "sapiens" (_wise_) as Isidore says (Etym. x) "is so named from +_sapor_ (savor), because just as the taste is quick to distinguish +between savors of meats, so is a wise man in discerning things and +causes." Wherefore it is manifest that _folly_ is opposed to _wisdom_ +as its contrary, while _fatuity_ is opposed to it as a pure negation: +since the fatuous man lacks the sense of judgment, while the fool has +the sense, though dulled, whereas the wise man has the sense acute +and penetrating. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to Isidore (Etym. x), "unwisdom is contrary +to wisdom because it lacks the savor of discretion and sense"; so +that unwisdom is seemingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear +to be a fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that +judgment, which is according to the highest cause, for if a man fails +in judgment about some trivial matter, he is not for that reason +called a fool. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as there is an evil wisdom, as stated above (Q. +45, A. 1, ad 1), called "worldly wisdom," because it takes for the +highest cause and last end some worldly good, so too there is a good +folly opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly +things: and it is of this folly that the Apostle speaks. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is the wisdom of the world that deceives and makes +us foolish in God's sight, as is evident from the Apostle's words (1 +Cor. 3:19). + +Reply Obj. 4: To be unconcerned when one is injured is sometimes due +to the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but only for +heavenly things. Hence this belongs not to worldly but to Divine +wisdom, as Gregory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it is +the result of a man's being simply stupid about everything, as may be +seen in idiots, who do not discern what is injurious to them, and +this belongs to folly simply. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 2] + +Whether Folly Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not a sin. For no sin arises +in us from nature. But some are fools naturally. Therefore folly is +not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Every sin is voluntary," according to Augustine (De +Vera Relig. xiv). But folly is not voluntary. Therefore it is not a +sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine precept. But folly +is not contrary to any precept. Therefore folly is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 1:32): "The prosperity of +fools shall destroy them." But no man is destroyed save for sin. +Therefore folly is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ Folly, as stated above (A. 1), denotes dullness of +sense in judging, and chiefly as regards the highest cause, which is +the last end and the sovereign good. Now a man may in this respect +contract dullness in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural +indisposition, as in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no +sin. Secondly, by plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his +sense is rendered incapable of perceiving Divine things, according to +1 Cor. 2:14, "The sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of +the Spirit of God," even as sweet things have no savor for a man +whose taste is infected with an evil humor: and such like folly is a +sin. + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: Though no man wishes to be a fool, yet he wishes those +things of which folly is a consequence, viz. to withdraw his sense +from spiritual things and to plunge it into earthly things. The same +thing happens in regard to other sins; for the lustful man desires +pleasure, without which there is no sin, although he does not desire +sin simply, for he would wish to enjoy the pleasure without sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Folly is opposed to the precepts about the +contemplation of truth, of which we have spoken above (Q. 16) when +we were treating of knowledge and understanding. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 46, Art. 3] + +Whether Folly Is a Daughter of Lust? + +Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not a daughter of lust. For +Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the daughters of lust, among +which however he makes no mention of folly. Therefore folly does not +proceed from lust. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:19): "The wisdom of this +world is foolishness with God." Now, according to Gregory (Moral. x, +29) "the wisdom of this world consists in covering the heart with +crafty devices;" and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a +daughter of duplicity rather than of lust. + +Obj. 3: Further, anger especially is the cause of fury and madness in +some persons; and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises from +anger rather than from lust. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 7:22): "Immediately he +followeth her," i.e. the harlot . . . "not knowing that he is drawn +like a fool to bonds." + +_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 2), folly, in so far as it is +a sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be +incapable of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is plunged +into earthly things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of +pleasures; and these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore +the folly which is a sin, arises chiefly from lust. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is part of folly that a man should have a distaste +for God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust, +pertaining to folly, namely, "hatred of God" and "despair of the life +to come"; thus he divides folly into two parts as it were. + +Reply Obj. 2: These words of the Apostle are to be understood, not +causally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is +folly with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to +worldly wisdom, is a cause of this folly. + +Reply Obj. 3: Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 48, AA. 2, 3, 4), produces a great change in the nature +of the body, wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which +results from a bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is +caused by a spiritual impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged into +earthly things, arises chiefly from lust, as stated above. +_______________________ + +TREATISE ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (QQ. 47-170) +_______________________ + +QUESTION 47 + +OF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF +(In Sixteen Articles) + +After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence +consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider +prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding +gift; fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning +prudence. + +Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason? + +(2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also +in the speculative reason? + +(3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars? + +(4) Whether it is virtue? + +(5) Whether it is a special virtue? + +(6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues? + +(7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues? + +(8) Whether its proper act is command? + +(9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence? + +(10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many? + +(11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same +in species as that which regards the common good? + +(12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers? + +(13) Whether prudence is in the wicked? + +(14) Whether prudence is in all good men? + +(15) Whether prudence is in us naturally? + +(16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 1] + +Whether Prudence Is in the Cognitive or in the Appetitive Faculty? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but +in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv): +"Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and +those that hinder." Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the +appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty. + +Obj. 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs +to prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the +appetitive faculty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1). Therefore +prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art it +is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case +of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse." Now the moral virtues, +of which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas +art is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather +than in the rational faculty. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): "Prudence is +the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid." + +_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who +sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the +event of uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but +to the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence +belongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, +because by the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and +offers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future +from knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to prudence, +belongs properly to the reason, because this is done by a process of +comparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is +in the reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4) the will moves all the +faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty +is love, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Accordingly +prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as +love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say +that "prudence is love discerning aright that which helps from that +which hinders us in tending to God." Now love is said to discern +because it moves the reason to discern. + +Reply Obj. 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as +they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at +the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence +considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end. +Now of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in +the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs +more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, +5, 7, 9) that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as choice +presupposes counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been +already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also +be ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence +directs the choice by means of counsel. + +Reply Obj. 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely, +but in its application to action, which is the end of the practical +reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to +prudence, since, the end being of most import in everything, it +follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst of all. +Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is +"something more than a merely rational habit," such as art is, since, +as stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4) it includes application to +action, which application is an act of the will. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 2] + +Whether Prudence Belongs to the Practical Reason Alone or Also to +the Speculative Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the +practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written +(Prov. 10:23): "Wisdom is prudence to a man." Now wisdom consists +chiefly in contemplation. Therefore prudence does also. + +Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is +concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of +fuller knowledge." Now this belongs to the speculative reason. +Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same +part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical +but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore +prudence also is both practical and speculative. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence +is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the +practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only. + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a +prudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now +counsel is about things that we have to do in relation to some end: +and the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the +practical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in +the practical reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 45, AA. 1, 3), wisdom considers the +absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest +cause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in +the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all +human life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For the +Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for +the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be +prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare, +so he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is +said to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is +wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is +not about the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good, +and this is not the best thing of all. And so it is stated +significantly that "prudence is wisdom for man," but not wisdom +absolutely. + +Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the +word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether +speculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act +itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a +matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently +comes under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards +its specification in relation to its object which is the "necessary +true," it comes under neither counsel nor prudence. + +Reply Obj. 3: Every application of right reason in the work of +production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the +application of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those +wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in +_Ethic._ iii, 3. Since then, the speculative reason makes things such +as syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process follows +certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is +possible to have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so +we find such a thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative +prudence. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 3] + +Whether Prudence Takes Cognizance of Singulars? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of +singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). +But "reason deals with universals," according to _Phys._ i, 5. +Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals. + +Obj. 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason +cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence +which is right reason, is not about singulars. + +Obj. 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is +not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are +devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of +singulars. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence +does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of +singulars also." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), to prudence belongs +not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to +action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can +conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the +thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now +actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the +prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the +singulars about which actions are concerned. + +Reply Obj. 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals, +and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases: +hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also +particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to +matter, as stated in _De Anima_ iii. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot +be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are uncertain" +(Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of +singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, +and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does +not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects, +but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and +experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not +mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its +princip[al] subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind +of application it extends to this sense. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 4] + +Whether Prudence Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For +Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of +what to desire and what to avoid." Now science is condivided with +virtue, as appears in the _Predicaments_ (vi). Therefore prudence is +not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a +virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore +art is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written +(2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort +of graving, and to devise ingeniously (_prudenter_) all that there +may be need of in the work." Therefore prudence is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is +immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): "Set bounds +to thy prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence, +temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 56, A. 1) +when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which +makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." Now good may +be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing +that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, +under the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power. +Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, without +regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature +of a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say, +to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the +aspect of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the +rectitude of the appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because +they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in +other words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of +good. + +Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3) to +apply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right +appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the +other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues +have it, among which virtues it is enumerated. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for +any kind of right reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, +because art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in +order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a +virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing +to do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a +particular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet, +by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in +matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the +uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for +counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as +stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3. + +Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence +itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on +other things according to prudence. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 5] + +Whether Prudence Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For +no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general, +since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that +follows a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as +a wise man decides." Now right reason is reason in accordance with +prudence, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a +special virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the +effect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that +of prudence, right action as regards the means." Now in every virtue +certain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore +prudence is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But prudence +has not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to action" +(Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore +prudence is not a special virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is distinct from and numbered among the other +virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and +prudence, justice and fortitude." + +_I answer that,_ Since acts and habits take their species from their +objects, as shown above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 2; Q. 54, A. 2), +any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from +other objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good +habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special, +not merely according to the consideration of its matter, but rather +according to its formal aspect, as explained above (I-II, Q. 54, A. +2, ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the subject matter of the +acts of different habits, and also of different powers, according to +its different formal aspects. Now a yet greater difference of object +is requisite for a difference of powers than for a difference of +habits, since several habits are found in the same power, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 1). Consequently any difference in the aspect +of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will _a fortiori_ +require a difference of habits. + +Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as +stated above (A. 2), it is differentiated from the other intellectual +virtues by a material difference of objects. _Wisdom,_ _knowledge_ +and _understanding_ are about necessary things, whereas _art_ and +_prudence_ are about contingent things, art being concerned with +_things made,_ that is, with things produced in external matter, such +as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with +_things done,_ that is, with things that have their being in the doer +himself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4). On the other hand +prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a +formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power, +wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral +virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue, +distinct from all other virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of +moral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an +intellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in +common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral +virtue is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the +aspect of virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument proves that prudence helps all the +virtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove +that it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus +from containing a species which is operative in every other species +of that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies. + +Reply Obj. 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so +far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true: +but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are +the object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 6] + +Whether Prudence Appoints the End to Moral Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral +virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in +the appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral +virtue, as reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the +appetitive power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral +virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but +he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts +of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to +irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures, +according to _Polit._ i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are +directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is "right reason +applied to action," as stated above (A. 2). Therefore all actions are +directed to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the +end to all moral virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is +concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are +concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral +virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral +virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while +prudence ensures the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not +belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to +regulate the means. + +_I answer that,_ The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good +of the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius +declares (Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of +necessity pre-exist in the reason. + +Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things +naturally known, about which is _understanding,_ and certain things +of which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about +which is _science,_ so in the practical reason, certain things +pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of +the moral virtues, since the end is in practical matters what +principles are in speculative matters, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 7, +ad 2; I-II, Q. 13, A. 3); while certain things are in the practical +reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather +from the ends themselves. About these is prudence, which applies +universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical +matters. Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the +end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means. + +Reply Obj. 1: Natural reason known by the name of _synderesis_ +appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above (I, Q. 79, A. 12): +but prudence does not do this for the reason given above. + +This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they +appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is +appointed by natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence, +which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it +follows that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and +moves them: yet _synderesis_ moves prudence, just as the +understanding of principles moves science. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 7] + +Whether It Belongs to Prudence to Find the Mean in Moral Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to +find the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is +the end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to +moral virtues, as shown above (A. 6). Therefore it does not find the +mean in them. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have +no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to +have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs +to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as +shown above (A. 5, Obj. 1). Therefore prudence does not cause the +mean in moral virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral +virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as +Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a +second nature in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not +appoint the mean to moral virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ In the foregoing definition of moral virtue +(A. 5, Obj. 1) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by +reason . . . even as a wise man decides." + +_I answer that,_ The proper end of each moral virtue consists +precisely in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends +that man should not stray from reason for the sake of his +concupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right +judgment of reason through fear or daring. Moreover this end is +appointed to man according to natural reason, since natural reason +dictates to each one that he should act according to reason. + +But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and +by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For +though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet +this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are +directed to the end. + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in +matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to +belong to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and +operations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong +to virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends +to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in +all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of +nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this +purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 8] + +Whether Command Is the Chief Act of Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of +prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine +(De Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid +ambushes." Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the +prudent man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to +command" seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been +said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 6). Therefore command is not the chief +act of prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to +rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other +powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the +reason. Therefore command is not an act of prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that +"prudence commands." + +_I answer that,_ Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as +stated above (A. 2). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in +regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there +are three such acts. The first is _to take counsel,_ which belongs to +discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above (I-II, +Q. 14, A. 1). The second act is _to judge of what one has +discovered,_ and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the +practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its +third act is _to command,_ which act consists in applying to action +the things counselled and judged. And since this act approaches +nearer to the end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the +chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence. + +In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists +in judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily +against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so +involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment, +and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the +reverse in prudence, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 5, for it is more +imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the +chief act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily. + +Reply Obj. 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good +and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the +avoidance of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an +act of prudence that does not continue in heaven. + +Reply Obj. 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good things +discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to +prudence which takes good counsel. + +Reply Obj. 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes +motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of +the reason, as stated above (I-II, Q. 17, A. 1). +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 9] + +Whether Solicitude Belongs to Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that solicitude does not belong to +prudence. For solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says +(Etym. x) that "a solicitous man is a restless man." Now motion +belongs chiefly to the appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does +also. But prudence is not in the appetitive power, but in the reason, +as stated above (A. 1). Therefore solicitude does not belong to +prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to solicitude, +wherefore it is related (1 Kings 9:20) that Samuel said to Saul: "As +for the asses which were lost three days ago, be not solicitous, +because they are found." Now the certainty of truth belongs to +prudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is +in opposition to prudence rather than belonging to it. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the "magnanimous +man is slow and leisurely." Now slowness is contrary to solicitude. +Since then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for "good is not +opposed to good," as stated in the _Predicaments_ (viii) it would +seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 4:7): "Be prudent . . . and +watch in prayers." But watchfulness is the same as solicitude. +Therefore solicitude belongs to prudence. + +_I answer that,_ According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be +solicitous through being shrewd (_solers_) and alert (_citus_), in so +far as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to +do whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief +act is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in +matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that +"one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in +taking counsel." Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to +prudence, and for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) +that "prudence keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we +be deceived unawares by evil counsel." + +Reply Obj. 1: Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to the +principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction and +command of reason, wherein solicitude consists. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "equal +certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter +according to its proper mode." And since the matter of prudence is +the contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty +of prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude. + +Reply Obj. 3: The magnanimous man is said to be "slow and leisurely" +not because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not +over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where +he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for +over-much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since +fear makes us take counsel, as stated above (I-II, Q. 44, A. 2) when +we were treating of the passion of fear. +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 10] + +Whether Solicitude Belongs to Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not extend to the +governing of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the +Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common +good is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore +prudence is not directed to the common good. + +Obj. 2: Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for +himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their own. +Therefore they are not prudent. + +Obj. 3: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance +and fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only +to a man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou, +is a faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath +appointed over his family?" + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some +have held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only +to the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man +is not bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is +opposed to charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13:5): +wherefore the Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): "Not seeking +that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be +saved." Moreover it is contrary to right reason, which judges the +common good to be better than the good of the individual. + +Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, +and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is +evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the +individual, but also the common good of the multitude. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now +just as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is +called "legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the +common good is called "political" prudence, for the latter stands in +the same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to +moral virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in +consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the +individual good is impossible without the common good of the family, +state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict. +Memor. iv, 6] of the ancient Romans that "they would rather be poor +in a rich empire than rich in a poor empire." Secondly, because, +since man is a part of the home and state, he must needs consider +what is good for him by being prudent about the good of the many. For +the good disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole; +thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that "any part which does not +harmonize with its whole, is offensive." + +Reply Obj. 3: Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the +common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as +stated in _Ethic._ v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, +since these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the +universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars. +_______________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 11] + +Whether Prudence About One's Own Good Is Specifically the Same As +That Which Extends to the Common Good? + +Objection 1: It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same +specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the +Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and +prudence are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same." + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue is +the same in a good man and in a good ruler." Now political prudence +is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were. +Since then prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence +and political prudence are the same habit. + +Obj. 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by +things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular good, +which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the +common good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence +and political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially. + +_On the contrary,_ "Political prudence," which is directed to the +common good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things +as relate to the common good of the household or family, and +"monastic economy" which is concerned with things affecting the good +of one person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner +there are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above +differences of matter. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5; Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), the +species of habits differ according to the difference of object +considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things +directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above +(I-II, Prolog.; Q. 102, A. 1), wherefore the species of habits differ +by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the +good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are +different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of +prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is +"prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good; +another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of +the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the +common good of the state or kingdom. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is +substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is +the same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This +is called "prudence" in respect of the common notion of prudence, +i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is called +"political," as being directed to the common good. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it +belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well," +wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good +ruler. Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs +specifically, even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated +by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2). + +Reply Obj. 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the +other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits +directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically +although their ends are subordinate to one another. In like manner, +though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the +many, that does not prevent this difference from making the habits +differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed +to the last end is above the other habits and commands them. +_______________________ + +TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 12] + +Whether Prudence Is in Subjects, or Only in Their Rulers? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only +in their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that +"prudence alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues +are common to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is +not a virtue but a true opinion." + +Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in _Polit._ i, 5 that "a slave is not +competent to take counsel." But prudence makes a man take good +counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or +subjects. + +Obj. 3: Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above (A. 8). +But command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only +of rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are +two kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and +belongs to rulers, while the other "retains the common name +political," and is about "individual actions." Now it belongs also to +subjects to perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is +not only in rulers but also in subjects. + +_I answer that,_ Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing +belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to +reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and +governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the +slave as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to +be ruled and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a +slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject. + +Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share +in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately +competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is +in the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but +in the subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft." + +Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood +strictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as +such. + +Reply Obj. 2: A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as +he is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he +does take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal. + +Reply Obj. 3: By prudence a man commands not only others, but also +himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers. +_______________________ + +THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 13] + +Whether Prudence Can Be in Sinners? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For +our Lord said (Luke 16:8): "The children of this world are more +prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of +light." Now the children of this world are sinners. Therefore there +be prudence in sinners. + +Obj. 2: Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But +there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence also. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vi, 7, "we say that to be of +good counsel is the work of prudent man especially." Now many sinners +can take good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it +is impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good." Now no sinner +is a good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent. + +_I answer that,_ Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, +which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a +prudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be +done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are +fitting for an evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he +takes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man +is called "a good robber," and in this way may speak of "a prudent +robber," by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of +committing robbery. This is the prudence of which the Apostle says +(Rom. 8:6): "The prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is death," +because, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of the +flesh. + +The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises +fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a +twofold source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is +not the common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; +thus when a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of +sailing a ship, he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent +sailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as +when a man takes counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even +about things concerning life as a whole, but fails to make an +effective command. + +The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel, +judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole +life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in +sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while +imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that +which is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since +that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is +only in the wicked. + +Reply Obj. 1: This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the +first prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent +absolutely, but that they are prudent in "their generation." + +Reply Obj. 2: The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the +appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the +other hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First +because its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such +ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue, +which rectify the appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there +is no prudence, as shown above (I-II, Q. 58, A. 5); secondly because +prudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless the +appetite be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object is +more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is +more opposed to sin, which arises from a disorder of the appetite. + +Reply Obj. 3: Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for +some particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for +the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel +into effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good +only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12) +there is "cleverness," [*_deinotike_] i.e. natural diligence which +may be directed to both good and evil; or "cunning," [*_panourgia_] +which is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be +"false prudence" or "prudence of the flesh." +_______________________ + +FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 14] + +Whether Prudence Is in All Who Have Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace. +Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to +be done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore +not all who have grace have prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as +stated above (A. 8, Obj. 2; A. 13, Obj. 3). Yet many have grace who do +not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others. +Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young +people are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace. +Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace. + +_On the contrary,_ No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man +can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) +that "the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect +prudently what they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have +grace have prudence. + +_I answer that,_ The virtues must needs be connected together, so that +whoever has one has all, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Now + whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the +other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above +(A. 4), he must, of necessity, have prudence also. + +Reply Obj. 1: Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient +with regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is +given to all who have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things" +(1 John 2:27). There is also another diligence which is more than +sufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself +and for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also +in all things relating to human life; and such diligence as this is +not in all who have grace. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those who require to be guided by the counsel of +others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves +in this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and +can discern good from evil counsel. + +Reply Obj. 3: Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of +acts, wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic. +ii, 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act. +On the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion. +Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the +use of reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even +as in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it +is also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This +by practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the +other virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong meat is +for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to +the discerning of good and evil." +_______________________ + +FIFTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 15] + +Whether Prudence Is in Us by Nature? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The +Philosopher says that things connected with prudence "seem to be +natural," namely "synesis, gnome" [*_synesis_ and _gnome_, Cf. I-II, +Q. 57, A. 6] and the like, but not those which are connected with +speculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the +same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature. + +Obj. 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now +prudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: "In the ancient is +wisdom, and in length of days prudence." Therefore prudence is +natural. + +Obj. 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than +with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain +natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De +Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that +"intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it +therefore demands experience and time." Now prudence is an +intellectual virtue, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore prudence is in +us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience. + +_I answer that,_ As shown above (A. 3), prudence includes knowledge +both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which +prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards +the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of +speculative science, because the primary universal principles of +either are known naturally, as shown above (A. 6): except that the +common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the +Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the +speculative reason is better than that which is according to man": +whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the +speculative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from +nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through +teaching. + +On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are +the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because +this matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now +the right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a +natural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated +above (I-II, Q. 51, A. 1; Q. 63, A. 1) that some, from a natural +inclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to right +ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment +about such like ends. + +But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, +are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and +affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to +something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man +naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man +has a greater aptitude than another in discerning them, just as it +happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since +then prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated +above (A. 6; I-II, Q. 57, A. 5), it follows that prudence is not from +nature. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to +prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had +said before (Ethic. vi, 5, 11) that "they are the principles of the +_ou heneka_" [*Literally, 'for the sake of which' (are the means)], +namely, the end; and so he does not mention _euboulia_ among them, +because it takes counsel about the means. + +Reply Obj. 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their +natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but +also because of their long experience. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining +an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species +act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his +reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently +extends to an infinity of singulars. +_______________________ + +SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 16] + +Whether Prudence Can Be Lost Through Forgetfulness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through +forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is +more certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of +action. But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is +prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same +things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now +the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of +many memories," as he states at the beginning of his _Metaphysics_ +(i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems +that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. + +Obj. 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of +universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through +forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that +"forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence." + +_I answer that,_ Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one +can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because +they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge +alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above +(A. 8), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies +the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. +Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but +rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. +vi, 5) that "pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence": +wherefore it is written (Dan. 13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and +lust hath subverted thy heart," and (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt thou +take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: 'wise']." + +Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the +latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten. + +Reply Obj. 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison +fails, as stated above [*Cf. I-II, Q. 53, A. 1]. + +Reply Obj. 2: The experience required by prudence results not from +memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright. + +Reply Obj. 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of +universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (A. 3). +Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the +principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 48 + +OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE +(In One Article) + +We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are +four points of inquiry: + +(1) Which are the parts of prudence? + +(2) Of its integral parts; + +(3) Of its subjective parts; + +(4) Of its potential parts. +_______________________ + +ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 48, Art.] + +Whether Three Parts of Prudence Are Fittingly Assigned? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned +unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of +prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight." +Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus +ascribes to prudence six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding," +"circumspection," "foresight," "docility" and "caution." Aristotle +says (Ethic. vi, 9, 10, 11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and +"gnome" belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he +mentions "conjecture," "shrewdness," "sense" and "understanding." And +another Greek philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q. 80, Obj. 4] says that +ten things are connected with prudence, namely, "good counsel," +"shrewdness," "foresight," "regnative [*Regnativa]," "military," +"political" and "domestic prudence," "dialectics," "rhetoric" and +"physics." Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is +either excessive or deficient. + +Obj. 2: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But +politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences. Therefore +they are not parts of prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the +intellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility, +belong not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits. +Therefore they should not be set down as parts of prudence. + +Obj. 4: Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts +of the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above (I-II, Q. +16, A. 1). Therefore, just as "eubulia" which refers to counsel, is +connected with prudence, and "synesis" and "gnome" which refer to +judgment, so also ought something to have been assigned corresponding +to use. + +Obj. 5: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above (Q. +47, A. 9). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among +the parts of prudence. + +_I answer that,_ Parts are of three kinds, namely, _integral,_ as +wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; _subjective,_ as ox +and lion are parts of animal; and _potential,_ as the nutritive and +sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be +assigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral +parts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of +a virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of +all the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of +prudence, namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with the addition of +a seventh, viz. _memory_ mentioned by Tully; and _eustochia_ or +_shrewdness_ mentioned by Aristotle. For the _sense_ of prudence is +also called _understanding_: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. +vi, 11): "Of such things one needs to have the sense, and this is +understanding." Of these eight, five belong to prudence as a +cognitive virtue, namely, _memory, reasoning, understanding, +_docility_ and _shrewdness:_ while the three others belong thereto, +as commanding and applying knowledge to action, namely, _foresight, +circumspection_ and _caution._ The reason of their difference is seen +from the fact that three things may be observed in reference to +knowledge. In the first place, knowledge itself, which, if it be of +the past, is called _memory,_ if of the present, whether contingent +or necessary, is called _understanding_ or _intelligence._ Secondly, +the acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to +which pertains _docility,_ or by _discovery,_ and to this belongs to +_eustochia_, i.e. "a happy conjecture," of which _shrewdness_ is a +part, which is a "quick conjecture of the middle term," as stated in +Poster. i, 9. Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed +from things known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this +belongs to _reasoning._ And the reason, in order to command aright, +requires to have three conditions. First, to order that which is +befitting the end, and this belongs to _foresight;_ secondly, to +attend to the circumstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs +to _circumspection;_ thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to +_caution._ + +The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way +the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence +whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a +multitude, which differ specifically as stated above (Q. 47, A. 11). +Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into +various species according to the various kinds of multitude. There is +the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose; +thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that +governs this is called _military._ There is also the multitude that +is united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a +home or family, and this is ruled by _domestic prudence_: and such +again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of +which is _regnative prudence_ in the ruler, and _political prudence,_ +simply so called, in the subjects. + +If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also +speculative knowledge, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 2) then its +parts include _dialectics,_ _rhetoric_ and _physics,_ according to +three methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the +attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to _physics_ (if +physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The +second method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises, +and this belongs to _dialectics._ The third method is to employ +conjectures in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade +somewhat, and this belongs to _rhetoric._ It may be said, however, +that these three belong also to prudence properly so called, since it +argues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes from +probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures. + +The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it, +which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, +as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the +parts of prudence are _good counsel,_ which concerns counsel, +_synesis,_ which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence, +and _gnome,_ which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the +law: while _prudence_ is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding. + +Reply Obj. 1: The various enumerations differ, either because +different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is +mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another +enumeration. Thus Tully includes "caution" and "circumspection" under +"foresight," and "reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under +"understanding." + +Reply Obj. 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as +sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply +may be gathered from what has been said. + +Reply Obj. 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by +taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with +things pertaining to prudence. + +Reply Obj. 4: Right command and right use always go together, because +the reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of the +lower powers, which pertain to use. + +Reply Obj. 5: Solicitude is included under foresight. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 49 + +OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under +this head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Memory; + +(2) Understanding or Intelligence; + +(3) Docility; + +(4) Shrewdness; + +(5) Reason; + +(6) Foresight; + +(7) Circumspection; + +(8) Caution. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 1] + +Whether Memory Is a Part of Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For +memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the +sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part +(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience, +whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part +of prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards +future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated +in _Ethic._ vi, 2, 7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory +among the parts of prudence. + +_I answer that,_ Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as +stated above (Q. 47, A. 5). Now in such like matters a man can be +directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, +but by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles +must be proportionate to their conclusions, and "like must be +concluded from like" (Ethic. vi [*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need +experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases: +wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual +virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time." Now +experience is the result of many memories as stated in _Metaph._ i, +1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence +memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6), prudence applies +universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence +many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for +prudence, and memory is one of them. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while +its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says +in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16, 24], memory not +only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence. + +There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when +a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet +somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us +more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the +mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we +were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these +illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions +easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some +corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on +sensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive +part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his +memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may +pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says +(De Memor. et Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to +us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other." +Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to +remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less +it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric +[*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the figures +of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we +wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that +"reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria +ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing +frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one +thing to another by a kind of natural order. + +Reply Obj. 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future +from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to +take good counsel for the future. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 2] + +Whether Understanding* Is a Part of Prudence? +[*Otherwise intuition; Aristotle's word is _nous_] + +Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of +prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part +of the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding +and prudence, according to _Ethic._ vi, 3. Therefore understanding +should not be reckoned a part of prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the +Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (Q. 8, AA. 1, +8). But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what +has been said above (Q. 4, A. 8; I-II, Q. 62, A. 2). Therefore +understanding does not pertain to prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic. +vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and +immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not +a part of prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts +"intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, +8] mentions "understanding," which comes to the same. + +_I answer that,_ Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual +power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is +taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first +principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds +from certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every +process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. +Therefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole +process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding. +Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence. + +Reply Obj. 1: The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a +conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated +above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6), it applies the knowledge of some universal +principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a +singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must +proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of +universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is an +intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative +principles, but also practical universal principles, such as "One +should do evil to no man," as shown above (Q. 47, A. 6). The other +understanding, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 11, is cognizant of an +extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent practical +matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the +syllogism of prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6). Now this +primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place. +Wherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right +estimate of some particular end. + +Reply Obj. 2: The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is +a quick insight into divine things, as shown above (Q. 8, AA. 1, 2). +It is in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as +stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The right estimate about a particular end is called +both "understanding," in so far as its object is a principle, and +"sense," in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the +Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we +need to have the sense, and this is understanding." But this is to be +understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know +proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a +particular. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 3] + +Whether Docility Should Be Accounted a Part of Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that docility should not be accounted a +part of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every +intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But +docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it +should not be accounted a part of prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our +power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are +praised or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this +is befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it +is not a part of prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since +it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are also +called "preceptors." Therefore docility is not a part of prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the +opinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 1; Q. 47, A. 3) prudence +is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such +matters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all +sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of +time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of +being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a +sane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the +Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "It is right to pay no less +attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such +persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to +their demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into +principles." Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not on thy own +prudence," and (Ecclus. 6:35): "Stand in the multitude of the +ancients" (i.e. the old men), "that are wise, and join thyself from +thy heart to their wisdom." Now it is a mark of docility to be ready +to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part +of prudence. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although docility is useful for every intellectual +virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given +above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for +other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for +much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must +carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings +of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor +despising them through pride. + +Reply Obj. 3: By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but +also for himself, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 12, ad 3). Hence as +stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for +prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned should +be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether +self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 4] + +Whether Shrewdness Is Part of Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence. +For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for +demonstrations, as stated in _Poster._ i, 34. Now the reasoning of +prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies. +Therefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to +_Ethic._ vi, 5, 7, 9. Now there is no place in good counsel for +shrewdness [*Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of +_eustochia_, i.e. "a happy conjecture": for the latter is +"unreasoning and rapid," whereas counsel needs to be slow, as stated +in _Ethic._ vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be accounted a +part of prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, shrewdness as stated above (Q. 48) is a "happy +conjecture." Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of +conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to +prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one +who is shrewd and alert (_solers citus_)." But solicitude belongs to +prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore shrewdness does +also. + +_I answer that,_ Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters +of action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, +both in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it +oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility +consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from +another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right +estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for _eustochia_, +of which it is a part. For _eustochia_ is a happy conjecture about +any matter, while shrewdness is "an easy and rapid conjecture in +finding the middle term" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the +philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q. 48, Obj. 1] who calls shrewdness a +part of prudence, takes it for _eustochia_, in general, hence he +says: "Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered +rapidly." + +Reply Obj. 1: Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the +middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical +syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends +they are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher +says (Poster. i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9) +to prove that _euboulia_, i.e. good counsel, is not _eustochia_, +which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a +man may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, +and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in +taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for +instance, something has to be done without warning. It is for this +reason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence. + +Reply Obj. 3: Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters, +wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric +and prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the +sense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable +to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 5] + +Whether Reason Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part +of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof. +But prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). +Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned +a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be +reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason +is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom +and science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason +should not be reckoned a part of prudence + +Obj. 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from +the intelligence, as stated above (I, Q. 79, A. 8). If therefore +intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add +reason. + +_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the +opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence. + +_I answer that,_ The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as +stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from +certain things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore +it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And +since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called +requisite or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason +should be numbered among these parts. + +Reply Obj. 1: Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its +good use. + +Reply Obj. 2: The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet +the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those +things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need +for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as +do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of +action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of +things intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less +certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are +nevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there +is no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in +_Ethic._ iii, 3. Hence, although in certain other intellectual +virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above +all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly +apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and +uncertain. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although intelligence and reason are not different +powers, yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence +takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth [*Cf. +II-II, Q. 8, A. 1], while reason is so called from being inquisitive +and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as explained +above (A. 2; Q. 47, A. 2, 3). +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 6] + +Whether Foresight* Should Be Accounted a Part of Prudence? +[*"Providentia," which may be translated either "providence" or +"foresight."] + +Objection 1: It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a +part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems +to be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), +"a prudent man is one who sees from afar (_porro videns_)": and this +is also the derivation of _providentia_ (foresight), according to +Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of +prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be +also speculative, because _seeing,_ whence we have the word "to +foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore +foresight is not a part of prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its +secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these +seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not +part of prudence. + +On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who +number foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above (Q. 48). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 1, ad 2, AA. 6, 13), +prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work +is to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things +are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet +nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters +of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has +become a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be +undone. In like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, +since it is necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits. + +Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by +man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of +these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the +notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present +has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence. + +Reply Obj. 1: Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of +them must needs be the principal to which all the others are +subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and +predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the +principal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is +required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular +thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very +name of prudence is taken from foresight (_providentia_) as from its +principal part. + +Reply Obj. 2: Speculation is about universal and necessary things, +which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and +always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know +them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but +only to practical matters. + +Reply Obj. 3: Right order to an end which is included in the notion +of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command, +without which no right order to the end is possible. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 7] + +Whether Circumspection Can Be a Part of Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of +prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's +surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be +considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore +circumspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral +virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote +nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection +apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see +things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant +things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part +of prudence in addition to foresight. + +On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above (Q. +48). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), it belongs to prudence +chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done +aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable. + +Since, however, prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 3) is about +singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of +circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable +to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, +by reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of +love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to +arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise +in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence +the need of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means +with the circumstances. + +Reply Obj. 1: Though the number of possible circumstances be +infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment +of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few +in number. + +Reply Obj. 2: Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because +prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of +moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing +of circumstances. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that +which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to +circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view +of the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its +own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 8] + +Whether Caution Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part +of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. +Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. +Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which +directs the virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same +faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now +it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to +avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of +prudence, distinct from foresight. + +Obj. 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no +man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore +caution does not belong to prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk +cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']." + +_I answer that,_ The things with which prudence is concerned, are +contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with +true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety +of these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, +and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs +caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on +our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of +acts of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the +opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different +in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both +belong to the one virtue of prudence. + +Reply Obj. 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of +frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against +them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether, +or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and +by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be +grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them, +although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the +surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 50 + +OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE +(In Four Articles) + +We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence. +And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man +rules himself (Q. 47, seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species +of prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are +four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative? + +(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of +prudence? + +(4) Whether military prudence is? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 1] + +Whether a Species of Prudence Is Regnative? + +Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a +species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the +preservation of justice, since according to _Ethic._ v, 6 the prince +is the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to +justice rather than to prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a +kingdom (_regnum_) is one of six species of government. But no +species of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of +government, which are "aristocracy," "polity," also called +"timocracy" [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and +"democracy." Therefore neither should a regnative species be ascribed +to a kingdom. + +Obj. 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to +certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according +to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a +part of prudence to be "legislative." Therefore it is not becoming to +substitute regnative prudence in its place. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that +"prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince." Therefore a +special kind of prudence is regnative. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, AA. 8, 10), it belongs to +prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we +find a special kind of governance and command, there must be a +special kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special +and perfect kind of governance in one who has to govern not only +himself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because +a government is the more perfect according as it is more universal, +extends to more matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in +its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged +with the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species +of prudence is reckoned to be regnative. + +Reply Obj. 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to +prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with +prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated +above (Q. 47, A. 5, ad 1; I-II, Q. 58, A. 2, ad 4). For this reason +also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the +common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance +of prudence. Hence these two virtues--prudence and justice--belong +most properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign +and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the +earth." Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and +execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species +of prudence which is directive, rather than to justice which is +executive. + +Reply Obj. 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in +_Ethic._ viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be +denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under +regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse +forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not +pertain to prudence. + +Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the +principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this +applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as +they have a share of kingly government. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 2] + +Whether Political Prudence Is Fittingly Accounted a Part of Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly +accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political +prudence, as stated above (A. 1). But a part should not be reckoned a +species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should not be +reckoned a part of prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their +various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as +what the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as +regards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence +distinct from regnative prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each +individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence +commonly so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of +prudence called political. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the +prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a +master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the +common name political, and deals with individuals." + +_I answer that,_ A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his +ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate +beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and +inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves +in motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of +their own actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not +in their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, +men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the +commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their +free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required +in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their +superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is +called political. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species +of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of +regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence, +even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence +of a thing retains the name of "proper." + +Reply Obj. 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the +species of a habit, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 5). Now the same +actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, +as by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various +departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political +prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft. + +Reply Obj. 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in +relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we +speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 3] + +Whether a Part of Prudence Should Be Reckoned to Be Domestic? + +Objection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a +part of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) +"prudence is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic +prudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to +_Ethic._ i, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic. + +Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13) prudence is only in +good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people, +since many sinners are provident in governing their household. +Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of +prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject, +so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political +is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to +regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither +should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there +are various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one +of which is domestic, another legislative, and another political." + +_I answer that,_ Different aspects of an object, in respect of +universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality, +diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act +of virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident +that a household is a mean between the individual and the city or +kingdom, since just as the individual is part of the household, so is +the household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as +prudence commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct +from political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from +both. + +Reply Obj. 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as +its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in _Polit. i, 3. On the +other hand, the end of political prudence is "a good life in general" +as regards the conduct of the household. In _Ethic._ i, 1 the +Philosopher speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way +of example and in accordance with the opinion of many. + +Reply Obj. 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters +of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in +regard to "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the +household, for which above all a virtuous life is required. + +Reply Obj. 3: The father has in his household an authority +like that of a king, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 10, but he has not the +full power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a +distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 4] + +Whether Military Prudence Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be +reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art, +according to _Ethic._ vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the +art of warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). +Therefore military prudence should not be accounted a species of +prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as military business is contained under +political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of +tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of +prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither +therefore should any be assigned to military business. + +Obj. 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in +warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather +than to prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 24:6): "War is managed by due +ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels." +Now it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great +need in warfare for that species of prudence which is called +"military." + +_I answer that,_ Whatever things are done according to art or reason, +should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with +nature, and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a +twofold tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to +withstand outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she +has provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby +they are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but +also with the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an +assailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance +with reason, there should be not only "political" prudence, which +disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common +good, but also a "military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are +repelled. + +Reply Obj. 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has +certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as +arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, +it belongs rather to prudence. + +Reply Obj. 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the profit +of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the +service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of the +entire common good. + +Reply Obj. 3: The execution of military service belongs to fortitude, +but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the +commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 51 + +OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE +(In Four Articles) + +In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with +prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head +there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether _euboulia_ is a virtue? + +(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence? + +(3) Whether _synesis_ is a special virtue? + +(4) Whether _gnome_ is a special virtue? + +[*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of +deliberating well (_euboulia_), of judging well according to common +law (_synesis_), and of judging well according to general law +(_gnome_), respectively.] +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 1] + +Whether _Euboulia_ Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that _euboulia_ is not a virtue. For, +according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19) "no man makes evil +use of virtue." Now some make evil use of _euboulia_ or good counsel, +either through devising crafty counsels in order to achieve evil +ends, or through committing sin in order that they may achieve good +ends, as those who rob that they may give alms. Therefore _euboulia_ +is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to _Phys._ vii. +But _euboulia_ is concerned with counsel, which implies doubt and +research, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore _euboulia_ +is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 65). Now _euboulia_ is not connected with the other +virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly men are +slow in taking counsel. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) +_euboulia_ "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of virtue +consists in right reason. Therefore _euboulia_ is a virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 4) the nature of a human +virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of +man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a +research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and +whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man, +as stated in _Ethic._ x. But _euboulia_ signifies goodness of +counsel, for it is derived from the _eu_, good, and _boule_, counsel, +being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good +counsel." Hence it is evident that _euboulia_ is a human virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an +evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even +as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in +coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from +false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence +both the aforesaid processes are contrary to _euboulia,_ as the +Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9). + +Reply Obj. 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does +not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies +perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his +parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which +counsel is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive +appetite, which are still more imperfect. + +It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to +the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with +certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which +are contingent. + +Reply Obj. 3: In no sinner as such is _euboulia_ to be found: since +all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good counsel requires +not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also +other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be neither +too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking +counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due +circumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the +other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things +which are directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not +take good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in +matters of trade, or warfare, or the like. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 2] + +Whether _Euboulia_ Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue +from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the +"prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel." Now this +belongs to _euboulia_ as stated above. Therefore _euboulia_ is not +distinct from prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are +specified chiefly by their end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. +18, AA. 4, 6). Now _euboulia_ and prudence are directed to the same +end, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 9, not indeed to some particular end, +but to the common end of all life. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a +distinct virtue from prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision +belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to +the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to +_euboulia,_ while decision belongs to prudence. There _euboulia_ is +not a distinct virtue from prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ Prudence is preceptive, according to _Ethic._ vi, +10. But this does not apply to _euboulia_. Therefore _euboulia_ is a +distinct virtue from prudence. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), virtue is properly directed +to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ +according to different acts, especially when there is a different +kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same +kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the +goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all +these belong to the same virtue of charity. + +Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor +have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different +causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good +command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another. +Consequently _euboulia_ which makes man take good counsel must needs +be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. And +since counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal, +so _euboulia_ is directed to prudence as to a principal virtue, +without which it would be no virtue at all, even as neither are the +moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by +commanding it, to _euboulia_ by eliciting it. + +Reply Obj. 2: Different acts are directed in different degrees to the +one end which is "a good life in general" [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for +counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The +last named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the +other two acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have +certain proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the +discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty. +Hence this proves not that _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue from +prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a +principal virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even in speculative matters the rational science of +dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct +from demonstrative science, which decides the truth. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 3] + +Whether _Synesis_ Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that _synesis_ is not a virtue. Virtues +are not in us by nature, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1. But _synesis_ +is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11). +Therefore _synesis_ is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), _synesis_ is +nothing but "a faculty of judging." But judgment without command can +be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it +seems that _synesis_ is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be +a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for +it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore _synesis_ be +reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is +no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and +consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable. +Therefore _synesis_ is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But +_euboulia_, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is +_synesis_ a virtue, as being good judgment. + +_I answer that,_ _synesis_ signifies a right judgment, not indeed +about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters, +about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of +_synesis_ are said to be _synetoi,_ i.e. "persons of sense," or +_eusynetoi,_ i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand, +those who lack this virtue are called _asynetoi,_ i.e. "senseless." + +Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must +correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of +counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause, +for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to +judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at +research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing +to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of +imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such +persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in +the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the +common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need, +besides _euboulia_, for another virtue, which judges well, and this +is called _synesis._ + +Reply Obj. 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power +apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the +right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well +disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are, +whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted +and misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to +receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to +nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift +of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the +cognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with +distorted, but with true and correct ideas: this belongs to _synesis_ +which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly, +through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result +being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a +good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but +this judgment is about the ends, whereas _synesis_ is rather about +the means. + +Reply Obj. 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a +universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the +particular matter of action, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13). + +Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or +execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which +judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal +virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 4] + +Whether _Gnome_ Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that _gnome_ is not a special virtue +distinct from _synesis._ For a man is said, in respect of _synesis,_ +to have good judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment, +unless he judge aright in all things. Therefore _synesis_ extends to +all matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of +good judgment called _gnome._ + +Obj. 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now +there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. _euboulia,_ and only +one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there is only +one virtue of good judgment, viz. _synesis._ + +Obj. 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart +from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and +with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 5. +Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore +there is no intellectual virtue about such matters. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that +_gnome_ is a special virtue. + +_I answer that_ cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower +principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher +principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from +it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident +that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is +sometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus +monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active +seminal force, and yet they come under the order of a higher +principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine +Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one could +not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is +possible if we consider Divine Providence. + +Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not +covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of +the enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back +his deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to +judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common +laws, according to which _synesis_ judges: and corresponding to such +higher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of +judgment, which is called _gnome,_ and which denotes a certain +discrimination in judgment. + +Reply Obj. 1: _Synesis_ judges rightly about all actions that are +covered by the common rules: but certain things have to be judged +beside these common rules, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper +principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common +principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which +aims at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration +which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence +_euboulia_ to which the research of counsel belongs is one for all, +but not so _synesis_ whose act is judicial. Command considers in all +matters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one. + +Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all +things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand, +among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of +such things by his reason: this belongs to _gnome,_ which denotes a +certain discrimination in judgment. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 52 + +OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to +prudence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the +Holy Ghost? + +(2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence? + +(3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven? + +(4) Whether the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," etc. +corresponds to the gift of counsel? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 1] + +Whether Counsel Should Be Reckoned Among the Gifts of the Holy Ghost? + +Objection 1: It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among +the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as +a help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for +the purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the +virtue of prudence, or even of _euboulia_, as is evident from what +has been said (Q. 47, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 51, AA. 1, 2). Therefore counsel +should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 2: Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy +Ghost and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are not +given to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the gifts +of the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But +counsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy +Ghost specially to certain persons, according to 1 Macc. 2:65: +"Behold . . . your brother Simon is a man of counsel." Therefore +counsel should be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than +among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Rom. 8:14): "Whosoever are led by the +Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." But counselling is not +consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the +Holy Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who "have received +the spirit of adoption of sons," it would seem that counsel should +not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): "(The Spirit of the +Lord) shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of +fortitude." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), the gifts of +the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable +to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according +to the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature +through time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but +not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22). +Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the +research of reason to perform any particular action, and this +research is called counsel. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the +rational creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned +among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 1: Prudence or _euboulia_, whether acquired or infused, +directs man in the research of counsel according to principles that +the reason can grasp; hence prudence or _euboulia_ makes man take +good counsel either for himself or for another. Since, however, human +reason is unable to grasp the singular and contingent things which +may occur, the result is that "the thoughts of mortal men are +fearful, and our counsels uncertain" (Wis. 9:14). Hence in the +research of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who +comprehends all things: and this is done through the gift of counsel, +whereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human +affairs, those who are unable to take counsel for themselves, seek +counsel from those who are wiser. + +Reply Obj. 2: That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel +others, may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be +counselled by God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for +salvation is common to all holy persons. + +Reply Obj. 3: The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost +according to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which +is the "faculty of will and reason" [*Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly +the gift of counsel is befitting the children of God in so far as the +reason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 2] + +Whether the Gift of Counsel Corresponds to the Virtue of Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not +fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest +point of that which is underneath touches that which is above," as +Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact +with the angel in respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are +inferior to the gifts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Since, +then, counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, while command +is its highest act, and judgment comes between, it seems that the +gift corresponding to prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of +judgment or command. + +Obj. 2: Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the +higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in _De Causis._ Now +prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only +speculative but also practical, as shown above (Q. 9, A. 3). +Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of +prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated +above (Q. 47, A. 8). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that man +should be directed by God, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the gift +of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ The gift of counsel is about what has to be done +for the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. +Therefore they correspond to one another. + +_I answer that,_ A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and +is perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, +as a body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the +rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a +lower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the +supreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which +denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through +being ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift +of counsel, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the gift of counsel +corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it. + +Reply Obj. 1: To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved, +but to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost, +the position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a +mover, as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), it follows that it +would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence by the +name of command or judgment rather than of counsel whereby it is +possible to signify that the counselled mind is moved by another +counselling it. + +Reply Obj. 2: The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to +prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by a kind of +extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel +corresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the +same things. + +Reply Obj. 3: The mover that is moved, moves through being moved. +Hence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by the +Holy Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 3] + +Whether the Gift of Counsel Remains in Heaven? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain +in heaven. For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of +an end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an +end, since there man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of +counsel is not in heaven. + +Obj. 2: Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take +counsel in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes +(Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there +is no counsel in heaven. + +Obj. 3: Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God, +according to 1 John 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to +Him." But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Rom. 11:34, +"Who hath been His counsellor?" Therefore neither to the saints in +heaven is the gift of counsel becoming. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): "When either the +guilt or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate +of the heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have +won in the conflict, or not to have won." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2; I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), the gifts +of the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational +creature by God. Now we must observe two points concerning the motion +of the human mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which +is moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition when +it is in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover is the principle +of the movement alone, when the movement ceases, the action of the +mover ceases as regards the thing moved, since it has already reached +the term of movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases +being built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover is +cause not only of the movement, but also of the form to which the +movement tends, then the action of the mover does not cease even +after the form has been attained: thus the sun lightens the air even +after it is lightened. In this way, then, God causes in us virtue and +knowledge, not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as +we persevere in them: and it is thus that God causes in the blessed a +knowledge of what is to be done, not as though they were ignorant, +but by continuing that knowledge in them. + +Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or +men, do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but +concern the government of things according to Divine Providence. As +regards these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God +moves the mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the +wayfarer, in another. For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in +matters of action, by soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt; +whereas there is simple nescience in the mind of the blessed as +regards the things they do not know. From this nescience the angel's +mind is cleansed, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does +there precede in them any research of doubt, for they simply turn to +God; and this is to take counsel of God, for as Augustine says (Gen. +ad lit. v, 19) "the angels take counsel of God about things beneath +them": wherefore the instruction which they receive from God in such +matters is called "counsel." + +Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God +preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them +in their nescience of what has to be done. + +Reply Obj. 1: Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an end, +or resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such as +the acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which +they themselves have attained, for example the ministrations of the +angels, and the prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of +counsel finds a place in them. + +Reply Obj. 2: Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state +of life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven. Even so +neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as +on the way thither. + +Reply Obj. 3: Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving it: +and the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the +source whence they receive. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 4] + +Whether the Fifth Beatitude, Which Is That of Mercy, Corresponds to +the Gift of Counsel? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of +mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the +beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 69, A. 1). +Now we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the +fifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other to counsel. + +Obj. 2: Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for +salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not +necessary for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation, +according to James 2:13, "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not +done mercy." On the other hand poverty is not necessary for +salvation, but belongs to the life of perfection, according to Matt. +19:21. Therefore the beatitude of poverty corresponds to the gift of +counsel, rather than to the beatitude of mercy. + +Obj. 3: Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they +denote a certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of +virtue. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as +appears from Gal. 5:22, 23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of +mercy correspond to the gift of counsel. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): "Counsel is +befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered +from evils so great, to pardon, and to give." + +_I answer that,_ Counsel is properly about things useful for an end. +Hence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all +correspond to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1 +Tim. 4:8, "Godliness [*_Pietas,_ whence our English word _pity,_ +which is the same as mercy; see note on II-II, Q. 30, A. 1] is +profitable to all things." Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially +corresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing +mercy. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although counsel directs in all the acts of +virtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason +given above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost +guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life +whether they be necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work +of mercy is necessary for salvation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the +ultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an +action which is the end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical +knowledge is numbered among the fruits, but only such things as +pertain to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among +these we find "goodness" and "benignity" which correspond to mercy. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 53 + +OF IMPRUDENCE +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine +says (Contra Julian. iv, 3): "There are vices opposed to every +virtue, not only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as +temerity is opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of +kinship and not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in +opposition to prudence we have craftiness." + +Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in +evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a +defect either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for +prudence, and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to +prudence, those namely which are due to abuse of the things required +for prudence. And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of +these considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of +negligence which is opposed to solicitude. + +Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is a special sin? + +(3) Of precipitation or temerity; + +(4) Of thoughtlessness; + +(5) Of inconstancy; + +(6) Concerning the origin of these vices. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 1] + +Whether Imprudence Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every +sin is voluntary, according to Augustine [*De Vera Relig. xiv]; +whereas imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be +imprudent. Therefore imprudence is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, none but original sin comes to man with his birth. +But imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young are +imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to +original justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But +imprudence is not taken away by repentance. Therefore imprudence is +not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away +save by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence, according to Prov. +21:20, "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of +the just, and the imprudent [Douay: 'foolish'] man shall spend it." +Therefore imprudence is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first, as a +privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly speaking it is not taken +as a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for +this can be without any sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes +lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this +sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man's negligence in striving +to have prudence. + +Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act +of reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, whereas the +right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man +despises counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions which +require consideration in the act of prudence. In this way imprudence +is a sin in respect of prudence considered under its proper aspect, +since it is not possible for a man to act against prudence, except by +infringing the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends. +Wherefore, if this should happen through aversion from the Divine +Law, it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately +through contempt and rejection of the Divine teaching: whereas if he +act beside the Law and without contempt, and without detriment to +things necessary for salvation, it will be a venial sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but the +rash man wills the act of imprudence, because he wishes to act +precipitately. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "he who +sins willingly against prudence is less to be commended." + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes imprudence in the negative sense. +It must be observed however that lack of prudence or of any other +virtue is included in the lack of original justice which perfected +the entire soul. Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed +to original sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus the lack +of this prudence ceases; but acquired prudence is not restored as to +the habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly +speaking the sin of imprudence consists. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 2] + +Whether Imprudence Is a Special Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For +whoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But +imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above (A. +1). Therefore imprudence is not a special sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge +is. But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of +the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be +reckoned among those causes. + +Obj. 3: Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances +of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil results +from each single defect." Now many things are requisite for prudence; +for instance, reason, intelligence, docility, and so on, as stated +above (QQ. 48, 49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence, +so that it is not a special sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above +(A. 1). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is +one special vice. + +_I answer that,_ A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways; +first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all +sins; secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices, +which are its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be +general on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated +of all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as +neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with +special acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by +participation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just +as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs +them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no +sin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason, +which defect belongs to imprudence. + +If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in +some particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin, +then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in +three ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of +prudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the +individual, from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above +(Q. 48; Q. 50, A. 7), so also we distinguish various kinds of +imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of +prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the +several acts of reason. Thus, by defect of "counsel" to which +_euboulia_ corresponds, "precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of +imprudence; by defect of "judgment," to which _synesis_ (judging well +according to common law) and _gnome_ (judging well according to +general law) refer, there is "thoughtlessness"; while "inconstancy" +and "negligence" correspond to the "command" which is the proper act +of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things +which are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts +of prudence. Since however all these things are intended for the +direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all +the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above. +Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in +"thoughtlessness"; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable +to "precipitation"; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of +shrewdness, belong to "negligence" and "inconstancy." + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers generality by participation. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since knowledge is further removed from morality than +prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows +that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on +account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent +result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes +of sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a +moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a special sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: When various circumstances are corrupted for the +same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same +species of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and +when one ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are +various species: for instance, if one man were to take another's +property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this +would constitute the species called sacrilege, while if another were +to take another's property when he ought not, merely through the lust +of possession, this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack +of those things which are requisite for prudence, does not constitute +a diversity of species, except in so far as they are directed to +different acts of reason, as stated above. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 3] + +Whether Precipitation Is a Sin Included in Imprudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included +in imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence; +whereas precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to +Gregory, who says (Moral. ii, 49) that the gift of "counsel is given +as a remedy to precipitation." Therefore precipitation is not a sin +contained under imprudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now +rashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride. Therefore +precipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste. Now +sin happens in counselling not only through being over hasty but also +through being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes +by, and through corruption of other circumstances, as stated in +_Ethic._ vi, 9. Therefore there is no reason for reckoning +precipitation as a sin contained under imprudence, rather than +slowness, or something else of the kind pertaining to inordinate +counsel. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 4:19): "The way of the wicked +is darksome, they know not where they fall." Now the darksome ways of +ungodliness belong to imprudence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to +fall or to be precipitate. + +_I answer that,_ Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of +the soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is +said to be precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is +brought down from above by the impulse either of its own movement or +of another's, and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit +of the soul is the reason, and the base is reached in the action +performed by the body; while the steps that intervene by which one +ought to descend in orderly fashion are _memory_ of the past, +_intelligence_ of the present, _shrewdness_ in considering the future +outcome, _reasoning_ which compares one thing with another, +_docility_ in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes counsel +descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed into +action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking +these steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then +inordinate counsel pertains to imprudence, it is evident that the +vice of precipitation is contained under imprudence. + +Reply Obj. 1: Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel and +to the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as stated above +(Q. 52, A. 2), and consequently precipitation is opposed to both. + +Reply Obj. 2: Things are said to be done rashly when they are not +directed by reason: and this may happen in two ways; first through +the impulse of the will or of a passion, secondly through contempt of +the directing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly +speaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride, +which refuses to submit to another's ruling. But precipitation refers +to both, so that rashness is contained under precipitation, although +precipitation refers rather to the first. + +Reply Obj. 3: Many things have to be considered in the research of +reason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one +should be slow in taking counsel." Hence precipitation is more +directly opposed to rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for +the latter bears a certain likeness to right counsel. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 4] + +Whether Thoughtlessness Is a Special Sin Included in Imprudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin +included in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to any +sin, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is unspotted"; and +yet it incites us to be thoughtless, according to Matt. 10:19, "Take +no thought how or what to speak." Therefore thoughtlessness is not a +sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to +many things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and +therefore to a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is +contained under thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is +not a special sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason, +viz. _counsel,_ _judgment_ about what has been counselled, and +_command_ [*Cf. Q. 47, A. 8]. Now thought precedes all these acts, +since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore +thoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 4:25): "Let thy eyes look +straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps." Now this +pertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness. +Therefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence. + +_I answer that,_ Thought signifies the act of the intellect in +considering the truth about something. Now just as research belongs +to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in +speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise +judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research +by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles. +Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack +of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, +to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of +those things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore +evident that thoughtlessness is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we +have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the +words quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no +opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or +through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of God +alone, because "as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes +to God," according to 2 Paral. 20:12: else if man, instead of doing +what he can, were to be content with awaiting God's assistance, he +would seem to tempt God. + +Reply Obj. 2: All thought about those things of which counsel takes +cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment, +wherefore this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently +thoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment. + +Reply Obj. 3: Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a +determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things +have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in +speculative matters, because actions are about singulars. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 5] + +Whether Inconstancy Is a Vice Contained Under Imprudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained +under imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of +perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult +matters belongs to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to +fortitude rather than to prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (James 3:16): "Where jealousy [Douay: +'envy'] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil +work." But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains +not to imprudence but to envy. + +Obj. 3: Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to +persevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of +"incontinency" in pleasurable matters, and of "effeminacy" or +"squeamishness" in unpleasant matters, according to _Ethic._ vii, 1. +Therefore inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence. + +_On the contrary,_ It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good +to the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to +imprudence. Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to +imprudence. + +_I answer that,_ Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good +purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, for a +man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account +of something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this +withdrawal completed except through a defect of reason, which is +deceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since +it can resist the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it +is due to its own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has +conceived; hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a +defect in the reason. Now just as all rectitude of the practical +reason belongs in some degree to prudence, so all lack of that +rectitude belongs to imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its +completion, belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitation is due +to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in +the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises from a defect in the act +of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant because his reason +fails in commanding what has been counselled and judged. + +Reply Obj. 1: The good of prudence is shared by all the moral +virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral +virtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater +impulse to the contrary. + +Reply Obj. 2: Envy and anger, which are the source of contention, +cause inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which power the +origin of inconstancy is due, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the +appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers +evil concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows +(which points to a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands +firm, in the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the +persevering man, against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance +seem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason; and to this +power inconstancy pertains also. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 6] + +Whether the Aforesaid Vices Arise from Lust? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from +lust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (A. 5, ad 2). +But envy is a distinct vice from lust. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (James 1:8): "A double-minded man is +inconstant in all his ways." Now duplicity does not seem to pertain +to lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of +covetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the +aforesaid vices do not arise from lust. + +Obj. 3: Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect +of reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than +carnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual +vices rather than from carnal vices. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the +aforesaid vices arise from lust. + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) "pleasure +above all corrupts the estimate of prudence," and chiefly sexual +pleasure which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight. +Now the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue +consists in abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the +aforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical +reason, as stated above (AA. 2, 5), it follows that they arise +chiefly from lust. + +Reply Obj. 1: Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the +reason to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by +destroying the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher +says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "the man who is incontinent through anger +listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent +through lust does not listen to it at all." + +Reply Obj. 2: Duplicity also is something resulting from lust, just +as inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the +mind from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1, +sc. 1) that "love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce." + +Reply Obj. 3: Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the +more as they lead us away from reason. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 54 + +OF NEGLIGENCE +(In Three Articles) + +We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether negligence is a special sin? + +(2) To which virtue is it opposed? + +(3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 1] + +Whether Negligence Is a Special Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For +negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in +every virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special +sin. Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins +neglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in +sin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not +a special sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, every special sin has a determinate matter. But +negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither +about evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence +if he omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done +negligently, they are no longer good. Therefore it seems that +negligence is not a special vice. + +_On the contrary,_ Sins committed through negligence, are +distinguished from those which are committed through contempt. + +_I answer that,_ Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every +lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence +is a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin +according as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain +sins are special through being about a special matter, as lust is +about sexual matters, while some vices are special on account of +their having a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of +matter, and such are all vices affecting an act of reason, since +every act of reason extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then +solicitude is a special act of reason, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9), +it follows that negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a +special sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because +the more we love (_diligimus_) a thing the more solicitous are we +about it. Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for +every virtue, in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every +virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an +act of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence +just as precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of +reason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in +any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the +lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is +found more or less in all sins. + +Reply Obj. 3: Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good +that one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done +negligently, but because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of +goodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through lack of +solicitude, or some due circumstance be omitted. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 2] + +Whether Negligence Is Opposed to Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not opposed to +prudence. For negligence seems to be the same as idleness or +laziness, which belongs to sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, +45). Now sloth is not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated +above (Q. 35, A. 3). Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence. +But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the +executive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to +prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But +negligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is +_precipitation,_ nor a defect of judgment, since that is +_thoughtlessness,_ nor a defect of command, because that is +_inconstancy._ Therefore negligence does not pertain to imprudence. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Eccles. 7:19): "He that feareth God, +neglecteth nothing." But every sin is excluded by the opposite +virtue. Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to +prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): "A babbler and a +fool (_imprudens_) will regard no time." Now this is due to +negligence. Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence. + +_I answer that,_ Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now +solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to +prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to +imprudence. This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore +observes (Etym. x) "a negligent man is one who fails to choose (_nec +eligens_)": and the right choice of the means belongs to prudence. +Therefore negligence pertains to imprudence. + +Reply Obj. 1: Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to +which choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote +slowness of execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in +setting about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the +execution itself. Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from +sloth, which is "an oppressive sorrow," i.e. hindering, the mind from +action [*Cf. Q. 35, A. 1; I-II, Q. 35, A. 8]. + +Reply Obj. 2: Omission regards the external act, for it +consists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is +opposed to justice, and is an effect of negligence, even as the +execution of a just deed is the effect of right reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: Negligence regards the act of command, which +solicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this +act otherwise than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in +commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the +negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will. + +Reply Obj. 4: The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because +according to Prov. 15:27, "by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth +from evil." Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though +negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites +man to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above (I-II, +Q. 44, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions, that "fear makes +us take counsel." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 3] + +Whether Negligence Can Be a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin. +For a gloss of Gregory [*Moral. ix. 34] on Job 9:28, "I feared all my +works," etc. says that "too little love of God aggravates the +former," viz. negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the love +of God is done away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a +mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ecclus. 7:34, "For thy negligences purify +thyself with a few," says: "Though the offering be small it cleanses +the negligences of many sins." Now this would not be, if negligence +were a mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed for +mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice +was prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal +sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 19:16): "He that neglecteth +his own life [Vulg.: 'way'] shall die." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 3), negligence arises out +of a certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of +solicitude on the part of the reason in commanding what it should +command, or as it should command. Accordingly negligence may happen +to be a mortal sin in two ways. First on the part of that which is +omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a +circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin. +Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will be so remiss about +Divine things, as to fall away altogether from the charity of God, +such negligence is a mortal sin, and this is the case chiefly when +negligence is due to contempt. + +But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance +that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial +sin, provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some +lack of fervor, to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First +through lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence +that is a venial sin: secondly through lack of charity itself, in +which sense we say that a man loves God less when he loves Him with a +merely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is a mortal +sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the same authority (gloss), a small +offering made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man +not only from venial but also from mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: When negligence consists in the omission of that which +is necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest +genus of sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions, are +more hidden, wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them +in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public +confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not be confessed in +public. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 55 + +OF VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a +resemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(3) Whether craftiness is a special sin? + +(4) Of guile; + +(5) Of fraud; + +(6) Of solicitude about temporal things; + +(7) Of solicitude about the future; + +(8) Of the origin of these vices. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 1] + +Whether Prudence of the Flesh Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin. +For prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it +governs them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither +therefore is any prudence a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it +is lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, "for no man +ever hated his own flesh" (Eph. 5:29). Therefore prudence of the +flesh is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he +tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or +of the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any +prudence of the flesh be accounted among sins. + +_On the contrary,_ No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness +according to Wis. 14:9, "To God the wicked and his wickedness are +hateful alike." Now it is written (Rom. 8:7): "The prudence [Vulg.: +'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God." Therefore prudence of the +flesh is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 13), prudence regards +things which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence +prudence of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who +looks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is +evident that this is a sin, because it involves a disorder in man +with respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods of +the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 2, A. 5). Therefore prudence of +the flesh is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Justice and temperance include in their very nature +that which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the +curbing of concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense. +On the other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing +(_providendo_), as stated above (Q. 47, A. 1; Q. 49, A. 6), which can +extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken +simply in a good sense, yet, if something be added, it may be taken +in a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to +be a sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on +account of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal +agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the +good of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in +a good of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it +is thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the +flesh. + +Reply Obj. 3: The devil tempts us, not through the good of the +appetible object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence +implies direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "prudence +of the devil," as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is +the aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as +worldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence we speak +of "carnal" and again of "worldly" prudence, according to Luke 16:8, +"The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in +their generation," etc. The Apostle includes all in the "prudence of +the flesh," because we covet the external things of the world on +account of the flesh. + +We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called +"wisdom," as stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1), we may distinguish a +threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation. +Hence it is written (James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is +"earthly, sensual and devilish," as explained above (Q. 45, A. 1, ad +1), when we were treating of wisdom. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 2] + +Whether Prudence of the Flesh Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal +sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since +this implies contempt of God. Now "the prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of +the flesh . . . is not subject to the law of God" (Rom. 8:7). +Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin. +Now prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, +for "it cannot be subject to the law of God" (Rom. 8:7), and so it +seems to be an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against +the Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good, +as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed +to that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore +prudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is +itself a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the +nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining +to the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence, +diminishes sin [*Cf. Prov. 6:30]. Therefore prudence of the flesh has +not of itself the nature of a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1; A. 13), a man is +said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to +the end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to +some particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or +something else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be +taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so +that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the +flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so +doing, since he cannot have several last ends, as stated above (I-II, +Q. 1, A. 5). + +If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as +corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it +happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affection for some +pleasure of the flesh, without turning away from God by a mortal sin; +in which case he does not place the end of his whole life in carnal +pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin +and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers +the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about +one's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no longer prudence +of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh as a means +to an end. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby +a man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and +this is a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the +Holy Ghost. For when it is stated that "it cannot be subject to the +law of God," this does not mean that he who has prudence of the +flesh, cannot be converted and submit to the law of God, but that +carnal prudence itself cannot be subject to God's law, even as +neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that which is +hot may become cold. + +Reply Obj. 3: Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is +shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed +to prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in +some very grave matter. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 3] + +Whether Craftiness Is a Special Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For +the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they +induce us to be crafty, according to Prov. 1:4, "To give craftiness +[Douay: 'subtlety'] to little ones." Therefore craftiness is not a +sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 13:16): "The crafty [Douay: +'prudent'] man doth all things with counsel." Therefore, he does so +either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no +sin seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to +carnal or worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin +distinct from prudence of the flesh. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, "The +simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn," says (Moral. x, 29): +"The wisdom of this world is to hide one's thoughts by artifice, to +conceal one's meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make +out the truth to be false," and further on he adds: "This prudence is +acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by children." Now the +above things seem to belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not +distinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently it seems +not to be a special sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 4:2): "We renounce the +hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor +adulterating the word of God." Therefore craftiness is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ Prudence is _right reason applied to action,_ just +as science is _right reason applied to knowledge._ In speculative +matters one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in +one way when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to +be true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false premises, +that appear to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion. +Even so a sin may be against prudence, through having some +resemblance thereto, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the +reason is directed to an end which is good not in truth but in +appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the flesh; secondly, +when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man +uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and this +belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin opposed +to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as +prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is +craftiness sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of +their mutual resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is +taken in a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in _Ethic._ vi, 12. + +Reply Obj. 2: Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for +an evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false +and counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if +it be directed to a good end. + +Reply Obj. 3: Under "worldly prudence" Gregory included everything +that can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness +also. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 4] + +Whether Guile Is a Sin Pertaining to Craftiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to +craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men. +Yet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Cor. +12:16, "Being crafty I caught you by guile." Therefore guile is not +always a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue, +according to Ps. 5:11, "They dealt deceitfully with their tongues." +Now craftiness like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore +guile does not pertain to craftiness. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:20): "Guile [Douay: +'Deceit'] is in the heart of them that think evil things." But the +thought of evil things does not always pertain to craftiness. +Therefore guile does not seem to belong to craftiness. + +_On the contrary,_ Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to +Eph. 4:14, "By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to +deceive": and guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to +craftiness. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to craftiness to +adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in +order to attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of +such ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as +regards the process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly +to craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end belongs +to prudence. Secondly the adopting of such like ways may be +considered with regard to their actual execution, and in this way it +belongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a certain execution of +craftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense, +and improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the +execution of craftiness. + +Reply Obj. 2: The execution of craftiness with the purpose of +deceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the +chief place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to +another man, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence +guile is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in +deeds, according to Ps. 104:25, "And to deal deceitfully with his +servants." Guile is also in the heart, according to Ecclus. 19:23, +"His interior is full of deceit," but this is to devise deceits, +according to Ps. 37:13: "They studied deceits all the day long." + +Reply Obj. 3: Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs +devise certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part +he devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end. +Nevertheless it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by +violence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult, +it is of less frequent occurrence. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 5] + +Whether Fraud Pertains to Craftiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness. +For a man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be +deceived, which is the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves +praise for allowing himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Cor. 6:1, +"Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore +fraud does not belong to craftiness. + +Obj. 2: Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or +receiving external things, for it is written (Acts 5:1) that "a +certain man named Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of +land, and by fraud kept back part of the price of the land." Now it +pertains to injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain +external things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to +craftiness which is opposed to prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the +frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written (Prov. 1:18) +concerning some "that they practice frauds [Douay: 'deceits'] against +their own souls." Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness. + +_On the contrary,_ The object of fraud is to deceive, according to +Job 13:9, "Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent +[Douay: 'deceitful'] dealings?" Now craftiness is directed to the +same object. Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness. + +_I answer that,_ Just as _guile_ consists in the execution of +craftiness, so also does _fraud._ But they seem to differ in the fact +that _guile_ belongs in general to the execution of craftiness, +whether this be effected by words, or by deeds, whereas _fraud_ +belongs more properly to the execution of craftiness by deeds. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be +deceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of +being deceived, and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud. + +Reply Obj. 2: The execution of craftiness may be carried out +by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and +accordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or +illiberality. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against +themselves or their own souls; it is through God's just judgment that +what they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to +Ps. 7:16, "He is fallen into the hole he made." +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 6] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Be Solicitous About Temporal Matters? + +Objection 1: It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal +matters. Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects, +according to Rom. 12:8, "He that ruleth, with solicitude." Now +according to the Divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things, +according to Ps. 8:8, "Thou hast subjected all things under his +feet," etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things. + +Obj. 2: Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he +works. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things +whereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 3:10): +"If any man will not work, neither let him eat." Therefore it is +lawful to be solicitous about temporal things. + +Obj. 3: Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy, +according to 2 Tim. 1:17, "When he was come to Rome, he carefully +sought me." Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes +connected with works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous +to watch over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore +solicitude about temporal things is not unlawful. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 6:31): "Be not +solicitous . . . saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, +or wherewith shall we be clothed?" And yet such things are very +necessary. + +_I answer that,_ Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain +something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when +there is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when +success is assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may +be unlawful in three ways. First on the part of the object of +solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence +Augustine says (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): "When Our Lord said: 'Be +not solicitous, ' etc. . . . He intended to forbid them either to +make such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do +whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the Gospel." +Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through +too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the +result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which +ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written +(Matt. 13:22) that "the care of this world . . . chokes up the word." +Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack +necessary things if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives +three motives for laying aside this fear. First, on account of the +yet greater favors bestowed by God on man, independently of his +solicitude, viz. his body and soul (Matt. 6:26); secondly, on account +of the care with which God watches over animals and plants without +the assistance of man, according to the requirements of their nature; +thirdly, because of Divine providence, through ignorance of which the +gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all others. +Consequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of all +about spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be granted +us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do. + +Reply Obj. 1: Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use +them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them +and be over solicitous about them. + +Reply Obj. 2: The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily +labor is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on +Matt. 6:31, "Be not solicitous," that "labor is necessary, but +solicitude must be banished," namely superfluous solicitude which +unsettles the mind. + +Reply Obj. 3: In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things +is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, +unless it be superfluous. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 7] + +Whether We Should Be Solicitous About the Future? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we should be solicitous about the +future. For it is written (Prov. 6:6-8): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, +and consider her ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no +guide, nor master . . . provideth her meat for herself in the summer, +and gathereth her food in the harvest." Now this is to be solicitous +about the future. Therefore solicitude about the future is +praiseworthy. + +Obj. 2: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is +chiefly about the future, since its principal part is _foresight of +future things,_ as stated above (Q. 49, A. 6, ad 1). Therefore it is +virtuous to be solicitous about the future. + +Obj. 3: Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for +the morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read (John 12:6) +that Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and +(Acts 4:34-37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which +had been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous +about the future. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 6:34): "Be not . . . +solicitous for tomorrow"; where "tomorrow" stands for the future, as +Jerome says in his commentary on this passage. + +_I answer that,_ No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with +its due circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to +Eccles. 8:6, "There is a time and opportunity for every business"; +which applies not only to external deeds but also to internal +solicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude; +thus solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and +solicitude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly if a +man were solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be +needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging to a future time. +Hence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude, saying: +"Be . . . not solicitous for tomorrow," wherefore He adds, "for the +morrow will be solicitous for itself," that is to say, the morrow +will have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the +soul. This is what He means by adding: "Sufficient for the day is +the evil thereof," namely, the burden of solicitude. + +Reply Obj. 1: The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is +this that is proposed for our example. + +Reply Obj. 2: Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it +would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, if a +man were to seek temporal things, to which the terms "past" and +"future" apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the +needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for +solicitude. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17), +"when we see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these +needful things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the +morrow, since even Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse, +and we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the +necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on account of a +threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not condemn those who +according to human custom, provide themselves with such things, but +those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these things." +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 8] + +Whether These Vices Arise from Covetousness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that these vices do not arise from +covetousness. As stated above (Q. 43, A. 6) lust is the chief cause +of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to +right reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from +lust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that +"Venus is full of guile and her girdle is many colored" and that "he +who is incontinent in desire acts with cunning." + +Obj. 2: Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence, +as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13). Now, since prudence is in the reason, +the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride +and vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride +rather than from covetousness. + +Obj. 3: Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold +of other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of +which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use +of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the +aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a +daughter of covetousness. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3; Q. 47, A. 13), carnal +prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain +resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among +all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason +appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the +undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, +the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices +arise chiefly from covetousness. + +Reply Obj. 1: On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of +concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising +its act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, +albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust. +When the Philosopher says that "Venus is full of guile," he is +referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away +suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means +of craftiness but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and +pleasure; wherefore he adds that "Venus doth cozen the wits of the +wisest man" [*Cf. Iliad xiv, 214-217]. + +Reply Obj. 2: To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to +pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the +Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or +apes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use +of fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from +covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by +excellence. + +Reply Obj. 3: Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with +precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the +aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use +stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from +hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the +Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2, 3) [*Cf. _Ethic._ vii, 6]. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 56 + +OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which +head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) The precepts of prudence; + +(2) The precepts relating to the opposite vices. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 56, Art. 1] + +Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Should Have Included a Precept +of Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue should +have included a precept of prudence. For the chief precepts should +include a precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts are +those of the decalogue. Since then prudence is the chief of the moral +virtues, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have +included a precept of prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, the teaching of the Gospel contains the Law +especially with regard to the precepts of the decalogue. Now the +teaching of the Gospel contains a precept of prudence (Matt. 10:16): +"Be ye . . . prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents." Therefore the +precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. + +Obj. 3: Further, the other lessons of the Old Testament are directed +to the precepts of the decalogue: wherefore it is written (Malach. +4:4): "Remember the law of Moses My servant, which I commanded him in +Horeb." Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include precepts +of prudence; for instance (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not upon thy own +prudence"; and further on (Prov. 4:25): "Let thine eyelids go before +thy steps." Therefore the Law also should have contained a precept of +prudence, especially among the precepts of the decalogue. + +The contrary however appears to anyone who goes through the precepts +of the decalogue. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3; A. 5, ad 1) +when we were treating of precepts, the commandments of the decalogue +being given to the whole people, are a matter of common knowledge to +all, as coming under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost +among the things dictated by natural reason are the ends of human +life, which are to the practical order what naturally known +principles are to the speculative order, as shown above (Q. 47, A. +6). Now prudence is not about the end, but about the means, as stated +above (Q. 47, A. 6). Hence it was not fitting that the precepts of +the decalogue should include a precept relating directly to prudence. +And yet all the precepts of the decalogue are related to prudence, in +so far as it directs all virtuous acts. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although prudence is simply foremost among all the +moral virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its +object under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary +condition for a precept, as stated above (Q. 44, A. 1; I-II, Q. 99, +AA. 1, 5). Hence it behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which are +those of the decalogue, to refer to justice rather than to prudence. + +Reply Obj. 2: The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of +perfection. Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all +matters relating to right conduct, whether ends or means: wherefore +it behooved the Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as the rest of the teaching of the Old Testament +is directed to the precepts of the decalogue as its end, so it +behooved man to be instructed by the subsequent lessons of the Old +Testament about the act of prudence which is directed to the means. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 56, Art. 2] + +Whether the Prohibitive Precepts Relating to the Vices Opposed to +Prudence Are Fittingly Propounded in the Old Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the prohibitive precepts relating to +the vices opposed to prudence are unfittingly propounded in the Old +Law. For such vices as imprudence and its parts which are directly +opposed to prudence are not less opposed thereto, than those which +bear a certain resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and vices +connected with it. Now the latter vices are forbidden in the Law: for +it is written (Lev. 19:13): "Thou shalt not calumniate thy neighbor," +and (Deut. 25:13): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a +greater and a less." Therefore there should have also been +prohibitive precepts about the vices directly opposed to prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further, there is room for fraud in other things than in +buying and selling. Therefore the Law unfittingly forbade fraud +solely in buying and selling. + +Obj. 3: Further, there is the same reason for prescribing an act of +virtue as for prohibiting the act of a contrary vice. But acts of +prudence are not prescribed in the Law. Therefore neither should any +contrary vices have been forbidden in the Law. + +The contrary, however, appears from the precepts of the Law which are +quoted in the first objection. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), justice, above all, regards +the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a +precept, because justice tends to render that which is due to +another, as we shall state further on (Q. 58, A. 2). Now craftiness, +as to its execution, is committed chiefly in matters of justice, as +stated above (Q. 55, A. 8): and so it was fitting that the Law should +contain precepts forbidding the execution of craftiness, in so far as +this pertains to injustice, as when a man uses guile and fraud in +calumniating another or in stealing his goods. + +Reply Obj. 1: Those vices that are manifestly opposed to prudence, do +not pertain to injustice in the same way as the execution of +craftiness, and so they are not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and +guile are, which latter pertain to injustice. + +Reply Obj. 2: All guile and fraud committed in matters of injustice, +can be understood to be forbidden in the prohibition of calumny (Lev. +19:13). Yet fraud and guile are wont to be practiced chiefly in +buying and selling, according to Ecclus. 26:28, "A huckster shall not +be justified from the sins of the lips": and it is for this reason +that the Law contained a special precept forbidding fraudulent buying +and selling. + +Reply Obj. 3: All the precepts of the Law that relate to acts of +justice pertain to the execution of prudence, even as the precepts +prohibitive of stealing, calumny and fraudulent selling pertain to +the execution of craftiness. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 57 + +OF RIGHT +(In Four Articles) + +After considering prudence we must in due sequence consider justice, +the consideration of which will be fourfold: + +(1) Of justice; + +(2) Of its parts; + +(3) Of the corresponding gift; + +(4) Of the precepts relating to justice. + +Four points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2) +Justice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether right is the object of justice? + +(2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive +right? + +(3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right? + +(4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 1] + +Whether Right Is the Object of Justice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that right is not the object of justice. +For the jurist Celsus says [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1] that +"right is the art of goodness and equality." Now art is not the +object of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore +right is not the object of justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Law," according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), "is a kind +of right." Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence, +wherefore the Philosopher [*Ethic. vi, 8] reckons "legislative" as +one of the parts of prudence. Therefore right is not the object of +justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for +Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving +God alone, and consequently governing aright all things subject to +man." Now right (_jus_) does not pertain to Divine things, but only +to human affairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "_fas_ is the +Divine law, and _jus,_ the human law." Therefore right is not the +object of justice. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "_jus_ (right) is +so called because it is just." Now the _just_ is the object of +justice, for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "all are +agreed in giving the name of justice to the habit which makes men +capable of doing just actions." + +_I answer that,_ It is proper to justice, as compared with the other +virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it +denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are +wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for +equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other +hand the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit +him in relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in the +works of the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue +tends as to its proper object, depends on its relation to the agent +only, whereas the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to +the agent, is set up by its relation to others. Because a man's work +is said to be just when it is related to some other by way of some +kind of equality, for instance the payment of the wage due for a +service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as having the +rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act of justice, +without taking into account the way in which it is done by the agent: +whereas in the other virtues nothing is declared to be right unless +it is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason justice has +its own special proper object over and above the other virtues, and +this object is called the just, which is the same as _right._ Hence +it is evident that right is the object of justice. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is usual for words to be distorted from their +original signification so as to mean something else: thus the word +"medicine" was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a +sick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this +is done. In like manner the word _jus_ (right) was first of all used +to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to +designate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further to +denote the place where justice is administered, thus a man is said to +appear _in jure_ [*In English we speak of a court of law, a barrister +at law, etc.], and yet further, we say even that a man, who has the +office of exercising justice, administers the _jus_ even if his +sentence be unjust. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsman +an expression of the things to be made externally by his craft, which +expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists +in the mind an expression of the particular just work which the +reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this +rule be expressed in writing it is called a "law," which according to +Isidore (Etym. v, 1) is "a written decree": and so law is not the +same as right, but an expression of right. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot +offer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a +perfectly just repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not +properly called _jus_ but _fas,_ because, to wit, God is satisfied if +we accomplish what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man +repay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him entirely. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 2] + +Whether Right Is Fittingly Divided into Natural Right and Positive +Right? + +Objection 1: It would seem that right is not fittingly divided into +natural right and positive right. For that which is natural is +unchangeable, and is the same for all. Now nothing of the kind is to +be found in human affairs, since all the rules of human right fail in +certain cases, nor do they obtain force everywhere. Therefore there +is no such thing as natural right. + +Obj. 2: Further, a thing is called "positive" when it proceeds from +the human will. But a thing is not just, simply because it proceeds +from the human will, else a man's will could not be unjust. Since +then the "just" and the "right" are the same, it seems that there is +no positive right. + +Obj. 3: Further, Divine right is not natural right, since it +transcends human nature. In like manner, neither is it positive +right, since it is based not on human, but on Divine authority. +Therefore right is unfittingly divided into natural and positive. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "political +justice is partly natural and partly legal," i.e. established by law. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) the "right" or the "just" is +a work that is adjusted to another person according to some kind of +equality. Now a thing can be adjusted to a man in two ways: first by +its very nature, as when a man gives so much that he may receive +equal value in return, and this is called "natural right." In another +way a thing is adjusted or commensurated to another person, by +agreement, or by common consent, when, to wit, a man deems himself +satisfied, if he receive so much. This can be done in two ways: first +by private agreement, as that which is confirmed by an agreement +between private individuals; secondly, by public agreement, as when +the whole community agrees that something should be deemed as though +it were adjusted and commensurated to another person, or when this is +decreed by the prince who is placed over the people, and acts in its +stead, and this is called "positive right." + +Reply Obj. 1: That which is natural to one whose nature is +unchangeable, must needs be such always and everywhere. But man's +nature is changeable, wherefore that which is natural to man may +sometimes fail. Thus the restitution of a deposit to the depositor is +in accordance with natural equality, and if human nature were always +right, this would always have to be observed; but since it happens +sometimes that man's will is unrighteous there are cases in which a +deposit should not be restored, lest a man of unrighteous will make +evil use of the thing deposited: as when a madman or an enemy of the +common weal demands the return of his weapons. + +Reply Obj. 2: The human will can, by common agreement, make a thing +to be just provided it be not, of itself, contrary to natural +justice, and it is in such matters that positive right has its place. +Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "in the case of the +legal just, it does not matter in the first instance whether it takes +one form or another, it only matters when once it is laid down." If, +however, a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the human +will cannot make it just, for instance by decreeing that it is lawful +to steal or to commit adultery. Hence it is written (Isa. 10:1): "Woe +to them that make wicked laws." + +Reply Obj. 3: The Divine right is that which is promulgated by God. +Such things are partly those that are naturally just, yet their +justice is hidden to man, and partly are made just by God's decree. +Hence also Divine right may be divided in respect of these two +things, even as human right is. For the Divine law commands certain +things because they are good, and forbids others, because they are +evil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others +evil because they are forbidden. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 3] + +Whether the Right of Nations Is the Same As the Natural Right? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the right of nations is the same as +the natural right. For all men do not agree save in that which is +natural to them. Now all men agree in the right of nations; since the +jurist [*Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] "the right of +nations is that which is in use among all nations." Therefore the +right of nations is the natural right. + +Obj. 2: Further, slavery among men is natural, for some are naturally +slaves according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2). Now "slavery +belongs to the right of nations," as Isidore states (Etym. v, 4). +Therefore the right of nations is a natural right. + +Obj. 3: Further, right as stated above (A. 2) is divided into natural +and positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive right, since +all nations never agreed to decree anything by common agreement. +Therefore the right of nations is a natural right. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that "right is either +natural, or civil, or right of nations," and consequently the right +of nations is distinct from natural right. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the natural right or just is +that which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with +another person. Now this may happen in two ways; first, according as +it is considered absolutely: thus a male by [his] very nature is +commensurate with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent +is commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a thing is +naturally commensurate with another person, not according as it is +considered absolutely, but according to something resultant from it, +for instance the possession of property. For if a particular piece of +land be considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should +belong to one man more than to another, but if it be considered in +respect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of +the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one +and not of another man, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. ii, 2). + +Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend +a thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural, is +common to us and other animals according to the first kind of +commensuration. But the right of nations falls short of natural right +in this sense, as the jurist [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] says +because "the latter is common to all animals, while the former is +common to men only." On the other hand to consider a thing by +comparing it with what results from it, is proper to reason, +wherefore this same is natural to man in respect of natural reason +which dictates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i, 1; De +Just. et Jure i, 9): "whatever natural reason decrees among all men, +is observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations." This +suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular +man should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on +natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful +to this man to be ruled by a wiser man, and to the latter to be +helped by the former, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). +Wherefore slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in +the second way, but not in the first. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since natural reason dictates matters which are +according to the right of nations, as implying a proximate equality, +it follows that they need no special institution, for they are +instituted by natural reason itself, as stated by the authority +quoted above. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 4] + +Whether Paternal Right and Right of Dominion Should Be Distinguished +As Special Species? + +Objection 1: It would seem that "paternal right" and "right of +dominion" should not be distinguished as special species. For it +belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, as Ambrose +states (De Offic. i, 24). Now right is the object of justice, as +stated above (A. 1). Therefore right belongs to each one equally; and +we ought not to distinguish the rights of fathers and masters as +distinct species. + +Obj. 2: Further, the law is an expression of what is just, as stated +above (A. 1, ad 2). Now a law looks to the common good of a city or +kingdom, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2), but not to the private +good of an individual or even of one household. Therefore there is no +need for a special right of dominion or paternal right, since the +master and the father pertain to a household, as stated in _Polit._ +i, 2. + +Obj. 3: Further, there are many other differences of degrees among +men, for instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are +princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to +them. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) distinguishes right +of dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct from civil +right. + +_I answer that,_ Right or just depends on commensuration with another +person. Now "another" has a twofold signification. First, it may +denote something that is other simply, as that which is altogether +distinct; as, for example, two men neither of whom is subject to the +other, and both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and +between these according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is the +"just" simply. Secondly a thing is said to be other from something +else, not simply, but as belonging in some way to that something +else: and in this way, as regards human affairs, a son belongs to his +father, since he is part of him somewhat, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, +12, and a slave belongs to his master, because he is his instrument, +as stated in _Polit._ i, 2 [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 11]. Hence a father +is not compared to his son as to another simply, and so between them +there is not the just simply, but a kind of just, called "paternal." +In like manner neither is there the just simply, between master and +servant, but that which is called "dominative." A wife, though she is +something belonging to the husband, since she stands related to him +as to her own body, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 5:28), is +nevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his +father, or a slave from his master: for she is received into a kind +of social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for justice between +husband and wife than between father and son, or master and slave, +because, as husband and wife have an immediate relation to the +community of the household, as stated in _Polit._ i, 2, 5, it follows +that between them there is "domestic justice" rather than "civic." + +Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to justice to render to each one his right, +the distinction between individuals being presupposed: for if a man +gives himself his due, this is not strictly called "just." And since +what belongs to the son is his father's, and what belongs to the +slave is his master's, it follows that properly speaking there is not +justice of father to son, or of master to slave. + +Reply Obj. 2: A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as +such, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man, is +something having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence +in so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards them in +a way: and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the +relations of father to his son, and of a master to his slave; but in +so far as each is something belonging to another, the perfect idea of +"right" or "just" is wanting to them. + +Reply Obj. 3: All other differences between one person and another in +a state, have an immediate relation to the community of the state and +to its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the perfect +sense of justice. This "just" however is distinguished according to +various offices, hence when we speak of "military," or "magisterial," +or "priestly" right, it is not as though such rights fell short of +the simply right, as when we speak of "paternal" right, or right of +"dominion," but for the reason that something proper is due to each +class of person in respect of his particular office. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 58 + +OF JUSTICE +(In Twelve Articles) + +We must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points +of inquiry: + +(1) What is justice? + +(2) Whether justice is always towards another? + +(3) Whether it is a virtue? + +(4) Whether it is in the will as its subject? + +(5) Whether it is a general virtue? + +(6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every +virtue? + +(7) Whether there is a particular justice? + +(8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own? + +(9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only? + +(10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean? + +(11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own? + +(12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 1] + +Whether Justice Is Fittingly Defined As Being the Perpetual and +Constant Will to Render to Each One His Right? + +Objection 1: It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined +justice as being "the perpetual and constant will to render to each +one his right" [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10]. For, according +to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a +man "capable of doing what is just, and of being just in action and +in intention." Now "will" denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore +justice is unfittingly defined as being a will. + +Obj. 2: Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the +will were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is +unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is +rectitude. Therefore justice is not the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore +justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice. + +Obj. 4: Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is +unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say +that it is both "perpetual" and "constant." + +Obj. 5: Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his +right. Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows +that it is in none but the sovereign: which is absurd. + +Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice +is love serving God alone." Therefore it does not render to each one +his right. + +_I answer that,_ The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if +understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the +principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of +the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the +proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our +intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on (A. 2). +Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object +is indicated in the words, "Rendering to each one his right," since, +as Isidore says (Etym. x), "a man is said to be just because he +respects the rights (_jus_) of others." + +Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be +virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the +Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be +virtuous it needs first of all to be done "knowingly," secondly to be +done "by choice," and "for a due end," thirdly to be done +"immovably." Now the first of these is included in the second, since +"what is done through ignorance is involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1). +Hence the definition of justice mentions first the "will," in order +to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is +made afterwards of its "constancy" and "perpetuity" in order to +indicate the firmness of the act. + +Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the +act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from +that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would +reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that +"justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a +constant and perpetual will": and this is about the same definition +as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice +is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions +in accordance with his choice." + +Reply Obj. 1: Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is +customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus +Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that "faith is to believe what +one sees not." + +Reply Obj. 2: Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but +causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will. + +Reply Obj. 3: The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on +the part of the will's act which endures for ever, and thus God's +will alone is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject, +because, to wit, a man wills to do a certain thing always, and this +is a necessary condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the +conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in some +particular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find +a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite that +one should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all +cases. + +Reply Obj. 4: Since "perpetual" does not imply perpetuity of the act +of the will, it is not superfluous to add "constant": for while the +"perpetual will" denotes the purpose of observing justice always, +"constant" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose. + +Reply Obj. 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way +of command and direction, because a judge is the "personification of +justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the +other hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by +way of execution. + +Reply Obj. 6: Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as +stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), so too the service of God includes +rendering to each one his due. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 2] + +Whether Justice Is Always Towards Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not always towards +another. For the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22) that "the justice of God is +by faith of Jesus Christ." Now faith does not concern the dealings of +one man with another. Neither therefore does justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), "it +belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his +authority over the things that are subject to him." Now the sensitive +appetite is subject to man, according to Gen. 4:7, where it is +written: "The lust thereof," viz. of sin, "shall be under thee, and +thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore it belongs to justice to +have dominion over one's own appetite: so that justice is towards +oneself. + +Obj. 3: Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else is +co-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards +another. + +Obj. 4: Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no +less than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are rectified +by justice, according to Prov. 11:5, "The justice of the upright +shall make his way prosperous." Therefore justice is about our +dealings not only with others, but also with ourselves. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of +justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse." +Now this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore +justice is concerned only about our dealings with others. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 57, A. 1) since justice by its +name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, +for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as +it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (Q. 57, +A. 1; I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) this otherness which justice demands must +needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to +supposits [*Cf. I, Q. 29, A. 2] and wholes and, properly speaking, +not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the +hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing +hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed +metaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a +distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards +another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak +metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the +reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so +many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is +said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and +concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to +each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the +Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this "metaphorical justice." + +Reply Obj. 1: The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby +the ungodly is justified: it consists in the due coordination of the +parts of the soul, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) where we were +treating of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to +metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all +by himself. + +This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: God's justice is from eternity in respect of the +eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice +consists); although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since +nothing is co-eternal with God. + +Reply Obj. 4: Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified +by the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues. But +his dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in +relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom +they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special +virtue, and this is justice. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 3] + +Whether Justice Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is +written (Luke 17:10): "When you shall have done all these things that +are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done +that which we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a +virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to a +profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition +of godliness." Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a +virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is +not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious. +But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is +of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous +actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now +those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning +behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher +(Metaph. ix) [*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to +justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems +that justice is not a moral virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire +structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance, +prudence, fortitude and justice. + +_I answer that,_ A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and +man himself good" [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice. +For a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, +which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since +justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders +man's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), +good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he +says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the luster of virtue appears above all +in justice." + +Reply Obj. 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the +person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing +him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what +he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously. +Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom "teacheth +temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such +things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in +life." + +Reply Obj. 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from _constraint,_ and +this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other +arises from the obligation of a _command,_ or from the necessity of +obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of +virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does +not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary +in this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation, +according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to +me, for a necessity lieth upon me." + +Reply Obj. 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not by +making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings +with other men. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 4] + +Whether Justice Is in the Will As Its Subject? + +Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not in the will as its +subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in +the will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will +as its subject. + +Obj. 2: Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it +belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another. +Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is +not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral +virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is +"rational by participation," viz. the irascible and the +concupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore +justice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and +concupiscible. + +_On the contrary,_ Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is +rectitude of the will observed for its own sake." + +_I answer that,_ The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that +virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an +act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through +knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the +intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said +to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate +principle of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in +some appetitive power as its subject. + +Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason +and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension, +and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in +the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Again the act of rendering his due to +each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because +sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider +the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the +reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible +as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic. +v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (A. +1). + +Reply Obj. 1: Since the will is the rational appetite, when the +rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the +will on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains +the name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the +name of truth. + +Reply Obj. 2: The will is borne towards its object consequently on +the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one +thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation +to another, and this belongs to justice. + +Reply Obj. 3: Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are +_rational by participation,_ but the entire _appetitive_ faculty, as +stated in _Ethic._ i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason. +Now the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can +be the subject of moral virtue. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 5] + +Whether Justice Is a General Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For +justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7, +"She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." +Now the "general" is not specified or reckoned together with the +species contained under the same "general." Therefore justice is not +a general virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are +temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is +reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in +any way be reckoned a general virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above +(A. 2). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a +general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against +oneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice +is every virtue." + +_I answer that,_ Justice, as stated above (A. 2) directs man in his +relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as +regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his +relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a +community, serves all those who are included in that community. +Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to +another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are +included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts +to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that +whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the +whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such +virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain +other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which +justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, +in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense +that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the +law to direct to the common good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. +2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, +is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the +law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. + +Reply Obj. 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the other +virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state +further on (AA. 7, 12). + +Reply Obj. 2: Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite, +viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are +appetitive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are +cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the +intellective appetite as its subject, which can have the universal +good as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence +justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude. + +Reply Obj. 3: Things referable to oneself are referable to +another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal +justice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a +general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general +sin; hence it is written (1 John 3:4) that all "sin is iniquity." +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 6] + +Whether Justice, As a General Virtue, Is Essentially the Same As All +Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is +essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. +v, 1) that "virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but +differ in their mode of being." Now things that differ merely in +their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore +justice is essentially the same as every virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all +virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to +the Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but the whole of +virtue." Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as +all virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that +virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of +temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be +directed to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the +acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the +common good of the multitude, which transcends the good of one single +individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all +virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of +the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without +use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be +so. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that +does not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good; +and so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all +virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are +able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable +to be virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2) +that "the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the +virtue of the good citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is +general justice, whereby a man is directed to the common good. +Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and +it is possible to have one without the other. + +_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First, +by _predication:_ thus "animal" is general in relation to man and +horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must +needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it +is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of +the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is +said to be general _virtually;_ thus a universal cause is general in +relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to +all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in +this sense there is no need for that which is "general" to be +essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is +general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it +is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said (A. 5), +legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as +it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is +to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may +be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all +the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as +it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. +Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its +proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too +legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so +far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it +is in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it +is secondarily and administratively in his subjects. + +However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so +far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid +legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless +virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially +the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in +this sense that the Philosopher speaks. + +Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument again takes legal justice for the +virtue commanded by legal justice. + +Reply Obj. 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act +to that virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a +further end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue +considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to +that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially +distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the +common good; and this virtue is legal justice. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 7] + +Whether There Is a Particular Besides a General Justice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a +general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as +neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man +sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is +no need for a particular justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to +"one" and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another in +matters relating to the multitude, as shown above (AA. 5, 6). +Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man +to another in matters relating to the individual. + +Obj. 3: Further, between the individual and the general public stands +the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general +justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the +individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice +directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not +the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a +legal justice. + +_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom in his commentary on Matt. 5:6, +"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom. +xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or +the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), legal justice is not +essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which +directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other +virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular +goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another +individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice +there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to +himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal +justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his +relations to other individuals. + +Reply Obj. 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in +his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so +immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so +mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a +man immediately to the good of another individual. + +Reply Obj. 2: The common good of the realm and the particular good of +the individual differ not only in respect of the _many_ and the +_few,_ but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the _common_ +good differs from the aspect of the _individual_ good, even as the +aspect of _whole_ differs from that of _part._ Wherefore the +Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "they are wrong who maintain that +the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and +not specifically." + +Reply Obj. 3: The household community, according to the Philosopher +(Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely +"of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of +which one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between +such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice, +viz. _domestic_ justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 6. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 8] + +Whether Particular Justice Has a Special Matter? + +Objection 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special +matter. Because a gloss on Gen. 2:14, "The fourth river is +Euphrates," says: "Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated +through what country it flows, because justice pertains to all the +parts of the soul." Now this would not be the case, if justice had a +special matter, since every special matter belongs to a special +power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that "the soul +has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz. +temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;" and he says that "the +fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues." Therefore +particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no +special matter. + +Obj. 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating +to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters +relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and +not special. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular +justice to be specially about those things which belong to social +life. + +_I answer that,_ Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of +moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can +rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external +actions, and also those external things of which man can make use. +And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by +means of which men can communicate with one another, that the +relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in +respect of internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in +himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not +about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external +actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in +so far as one man is related to another through them. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part +of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will +which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and +accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not +directly but by a kind of diffusion. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the cardinal +virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each +having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of +virtue. In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted: +for he says that "prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and +avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures, +fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with passing trials, justice +is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues, +that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between +one man and another." + +Reply Obj. 3: A man's internal passions which are a part of moral +matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs +to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external +actions, are capable of being directed to another man. Consequently +it does not follow that the matter of justice is general. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 9] + +Whether Justice Is About the Passions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that justice is about the passions. For +the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about +pleasure and pain." Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions, +as stated above [*I-II, Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1] when +we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral +virtue, is about the passions. + +Obj. 2: Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's +operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations +cannot be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is +owing to disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the +aforesaid operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and +overmuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs +be about the passions. + +Obj. 3: Further, even as particular justice is towards another person +so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it +would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently +about the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is +about operations. + +_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question may be gathered +from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from +the will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 22, A. 3; Q. 59, A. 4), for it is only the sensitive +appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not +about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the +irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the +matter, because justice is about man's relations with another, and we +are not directed immediately to another by the internal passions. +Therefore justice is not about the passions. + +Reply Obj. 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as +its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but +every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be +acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure +and pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this +is an evil, and that a good": and in this way too they belong to +justice, since "a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions" +(Ethic. i, 8). + +Reply Obj. 2: External operations are as it were between external +things, which are their matter, and internal passions, which are +their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one +of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may +steal another's property, not through the desire to have the thing, +but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet +another's property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the +directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external +things, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the +passions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the +passions. Hence justice hinders theft of another's property, in so +far as stealing is contrary to the equality that should be maintained +in external things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from an +immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations +take their species, not from the internal passions but from external +things as being their objects, it follows that, external operations +are essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral +virtues. + +Reply Obj. 3: The common good is the end of each individual +member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of +each part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end +of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to +the common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions +whereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than +particular justice which is directed to the good of another +individual: although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in +the point of their external operations, in so far, to wit, as "the law +commands us to perform the actions of a courageous person . . . the +actions of a temperate person . . . and the actions of a gentle +person" (Ethic. v, 5). +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 10] + +Whether the Mean of Justice Is the Real Mean? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real +mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now +moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which +observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore justice +observes the rational and not the real mean. + +Obj. 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither +excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is +clearly the case with the virtues, according to _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now +justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in _Ethic._ +v. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean. + +Obj. 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe +the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean +varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one +is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case +in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same +punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice +also observes, not the real, but the rational mean. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the +mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical" +proportion, so that it is the real mean. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9; I-II, Q. 59, A. 4), the other +moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation +of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is +the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are +vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such +like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to +another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so +that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our +regard. + +On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so +far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly +proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice +consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external +thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between +greater and less, as stated in _Metaph._ x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. +_Ethic._ v, 4]: wherefore justice observes the real mean. + +Reply Obj. 1: This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore +justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways. +First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good; +and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply +in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through +being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil +through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it +is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who +can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is +about things that are good simply. + +Reply Obj. 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a +prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each +injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and +this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity. +_______________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 11] + +Whether the Act of Justice Is to Render to Each One His Own? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the act of justice is not to render +to each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to +justice the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we +give them what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice +does not consist in rendering to each one his own. + +Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that "beneficence which +we may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice." Now it +pertains to liberality to give to another of one's own, not of what +is his. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to +each one his own. + +Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute things +duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder, adultery +and so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his seems to +belong solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act of +justice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in +rendering to each one his own. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "It is justice +that renders to each one what is his, and claims not another's +property; it disregards its own profit in order to preserve the +common equity." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 8, 10), the matter of justice +is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use +by it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are +related by justice. Now each man's own is that which is due to him +according to equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of +justice is nothing else than to render to each one his own. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary +virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected with +it, as we shall state further on (Q. 80, A. 1). Wherefore to succor +the needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally +beneficent, which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction +ascribed to justice as to their principal virtue. + +This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of +justice, the name of "profit" is extended to whatever is excessive, +and whatever is deficient is called "loss." The reason for this is +that justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary +interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein those +expressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred to +all other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to +each one of what is his own. +_______________________ + +TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 12] + +Whether Justice Stands Foremost Among All Moral Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among +all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to +each one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of +one's own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a +greater virtue than justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than +itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all +the virtues, according to _Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is +more excellent than justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and +"good," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3. But fortitude is about more +difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death, +according to _Ethic._ iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent +than justice. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most +resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man." + +_I answer that,_ If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it +stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the +common good transcends the individual good of one person. In this +sense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent +of the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than +either the evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of +particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two +reasons. The first reason may be taken from the subject, because +justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational +appetite or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the +sensitive appetite, whereunto appertain the passions which are the +matter of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from +the object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect of +the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is +praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed +towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another +person, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. +i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most +profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing +good to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the +brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and +justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace." + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does +so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own +virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through +consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed +towards all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again +liberality which gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby +one renders to each man what is his. + +Reply Obj. 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the +latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a +virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although fortitude is about the most difficult things, +it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas +justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 59 + +OF INJUSTICE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether injustice is a special vice? + +(2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds? + +(3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly? + +(4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 1] + +Whether Injustice Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For +it is written (1 John 3:4): "All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'Whosoever +committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity']." Now +iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a +kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as +inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But +injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it +is opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness, +and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is +not a special sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the +will. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus +Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a +special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice. + +_I answer that,_ Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal +injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially +a special vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the +common good which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as +regards the intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to +all kinds of sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the +common good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose +from injustice, in accord with what has been said above about justice +(Q. 58, AA. 5, 6). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an +inequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to +have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such +as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a +particular vice opposed to particular justice. + +Reply Obj. 1: Even as legal justice is referred to human +common good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to +which all sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be +iniquity. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to +all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both +to justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways +as stated above (Q. 58, A. 9, ad 2). + +Reply Obj. 3: The will, like the reason, extends to all moral +matters, i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to +another person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in +the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and +the same applies to injustice. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 2] + +Whether a Man Is Called Unjust Through Doing an Unjust Thing? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing +an unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper object of justice is the +just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a +man should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust +through doing an unjust thing. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they +hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do +suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of +doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not +be false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is +unjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he +does an unjust thing. + +Obj. 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper +act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does +what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever +does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may +do an unjust thing without being unjust." + +_I answer that,_ Even as the object of justice is something equal in +external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal, +through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to +him. To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of +its proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may +happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not +unjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the +operation and its proper object. For the operation takes its species +and name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in +things directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and +the indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence if a man do that +which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for +instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is +unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but +only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is +unjust: hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly, +this may happen on account of a lack of proportion between the +operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a +passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, +for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's +complacency. In the latter case properly speaking it arises from a +habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit +is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust +intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which +sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man +may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without +having the habit of injustice. + +Reply Obj. 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct and +formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from +choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the +sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as +the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9). + +Reply Obj. 3: The object of temperance is not something established +externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance, +i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man +himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be +said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like manner +neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there is +dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as +regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is +similarity in all respects. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 3] + +Whether We Can Suffer Injustice Willingly? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. +For injustice is inequality, as stated above (A. 2). Now a man by +injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another. +Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another. +But whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. +Therefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be +inflicted by himself. + +Obj. 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for +having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished +according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable +burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man +can do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a +man suffers injustice voluntarily. + +Obj. 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers +that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one +who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it +is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice +voluntarily. + +_On the contrary,_ To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are +contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore +on the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will. + +_I answer that,_ Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent, +whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in +the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in +_Phys._ iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is +the will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does +voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he +suffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a +principle in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather +than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly +speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an +injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so +to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to +be done involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally), +or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to +another more than he owes him). + +Reply Obj. 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he +does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality. For a +man's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if +he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by +another's action. + +Reply Obj. 2: An individual person may be considered in two ways. +First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on +himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin, +intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because +injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person. +Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the +State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and +image; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to +himself, but to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in +accordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle +declares in respect of the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): "If any man +violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy." + +Reply Obj. 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now +in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is +that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above +(A. 2), and the formal and essential element is on the part of +the will of agent and patient, as stated above (A. 2). +Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and +injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the +material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an +injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other +man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and +on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an +injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury +unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 4] + +Whether Whoever Does an Injustice Sins Mortally? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice +sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is +sometimes a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says +(Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they +do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter." +Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally. + +Obj. 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs +but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and +should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher +declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an +injustice sins mortally. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues" [*Peter +Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary thereto +that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the +other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin +to do an injustice. + +_On the contrary,_ Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal +sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the +law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to +murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on (Q. +64, seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 12, A. 5), when we were +treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is +contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury +inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which +moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always +consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that +to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus. + +Reply Obj. 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be +understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls +"ignorance of particular circumstances" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which +deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not +excuse: and he who does an injustice through ignorance, does no +injustice except accidentally, as stated above (A. 2) + +Reply Obj. 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls +short of the perfection of an unjust deed, in so far as what he does +may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who +suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such +thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter +is not hurt or displeased. + +Reply Obj. 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues +are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder +affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 60 + +OF JUDGMENT +(In Six Articles) + +In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are +six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice? + +(2) Whether it is lawful to judge? + +(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions? + +(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably? + +(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written +law? + +(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 1] + +Whether Judgment Is an Act of Justice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice. +The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what +he knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive +faculty. Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. +Therefore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which +is in the will, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4). + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual man +judgeth all things." Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue +of charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost +Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity +rather than to justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its +proper matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure in +everything," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore +judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral +virtues. + +Obj. 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But +the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then +judges are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the +proper act of justice. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until justice be +turned into judgment." + +_I answer that,_ Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as +such. Now a judge (_judex_) is so called because he asserts the right +(_jus dicens_) and right is the object of justice, as stated above +(Q. 57, A. 1). Consequently the original meaning of the word +"judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to +decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from +the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about +matters relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which denotes a +right decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For +this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that "men have +recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice." + +Reply Obj. 1: The word "judgment," from its original meaning of a +right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a +right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a +right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the +virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is +an act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or +define. The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which +depends his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of +justice, judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of +fortitude, it proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act +of justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of +prudence in so far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore +_synesis_ which belongs to prudence is said to "judge rightly," as +stated above (Q. 51, A. 3). + +Reply Obj. 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity, +has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to the +Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces +judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces +judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling +of the law. + +Reply Obj. 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself, whereas +justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown above (Q. +58, A. 2). Now man is master in things concerning himself, but not in +matters relating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are +in question, there is no need for judgment other than that of a +virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as explained +above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further need for +the judgment of a superior, who is "able to reprove both, and to put +his hand between both" [*Job 9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more +specifically to justice than to any other virtue. + +Reply Obj. 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue [*Cf. Q. +58, A. 6], commanding and prescribing what is just; while it is in +the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue. Hence +judgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to +justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Judge? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished +except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with +punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Matt. +7:1, "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged." Therefore it is +unlawful to judge. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that +judgest another man's servant[?] To his own lord he standeth or +falleth." Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it +lawful to judge. + +Obj. 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 John 1:8, "If we +say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now it is unlawful +for a sinner to judge, according to Rom. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable, +O man, whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest +another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which +thou judgest." Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint +judges and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the +people with just judgment." + +_I answer that,_ Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of +justice. Now it follows from what has been stated above (A. 1, ad 1, +3) that three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of +justice: first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice; +secondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it +be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one +of these be lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, +when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is +called "perverted" or "unjust": secondly, when a man judges about +matters wherein he has no authority, and this is called judgment "by +usurpation": thirdly, when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man, +without any solid motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden +matter, and then it is called judgment by "suspicion" or "rash" +judgment. + +Reply Obj. 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is +about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine +states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment +about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply believe, +since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on +Matt. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in +the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], He +forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from +bitterness of heart. + +Reply Obj. 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore it is +written (Deut. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on +(Deut. 1:17), "because it is the judgment of God." + +Reply Obj. 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not +judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom +[*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Matt. 7:1, "Judge not." Above all +does this hold when such sins are public, because there would be an +occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they +are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the +judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove +or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. +in Monte ii, 19): "If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as +another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to +strive against it together with us." And yet it is not through acting +thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned +once again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be +equally deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 3] + +Whether It Is Unlawful to Form a Judgment from Suspicions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment +from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion +about an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that +suspicion is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible +to have any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. +Since then human judgment is about human acts, which are about +singular and contingent matters, it seems that no judgment would be +lawful, if it were not lawful to judge from suspicions. + +Obj. 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him +unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a +man's opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the +injury of another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not +unlawful. + +Obj. 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an +injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (A. +1). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus, +as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4). Therefore a judgment based on +suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this +is false, because "we cannot avoid suspicions," according to a gloss +of Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before +the time." Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to +be unlawful. + +_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus +Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] in comment on +the words of Matt. 7:1, "Judge not," etc., says: "By this commandment +our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly +motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his +own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part +on mere suspicion." + +_I answer that,_ As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion +denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to +three causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this +very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to +think evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, "The fool when he +walketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men +fools." Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards +another: for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with +or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of +him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this +is due to long experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, +13) that "old people are very suspicious, for they have often +experienced the faults of others." The first two causes of suspicion +evidently connote perversity of the affections, while the third +diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to +certainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently +suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, +the more vicious it is. + +Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a +man begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications. +This is a venial and a light sin; for "it belongs to human temptation +without which no man can go through this life," according to a gloss +on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the time." The second degree is when +a man, from slight indications, esteems another man's wickedness as +certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since +it cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss +goes on to say: "If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are +human, we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from +forming a definite and fixed opinion." The third degree is when a +judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains +directly to injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts, not +indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting the +matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable +witnesses. + +Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of another +without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore does +him an injury. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since justice and injustice are about external +operations, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. 8, 10, 11; Q. 59, A. 1, ad +3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it +is betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as +stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as +it is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the +external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or +anger to murder. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 4] + +Whether Doubts Should Be Interpreted for the Best? + +Objection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for +the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most +part. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the +number of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the imagination and +thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Gen. 8:21). +Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for +the best. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he +leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, +and turns neither to this side nor to that." Now he who interprets a +doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should +not be done. + +Obj. 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with +regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the +worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works." Therefore it +seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be +interpreted for the worst. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him +not judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in +the best sense." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 2), from the very fact +that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures +and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure +another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have +evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him +good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him. + +Reply Obj. 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may +happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err +frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less +frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in +the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge +of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good +or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take +no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there +is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly, +and of his evil if he judge falsely because "the true is the good of +the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in _Ethic._ vi, +2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with +things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the good +and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the +person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy +of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and +deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we +ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless +there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge +falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our +good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither +does it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of +contingent singulars in themselves. + +Reply Obj. 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for the +best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we +have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's, in +order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure, +it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be +efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against +a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or +for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when +judging of things we should try to interpret each thing according as +it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best +as stated above. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 5] + +Whether We Should Always Judge According to the Written Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge +according to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging +unjustly. But written laws sometimes contain injustice, according to +Isa. 10:1, "Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, +write injustice." Therefore we ought not always to judge according to +the written law. + +Obj. 2: Further, judgment has to be formed about individual +happenings. But no written law can cover each and every individual +happening, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it +seems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written +law. + +Obj. 3: Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver's +intention may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if +the lawgiver himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore +we ought not always to judge according to the written law. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "In these +earthly laws, though men judge about them when they are making them, +when once they are established and passed, the judges may judge no +longer of them, but according to them." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), judgment is nothing else but +a decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes just +in two ways: first by the very nature of the case, and this is called +"natural right," secondly by some agreement between men, and this is +called "positive right," as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2). Now laws are +written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but in +different ways. For the written law does indeed contain natural +right, but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its +force, not from the law but from nature: whereas the written law both +contains positive right, and establishes it by giving it force of +authority. + +Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else +judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive +right. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as the written law does not give force to the +natural right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force, because +neither can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law +contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has +no binding force. For positive right has no place except where "it +matters not," according to the natural right, "whether a thing be +done in one way or in another"; as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2, ad 2). +Wherefore such documents are to be called, not laws, but rather +corruptions of law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 95, A. 2): and +consequently judgment should not be delivered according to them. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even as unjust laws by their very nature are, either +always or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so too +laws that are rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they +were observed they would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore +in such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to the +letter of the law, but according to equity which the lawgiver has in +view. Hence the jurist says [*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque +consult. 25]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it +allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those +useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man." In +such cases even the lawgiver himself would decide otherwise; and if +he had foreseen the case, he might have provided for it by law. + +This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 6] + +Whether Judgment Is Rendered Perverse by Being Usurped? + +Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by +being usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now +truth is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from +the person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses +nothing, no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is +meant by judgment. + +Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is +related to the praise of some that they punished sins without having +authority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the +Egyptian (Ex. 2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri +the son of Salu (Num. 25:7-14), and "it was reputed to him unto +justice" (Ps. 105:31). Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not +to injustice. + +Obj. 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now +prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters +concerning the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not +unlawful. + +Obj. 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to +judge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown +above (A. 1, ad 1, 3; A. 2). But a judgment is not described as +unjust, if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge +of the law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by +usurpation, i.e. without authority. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that +judgest another man's servant?" + +_I answer that,_ Since judgment should be pronounced according to the +written law, as stated above (A. 5), he that pronounces judgment, +interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some +particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to +interpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by +public authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by +public authority, which extends over those who are subject to the +community. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force +another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority, +so too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment +that is pronounced by other than the public authority. + +Reply Obj. 1: When the truth is declared there is no obligation to +accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes. +On the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is +unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority. + +Reply Obj. 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by authority +received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to follow from +Acts 7:24, 25, where it is said that "striking the Egyptian . . . he +thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand would save +Israel [Vulg.: 'them']." Or it may be replied that Moses slew the +Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked, +without himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence. +Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that "whoever does not ward +off a blow from a fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the +striker"; and he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with +Augustine (QQ. Exod. qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just +as "the soil gives proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs +before the useful seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful +although it gave a sign of great fertility," in so far, to wit, as it +was a sign of the power whereby he was to deliver his people. + +With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for +God by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest, +he was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his +concern as of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex. +22:20; Lev. 20; Deut. 13, 17]. + +Reply Obj. 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as +the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not +usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal +matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have +been committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority. + +Reply Obj. 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of +the individual, and consequently their absence does not make a +judgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority which +gives a judgment its coercive force. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 61 + +OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts, +which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative +justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts, +i.e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will +be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And +since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we +must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and +distributive justice; (2) restitution. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and +commutative? + +(2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way? + +(3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold? + +(4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as +counter-passion? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 1] + +Whether Two Species of Justice Are Suitably Assigned, Viz. +Commutative and Distributive? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are +unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is +hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is +directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of +the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many, +both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and +because the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De +Offic. ii, 15): "He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to +expect that he will receive again." Therefore distribution does not +belong to any species of justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is +his own, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 2). But when things are +distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes +possessed of something which belonged to the community. Therefore +this does not pertain to justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in +the subject, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 6). But it belongs +exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution +does not always belong to justice. + +Obj. 4: Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods" (Ethic. +v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice. +Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of +legal justice. + +Obj. 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a +virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to +one person, while distributive justice consists in giving something +to many. Therefore they are not different species of justice. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and +says (Ethic. v, 2) that "one directs distributions, the other, +commutations." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, AA. 7, 8), particular +justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the +community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be +considered in relation to a part. In the first place there is the +order of one part to another, to which corresponds the order of one +private individual to another. This order is directed by commutative +justice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two +persons. In the second place there is the order of the whole towards +the parts, to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to +the community in relation to each single person. This order is +directed by distributive justice, which distributes common goods +proportionately. Hence there are two species of justice, distributive +and commutative. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as a private individual is praised for moderation +in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation +to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein +distributive justice directs. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too +that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: +so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a +number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his +own. + +Reply Obj. 3: The act of distributing the goods of the community, +belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods; +and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those +goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just +distribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made +not to the state but to the members of a family, and such +distribution can be made by authority of a private individual. + +Reply Obj. 4: Movement takes its species from the term +_whereunto._ Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common +good those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the +contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to +particular individuals by way of distribution. + +Reply Obj. 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not +only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of +different kinds of due: because common property is due to an +individual in one way, and his personal property in another way. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 2] + +Whether the Mean Is to Be Observed in the Same Way in Distributive As +in Commutative Justice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is +to be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of +these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above (A. 1). Now +the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or +fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way +in both distributive and commutative justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the +mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then, one +virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the +same. + +Obj. 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive justice +we have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a person's +deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for instance, in +punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished more than +one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is observed +in the same way in both kinds of justice. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3, 4) that the +mean in distributive justice is observed according to "geometrical +proportion," whereas in commutative justice it follows "arithmetical +proportion." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), in distributive justice +something is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs +to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is +proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in +respect of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person +receives all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a +more prominent position in the community. This prominence in an +aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy +according to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in +various ways according to various forms of community. Hence in +distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality +between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things +and persons: in such a way that even as one person surpasses another, +so that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted +to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3, 4) that the mean +in the latter case follows "geometrical proportion," wherein equality +depends not on quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6 +is to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion equals +11/2; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half: +whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6 +exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1. + +On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual +on account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen +chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is +found primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, +so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as +he has become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The +result of this will be equality according to the "arithmetical mean" +which is gauged according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the +mean between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by +the former, by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5, +and one of them receives 1 out of the other's belongings, the one +that is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be left with 4: +and so there will be justice if both be brought back to the mean, 1 +being taken from him that has 6, and given to him that has 4, for +then both will have 5 which is the mean. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the other moral virtues the rational, not the real +mean, is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean; wherefore +the mean, in justice, depends on the diversity of things. + +Reply Obj. 2: Equality is the general form of justice, wherein +distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find +equality of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find +equality of arithmetical proportion. + +Reply Obj. 3: In actions and passions a person's station affects the +quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a prince +than a private person. Hence in distributive justice a person's +station is considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is +considered in so far as it causes a diversity of things. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 3] + +Whether There Is a Different Matter for Both Kinds of Justice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a different matter for +both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of +virtue, as in the case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if +distributive and commutative justice have different matters, it would +seem that they are not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, the distribution that has to do with distributive +justice is one of "wealth or of honors, or of whatever can be +distributed among the members of the community" (Ethic. v, 2), which +very things are the subject matter of commutations between one person +and another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Therefore the +matters of distributive and commutative justice are not distinct. + +Obj. 3: Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs from +that of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ +specifically, where there is no specific difference, there ought to +be no diversity of matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons +commutative justice as one species, and yet this has many kinds of +matter. Therefore the matter of these species of justice is, +seemingly, not of many kinds. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated in _Ethic._ v, 2 that "one kind of +justice directs distributions, and another commutations." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 51, AA. 8, 10), justice is about +certain external operations, namely distribution and commutation. +These consist in the use of certain externals, whether things, +persons or even works: of things, as when one man takes from or +restores to another that which is his; of persons, as when a man does +an injury to the very person of another, for instance by striking or +insulting him, or even by showing respect for him; and of works, as +when a man justly exacts a work of another, or does a work for him. +Accordingly, if we take for the matter of each kind of justice the +things themselves of which the operations are the use, the matter of +distributive and commutative justice is the same, since things can be +distributed out of the common property to individuals, and be the +subject of commutation between one person and another; and again +there is a certain distribution and payment of laborious works. + +If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the +principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things, +and works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For +distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice +directs commutations that can take place between two persons. Of +these some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when +anyone uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will, +and this may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In +either case the offence may be committed against the other man's +chattel or person, or against a person connected with him. If the +offence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, it is +called "theft," if openly, it is called "robbery." If it be against +another man's person, it may affect either the very substance of his +person, or his dignity. If it be against the substance of his person, +a man is injured secretly if he is treacherously slain, struck or +poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or +maimed. If it be against his personal dignity, a man is injured +secretly by false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is +deprived of his good name, and openly, by being accused in a court of +law, or by public insult. If it be against a personal connection, a +man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly (for the most +part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the latter be +induced to leave his master: which things can also be done openly. +The same applies to other personal connections, and whatever injury +may be committed against the principal, may be committed against them +also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to leave his master are +properly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a slave +is his master's chattel, is referred to theft. Voluntary commutations +are when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person. +And if he transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no debt, as +in the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but of liberality. +A voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far as it includes the +notion of debt, and this may occur in many ways. First when one man +simply transfers his thing to another in exchange for another thing, +as happens in selling and buying. Secondly when a man transfers his +thing to another, that the latter may have the use of it with the +obligation of returning it to its owner. If he grant the use of a +thing gratuitously, it is called "usufruct" in things that bear +fruit; and simply "borrowing" on "loan" in things that bear no fruit, +such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even the use is granted +gratis, it is called "letting" or "hiring." Thirdly, a man transfers +his thing with the intention of recovering it, not for the purpose of +its use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a "deposit," or under +some obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when one man +stands security for another. In all these actions, whether voluntary +or involuntary, the mean is taken in the same way according to the +equality of repayment. Hence all these actions belong to the one same +species of justice, namely commutative justice. And this suffices for +the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 4] + +Whether the Just Is Absolutely the Same As Retaliation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as +retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the +judgment of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with +his deeds, according to Matt. 7:2: "With what measure you judge, you +shall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured +to you again." Therefore the just is absolutely the same as +retaliation. + +Obj. 2: Further, in either kind of justice something is given to +someone according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice this +equality regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly +on what a person has done for the good of the community; while in +commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has +suffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there is retaliation +in respect of the deed committed. Therefore it would seem that the +just is absolutely the same as retaliation. + +Obj. 3: Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based on +the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for he who +does an injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary +and involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify the +mean of justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on +us. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as +retaliation. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just +is not always the same as retaliation. + +_I answer that,_ Retaliation (_contrapassum_) denotes equal passion +repaid for previous action; and the expression applies most properly +to injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of +his neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back. +This kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23, 24): "He shall +render life for life, eye for eye," etc. And since also to take away +what belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows that +secondly retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes +loss to another, should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss +is also found in the Law (Ex. 22:1): "If any man steal an ox or a +sheep, and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and +four sheep for one sheep." Thirdly retaliation is transferred to +voluntary commutations, where action and passion are on both sides, +although voluntariness detracts from the nature of passion, as stated +above (Q. 59, A. 3). + +In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of +equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely +that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not +always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action. +Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one +who is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species +that he might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not +only struck back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner +when a man despoils another of his property against the latter's +will, the action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of +that thing, because the man who caused another's loss, himself would +lose nothing, and so he is punished by making restitution several +times over, because not only did he injure a private individual, but +also the common weal, the security of whose protection he has +infringed. Nor again would there be equality of passion in voluntary +commutations, were one always to exchange one's chattel for another +man's, because it might happen that the other man's chattel is much +greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to equalize +passion and action in commutations according to a certain +proportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented. +Hence retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but +there is no place for it in distributive justice, because in +distributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing +and thing or between passion and action (whence the expression +_contrapassum_), but according to proportion between things and +persons, as stated above (A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 1: This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with +the conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are +apportioned to merits, and punishments to sins. + +Reply Obj. 2: When a man who has served the community is paid for his +services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive, +justice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not +between the thing received and the thing done, but between the thing +received by one person and the thing received by another according to +the respective conditions of those persons. + +Reply Obj. 3: When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is +aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence +it requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a +difference, not on our part, but on the part of the thing. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 62 + +OF RESTITUTION +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight +points of inquiry: + +(1) Of what is it an act? + +(2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what +one has taken away? + +(3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away? + +(4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away? + +(5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from +whom something has been taken? + +(6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to +restore it? + +(7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution? + +(8) Whether one is bound to restore at once? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 1] + +Whether Restitution Is an Act of Commutative Justice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not an act of +commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due. +Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due. +Therefore restitution is not the act of any part of justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be +restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and +passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution +would not seem to be the act of a part of justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away. +Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation, +but also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man +less than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of +commutative than of distributive justice. + +_On the contrary,_ Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is +an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another. +Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs +commutations. + +_I answer that,_ To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a +person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in +restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment +of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice. +Hence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one +person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for +instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or +theft. + +Reply Obj. 1: That which is not due to another is not his properly +speaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is +a mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another +what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution, +since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same +in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which considers that +thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is not +restitution properly so called. + +Reply Obj. 2: In so far as the word restitution denotes something +done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem +originally to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass +from one person to another, since they remain the same both +substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as +the term "commutation" has passed from such like things to those +actions and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit +on another person, so too the term "restitution" is applied, to +things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in +their effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt +by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or +dishonored by injurious words. + +Reply Obj. 3: Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to +whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing, +when the latter receives so much the more according as he received +less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative +justice. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 2] + +Whether Restitution of What Has Been Taken Away Is Necessary for +Salvation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what +has been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary +for salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has +been taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does +not seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from +another. + +Obj. 2: Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for +salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is +impossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one +has taken away another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it +is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from +another. + +Obj. 3: Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man +loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that +which has been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it +is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken. + +Obj. 4: Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is +seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since "to lack little +is almost the same as to lack nothing at all," as the Philosopher +says (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a +benefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the +benefice, since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is +not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): "Unless a +man restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven." + +_I answer that,_ Restitution as stated above (A. 1) is an act of +commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore +restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; since it +is by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it +be taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no +need for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since +therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it +follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been +taken unjustly. + +Reply Obj. 1: When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it +suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God +and our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). +Wherefore when that which has been taken cannot be restored in +equivalent, compensation should be made as far as possible: for +instance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make +compensation either in money or in honor, the condition of either +party being duly considered according to the judgment of a good man. + +Reply Obj. 2: There are three ways in which one may take away +another's good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly, +as when a man reveals another's sin, while observing the right order +of so doing, and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by +saying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore +that man's good name, by confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly, +by saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals another's +sin contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound +to restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an +untruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed +him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name, he must +compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases, as stated above +(ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be +undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its +effect, viz. the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in the +opinion of other men. + +Reply Obj. 4: There are several ways of preventing a man from +obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view +the honor of God or the good of the Church, one procures its being +conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation +whatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if +the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, through +hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefice has +been definitely assigned to anyone, one prevents its being conferred +on a worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred on him, one +is bound to make some compensation, after taking account of the +circumstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a +prudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man +had not obtained the benefice and might have been prevented in many +ways from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had +already been assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some undue +cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had +deprived a man of what he already possessed, and consequently he would +be bound to compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to his +means. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 3] + +Whether It Suffices to Restore the Exact Amount Taken? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the +exact amount taken. For it is written (Ex. 22:1): "If a man shall +steal an ox or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five +oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Now everyone is bound +to keep the commandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is +bound to restore four- or fivefold. + +Obj. 2: Further, "What things soever were written, were written for +our learning" (Rom. 15:4). Now Zachaeus said (Luke 19:8) to our Lord: +"If I have wronged any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold." +Therefore a man is bound to restore several times over the amount he +has taken unjustly. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one can be unjustly deprived of what he is not +bound to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than the +amount of his theft, under the head of damages. Therefore a man is +bound to pay it, and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the +exact amount. + +_On the contrary,_ Restitution re-establishes equality where an +unjust taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by +repaying the exact amount taken. Therefore there is no obligation to +restore more than the exact amount taken. + +_I answer that,_ When a man takes another's thing unjustly, two +things must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the +thing, which inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the +case in loans. The other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent +with equality on the part of the thing, as when a person intends to +use violence but fails. + +As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitution, +since thereby equality is re-established; and for this it is enough +that a man restore just so much as he has belonging to another. But +as regards the sin, the remedy is applied by punishment, the +infliction of which belongs to the judge: and so, until a man is +condemned by the judge, he is not bound to restore more than he took, +but when once he is condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty. + +Hence it is clear how to answer the First Objection: because this law +fixes the punishment to be inflicted by the judge. Nor is this +commandment to be kept now, because since the coming of Christ no man +is bound to keep the judicial precepts, as stated above (I-II, Q. +104, A. 3). Nevertheless the same might be determined by human law, +and then the same answer would apply. + +Reply Obj. 2: Zachaeus said this being willing to do more than he was +bound to do; hence he had said already: "Behold . . . the half of my +goods I give to the poor." + +Reply Obj. 3: By condemning the man justly, the judge can exact more +by way of damages; and yet this was not due before the sentence. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 4] + +Whether a Man Is Bound to Restore What He Has Not Taken? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore what he has +not taken. For he that has inflicted a loss on a man is bound to +remove that loss. Now it happens sometimes that the loss sustained is +greater than the thing taken: for instance, if you dig up a man's +seeds, you inflict on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest, +and thus you would seem to be bound to make restitution accordingly. +Therefore a man is bound to restore what he has not taken. + +Obj. 2: Further, he who retains his creditor's money beyond the +stated time, would seem to occasion his loss of all his possible +profits from that money, and yet he does not really take them. +Therefore it seems that a man is bound to restore what he did not +take. + +Obj. 3: Further, human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now a +man is bound to restore to God more than he has received from Him, +according to Matt. 25:26, "Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not, +and gather where I have not strewed." Therefore it is just that one +should restore to a man also, something that one has not taken. + +_On the contrary,_ Restitution belongs to justice, because it +re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore what one did not +take, there would not be equality. Therefore it is not just to make +such a restitution. + +_I answer that,_ Whoever brings a loss upon another person, +seemingly, takes from him the amount of the loss, since, according to +the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so called from a man having +_less_* than his due. [*The derivation is more apparent in English +than in Latin, where _damnum_ stands for _loss,_ and _minus_ for +_less._ Aristotle merely says that to have more than your own is +called "gain," and to have less than you started with is called +"loss."] Therefore a man is bound to make restitution according to +the loss he has brought upon another. + +Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by being deprived of +what he actually has; and a loss of this kind is always to be made +good by repayment in equivalent: for instance if a man damnifies +another by destroying his house he is bound to pay him the value of +the house. Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him from +obtaining what he was on the way to obtain. A loss of this kind need +not be made good in equivalent; because to have a thing virtually is +less than to have it actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing +is to have it merely virtually or potentially, and so were he to be +indemnified by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not +the exact value taken from him, but more, and this is not necessary +for salvation, as stated above. However he is bound to make some +compensation, according to the condition of persons and things. + +From this we see how to answer the First and Second Objections: +because the sower of the seed in the field, has the harvest, not +actually but only virtually. In like manner he that has money has the +profit not yet actually but only virtually: and both may be hindered +in many ways. + +Reply Obj. 3: God requires nothing from us but what He Himself has +sown in us. Hence this saying is to be understood as expressing +either the shameful thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he +had received nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects +from us the fruit of His gifts, which fruit is from Him and from us, +although the gifts themselves are from God without us. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 5] + +Whether Restitution Must Always Be Made to the Person from Whom a +Thing Has Been Taken? + +Objection 1: It would seem that restitution need not always be made +to the person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful +to injure anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man +himself, or to others, were one to restore to him what has been taken +from him; if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword. +Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom +a thing has been taken. + +Obj. 2: Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does not +deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully that +which another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and +receiver who are guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always +necessary to make restitution to the person from whom one has taken +something. + +Obj. 3: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it is +sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from whom a +thing has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he is too +far away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need +not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. + +Obj. 4: Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we have +received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors from +others (our parents for instance) than from a lender or depositor. +Therefore sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather than +make restitution to one from whom we have taken something. + +Obj. 5: Further, it is useless to restore a thing which reverts to +the restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly taken +something from the Church and makes restitution to the Church, it +reverts into his hands, since he is the guardian of the Church's +property. Therefore he ought not to restore to the Church from whom +he has taken: and so restitution should not always be made to the +person from whom something has been taken away. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 13:7): "Render . . . to all +men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom +custom." + +_I answer that,_ Restitution re-establishes the equality of +commutative justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of +thing to thing, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 58, A. 10). Now this +equalizing of things is impossible, unless he that has less than his +due receive what is lacking to him: and for this to be done, +restitution must be made to the person from whom a thing has been +taken. + +Reply Obj. 1: When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously +injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some +other, it should not be restored to him there and then, because +restitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made, +since all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who +retains another's property must not appropriate it, but must either +reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over +to another to keep it more securely. + +Reply Obj. 2: A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways. First +through the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as is +the case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves +to lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to +him: and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he +must not retain the price, but must use it for some pious object. +Secondly a man gives unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful +purpose, albeit the giving itself is not unlawful, as when a woman +receives payment for fornication: wherefore she may keep what she has +received. If, however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit, +she would be bound to restitution. + +Reply Obj. 3: If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown +altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance +by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or +living): but not without previously making a careful inquiry about +his person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead, +restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon as one +with him. If he be very far away, what is due to him should be sent +to him, especially if it be of great value and can easily be sent: +else it should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for him, and +the owner should be advised of the fact. + +Reply Obj. 4: A man is bound, out of his own property, to succor his +parents, or those from whom he has received greater benefits; but he +ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to others; +and he would be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is +due to another. Exception must be made in cases of extreme need, for +then he could and should even take what belongs to another in order +to succor a parent. + +Reply Obj. 5: There are three ways in which a prelate can rob the +Church of her property. First by laying hands on Church property +which is committed, not to him but to another; for instance, if a +bishop appropriates the property of the chapter. In such a case it is +clear that he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those +who are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another person +(for instance a relative or a friend) Church property committed to +himself: in which case he must make restitution to the Church, and +have it under his own care, so as to hand it over to his successor. +Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands on Church property, merely in +intention, when, to wit, he begins to have a mind to hold it as his +own and not in the name of the Church: in which case he must make +restitution by renouncing his intention. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 6] + +Whether He That Has Taken a Thing Is Always Bound to Restitution? + +Objection 1: It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not +always bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality +of justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him +that has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that +which belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed +into another's hands. Therefore it should be restored, not by the +person that took it, but by the one that has it. + +Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by +making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the +case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always +bound to restitution. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same thing should not be restored several times. +Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one +of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing +is not always bound to restitution. + +_On the contrary,_ He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now +restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a +thing is bound to restore it. + +_I answer that,_ With regard to a man who has taken another's +property, two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the +taking. By reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as +long as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in +addition to what is his, should be taken away from him, and given to +him who lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On the +other hand, the taking of the thing that is another's property, may +be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will of +the owner, as in theft and robbery: in which case the thief is bound +to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of +the injurious action, even though the thing is no longer in his +possession. For just as a man who strikes another, though he gain +nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured person, so too he +that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make compensation for +the loss incurred, although he be no better off; and in addition he +must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes +another's property for his own profit but without committing an +injury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a loan: +and then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason of +the thing, but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost the +thing: for he is bound to compensate the person who has done him a +favor, and he would not be doing so if the latter were to lose +thereby. Thirdly, a man takes another's property without injury to +the latter or profit to himself, as in the case of a deposit; +wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on account +of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; but he is bound +to restitution on account of the thing taken. Consequently if this +thing be taken from him without any fault on his part, he is not +bound to restitution, although he would be, if he were to lose the +thing through a grievous fault on his part. + +Reply Obj. 1: The chief end of restitution is, not that he who has +more than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than +his due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for +restitution in those things which one man may receive from another +without loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from +another's candle. Consequently although he that has taken something +from another, may have ceased to have what he took, through having +transferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what +is his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the thing, on +account of the injurious taking, and he that has it, on account of +the thing. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to +other men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so +he may make restitution of another's property through the priest to +whom he confesses. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since restitution is chiefly directed to the +compensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing +has been taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has +received sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound +to any further restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund +the person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse +them from so doing. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 7] + +Whether Restitution Is Binding on Those Who Have Not Taken? + +Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not binding on those +who have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. Now +none should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are +bound to restitution save the one who has taken. + +Obj. 2: Further, justice does not bind one to increase another's +property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who +takes a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way +whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the +gainer, both because he would receive restitution many times over, +and because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken +away from someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore +the others are not bound to restitution. + +Obj. 3: Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in +order to safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would +expose himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or +withstand him. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not +betraying or withstanding a thief. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:32): "They who do such +things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also +they that consent to them that do them." Therefore in like manner +they that consent are bound to restitution. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), a person is bound to +restitution not only on account of someone else's property which he +has taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever +is cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in +two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces +another to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the +taking, by moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel, +or consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving. +Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving him shelter or any +other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by +taking part in the theft or robbery, as a fellow evil-doer. +Indirectly, when a man does not prevent another from evil-doing +(provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by omitting +the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or +robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by +sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows: + +"By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by +participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing." + +It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the +cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of +command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is +bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent; +namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place. +Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver +of thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of +participation; when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty. +Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do +so; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to safeguard +justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their neglect +thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of +their preserving justice here below. + +In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to +restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the +efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is +bound to restitution, only when it may be judged with probability +that the unjust taking resulted from such causes. + +Reply Obj. 1: Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the +sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by +counselling, or by commanding, or in any other way whatever. + +Reply Obj. 2: He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the +principal in the deed; first of all, the _commander;_ secondly, the +_executor,_ and in due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of +them make restitution, another is not bound to make restitution to +the same person. Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who +took possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those who have +already made restitution. When a man commands an unjust taking that +does not follow, no restitution has to be made, since its end is +chiefly to restore the property of the person who has been unjustly +injured. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand +or reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when he +is obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of +earthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they +are invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain +justice. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 8] + +Whether a Man Is Bound to Immediate Restitution, or May He Put It Off? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate +restitution, and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative +precepts do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making +restitution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore a +man is not bound to immediate restitution. + +Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it is +sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore no man is +bound to immediate restitution. + +Obj. 3: Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice. +Now time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts. +Since then the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of +virtue, but are determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it +seems that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a +man be bound to restore at once. + +_On the contrary,_ All matters of restitution seem to come under one +head. Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not +delay compensation, as appears from Lev. 19:13, "The wages of him +that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the +morning." Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of +restitution, to delay, and restitution should be made at once. + +_I answer that,_ Even as it is a sin against justice to take +another's property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold +the property of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him +of the use of what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is +clear that it is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time; and +one is bound to renounce one's sin at once, according to Ecclus. +21:2, "Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent." Consequently one +is bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for a +respite from the person who is empowered to grant the use of the +thing. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the precept about the making of restitution is +affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us to +withhold another's property. + +Reply Obj. 2: When one is unable to restore at once, this very +inability excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is +altogether excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable +to make it. He is, however, bound either himself or through another +to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a +remission or a respite. + +Reply Obj. 3: Whenever the omission of a circumstance is contrary to +virtue that circumstance must be looked upon as determinate, and we +are bound to observe it: and since delay of restitution involves a +sin of unjust detention which is opposed to just detention, it stands +to reason that the time is determinate in the point of restitution +being immediate. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 63 + +OF RESPECT OF PERSONS +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of +justice. First we shall consider respect of persons which is opposed +to distributive justice; secondly we shall consider the vices opposed +to commutative justice. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether respect of persons is a sin? + +(2) Whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities? + +(3) Whether it takes place in showing honor? + +(4) Whether it takes place in judicial sentences? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 1] + +Whether Respect of Persons Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For +the word "person" includes a reference to personal dignity [*Cf. I, +Q. 29, A. 3, ad 2]. Now it belongs to distributive justice to +consider personal dignity. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, in human affairs persons are of more importance than +things, since things are for the benefit of persons and not +conversely. But respect of things is not a sin. Much less, therefore, +is respect of persons. + +Obj. 3: Further, no injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems to +respect persons, since of two men circumstanced alike He sometimes +upraises one by grace, and leaves the other in sin, according to +Matt. 24:40: "Two shall be in a bed [Vulg.: 'field'] [*'Bed' is the +reading of Luke 17:34], one shall be taken, and one shall be left." +Therefore respect of persons is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Nothing but sin is forbidden in the Divine law. +Now respect of persons is forbidden, Deut. 1:17: "Neither shall you +respect any man's person." Therefore respect of persons is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ Respect of persons is opposed to distributive +justice. For the equality of distributive justice consists in +allotting various things to various persons in proportion to their +personal dignity. Accordingly, if one considers that personal +property by reason of which the thing allotted to a particular person +is due to him, this is respect not of the person but of the cause. +Hence a gloss on Eph. 6:9, "There is no respect of persons with God +[Vulg.: 'Him']," says that "a just judge regards causes, not +persons." For instance if you promote a man to a professorship on +account of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider the due +cause, not the person; but if, in conferring something on someone, +you consider in him not the fact that what you give him is +proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this particular +man (e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the person, +since you give him something not for some cause that renders him +worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And any +circumstance that does not amount to a reason why this man be worthy +of this gift, is to be referred to his person: for instance if a man +promote someone to a prelacy or a professorship, because he is rich +or because he is a relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may +happen, however, that a circumstance of person makes a man worthy as +regards one thing, but not as regards another: thus consanguinity +makes a man worthy to be appointed heir to an estate, but not to be +chosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority: wherefore +consideration of the same circumstance of person will amount to +respect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows, +accordingly, that respect of persons is opposed to distributive +justice in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but +sin is opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: In distributive justice we consider those circumstances +of a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect of +persons we consider circumstances that do not so result. + +Reply Obj. 2: Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of +things which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things +pertaining to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions +ought to be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the +persons themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though +it were; and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy, +absolutely speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is a twofold giving. One belongs to justice, and +occurs when we give a man his due: in such like givings respect of +persons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality, when one +gives gratis that which is not a man's due: such is the bestowal of +the gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In such a +giving there is no place for respect of persons, because anyone may, +without injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom he +will, according to Matt. 20:14, 15, "Is it not lawful for me to do +what I will? . . . Take what is thine, and go thy way." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 2] + +Whether Respect of Persons Takes Place in the Dispensation of +Spiritual Goods? + +Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take +place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. For it would seem to +savor of respect of persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity +or benefice on account of consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a +cause whereby a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice. +Yet this apparently is not a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are +wont to do so. Therefore the sin of respect of persons does not take +place in the conferring of spiritual goods. + +Obj. 2: Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a +poor man seems to pertain to respect of persons, according to James +2:2, 3. Nevertheless dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees +are more readily granted to the rich and powerful than to others. +Therefore the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in +the dispensation of spiritual goods. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to jurists [*Cap. Cum dilectus.] it +suffices to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one +choose the better man. But it would seem to savor of respect of +persons to choose one who is less good for a higher position. +Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters. + +Obj. 4: Further, according to the law of the Church (Cap. Cum +dilectus.) the person to be chosen should be "a member of the flock." +Now this would seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more +competent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore respect of +persons is not a sin in spiritual matters. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:1): "Have not the faith of +our Lord Jesus Christ . . . with respect of persons." On these words +a gloss of Augustine says: "Who is there that would tolerate the +promotion of a rich man to a position of honor in the Church, to the +exclusion of a poor man more learned and holier?" [*Augustine, Ep. ad +Hieron. clxvii.] + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), respect of persons is a sin, +in so far as it is contrary to justice. Now the graver the matter in +which justice is transgressed, the more grievous the sin: so that, +spiritual things being of greater import than temporal, respect of +persons is a more grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in +dispensing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when +something is allotted to a person out of proportion to his deserts, +it must be observed that a person's worthiness may be considered in +two ways. First, simply and absolutely: and in this way the man who +abounds the more in the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy. +Secondly, in relation to the common good; for it happens at times +that the less holy and less learned man may conduce more to the +common good, on account of worldly authority or activity, or +something of the kind. And since the dispensation of spiritualities +is directed chiefly to the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, +"The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit," +it follows that in the dispensation of spiritualities the simply less +good are sometimes preferred to the better, without respect of +persons, just as God sometimes bestows gratuitous graces on the less +worthy. + +Reply Obj. 1: We must make a distinction with regard to a prelate's +kinsfolk: for sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely +speaking, and in relation to the common good: and then if they are +preferred to the more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in +the dispensation of spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical +superior is not the owner, with power to give them away as he will, +but the dispenser, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of +us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries +of God." Sometimes however the prelate's kinsfolk are as worthy as +others, and then without respect of persons he can lawfully give +preference to his kindred since there is at least this advantage, +that he can trust the more in their being of one mind with him in +conducting the business of the Church. Yet he would have to forego so +doing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take an example from him +and give the goods of the Church to their kindred without regard to +their deserts. + +Reply Obj. 2: Dispensations for contracting marriage came into use +for the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace: and this is more +necessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing, so +that there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more +readily to such persons. + +Reply Obj. 3: In order that an election be not rebutted in a court of +law, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to elect +the better man, because otherwise every election might have a flaw. +But as regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect +one who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to the +common good. For if it is possible to have one who is more competent +for a post, and yet another be preferred, it is necessary to have +some cause for this. If this cause have anything to do with the +matter in point, he who is elected will, in this respect, be more +competent; and if that which is taken for cause have nothing to do +with the matter, it will clearly be respect of persons. + +Reply Obj. 4: The man who is taken from among the members of a +particular Church, is generally speaking more useful as regards the +common good, since he loves more the Church wherein he was brought +up. For this reason it was commanded (Deut. 17:15): "Thou mayest not +make a man of another nation king, who is not thy brother." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 3] + +Whether Respect of Persons Takes Place in Showing Honor and Respect? + +Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take +place in showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing +else than "reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue," +as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes +should be honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of +whom it is written (Ex. 20:12): "Honor thy father and thy mother." +Again masters, though they be wicked, should be honored by their +servants, according to 1 Tim. 6:1: "Whoever are servants under the +yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor." Therefore it +seems that it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is commanded (Lev. 19:32): "Rise up before the +hoary head, and, honor the person of the aged man." But this seems to +savor of respect of persons, since sometimes old men are not +virtuous; according to Dan. 13:5: "Iniquity came out from the +ancients of the people [*Vulg.: 'Iniquity came out of Babylon from +the ancient judges, that seemed to govern the people.']." Therefore +it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor. + +Obj. 3: Further, on the words of James 2:1, "Have not the faith . . . +with respect of persons," a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. ad Hieron. +clxvii.] says: "If the saying of James, 'If there shall come into +your assembly a man having a golden ring,' etc., refer to our daily +meetings, who sins not here, if however he sin at all?" Yet it is +respect of persons to honor the rich for their riches, for Gregory +says in a homily (xxviii in Evang.): "Our pride is blunted, since in +men we honor, not the nature wherein they are made to God's image, +but wealth," so that, wealth not being a due cause of honor, this +will savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a sin to +respect persons in showing honor. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on James 2:1, says: "Whoever honors the +rich for their riches, sins," and in like manner, if a man be honored +for other causes that do not render him worthy of honor. Now this +savors of respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect +persons in showing honor. + +_I answer that,_ To honor a person is to recognize him as having +virtue, wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of a person being +honored. Now it is to be observed that a person may be honored not +only for his own virtue, but also for another's: thus princes and +prelates, although they be wicked, are honored as standing in God's +place, and as representing the community over which they are placed, +according to Prov. 26:8, "As he that casteth a stone into the heap of +Mercury, so is he that giveth honor to a fool." For, since the +gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to Mercury, "the heap of +Mercury" signifies the casting up of an account, when a merchant +sometimes substitutes a pebble [*_Lapillus_ or _calculus_ whence the +English word 'calculate'] for one hundred marks. So too, is a fool +honored if he stand in God's place or represent the whole community: +and in the same way parents and masters should be honored, on account +of their having a share of the dignity of God Who is the Father and +Lord of all. The aged should be honored, because old age is a sign of +virtue, though this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to Wis. +4:8, 9, "venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by +the number of years; but the understanding of a man is gray hairs, +and a spotless life is old age." The rich ought to be honored by +reason of their occupying a higher position in the community: but if +they be honored merely for their wealth, it will be the sin of +respect of persons. + +Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 4] + +Whether the Sin of Respect of Persons Takes Place in Judicial +Sentences? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does +not take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is +opposed to distributive justice, as stated above (A. 1): whereas +judicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice. +Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial +sentences. + +Obj. 2: Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now +it is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since a +heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a +prince than on one who injures the person of others. Therefore +respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): "In judging be +merciful to the fatherless." But this seems to imply respect of the +person of the needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of +persons is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 18:5): "It is not good to +accept the person in judgment [*Vulg.: 'It is not good to accept the +person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.']." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 60, A. 1), judgment is an act of +justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice, +those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of +persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is +allotted to a person out of that proportion to him in which the +equality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment +is rendered corrupt by respect of persons. + +Reply Obj. 1: A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view +of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to +commutative and distributive justice: because it may be decided by +judgment how some common good is to be distributed among many, and +how one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him. +Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of judgment, in as +much as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes from one and +gives to another, and this belongs to distributive justice. In this +way respect of persons may take place in any judgment. + +Reply Obj. 2: When a person is more severely punished on account of a +crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of +persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in that case, +a diversity of things, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 10, ad 3; Q. 61, A. +2, ad 3). + +Reply Obj. 3: In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy +as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying +of Ex. 23:3 would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in +judgment." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 64 + +OF MURDER +(In Eight Articles) + +In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative +justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in +relation to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed +with regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation +to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one's neighbor +against his will: and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or +by word. By deed when one's neighbor is injured either in his own +person, or in a person connected with him, or in his possessions. + +We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the +first place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the +greatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants? + +(2) Whether it is lawful to kill a sinner? + +(3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public +person only? + +(4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric? + +(5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself? + +(6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man? + +(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense? + +(8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 1] + +Whether It Is Unlawful to Kill Any Living Thing? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the +Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): "They that resist the ordinance of God +purchase to themselves damnation [*Vulg.: 'He that resisteth the +power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase +themselves damnation.']." Now Divine providence has ordained that all +living things should be preserved, according to Ps. 146:8, 9, "Who +maketh grass to grow on the mountains . . . Who giveth to beasts +their food." Therefore it seems unlawful to take the life of any +living thing. + +Obj. 2: Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life. +Now life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same +reason it is apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants. + +Obj. 3: Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not +appointed save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be +inflicted, according to the Divine law, on one who killed another +man's ox or sheep (Ex. 22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals +is a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "When we hear +it said, 'Thou shalt not kill,' we do not take it as referring to +trees, for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because +they have no fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words, +'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a man." + +_I answer that,_ There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for +which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are +for the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds +from imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the +generation of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, +and lastly a man, so too things, like the plants, which merely have +life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man. +Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of +animals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher states +(Polit. i, 3). + +Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that +animals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and this cannot be +done unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to +take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for +the use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of +God Himself: for it is written (Gen. 1:29, 30): "Behold I have given +you every herb . . . and all trees . . . to be your meat, and to all +beasts of the earth": and again (Gen. 9:3): "Everything that moveth +and liveth shall be meat to you." + +Reply Obj. 1: According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals +and plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as +Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), "by a most just ordinance of the +Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use." + +Reply Obj. 2: Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of +reason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it +were by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is +that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of +others. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that kills another's ox, sins, not through killing +the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore +this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or +robbery. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Kill Sinners? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For +our Lord in the parable (Matt. 13) forbade the uprooting of the +cockle which denotes wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is +forbidden by God is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner. + +Obj. 2: Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now +according to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance, +according to Ezech. 33:11, "I desire not the death of the wicked, but +that the wicked turn from his way and live." Therefore it seems +altogether unjust to kill sinners. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to do +that which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. +vii) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in +itself, since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and "we +wish our friends to live and to exist," according to _Ethic._ ix, 4. +Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt not +suffer to live"; and (Ps. 100:8): "In the morning I put to death all +the wicked of the land." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it is lawful to kill dumb +animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man's use, as +the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed +to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is +naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that +if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, +through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will +be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every +individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to +whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the +community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and +advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, +since "a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump" (1 Cor. 5:6). + +Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the +cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when +the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, +either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they +have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to +the good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our +Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that +vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that +the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the +good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the +slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes +slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas +sometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what +is expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate +according to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous +to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin +without grievously harming others. + +Reply Obj. 3: By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and +consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as +he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the +slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is +useful to others. This is expressed in Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was +in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless +beasts, and made like to them," and Prov. 11:29: "The fool shall +serve the wise." Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man +so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man +who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse +than a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. +i, 1 and _Ethic._ vii, 6). +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 3] + +Whether It Is Lawful for a Private Individual to Kill a Man Who Has +Sinned? + +Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a +man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine +law. Yet, on account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded +(Ex. 32:27): "Let every man kill his brother, and friend, and +neighbor." Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a +sinner. + +Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3), man, on account of +sin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful for any private +individual to kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful. +Therefore for the same reason, it is lawful for any private +individual to kill a man who has sinned. + +Obj. 3: Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves praise +for doing what is useful for the common good. Now the slaying of +evildoers is useful for the common good, as stated above (A. 2). +Therefore it is deserving of praise if even private individuals kill +evil-doers. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [*Can. Quicumque +percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8]: "A man who, without exercising public +authority, kills an evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and +all the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not +given him." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it is lawful to kill an +evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole +community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the +community's welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a +decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the health +of the whole body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to +persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and +not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death. + +Reply Obj. 1: The person by whose authority a thing is done really +does the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence +according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "He slays not who owes +his service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the +instrument to him that wields it." Wherefore those who, at the Lord's +command, slew their neighbors and friends, would seem not to have +done this themselves, but rather He by whose authority they acted +thus: just as a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his +sovereign, and the executioner slays the robber by the authority of +the judge. + +Reply Obj. 2: A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in +the case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill +it; whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is +required, not for their sake, but on account of the owner's loss. On +the other hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from +good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn +him to death for the common good. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful for any private individual to do anything +for the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful to +some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of +the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the +parts for the welfare of the whole. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Lawful for Clerics to Kill Evil-doers? + +Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers. For +clerics especially should fulfil the precept of the Apostle (1 Cor. +4:16): "Be ye followers of me as I also am of Christ," whereby we are +called upon to imitate God and His saints. Now the very God whom we +worship puts evildoers to death, according to Ps. 135:10, "Who smote +Egypt with their firstborn." Again Moses made the Levites slay +twenty-three thousand men on account of the worship of the calf (Ex. +32), the priest Phinees slew the Israelite who went in to the woman +of Madian (Num. 25), Samuel killed Agag king of Amalec (1 Kings 15), +Elias slew the priests of Baal (3 Kings 18), Mathathias killed the +man who went up to the altar to sacrifice (1 Mac. 2); and, in the New +Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira (Acts 5). Therefore it +seems that even clerics may kill evil-doers. + +Obj. 2: Further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and is +more united to God. Now the secular power as "God's minister" +lawfully puts evil-doers to death, according to Rom. 13:4. Much more +therefore may clerics, who are God's ministers and have spiritual +power, put evil-doers to death. + +Obj. 3: Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office, may lawfully +exercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the princely +office to slay evildoers, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore those +clerics who are earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 3:2, 3): "It behooveth . . . +a bishop to be without crime [*Vulg.: 'blameless.' 'Without crime' is +the reading in Tit. 1:7] . . . not given to wine, no striker." + +_I answer that,_ It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons. +First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon +is represented the Passion of Christ slain "Who, when He was struck +did not strike [Vulg.: 'When He suffered, He threatened not']" (1 +Pet. 2:23). Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: for +ministers should imitate their master, according to Ecclus. 10:2, "As +the judge of the people is himself, so also are his ministers." The +other reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of +the New Law, wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is +appointed: wherefore they should abstain from such things in order +that they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament. + +Reply Obj. 1: God works in all things without exception whatever is +right, yet in each one according to its mode. Wherefore everyone +should imitate God in that which is specially becoming to him. Hence, +though God slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that +all should imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put +Ananias and Saphira to death by his own authority or with his own +hand, but published their death sentence pronounced by God. The +Priests or Levites of the Old Testament were the ministers of the Old +Law, which appointed corporal penalties, so that it was fitting for +them to slay with their own hands. + +Reply Obj. 2: The ministry of clerics is concerned with better things +than corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual +welfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with minor +matters. + +Reply Obj. 3: Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of earthly +princes, not that they may inflict capital punishment themselves, but +that this may be carried into effect by others in virtue of their +authority. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 5] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Kill Oneself? + +Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For +murder is a sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man +can do an injustice to himself, as is proved in _Ethic._ v, 11. +Therefore no man sins by killing himself. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public +authority, to kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority +is sometimes an evil-doer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a +lesser danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a +man to cut off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his +whole body. Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater +evil, for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a +man may kill himself. + +Obj. 4: Further, Samson killed himself, as related in Judges 16, and +yet he is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11). Therefore it is lawful +for a man to kill himself. + +Obj. 5: Further, it is related (2 Mac. 14:42) that a certain Razias +killed himself, "choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the +hands of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble +birth." Now nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful. +Therefore suicide is not unlawful. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "Hence it +follows that the words 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of +a man--not another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills +himself, kills nothing else than a man." + +_I answer that,_ It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three +reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result +being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists +corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the +inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love +himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to +the natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as +such, belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community, +and so, as such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing +himself he injures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. +v, 11). Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to +His power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own +life, sins against God, even as he who kills another's slave, sins +against that slave's master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment +of a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to +pronounce sentence of death and life, according to Deut. 32:39, "I +will kill and I will make to live." + +Reply Obj. 1: Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to +justice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a man should +have towards himself: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to +oneself. In relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by +reason also of its opposition to justice. + +Reply Obj. 2: One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to +death an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man is +judge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises +public authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever: +although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others. + +Reply Obj. 3: Man is made master of himself through his free-will: +wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters +which pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free-will. But the +passage from this life to another and happier one is subject not to +man's free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for +man to take his own life that he may pass to a happier life, nor that +he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, because +the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the +Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon +oneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to +adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is +unlawful to take one's own life on account of one's having committed +a sin, both because by so doing one does oneself a very great injury, +by depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance, and because +it is not lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the +public authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself +lest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on herself the +very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sin of another. For +she commits no sin in being violated by force, provided she does not +consent, since "without consent of the mind there is no stain on the +body," as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that +fornication and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man's, +especially one's own, life: since the latter is most grievous, +because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love. +Moreover it is most dangerous since no time is left wherein to +expiate it by repentance. Again it is not lawful for anyone to take +his own life for fear he should consent to sin, because "evil must +not be done that good may come" (Rom. 3:8) or that evil may be +avoided especially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain +event, for it is uncertain whether one will at some future time +consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man from sin under any +temptation whatever. + +Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "not even Samson +is to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies +under the ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought +many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him to do this." He +assigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the +time of persecution took their own lives, and who are commemorated by +the Church. + +Reply Obj. 5: It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from +being slain by another, for the sake of the good of virtue, and that +he may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to avoid +penal evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason +some, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to act +from fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a weakness +of soul unable to bear penal evils, as the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, +7) and Augustine (De Civ. Dei 22, 23) declare. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 6] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Kill the Innocent? + +Objection 1: It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill +the innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on +the contrary "the fear of the Lord driveth out sin" (Ecclus. 1:27). +Now Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was +willing to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin, +kill an innocent person. + +Obj. 2: Further, among those sins that are committed against one's +neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous +injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is +a greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the +latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life +to the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to +kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a +righteous person. + +Obj. 3: Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is +not a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of +justice, to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who +is bound to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man +whom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses; +and again the executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to +death the man who has been unjustly sentenced. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 23:7): "The innocent and just +person thou shalt not put to death." + +_I answer that,_ An individual man may be considered in two ways: +first, in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we +consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in +every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God +has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as +stated above (A. 2) the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in +relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. On the other +hand the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common +good, since they are the chief part of the community. Therefore it is +in no way lawful to slay the innocent. + +Reply Obj. 1: God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both +the sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God's command kills +an innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he +executes: indeed his obedience to God's commands is a proof that he +fears Him. + +Reply Obj. 2: In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the +essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just +man, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first, +because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in +opposition to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a +man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to +justice: thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater +good: fourthly, because he despises God more, according to Luke +10:16, "He that despiseth you despiseth Me." On the other hand it is +accidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be +received by God into glory. + +Reply Obj. 3: If the judge knows that a man who has been convicted by +false witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the +witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the +innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment +by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if +he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not +he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be +guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has +condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable +error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the +executions of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest +injustice, he does not sin by carrying out the sentence, because he +has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he +who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Kill a Man in Self-defense? + +Objection 1: It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in +self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "I do not +agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by +him; unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one +does it not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, +provided it be in keeping with one's person." Now he who kills a man +in self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this +would seem to be unlawful. + +Obj. 2: Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "How are they free from +sin in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man's +life for the sake of these contemptible things?" Now among +contemptible things he reckons "those which men may forfeit +unwillingly," as appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and +the chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful +for any man to take another's life for the sake of the life of his +own body. + +Obj. 3: Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his +clericis] says in the Decretals: "Concerning the clerics about whom +you have consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in +self-defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they +may return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree; know +that in no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any +circumstances whatever." Now clerics and laymen are alike bound to +observe the moral precepts. Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen +to kill anyone in self-defense. + +Obj. 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or +adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or +adultery or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since +the spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body. +Therefore no man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in +order to save his own life. + +Obj. 5: Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to +Matt. 7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according +to Rom. 12:19: "Not defending [Douay: 'revenging'] yourselves, my +dearly beloved." Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, +is also unlawful. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:2): "If a thief be found +breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die; +he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood." Now it is much more +lawful to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a +man guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life. + +_I answer that,_ Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, +only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the +intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is +intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since +this is accidental as explained above (Q. 43, A. 3; I-II, Q. 12, A. +1). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is +the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. +Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, +is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep +itself in _being,_ as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding +from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out +of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses +more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he +repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because +according to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel +casual.], "it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does +not exceed the limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary +for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in +order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more +care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to +take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the +common good, as stated above (A. 3), it is not lawful for a man to +intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public +authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer +this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against +the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, +although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity. + +Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when +one man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The +passage quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the +same sense. Hence he says pointedly, "for the sake of these things," +whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to +the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: Irregularity results from the act though sinless of +taking a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly +condemns a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a +man in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, +but to defend himself. + +Reply Obj. 4: The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily +directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence +sometimes results the taking of a man's life. + +Reply Obj. 5: The defense forbidden in this passage is that which +comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not defending +yourselves--that is, not striking your enemy back." +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 8] + +Whether One Is Guilty of Murder Through Killing Someone by Chance? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through +killing someone by chance. For we read (Gen. 4:23, 24) that Lamech +slew a man in mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does +not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gen. +4:23], and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one +incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): "If . . . one strike a +woman with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue +thereupon, he shall render life for life." Yet this may happen +without any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty +of murder through killing someone by chance. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons +prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not +due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs +the guilt of murder. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "When we +do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we +unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be +imputed to us." Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is +killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore +the person who did it is not accounted guilty. + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) "chance +is a cause that acts beside one's intention." Hence chance +happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary. +And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera +Relig. xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins. + +Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly +voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally, +according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental +cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide +results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of +voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes +another's death through occupying himself with unlawful things which +he ought to avoid: secondly, when he does not take sufficient care. +Hence, according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and +take due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is +not guilty of that person's death: whereas if he be occupied with +something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due +care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his action +results in someone's death. + +Reply Obj. 1: Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a +man's life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide. + +Reply Obj. 2: He that strikes a woman with child does something +unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or +of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, +especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow. + +Reply Obj. 3: According to the canons a penalty is inflicted on those +who cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, or +failing to take sufficient care. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 65 + +OF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person. +Under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) The mutilation of members; + +(2) Blows; + +(3) Imprisonment; + +(4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries +are aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with +others? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 1] + +Whether in Some Cases It May Be Lawful to Maim Anyone? + +Objection 1: It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim +anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that "sin consists +in departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is +contrary to nature." Now according to nature it is appointed by God +that a man's body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary +to nature that it should be deprived of a member. Therefore it seems +that it is always a sin to maim a person. + +Obj. 2: Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the +parts of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). But it +is unlawful to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by +public authority. Therefore neither is it lawful to maim anyone, +except perhaps by public authority. + +Obj. 3: Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the +welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself +for the sake of the soul's welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P. +I, sect. 4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves that they +might preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other +reason to maim a person. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for +tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot." + +_I answer that,_ Since a member is part of the whole human body, it +is for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence +a member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is +expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself +useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen +to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to +the whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and +retains its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury +to the whole body. But as the whole of man is directed as to his end +to the whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above +(Q. 61, A. 1; Q. 64, AA. 2, 5), it may happen that although the +removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may +nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so far as +it is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of +restraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is +lawfully deprived of life altogether on account of certain more +heinous sins, so is he deprived of a member on account of certain +lesser sins. But this is not lawful for a private individual, even +with the consent of the owner of the member, because this would +involve an injury to the community, to whom the man and all his parts +belong. If, however, the member be decayed and therefore a source of +corruption to the whole body, then it is lawful with the consent of +the owner of the member, to cut away the member for the welfare of +the whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own +welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent of the +person whose business it is to care for the welfare of the person who +has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether unlawful to maim +anyone. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a particular +nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus death and +corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the particular +nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping with +universal nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to +the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is +nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common +good. + +Reply Obj. 2: The life of the entire man is not directed to something +belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is directed +to his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to take +anyone's life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted +the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be +directed to the good of one man, and consequently in certain cases +can pertain to him. + +Reply Obj. 3: A member should not be removed for the sake of the +bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to +further the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further +one's spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, +because sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no +case is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever. +Hence Chrysostom, in his exposition on Matt. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in +Matth.), "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the +kingdom of heaven," says: "Not by maiming themselves, but by +destroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself, +since they are murderers who do such things." And further on he says: +"Nor is lust tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more +importunate, for the seed springs in us from other sources, and +chiefly from an incontinent purpose and a careless mind: and +temptation is curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by +curbing one's thoughts." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful for Parents to Strike Their Children, or +Masters Their Slaves? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their +children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4): +"You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger"; and further on +(Eph. 9:6): "And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves +[Vulg.: 'to them'] forbearing threatenings." Now some are provoked to +anger by blows, and become more troublesome when threatened. +Therefore neither should parents strike their children, nor masters +their slaves. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a father's +words are admonitory and not coercive." Now blows are a kind of +coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their +children. + +Obj. 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this +belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2). +If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for +the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any +person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same +conclusion follows. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the +rod hateth his son," and further on (Prov. 23:13): "Withhold not +correction from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he +shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul +from hell." Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): "Torture and fetters +are for a malicious slave." + +_I answer that,_ Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as +when it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while +a blow merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much +less harm than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a +person a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice. +Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to +his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike +another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And +since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave +to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, +and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused +chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher +states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their +children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their +children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on +them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear from +threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that +they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation +of correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their +threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness +temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment. + +Reply Obj. 2: The greater power should exercise the greater coercion. +Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city +has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable +punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the +father and the master who preside over the family household, which is +an imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is +exercised by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows, +which do not inflict irreparable harm. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a +willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to +those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by +blows. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 3] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Imprison a Man? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which +deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above (I-II, +Q. 18, A. 2). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter for +imprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is +unlawful to imprison a man. + +Obj. 2: Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice. Now +according to Ecclus. 15:14, "God left man in the hand of his own +counsel." Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by +chains or prisons. + +Obj. 3: Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from +doing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from +doing this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order +to restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put +a man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same +conclusion follows. + +_On the contrary,_ We read in Lev. 24 that a man was imprisoned for +the sin of blasphemy. + +_I answer that,_ In the goods of the body three things may be +considered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of the +body, and this is injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or +rest of the senses, and to this striking or anything causing a sense +of pain is opposed. Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and +this is hindered by binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention. + +Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, +unless it be done according to the order of justice, either in +punishment, or as a measure of precaution against some evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: A man who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to +lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use of +his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the order of His wisdom God +sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to +Job 5:12: "Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so +that their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes +He allows them to do what they will." In like manner, according to +human justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain +ones. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a +time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man +prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from +striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in +general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong +primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him +from doing not only evil but also good deeds. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 4] + +Whether the Sin Is Aggravated by the Fact That the Aforesaid Injuries +Are Perpetrated on Those Who Are Connected with Others? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact +that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are +connected with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character +from inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil +inflicted on a man's own person is more against his will than that +which is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an +injury inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous. + +Obj. 2: Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do injuries +to orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17): "He will +not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when she +poureth out her complaint." Now the widow and the orphan are not +connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated +through an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others. + +Obj. 3: Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own +just as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary +for him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the +case of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now +these injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary +commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 28:32) as though indicating +an aggravating circumstance: "Thy sons and thy daughters shall be +given to another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg.: 'May thy sons +and thy daughters be given,' etc.]." + +_I answer that,_ Other things being equal, an injury is a more +grievous sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is +that it is a more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in +authority than a private individual, because it conduces to the +injury of the whole community, as stated above (I-II, Q. 73, A. 9). +Now when an injury is inflicted on one who is connected in any way +with another, that injury affects two persons, so that, other things +being equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen, +however, that in view of certain circumstances, a sin committed +against one who is not connected with any other person, is more +grievous, on account of either the dignity of the person, or the +greatness of the injury. + +Reply Obj. 1: An injury inflicted on a person connected with others +is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than if it +were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view it +is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the +person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man +is guilty through injuring the other one in himself. + +Reply Obj. 2: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted +upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the same +injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they have +no one to turn to for relief. + +Reply Obj. 3: The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the +adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is +concerned, for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed +her by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her +husband, since "the wife hath not power of her own body; but the +husband" (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. Of +adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to +chastity, we shall speak in the treatise on Temperance (Q. 154, A. 8). +_______________________ + +QUESTION 66 + +OF THEFT AND ROBBERY +(In Nine Articles) + +We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man +injures his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery. + +Under this head there are nine points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things? + +(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own? + +(3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another's property? + +(4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft? + +(5) Whether every theft is a sin? + +(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin? + +(7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity? + +(8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin? + +(9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 1] + +Whether It Is Natural for Man to Possess External Things? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess +external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is +God's. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God, +according to Ps. 23:1, "The earth is the Lord's," etc. Therefore it +is not natural for man to possess external things. + +Obj. 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man (Luke +12:18), "I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my +goods," says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: "Tell me: which are thine? +where did you take them from and bring them into being?" Now whatever +man possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man +does not naturally possess external things. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad +Gratianum, i, 1]) "dominion denotes power." But man has no power over +external things, since he can work no change in their nature. +Therefore the possession of external things is not natural to man. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 8:8): "Thou hast subjected all +things under his feet." + +_I answer that,_ External things can be considered in two ways. +First, as regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power +of man, but only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. +Secondly, as regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural +dominion over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is +able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his +account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as +stated above (Q. 64, A. 1). It is by this argument that the +Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external +things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural dominion of man over +other creatures, which is competent to man in respect of his reason +wherein God's image resides, is shown forth in man's creation (Gen. +1:26) by the words: "Let us make man to our image and likeness: and +let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea," etc. + +Reply Obj. 1: God has sovereign dominion over all things: and +He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the +sustenance of man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion +over things, as regards the power to make use of them. + +Reply Obj. 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external +things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received +them from another, namely from God. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the dominion over +external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to +God alone, as stated above. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful for a Man to Possess a Thing As His Own? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as +his own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now +according to the natural law all things are common property: and the +possession of property is contrary to this community of goods. +Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external +thing to himself. + +Obj. 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted +above (A. 1, Obj. 2), says: "The rich who deem as their own property +the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by +going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and +appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use." Now it +would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of +common goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what +belongs to the community. + +Obj. 3: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp.], and his words +are quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.]: "Let no +man call his own that which is common property": and by "common" he +means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it +seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): "The +'Apostolici' are those who with extreme arrogance have given +themselves that name, because they do not admit into their communion +persons who are married or possess anything of their own, such as +both monks and clerics who in considerable number are to be found in +the Catholic Church." Now the reason why these people are heretics +was because severing themselves from the Church, they think that +those who enjoy the use of the above things, which they themselves +lack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to +maintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess property. + +_I answer that,_ Two things are competent to man in respect of +exterior things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and +in this regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover +this is necessary to human life for three reasons. First because +every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than +that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk +the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as +happens where there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because +human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is +charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas +there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing +indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to +man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed +that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the +things possessed. + +The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external +things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external +things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready +to communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says +(1 Tim. 6:17, 18): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give +easily, to communicate to others," etc. + +Reply Obj. 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not +that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in +common and that nothing should be possessed as one's own: but because +the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but +rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as +stated above (Q. 57, AA. 2, 3). Hence the ownership of possessions is +not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by +human reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand +to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts unlawfully if +by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man +does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking +possession of something which at first was common property, and gives +others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately +from using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): "Why are you +rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit +of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?" + +Reply Obj. 3: When Ambrose says: "Let no man call his own that which +is common," he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore he +adds: "He who spends too much is a robber." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 3] + +Whether the Essence of Theft Consists in Taking Another's Thing +Secretly? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take +another's thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not, +apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends +to diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as +indicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some (Isa. 3:9): +"They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not +hid it." Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should +consist in taking another's thing secretly. + +Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp., A. 2, Obj. 3, +Can. Sicut hi.]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals [*Dist. +xlvii]: "It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than to +refuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off." Therefore +just as theft consists in taking another's thing, so does it consist +in keeping it back. + +Obj. 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that +which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with +another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it +is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's +thing secretly. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): "_Fur_ (thief) is derived +from _furvus_ and so from _fuscus_ (dark), because he takes advantage +of the night." + +_I answer that,_ Three things combine together to constitute theft. +The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives +to each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take +possession of what is another's. The second thing belongs to theft as +distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such +as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be +about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another's not as +a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or +as a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his +daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. +The third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and +consists in a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it +belongs properly to theft that it consists in "taking another's thing +secretly." + +Reply Obj. 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a man +employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and +guile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a +species of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is +merely a circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both +because it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal. + +Reply Obj. 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the same +kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust +detention is included in an unjust taking. + +Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person +simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit +belongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is +the depositary's, and the thing stolen is the thief's, not simply, +but as regards its custody. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 4] + +Whether Theft and Robbery Are Sins of Different Species? + +Objection 1: It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of +different species. For theft and robbery differ as "secret" and +"manifest": because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery +is to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of +sins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically. +Therefore theft and robbery are not different species of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6). Now theft and robbery +are directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another's +property. Therefore they do not differ specifically. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of +possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore +Isidore says (Etym. x) that "he who commits a rape is called a +corrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted." Now +it is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or +secretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken by +force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and +robbery do not differ. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft +from robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that +robbery is done openly. + +_I answer that,_ Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in +as much as one man does another an injustice. Now "no man suffers an +injustice willingly," as stated in _Ethic._ v, 9. Wherefore theft and +robbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking being +involuntary on the part of the person from whom something is taken. +Now the involuntary is twofold, namely, through violence and through +ignorance, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect +of robbery differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ +specifically. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is not +derived from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to +justice: and so where there is a different kind of involuntary, there +is a different species of sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: The remote end of robbery and theft is the same. But +this is not enough for identity of species, because there is a +difference of proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing +by his own power, but the thief, by cunning. + +Reply Obj. 3: The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the part of +the woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as regards the +others from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the +part of the woman to whom violence is done. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 5] + +Whether Theft Is Always a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin +is commanded by God, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): "He hath +commanded no man to do wickedly." Yet we find that God commanded +theft, for it is written (Ex. 12:35, 36): "And the children of Israel +did as the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg.: 'as Moses had +commanded']. . . and they stripped the Egyptians." Therefore theft is +not always a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes it, +he seems to commit a theft, for he takes another's property. Yet this +seems lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold. [*See +loc. cit. in Reply.] Therefore it seems that theft is not always a +sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to sin, +because he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy +its equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his +own property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another. +Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 20:15): "Thou shalt not steal." + +_I answer that,_ If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will +find that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its +opposition to justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that +for this reason theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking +of what belongs to another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud +committed by the thief, by laying hands on another's property +secretly and cunningly. Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a +sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is no theft for a man to take another's property +either secretly or openly by order of a judge who has commanded him +to do so, because it becomes his due by the very fact that it is +adjudicated to him by the sentence of the court. Hence still less was +it a theft for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the +Egyptians at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done on +account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the Egyptians +without any cause: wherefore it is written significantly (Wis. +10:19): "The just took the spoils of the wicked." + +Reply Obj. 2: With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must be +made. For some there are that were never in anyone's possession, for +instance precious stones and jewels, found on the seashore, and such +the finder is allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst. +II, i, De rerum divis.]. The same applies to treasure hidden +underground long since and belonging to no man, except that according +to civil law the finder is bound to give half to the owner of the +land, if the treasure trove be in the land of another person [*Inst. +II, i, 39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris]. Hence in the parable of the +Gospel (Matt. 13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden +in a field that he bought the field, as though he purposed thus to +acquire the right of possessing the whole treasure. On the other Land +the treasure-trove may be nearly in someone's possession: and then if +anyone take it with the intention, not of keeping it but of returning +it to the owner who does not look upon such things as unappropriated, +he is not guilty of theft. In like manner if the thing found appears +to be unappropriated, and if the finder believes it to be so, +although he keep it, he does not commit a theft [*Inst. II, i, 47]. +In any other case the sin of theft is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De +acquirend. rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II, i, 48]: wherefore Augustine +says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb. Apost.): "If thou hast +found a thing and not returned it, thou hast stolen it" (Dig. xiv, 5, +can. Si quid invenisti). + +Reply Obj. 3: He who by stealth takes his own property which is +deposited with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound +either to restitution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is +clearly guilty of sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his +burden. On the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own property, +if this be unjustly detained by another, he sins indeed; yet not +because he burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to +restitution or compensation: but he sins against general justice by +disregarding the order of justice and usurping judgment concerning +his own property. Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor +to allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbor by acting +this way. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 6] + +Whether Theft Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it is +written (Prov. 6:30): "The fault is not so great when a man hath +stolen." But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is +not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death. But +in the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity, according +to Ex. 22:1, "If any man steal an ox or a sheep . . . he shall +restore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." +Therefore theft is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great +things. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with +eternal death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a +quill. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save +for a mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to +Zech. 5:3, "This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the +earth; for every thief shall be judged as is there written." +Therefore theft is a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 59, A. 4; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5), a +mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life +of the soul. Now charity consists principally in the love of God, and +secondarily in the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our +wishing and doing him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our +neighbor in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another +habitually, human society would be undone. Therefore theft, as being +opposed to charity, is a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: The statement that theft is not a great fault is in +view of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through +necessity. This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we +shall show further on (A. 7). Hence the text continues: "For he +stealeth to fill his hungry soul." Secondly, theft is stated not to +be a great fault in comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is +punished with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that +"if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold . . . but he that is an +adulterer . . . shall destroy his own soul." + +Reply Obj. 2: The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than +retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment which +is pronounced against sinners "according to truth" (Rom. 2:2). +Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death +punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such +as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some +horrible deformity. Hence according to the present judgment the pain +of death is not inflicted for theft which does not inflict an +irreparable harm, except when it is aggravated by some grave +circumstance, as in the case of sacrilege which is the theft of a +sacred thing, of peculation, which is theft of common property, as +Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.), and of kidnaping which is +stealing a man, for which the pain of death is inflicted (Ex. 21:16). + +Reply Obj. 3: Reason accounts as nothing that which is little: so +that a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters: +and the person who takes such things can presume that this is not +against the will of the owner. And if a person take such like very +little things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet +if his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a +mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be +through consent in a mere thought. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 7] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Steal Through Stress of Need? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need. +For penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is +stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): "If anyone, through stress +of hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do +penance for three weeks." Therefore it is not lawful to steal through +stress of need. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "there are +some actions whose very name implies wickedness," and among these he +reckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done for +a good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to remedy +a need. + +Obj. 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now, +according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal +in order to succor one's neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore +neither is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one's own needs. + +_On the contrary,_ In cases of need all things are common property, +so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property, +for need has made it common. + +_I answer that,_ Things which are of human right cannot derogate from +natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order +established by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for +the purpose of succoring man's needs by their means. Wherefore the +division and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do +not preclude the fact that man's needs have to be remedied by means +of these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in +superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring +the poor. For this reason Ambrose [*Loc. cit., A. 2, Obj. 3] says, +and his words are embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut +ii): "It is the hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's +cloak that you store away, the money that you bury in the earth is +the price of the poor man's ransom and freedom." + +Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is +impossible for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each +one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out +of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need. +Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is +evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be +at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and +there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to +succor his own need by means of another's property, by taking it +either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or +robbery. + +Reply Obj. 1: This decretal considers cases where there is no urgent +need. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly +and use another's property in a case of extreme need: because that +which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own property +by reason of that need. + +Reply Obj. 3: In a case of a like need a man may also take secretly +another's property in order to succor his neighbor in need. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 8] + +Whether Robbery May Be Committed Without Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin. +For spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the +essence of robbery, according to what has been said (A. 4). Now it is +lawful to take spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De Patriarch. +4 [*De Abraham i, 3]): "When the conqueror has taken possession of +the spoils, military discipline demands that all should be reserved +for the sovereign," in order, to wit, that he may distribute them. +Therefore in certain cases robbery is lawful. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his. Now +the things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine says +(Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. xciii.): "You falsely call things your own, +for you do not possess them justly, and according to the laws of +earthly kings you are commanded to forfeit them." Therefore it seems +that one may lawfully rob unbelievers. + +Obj. 3: Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from +their subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would seem +a grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that +case nearly every prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases +robbery is lawful. + +_On the contrary,_ Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to God +in sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds +of robbery, according to Isa. 61:8, "I am the Lord that love +judgment, and hate robbery in a holocaust." Therefore it is not +lawful to take anything by robbery. + +_I answer that,_ Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion +employed in taking unjustly from a man that which is his. Now in +human society no man can exercise coercion except through public +authority: and, consequently, if a private individual not having +public authority takes another's property by violence, he acts +unlawfully and commits a robbery, as burglars do. As regards princes, +the public power is entrusted to them that they may be the guardians +of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use violence or +coercion, save within the bounds of justice--either by fighting +against the enemy, or against the citizens, by punishing evil-doers: +and whatever is taken by violence of this kind is not the spoils of +robbery, since it is not contrary to justice. On the other hand to +take other people's property violently and against justice, in the +exercise of public authority, is to act unlawfully and to be guilty +of robbery; and whoever does so is bound to restitution. + +Reply Obj. 1: A distinction must be made in the matter of spoils. For +if they who take spoils from the enemy, are waging a just war, such +things as they seize in the war become their own property. This is no +robbery, so that they are not bound to restitution. Nevertheless even +they who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils through +cupidity arising from an evil intention, if, to wit, they fight +chiefly not for justice but for spoil. For Augustine says (De Verb. +Dom. xix; Serm. lxxxii) that "it is a sin to fight for booty." If, +however, those who take the spoil, are waging an unjust war, they are +guilty of robbery, and are bound to restitution. + +Reply Obj. 2: Unbelievers possess their goods unjustly in so far as +they are ordered by the laws of earthly princes to forfeit those +goods. Hence these may be taken violently from them, not by private +but by public authority. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is no robbery if princes exact from their subjects +that which is due to them for the safe-guarding of the common good, +even if they use violence in so doing: but if they extort something +unduly by means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary is. Hence +Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): "If justice be disregarded, what +is a king but a mighty robber? since what is a robber but a little +king?" And it is written (Ezech. 22:27): "Her princes in the midst of +her, are like wolves ravening the prey." Wherefore they are bound to +restitution, just as robbers are, and by so much do they sin more +grievously than robbers, as their actions are fraught with greater +and more universal danger to public justice whose wardens they are. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 9] + +Whether Theft Is a More Grievous Sin Than Robbery? + +Objection 1: It would seem that theft is a more grievous sin than +robbery. For theft adds fraud and guile to the taking of another's +property: and these things are not found in robbery. Now fraud and +guile are sinful in themselves, as stated above (Q. 55, AA. 4, 5). +Therefore theft is a more grievous sin than robbery. + +Obj. 2: Further, shame is fear about a wicked deed, as stated in +_Ethic._ iv, 9. Now men are more ashamed of theft than of robbery. +Therefore theft is more wicked than robbery. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more persons a sin injures the more grievous it +would seem to be. Now the great and the lowly may be injured by +theft: whereas only the weak can be injured by robbery, since it is +possible to use violence towards them. Therefore the sin of theft +seems to be more grievous than the sin of robbery. + +_On the contrary,_ According to the laws robbery is more severely +punished than theft. + +_I answer that,_ Robbery and theft are sinful, as stated above (AA. +4, 6), on account of the involuntariness on the part of the person +from whom something is taken: yet so that in theft the +involuntariness is due to ignorance, whereas in robbery it is due to +violence. Now a thing is more involuntary through violence than +through ignorance, because violence is more directly opposed to the +will than ignorance. Therefore robbery is a more grievous sin than +theft. There is also another reason, since robbery not only inflicts +a loss on a person in his things, but also conduces to the ignominy +and injury of his person, and this is of graver import than fraud or +guile which belong to theft. Hence the Reply to the First Objection +is evident. + +Reply Obj. 2: Men who adhere to sensible things think more of +external strength which is evidenced in robbery, than of internal +virtue which is forfeit through sin: wherefore they are less ashamed +of robbery than of theft. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although more persons may be injured by theft than by +robbery, yet more grievous injuries may be inflicted by robbery than +by theft: for which reason also robbery is more odious. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 67 + +OF THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE, IN JUDGING +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice, +that consist in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall consider +(1) those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and +(2) injurious words uttered extra-judicially. + +Under the first head five points occur for our consideration: (1) The +injustice of a judge in judging; (2) The injustice of the prosecutor +in accusing; (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself; +(4) The injustice of the witnesses in giving evidence; (5) The +injustice of the advocate in defending. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject? + +(2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to +deliver judgment in opposition to the truth which is known to him? + +(3) Whether a judge can justly sentence a man who is not accused? + +(4) Whether he can justly remit the punishment? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 1] + +Whether a Man Can Justly Judge One Who Is Not Subject to His +Jurisdiction? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man can justly judge one who is not +subject to his jurisdiction. For it is stated (Dan. 13) that Daniel +sentenced the ancients who were convicted of bearing false witness. +But these ancients were not subject to Daniel; indeed they were +judges of the people. Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that is +not subject to his jurisdiction. + +Obj. 2: Further, Christ was no man's subject, indeed He was "King of +kings and Lord of lords" (Apoc. 19:16). Yet He submitted to the +judgment of a man. Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge +one that is not subject to his jurisdiction. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to the law [*Cap. Licet ratione, de Foro +Comp.] a man is tried in this or that court according to his kind of +offense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject of the man +whose business it is to judge in that particular place, for instance +when the defendant belongs to another diocese or is exempt. Therefore +it seems that a man may judge one that is not his subject. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Regist. xi, epist. 64] in commenting on +Deut. 23:25, "If thou go into thy friend's corn," etc. says: "Thou +mayest not put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is entrusted +to another." + +_I answer that,_ A judge's sentence is like a particular law +regarding some particular fact. Wherefore just as a general law +should have coercive power, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 9), +so too the sentence of a judge should have coercive power, whereby +either party is compelled to comply with the judge's sentence; else +the judgment would be of no effect. Now coercive power is not +exercised in human affairs, save by those who hold public authority: +and those who have this authority are accounted the superiors of +those over whom they preside whether by ordinary or by delegated +authority. Hence it is evident that no man can judge others than his +subjects and this in virtue either of delegated or of ordinary +authority. + +Reply Obj. 1: In judging those ancients Daniel exercised an +authority delegated to him by Divine instinct. This is indicated where +it is said (Dan. 13:45) that "the Lord raised up the . . . spirit of a +young boy." + +Reply Obj. 2: In human affairs a man may submit of his own accord to +the judgment of others although these be not his superiors, an +example of which is when parties agree to a settlement by +arbitrators. Wherefore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be +upheld by a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising +authority in the case, have not of themselves full power of coercion. +Accordingly in this way did Christ of his own accord submit to human +judgment: and thus too did Pope Leo [*Leo IV] submit to the judgment +of the emperor [*Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii, qu. 7]. + +Reply Obj. 3: The bishop of the defendant's diocese becomes +the latter's superior as regards the fault committed, even though he +be exempt: unless perchance the defendant offend in a matter exempt +from the bishop's authority, for instance in administering the +property of an exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a +theft, or a murder or the like, he may be justly condemned by the +ordinary. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful for a Judge to Pronounce Judgment Against the +Truth That He Knows, on Account of Evidence to the Contrary? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment +against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the +contrary. For it is written (Deut. 17:9): "Thou shalt come to the +priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that +time; and thou shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the truth +of the judgment." Now sometimes certain things are alleged against +the truth, as when something is proved by means of false witnesses. +Therefore it is unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment according +to what is alleged and proved in opposition to the truth which he +knows. + +Obj. 2: Further, in pronouncing judgment a man should conform to the +Divine judgment, since "it is the judgment of God" (Deut. 1:17). Now +"the judgment of God is according to the truth" (Rom. 2:2), and it +was foretold of Christ (Isa. 11:3, 4): "He shall not judge according +to the sight of the eyes, nor reprove according to the hearing of the +ears. But He shall judge the poor with justice, and shall reprove +with equity for the meek of the earth." Therefore the judge ought not +to pronounce judgment according to the evidence before him if it be +contrary to what he knows himself. + +Obj. 3: Further, the reason why evidence is required in a court of +law, is that the judge may have a faithful record of the truth of the +matter, wherefore in matters of common knowledge there is no need of +judicial procedure, according to 1 Tim. 5:24, "Some men's sins are +manifest, going before to judgment." Consequently, if the judge by +his personal knowledge is aware of the truth, he should pay no heed +to the evidence, but should pronounce sentence according to the truth +which he knows. + +Obj. 4: Further, the word "conscience" denotes application of +knowledge to a matter of action as stated in the First Part (Q. 79, +A. 13). Now it is a sin to act contrary to one's knowledge. Therefore +a judge sins if he pronounces sentence according to the evidence but +against his conscience of the truth. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Ambrose, Super Ps. 118, serm. 20] says +in his commentary on the Psalter: "A good judge does nothing +according to his private opinion but pronounces sentence according to +the law and the right." Now this is to pronounce judgment according +to what is alleged and proved in court. Therefore a judge ought to +pronounce judgment in accordance with these things, and not according +to his private opinion. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 60, AA. 2, 6) it is the +duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as much as he exercises +public authority, wherefore his judgment should be based on +information acquired by him, not from his knowledge as a private +individual, but from what he knows as a public person. Now the latter +knowledge comes to him both in general and in particular--in general +through the public laws, whether Divine or human, and he should admit +no evidence that conflicts therewith--in some particular matter, +through documents and witnesses, and other legal means of +information, which in pronouncing his sentence, he ought to follow +rather than the information he has acquired as a private individual. +And yet this same information may be of use to him, so that he can +more rigorously sift the evidence brought forward, and discover its +weak points. If, however, he is unable to reject that evidence +juridically, he must, as stated above, follow it in pronouncing +sentence. + +Reply Obj. 1: The reason why, in the passage quoted, it is stated +that the judges should first of all be asked their reasons, is to +make it clear that the judges ought to judge the truth in accordance +with the evidence. + +Reply Obj. 2: To judge belongs to God in virtue of His own power: +wherefore His judgment is based on the truth which He Himself knows, +and not on knowledge imparted by others: the same is to be said of +Christ, Who is true God and true man: whereas other judges do not +judge in virtue of their own power, so that there is no comparison. + +Reply Obj. 3: The Apostle refers to the case where something is well +known not to the judge alone, but both to him and to others, so that +the guilty party can by no means deny his guilt (as in the case of +notorious criminals), and is convicted at once from the evidence of +the fact. If, on the other hand, it be well known to the judge, but +not to others, or to others, but not to the judge, then it is +necessary for the judge to sift the evidence. + +Reply Obj. 4: In matters touching his own person, a man must form his +conscience from his own knowledge, but in matters concerning the +public authority, he must form his conscience in accordance with the +knowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 3] + +Whether a Judge May Condemn a Man Who Is Not Accused? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a judge may pass sentence on a man +who is not accused. For human justice is derived from Divine justice. +Now God judges the sinner even though there be no accuser. Therefore +it seems that a man may pass sentence of condemnation on a man even +though there be no accuser. + +Obj. 2: Further, an accuser is required in judicial procedure in +order that he may relate the crime to the judge. Now sometimes the +crime may come to the judge's knowledge otherwise than by accusation; +for instance, by denunciation, or by evil report, or through the +judge himself being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may condemn a +man without there being an accuser. + +Obj. 3: Further, the deeds of holy persons are related in Holy Writ, +as models of human conduct. Now Daniel was at the same time the +accuser and the judge of the wicked ancients (Dan. 13). Therefore it +is not contrary to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while +being at the same time his accuser. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose in his commentary on 1 Cor. 5:2, +expounding the Apostle's sentence on the fornicator, says that "a +judge should not condemn without an accuser, since our Lord did not +banish Judas, who was a thief, yet was not accused." + +_I answer that,_ A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as +the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as +to one who is the personification of justice." Now, as stated above +(Q. 58, A. 2), justice is not between a man and himself but between +one man and another. Hence a judge must needs judge between two +parties, which is the case when one is the prosecutor, and the other +the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases the judge cannot sentence +a man unless the latter has an accuser, according to Acts 25:16: "It +is not the custom of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he +who is accused have his accusers present, and have liberty to make +his answer, to clear himself of the crimes" of which he is accused. + +Reply Obj. 1: God, in judging man, takes the sinner's conscience as +his accuser, according to Rom. 2:15, "Their thoughts between +themselves accusing, or also defending one another"; or again, He +takes the evidence of the fact as regards the deed itself, according +to Gen. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to Me from the +earth." + +Reply Obj. 2: Public disgrace takes the place of an accuser. Hence a +gloss on Gen. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood," etc. says: +"There is no need of an accuser when the crime committed is +notorious." In a case of denunciation, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 7), +the amendment, not the punishment, of the sinner is intended: +wherefore when a man is denounced for a sin, nothing is done against +him, but for him, so that no accuser is required. The punishment that +is inflicted is on account of his rebellion against the Church, and +since this rebellion is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser. +The fact that the judge himself was an eye-witness, does not +authorize him to proceed to pass sentence, except according to the +order of judicial procedure. + +Reply Obj. 3: God, in judging man, proceeds from His own knowledge of +the truth, whereas man does not, as stated above (A. 2). Hence a man +cannot be accuser, witness and judge at the same time, as God is. +Daniel was at once accuser and judge, because he was the executor of +the sentence of God, by whose instinct he was moved, as stated above +(A. 1, ad 1). +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 4] + +Whether the Judge Can Lawfully Remit the Punishment? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the judge can lawfully remit the +punishment. For it is written (James 2:13): "Judgment without mercy" +shall be done "to him that hath not done mercy." Now no man is +punished for not doing what he cannot do lawfully. Therefore any +judge can lawfully do mercy by remitting the punishment. + +Obj. 2: Further, human judgment should imitate the Divine judgment. +Now God remits the punishment to sinners, because He desires not the +death of the sinner, according to Ezech. 18:23. Therefore a human +judge also may lawfully remit the punishment to one who repents. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is lawful for anyone to do what is profitable to +some one and harmful to none. Now the remission of his punishment +profits the guilty man and harms nobody. Therefore the judge can +lawfully loose a guilty man from his punishment. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 13:8, 9) concerning anyone +who would persuade a man to serve strange gods: "Neither let thy eye +spare him to pity and conceal him, but thou shalt presently put him +to death": and of the murderer it is written (Deut. 19:12, 13): "He +shall die. Thou shalt not pity him." + +_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said (AA. 2, +3), with regard to the question in point, two things may be observed +in connection with a judge. One is that he has to judge between +accuser and defendant, while the other is that he pronounces the +judicial sentence, in virtue of his power, not as a private +individual but as a public person. Accordingly on two counts a judge +is hindered from loosing a guilty person from his punishment. First +on the part of the accuser, whose right it sometimes is that the +guilty party should be punished--for instance on account of some +injury committed against the accuser--because it is not in the power +of a judge to remit such punishment, since every judge is bound to +give each man his right. Secondly, he finds a hindrance on the part +of the commonwealth, whose power he exercises, and to whose good it +belongs that evil-doers should be punished. + +Nevertheless in this respect there is a difference between judges of +lower degree and the supreme judge, i.e. the sovereign, to whom the +entire public authority is entrusted. For the inferior judge has no +power to exempt a guilty man from punishment against the laws imposed +on him by his superior. Wherefore Augustine in commenting on John +19:11, "Thou shouldst not have any power against Me," says (Tract. +cxvi in Joan.): "The power which God gave Pilate was such that he was +under the power of Caesar, so that he was by no means free to acquit +the person accused." On the other hand the sovereign who has full +authority in the commonwealth, can lawfully remit the punishment to a +guilty person, provided the injured party consent to the remission, +and that this do not seem detrimental to the public good. + +Reply Obj. 1: There is a place for the judge's mercy in matters that +are left to the judge's discretion, because in like matters a good +man is slow to punish as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But +in matters that are determined in accordance with Divine or human +laws, it is not left to him to show mercy. + +Reply Obj. 2: God has supreme power of judging, and it concerns Him +whatever is done sinfully against anyone. Therefore He is free to +remit the punishment, especially since punishment is due to sin +chiefly because it is done against Him. He does not, however, remit +the punishment, except in so far as it becomes His goodness, which is +the source of all laws. + +Reply Obj. 3: If the judge were to remit punishment inordinately, he +would inflict an injury on the community, for whose good it behooves +ill-deeds to be punished, in order that men may avoid sin. Hence the +text, after appointing the punishment of the seducer, adds (Deut. +13:11): "That all Israel hearing may fear, and may do no more +anything like this." He would also inflict harm on the injured +person; who is compensated by having his honor restored in the +punishment of the man who has injured him. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 68 + +OF MATTERS CONCERNING UNJUST ACCUSATION +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. Under +this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether a man is bound to accuse? + +(2) Whether the accusation should be made in writing? + +(3) How is an accusation vitiated? + +(4) How should those be punished who have accused a man wrongfully? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 1] + +Whether a Man Is Bound to Accuse? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to accuse. For no +man is excused on account of sin from fulfilling a Divine precept, +since he would thus profit by his sin. Yet on account of sin some are +disqualified from accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of +evil fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not yet +proved to be innocent [*1 Tim. 1:5]. Therefore a man is not bound by +a Divine precept to accuse. + +Obj. 2: Further, every duty depends on charity which is "the end of +the precept" [*Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. 1]: +wherefore it is written (Rom. 13:8): "Owe no man anything, but to +love one another." Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that +man owes to all both of high and of low degree, both superiors and +inferiors. Since therefore subjects should not accuse their +superiors, nor persons of lower degree, those of a higher degree, as +shown in several chapters (Decret. II, qu. vii), it seems that it is +no man's duty to accuse. + +Obj. 3: Further, no man is bound to act against the fidelity which he +owes his friend; because he ought not to do to another what he would +not have others do to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary +to the fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written (Prov. +11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but he that +is faithful, concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend." +Therefore a man is not bound to accuse. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 5:1): "If any one sin, and +hear the voice of one swearing, and is a witness either because he +himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall +bear his iniquity." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 33, AA. 6, 7; Q. 67, A. 3, ad +2), the difference between denunciation and accusation is that in +denunciation we aim at a brother's amendment, whereas in accusation +we intend the punishment of his crime. Now the punishments of this +life are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not the +final time of retribution, but in their character of medicine, +conducing either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of +the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punishment of +evil-doers. The former of these is intended in denunciation, as +stated, whereas the second regards properly accusation. Hence in the +case of a crime that conduces to the injury of the commonwealth, a +man is bound to accusation, provided he can offer sufficient proof, +since it is the accuser's duty to prove: as, for example, when +anyone's sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual corruption of the +community. If, however, the sin be not such as to affect the +community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is not bound +to attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he cannot duly +accomplish. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin from doing +what men are under an obligation to do: for instance from meriting +eternal life, and from receiving the sacraments of the Church. Nor +does a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous fault to fail +to do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are perfections of +man. + +Reply Obj. 2: Subjects are debarred from accusing their superiors, +"if it is not the affection of charity but their own wickedness that +leads them to defame and disparage the conduct of their superiors" +[*Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7]--or again if +the subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty of +crime [*Decret. II, qu. vii, can. Praesumunt.]. Otherwise, provided +they be in other respects qualified to accuse, it is lawful for +subjects to accuse their superiors out of charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is contrary to fidelity to make known secrets +to the injury of a person; but not if they be revealed for the good of +the community, which should always be preferred to a private good. +Hence it is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to the common +good: and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are sufficient +witnesses to prove it. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Necessary for the Accusation to Be Made in Writing? + +Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for the accusation to be made +in writing. For writing was devised as an aid to the human memory of +the past. But an accusation is made in the present. Therefore the +accusation needs not to be made in writing. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Per +scripta) that "no man may accuse or be accused in his absence." Now +writing seems to be useful in the fact that it is a means of +notifying something to one who is absent, as Augustine declares (De +Trin. x, 1). Therefore the accusation need not be in writing: and all +the more that the canon declares that "no accusation in writing +should be accepted." + +Obj. 3: Further, a man's crime is made known by denunciation, even as +by accusation. Now writing is unnecessary in denunciation. Therefore +it is seemingly unnecessary in accusation. + +_On the contrary,_ It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. +Accusatorum) that "the role of accuser must never be sanctioned +without the accusation be in writing." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 67, A. 3), when the process in a +criminal case goes by way of accusation, the accuser is in the +position of a party, so that the judge stands between the accuser and +the accused for the purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it +behooves one to proceed on certainties, as far as possible. Since +however verbal utterances are apt to escape one's memory, the judge +would be unable to know for certain what had been said and with what +qualifications, when he comes to pronounce sentence, unless it were +drawn up in writing. Hence it has with reason been established that +the accusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure, +should be put into writing. + +Reply Obj. 1: Words are so many and so various that it is difficult +to remember each one. A proof of this is the fact that if a number of +people who have heard the same words be asked what was said, they +will not agree in repeating them, even after a short time. And since +a slight difference of words changes the sense, even though the +judge's sentence may have to be pronounced soon afterwards, the +certainty of judgment requires that the accusation be drawn up in +writing. + +Reply Obj. 2: Writing is needed not only on account of the absence of +the person who has something to notify, or of the person to whom +something is notified, but also on account of the delay of time as +stated above (ad 1). Hence when the canon says, "Let no accusation be +accepted in writing" it refers to the sending of an accusation by one +who is absent: but it does not exclude the necessity of writing when +the accuser is present. + +Reply Obj. 3: The denouncer does not bind himself to give proofs: +wherefore he is not punished if he is unable to prove. For this +reason writing is unnecessary in a denunciation: and it suffices that +the denunciation be made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in +virtue of her office, to the correction of the brother. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 3] + +Whether an Accusation Is Rendered Unjust by Calumny, Collusion or +Evasion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust +by calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu. +iii [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.], "calumny consists +in falsely charging a person with a crime." Now sometimes one man +falsely accuses another of a crime through ignorance of fact which +excuses him. Therefore it seems that an accusation is not always +rendered unjust through being slanderous. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "collusion +consists in hiding the truth about a crime." But seemingly this is +not unlawful, because one is not bound to disclose every crime, as +stated above (A. 1; Q. 33, A. 7). Therefore it seems that an +accusation is not rendered unjust by collusion. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "evasion +consists in withdrawing altogether from an accusation." But this can +be done without injustice: for it is stated there also: "If a man +repent of having made a wicked accusation and inscription* in a +matter which he cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the +innocent party whom he has accused, let them acquit one another." +[*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the +writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was +that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, +to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if +proved guilty.] Therefore evasion does not render an accusation +unjust. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated by the same authority: "The rashness +of accusers shows itself in three ways. For they are guilty either of +calumny, or of collusion, or of evasion." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), accusation is ordered for +the common good which it aims at procuring by means of knowledge of +the crime. Now no man ought to injure a person unjustly, in order to +promote the common good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when +making an accusation: first through acting unjustly against the +accused, by charging him falsely with the commission of a crime, i.e. +by calumniating him; secondly, on the part of the commonwealth, whose +good is intended chiefly in an accusation, when anyone with wicked +intent hinders a sin being punished. This again happens in two ways: +first by having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This +belongs to collusion (_prevaricatio_) for "he that is guilty of +collusion is like one who rides astraddle (_varicator_), because he +helps the other party, and betrays his own side" [*Append. Grat. ad +can. Si quem poenituerit.]. Secondly by withdrawing altogether from +the accusation. This is evasion (_tergiversatio_) for by desisting +from what he had begun he seems to turn his back (_tergum vertere_). + +Reply Obj. 1: A man ought not to proceed to accuse except of what he +is quite certain about, wherein ignorance of fact has no place. Yet +he who falsely charges another with a crime is not a calumniator +unless he gives utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it +happens sometimes that a man through levity of mind proceeds to +accuse someone, because he believes too readily what he hears, and +this pertains to rashness; while, on the other hand sometimes a man +is led to make an accusation on account of an error for which he is +not to blame. All these things must be weighed according to the +judge's prudence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of +calumny, who through levity of mind or an error for which he is not +to be blamed has uttered a false accusation. + +Reply Obj. 2: Not everyone who hides the truth about a crime is +guilty of collusion, but only he who deceitfully hides the matter +about which he makes the accusation, by collusion with the defendant, +dissembling his proofs, and admitting false excuses. + +Reply Obj. 3: Evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from the +accusation, by renouncing the intention of accusing, not anyhow, but +inordinately. There are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly +desist from accusing without committing a sin--in one way, in the +very process of accusation, if it come to his knowledge that the +matter of his accusation is false, and then by mutual consent the +accuser and the defendant acquit one another--in another way, if the +accusation be quashed by the sovereign to whom belongs the care of +the common good, which it is intended to procure by the accusation. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 4] + +Whether an Accuser Who Fails to Prove His Indictment Is Bound to the +Punishment of Retaliation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the accuser who fails to prove his +indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation. For +sometimes a man is led by a just error to make an accusation, in +which case the judge acquit the accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu. +iii. [*Append. Grat., ad can. Si quem poenituerit.] Therefore the +accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the +punishment of retaliation. + +Obj. 2: Further, if the punishment of retaliation ought to be +inflicted on one who has accused unjustly, this will be on account of +the injury he has done to someone--but not on account of any injury +done to the person of the accused, for in that case the sovereign +could not remit this punishment, nor on account of an injury to the +commonwealth, because then the accused could not acquit him. +Therefore the punishment of retaliation is not due to one who has +failed to prove his accusation. + +Obj. 3: Further, the one same sin does not deserve a twofold +punishment, according to Nahum 1:9 [*Septuagint version]: "God shall +not judge the same thing a second time." But he who fails to prove +his accusation, incurs the punishment due to defamation [*Can. +Infames, caus. vi, qu. 1], which punishment even the Pope seemingly +cannot remit, according to a statement of Pope Gelasius [*Callist. I, +Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.]: "Although we are able to save souls by +Penance, we are unable to remove the defamation." Therefore he is not +bound to suffer the punishment of retaliation. + +_On the contrary,_ Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): "He that fails to +prove his accusation, must himself suffer the punishment which his +accusation inferred." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), in a case, where the +procedure is by way of accusation, the accuser holds the position of +a party aiming at the punishment of the accused. Now the duty of the +judge is to establish the equality of justice between them: and the +equality of justice requires that a man should himself suffer +whatever harm he has intended to be inflicted on another, according +to Ex. 21:24, "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Consequently it is just +that he who by accusing a man has put him in danger of being punished +severely, should himself suffer a like punishment. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5) justice does not +always require counterpassion, because it matters considerably +whether a man injures another voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury +deserves punishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when the +judge becomes aware that a man has made a false accusation, not with +a mind to do harm, but involuntarily through ignorance or a just +error, he does not impose the punishment of retaliation. + +Reply Obj. 2: He who accuses wrongfully sins both against the person +of the accused and against the commonwealth; wherefore he is punished +on both counts. This is the meaning of what is written (Deut. +19:18-20): "And when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find +that the false witness hath told a lie against his brother: they +shall render to him as he meant to do to his brother," and this +refers to the injury done to the person: and afterwards, referring to +the injury done to the commonwealth, the text continues: "And thou +shalt take away the evil out of the midst of thee, that others +hearing may fear, and may not dare to do such things." Specially, +however, does he injure the person of the accused, if he accuse him +falsely. Wherefore the accused, if innocent, may condone the injury +done to himself, particularly if the accusation were made not +calumniously but out of levity of mind. But if the accuser desist +from accusing an innocent man, through collusion with the latter's +adversary, he inflicts an injury on the commonwealth: and this cannot +be condoned by the accused, although it can be remitted by the +sovereign, who has charge of the commonwealth. + +Reply Obj. 3: The accuser deserves the punishment of retaliation in +compensation for the harm he attempts to inflict on his neighbor: but +the punishment of disgrace is due to him for his wickedness in +accusing another man calumniously. Sometimes the sovereign remits the +punishment, and not the disgrace, and sometimes he removes the +disgrace also: wherefore the Pope also can remove this disgrace. When +Pope Gelasius says: "We cannot remove the disgrace," he may mean +either the disgrace attaching to the deed (_infamia facti_), or that +sometimes it is not expedient to remove it, or again he may be +referring to the disgrace inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian +states (Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.). +_______________________ + +QUESTION 69 + +OF SINS COMMITTED AGAINST JUSTICE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider those sins which are committed against justice +on the part of the defendant. Under this head there are four points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to +one's condemnation? + +(2) Whether it is lawful to defend oneself with calumnies? + +(3) Whether it is lawful to escape condemnation by appealing? + +(4) Whether it is lawful for one who has been condemned to defend +himself by violence if he be able to do so? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 1] + +Whether One Can, Without a Mortal Sin, Deny the Truth Which Would +Lead to One's Condemnation? + +Objection 1: It would seem one can, without a mortal sin, deny the +truth which would lead to one's condemnation. For Chrysostom says +(Hom. xxxi super Ep. ad Heb.): "I do not say that you should lay bare +your guilt publicly, nor accuse yourself before others." Now if the +accused were to confess the truth in court, he would lay bare his +guilt and be his own accuser. Therefore he is not bound to tell the +truth: and so he does not sin mortally if he tell a lie in court. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as it is an officious lie when one tells a lie +in order to rescue another man from death, so is it an officious lie +when one tells a lie in order to free oneself from death, since one +is more bound towards oneself than towards another. Now an officious +lie is considered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore if the +accused denies the truth in court, in order to escape death, he does +not sin mortally. + +Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated +above (Q. 24, A. 12). But that the accused lie by denying himself to +be guilty of the crime laid to his charge is not contrary to charity, +neither as regards the love we owe God, nor as to the love due to our +neighbor. Therefore such a lie is not a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Whatever is opposed to the glory of God is a +mortal sin, because we are bound by precept to "do all to the glory +of God" (1 Cor. 10:31). Now it is to the glory of God that the +accused confess that which is alleged against him, as appears from +the words of Josue to Achan, "My son, give glory to the Lord God of +Israel, and confess and tell me what thou hast done, hide it not" +(Joshua 7:19). Therefore it is a mortal sin to lie in order to cover +one's guilt. + +_I answer that,_ Whoever acts against the due order of justice, sins +mortally, as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4). Now it belongs to the order +of justice that a man should obey his superior in those matters to +which the rights of his authority extend. Again, the judge, as stated +above (Q. 67, A. 1), is the superior in relation to the person whom +he judges. Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge +the truth which the latter exacts from him according to the form of +law. Hence if he refuse to tell the truth which he is under +obligation to tell, or if he mendaciously deny it, he sins mortally. +If, on the other hand, the judge asks of him that which he cannot ask +in accordance with the order of justice, the accused is not bound to +satisfy him, and he may lawfully escape by appealing or otherwise: +but it is not lawful for him to lie. + +Reply Obj. 1: When a man is examined by the judge according to the +order of justice, he does not lay bare his own guilt, but his guilt +is unmasked by another, since the obligation of answering is imposed +on him by one whom he is bound to obey. + +Reply Obj. 2: To lie, with injury to another person, in order to +rescue a man from death is not a purely officious lie, for it has an +admixture of the pernicious lie: and when a man lies in court in +order to exculpate himself, he does an injury to one whom he is bound +to obey, since he refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the truth. + +Reply Obj. 3: He who lies in court by denying his guilt, acts both +against the love of God to whom judgment belongs, and against the +love of his neighbor, and this not only as regards the judge, to whom +he refuses his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished +if he fail to prove his accusation. Hence it is written (Ps. 140:4): +"Incline not my heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins": on +which words a gloss says: "Shameless men are wont by lying to deny +their guilt when they have been found out." And Gregory in expounding +Job 31:33, "If as a man I have hid my sin," says (Moral. xxii, 15): +"It is a common vice of mankind to sin in secret, by lying to hide +the sin that has been committed, and when convicted to aggravate the +sin by defending oneself." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful for the Accused to Defend Himself with +Calumnies? + +Objection 1: It would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself +with calumnies. Because, according to civil law (Cod. II, iv, De +transact. 18), when a man is on trial for his life it is lawful for +him to bribe his adversary. Now this is done chiefly by defending +oneself with calumnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his +life does not sin if he defend himself with calumnies. + +Obj. 2: Further, an accuser who is guilty of collusion with the +accused, is punishable by law (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem +poenit.). Yet no punishment is imposed on the accused for collusion +with the accuser. Therefore it would seem lawful for the accused to +defend himself with calumnies. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and +declineth from evil, the fool leapeth over and is confident." Now +what is done wisely is no sin. Therefore no matter how a man declines +from evil, he does not sin. + +_On the contrary,_ In criminal cases an oath has to be taken against +calumnious allegations (Extra, De juramento calumniae, cap. +Inhaerentes): and this would not be the case if it were lawful to +defend oneself with calumnies. Therefore it is not lawful for the +accused to defend himself with calumnies. + +_I answer that,_ It is one thing to withhold the truth, and another +to utter a falsehood. The former is lawful sometimes, for a man is +not bound to divulge all truth, but only such as the judge can and +must require of him according to the order of justice; as, for +instance, when the accused is already disgraced through the +commission of some crime, or certain indications of his guilt have +already been discovered, or again when his guilt is already more or +less proven. On the other hand it is never lawful to make a false +declaration. + +As regards what he may do lawfully, a man can employ either lawful +means, and such as are adapted to the end in view, which belongs to +prudence; or he can use unlawful means, unsuitable to the proposed +end, and this belongs to craftiness, which is exercised by fraud and +guile, as shown above (Q. 55, AA. 3, seqq.). His conduct in the +former case is praiseworthy, in the latter sinful. Accordingly it is +lawful for the accused to defend himself by withholding the truth +that he is not bound to avow, by suitable means, for instance by not +answering such questions as he is not bound to answer. This is not to +defend himself with calumnies, but to escape prudently. But it is +unlawful for him, either to utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth +that he is bound to avow, or to employ guile or fraud, because fraud +and guile have the force of a lie, and so to use them would be to +defend oneself with calumnies. + +Reply Obj. 1: Human laws leave many things unpunished, which +according to the Divine judgment are sins, as, for example, simple +fornication; because human law does not exact perfect virtue from +man, for such virtue belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a +number of people as human law has to direct. That a man is sometimes +unwilling to commit a sin in order to escape from the death of the +body, the danger of which threatens the accused who is on trial for +his life, is an act of perfect virtue, since "death is the most +fearful of all temporal things" (Ethic. iii, 6). Wherefore if the +accused, who is on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins +indeed by inducing him to do what is unlawful, yet the civil law does +not punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to be lawful. + +Reply Obj. 2: If the accuser is guilty of collusion with the accused +and the latter is guilty, he incurs punishment, and so it is evident +that he sins. Wherefore, since it is a sin to induce a man to sin, or +to take part in a sin in any way--for the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32), +that "they . . . are worthy of death . . . that consent" to those who +sin--it is evident that the accused also sins if he is guilty of +collusion with his adversary. Nevertheless according to human laws no +punishment is inflicted on him, for the reason given above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The wise man hides himself not by slandering others but +by exercising prudence. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 3] + +Whether It Is Lawful for the Accused to Escape Judgment by Appealing? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for the accused to escape +judgment by appealing. The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "Let every soul +be subject to the higher powers." Now the accused by appealing +refuses to be subject to a higher power, viz. the judge. Therefore he +commits a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, ordinary authority is more binding than that which +we choose for ourselves. Now according to the Decretals (II, qu. vi, +cap. A judicibus) it is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen by +common consent. Much less therefore is it lawful to appeal from +ordinary judges. + +Obj. 3: Further, whatever is lawful once is always lawful. But it is +not lawful to appeal after the tenth day [*Can. Anteriorum, caus. ii, +qu. 6], nor a third time on the same point [*Can. Si autem, caus. ii, +qu. 6]. Therefore it would seem that an appeal is unlawful in itself. + +_On the contrary,_ Paul appealed to Caesar (Acts 25). + +_I answer that,_ There are two motives for which a man appeals. First +through confidence in the justice of his cause, seeing that he is +unjustly oppressed by the judge, and then it is lawful for him to +appeal, because this is a prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid +down (Decret. II, qu. vi, can. Omnis oppressus): "All those who are +oppressed are free, if they so wish, to appeal to the judgment of the +priests, and no man may stand in their way." Secondly, a man appeals +in order to cause a delay, lest a just sentence be pronounced against +him. This is to defend oneself calumniously, and is unlawful as +stated above (A. 2). For he inflicts an injury both on the judge, +whom he hinders in the exercise of his office, and on his adversary, +whose justice he disturbs as far as he is able. Hence it is laid down +(II, qu. vi, can. Omnino puniendus): "Without doubt a man should be +punished if his appeal be declared unjust." + +Reply Obj. 1: A man should submit to the lower authority in so far as +the latter observes the order of the higher authority. If the lower +authority departs from the order of the higher, we ought not to +submit to it, for instance "if the proconsul order one thing and the +emperor another," according to a gloss on Rom. 13:2. Now when a judge +oppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he departs from the order +of the higher authority, whereby he is obliged to judge justly. Hence +it is lawful for a man who is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to +the authority of the higher power, by appealing either before or +after sentence has been pronounced. And since it is to be presumed +that there is no rectitude where true faith is lacking, it is +unlawful for a Catholic to appeal to an unbelieving judge, according +to Decret. II, qu. vi, can. _Catholicus:_ "The Catholic who appeals +to the decision of a judge of another faith shall be excommunicated, +whether his case be just or unjust." Hence the Apostle also rebuked +those who went to law before unbelievers (1 Cor. 6:6). + +Reply Obj. 2: It is due to a man's own fault or neglect that, of his +own accord, he submits to the judgment of one in whose justice he has +no confidence. Moreover it would seem to point to levity of mind for +a man not to abide by what he has once approved of. Hence it is with +reason that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing from the +decision of judges of our own choice, who have no power save by +virtue of the consent of the litigants. On the other hand the +authority of an ordinary judge depends, not on the consent of those +who are subject to his judgment, but on the authority of the king or +prince who appointed him. Hence, as a remedy against his unjust +oppression, the law allows one to have recourse to appeal, so that +even if the judge be at the same time ordinary and chosen by the +litigants, it is lawful to appeal from his decision, since seemingly +his ordinary authority occasioned his being chosen as arbitrator. Nor +is it to be imputed as a fault to the man who consented to his being +arbitrator, without adverting to the fact that he was appointed +ordinary judge by the prince. + +Reply Obj. 3: The equity of the law so guards the interests of +the one party that the other is not oppressed. Thus it allows ten days +for appeal to be made, this being considered sufficient time for +deliberating on the expediency of an appeal. If on the other hand +there were no fixed time limit for appealing, the certainty of +judgment would ever be in suspense, so that the other party would +suffer an injury. The reason why it is not allowed to appeal a third +time on the same point, is that it is not probable that the judges +would fail to judge justly so many times. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 4] + +Whether a Man Who Is Condemned to Death May Lawfully Defend Himself +If He Can? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man who is condemned to death may +lawfully defend himself if he can. For it is always lawful to do that +to which nature inclines us, as being of natural right, so to speak. +Now, to resist corruption is an inclination of nature not only in men +and animals but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore if he can +do so, the accused, after condemnation, may lawfully resist being put +to death. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as a man, by resistance, escapes the death to +which he has been condemned, so does he by flight. Now it is lawful +seemingly to escape death by flight, according to Ecclus. 9:18, "Keep +thee far from the man that hath power to kill [and not to quicken]" +[*The words in the brackets are not in the Vulgate]. Therefore it is +also lawful for the accused to resist. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 24:11): "Deliver them that are +led to death: and those that are drawn to death forbear not to +deliver." Now a man is under greater obligation to himself than to +another. Therefore it is lawful for a condemned man to defend himself +from being put to death. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): "He that resisteth +the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, +purchase to themselves damnation." Now a condemned man, by defending +himself, resists the power in the point of its being ordained by God +"for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of the good" +[*1 Pet. 2:14]. Therefore he sins in defending himself. + +_I answer that,_ A man may be condemned to death in two ways. First +justly, and then it is not lawful for the condemned to defend +himself, because it is lawful for the judge to combat his resistance +by force, so that on his part the fight is unjust, and consequently +without any doubt he sins. + +Secondly a man is condemned unjustly: and such a sentence is like the +violence of robbers, according to Ezech. 22:21, "Her princes in the +midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood." +Wherefore even as it is lawful to resist robbers, so is it lawful, in +a like case, to resist wicked princes; except perhaps in order to +avoid scandal, whence some grave disturbance might be feared to arise. + +Reply Obj. 1: Reason was given to man that he might ensue those +things to which his nature inclines, not in all cases, but in +accordance with the order of reason. Hence not all self-defense is +lawful, but only such as is accomplished with due moderation. + +Reply Obj. 2: When a man is condemned to death, he has not to kill +himself, but to suffer death: wherefore he is not bound to do +anything from which death would result, such as to stay in the place +whence he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those who +lead him to death, in order that he may not suffer what is just for +him to suffer. Even so, if a man were condemned to die of hunger, he +does not sin if he partakes of food brought to him secretly, because +to refrain from taking it would be to kill himself. + +Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the wise man does not direct that one +should deliver a man from death in opposition to the order of +justice: wherefore neither should a man deliver himself from death by +resisting against justice. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 70 + +OF INJUSTICE WITH REGARD TO THE PERSON OF THE WITNESS +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider injustice with regard to the person of the +witness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether a man is bound to give evidence? + +(2) Whether the evidence of two or three witnesses suffices? + +(3) Whether a man's evidence may be rejected without any fault on his +part? + +(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to bear false witness? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 1] + +Whether a Man Is Bound to Give Evidence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to give evidence. +Augustine says (QQ. Gen. 1:26) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 33, 34], +that when Abraham said of his wife (Gen. 20:2), "She is my sister," +he wished the truth to be concealed and not a lie be told. Now, by +hiding the truth a man abstains from giving evidence. Therefore a man +is not bound to give evidence. + +Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to act deceitfully. Now it is +written (Prov. 11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully revealeth +secrets, but he that is faithful concealeth the thing committed to +him by his friend." Therefore a man is not always bound to give +evidence, especially on matters committed to him as a secret by a +friend. + +Obj. 3: Further, clerics and priests, more than others, are bound to +those things that are necessary for salvation. Yet clerics and +priests are forbidden to give evidence when a man is on trial for his +life. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to give evidence. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Can. Quisquis, caus. xi, qu. 3, cap. +Falsidicus; cf. Isidore, Sentent. iii, 55] says: "Both he who +conceals the truth and he who tells a lie are guilty, the former +because he is unwilling to do good, the latter because he desires to +hurt." + +_I answer that,_ We must make a distinction in the matter of giving +evidence: because sometimes a certain man's evidence is necessary, +and sometimes not. If the necessary evidence is that of a man subject +to a superior whom, in matters pertaining to justice, he is bound to +obey, without doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points +which are required of him in accordance with the order of justice, +for instance on manifest things or when ill-report has preceded. If +however he is required to give evidence on other points, for instance +secret matters, and those of which no ill-report has preceded, he is +not bound to give evidence. On the other hand, if his evidence be +required by authority of a superior whom he is bound to obey, we must +make a distinction: because if his evidence is required in order to +deliver a man from an unjust death or any other penalty, or from +false defamation, or some loss, in such cases he is bound to give +evidence. Even if his evidence is not demanded, he is bound to do +what he can to declare the truth to someone who may profit thereby. +For it is written (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy +from the hand of the sinner"; and (Prov. 24:11): "Deliver them that +are led to death"; and (Rom. 1:32): "They are worthy of death, not +only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do +them," on which words a gloss says: "To be silent when one can +disprove is to consent." In matters pertaining to a man's +condemnation, one is not bound to give evidence, except when one is +constrained by a superior in accordance with the order of justice; +since if the truth of such a matter be concealed, no particular +injury is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens the +accuser, it matters not since he risked the danger of his own accord: +whereas it is different with the accused, who incurs the danger +against his will. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of concealment of the truth in a +case when a man is not compelled by his superior's authority to +declare the truth, and when such concealment is not specially +injurious to any person. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man should by no means give evidence on +matters secretly committed to him in confession, because he knows such +things, not as man but as God's minister: and the sacrament is more +binding than any human precept. But as regards matters committed to +man in some other way under secrecy, we must make a distinction. +Sometimes they are of such a nature that one is bound to make them +known as soon as they come to our knowledge, for instance if they +conduce to the spiritual or corporal corruption of the community, or +to some grave personal injury, in short any like matter that a man is +bound to make known either by giving evidence or by denouncing it. +Against such a duty a man cannot be obliged to act on the plea that +the matter is committed to him under secrecy, for he would break the +faith he owes to another. On the other hand sometimes they are such as +one is not bound to make known, so that one may be under obligation +not to do so on account of their being committed to one under secrecy. +In such a case one is by no means bound to make them known, even if +the superior should command; because to keep faith is of natural +right, and a man cannot be commanded to do what is contrary to natural +right. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is unbecoming for ministers of the altar to +slay a man or to cooperate in his slaying, as stated above +(Q. 64, A. 4); hence according to the order of justice they +cannot be compelled to give evidence when a man is on trial for his +life. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 2] + +Whether the Evidence of Two or Three Persons Suffices? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the evidence of two or three persons +is not sufficient. For judgment requires certitude. Now certitude of +the truth is not obtained by the assertions of two or three +witnesses, for we read that Naboth was unjustly condemned on the +evidence of two witnesses (3 Kings 21). Therefore the evidence of two +or three witnesses does not suffice. + +Obj. 2: Further, in order for evidence to be credible it must agree. +But frequently the evidence of two or three disagrees in some point. +Therefore it is of no use for proving the truth in court. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. iv, can. Praesul.): +"A bishop shall not be condemned save on the evidence of seventy-two +witnesses; nor a cardinal priest of the Roman Church, unless there be +sixty-four witnesses. Nor a cardinal deacon of the Roman Church, +unless there be twenty-seven witnesses; nor a subdeacon, an acolyte, +an exorcist, a reader or a doorkeeper without seven witnesses." Now +the sin of one who is of higher dignity is more grievous, and +consequently should be treated more severely. Therefore neither is +the evidence of two or three witnesses sufficient for the +condemnation of other persons. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 17:6): "By the mouth of two +or three witnesses shall he die that is to be slain," and further on +(Deut. 19:15): "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word +shall stand." + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "we must +not expect to find certitude equally in every matter." For in human +acts, on which judgments are passed and evidence required, it is +impossible to have demonstrative certitude, because they are about +things contingent and variable. Hence the certitude of probability +suffices, such as may reach the truth in the greater number of cases, +although it fail in the minority. Now it is probable that the +assertion of several witnesses contains the truth rather than the +assertion of one: and since the accused is the only one who denies, +while several witness affirm the same as the prosecutor, it is +reasonably established both by Divine and by human law, that the +assertion of several witnesses should be upheld. Now all multitude is +comprised of three elements, the beginning, the middle and the end. +Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 1), "we reckon +'all' and 'whole' to consist of three parts." Now we have a triple +voucher when two agree with the prosecutor: hence two witnesses are +required; or for the sake of greater certitude three, which is the +perfect number. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 4:12): "A threefold +cord is not easily broken": and Augustine, commenting on John 8:17, +"The testimony of two men is true," says (Tract. xxxvi) that "there +is here a mystery by which we are given to understand that Trinity +wherein is perpetual stability of truth." + +Reply Obj. 1: No matter how great a number of witnesses may be +determined, the evidence might sometimes be unjust, since is written +(Ex. 23:2): "Thou shalt not follow the multitude to do evil." And yet +the fact that in so many it is not possible to have certitude without +fear of error, is no reason why we should reject the certitude which +can probably be had through two or three witnesses, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: If the witnesses disagree in certain principal +circumstances which change the substance of the fact, for instance in +time, place, or persons, which are chiefly in question, their +evidence is of no weight, because if they disagree in such things, +each one would seem to be giving distinct evidence and to be speaking +of different facts. For instance, one say that a certain thing +happened at such and such a time or place, while another says it +happened at another time or place, they seem not to be speaking of +the same event. The evidence is not weakened if one witness says that +he does not remember, while the other attests to a determinate time +or place. And if on such points as these the witness for prosecution +and defense disagree altogether, and if they be equal in number on +either side, and of equal standing, the accused should have the +benefit of the doubt, because the judge ought to be more inclined to +acquit than to condemn, except perhaps in favorable suits, such as a +pleading for liberty and the like. If, however, the witnesses for the +same side disagree, the judge ought to use his own discretion in +discerning which side to favor, by considering either the number of +witnesses, or their standing, or the favorableness of the suit, or +the nature of the business and of the evidence. + +Much more ought the evidence of one witness to be rejected if he +contradict himself when questioned about what he has seen and about +what he knows; not, however, if he contradict himself when questioned +about matters of opinion and report, since he may be moved to answer +differently according to the different things he has seen and heard. + +On the other hand if there be discrepancy of evidence in +circumstances not touching the substance of the fact, for instance, +whether the weather were cloudy or fine, whether the house were +painted or not, or such like matters, such discrepancy does not +weaken the evidence, because men are not wont to take much notice of +such things, wherefore they easily forget them. Indeed, a discrepancy +of this kind renders the evidence more credible, as Chrysostom states +(Hom. i in Matth.), because if the witnesses agreed in every point, +even in the minutest of details, they would seem to have conspired +together to say the same thing: but this must be left to the prudent +discernment of the judge. + +Reply Obj. 3: This passage refers specially to the bishops, priests, +deacons and clerics of the Roman Church, on account of its dignity: +and this for three reasons. First because in that Church those men +ought to be promoted whose sanctity makes their evidence of more +weight than that of many witnesses. Secondly, because those who have +to judge other men, often have many opponents on account of their +justice, wherefore those who give evidence against them should not be +believed indiscriminately, unless they be very numerous. Thirdly, +because the condemnation of any one of them would detract in public +opinion from the dignity and authority of that Church, a result which +would be more fraught with danger than if one were to tolerate a +sinner in that same Church, unless he were very notorious and +manifest, so that a grave scandal would arise if he were tolerated. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 3] + +Whether a Man's Evidence Can Be Rejected Without Any Fault of His? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man's evidence ought not to be +rejected except on account of some fault. For it is inflicted as a +penalty on some that their evidence is inadmissible, as in the case +of those who are branded with infamy. Now a penalty must not be +inflicted save for a fault. Therefore it would seem that no man's +evidence ought to be rejected save on account of a fault. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Good is to be presumed of every one, unless the +contrary appear" [*Cap. Dudum, de Praesumpt.]. Now it pertains to a +man's goodness that he should give true evidence. Since therefore +there can be no proof of the contrary, unless there be some fault of +his, it would seem that no man's evidence should be rejected save for +some fault. + +Obj. 3: Further, no man is rendered unfit for things necessary for +salvation except by some sin. But it is necessary for salvation to +give true evidence, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore no man should +be excluded from giving evidence save for some fault. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Regist. xiii, 44): "As to the bishop +who is said to have been accused by his servants, you are to know +that they should by no means have been heard": which words are +embodied in the Decretals (II, qu. 1, can. Imprimis). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the authority of evidence is +not infallible but probable; and consequently the evidence for one +side is weakened by whatever strengthens the probability of the +other. Now the reliability of a person's evidence is weakened, +sometimes indeed on account of some fault of his, as in the case of +unbelievers and persons of evil repute, as well as those who are +guilty of a public crime and who are not allowed even to accuse; +sometimes, without any fault on his part, and this owing either to a +defect in the reason, as in the case of children, imbeciles and +women, or to personal feeling, as in the case of enemies, or persons +united by family or household ties, or again owing to some external +condition, as in the case of poor people, slaves, and those who are +under authority, concerning whom it is to be presumed that they might +easily be induced to give evidence against the truth. + +Thus it is manifest that a person's evidence may be rejected either +with or without some fault of his. + +Reply Obj. 1: If a person is disqualified from giving evidence this +is done as a precaution against false evidence rather than as a +punishment. Hence the argument does not prove. + +Reply Obj. 2: Good is to be presumed of everyone unless the contrary +appear, provided this does not threaten injury to another: because, +in that case, one ought to be careful not to believe everyone +readily, according to 1 John 4:1: "Believe not every spirit." + +Reply Obj. 3: To give evidence is necessary for salvation, provided +the witness be competent, and the order of justice observed. Hence +nothing hinders certain persons being excused from giving evidence, +if they be considered unfit according to law. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Always a Mortal Sin to Give False Evidence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always a mortal sin to give +false evidence. For a person may happen to give false evidence, +through ignorance of fact. Now such ignorance excuses from mortal +sin. Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal +sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, a lie that benefits someone and hurts no man is +officious, and this is not a mortal sin. Now sometimes a lie of this +kind occurs in false evidence, as when a person gives false evidence +in order to save a man from death, or from an unjust sentence which +threatens him through other false witnesses or a perverse judge. +Therefore in such cases it is not a mortal sin to give false evidence. + +Obj. 3: Further, a witness is required to take an oath in order that +he may fear to commit a mortal sin of perjury. But this would not be +necessary, if it were already a mortal sin to give false evidence. +Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 19:5): "A false witness shall +not be unpunished." + +_I answer that,_ False evidence has a threefold deformity. The first +is owing to perjury, since witnesses are admitted only on oath and on +this count it is always a mortal sin. Secondly, owing to the +violation of justice, and on this account it is a mortal sin +generically, even as any kind of injustice. Hence the prohibition of +false evidence by the precept of the decalogue is expressed in this +form when it is said (Ex. 20:16), "Thou shalt not bear false witness +against thy neighbor." For one does nothing against a man by +preventing him from doing someone an injury, but only by taking away +his justice. Thirdly, owing to the falsehood itself, by reason of +which every lie is a sin: on this account, the giving of false +evidence is not always a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: In giving evidence a man ought not to affirm as +certain, as though he knew it, that about which he is not certain; +and he should confess his doubt in doubtful terms, and that which he +is certain about, in terms of certainty. Owing however to the frailty +of the human memory, a man sometimes thinks he is certain about +something that is not true; and then if after thinking over the +matter with due care he deems himself certain about that false thing, +he does not sin mortally if he asserts it, because the evidence which +he gives is not directly and intentionally, but accidentally contrary +to what he intends. + +Reply Obj. 2: An unjust judgment is not a judgment, wherefore the +false evidence given in an unjust judgment, in order to prevent +injustice is not a mortal sin by virtue of the judgment, but only by +reason of the oath violated. + +Reply Obj. 3: Men abhor chiefly those sins that are against God, as +being most grievous; and among them is perjury: whereas they do not +abhor so much sins against their neighbor. Consequently, for the +greater certitude of evidence, the witness is required to take a oath. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 71 + +OF INJUSTICE IN JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF COUNSEL +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the injustice which takes place in judgment on +the part of counsel, and under this head there are four points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor? + +(2) Whether certain persons should be prohibited from exercising the +office of advocate? + +(3) Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause? + +(4) Whether he sins if he accept a fee for defending a suit? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 1] + +Whether an Advocate Is Bound to Defend the Suits of the Poor? + +Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate is bound to defend the +suits of the poor. For it is written (Ex. 23:5): "If thou see the ass +of him that hateth thee lie underneath his burden, thou shalt not +pass by, but shall lift him up with him." Now no less a danger +threatens the poor man whose suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than +if his ass were to lie underneath its burden. Therefore an advocate +is bound to defend the suits of the poor. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix in Evang.): "Let him +that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let +him that hath abundance of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful +bounty; let him who is a servant to art share his skill with his +neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy +plead the cause of the poor: for the slightest gift you have received +will be reputed a talent." Now every man is bound, not to hide but +faithfully to dispense the talent committed to him; as evidenced by +the punishment inflicted on the servant who hid his talent (Matt. +25:30). Therefore an advocate is bound to plead for the poor. + +Obj. 3: Further, the precept about performing works of mercy, being +affirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this is +chiefly in cases of need. Now it seems to be a case of need when the +suit of a poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore it seems that in +such a case an advocate is bound to defend the poor man's suit. + +_On the contrary,_ He that lacks food is no less in need than he that +lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give food is not always +bound to feed the needy. Therefore neither is an advocate always +bound to defend the suits of the poor. + +_I answer that,_ Since defense of the poor man's suit belongs to the +works of mercy, the answer to this inquiry is the same as the one +given above with regard to the other works of mercy (Q. 32, AA. 5, +9). Now no man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those +who need it. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), +"since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly +who by reason of place, time, or any other circumstance, by a kind of +chance are more closely united to us." He says "by reason of place," +because one is not bound to search throughout the world for the needy +that one may succor them; and it suffices to do works of mercy to +those one meets with. Hence it is written (Ex. 23:4): "If thou meet +thy enemy's ass going astray, bring it back to him." He says also "by +reason of time," because one is not bound to provide for the future +needs of others, and it suffices to succor present needs. Hence it is +written (1 John 3:17): "He that . . . shall see his brother in need, +and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God +abide in him?" Lastly he says, "or any other circumstance," because +one ought to show kindness to those especially who are by any tie +whatever united to us, according to 1 Tim. 5:8, "If any man have not +care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied +the faith and is worse than an infidel." + +It may happen however that these circumstances concur, and then we +have to consider whether this particular man stands in such a need +that it is not easy to see how he can be succored otherwise, and then +one is bound to bestow the work of mercy on him. If, however, it is +easy to see how he can be otherwise succored, either by himself, or +by some other person still more closely united to him, or in a better +position to help him, one is not bound so strictly to help the one in +need that it would be a sin not to do so: although it would be +praiseworthy to do so where one is not bound to. Therefore an +advocate is not always bound to defend the suits of the poor, but +only when the aforesaid circumstances concur, else he would have to +put aside all other business, and occupy himself entirely in +defending the suits of poor people. The same applies to a physician +with regard to attendance on the sick. + +Reply Obj. 1: So long as the ass lies under the burden, there is no +means of help in this case, unless those who are passing along come +to the man's aid, and therefore they are bound to help. But they +would not be so bound if help were possible from another quarter. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man is bound to make good use of the talent bestowed +on him, according to the opportunities afforded by time, place, and +other circumstances, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Not every need is such that it is one's duty to remedy +it, but only such as we have stated above. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Fitting That the Law Should Debar Certain Persons from +the Office of Advocate? + +Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for the law to debar certain +persons from the office of advocate. For no man should be debarred +from doing works of mercy. Now it belongs to the works of mercy to +defend a man's suit, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore no man should +be debarred from this office. + +Obj. 2: Further, contrary causes have not, seemingly, the same +effect. Now to be busy with Divine things and to be busy about sin +are contrary to one another. Therefore it is unfitting that some +should be debarred from the office of advocate, on account of +religion, as monks and clerics, while others are debarred on account +of sin, as persons of ill-repute and heretics. + +Obj. 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now it is +a duty of love for an advocate to plead a person's cause. Therefore +it is unfitting that certain persons should be debarred from pleading +the cause of others, while they are allowed to advocate their own +cause. + +_On the contrary,_ According to Decret. III, qu. vii, can. _Infames,_ +many persons are debarred from the office of advocate. + +_I answer that,_ In two ways a person is debarred from performing a +certain act: first because it is impossible to him, secondly because +it is unbecoming to him: but, whereas the man to whom a certain act +is impossible, is absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom +an act is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity may +do away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly some are debarred from +the office of advocate because it is impossible to them through lack +of sense--either interior, as in the case of madmen and minors--or +exterior, as in the case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs +to have both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the +justice of the cause he defends, and also speech and hearing, that he +may speak and hear what is said to him. Consequently those who are +defective in these points, are altogether debarred from being +advocates either in their own or in another's cause. The becomingness +of exercising this office is removed in two ways. First, through a +man being engaged in higher things. Wherefore it is unfitting that +monks or priests should be advocates in any cause whatever, or that +clerics should plead in a secular court, because such persons are +engaged in Divine things. Secondly, on account of some personal +defect, either of body (for instance a blind man whose attendance in +a court of justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill +becomes one who has disdained to be just himself, to plead for the +justice of another. Wherefore it is unbecoming that persons of ill +repute, unbelievers, and those who have been convicted of grievous +crimes should be advocates. Nevertheless this unbecomingness is +outweighed by necessity: and for this reason such persons can plead +either their own cause or that of persons closely connected with +them. Moreover, clerics can be advocates in the cause of their own +church, and monks in the cause of their own monastery, if the abbot +direct them to do so. + +Reply Obj. 1: Certain persons are sometimes debarred by +unbecomingness, and others by inability from performing works of +mercy: for not all the works of mercy are becoming to all persons: +thus it ill becomes a fool to give counsel, or the ignorant to teach. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as virtue is destroyed by "too much" and "too +little," so does a person become incompetent by "more" and "less." +For this reason some, like religious and clerics, are debarred from +pleading in causes, because they are above such an office; and others +because they are less than competent to exercise it, such as persons +of ill-repute and unbelievers. + +Reply Obj. 3: The necessity of pleading the causes of others is not +so pressing as the necessity of pleading one's own cause, because +others are able to help themselves otherwise: hence the comparison +fails. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 3] + +Whether an Advocate Sins by Defending an Unjust Cause? + +Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending +an unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing +a desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if he can +defend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals a +desperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but +ought to be praised, if he defends an unjust cause. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing a sin. +Yet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief (Decret. II, +qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an advocate does not sin by +defending an unjust cause, when once he has undertaken its defense. + +Obj. 3: Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate to +use unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by producing false +witnesses, or alleging false laws), than to defend an unjust cause, +since the former is a sin against the form, the latter against the +matter of justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make +use of such underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to +lay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an advocate +does not sin by defending an unjust cause. + +_On the contrary,_ It is said (2 Paralip. 19:2): "Thou helpest the +ungodly . . . and therefore thou didst deserve . . . the wrath of the +Lord." Now an advocate by defending an unjust cause, helps the +ungodly. Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord. + +_I answer that,_ It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by +counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or +assist an action is, in a way, to do it, and the Apostle says (Rom. +1:32) that "they . . . are worthy of death, not only they that do" a +sin, "but they also that consent to them that do" it. Hence it was +stated above (Q. 62, A. 7), that all such are bound to restitution. +Now it is evident that an advocate provides both assistance and +counsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if knowingly he +defends an unjust cause, without doubt he sins grievously, and is +bound to restitution of the loss unjustly incurred by the other party +by reason of the assistance he has provided. If, however, he defends +an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be excused +according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable. + +Reply Obj. 1: The physician injures no man by undertaking to heal a +desperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in an +unjust cause, unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads +unjustly. Hence the comparison fails. For though he may seem to +deserve praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by +reason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for an evil +end. + +Reply Obj. 2: If an advocate believes from the outset that the cause +is just, and discovers afterwards while the case is proceeding that +it is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as to +help the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to +the other party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce his +client to give way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the +opposing party. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 40, A. 3), it is lawful for a +soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently +concealing what he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent +falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says +(De offic. iii, 29). Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending +his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue, +but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Lawful for an Advocate to Take a Fee for Pleading? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for +pleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human +remuneration, according to Luke 14:12, "When thou makest a dinner or +a supper, call not thy friends . . . nor thy neighbors who are rich: +lest perhaps they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to +thee." Now it is a work of mercy to plead another's cause, as stated +above (A. 1). Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take +payment in money for pleading. + +Obj. 2: Further, spiritual things are not to be bartered with +temporal things. But pleading a person's cause seems to be a +spiritual good since it consists in using one's knowledge of law. +Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs towards +the pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the judge and +of the witness. Now, according to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.), +"the judge should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness true +evidence." Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that "an +advocate may lawfully sell his pleading, and a lawyer his advice." + +_I answer that,_ A man may justly receive payment for granting what +he is not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not +always bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people's +causes. Wherefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act +against justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a +sick person to heal him, and to all like persons; provided, however, +they take a moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the +matter in hand, for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the +country. If, however, they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they +sin against justice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) +that "it is customary to demand from them restitution of what they +have extorted by a wicked excess, but not what has been given to them +in accordance with a commendable custom." + +Reply Obj. 1: Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he +can do from motives of mercy: else no man could lawfully sell +anything, since anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when +a man does give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, but +a Divine reward. In like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads +the cause of a poor man, should have in view not a human but a Divine +meed; and yet he is not always bound to give his services +gratuitously. + +Reply Obj. 2: Though knowledge of law is something spiritual, the use +of that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body: hence it +is lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no craftsman +would be allowed to make profit by his art. + +Reply Obj. 3: The judge and witnesses are common to either +party, since the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the +witness to give true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to +one side rather than to the other: and consequently judges receive out +of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and witnesses receive +their expenses (not as payment for giving evidence, but as a fee for +their labor) either from both parties or from the party by whom they +are adduced, because no man "serveth as a soldier at any time at his +own charge [*Vulg.: 'Who serveth as a soldier,']" (1 Cor. 9:7). On the +other hand an advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully +accept fee from the party he assists. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 72 + +OF REVILING +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered +extrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting, +(3) tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) What is reviling? + +(2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin? + +(3) Whether one ought to check revilers? + +(4) Of the origin of reviling. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 1] + +Whether Reviling Consists in Words? + +Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not consist in words. +Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is +a kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's +neighbor, either in his person, or in his belongings. Therefore +reviling does not consist in words. + +Obj. 2: Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can be +dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore it +seems that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds. + +Obj. 3: Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing or +a taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt. +Therefore reviling does not consist in words. + +_On the contrary,_ Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing. +Now reviling is perceived by the hearing according to Jer. 20:10, "I +heard reviling [Douay: 'contumelies'] on every side." Therefore +reviling consists in words. + +_I answer that,_ Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and +this happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence, +one person dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the +excellence for which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed, +whereof we have spoken above (Q. 64, seqq.). Secondly, when a man +publishes something against another's honor, thus bringing it to the +knowledge of the latter and of other men. This reviling properly so +called, and is done by some kind of signs. Now, according to +Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), "compared with words all other +signs are very few, for words have obtained the chief place among men +for the purpose of expressing whatever the mind conceives." Hence +reviling, properly speaking, consists in words: wherefore, Isidore +says (Etym. x) that a reviler (_contumeliosus_) "is hasty and bursts +out (_tumet_) in injurious words." Since, however, things are also +signified by deeds, which on this account have the same significance +as words, it follows that reviling in a wider sense extends also to +deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Rom. 1:30, "contumelious, proud," says: +"The contumelious are those who by word or deed revile and shame +others." + +Reply Obj. 1: Our words, if we consider them in their essence, i.e. +as audible sounds, injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the +ear, as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs +conveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many +kinds of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his +honor, or of the respect due to him from others. Hence the reviling +is greater if one man reproach another in the presence of many: and +yet there may still be reviling if he reproach him by himself, in so +far as the speaker acts unjustly against the respect due to the +hearer. + +Reply Obj. 2: One man slights another by deeds in so far as such +deeds cause or signify that which is against that other man's honor. +In the former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some other +kind of injustice, of which we have spoken above (QQ. 64, 65, 66): +where as in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds +have the significant force of words. + +Reply Obj. 3: Railing and taunts consist in words, even as reviling, +because by all of them a man's faults are exposed to the detriment of +his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault +of guilt, which is exposed by _reviling_ words. Secondly, there is +the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by _taunts_ +(_convicium_), because _vice_ is commonly spoken of in connection +with not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man says +spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not revile +him: whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only taunts but +also reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his +inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him for +any kind of excellence. This is done by _upbraiding_ words, and +properly speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man that one +has succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written (Ecclus. +20:15): "He will give a few things and upbraid much." Nevertheless +these terms are sometimes employed one for the other. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 2] + +Whether Reviling or Railing Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal +sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act of +a virtue, viz. of wittiness (_eutrapelia_) [*Cf. I-II, Q. 60, A. 5] +to which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher +(Ethic. iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and +yet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the +Apostle says (Gal. 3:1): "O senseless Galatians!," and our Lord said +(Luke 24:25): "O foolish and slow of heart to believe!" Therefore +railing or reviling is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of its +genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its genus +cannot become venial, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, AA. 4, 6). Hence +if by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to +railing or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin. +But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who +utters a reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger. +Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its +genus. + +_On the contrary,_ Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal +punishment of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment +of hell, according to Matt. 5:22, "Whosoever shall say to his brother +. . . Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." Therefore railing +or reviling is a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), words are injurious to other +persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification depends +on the speaker's inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it seems +that we ought to consider with what intention the words are uttered. +Since then railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring, if +the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other man, this is +properly and essentially to give utterance to railing or reviling: +and this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since a man +loves his honor no less than his possessions. If, on the other hand, +a man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the +intention, not of dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting +him or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not +formally and essentially, but accidentally and materially, in so far +to wit as he says that which might be a railing or reviling. Hence +this may be sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without any sin at +all. Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters, and +one should use such words with moderation, because the railing might +be so grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dishonor the +person against whom it is uttered. In such a case a man might commit +a mortal sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other +man: just as were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by +striking him in fun, he would not be without blame. + +Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight mockery, +not with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the object of +the mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and this may +be without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. On the other +hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object of +his witty mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful, +as stated in the passage quoted. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or damnify him +in his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too, for the +purpose of correction, may one say a mocking word to a person whom +one has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples +"foolish," and the Apostle called the Galatians "senseless." Yet, as +Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), "seldom and only when +it is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, and then +so as to urge God's service, not our own." + +Reply Obj. 3: Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on the +intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it be +a slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and be +uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the +fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by +such a word to give but little pain. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 3] + +Whether One Ought to Suffer Oneself to Be Reviled? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be +reviled. For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the +reviler. But one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to +suffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler. + +Obj. 2: Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now one +ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written +(Prov. 26:10): "He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger." +Therefore neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled. + +Obj. 3: Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it is +said: "Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay" [*Heb. 10:30]. Now by +submitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to +Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.): "If thou wilt be revenged, be +silent; thou hast dealt him a fatal blow." Therefore one ought not by +silence to submit to reviling words, but rather answer back. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 37:13): "They that sought evils +to me spoke vain things," and afterwards (Ps. 37:14) he says: "But I +as a deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth." + +_I answer that,_ Just as we need patience in things done against us, +so do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of +patience in those things done against us refer to the preparedness of +the mind, according to Augustine's (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) +exposition on our Lord's precept, "If one strike thee on thy right +cheek, turn to him also the other" [*The words as quoted by St. +Thomas are a blending of Matt. 5:39 and Luke 6:29]: that is to say, a +man ought to be prepared to do so if necessary. But he is not always +bound to do this actually: since not even did our Lord do so, for +when He received a blow, He said: "Why strikest thou Me?" (John +18:23). Consequently the same applies to the reviling words that are +said against us. For we are bound to hold our minds prepared to +submit to be reviled, if it should be expedient. Nevertheless it +sometimes behooves us to withstand against being reviled, and this +chiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler; namely, +that his daring may be checked, and that he may not repeat the +attempt, according to Prov. 26:5, "Answer a fool according to his +folly, lest he imagine himself to be wise." Secondly, for the good of +many who would be prevented from progressing in virtue on account of +our being reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super Ezech.): "Those +who are so placed that their life should be an example to others, +ought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their preaching +be not heard by those who could have heard it, and they continue +their evil conduct through contempt of a good life." + +Reply Obj. 1: The daring of the railing reviler should be checked +with moderation, i.e. as a duty of charity, and not through lust for +one's own honor. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:4): "Answer not a fool +according to his folly, lest thou be like him." + +Reply Obj. 2: When one man prevents another from being reviled there +is not the danger of lust for one's own honor as there is when a man +defends himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to +proceed from a sense of charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: It would be an act of revenge to keep silence with the +intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be +praiseworthy to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it +is written (Ecclus. 8:4): "Strive not with a man that is full of +tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 4] + +Whether Reviling Arises from Anger? + +Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger. +For it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where pride is, there shall also be +reviling [Douay: 'reproach']." But anger is a vice distinct from +pride. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:3): "All fools are meddling +with revilings [Douay: 'reproaches']." Now folly is a vice opposed to +wisdom, as stated above (Q. 46, A. 1); whereas anger is opposed to +meekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger. + +Obj. 3: Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of +reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: for it +is a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger. +Therefore reviling does not arise from anger. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "anger gives +rise to revilings." + +_I answer that,_ While one sin may arise from various causes, it is +nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which +it is wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected +with its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger's end, +which is revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take +revenge on another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises +chiefly from anger. + +Reply Obj. 1: Reviling is not directed to the end of pride which is +excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride. +Nevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who +think themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and +inflict injuries on them, because they are more easily angered, +through deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done +against their will. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6) +"anger listens imperfectly to reason": wherefore an angry man suffers +a defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence +reviling arises from folly on account of the latter's kinship with +anger. + +Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) "an +angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about +this." Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger +rather than to hatred. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 73 + +OF BACKBITING [*Or detraction] +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) What is backbiting? + +(2) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(3) Of its comparison with other sins; + +(4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 1] + +Whether Backbiting Is Suitably Defined As the Blackening of Another's +Character by Secret Words? + +Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some +[*Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii.], "the blackening of +another's good name by words uttered in secret." For "secretly" and +"openly" are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a +sin, because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by +few. Now that which does not constitute the species of a sin, does +not belong to its essence, and should not be included in its +definition. Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting +that it should be done by secret words. + +Obj. 2: Further, the notion of a good name implies something known to +the public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened by +backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered +openly. + +Obj. 3: Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish something +already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is blackened, even +without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when one reveals +the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore not every +blackening of a good name is backbiting. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 10:11): "If a serpent bite +in silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth." + +_I answer that,_ Just as one man injures another by deed in two +ways--openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence--and +secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures +another by words in two ways--in one way, openly, and this is done by +reviling him, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 1)--and in another way +secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one +man openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think +little of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that +reviling is detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the +other hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect +rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his honor +but his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he, +for his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the +person against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends +and aims at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting +differs from reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the +words are uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and +the backbiter secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, i.e. as +regards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honor, the +backbiter injuring his good name. + +Reply Obj. 1: In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced all +injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the +kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances "secretly" and +"openly," because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence +and by ignorance, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 4; I-II, Q. 6, AA. 5, 8). + +Reply Obj. 2: The words of a backbiter are said to be secret, not +altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said, +because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On +the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face. +Wherefore if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, +it is a case of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he +alone be present: although if a man speak ill of an absent person to +one man alone, he destroys his good name not altogether but partly. + +Reply Obj. 3: A man is said to backbite (_detrahere_) another, not +because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good +name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. +Directly, in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about +him; secondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, +by revealing something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his +good deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by +gainsaying his good, or by maliciously concealing it, or by +diminishing it. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 2] + +Whether Backbiting Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For +no act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin, +which pertains to backbiting, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), is an act +of the virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's sin +in order that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby +a man accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, "Have nothing to do with +detractors," says: "The whole human race is in peril from this vice." +But no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many +refrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found +in all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine in a homily _on the Fire of Purgatory_ +[*Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a +slight sin "to speak ill without hesitation or forethought." But this +pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:30): "Backbiters, hateful to +God," which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, "lest it be +deemed a slight sin because it consists in words." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 72, A. 2), sins of word should +be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting +by its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore, +properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in +order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to +blacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's +good name seems the most precious, since for lack of it he is +hindered from doing many things well. For this reason it is written +(Ecclus. 41:15): "Take care of a good name, for this shall continue +with thee, more than a thousand treasures precious and great." +Therefore backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin. +Nevertheless it happens sometimes that a man utters words, whereby +someone's good name is tarnished, and yet he does not intend this, +but something else. This is not backbiting strictly and formally +speaking, but only materially and accidentally as it were. And if +such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some necessary good, +and with attention to the due circumstances, it is not a sin and +cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of lightness +of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal sin, +unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature, as to +cause a notable injury to a man's good name, especially in matters +pertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of +the words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a +man his good name, no less than any other thing one has taken from +him, in the manner stated above (Q. 62, A. 2) when we were treating +of restitution. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a man's +hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or +accuse him for the good of public justice. + +Reply Obj. 2: This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to +be found throughout the whole of mankind, but "almost," both because +"the number of fools is infinite," [*Eccles. 1:15] and few are they +that walk in the way of salvation, [*Cf. Matt. 7:14] and because there +are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of +heart, so as to injure someone's good name at least slightly, for it +is written (James 3:2): "If any man offend not in word, the same is a +perfect man." + +Reply Obj. 3: Augustine is referring to the case when a man +utters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but +through lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 3] + +Whether Backbiting Is the Gravest of All Sins Committed Against One's +Neighbor? + +Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins +committed against one's neighbor. Because a gloss on Ps. 108:4, +"Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me," a gloss +says: "Those who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of +future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that +was soon to rise again." From this it seems to follow that backbiting +is by so much a graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to +kill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the +other sins that are committed against one's neighbor. Therefore +backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all. + +Obj. 2: Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than reviling, +because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret backbiting. +Now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery, because +adultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling severs +utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more grievous +than adultery: and yet of all other sins a man commits against his +neighbor, adultery is most grave. + +Obj. 3: Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting arises +from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a +graver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than +reviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before. + +Obj. 4: Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity of +the defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous +defect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2): +"What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt +into their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the +less they see of the truth?" Therefore backbiting is the most +grievous sin committed against one's neighbor. + +_On the contrary,_ It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word. +But backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft +are sins of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other +sins committed against one's neighbor. + +_I answer that,_ The essential gravity of sins committed against +one's neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him, +since it is thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the +greater the good taken away, the greater the injury. And while man's +good is threefold, namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, +and the good of external things; the good of the soul, which is the +greatest of all, cannot be taken from him by another save as an +occasional cause, for instance by an evil persuasion, which does not +induce necessity. On the other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the +body and of external things, can be taken away by violence. Since, +however, the goods of the body excel the goods of external things, +those sins which injure a man's body are more grievous than those +which injure his external things. Consequently, among other sins +committed against one's neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since +it deprives man of the life which he already possesses: after this +comes adultery, which is contrary to the right order of human +generation, whereby man enters upon life. In the last place come +external goods, among which a man's good name takes precedence of +wealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods, wherefore it is +written (Prov. 22:1): "A good name is better than great riches." +Therefore backbiting according to its genus is a more grievous sin +than theft, but is less grievous than murder or adultery. +Nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or +extenuating circumstances. + +The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to +the sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if +he sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of +word have a certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur +through a slip of the tongue, and without much forethought. + +Reply Obj. 1: Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith of His +members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our faith. +Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy. + +Reply Obj. 2: Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting, in as +much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as +robbery is a graver sin than theft, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 9). +Yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the +gravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union of +bodies, but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the +reviler is not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man, +but is only the occasional cause of division among those who were +united, in so far, to wit, as by declaring the evils of another, he +for his own part severs that man from the friendship of other men, +though they are not forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a +backbiter is a murderer _occasionally,_ since by his words he gives +another man an occasion for hating or despising his neighbor. For +this reason it is stated in the Epistle of Clement [*Ad Jacob. Ep. i] +that "backbiters are murderers," i.e. occasionally; because "he that +hateth his brother is a murderer" (1 John 3:15). + +Reply Obj. 3: Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the Philosopher +states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes place in +secret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but rather of +envy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's glory. +Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than +reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just as +anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin +depends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on the thing to which the +sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away +from. + +Reply Obj. 4: Since "a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his mouth" +(Prov. 15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves and +believes what he says, and consequently more and more hates his +neighbor, and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less. +This effect however may also result from other sins pertaining to +hate of one's neighbor. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is a Grave Sin for the Listener to Suffer the Backbiter? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter +does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations +to others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer +his own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): "Just as +we ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so +ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited +by their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater." +Therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who +backbite others. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): "In no wise speak +against the truth." Now sometimes a person tells the truth while +backbiting, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore it seems that one +is not always bound to withstand a backbiter. + +Obj. 3: Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to others. +Now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten: for +Pope Pius [*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus. vi, +qu. 1]: "Not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good +persons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted +through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, are +humbled by backbiting." Therefore one ought not to withstand +backbiters. + +_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Take care not to +have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract +others nor listen to backbiters." + +_I answer that,_ According to the Apostle (Rom. 1:32), they "are +worthy of death . . . not only they that" commit sins, "but they also +that consent to them that do them." Now this happens in two ways. +First, directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or +when the sin is pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he +does not withstand him when he might do so, and this happens +sometimes, not because the sin is pleasing to him, but on account of +some human fear. + +Accordingly we must say that if a man listens to backbiting without +resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he +becomes a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite, +or at least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his +hatred of the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor, +and sometimes more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): "It +is difficult to say which is the more to be condemned[:] the +backbiter or he that listens to backbiting." If however the sin is +not pleasing to him, and he fails to withstand the backbiter, through +fear, negligence, or even shame, he sins indeed, but much less than +the backbiter, and, as a rule venially. Sometimes too this may be a +mortal sin, either because it is his official duty to correct the +backbiter, or by reason of some consequent danger; or on account of +the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes be a mortal +sin, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 3). + +Reply Obj. 1: No man hears himself backbitten, because when a man is +spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly +speaking, but reviling, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Yet it is +possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his +knowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his +discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name, +unless this endanger the good of others, as stated above (Q. 72, A. +3). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as he +suffers patiently being detracted himself. But it is not left to his +discretion to permit an injury to be done to another's good name, +hence he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for +the same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man's ass +lying "underneath his burden," as commanded in Deut. 21:4 [*Ex. 23:5]. + +Reply Obj. 2: One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by +endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows +that he is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with +words, for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our +pained demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting, +because according to Prov. 25:23, "the north wind driveth away rain, +as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue." + +Reply Obj. 3: The profit one derives from being backbitten is due, +not to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God +Who produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less +withstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even +though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 74 + +OF TALE-BEARING +[*_Susurratio,_ i.e. whispering] +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting? + +(2) Which of the two is the more grievous? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 74, Art. 1] + +Whether Tale-bearing Is a Sin Distinct from Backbiting? + +Objection 1: It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin +from backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): "The _susurro_ (tale-bearer) +takes his name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks +disparagingly not to the face but into the ear." But to speak of +another disparagingly belongs to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing +is not a distinct sin from backbiting. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): "Thou shalt not be an +informer [Douay: 'a detractor'] nor a tale-bearer [Douay: +'whisperer'] among the people." But an informer is apparently the +same as a backbiter. Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from +backbiting. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer +[Douay: 'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed." But a +double-tongued man is apparently the same as a backbiter, because a +backbiter speaks with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with +another in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a +backbiter. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 1:29, 30, "Tale-bearers, +backbiters [Douay: 'whisperers, detractors']" says: "Tale-bearers sow +discord among friends; backbiters deny or disparage others' good +points." + +_I answer that,_ The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter, +and also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil +secretly of their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are +sometimes used one for the other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, "Be +not called a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']" says: "i.e. a +backbiter." They differ however in end, because the backbiter intends +to blacken his neighbor's good name, wherefore he brings forward +those evils especially about his neighbor which are likely to defame +him, or at least to depreciate his good name: whereas a tale-bearer +intends to sever friendship, as appears from the gloss quoted above +and from the saying of Prov. 26:20, "Where the tale-bearer is taken +away, contentions shall cease." Hence it is that a tale-bearer speaks +such ill about his neighbors as may stir his hearer's mind against +them, according to Ecclus. 28:11, "A sinful man will trouble his +friends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace." + +Reply Obj. 1: A tale-bearer is called a backbiter in so far as he +speaks ill of another; yet he differs from a backbiter since he +intends not to speak ill as such, but to say anything that may stir +one man against another, though it be good simply, and yet has a +semblance of evil through being unpleasant to the hearer. + +Reply Obj. 2: An informer differs from a tale-bearer and a backbiter, +for an informer is one who charges others publicly with crimes, +either by accusing or by railing them, which does not apply to a +backbiter or tale-bearer. + +Reply Obj. 3: A double-tongued person is properly speaking a +tale-bearer. For since friendship is between two, the tale-bearer +strives to sever friendship on both sides. Hence he employs a double +tongue towards two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other: +wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer [Douay: +'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed," and then it is +added, "for he hath troubled many that were peace." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 74, Art. 2] + +Whether Backbiting Is a Graver Sin Than Tale-bearing? + +Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than +tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a +backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for +such things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name: +whereas a tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently +evil, because to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore +backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing. + +Obj. 2: Further, he that deprives a man of his good name, deprives +him not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is minded +to scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is +reproached against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] (2 Paralip. +19:2): "Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord." +But tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore +backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (James 4:11): "He that backbiteth +[Douay: 'detracteth'] his brother . . . detracteth the law," and +consequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of +backbiting seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as +stated above (Q. 20, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3). On the other hand the +sin of tale-bearing is against one's neighbor. Therefore the sin of +backbiting is graver than the sin of tale-bearing. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): "An evil mark of +disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay: +'whisperer'] hatred, and enmity, and reproach." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 73, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 8), +sins against one's neighbor are the more grievous, according as they +inflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the +greater, according to the greatness of the good which it takes away. +Now of all one's external goods a friend takes the first place, since +"no man can live without friends," as the Philosopher declares +(Ethic. viii, 1). Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): "Nothing can be +compared to a faithful friend." Again, a man's good name whereof +backbiting deprives him, is most necessary to him that he may be +fitted for friendship. Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than +backbiting or even reviling, because a friend is better than honor, +and to be loved is better than to be honored, according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. viii). + +Reply Obj. 1: The species and gravity of a sin depend on the end +rather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its end, +tale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the +backbiter says worse things. + +Reply Obj. 2: A good name is a disposition for friendship, and a bad +name is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short of +the thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to a +disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what +conduces directly to enmity. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that backbites his brother, seems to detract the +law, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one's neighbor: +while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more directly +against this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially against +God, because "God is charity" (1 John 4:16), and for this reason it +is written (Prov. 6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord +hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," and the seventh is "he +(Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord among brethren." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 75 + +OF DERISION +[*Or mockery] +(In Two Articles) + +We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins +whereby one's neighbor is injured by words? + +(2) Whether derision is a mortal sin? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 75, Art. 1] + +Whether Derision Is a Special Sin Distinct from Those Already +Mentioned? + +Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin +distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is +apparently the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to +reviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from reviling. + +Obj. 2: Further, no man is derided except for something reprehensible +which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they be imputed to +a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts +to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct +from the foregoing vices. + +Obj. 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury +they inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by +derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is +detrimental to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin +distinct from the foregoing. + +_On the contrary,_ Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is +described as "making fun." Now all the foregoing are done seriously +and not in jest. Therefore derision differs from all of them. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 72, A. 2), sins of word should +be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these +sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those +who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure +the honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good +name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider +intends to shame the person he derides. And since this end is +distinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is +distinct from the foregoing sins. + +Reply Obj. 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but +differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i.e. by +words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the +nose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall +laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the +species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs +from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as +Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). + +Reply Obj. 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect +and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the glory +of a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our glory is this, +the testimony of our conscience." Hence, on the other hand, for doing +a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor and +good name in the eyes of others--and for this purpose the reviler and +the backbiter speak of another person--while in his own eyes, he +loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed +at reprehensible deeds being imputed to him--and for this purpose the +derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision +agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to +the end. + +Reply Obj. 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good, according +to Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast." Wherefore +he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him inflicts a +special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 75, Art. 2] + +Whether Derision Can Be a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin. +Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem +contrary to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among +friends, wherefore it is known as "making fun." Therefore derision +cannot be a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that which +is done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal sin +when it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin to +relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore says +(De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that "he who continues to do what he has +repented of, is a derider and not a penitent." It would likewise +follow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to +Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 15) "the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who +derides the horse, i.e. the just man, and his rider, i.e. God." +Therefore derision is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins than +derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest. +But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less +therefore is derision a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 3:34): "He derideth [Vulg.: +'shall scorn'] the scorners." But God's derision is eternal +punishment for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Ps. 2:4, "He +that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them." Therefore derision is a +mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ The object of derision is always some evil or +defect. Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but +seriously: consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule +(whence the terms 'derision' and 'jesting'), this is because it is +considered to be slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight +in two ways: first, in itself, secondly, in relation to the person. +When anyone makes game or fun of another's evil or defect, because it +is a slight evil in itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its +genus. On the other hand this defect may be considered as a slight +evil in relation to the person, just as we are wont to think little +of the defects of children and imbeciles: and then to make game or +fun of a person, is to scorn him altogether, and to think him so +despicable that his misfortune troubles us not one whit, but is held +as an object of derision. In this way derision is a mortal sin, and +more grievous than reviling, which is also done openly: because the +reviler would seem to take another's evil seriously; whereas the +derider does so in fun, and so would seem the more to despise and +dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a +grievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a greater +respect is due to the person derided. + +Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the +things of God, according to Isa. 37:23, "Whom hast thou reproached, +and whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy +voice?" and he replies: "Against the Holy One of Israel." In the +second place comes derision of one's parents, wherefore it is written +(Prov. 30:17): "The eye that mocketh at his father, and that +despiseth the labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of +the brooks pick it out, and the young eagles eat it." Further, the +derision of good persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of +virtue, and against this it is written (Job 12:4): "The simplicity of +the just man is laughed to scorn." Such like derision does very much +harm: because it turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory +(Moral. xx, 14), "Who when they perceive any good points appearing in +the acts of others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a +mischievous reviling." + +Reply Obj. 1: Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in relation +to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something against +charity in relation to the person who is the object of the jest, on +account of contempt, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he has +repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly, in +so far as either's behavior is like a derider's. Nor is it true that +to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but +only dispositively and imperfectly. + +Reply Obj. 3: Derision considered in itself is less grievous than +backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but jest. +Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as +stated above, and then it is a grave sin. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 76 + +OF CURSING +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether one may lawfully curse another? + +(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature? + +(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin? + +(4) Of its comparison with other sins. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 1] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Curse Anyone? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is +unlawful to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ +spoke, according to 2 Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14), +"Bless and curse not." Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone. + +Obj. 2: Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Dan. 3:82, +"O ye sons of men, bless the Lord." Now the same mouth cannot both +bless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James. +Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man. + +Obj. 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him some +evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be a +kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone, +indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil. +Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse. + +Obj. 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his +obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it +lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): "While +the ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul." Much less +therefore is it lawful to curse a man. + +Obj. 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, "How shall I curse whom God +hath not cursed?" says: "There cannot be a just cause for cursing a +sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments." Now one man cannot know +another man's sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore +no man may lawfully curse another. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 27:26): "Cursed be he that +abideth not in the words of this law." Moreover Eliseus cursed the +little boys who mocked him (4 Kings 2:24). + +_I answer that,_ To curse (_maledicere_) is the same as to speak ill +(_malum dicere_). Now "speaking" has a threefold relation to the +thing spoken. First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is +expressed in the indicative mood: in this way _maledicere_ signifies +simply to tell someone of another's evil, and this pertains to +backbiting, wherefore tellers of evil (_maledici_) are sometimes +called backbiters. Secondly, speaking is related to the thing spoken, +by way of cause, and this belongs to God first and foremost, since He +made all things by His word, according to Ps. 32:9, "He spoke and +they were made"; while secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his +word, commands others and thus moves them to do something: it is for +this purpose that we employ verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly, +"speaking" is related to the thing spoken by expressing the +sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed in words; and +for this purpose we employ the verb in the optative mood. + +Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by +way of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds. +And here we must observe that to do something and to will it are +consequent on one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness, +as shown above (I-II, Q. 20, A. 3). Hence in these two ways of evil +speaking, by way of command and by way of desire, there is the same +aspect of lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or +desires another's evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself, +then evil speaking will be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is +meant by cursing. On the other hand if a man commands or desires +another's evil under the aspect of good, it is lawful; and it may be +called cursing, not strictly speaking, but accidentally, because the +chief intention of the speaker is directed not to evil but to good. + +Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the +aspect of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and +thus a judge lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just +penalty: thus too the Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the +same way the prophets in the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on +sinners, as though conforming their will to Divine justice, although +such like imprecation may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes +evil is spoken under the aspect of useful, as when one wishes a +sinner to suffer sickness or hindrance of some kind, either that he +may himself reform, or at least that he may cease from harming others. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called with an +evil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of good, is +not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good simply, in +fact rather is it in conformity therewith. + +Reply Obj. 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be considered. +His nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful to curse +it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed, +according to Job 3:8, "Let them curse it who curse the day." Yet when +a sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same +reason he judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he +is said to curse his own soul. + +Reply Obj. 5: Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be perceived in +themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest sin, which +has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom +God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to know +who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Curse an Irrational Creature? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational +creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to +punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects +either of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse +them. + +Obj. 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but the +nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the +devil, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse +an irrational creature. + +Obj. 3: Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as bodies, +or transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral. iv, +2), "it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to curse +what exists." Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational +creature. + +_On the contrary,_ our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Matt. +21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1. + +_I answer that,_ Benediction and malediction, properly speaking, +regard things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational +creatures: while good and evil are said to happen to irrational +creatures in relation to the rational creature for whose sake they +are. Now they are related to the rational creature in several ways. +First by way of ministration, in so far as irrational creatures +minister to the needs of man. In this sense the Lord said to man +(Gen. 3:17): "Cursed is the earth in thy work," so that its +barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also David cursed the +mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding (Moral. iv, +3). Again the irrational creature is related to the rational creature +by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in +signification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is related +to rational creatures as something containing them, namely by way of +time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account +of the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on account of +the consequent penalties. In this sense also we may understand David +to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in 2 Kings 1:21, +namely on account of the people slaughtered there. + +But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a +sin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is +idle and vain and consequently unlawful. + +From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 3] + +Whether Cursing Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For +Augustine in a homily _on the Fire of Purgatory_ [*Serm. civ in the +appendix of St. Augustine's works] reckons cursing among slight sins. +But such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a +venial Sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the +mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing +sometimes arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a +mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words. But evil deeds +are not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing a mortal +sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the +kingdom of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God, +according to 1 Cor. 6:10, "Nor cursers [Douay: 'railers'], nor +extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God." Therefore cursing is +a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ The evil words of which we are speaking now are +those whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or +desire. Now to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil +by commanding it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity whereby +we love our neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a +mortal sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, as the +person whom we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect. +Hence it is written (Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or +mother, dying let him die." + +It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial +sin either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in +cursing him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters +the curse; because he may say such words through some slight +movement, or in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word +should be weighed chiefly with regard to the speaker's intention, as +stated above (Q. 72, A. 2). + +From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 4] + +Whether Cursing Is a Graver Sin Than Backbiting? + +Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is a graver sin than +backbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy, as implied +in the canonical epistle of Jude (verse 9) where it is said that +"when Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended +about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment +of blasphemy [Douay: 'railing speech']," where blasphemy stands for +cursing, according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver sin than +backbiting. Therefore cursing is a graver sin than backbiting. + +Obj. 2: Further, murder is more grievous than backbiting, as stated +above (Q. 73, A. 3). But cursing is on a par with the sin of murder; +for Chrysostom says (Hom. xix, super Matth.): "When thou sayest: +'Curse him down with his house, away with everything,' you are no +better than a murderer." Therefore cursing is graver than backbiting. + +Obj. 3: Further, to cause a thing is more than to signify it. But the +curser causes evil by commanding it, whereas the backbiter merely +signifies an evil already existing. Therefore the curser sins more +grievously than the backbiter. + +_On the contrary,_ It is impossible to do well in backbiting, whereas +cursing may be either a good or an evil deed, as appears from what +has been said (A. 1). Therefore backbiting is graver than cursing. + +_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part (Q. 48, A. 5), evil is +twofold, evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the two, evil +of fault is the worse (I, Q. 48, A. 6). Hence to speak evil of fault +is worse than to speak evil of punishment, provided the mode of +speaking be the same. Accordingly it belongs to the reviler, the +tale-bearer, the backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault, +whereas it belongs to the evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to +speak evil of punishment, and not evil of fault except under the +aspect of punishment. But the mode of speaking is not the same, for +in the case of the four vices mentioned above, evil of fault is +spoken by way of assertion, whereas in the case of cursing evil of +punishment is spoken, either by causing it in the form of a command, +or by wishing it. Now the utterance itself of a person's fault is a +sin, in as much as it inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, and it is +more grievous to inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, other +things being equal. + +Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin +than the cursing which expresses a mere desire; while the cursing +which is expressed by way of command, since it has the aspect of a +cause, will be more or less grievous than backbiting, according as it +inflicts an injury more or less grave than the blackening of a man's +good name. Moreover this must be taken as applying to these vices +considered in their essential aspects: for other accidental points +might be taken into consideration, which would aggravate or extenuate +the aforesaid vices. + +Reply Obj. 1: To curse a creature, as such, reflects on God, and thus +accidentally it has the character of blasphemy; not so if one curse a +creature on account of its fault: and the same applies to backbiting. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 3), cursing, in one way, includes +the desire for evil, where if the curser desire the evil of another's +violent death, he does not differ, in desire, from a murderer, but he +differs from him in so far as the external act adds something to the +act of the will. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers cursing by way of command. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 77 + +OF CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary +commutations. First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed +in buying and selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which +occurs in loans. In connection with the other voluntary commutations +no special kind of sin is to be found distinct from rapine and theft. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is +lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth? + +(2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold; + +(3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold? + +(4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price +than was paid for it? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 1] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Sell a Thing for More Than Its Worth? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more +than its worth. In the commutations of human life, civil laws +determine that which is just. Now according to these laws it is just +for buyer and seller to deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De +Rescind. Vend. 8, 15): and this occurs by the seller selling a thing +for more than its worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than +its worth. Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its +worth. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to all would seem to be natural +and not sinful. Now Augustine relates that the saying of a certain +jester was accepted by all, "You wish to buy for a song and to sell +at a premium," which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, "It is +naught, it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away, +then he will boast." Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more +than its worth. + +Obj. 3: Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty +demands be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on +utility, the amount of the recompense for a favor received should +depend on the utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility +sometimes is worth more than the thing given, for instance if the +receiver be in great need of that thing, whether for the purpose of +avoiding a danger, or of deriving some particular benefit. Therefore, +in contracts of buying and selling, it is lawful to give a thing in +return for more than its worth. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 7:12): "All things . . . +whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them." +But no man wishes to buy a thing for more than its worth. Therefore +no man should sell a thing to another man for more than its worth. + +_I answer that,_ It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit +in order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this +is to deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says +(De Offic. iii, 15): "Contracts should be entirely free from +double-dealing: the seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the +buyer upon one that bids against him." + +But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two +ways. First, as considered in themselves, and from this point of +view, buying and selling seem to be established for the common +advantage of both parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to +the other, and vice versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3). +Now whatever is established for the common advantage, should not be +more of a burden to one party than to another, and consequently all +contracts between them should observe equality of thing and thing. +Again, the quality of a thing that comes into human use is measured +by the price given for it, for which purpose money was invented, as +stated in _Ethic._ v, 5. Therefore if either the price exceed the +quantity of the thing's worth, or, conversely, the thing exceed the +price, there is no longer the equality of justice: and consequently, +to sell a thing for more than its worth, or to buy it for less than +its worth, is in itself unjust and unlawful. + +Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as +accidentally tending to the advantage of one party, and to the +disadvantage of the other: for instance, when a man has great need of +a certain thing, while another man will suffer if he be without it. +In such a case the just price will depend not only on the thing sold, +but on the loss which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will +be lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though +the price paid be not more than it is worth to the owner. Yet if the +one man derive a great advantage by becoming possessed of the other +man's property, and the seller be not at a loss through being without +that thing, the latter ought not to raise the price, because the +advantage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to a +circumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man should sell what is not +his, though he may charge for the loss he suffers. + +On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from +something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller +something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 2) human law is given +to the people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it is not +given to the virtuous alone. Hence human law was unable to forbid all +that is contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit +whatever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats other +matters as though they were lawful, not by approving of them, but by +not punishing them. Accordingly, if without employing deceit the +seller disposes of his goods for more than their worth, or the buyer +obtain them for less than their worth, the law looks upon this as +licit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be +too great, because then even human law demands restitution to be +made, for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half +the amount of the just price of a thing [*Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. +Vend. 2, 8]. + +On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is +contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is +reckoned unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in +buying and selling: and he who has received more than he ought must +make compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be +considerable. I add this condition, because the just price of things +is not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of +estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to +destroy the equality of justice. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says "this jester, either by looking into +himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are +inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since +in reality this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire that +justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination." And +then he gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book +to a man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is +evident that this common desire is not from nature but from vice, +wherefore it is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: In commutative justice we consider chiefly real +equality. On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we +consider equality of usefulness, so that the recompense should depend +on the usefulness accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to +the thing bought. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 2] + +Whether a Sale Is Rendered Unlawful Through a Fault in the Thing Sold? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a sale is not rendered unjust and +unlawful through a fault in the thing sold. For less account should +be taken of the other parts of a thing than of what belongs to its +substance. Yet the sale of a thing does not seem to be rendered +unlawful through a fault in its substance: for instance, if a man +sell instead of the real metal, silver or gold produced by some +chemical process, which is adapted to all the human uses for which +silver and gold are necessary, for instance in the making of vessels +and the like. Much less therefore will it be an unlawful sale if the +thing be defective in other ways. + +Obj. 2: Further, any fault in the thing, affecting the quantity, +would seem chiefly to be opposed to justice which consists in +equality. Now quantity is known by being measured: and the measures +of things that come into human use are not fixed, but in some places +are greater, in others less, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 7). +Therefore just as it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of +the thing sold, it seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful through +the thing sold being defective. + +Obj. 3: Further, the thing sold is rendered defective by lacking a +fitting quality. But in order to know the quality of a thing, much +knowledge is required that is lacking in most buyers. Therefore a +sale is not rendered unlawful by a fault (in the thing sold). + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11): "It is +manifestly a rule of justice that a good man should not depart from +the truth, nor inflict an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any +connection with fraud." + +_I answer that,_ A threefold fault may be found pertaining to the +thing which is sold. One, in respect of the thing's substance: and if +the seller be aware of a fault in the thing he is selling, he is +guilty of a fraudulent sale, so that the sale is rendered unlawful. +Hence we find it written against certain people (Isa. 1:22), "Thy +silver is turned into dross, thy wine is mingled with water": because +that which is mixed is defective in its substance. + +Another defect is in respect of quantity which is known by being +measured: wherefore if anyone knowingly make use of a faulty measure +in selling, he is guilty of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it +is written (Deut. 25:13, 14): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in +thy bag, a greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a +greater bushel and a less," and further on (Deut. 25:16): "For the +Lord . . . abhorreth him that doth these things, and He hateth all +injustice." + +A third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance, if a man +sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one: and if anyone do +this knowingly he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, and the sale, in +consequence, is illicit. + +In all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraudulent sale, +but he is also bound to restitution. But if any of the foregoing +defects be in the thing sold, and he knows nothing about this, the +seller does not sin, because he does that which is unjust materially, +nor is his deed unjust, as shown above (Q. 59, A. 2). Nevertheless he +is bound to compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his +knowledge. Moreover what has been said of the seller applies equally +to the buyer. For sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his +goods to be specifically of lower value, as when a man sells gold +instead of copper, and then if the buyer be aware of this, he buys it +unjustly and is bound to restitution: and the same applies to a +defect in quantity as to a defect in quality. + +Reply Obj. 1: Gold and silver are costly not only on account of the +usefulness of the vessels and other like things made from them, but +also on account of the excellence and purity of their substance. +Hence if the gold or silver produced by alchemists has not the true +specific nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent +and unjust, especially as real gold and silver can produce certain +results by their natural action, which the counterfeit gold and +silver of alchemists cannot produce. Thus the true metal has the +property of making people joyful, and is helpful medicinally against +certain maladies. Moreover real gold can be employed more frequently, +and lasts longer in its condition of purity than counterfeit gold. If +however real gold were to be produced by alchemy, it would not be +unlawful to sell it for the genuine article, for nothing prevents art +from employing certain natural causes for the production of natural +and true effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things +produced by the art of the demons. + +Reply Obj. 2: The measures of salable commodities must needs be +different in different places, on account of the difference of +supply: because where there is greater abundance, the measures are +wont to be larger. However in each place those who govern the state +must determine the just measures of things salable, with due +consideration for the conditions of place and time. Hence it is not +lawful to disregard such measures as are established by public +authority or custom. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 16) the price of +things salable does not depend on their degree of nature, since at +times a horse fetches a higher price than a slave; but it depends on +their usefulness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or +buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing sold, but +only of such as render the thing adapted to man's use, for instance, +that the horse be strong, run well and so forth. Such qualities the +seller and buyer can easily discover. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 3] + +Whether the Seller Is Bound to State the Defects of the Thing Sold? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the +defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer +to buy, he would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods +offered for sale. Now judgment about a thing and knowledge of that +thing belong to the same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable +to the seller if the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be +hurried into buying a thing without carefully inquiring into its +condition. + +Obj. 2: Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents him +carrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the goods +he has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic. +iii, 13) pictures a man as saying: "Could anything be more absurd +than for a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: 'I offer +this unhealthy horse for sale?'" Therefore the seller is not bound to +state the defects of the thing sold. + +Obj. 3: Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to +know the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound to +offer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters +pertaining to virtue, though one should not tell anyone what is +false. Much less therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of +what he offers for sale, as though he were counseling the buyer. + +Obj. 4: Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one +offers for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. Now +sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, without +any defect in the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat +to a place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will +come after him carrying wheat; because if the buyers knew this they +would give a lower price. But apparently the seller need not give the +buyer this information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he +tell him the faults of the goods he is selling. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10): "In all +contracts the defects of the salable commodity must be stated; and +unless the seller make them known, although the buyer has already +acquired a right to them, the contract is voided on account of the +fraudulent action." + +_I answer that,_ It is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of +danger or loss, although a man need not always give another the help +or counsel which would be for his advantage in any way; but only in +certain fixed cases, for instance when someone is subject to him, or +when he is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who offers +goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger, by the +very fact that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may +occasion loss or danger to the buyer--loss, if, by reason of this +defect, the goods are of less value, and he takes nothing off the +price on that account--danger, if this defect either hinder the use +of the goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a +lame for a fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or +poisonous food for wholesome. Wherefore if such like defects be +hidden, and the seller does not make them known, the sale will be +illicit and fraudulent, and the seller will be bound to compensation +for the loss incurred. + +On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for instance if a horse +have but one eye, or if the goods though useless to the buyer, be +useful to someone else, provided the seller take as much as he ought +from the price, he is not bound to state the defect of the goods, +since perhaps on account of that defect the buyer might want him to +allow a greater rebate than he need. Wherefore the seller may look to +his own indemnity, by withholding the defect of the goods. + +Reply Obj. 1: Judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is manifest: +for "a man judges of what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if the +defects of the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them is +not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made +known to him. The case would be different if the defects were +manifest. + +Reply Obj. 2: There is no need to publish beforehand by the public +crier the defects of the goods one is offering for sale, because if +he were to begin by announcing its defects, the bidders would be +frightened to buy, through ignorance of other qualities that might +render the thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated +to each individual that offers to buy: and then he will be able to +compare the various points one with the other, the good with the bad: +for nothing prevents that which is defective in one respect being +useful in many others. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although a man is not bound strictly speaking to tell +everyone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is so +bound in a case when, unless he tells the truth, his conduct would +endanger another man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this +case. + +Reply Obj. 4: The defect in a thing makes it of less value now than +it seems to be: but in the case cited, the goods are expected to be +of less value at a future time, on account of the arrival of other +merchants, which was not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the +seller, since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him, +does not seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is +going to happen. If however he were to do so, or if he lowered his +price, it would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does +not seem to be bound to do this as a debt of justice. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 4] + +Whether, in Trading, It Is Lawful to Sell a Thing at a Higher Price +Than What Was Paid for It? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful, in trading, to sell +a thing for a higher price than we paid for it. For Chrysostom [*Hom. +xxxviii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John +Chrysostom] says on Matt. 21:12: "He that buys a thing in order that +he may sell it, entire and unchanged, at a profit, is the trader who +is cast out of God's temple." Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in +his commentary on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have not known learning, or +trading" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "What is +trade," says he, "but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of +retailing at a higher price?" and he adds: "Such were the tradesmen +whom Our Lord cast out of the temple." Now no man is cast out of the +temple except for a sin. Therefore such like trading is sinful. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a higher +price than their worth, or to buy them for less than their value, as +shown above (A. 1). Now if you sell a thing for a higher price than +you paid for it, you must either have bought it for less than its +value, or sell it for more than its value. Therefore this cannot be +done without sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Shun, as you would +the plague, a cleric who from being poor has become wealthy, or who, +from being a nobody has become a celebrity." Now trading would net +seem to be forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness. +Therefore it is a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to sell +at a higher price. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have +not known learning," [*Cf. Obj. 1] says: "The greedy tradesman +blasphemes over his losses; he lies and perjures himself over the +price of his wares. But these are vices of the man, not of the craft, +which can be exercised without these vices." Therefore trading is not +in itself unlawful. + +_I answer that,_ A tradesman is one whose business consists in the +exchange of things. According to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), +exchange of things is twofold; one, natural as it were, and +necessary, whereby one commodity is exchanged for another, or money +taken in exchange for a commodity, in order to satisfy the needs of +life. Such like trading, properly speaking, does not belong to +tradesmen, but rather to housekeepers or civil servants who have to +provide the household or the state with the necessaries of life. The +other kind of exchange is either that of money for money, or of any +commodity for money, not on account of the necessities of life, but +for profit, and this kind of exchange, properly speaking, regards +tradesmen, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3). The former +kind of exchange is commendable because it supplies a natural need: +but the latter is justly deserving of blame, because, considered in +itself, it satisfies the greed for gain, which knows no limit and +tends to infinity. Hence trading, considered in itself, has a certain +debasement attaching thereto, in so far as, by its very nature, it +does not imply a virtuous or necessary end. Nevertheless gain which +is the end of trading, though not implying, by its nature, anything +virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote anything sinful +or contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing prevents gain from being +directed to some necessary or even virtuous end, and thus trading +becomes lawful. Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate +gain which he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his +household, or for the assistance of the needy: or again, a man may +take to trade for some public advantage, for instance, lest his +country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an end, +but as payment for his labor. + +Reply Obj. 1: The saying of Chrysostom refers to the trading which +seeks gain as a last end. This is especially the case where a man +sells something at a higher price without its undergoing any change. +For if he sells at a higher price something that has changed for the +better, he would seem to receive the reward of his labor. +Nevertheless the gain itself may be lawfully intended, not as a last +end, but for the sake of some other end which is necessary or +virtuous, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Not everyone that sells at a higher price than he +bought is a tradesman, but only he who buys that he may sell at a +profit. If, on the contrary, he buys not for sale but for possession, +and afterwards, for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade +transaction even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this, +either because he has bettered the thing, or because the value of the +thing has changed with the change of place or time, or on account of +the danger he incurs in transferring the thing from one place to +another, or again in having it carried by another. In this sense +neither buying nor selling is unjust. + +Reply Obj. 3: Clerics should abstain not only from things that are +evil in themselves, but even from those that have an appearance of +evil. This happens in trading, both because it is directed to worldly +gain, which clerics should despise, and because trading is open to so +many vices, since "a merchant is hardly free from sins of the lips" +[*'A merchant is hardly free from negligence, and a huckster shall +not be justified from the sins of the lips'] (Ecclus. 26:28). There +is also another reason, because trading engages the mind too much +with worldly cares, and consequently withdraws it from spiritual +cares; wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:4): "No man being a +soldier to God entangleth himself with secular businesses." +Nevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage in the first +mentioned kind of exchange, which is directed to supply the +necessaries of life, either by buying or by selling. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 78 + +OF THE SIN OF USURY +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans: +and under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent, +which is to receive usury? + +(2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of +consideration, by way of payment for the loan? + +(3) Whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money +taken in usury? + +(4) Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 1] + +Whether It Is a Sin to Take Usury for Money Lent? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to take usury for +money lent. For no man sins through following the example of Christ. +But Our Lord said of Himself (Luke 19:23): "At My coming I might have +exacted it," i.e. the money lent, "with usury." Therefore it is not a +sin to take usury for lending money. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is +unspotted," because, to wit, it forbids sin. Now usury of a kind is +allowed in the Divine law, according to Deut. 23:19, 20: "Thou shalt +not fenerate to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but +to the stranger": nay more, it is even promised as a reward for the +observance of the Law, according to Deut. 28:12: "Thou shalt +fenerate* to many nations, and shalt not borrow of any one." +[*_Faeneraberis_--'Thou shalt lend upon usury.' The Douay version has +simply 'lend.' The objection lays stress on the word _faeneraberis:_ +hence the necessity of rendering it by 'fenerate.'] Therefore it is +not a sin to take usury. + +Obj. 3: Further, in human affairs justice is determined by civil +laws. Now civil law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems to +be lawful. + +Obj. 4: Further, the counsels are not binding under sin. But, among +other counsels we find (Luke 6:35): "Lend, hoping for nothing +thereby." Therefore it is not a sin to take usury. + +Obj. 5: Further, it does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept a +price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is +not bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is +lawful for him sometimes to accept a price for lending it. + +Obj. 6: Further, silver made into coins does not differ specifically +from silver made into a vessel. But it is lawful to accept a price +for the loan of a silver vessel. Therefore it is also lawful to +accept a price for the loan of a silver coin. Therefore usury is not +in itself a sin. + +Obj. 7: Further, anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its owner +freely gives him. Now he who accepts the loan, freely gives the +usury. Therefore he who lends may lawfully take the usury. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to +any of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt +not be hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with +usuries." + +_I answer that,_ To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, +because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads +to inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this +evident, we must observe that there are certain things the use of +which consists in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use +it for drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore +in such like things the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart +from the thing itself, and whoever is granted the use of the thing, +is granted the thing itself and for this reason, to lend things of +this kind is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted +to sell wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be selling +the same thing twice, or he would be selling what does not exist, +wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of injustice. In like +manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or wheat, and asks for +double payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in equal measure, +the other, the price of the use, which is called usury. + +On the other hand, there are things the use of which does not consist +in their consumption: thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to +destroy it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for +instance, one man may hand over to another the ownership of his house +while reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa, +he may grant the use of the house, while retaining the ownership. For +this reason a man may lawfully make a charge for the use of his +house, and, besides this, revendicate the house from the person to +whom he has granted its use, as happens in renting and letting a +house. + +Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3) +was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and consequently +the proper and principal use of money is its consumption or +alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very +nature unlawful to take payment for the use of money lent, which +payment is known as usury: and just as a man is bound to restore +other ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore the money which he +has taken in usury. + +Reply Obj. 1: In this passage usury must be taken figuratively for +the increase of spiritual goods which God exacts from us, for He +wishes us ever to advance in the goods which we receive from Him: and +this is for our own profit not for His. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their +brethren, i.e. from other Jews. By this we are given to understand +that to take usury from any man is evil simply, because we ought to +treat every man as our neighbor and brother, especially in the state +of the Gospel, whereto all are called. Hence it is said without any +distinction in Ps. 14:5: "He that hath not put out his money to +usury," and (Ezech. 18:8): "Who hath not taken usury [*Vulg.: 'If a +man . . . hath not lent upon money, nor taken any increase . . . he +is just.']." They were permitted, however, to take usury from +foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in order to avoid a +greater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to which they were prone +according to Isa. 56:11, they should take usury from the Jews who +were worshippers of God. + +Where we find it promised to them as a reward, "Thou shalt fenerate +to many nations," etc., fenerating is to be taken in a broad sense +for lending, as in Ecclus. 29:10, where we read: "Many have refused +to fenerate, not out of wickedness," i.e. they would not lend. +Accordingly the Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth, +so that they would be able to lend to others. + +Reply Obj. 3: Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account +of the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be +deprived of many advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and +punishments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted +usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice, but +lest the advantage of many should be hindered. Hence it is that in +civil law [*Inst. II, iv, de Usufructu] it is stated that "those +things according to natural reason and civil law which are consumed +by being used, do not admit of usufruct," and that "the senate did +not (nor could it) appoint a usufruct to such things, but established +a quasi-usufruct," namely by permitting usury. Moreover the +Philosopher, led by natural reason, says (Polit. i, 3) that "to make +money by usury is exceedingly unnatural." + +Reply Obj. 4: A man is not always bound to lend, and for this reason +it is placed among the counsels. Yet it is a matter of precept not to +seek profit by lending: although it may be called a matter of counsel +in comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees, who deemed some kinds +of usury to be lawful, just as love of one's enemies is a matter of +counsel. Or again, He speaks here not of the hope of usurious gain, +but of the hope which is put in man. For we ought not to lend or do +any good deed through hope in man, but only through hope in God. + +Reply Obj. 5: He that is not bound to lend, may accept repayment for +what he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is repaid +according to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent. +Wherefore if he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no +other use but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of +something non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust. + +Reply Obj. 6: The principal use of a silver vessel is not its +consumption, and so one may lawfully sell its use while retaining +one's ownership of it. On the other hand the principal use of silver +money is sinking it in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its +use and at the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent. +It must be observed, however, that the secondary use of silver +vessels may be an exchange, and such use may not be lawfully sold. In +like manner there may be some secondary use of silver money; for +instance, a man might lend coins for show, or to be used as security. + +Reply Obj. 7: He who gives usury does not give it voluntarily simply, +but under a certain necessity, in so far as he needs to borrow money +which the owner is unwilling to lend without usury. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Ask for Any Other Kind of Consideration for +Money Lent? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one may ask for some other kind of +consideration for money lent. For everyone may lawfully seek to +indemnify himself. Now sometimes a man suffers loss through lending +money. Therefore he may lawfully ask for or even exact something else +besides the money lent. + +Obj. 2: Further, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 5, one is in duty bound by +a point of honor, to repay anyone who has done us a favor. Now to +lend money to one who is in straits is to do him a favor for which he +should be grateful. Therefore the recipient of a loan, is bound by a +natural debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful to +bind oneself to an obligation of the natural law. Therefore it is not +unlawful, in lending money to anyone, to demand some sort of +compensation as condition of the loan. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as there is real remuneration, so is there +verbal remuneration, and remuneration by service, as a gloss says on +Isa. 33:15, "Blessed is he that shaketh his hands from all bribes +[*Vulg.: 'Which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? . . . +He that shaketh his hands from all bribes.']." Now it is lawful to +accept service or praise from one to whom one has lent money. +Therefore in like manner it is lawful to accept any other kind of +remuneration. + +Obj. 4: Further, seemingly the relation of gift to gift is the same +as of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept money for money given. +Therefore it is lawful to accept repayment by loan in return for a +loan granted. + +Obj. 5: Further, the lender, by transferring his ownership of a sum +of money removes the money further from himself than he who entrusts +it to a merchant or craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive interest +for money entrusted to a merchant or craftsman. Therefore it is also +lawful to receive interest for money lent. + +Obj. 6: Further, a man may accept a pledge for money lent, the use of +which pledge he might sell for a price: as when a man mortgages his +land or the house wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to +receive interest for money lent. + +Obj. 7: Further, it sometimes happens that a man raises the price of +his goods under guise of loan, or buys another's goods at a low +figure; or raises his price through delay in being paid, and lowers +his price that he may be paid the sooner. Now in all these cases +there seems to be payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to +be manifestly illicit. Therefore it seems to be lawful to expect or +exact some consideration for money lent. + +_On the contrary,_ Among other conditions requisite in a just man it +is stated (Ezech. 18:17) that he "hath not taken usury and increase." + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), a thing +is reckoned as money "if its value can be measured by money." +Consequently, just as it is a sin against justice, to take money, by +tacit or express agreement, in return for lending money or anything +else that is consumed by being used, so also is it a like sin, by +tacit or express agreement to receive anything whose price can be +measured by money. Yet there would be no sin in receiving something +of the kind, not as exacting it, nor yet as though it were due on +account of some agreement tacit or expressed, but as a gratuity: +since, even before lending the money, one could accept a gratuity, +nor is one in a worse condition through lending. + +On the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation for a loan, in +respect of such things as are not appreciated by a measure of money, +for instance, benevolence, and love for the lender, and so forth. + +Reply Obj. 1: A lender may without sin enter an agreement with the +borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he +ought to have, for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid +a loss. It may also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss +than the lender incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the lender +with what he has gained. But the lender cannot enter an agreement for +compensation, through the fact that he makes no profit out of his +money: because he must not sell that which he has not yet and may be +prevented in many ways from having. + +Reply Obj. 2: Repayment for a favor may be made in two ways. In one +way, as a debt of justice; and to such a debt a man may be bound by a +fixed contract; and its amount is measured according to the favor +received. Wherefore the borrower of money or any such thing the use +of which is its consumption is not bound to repay more than he +received in loan: and consequently it is against justice if he be +obliged to pay back more. In another way a man's obligation to +repayment for favor received is based on a debt of friendship, and +the nature of this debt depends more on the feeling with which the +favor was conferred than on the greatness of the favor itself. This +debt does not carry with it a civil obligation, involving a kind of +necessity that would exclude the spontaneous nature of such a +repayment. + +Reply Obj. 3: If a man were, in return for money lent, as though +there had been an agreement tacit or expressed, to expect or exact +repayment in the shape of some remuneration of service or words, it +would be the same as if he expected or exacted some real +remuneration, because both can be priced at a money value, as may be +seen in the case of those who offer for hire the labor which they +exercise by work or by tongue. If on the other hand the remuneration +by service or words be given not as an obligation, but as a favor, +which is not to be appreciated at a money value, it is lawful to +take, exact, and expect it. + +Reply Obj. 4: Money cannot be sold for a greater sum than the amount +lent, which has to be paid back: nor should the loan be made with a +demand or expectation of aught else but of a feeling of benevolence +which cannot be priced at a pecuniary value, and which can be the +basis of a spontaneous loan. Now the obligation to lend in return at +some future time is repugnant to such a feeling, because again an +obligation of this kind has its pecuniary value. Consequently it is +lawful for the lender to borrow something else at the same time, but +it is unlawful for him to bind the borrower to grant him a loan at +some future time. + +Reply Obj. 5: He who lends money transfers the ownership of the money +to the borrower. Hence the borrower holds the money at his own risk +and is bound to pay it all back: wherefore the lender must not exact +more. On the other hand he that entrusts his money to a merchant or +craftsman so as to form a kind of society, does not transfer the +ownership of his money to them, for it remains his, so that at his +risk the merchant speculates with it, or the craftsman uses it for +his craft, and consequently he may lawfully demand as something +belonging to him, part of the profits derived from his money. + +Reply Obj. 6: If a man in return for money lent to him pledges +something that can be valued at a price, the lender must allow for +the use of that thing towards the repayment of the loan. Else if he +wishes the gratuitous use of that thing in addition to repayment, it +is the same as if he took money for lending, and that is usury, +unless perhaps it were such a thing as friends are wont to lend to +one another gratis, as in the case of the loan of a book. + +Reply Obj. 7: If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than +that which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is +manifestly a case of usury: because this waiting for the payment of +the price has the character of a loan, so that whatever he demands +beyond the just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price +for a loan, which pertains to usury. In like manner if a buyer wishes +to buy goods at a lower price than what is just, for the reason that +he pays for the goods before they can be delivered, it is a sin of +usury; because again this anticipated payment of money has the +character of a loan, the price of which is the rebate on the just +price of the goods sold. On the other hand if a man wishes to allow a +rebate on the just price in order that he may have his money sooner, +he is not guilty of the sin of usury. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 3] + +Whether a Man Is Bound to Restore Whatever Profits He Has Made Out of +Money Gotten by Usury? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore whatever +profits he has made out of money gotten by usury. For the Apostle +says (Rom. 11:16): "If the root be holy, so are the branches." +Therefore likewise if the root be rotten so are the branches. But the +root was infected with usury. Therefore whatever profit is made +therefrom is infected with usury. Therefore he is bound to restore it. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is laid down (Extra, De Usuris, in the Decretal: +'Cum tu sicut asseris'): "Property accruing from usury must be sold, +and the price repaid to the persons from whom the usury was +extorted." Therefore, likewise, whatever else is acquired from +usurious money must be restored. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which a man buys with the proceeds of usury is +due to him by reason of the money he paid for it. Therefore he has no +more right to the thing purchased than to the money he paid. But he +was bound to restore the money gained through usury. Therefore he is +also bound to restore what he acquired with it. + +_On the contrary,_ A man may lawfully hold what he has lawfully +acquired. Now that which is acquired by the proceeds of usury is +sometimes lawfully acquired. Therefore it may be lawfully retained. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), there are certain things +whose use is their consumption, and which do not admit of usufruct, +according to law (ibid., ad 3). Wherefore if such like things be +extorted by means of usury, for instance money, wheat, wine and so +forth, the lender is not bound to restore more than he received +(since what is acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing +but of human industry), unless indeed the other party by losing some +of his own goods be injured through the lender retaining them: for +then he is bound to make good the loss. + +On the other hand, there are certain things whose use is not their +consumption: such things admit of usufruct, for instance house or +land property and so forth. Wherefore if a man has by usury extorted +from another his house or land, he is bound to restore not only the +house or land but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since +they are the fruits of things owned by another man and consequently +are due to him. + +Reply Obj. 1: The root has not only the character of matter, as money +made by usury has; but has also somewhat the character of an active +cause, in so far as it administers nourishment. Hence the comparison +fails. + +Reply Obj. 2: Further, Property acquired from usury does not belong +to the person who paid usury, but to the person who bought it. Yet he +that paid usury has a certain claim on that property just as he has +on the other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed that +such property should be assigned to the persons who paid usury, since +the property is perhaps worth more than what they paid in usury, but +it is commanded that the property be sold, and the price be restored, +of course according to the amount taken in usury. + +Reply Obj. 3: The proceeds of money taken in usury are due to the +person who acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as +instrumental cause, but on account of his own industry as principal +cause. Wherefore he has more right to the goods acquired with +usurious money than to the usurious money itself. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Borrow Money Under a Condition of Usury? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to borrow money +under a condition of usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32) that +they "are worthy of death . . . not only they that do" these sins, +"but they also that consent to them that do them." Now he that +borrows money under a condition of usury consents in the sin of the +usurer, and gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he sins also. + +Obj. 2: Further, for no temporal advantage ought one to give another +an occasion of committing a sin: for this pertains to active scandal, +which is always sinful, as stated above (Q. 43, A. 2). Now he that +seeks to borrow from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore +he is not to be excused on account of any temporal advantage. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit +one's money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems +altogether unlawful to deposit one's money with a usurer, even as it +would be unlawful to deposit one's sword with a madman, a maiden with +a libertine, or food with a glutton. Neither therefore is it lawful +to borrow from a usurer. + +_On the contrary,_ He that suffers injury does not sin, according to +the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore justice is not a mean +between two vices, as stated in the same book (ch. 5). Now a usurer +sins by doing an injury to the person who borrows from him under a +condition of usury. Therefore he that accepts a loan under a +condition of usury does not sin. + +_I answer that,_ It is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet +it is lawful to make use of another's sin for a good end, since even +God uses all sin for some good, since He draws some good from every +evil as stated in the Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked +whether it were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swearing +by false gods (which is a manifest sin, for he gives Divine honor to +them) Augustine (Ep. xlvii) answered that he who uses, not for a bad +but for a good purpose, the oath of a man that swears by false gods, +is a party, not to his sin of swearing by demons, but to his good +compact whereby he kept his word. If however he were to induce him to +swear by false gods, he would sin. + +Accordingly we must also answer to the question in point that it is +by no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition of +usury: yet it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready +to do so and is a usurer by profession; provided the borrower have a +good end in view, such as the relief of his own or another's need. +Thus too it is lawful for a man who has fallen among thieves to point +out his property to them (which they sin in taking) in order to save +his life, after the example of the ten men who said to Ismahel (Jer. +41:8): "Kill us not: for we have stores in the field." + +Reply Obj. 1: He who borrows for usury does not consent to the +usurer's sin but makes use of it. Nor is it the usurer's acceptance +of usury that pleases him, but his lending, which is good. + +Reply Obj. 2: He who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion, +not for taking usury, but for lending; it is the usurer who finds an +occasion of sin in the malice of his heart. Hence there is passive +scandal on his part, while there is no active scandal on the part of +the person who seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a reason +why the other person should desist from borrowing if he is in need, +since this passive scandal arises not from weakness or ignorance but +from malice. + +Reply Obj. 3: If one were to entrust one's money to a usurer lacking +other means of practising usury; or with the intention of making a +greater profit from his money by reason of the usury, one would be +giving a sinner matter for sin, so that one would be a participator +in his guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom one entrusts +one's money has other means of practising usury, there is no sin in +entrusting it to him that it may be in safer keeping, since this is +to use a sinner for a good purpose. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 79 + +OF THE QUASI-INTEGRAL PARTS OF JUSTICE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are +_to do good,_ and _to decline from evil,_ and the opposite vices. +Under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether these two are parts of justice? + +(2) Whether transgression is a special sin? + +(3) Whether omission is a special sin? + +(4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 1] + +Whether to Decline from Evil and to Do Good Are Parts of Justice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good +are not parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform a +good deed and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the +whole. Therefore to decline from evil and to do good should not be +reckoned parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 33:15, "Turn away from evil and do +good," says: "The former," i.e. to turn away from evil, "avoids sin, +the latter," i.e. to do good, "deserves the life and the palm." But +any part of a virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to +decline from evil is not a part of justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, things that are so related that one implies the +other, are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now declining +from evil is implied in doing good: since no one does evil and good +at the same time. Therefore declining from evil and doing good are +not parts of justice. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares that +"declining from evil and doing good" belong to the justice of the law. + +_I answer that,_ If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs +to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they +cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the +sense of "all virtue" [*Cf. Q. 58, A. 5]. And yet even if justice be +taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good; +namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law. + +On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good +as due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special +justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid +the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's neighbor; +while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the +community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil. + +Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of +special justice, because each is required for the perfect act of +justice. For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our +relations with others, as shown above (Q. 58, A. 2): and it pertains +to the same cause to establish and to preserve that which it has +established. Now a person establishes the equality of justice by +doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves +the already established equality of justice by declining from evil, +that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 1: Good and evil are here considered under a special +aspect, by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason why +these two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of +good and evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral +virtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with the +passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean, which is the same +as to avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding +evil come to the same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other +hand justice is concerned with operations and external things, +wherein to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the +equality established is another. + +Reply Obj. 2: To decline from evil, considered as a part of justice, +does not denote a pure negation, viz. "not to do evil"; for this does +not deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it implies +a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term +"decline" shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person +resists against an instigation to do evil. + +Reply Obj. 3: Doing good is the completive act of justice, and the +principal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more +imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a +material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the +formal and completive part. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 2] + +Whether Transgression Is a Special Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that transgression is not a special sin. +For no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now +transgression is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose +says (De Parad. viii) that sin is "a transgression of the Divine +law." Therefore transgression is not a species of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus. But +transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is a "word, +deed or desire against the law of God," according to Augustine +(Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature, +or custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, no species contains all the parts into which its +genus is divided. Now the sin of transgression extends to all the +capital vices, as well as to sins of thought, word and deed. +Therefore transgression is not a special sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice. + +_I answer that,_ The term transgression is derived from bodily +movement and applied to moral actions. Now a person is said to +transgress in bodily movement, when he steps (_graditur_) beyond +(_trans_) a fixed boundary--and it is a negative precept that fixes +the boundary that man must not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore +to transgress, properly speaking, is to act against a negative +precept. + +Now materially considered this may be common to all the species of +sin, because man transgresses a Divine precept by any species of +mortal sin. But if we consider it formally, namely under its special +aspect of an act against a negative precept, it is a special sin in +two ways. First, in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin +that are opposed to the other virtues: for just as it belongs +properly to legal justice to consider a precept as binding, so it +belongs properly to a transgression to consider a precept as an +object of contempt. Secondly, in so far as it is distinct from +omission which is opposed to an affirmative precept. + +Reply Obj. 1: Even as legal justice is "all virtue" (Q. 58, A. 5) as +regards its subject and matter, so legal injustice is materially "all +sin." It is in this way that Ambrose defined sin, considering it from +the point of view of legal injustice. + +Reply Obj. 2: The natural inclination concerns the precepts of the +natural law. Again, a laudable custom has the force of a precept; +since as Augustine says in an epistle _on the Fast of the Sabbath_ +(Ep. xxxvi), "a custom of God's people should be looked upon as law." +Hence both sin and transgression may be against a laudable custom and +against a natural inclination. + +Reply Obj. 3: All these species of sin may include transgression, if +we consider them not under their proper aspects, but under a special +aspect, as stated above. The sin of omission, however, is altogether +distinct from the sin of transgression. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 3] + +Whether Omission Is a Special Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that omission is not a special sin. For +every sin is either original or actual. Now omission is not original +sin, for it is not contracted through origin; nor is it actual sin, +for it may be altogether without act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, +A. 5) when we were treating of sins in general. Therefore omission is +not a special sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, every sin is voluntary. Now omission sometimes is +not voluntary but necessary, as when a woman is violated after taking +a vow of virginity, or when one lose that which one is under an +obligation to restore, or when a priest is bound to say Mass, and is +prevented from doing so. Therefore omission is not always a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time when any special sin +begins. But this is not possible in the case of omission, since one +is not altered by not doing a thing, no matter when the omission +occurs, and yet the omission is not always sinful. Therefore omission +is not a special sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. +But it is not possible to assign any special virtue to which omission +is opposed, both because the good of any virtue can be omitted, and +because justice to which it would seem more particularly opposed, +always requires an act, even in declining from evil, as stated above +(A. 1, ad 2), while omission may be altogether without act. Therefore +omission is not a special sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 4:17): "To him . . . who +knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin." + +_I answer that,_ omission signifies the non-fulfilment of a good, not +indeed of any good, but of a good that is due. Now good under the +aspect of due belongs properly to justice; to legal justice, if the +thing due depends on Divine or human law; to special justice, if the +due is something in relation to one's neighbor. Wherefore, in the +same way as justice is a special virtue, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. +6, 7), omission is a special sin distinct from the sins which are +opposed to the other virtues; and just as doing good, which is the +opposite of omitting it, is a special part of justice, distinct from +avoiding evil, to which transgression is opposed, so too is omission +distinct from transgression. + +Reply Obj. 2: Omission is not original but actual sin, not as though +it had some act essential to it, but for as much as the negation of +an act is reduced to the genus of act, and in this sense non-action +is a kind of action, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6, ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 2: Omission, as stated above, is only of such good as is +due and to which one is bound. Now no man is bound to the impossible: +wherefore no man sins by omission, if he does not do what he cannot. +Accordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity, is guilty of +an omission, not through not having virginity, but through not +repenting of her past sin, or through not doing what she can to +fulfil her vow by observing continence. Again a priest is not bound +to say Mass, except he have a suitable opportunity, and if this be +lacking, there is no omission. And in like manner, a person is bound +to restitution, supposing he has the wherewithal; if he has not and +cannot have it, he is not guilty of an omission, provided he does +what he can. The same applies to other similar cases. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as the sin of transgression is opposed to negative +precepts which regard the avoidance of evil, so the sin of omission +is opposed to affirmative precepts, which regard the doing of good. +Now affirmative precepts bind not for always, but for a fixed time, +and at that time the sin of omission begins. But it may happen that +then one is unable to do what one ought, and if this inability is +without any fault on his part, he does not omit his duty, as stated +above (ad 2; I-II, Q. 71, A. 5). On the other hand if this inability +is due to some previous fault of his (for instance, if a man gets +drunk at night, and cannot get up for matins, as he ought to), some +say that the sin of omission begins when he engages in an action that +is illicit and incompatible with the act to which he is bound. But +this does not seem to be true, for supposing one were to rouse him by +violence and that he went to matins, he would not omit to go, so +that, evidently, the previous drunkenness was not an omission, but +the cause of an omission. Consequently, we must say that the omission +begins to be imputed to him as a sin, when the time comes for the +action; and yet this is on account of a preceding cause by reason of +which the subsequent omission becomes voluntary. + +Reply Obj. 4: Omission is directly opposed to justice, as stated +above; because it is a non-fulfilment of a good of virtue, but only +under the aspect of due, which pertains to justice. Now more is +required for an act to be virtuous and meritorious than for it to be +sinful and demeritorious, because "good results from an entire cause, +whereas evil arises from each single defect" [*Dionysius, De Div. +Nom. iv]. Wherefore the merit of justice requires an act, whereas an +omission does not. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 4] + +Whether a Sin of Omission Is More Grievous Than a Sin of +Transgression? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous +than a sin of transgression. For _delictum_ would seem to signify the +same as _derelictum_ [*Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx], and +therefore is seemingly the same as an omission. But _delictum_ +denotes a more grievous offence than transgression, because it +deserves more expiation as appears from Lev. 5. Therefore the sin of +omission is more grievous than the sin of transgression. + +Obj. 2: Further, the greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as +the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). Now to do good is a more +excellent part of justice, than to decline from evil, to which +transgression is opposed, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore +omission is a graver sin than transgression. + +Obj. 3: Further, sins of transgression may be either venial or +mortal. But sins of omission seem to be always mortal, since they are +opposed to an affirmative precept. Therefore omission would seem to +be a graver sin than transgression. + +Obj. 4: Further, the pain of loss which consists in being deprived of +seeing God and is inflicted for the sin of omission, is a greater +punishment than the pain of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of +transgression, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super Matth.). Now +punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of omission +is graver than the sin of transgression. + +_On the contrary,_ It is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to +accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain +from an evil deed, i.e. _to transgress,_ than not to accomplish a +good deed, which is _to omit._ + +_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from +virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest remoteness, according to +_Metaph._ x [*Didot. ed. ix, 4]. Wherefore a thing is further removed +from its contrary than from its simple negation; thus black is +further removed from white than not-white is, since every black is +not-white, but not conversely. Now it is evident that transgression +is contrary to an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation +thereof: for instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to give +one's parents due reverence, while it is a sin of transgression to +revile them or injure them in any way. Hence it is evident that, +simply and absolutely speaking, transgression is a graver sin than +omission, although a particular omission may be graver than a +particular transgression. + +Reply Obj. 1: _Delictum_ in its widest sense denotes any kind of +omission; but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission of +something concerning God, or for a man's intentional and as it were +contemptuous dereliction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity, +for which reason it demands a greater expiation. + +Reply Obj. 2: The opposite of _doing good_ is both _not doing good,_ +which is an omission, and _doing evil,_ which is a transgression: but +the first is opposed by contradiction, the second by contrariety, +which implies greater remoteness: wherefore transgression is the more +grievous sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, so +is transgression opposed to negative precepts: wherefore both, +strictly speaking, have the character of mortal sin. Transgression +and omission, however, may be taken broadly for any infringement of +an affirmative or negative precept, disposing to the opposite of such +precept: and so taking both in a broad sense they may be venial sins. + +Reply Obj. 4: To the sin of transgression there correspond both the +pain of loss on account of the aversion from God, and the pain of +sense, on account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. In +like manner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the +pain of sense, according to Matt. 7:19, "Every tree that bringeth not +forth good fruit shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire"; +and this on account of the root from which it grows, although it does +not necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 80 + +OF THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE +(In One Article) + +We must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the +virtues annexed thereto; under which head there are two points of +consideration: + +(1) What virtues are annexed to justice? + +(2) The individual virtues annexed to justice. +_______________________ + +ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 80, Art.] + +Whether the Virtues Annexed to Justice Are Suitably Enumerated? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are +unsuitably enumerated. Tully [*De Invent. ii, 53] reckons six, viz. +"religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth." Now revenge +is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby revenge is +taken for injuries inflicted, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 4). +Therefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to +justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven, +viz. "innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, +humanity," several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the +virtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated. + +Obj. 3: Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz. +"obedience" in respect of one's superiors, "discipline" with regard +to inferiors, "equity" as regards equals, "fidelity" and +"truthfulness" towards all; and of these "truthfulness" alone is +mentioned by Tully. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated +insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice. + +Obj. 4: Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons +nine parts annexed to justice viz. "liberality, kindliness, revenge, +commonsense, [*_eugnomosyne_] piety, gratitude, holiness, just +exchange" and "just lawgiving"; and of all these it is evident that +Tully mentions none but "revenge." Therefore he would appear to have +made an incomplete enumeration. + +Obj. 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions _epieikeia_ as +being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any +of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to +justice are insufficiently enumerated. + +_I answer that,_ Two points must be observed about the virtues +annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have +something in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that +in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. +Accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above +(Q. 58, A. 2), all the virtues that are directed to another person +may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the +essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his +due according to equality, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 11). Wherefore +in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the +perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of +equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For +certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are +unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man +renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered +to God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, "What shall I +render to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?" +In this respect _religion_ is annexed to justice since, according to +Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and +ceremonial rites or worship to "some superior nature that men call +divine." Secondly, it is not possible to make to one's parents an +equal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares +(Ethic. viii, 14); and thus _piety_ is annexed to justice, for +thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man "renders service +and constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his +country." Thirdly, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man +is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus _observance_ is +annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53) +in the "deference and honor rendered to those who excel in worth." + +A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a +twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, +13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which +one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due +is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On +the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in +respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies +necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so +necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this +has more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered +from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to +this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he +is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed _truth,_ +whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and future +things are told without perversion. It may also be considered from +the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the +reward he receives with what he has done--sometimes in good things; +and then annexed to justice we have _gratitude_ which "consists in +recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in +desiring to pay them back," as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)--and +sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed _revenge,_ +whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), "we resist force, +injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by self-defense." +[*St. Thomas read _obscurum,_ and explains it as meaning +_derogatory,_ infra Q. 108, A. 2. Cicero, however, wrote _obfuturum,_ +i.e. _hurtful._] + +There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces +to greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured. +This due is the concern of _liberality,_ _affability_ or +_friendship,_ or the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid +enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in +them. + +Reply Obj. 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in +accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice: +whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though +not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge, +belongs to the virtue annexed to justice. + +Reply Obj. 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral +parts of justice, namely, _declining from evil,_ to which _innocence_ +belongs, and _doing good,_ to which the six others belong. Of these, +two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely, +_friendship_ in the external conduct and _concord_ internally; two +regard our relations toward superiors, namely, _piety_ to parents, +and _religion_ to God; while two regard our relations towards +inferiors, namely, _condescension,_ in so far as their good pleases +us, and _humanity,_ whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore +says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be "humane, through having a +feeling of love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity +whereby we uphold one another." In this sense _friendship_ is +understood as directing our external conduct towards others, from +which point of view the Philosopher treats of it in _Ethic._ iv, 6. +_Friendship_ may also be taken as regarding properly the affections, +and as the Philosopher describes it in _Ethic._ viii and ix. In this +sense three things pertain to friendship, namely, _benevolence_ which +is here called _affection_; _concord,_ and _beneficence_ which is +here called _humanity._ These three, however, are omitted by Tully, +because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a due. + +Reply Obj. 3: _Obedience_ is included in observance, which Tully +mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to +persons who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his +words" [*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in +_truthfulness_ as to the observance of one's promises: yet +_truthfulness_ covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on +(Q. 109, AA. 1, 3). _Discipline_ is not due as a necessary duty, +because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a +superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors, +according to Matt. 24:45, "A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord +hath appointed over his family": and for this reason it is omitted by +Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by +Macrobius; and equity under _epieikeia_ or under _friendship._ + +Reply Obj. 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true +justice. To particular justice belongs _justice of exchange,_ which +he describes as "the habit of observing equality in commutations." To +legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes +_legislative justice,_ which he describes as "the science of +political commutations relating to the community." As regards things +which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he +mentions _common sense_ or _good judgment,_* which is our guide in +such like matters, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 4) in the treatise on +prudence: wherefore he says that it is a "voluntary justification," +because by his own free will man observes what is just according to +his judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas +indicates the Greek derivation: _eugnomosyne_ quasi 'bona _gnome_.'] +These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice +as their executor. _Eusebeia_ (piety) means _good worship_ and +consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is +the science of "the service of God" (he speaks after the manner of +Socrates who said that 'all the virtues are sciences') [*Aristotle, +_Ethic._ vi, 13]: and _holiness_ comes to the same, as we shall state +further on (Q. 81, A. 8). _Eucharistia_ (gratitude) means "good +thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says +(Etym. x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to +do good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that +"kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence." _Liberality_ would +seem to pertain to _humanity._ + +Reply Obj. 5: _Epieikeia_ is annexed, not to particular but to legal +justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of +_eugnomosyne_ (common sense). +_______________________ + +QUESTION 81 + +OF RELIGION +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as +our present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, +(3) observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, +(8) liberality, (9) _epieikeia_. Of the other virtues that have been +mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of +concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for +instance, of right commutations and of innocence. Of legislative +justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence. + +Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in +itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices. + +Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God? + +(2) Whether religion is a virtue? + +(3) Whether religion is one virtue? + +(4) Whether religion is a special virtue? + +(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue? + +(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues? + +(7) Whether religion has any external actions? + +(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 1] + +Whether Religion Directs Man to God Alone? + +Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not direct man to God +alone. It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled +before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows +in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world." +Now "to visit the fatherless and widows" indicates an order between +oneself and one's neighbor, and "to keep oneself unspotted from this +world" belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore +religion does not imply order to God alone. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that "since in +speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere +wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred +and relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of +tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of +Divine worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that +religion is nothing else but the worship of God." Therefore religion +signifies a relation not only to God but also to our kindred. + +Obj. 3: Further, seemingly _latria_ pertains to religion. Now +"_latria_ signifies servitude," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, +1). And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor, +according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another." +Therefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also. + +Obj. 4: Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to +worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying +of Cato [*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], "Worship thy parents." +Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to +God. + +Obj. 5: Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject +to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious, +but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances, +and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does +not denote a relation of subjection of man to God. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that "religion consists +in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that +men call divine." + +_I answer that,_ as Isidore says (Etym. x), "according to Cicero, a +man is said to be religious from _religio,_ because he often ponders +over, and, as it were, reads again (_relegit_), the things which +pertain to the worship of God," so that religion would seem to take +its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine +worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our +hearts, according to Prov. 3:6, "In all thy ways think on Him." +According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name +from the fact that "we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by +our neglect" [*St. Augustine plays on the words _reeligere,_ i.e. to +choose over again, and _negligere,_ to neglect or despise.]. Or +again, religion may be derived from _religare_ (to bind together), +wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): "May religion bind us +to the one Almighty God." However, whether religion take its name +from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been +lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a +relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our +unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely +directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by +sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith. + +Reply Obj. 1: Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and +immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God +alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has +other acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which +it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue +which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are +concerned with the means. Accordingly "to visit the fatherless and +widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and +an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from +this world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or +of some similar virtue as eliciting. + +Reply Obj. 2: Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to +one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense, +but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the +passage quoted, Augustine says: "In a stricter sense religion seems +to denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God." + +Reply Obj. 3: Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever +there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special +kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a +special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme +dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to +Him, which is known as _latria_ in Greek; and therefore it belongs to +religion. + +Reply Obj. 4: We are said to worship those whom we honor, and to +cultivate [*In the Latin the same word _colere_ stands for "worship" +and "cultivate"] a man's memory or presence: we even speak of +cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer (_agricola_) is +one who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant (_incola_) is one who +cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor +is due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is +due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is _Eusebeia_ or +_Theosebeia_, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). + +Reply Obj. 5: Although the name "religious" may be given to all in +general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who +consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing +from human affairs. Thus also the term "contemplative" is applied, +not to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole +lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for +man's sake but for God's sake, according to the word of the Apostle +(Gal. 4:14), "You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as +Christ Jesus." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 2] + +Whether Religion Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly +it belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an +act of fear which is a gift, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 9). Therefore +religion is not a virtue but a gift. + +Obj. 2: Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will, +wherefore it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit" +[*Ethic. ii, 6]. Now, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3) _latria_ belongs +to religion, and _latria_ denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore +religion is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is +in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the +dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer +ceremonial worship to the Godhead" [*Cf. A. 1], and ceremonial +matters, as stated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 3, ad 2; Q. 101), do not +belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a +virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is enumerated with the other virtues, as +appears from what has been said above (Q. 80). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, A. 3; I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4) +"a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good +likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to +a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the +aspect of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes +suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a +becoming manner. But order comes under the aspect of good, just as +mode and species, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since +then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to +God, it is evident that religion is a virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of +fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through +reverence for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as +the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more +excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as +stated above (Q. 9, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). + +Reply Obj. 2: Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his +master, and so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad +Furiam.], by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due +service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so +voluntarily. + +Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that +man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should +do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of +natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 3] + +Whether Religion Is One Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion +directs us to God, as stated above (A. 1). Now in God there are three +Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically +from one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for +a difference of virtue, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 2, ad 2). +Therefore religion is not one virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since +habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of +religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to +sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid +to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God Himself. +Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would +seem that religion is not one virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 4:5): "One God [Vulg.: +'Lord'], one faith." Now true religion professes faith in one God. +Therefore religion is one virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), habits +are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now +it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect, +namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of +things. Wherefore He Himself says (Malach. 1:6): "If . . . I be a +father, where is My honor?" For it belongs to a father to beget and +to govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the +creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one +religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the +aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and +governs them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore +religion is one virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: By the one same act man both serves and worships God, +for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due: +while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is +under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong +all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears +witness to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God, +either by offering something to God, or by assuming something Divine. + +Reply Obj. 3: The worship of religion is paid to images, not as +considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to +God incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the +image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither _latria_ +nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that +religious worship is paid to the images of Christ. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 4] + +Whether Religion Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from the Others? + +Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a special virtue +distinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "Any +action whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true +sacrifice." But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every +virtuous deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a +special virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the +glory of God." Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence +of God, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2; A. 2). Therefore religion is not +a special virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from +the charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to _Ethic._ + viii, 8 "to be honored is almost to be loved." Therefore the +religion whereby we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from +observance, or _dulia,_ or piety whereby we honor our neighbor. +Therefore religion is not a special virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from +the other parts. + +_I answer that,_ Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there +is a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the +good to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God. +Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to +God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses +all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special +honor due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor is +due to different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father, +another to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is +a special virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in so +far as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove +that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other +virtues, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 2: Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's honor, +belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong +to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God by +reason of their specific character. + +Reply Obj. 3: The object of love is the good, but the object of honor +and reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is +communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is +not. Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the +charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby +God is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our +neighbor. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 5] + +Whether Religion Is a Theological Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue. +Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that "God is worshiped by faith, +hope and charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to +religion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological +virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its +object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to +God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore religion is a +theological virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, +or moral, as is clear from what has been said (I-II, QQ. 57, 58, 62). +Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue, +because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth: +nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the +mean between too much and too little, for one cannot worship God too +much, according to Ecclus. 43:33, "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as +much as you can; for He is above all praise." Therefore it remains +that it is a theological virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral +virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4) religion pays due worship to +God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that +which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter +and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, +viz. God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is +worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we +reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Q. 1, +AA. 1, 2, 4) that God is the object of faith, not only because we +believe in a God, but because we believe God. + +Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God +is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are +done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is +related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and +consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the +last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred +to the end. + +Reply Obj. 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, +moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with +matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, +hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper +object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, +which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says +that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity. + +Reply Obj. 2: Religion directs man to God not as its object but as +its end. + +Reply Obj. 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual, +but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a +mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by +establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say "equality," I +do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God +as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability +and God's acceptance. + +And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the +Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as +regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom +it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some +other circumstance. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 6] + +Whether Religion Should Be Preferred to the Other Moral Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to +the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in +its observing the mean, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. But religion +fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an +absolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than +the other moral virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more +praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater +need: wherefore it is written (Isa. 57:7): "Deal thy bread to the +hungry." But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to +Ps. 15:2, "I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my +goods." Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the +other virtues whereby man's needs are relieved. + +Obj. 3: Further, the greater the obligation to do a thing, the less +praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the +Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me." Now the +more a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, +then, what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him, +it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human +virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ The precepts pertaining to religion are given +precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of +precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts +of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief +of the moral virtues. + +_I answer that,_ Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness +from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end +the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above (A. 5; Q. 4, A. +7), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And +religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so +far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor +of God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of +the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is +the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no +less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of his will. + +Reply Obj. 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of its +usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the +offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God +not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His +glory, and on account of its usefulness to us. + +Reply Obj. 3: Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the +luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it be +done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 7] + +Whether Religion Has an External Act? + +Objection 1: It would seem that religion has not an external act. It +is written (John 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, +must adore Him in spirit and in truth." Now external acts pertain, +not to the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which +adoration belongs, has acts that are not external but internal. + +Obj. 2: Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and +honor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one +were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since +then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed +properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of +inferior creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in +showing reverence to God. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca for +finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are +wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals +is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to +the true God, Who is "exalted above all gods" [*Ps. 94:3]. Therefore +it would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore +religion has no bodily actions. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh +have rejoiced in the living God." Now just as internal actions belong +to the heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the +flesh. Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by +internal but also by external actions. + +_I answer that,_ We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake +(because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add +anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we +revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its +perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to +its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened +by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the +human mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the +sensible world, since "invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being +understood by the things that are made," as the Apostle says (Rom. +1:20). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of +corporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby, as by +signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God. +Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others +and belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are +secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts. + +Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important +and directly intended in the worship of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: These external things are offered to God, not as though +He stood in need of them, according to Ps. 49:13, "Shall I eat the +flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats?" but as signs +of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves +acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "The +visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible +sacrifice." + +Reply Obj. 3: Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things +pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual +things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the +idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 8] + +Whether Religion Is the Same As Sanctity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity. +Religion is a special virtue, as stated above (A. 4): whereas +sanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and +fulfil our just obligations to God, according to Andronicus [*De +Affectibus]. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For +Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanctity is free from all +uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity." Now +purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels +bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would +seem that sanctity is not the same as religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, things that are opposite members of a division are +not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above +(Q. 80, ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as +distinct from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as +religion. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 1:74, 75): "That . . . we may +serve Him . . . in holiness and justice." Now, "to serve God" belongs +to religion, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3, ad 2). Therefore +religion is the same as sanctity. + +_I answer that,_ The word "sanctity" seems to have two +significations. In one way it denotes purity; and this signification +fits in with the Greek, for _hagios_ means "unsoiled." In another way +it denotes firmness, wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was +applied to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be +violated. Hence a thing is said to be sacred (_sancitum_) when it is +ratified by law. Again, in Latin, this word _sanctus_ may be +connected with purity, if it be resolved into _sanguine tinctus,_ +"since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were +sprinkled with the victim's blood," according to Isidore (Etym. x). +In either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to +those things that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only +men, but also the temple, vessels and such like things are said to be +sanctified through being applied to the worship of God. For purity is +necessary in order that the mind be applied to God, since the human +mind is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things +depreciate by admixture with baser things, for instance, silver by +being mixed with lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the +Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence it +is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God. Wherefore +it is written (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, +without which no man shall see God." Again, firmness is required for +the mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last +end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most +immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom. 8:38, 39): "I am sure that +neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me [*Vulg.: 'shall be +able to separate us'] from the love of God." + +Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and +its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but +only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it +gives God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine +worship, such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is +called sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but +also the works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of +certain good works disposes himself to the worship of God. + +Reply Obj. 1: Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence; +and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it +has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the +acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is +said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all +the virtues to the common good. + +Reply Obj. 2: Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to have the +character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of +virginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "it is honored +not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God." + +Reply Obj. 3: Sanctity differs from religion as explained above, not +really but logically. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 82 + +OF DEVOTION +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider +the interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts; +secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. +The interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer. +Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of +prayer. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether devotion is a special act? + +(2) Whether it is an act of religion? + +(3) Of the cause of devotion? + +(4) Of its effect? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 1] + +Whether Devotion Is a Special Act? + +Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That +which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now +devotion seems to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Paralip. +29:31): "All the multitude offered victims, and praises, and +holocausts with a devout mind." Therefore devotion is not a special +act. + +Obj. 2: Further, no special kind of act is common to various genera +of acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts, namely, +corporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate +devoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a +special act. + +Obj. 3: Further, every special act belongs either to an appetitive or +to a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as +may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either +faculty, as enumerated above (I, QQ. 78, seqq.; I-II, Q. 23, A. 4). +Therefore devotion is not a special act. + +_On the contrary,_ Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (I-II, +Q. 21, AA. 34). But devotion has a special reason for merit. +Therefore devotion is a special act. + +_I answer that,_ Devotion is derived from "devote" [*The Latin +_devovere_ means "to vow"]; wherefore those persons are said to be +"devout" who, in a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject +themselves wholly to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a +devotee was one who vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety +of his army, as Livy relates of the two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x, +28). Hence devotion is apparently nothing else but the will to give +oneself readily to things concerning the service of God. Wherefore it +is written (Ex. 35:20, 21) that "the multitude of the children of +Israel . . . offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and +devout mind." Now it is evident that the will to do readily what +concerns the service of God is a special kind of act. Therefore +devotion is a special act of the will. + +Reply Obj. 1: The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the +thing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their +acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both +itself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above (I-II, Q. +9, A. 3). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a +man offers himself for the service of God Who is the last end, it +follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they +be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts +of the other powers that are moved by the will. + +Reply Obj. 2: Devotion is to be found in various genera of acts, not +as a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover is found +virtually in the movements of the things moved. + +Reply Obj. 3: Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the soul, +and is a movement of the will, as stated above. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 2] + +Whether Devotion Is an Act of Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion. +Devotion, as stated above (A. 1), consists in giving oneself up to +God. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to +Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "the Divine love produces ecstasy, for it +takes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved." +Therefore devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, charity precedes religion; and devotion seems to +precede charity; since, in the Scriptures, charity is represented by +fire, while devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of +fire [*Cant. 8:6; Ps. 52:6]. Therefore devotion is not an act of +religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, by religion man is directed to God alone, as stated +above (Q. 81, A. 1). But devotion is directed also to men; for we +speak of people being devout to certain holy men, and subjects are +said to be devoted to their masters; thus Pope Leo says [*Serm. viii, +De Pass. Dom.] that the Jews "out of devotion to the Roman laws," +said: "We have no king but Caesar." Therefore devotion is not an act +of religion. + +_On the contrary,_ Devotion is derived from _devovere,_ as stated +(A. 1). But a vow is an act of religion. Therefore devotion is also +an act of religion. + +_I answer that,_ It belongs to the same virtue, to will to do +something, and to have the will ready to do it, because both acts +have the same object. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, +1): "It is justice whereby men both will end do just actions." Now it +is evident that to do what pertains to the worship or service of God, +belongs properly to religion, as stated above (Q. 81). Wherefore it +belongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do such things, and +this is to be devout. Hence it is evident that devotion is an act of +religion. + +Reply Obj. 1: It belongs immediately to charity that man should give +himself to God, adhering to Him by a union of the spirit; but it +belongs immediately to religion, and, through the medium of religion, +to charity which is the principle of religion, that man should give +himself to God for certain works of Divine worship. + +Reply Obj. 2: Bodily fatness is produced by the natural heat in the +process of digestion, and at the same time the natural heat thrives, +as it were, on this fatness. In like manner charity both causes +devotion (inasmuch as love makes one ready to serve one's friend) and +feeds on devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded and +increased by the practice and consideration of friendly deeds. + +Reply Obj. 3: Devotion to God's holy ones, dead or living, does not +terminate in them, but passes on to God, in so far as we honor God in +His servants. But the devotion of subjects to their temporal masters +is of another kind, just as service of a temporal master differs from +the service of God. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 3] + +Whether Contemplation or Meditation Is the Cause of Devotion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that contemplation or meditation is not +the cause of devotion. No cause hinders its effect. But subtle +considerations about abstract matters are often a hindrance to +devotion. Therefore contemplation or meditation is not the cause of +devotion. + +Obj. 2: Further, if contemplation were the proper and essential cause +of devotion, the higher objects of contemplation would arouse greater +devotion. But the contrary is the case: since frequently we are urged +to greater devotion by considering Christ's Passion and other +mysteries of His humanity than by considering the greatness of His +Godhead. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion. + +Obj. 3: Further, if contemplation were the proper cause of devotion, +it would follow that those who are most apt for contemplation, are +also most apt for devotion. Yet the contrary is to be noticed, for +devotion is frequently found in men of simplicity and members of the +female sex, who are defective in contemplation. Therefore +contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 38:4): "In my meditation a fire +shall flame out." But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore +meditation is the cause of devotion. + +_I answer that,_ The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, of +Whom Ambrose, commenting on Luke 9:55, says that "God calls whom He +deigns to call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane +Samaritans, had He so willed, He would have made devout." But the +intrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or +contemplation. For it was stated above (A. 1) that devotion is an act +of the will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the +service of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some +consideration, since the object of the will is a good understood. +Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that "the will +arises from the intelligence." Consequently meditation must needs be +the cause of devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives +the thought of surrendering himself to God's service. Indeed a +twofold consideration leads him thereto. The one is the consideration +of God's goodness and loving kindness, according to Ps. 72:28, "It is +good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God": and +this consideration wakens love [*_Dilectio,_ the interior act of +charity; cf. Q. 27] which is the proximate cause of devotion. The +other consideration is that of man's own shortcomings, on account of +which he needs to lean on God, according to Ps. 120:1, 2, "I have +lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to +me: my help is from the Lord, Who made heaven and earth"; and this +consideration shuts out presumption whereby man is hindered from +submitting to God, because he leans on His strength. + +Reply Obj. 1: The consideration of such things as are of a nature to +awaken our love [*Ibid.] of God, causes devotion; whereas the +consideration of foreign matters that distract the mind from such +things is a hindrance to devotion. + +Reply Obj. 2: Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, the +strongest incentive to love [*Ibid.] and consequently to devotion, +because God is supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the +human mind that it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, +but also to the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible +objects known to us. Chief among these is the humanity of Christ, +according to the words of the Preface [*Preface for Christmastide], +"that through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to the love of +things invisible." Wherefore matters relating to Christ's humanity +are the chief incentive to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding +hand, although devotion itself has for its object matters concerning +the Godhead. + +Reply Obj. 3: Science and anything else conducive to greatness, is to +man an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly +surrender himself to God. The result is that such like things +sometimes occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and +women devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man +perfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this +very fact his devotion is increased. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 4] + +Whether Joy Is an Effect of Devotion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not an effect of devotion. As +stated above (A. 3, ad 2), Christ's Passion is the chief incentive to +devotion. But the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the +soul, according to Lam. 3:19, "Remember my poverty . . . the wormwood +and the gall," which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (Lam. +3:20) it is said: "I will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall +languish within me." Therefore delight or joy is not the effect of +devotion. + +Obj. 2: Further, devotion consists chiefly in an interior sacrifice +of the spirit. But it is written (Ps. 50:19): "A sacrifice to God is +an afflicted spirit." Therefore affliction is the effect of devotion +rather than gladness or joy. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Homine xii) [*Orat. +funebr. de Placilla Imp.] that "just as laughter proceeds from joy, +so tears and groans are signs of sorrow." But devotion makes some +people shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not the effect of +devotion. + +_On the contrary,_ We say in the Collect [*Thursday after fourth +Sunday of Lent]: "That we who are punished by fasting may be +comforted by a holy devotion." + +_I answer that,_ The direct and principal effect of devotion is the +spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is its secondary and +indirect effect. For it has been stated (A. 3) that devotion is +caused by a twofold consideration: chiefly by the consideration of +God's goodness, because this consideration belongs to the term, as it +were, of the movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and +the direct result of this consideration is joy, according to Ps. +76:4, "I remembered God, and was delighted"; but accidentally this +consideration causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy +God fully, according to Ps. 41:3, "My soul hath thirsted after the +strong living God," and afterwards it is said (Ps. 41:4): "My tears +have been my bread," etc. Secondarily devotion is caused as stated +(A. 3), by the consideration of one's own failings; for this +consideration regards the term from which man withdraws by the +movement of his devout will, in that he trusts not in himself, but +subjects himself to God. This consideration has an opposite tendency +to the first: for it is of a nature to cause sorrow directly (when +one thinks over one's own failings), and joy accidentally, namely, +through hope of the Divine assistance. It is accordingly evident that +the first and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the secondary +and accidental effect is that "sorrow which is according to God" [*2 +Cor. 7:10]. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the consideration of Christ's Passion there is +something that causes sorrow, namely, the human defect, the removal +of which made it necessary for Christ to suffer [*Luke 24:25]; and +there is something that causes joy, namely, God's loving-kindness to +us in giving us such a deliverance. + +Reply Obj. 2: The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on +account of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is +rejoiced, by the consideration of God's goodness, and by the hope of +the Divine help. + +Reply Obj. 3: Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but also +through a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when one +considers something that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are wont +to shed tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover their +children or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost. In this way +tears arise from devotion. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 83 + +OF PRAYER (In Seventeen Articles) + +We must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive +power? + +(2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God? + +(3) Whether prayer is an act of religion? + +(4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone? + +(5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray? + +(6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray? + +(7) Whether we ought to pray for others? + +(8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies? + +(9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer; + +(10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature? + +(11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us? + +(12) Whether prayer should be vocal? + +(13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer? + +(14) Whether prayer should last a long time? + +(15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16] + +(16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? [*Art. +15] + +(17) of the different kinds of prayer. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 1] + +Whether Prayer Is an Act of the Appetitive Power? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive +power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is +heard by God, according to Ps. 9:38, "The Lord hath heard the desire +of the poor." Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the +appetitive power: and therefore prayer is also. + +Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): "It is useful to +begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves +to God and unite ourselves to Him." Now union with God is effected by +love which belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs +to the appetitive power. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there +are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is +"the understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend +what a thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and "analysis," +whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may +be added, namely, "reasoning," whereby we proceed from the known to +the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations. +Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the +appetitive power. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that "to pray is to speak." +Now speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not +of the appetitive, but of the intellective power. + +_I answer that,_ According to Cassiodorus [*Comment. in Ps. 38:13] +"prayer (_oratio_) is spoken reason (_oris ratio_)." Now the +speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative +merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only +apprehends but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another in two +ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this +happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause; +secondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the +reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the +cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things +in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and in this way it belongs +to reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of +the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by +commanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way, +disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to +be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or +its superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command and to ask or +beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something +to be effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the +reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this reason the +Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us to do +what is best." + +Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [*This last +paragraph refers to the Latin word _oratio_ (prayer) which originally +signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from _os,_ +_oris_ (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which +sense Augustine [*Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14]: says (De Verb. Dom.) +that "prayer is a petition," and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii, +24) that "to pray is to ask becoming things of God." Accordingly it +is evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor, either +because desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition is +like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily +they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than God +hears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of +Isa. 65:24, "And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will +hear." + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1, ad +3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders +the act of reason, under the motion of the will, from tending to an +end such as charity which is union with God. Now prayer tends to God +through being moved by the will of charity, as it were, and this in +two ways. First, on the part of the object of our petition, because +when we pray we ought principally to ask to be united to God, +according to Ps. 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will +I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days +of my life." Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who ought to +approach the person whom he petitions, either locally, as when he +petitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions God. Hence +Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "when we call upon God in our +prayers, we unveil our mind in His presence": and in the same sense +Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer is the raising up +of the mind to God." + +Reply Obj. 3: These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but +to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something by +way of command or of petition, as stated above. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Becoming to Pray? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer +seems to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to +the person to whom we pray. But according to Matt. 6:32, "Your Father +knoweth that you have need of all these things." Therefore it is not +becoming to pray to God. + +Obj. 2: Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we +pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But God's mind is +unchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Kings 15:29, "But the +Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to +repentance." Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to God. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not, +than to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii, +1), "nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers." +But God is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to +pray to God. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 18:1): "We ought always to +pray, and not to faint." + +_I answer that,_ Among the ancients there was a threefold error +concerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by +Divine providence; whence it would follow that it is useless to pray +and to worship God at all: of these it is written (Malach. 3:14): +"You have said: He laboreth in vain that serveth God." Another +opinion held that all things, even in human affairs, happen of +necessity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness of Divine +providence, or through the compelling influence of the stars, or on +account of the connection of causes: and this opinion also excluded +the utility of prayer. There was a third opinion of those who held +that human affairs are indeed ruled by Divine providence, and that +they do not happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of +Divine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed by prayers +and other things pertaining to the worship of God. All these opinions +were disproved in the First Part (Q. 19, AA. 7, 8; Q. 22, AA. 2, 4; +Q. 115, A. 6; Q. 116). Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the +utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs +subject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part +of the Divine disposition. + +In order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine +providence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also +from what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now +among other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects. +Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions, not that thereby +they may change the Divine disposition, but that by those actions +they may achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine +disposition: and the same is to be said of natural causes. And so is +it with regard to prayer. For we pray not that we may change the +Divine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has +disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers, in other words "that by +asking, men may deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity +has disposed to give," as Gregory says (Dial. i, 8). + +Reply Obj. 1: We need to pray to God, not in order to make known to +Him our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded of the +necessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, our motive in praying is, not that we +may change the Divine disposition, but that, by our prayers, we may +obtain what God has appointed. + +Reply Obj. 3: God bestows many things on us out of His liberality, +even without our asking for them: but that He wishes to bestow +certain things on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good, +namely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, and +that we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. Hence +Chrysostom says [*Implicitly (Hom. ii, de Orat.; Hom. xxx in Genes.; +Cf. Caten. Aur. on Luke 18)]: "Think what happiness is granted thee, +what honor bestowed on thee, when thou conversest with God in prayer, +when thou talkest with Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt, +whatever thou desirest." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 3] + +Whether Prayer Is an Act of Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion. +Since religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its +subject. But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above +(A. 1). Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but of +the gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to God. + +Obj. 2: Further, the act of _latria_ falls under a necessity of +precept. But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of +precept, but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else +than a petition for what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not +an act of religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to religion that one "offers +worship and ceremonial rites to the Godhead" [*Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53]. +But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but to ask to obtain +something from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 140:2): "Let my prayer be +directed as incense in Thy sight": and a gloss on the passage says +that "it was to signify this that under the Old Law incense was said +to be offered for a sweet smell to the Lord." Now this belongs to +religion. Therefore prayer is an act of religion. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, AA. 2, 4), it belongs +properly to religion to show honor to God, wherefore all those things +through which reverence is shown to God, belong to religion. Now man +shows reverence to God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects +himself to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as the +Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is properly an +act of religion. + +Reply Obj. 1: The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end, +as stated above (Q. 82, A. 1, ad 1), and therefore religion, which is +in the will, directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence of +God. Now among the other powers of the soul the intellect is the +highest, and the nearest to the will; and consequently after devotion +which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the intellective +part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by it religion +directs man's intellect to God. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is a matter of precept not only that we should ask +for what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to +desire comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a +precept of religion, which precept is expressed in Matt. 7:7, where +it is said: "Ask and ye shall receive" [*Vulg.: 'Ask and it shall be +given you.']. + +Reply Obj. 3: By praying man surrenders his mind to God, since he +subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to +Him, as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (A. 1, Obj. +2). Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things, whether +bodily members, or those external things that are employed for God's +service, so too, prayer surpasses other acts of religion. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 4] + +Whether We Ought to Pray to God Alone? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to pray to God alone. Prayer +is an act of religion, as stated above (A. 3). But God alone is to be +worshiped by religion. Therefore we should pray to God alone. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of the +prayer. But it belongs to God alone to know one's prayer, both +because frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God +alone knows, rather than by words, according to the saying of the +Apostle (1 Cor. 14:15), "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray +also with the understanding": and again because, as Augustine says +(De Cura pro mortuis xiii) the "dead, even the saints, know not what +the living, even their own children, are doing." Therefore we ought +to pray to God alone. + +Obj. 3: Further, if we pray to any of the saints, this is only +because they are united to God. Now some yet living in this world, or +even some who are in Purgatory, are closely united to God by grace, +and yet we do not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to +the saints who are in Paradise. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 5:1), "Call . . . if there be +any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints." + +_I answer that,_ Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as +to be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. In +the first way we offer prayer to God alone, since all our prayers +ought to be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God +alone gives, according to Ps. 83:12, "The Lord will give grace and +glory." But in the second way we pray to the saints, whether angels +or men, not that God may through them know our petitions, but that +our prayers may be effective through their prayers and merits. Hence +it is written (Apoc. 8:4) that "the smoke of the incense," namely +"the prayers of the saints ascended up before God." This is also +clear from the very style employed by the Church in praying: since we +beseech the Blessed Trinity "to have mercy on us," while we ask any +of the saints "to pray for us." + +Reply Obj. 1: To Him alone do we offer religious worship when +praying, from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so +doing we confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those +whom we call upon as our advocates in God's presence. + +Reply Obj. 2: The dead, if we consider their natural condition, do +not know what takes place in this world, especially the interior +movements of the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral. +xii, 21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what +happens to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart, +is made known to them in the Word: and it is most becoming to their +exalted position that they should know the petitions we make to them +by word or thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to +them are known to them through Divine manifestation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those who are in this world or in Purgatory, do not yet +enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we think +or say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to them, +but ask it of the living by speaking to them. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 5] + +Whether We Ought to Ask for Something Definite When We Pray? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything +definite when we pray to God. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. +iii, 24), "to pray is to ask becoming things of God"; wherefore it is +useless to pray for what is inexpedient, according to James 4:3, "You +ask, and receive not: because you ask amiss." Now according to Rom. +8:26, "we know not what we should pray for as we ought." Therefore we +ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray. + +Obj. 2: Further, those who ask another person for something definite +strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves. But we +ought not to endeavor to make God will what we will; on the contrary, +we ought to strive to will what He wills, according to a gloss on Ps. +32:1, "Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just." Therefore we ought not to ask +God for anything definite when we pray. + +Obj. 3: Further, evil things are not to be sought from God; and as to +good things, God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is useless +to ask a person to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we +ought not to ask God for anything definite in our prayers. + +_On the contrary,_ our Lord (Matt. 6 and Luke 11) taught His +disciples to ask definitely for those things which are contained in +the petitions of the Lord's Prayer. + +_I answer that,_ According to Valerius Maximus [*Fact. et Dict. +Memor. vii, 2], "Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods +for nothing else but that they should grant us good things, because +they at any rate know what is good for each one whereas when we pray +we frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain." +This opinion is true to a certain extent, as to those things which +may have an evil result, and which man may use ill or well, such as +"riches, by which," as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict. +Memor. vii, 2), "many have come to an evil end; honors, which have +ruined many; power, of which we frequently witness the unhappy +results; splendid marriages, which sometimes bring about the total +wreck of a family." Nevertheless there are certain goods which man +cannot ill use, because they cannot have an evil result. Such are +those which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit it: and +these the saints seek absolutely when they pray, as in Ps. 79:4, +"Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved," and again in Ps. 118:35, +"Lead me into the path of Thy commandments." + +Reply Obj. 1: Although man cannot by himself know what he ought to +pray for, "the Spirit," as stated in the same passage, "helpeth our +infirmity," since by inspiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask +for what is right. Hence our Lord said (John 4:24) that true adorers +"must adore . . . in spirit and in truth." + +Reply Obj. 2: When in our prayers we ask for things concerning our +salvation, we conform our will to God's, of Whom it is written (1 +Tim. 2:4) that "He will have all men to be saved." + +Reply Obj. 3: God so invites us to take good things, that we may +approach to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires +and devout prayers. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 6] + +Whether Man Ought to Ask God for Temporal Things When He Prays? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal +things when he prays. We seek what we ask for in prayer. But we +should not seek for temporal things, for it is written (Matt. 6:33): +"Seek ye . . . first the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all +these things shall be added unto you," that is to say, temporal +things, which, says He, we are not to seek, but they will be added to +what we seek. Therefore temporal things are not to be asked of God in +prayer. + +Obj. 2: Further, no one asks save for that which he is solicitous +about. Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things, +according to the saying of Matt. 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your +life, what you shall eat." Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal +things when we pray. + +Obj. 3: Further, by prayer our mind should be raised up to God. But +by asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath it, +against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18), "While we look not +at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. +For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are +not seen are eternal." Therefore man ought not to ask God for +temporal things when he prays. + +Obj. 4: Further, man ought not to ask of God other than good and +useful things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, are +harmful, not only in a spiritual sense, but also in a material sense. +Therefore we should not ask God for them in our prayers. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 30:8): "Give me only the +necessaries of life." + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. +cxxx, 12): "It is lawful to pray for what it is lawful to desire." +Now it is lawful to desire temporal things, not indeed principally, +by placing our end therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in +tending towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means +of supporting the life of the body, and are of service to us as +instruments in performing acts of virtue, as also the Philosopher +states (Ethic. i, 8). Augustine too says the same to Proba (ad +Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 6, 7) when he states that "it is +not unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for a livelihood, and no +more; for this sufficiency is desired, not for its own sake, but for +the welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed in a +way befitting one's station, so as not to be out of keeping with +those among whom we have to live. Accordingly we ought to pray that +we may keep these things if we have them, and if we have them not, +that we may gain possession of them." + +Reply Obj. 1: We should seek temporal things not in the first but in +the second place. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, +16): "When He says that this" (i.e. the kingdom of God) "is to be +sought first, He implies that the other" (i.e. temporal goods) "is to +be sought afterwards, not in time but in importance, this as being +our good, the other as our need." + +Reply Obj. 2: Not all solicitude about temporal things is forbidden, +but that which is superfluous and inordinate, as stated above (Q. 55, +A. 6). + +Reply Obj. 3: When our mind is intent on temporal things in order +that it may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when it is +intent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is not +lowered by them, but raises them to a higher level. + +Reply Obj. 4: From the very fact that we ask for temporal things not +as the principal object of our petition, but as subordinate to +something else, we ask God for them in the sense that they may be +granted to us in so far as they are expedient for salvation. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 7] + +Whether We Ought to Pray for Others? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for others. In +praying we ought to conform to the pattern given by our Lord. Now in +the Lord's Prayer we make petitions for ourselves, not for others; +thus we say: "Give us this day our daily bread," etc. Therefore we +should not pray for others. + +Obj. 2: Further, prayer is offered that it may be heard. Now one of +the conditions required for prayer that it may be heard is that one +pray for oneself, wherefore Augustine in commenting on John 16:23, +"If you ask the Father anything in My name He will give it you," says +(Tract. cii): "Everyone is heard when he prays for himself, not when +he prays for all; wherefore He does not say simply 'He will give it,' +but 'He will give it you.'" Therefore it would seem that we ought not +to pray for others, but only for ourselves. + +Obj. 3: Further, we are forbidden to pray for others, if they are +wicked, according to Jer. 7:16, "Therefore do not then pray for this +people . . . and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee." On +the other hand we are not bound to pray for the good, since they are +heard when they pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem that we +ought not to pray for others. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 5:16): "Pray one for another, +that you may be saved." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), when we pray we ought to ask +for what we ought to desire. Now we ought to desire good things not +only for ourselves, but also for others: for this is essential to the +love which we owe to our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 12; +Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 31, A. 1). Therefore charity requires us to pray for +others. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.) [*Opus +Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "Necessity +binds us to pray for ourselves, fraternal charity urges us to pray +for others: and the prayer that fraternal charity proffers is sweeter +to God than that which is the outcome of necessity." + +Reply Obj. 1: As Cyprian says (De orat. Dom.), "We say 'Our Father' +and not 'My Father,' 'Give us' and not 'Give me,' because the Master +of unity did not wish us to pray privately, that is for ourselves +alone, for He wished each one to pray for all, even as He Himself +bore all in one." + +Reply Obj. 2: It is a condition of prayer that one pray for oneself: +not as though it were necessary in order that prayer be meritorious, +but as being necessary in order that prayer may not fail in its +effect of impetration. For it sometimes happens that we pray for +another with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to +his salvation, and yet it is not granted on account of some obstacle +on the part of the person we are praying for, according to Jer. 15:1, +"If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards +this people." And yet the prayer will be meritorious for the person +who prays thus out of charity, according to Ps. 34:13, "My prayer +shall be turned into my bosom, i.e. though it profit them not, I am +not deprived of my reward," as the gloss expounds it. + +Reply Obj. 3: We ought to pray even for sinners, that they may be +converted, and for the just that they may persevere and advance in +holiness. Yet those who pray are heard not for all sinners but for +some: since they are heard for the predestined, but not for those who +are foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we correct the +brethren, has an effect in the predestined but not in the reprobate, +according to Eccles. 7:14, "No man can correct whom God hath +despised." Hence it is written (1 John 5:16): "He that knoweth his +brother to sin a sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life +shall be given to him, who sinneth not to death." Now just as the +benefit of correction must not be refused to any man so long as he +lives here below, because we cannot distinguish the predestined from +the reprobate, as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xv), so too no +man should be denied the help of prayer. + +We ought also to pray for the just for three reasons: First, because +the prayers of a multitude are more easily heard, wherefore a gloss +on Rom. 15:30, "Help me in your prayers," says: "The Apostle rightly +tells the lesser brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if +they be united together in one mind, become great, and it is +impossible for the prayers of a multitude not to obtain" that which +is possible to be obtained by prayer. Secondly, that many may thank +God for the graces conferred on the just, which graces conduce to the +profit of many, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 1:11). Thirdly, that +the more perfect may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they +need the prayers of the less perfect. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 8] + +Whether We Ought to Pray for Our Enemies? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for our enemies. +According to Rom. 15:4, "what things soever were written, were +written for our learning." Now Holy Writ contains many imprecations +against enemies; thus it is written (Ps. 6:11): "Let all my enemies +be ashamed and be . . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be troubled +very speedily [*Vulg.: 'Let them be turned back and be ashamed.']." +Therefore we too should pray against rather than for our enemies. + +Obj. 2: Further, to be revenged on one's enemies is harmful to them. +But holy men seek vengeance of their enemies according to Apoc. 6:10, +"How long . . . dost Thou not . . . revenge our blood on them that +dwell on earth?" Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their +enemies, according to Ps. 57:11, "The just shall rejoice when he +shall see the revenge." Therefore we should not pray for our enemies, +but against them. + +Obj. 3: Further, man's deed should not be contrary to his prayer. Now +sometimes men lawfully attack their enemies, else all wars would be +unlawful, which is opposed to what we have said above (Q. 40, A. 1). +Therefore we should not pray for our enemies. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:44): "Pray for them that +persecute and calumniate you." + +_I answer that,_ To pray for another is an act of charity, as stated +above (A. 7). Wherefore we are bound to pray for our enemies in the +same manner as we are bound to love them. Now it was explained above +in the treatise on charity (Q. 25, AA. 8, 9), how we are bound to +love our enemies, namely, that we must love in them their nature, not +their sin, and that to love our enemies in general is a matter of +precept, while to love them in the individual is not a matter of +precept, except in the preparedness of the mind, so that a man must +be prepared to love his enemy even in the individual and to help him +in a case of necessity, or if his enemy should beg his forgiveness. +But to love one's enemies absolutely in the individual, and to assist +them, is an act of perfection. + +In like manner it is a matter of obligation that we should not +exclude our enemies from the general prayers which we offer up for +others: but it is a matter of perfection, and not of obligation, to +pray for them individually, except in certain special cases. + +Reply Obj. 1: The imprecations contained in Holy Writ may be +understood in four ways. First, according to the custom of the +prophets "to foretell the future under the veil of an imprecation," +as Augustine states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21]. Secondly, in the +sense that certain temporal evils are sometimes inflicted by God on +the wicked for their correction. Thirdly, because they are understood +to be pronounced, not against the men themselves, but against the +kingdom of sin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroying sin by the +correction of men. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our will to the +Divine justice with regard to the damnation of those who are +obstinate in sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine states in the same book (De Serm. Dom. in +Monte i, 22), "the martyrs' vengeance is the overthrow of the kingdom +of sin, because they suffered so much while it reigned": or as he +says again (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. lxviii), "their prayer for +vengeance is expressed not in words but in their minds, even as the +blood of Abel cried from the earth." They rejoice in vengeance not +for its own sake, but for the sake of Divine justice. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful to attack one's enemies, that they may be +restrained from sin: and this is for their own good and for the good +of others. Consequently it is even lawful in praying to ask that +temporal evils be inflicted on our enemies in order that they may +mend their ways. Thus prayer and deed will not be contrary to one +another. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 9] + +Whether the Seven Petitions of the Lord's Prayer Are Fittingly +Assigned? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the seven petitions of the Lord's +Prayer are not fittingly assigned. It is useless to ask for that to +be hallowed which is always holy. But the name of God is always holy, +according to Luke 1:49, "Holy is His name." Again, His kingdom is +everlasting, according to Ps. 144:13, "Thy kingdom is a kingdom of +all ages." Again, God's will is always fulfilled, according to Isa +46:10, "All My will shall be done." Therefore it is useless to ask +for "the name of God to be hallowed," for "His kingdom to come," and +for "His will to be done." + +Obj. 2: Further, one must withdraw from evil before attaining good. +Therefore it seems unfitting for the petitions relating to the +attainment of good to be set forth before those relating to the +removal of evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, one asks for a thing that it may be given to one. +Now the chief gift of God is the Holy Ghost, and those gifts that we +receive through Him. Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly +assigned, since they do not correspond to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 4: Further, according to Luke, only five petitions are mentioned +in the Lord's Prayer, as appears from the eleventh chapter. Therefore +it was superfluous for Matthew to mention seven. + +Obj. 5: Further, it seems useless to seek to win the benevolence of +one who forestalls us by his benevolence. Now God forestalls us by +His benevolence, since "He first hath loved us" ( 1 John 4:19). +Therefore it is useless to preface the petitions with the words our +"Father Who art in heaven," which seem to indicate a desire to win +God's benevolence. + +_On the contrary,_ The authority of Christ, who composed this prayer, +suffices. + +_I answer that,_ The Lord's Prayer is most perfect, because, as +Augustine says (ad Probam Ep. cxxx, 12), "if we pray rightly and +fittingly, we can say nothing else but what is contained in this +prayer of our Lord." For since prayer interprets our desires, as it +were, before God, then alone is it right to ask for something in our +prayers when it is right that we should desire it. Now in the Lord's +Prayer not only do we ask for all that we may rightly desire, but +also in the order wherein we ought to desire them, so that this +prayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all our +affections. Thus it is evident that the first thing to be the object +of our desire is the end, and afterwards whatever is directed to the +end. Now our end is God towards Whom our affections tend in two ways: +first, by our willing the glory of God, secondly, by willing to enjoy +His glory. The first belongs to the love whereby we love God in +Himself, while the second belongs to the love whereby we love +ourselves in God. Wherefore the first petition is expressed thus: +"Hallowed be Thy name," and the second thus: "Thy kingdom come," by +which we ask to come to the glory of His kingdom. + +To this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one way, by its +very nature, in another way, accidentally. Of its very nature the +good which is useful for an end directs us to that end. Now a thing +is useful in two ways to that end which is beatitude: in one way, +directly and principally, according to the merit whereby we merit +beatitude by obeying God, and in this respect we ask: "Thy will be +done on earth as it is in heaven"; in another way instrumentally, and +as it were helping us to merit, and in this respect we say: "Give us +this day our daily bread," whether we understand this of the +sacramental Bread, the daily use of which is profitable to man, and +in which all the other sacraments are contained, or of the bread of +the body, so that it denotes all sufficiency of food, as Augustine +says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11), since the Eucharist is the chief +sacrament, and bread is the chief food: thus in the Gospel of Matthew +we read, "supersubstantial," i.e. "principal," as Jerome expounds it. + +We are directed to beatitude accidentally by the removal of +obstacles. Now there are three obstacles to our attainment of +beatitude. First, there is sin, which directly excludes a man from +the kingdom, according to 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, "Neither fornicators, nor +idolaters, etc., shall possess the kingdom of God"; and to this refer +the words, "Forgive us our trespasses." Secondly, there is temptation +which hinders us from keeping God's will, and to this we refer when +we say: "And lead us not into temptation," whereby we do not ask not +to be tempted, but not to be conquered by temptation, which is to be +led into temptation. Thirdly, there is the present penal state which +is a kind of obstacle to a sufficiency of life, and to this we refer +in the words, "Deliver us from evil." + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 5), when +we say, "Hallowed be Thy name, we do not mean that God's name is not +holy, but we ask that men may treat it as a holy thing," and this +pertains to the diffusion of God's glory among men. When we say, "Thy +kingdom come, we do not imply that God is not reigning now," but "we +excite in ourselves the desire for that kingdom, that it may come to +us, and that we may reign therein," as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. +cxxx, 11). The words, "Thy will be done" rightly signify, "'May Thy +commandments be obeyed' on earth as in heaven, i.e. by men as well as +by angels" (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 6). Hence these three +petitions will be perfectly fulfilled in the life to come; while the +other four, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the +needs of the present life. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since prayer is the interpreter of desire, the order of +the petitions corresponds with the order, not of execution, but of +desire or intention, where the end precedes the things that are +directed to the end, and attainment of good precedes removal of evil. + +Reply Obj. 3: Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 11) adapts the +seven petitions to the gifts and beatitudes. He says: "If it is fear +of God whereby blessed are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God's +name be hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby +blessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may come, so that +we become meek and no longer resist Him. If it is knowledge whereby +blessed are they that mourn, let us pray that His will be done, for +thus we shall mourn no more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed ere +they that hunger, let us pray that our daily bread be given to us. If +it is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive the +trespasses of others that our own may be forgiven. If it is +understanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart, let us pray lest +we have a double heart by seeking after worldly things which ere the +occasion of our temptations. If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the +peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God, let us pray +to be delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we shall by that +very fact become the free children of God." + +Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Enchiridion cxvi), "Luke +included not seven but five petitions in the Lord's Prayer, for by +omitting it, he shows that the third petition is a kind of repetition +of the two that precede, and thus helps us to understand it"; +because, to wit, the will of God tends chiefly to this--that we come +to the knowledge of His holiness and to reign together with Him. +Again the last petition mentioned by Matthew, "Deliver us from evil," +is omitted by Luke, so that each one may know himself to be delivered +from evil if he be not led into temptation. + +Reply Obj. 5: Prayer is offered up to God, not that we may bend Him, +but that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask: which +confidence is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of His +charity in our regard, whereby he wills our good--wherefore we say: +"Our Father"; and of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfil +it--wherefore we say: "Who art in heaven." +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 10] + +Whether Prayer Is Proper to the Rational Creature? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not proper to the rational +creature. Asking and receiving apparently belong to the same subject. +But receiving is becoming also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and +Holy Ghost. Therefore it is competent to them to pray: for the Son +said (John 14:16): "I will ask My [Vulg.: 'the'] Father," and the +Apostle says of the Holy Ghost (Rom. 8:26): "The Spirit . . . asketh +for us." + +Obj. 2: Angels are above rational creatures, since they are +intellectual substances. Now prayer is becoming to the angels, +wherefore we read in the Ps. 96:7: "Adore Him, all you His angels." +Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creature. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same subject is fitted to pray as is fitted to +call upon God, since this consists chiefly in prayer. But dumb +animals are fitted to call upon God, according to Ps. 146:9, "Who +giveth to beasts their food and to the young ravens that call upon +Him." Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creatures. + +_On the contrary,_ Prayer is an act of reason, as stated above (A. +1). But the rational creature is so called from his reason. Therefore +prayer is proper to the rational creature. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) prayer is an act of reason, +and consists in beseeching a superior; just as command is an act of +reason, whereby an inferior is directed to something. Accordingly +prayer is properly competent to one to whom it is competent to have +reason, and a superior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the +Divine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason. Therefore +prayer is unbecoming both the Divine Persons and dumb animals, and it +is proper to the rational creature. + +Reply Obj. 1: Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in respect of +their nature, whereas prayer belongs to one who receives through +grace. The Son is said to ask or pray in respect of His assumed, i.e. +His human, nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and the Holy +Ghost is said to ask, because He makes us ask. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 8), intellect +and reason are not distinct powers in us: but they differ as the +perfect from the imperfect. Hence intellectual creatures which are +the angels are distinct from rational creatures, and sometimes are +included under them. In this sense prayer is said to be proper to the +rational creature. + +Reply Obj. 3: The young ravens are said to call upon God, on account +of the natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way, desire +to attain the Divine goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey +God, on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved by God. +_______________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 11] + +Whether the Saints in Heaven Pray for Us? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the saints in heaven do not pray for +us. A man's action is more meritorious for himself than for others. +But the saints in heaven do not merit for themselves, neither do they +pray for themselves, since they are already established in the term. +Neither therefore do they pray for us. + +Obj. 2: Further, the saints conform their will to God perfectly, so +that they will only what God wills. Now what God wills is always +fulfilled. Therefore it would be useless for the saints to pray for +us. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as the saints in heaven are above, so are those +in Purgatory, for they can no longer sin. Now those in Purgatory do +not pray for us, on the contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither +do the saints in heaven pray for us. + +Obj. 4: Further, if the saints in heaven pray for us, the prayers of +the higher saints would be more efficacious; and so we ought not to +implore the help of the lower saints' prayers but only of those of +the higher saints. + +Obj. 5: Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore the +souls of the saints pray for us, so long as they are separated from +their bodies, we ought not to call upon Saint Peter, but on his soul, +to pray for us: yet the Church does the contrary. The saints +therefore do not pray for us, at least before the resurrection. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): "This is . . . he +that prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias +the prophet of God." + +_I answer that,_ As Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6), the error of +Vigilantius consisted in saying that "while we live, we can pray one +for another; but that after we are dead, none of our prayers for +others can be heard, seeing that not even the martyrs' prayers are +granted when they pray for their blood to be avenged." But this is +absolutely false, because, since prayers offered for others proceed +from charity, as stated above (AA. 7, 8), the greater the charity of +the saints in heaven, the more they pray for wayfarers, since the +latter can be helped by prayers: and the more closely they are united +to God, the more are their prayers efficacious: for the Divine order +is such that lower beings receive an overflow of the excellence of +the higher, even as the air receives the brightness of the sun. +Wherefore it is said of Christ (Heb. 7:25): "Going to God by His own +power . . . to make intercession for us" [*Vulg.: 'He is able to save +for ever them that come to God by Him, always living to make +intercession for us.']. Hence Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6): "If +the apostles and martyrs while yet in the body and having to be +solicitous for themselves, can pray for others, how much more now +that they have the crown of victory and triumph." + +Reply Obj. 1: The saints in heaven, since they are blessed, have no +lack of bliss, save that of the body's glory, and for this they pray. +But they pray for us who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss: and +their prayers are efficacious in impetrating through their previous +merits and through God's acceptance. + +Reply Obj. 2: The saints impetrate what ever God wishes to take place +through their prayers: and they pray for that which they deem will be +granted through their prayers according to God's will. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those who are in Purgatory though they are above us on +account of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the pains +which they suffer: and in this respect they are not in a condition to +pray, but rather in a condition that requires us to pray for them. + +Reply Obj. 4: It is God's will that inferior beings should be helped +by all those that are above them, wherefore we ought to pray not only +to the higher but also to the lower saints; else we should have to +implore the mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens sometime that +prayers addressed to a saint of lower degree are more efficacious, +either because he is implored with greater devotion, or because God +wishes to make known his sanctity. + +Reply Obj. 5: It is because the saints while living merited to pray +for us, that we invoke them under the names by which they were known +in this life, and by which they are better known to us: and also in +order to indicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the +saying of Ex. 3:6, "I am the God of Abraham," etc. +_______________________ + +TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 12] + +Whether Prayer Should Be Vocal? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prayer ought not to be vocal. As +stated above (A. 4), prayer is addressed chiefly to God. Now God +knows the language of the heart. Therefore it is useless to employ +vocal prayer. + +Obj. 2: Further, prayer should lift man's mind to God, as stated +above (A. 1, ad 2). But words, like other sensible objects, prevent +man from ascending to God by contemplation. Therefore we should not +use words in our prayers. + +Obj. 3: Further, prayer should be offered to God in secret, according +to Matt. 6:6, "But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy +chamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret." But +prayer loses its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer +should not be vocal. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 141:2): "I cried to the Lord +with my voice, with my voice I made supplication to the Lord." + +_I answer that,_ Prayer is twofold, common and individual. Common +prayer is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church +representing the body of the faithful: wherefore such like prayer +should come to the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is +offered: and this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer. +Therefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of the Church +should say these prayers even in a loud voice, so that they may come +to the knowledge of all. + +On the other hand individual prayer is that which is offered by any +single person, whether he pray for himself or for others; and it is +not essential to such a prayer as this that it be vocal. And yet the +voice is employed in such like prayers for three reasons. First, in +order to excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person +praying is raised to God, because by means of external signs, whether +of words or of deeds, the human mind is moved as regards +apprehension, and consequently also as regards the affections. Hence +Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9) that "by means of words and +other signs we arouse ourselves more effectively to an increase of +holy desires." Hence then alone should we use words and such like +signs when they help to excite the mind internally. But if they +distract or in any way impede the mind we should abstain from them; +and this happens chiefly to those whose mind is sufficiently prepared +for devotion without having recourse to those signs. Wherefore the +Psalmist (Ps. 26:8) said: "My heart hath said to Thee: 'My face hath +sought Thee,'" and we read of Anna (1 Kings 1:13) that "she spoke in +her heart." Secondly, the voice is used in praying as though to pay a +debt, so that man may serve God with all that he has from God, that +is to say, not only with his mind, but also with his body: and this +applies to prayer considered especially as satisfactory. Hence it is +written (Osee 14:3): "Take away all iniquity, and receive the good: +and we will render the calves of our lips." Thirdly, we have recourse +to vocal prayer, through a certain overflow from the soul into the +body, through excess of feeling, according to Ps. 15:9, "My heart +hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced." + +Reply Obj. 1: Vocal prayer is employed, not in order to tell God +something He does not know, but in order to lift up the mind of the +person praying or of other persons to God. + +Reply Obj. 2: Words about other matters distract the mind and hinder +the devotion of those who pray: but words signifying some object of +devotion lift up the mind, especially one that is less devout. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum +falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "Our Lord forbids one to +pray in presence of others in order that one may be seen by others. +Hence when you pray, do nothing strange to draw men's attention, +either by shouting so as to be heard by others, or by openly striking +the heart, or extending the hands, so as to be seen by many. And yet, +according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 3), "it is not +wrong to be seen by men, but to do this or that in order to be seen +by men." +_______________________ + +THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 13] + +Whether Attention Is a Necessary Condition of Prayer? + +Objection 1: It would seem that attention is a necessary condition of +prayer. It is written (John 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that +adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But prayer is not +in spirit unless it be attentive. Therefore attention is a necessary +condition of prayer. + +Obj. 2: Further, prayer is "the ascent of the mind to God" +[*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii, 24]. But the mind does not ascend to +God if the prayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary +condition of prayer. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is a necessary condition of prayer that it should +be altogether sinless. Now if a man allows his mind to wander while +praying he is not free of sin, for he seems to make light of God; +even as if he were to speak to another man without attending to what +he was saying. Hence Basil says [*De Constit. Monach. i] that the +"Divine assistance is to be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind +wandering hither and thither: because he that prays thus not only +will not obtain what he asks, nay rather will he provoke God to +anger." Therefore it would seem a necessary condition of prayer that +it should be attentive. + +_On the contrary,_ Even holy men sometimes suffer from a wandering of +the mind when they pray, according to Ps. 39:13, "My heart hath +forsaken me." + +_I answer that,_ This question applies chiefly to vocal prayer. +Accordingly we must observe that a thing is necessary in two ways. +First, a thing is necessary because thereby the end is better +obtained: and thus attention is absolutely necessary for prayer. +Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary when without it something +cannot obtain its effect. Now the effect of prayer is threefold. The +first is an effect which is common to all acts quickened by charity, +and this is merit. In order to realize this effect, it is not +necessary that prayer should be attentive throughout; because the +force of the original intention with which one sets about praying +renders the whole prayer meritorious, as is the case with other +meritorious acts. The second effect of prayer is proper thereto, and +consists in impetration: and again the original intention, to which +God looks chiefly, suffices to obtain this effect. But if the +original intention is lacking, prayer lacks both merit and +impetration: because, as Gregory [*Hugh St. Victor, Expos. in Reg. S. +Aug. iii] says, "God hears not the prayer of those who pay no +attention to their prayer." The third effect of prayer is that which +it produces at once; this is the spiritual refreshment of the mind, +and for this effect attention is a necessary condition: wherefore it +is written (1 Cor. 14:14): "If I pray in a tongue . . . my +understanding is without fruit." + +It must be observed, however, that there are three kinds of attention +that can be brought to vocal prayer: one which attends to the words, +lest we say them wrong, another which attends to the sense of the +words, and a third, which attends to the end of prayer, namely, God, +and to the thing we are praying for. That last kind of attention is +most necessary, and even idiots are capable of it. Moreover this +attention, whereby the mind is fixed on God, is sometimes so strong +that the mind forgets all other things, as Hugh of St. Victor states +[*De Modo Orandi ii]. + +Reply Obj. 1: To pray in spirit and in truth is to set about praying +through the instigation of the Spirit, even though afterwards the +mind wander through weakness. + +Reply Obj. 2: The human mind is unable to remain aloft for long on +account of the weakness of nature, because human weakness weighs down +the soul to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that when, +while praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, of a sudden +it wanders off through weakness. + +Reply Obj. 3: Purposely to allow one's mind to wander in prayer is +sinful and hinders the prayer from having fruit. It is against this +that Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "When you pray God with +psalms and hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips +pronounce." But to wander in mind unintentionally does not deprive +prayer of its fruit. Hence Basil says (De Constit. Monach. i): "If +you are so truly weakened by sin that you are unable to pray +attentively, strive as much as you can to curb yourself, and God will +pardon you, seeing that you are unable to stand in His presence in a +becoming manner, not through negligence but through frailty." +_______________________ + +FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 14] + +Whether Prayer Should Last a Long Time? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prayer should not be continual. It is +written (Matt. 6:7): "When you are praying, speak not much." Now one +who prays a long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal +prayer. Therefore prayer should not last a long time. + +Obj. 2: Further, prayer expresses the desire. Now a desire is all the +holier according as it is centered on one thing, according to Ps. +26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after." +Therefore the shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable to God. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems to be wrong to transgress the limits fixed +by God, especially in matters concerning Divine worship, according to +Ex. 19:21: "Charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass +the limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of them should +perish." But God has fixed for us the limits of prayer by instituting +the Lord's Prayer (Matt. 6). Therefore it is not right to prolong our +prayer beyond its limits. + +Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It would seem that we ought to pray +continually. For our Lord said (Luke 18:1): "We ought always to pray, +and not to faint": and it is written (1 Thess. 5:17): "Pray without +ceasing." + +_I answer that,_ We may speak about prayer in two ways: first, by +considering it in itself; secondly, by considering it in its cause. +The cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought +to arise: and this desire ought to be in us continually, either +actually or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in +whatever we do out of charity; and we ought to "do all things to the +glory of God" (1 Cor. 10:31). From this point of view prayer ought to +be continual: wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9): +"Faith, hope and charity are by themselves a prayer of continual +longing." But prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual, +because we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine says +(ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), "we pray to God with our lips at certain +intervals and seasons, in order to admonish ourselves by means of +such like signs, to take note of the amount of our progress in that +desire, and to arouse ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof." +Now the quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for +instance the quantity of the dose should be commensurate with health. +And so it is becoming that prayer should last long enough to arouse +the fervor of the interior desire: and when it exceeds this measure, +so that it cannot be continued any longer without causing weariness, +it should be discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. +cxxx): "It is said that the brethren in Egypt make frequent but very +short prayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest that vigilant and +erect attention which is so necessary in prayer slacken and languish, +through the strain being prolonged. By so doing they make it +sufficiently clear not only that this attention must not be forced if +we are unable to keep it up, but also that if we are able to +continue, it should not be broken off too soon." And just as we must +judge of this in private prayers by considering the attention of the +person praying, so too, in public prayers we must judge of it by +considering the devotion of the people. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx), "to pray with +many words is not the same as to pray long; to speak long is one +thing, to be devout long is another. For it is written that our Lord +passed the whole night in prayer, and that He 'prayed the longer' in +order to set us an example." Further on he says: "When praying say +little, yet pray much so long as your attention is fervent. For to +say much in prayer is to discuss your need in too many words: whereas +to pray much is to knock at the door of Him we pray, by the +continuous and devout clamor of the heart. Indeed this business is +frequently done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather +than with speech." + +Reply Obj. 2: Length of prayer consists, not in praying for many +things, but in the affections persisting in the desire of one thing. + +Reply Obj. 3: Our Lord instituted this prayer, not that we might use +no other words when we pray, but that in our prayers we might have +none but these things in view, no matter how we express them or think +of them. + +Reply Obj. 4: One may pray continually, either through having a +continual desire, as stated above; or through praying at certain +fixed times, though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect, +whether in the person who prays--because he remains more devout even +after praying, or in some other person--as when by his kindness a man +incites another to pray for him, even after he himself has ceased +praying. +_______________________ + +FIFTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 15] + +Whether Prayer Is Meritorious? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not meritorious. All merit +proceeds from grace. But prayer precedes grace, since even grace is +obtained by means of prayer according to Luke 11:13, "(How much more) +will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask +Him!" Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act. + +Obj. 2: Further, if prayer merits anything, this would seem to be +chiefly that which is besought in prayer. Yet it does not always +merit this, because even the saints' prayers are frequently not +heard; thus Paul was not heard when he besought the sting of the +flesh to be removed from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious +act. + +Obj. 3: Further, prayer is based chiefly on faith, according to James +1:6, "But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering." Now faith is not +sufficient for merit, as instanced in those who have lifeless faith. +Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words of Ps. 34:13, "My prayer +shall be turned into my bosom," explains them as meaning, "if my +prayer does not profit them, yet shall not I be deprived of my +reward." Now reward is not due save to merit. Therefore prayer is +meritorious. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 13) prayer, besides causing +spiritual consolation at the time of praying, has a twofold efficacy +in respect of a future effect, namely, efficacy in meriting and +efficacy in impetrating. Now prayer, like any other virtuous act, is +efficacious in meriting, because it proceeds from charity as its +root, the proper object of which is the eternal good that we merit to +enjoy. Yet prayer proceeds from charity through the medium of +religion, of which prayer is an act, as stated above (A. 3), and with +the concurrence of other virtues requisite for the goodness of +prayer, viz. humility and faith. For the offering of prayer itself to +God belongs to religion, while the desire for the thing that we pray +to be accomplished belongs to charity. Faith is necessary in +reference to God to Whom we pray; that is, we need to believe that we +can obtain from Him what we seek. Humility is necessary on the part +of the person praying, because he recognizes his neediness. Devotion +too is necessary: but this belongs to religion, for it is its first +act and a necessary condition of all its secondary acts, as stated +above (Q. 82, AA. 1, 2). + +As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this from the grace +of God to Whom we pray, and Who instigates us to pray. Wherefore +Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cv, 1): "He would not urge us to +ask, unless He were willing to give"; and Chrysostom [*Cf. Catena +Aurea of St. Thomas on Luke 18. The words as quoted are not to be +found in the words of Chrysostom] says: "He never refuses to grant +our prayers, since in His loving-kindness He urged us not to faint in +praying." + +Reply Obj. 1: Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is +meritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which +impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a +gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is "a gift of God," as +Augustine states (De Persever. xxiii). + +Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes the merit of prayer regards chiefly something +distinct from the object of one's petition. For the chief object of +merit is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition of +prayer extends sometimes to certain other things, as stated above +(AA. 6, 7). Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for ourselves +be not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and sometimes by +asking for and desiring such things we lose merit for instance if we +ask of God the accomplishment of some sin, which would be an impious +prayer. And sometimes it is not necessary for salvation, nor yet +manifestly contrary thereto; and then although he who prays may merit +eternal life by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain what he asks +for. Hence Augustine says (Liber. Sentent. Prosperi sent. ccxii): "He +who faithfully prays God for the necessaries of this life, is both +mercifully heard, and mercifully not heard. For the physician knows +better than the sick man what is good for the disease." For this +reason, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed for the removal of the +sting in his flesh, because this was not expedient. If, however, we +pray for something that is useful for our beatitude, through being +conducive to salvation, we merit it not only by praying, but also by +doing other good deeds: therefore without any doubt we receive what +we ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: "since certain things +are not denied us, but are deferred that they may be granted at a +suitable time," according to Augustine (Tract. cii in Joan.): and +again this may be hindered if we persevere not in asking for it. +Wherefore Basil says (De Constit. Monast. i): "The reason why +sometimes thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast +asked amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because thou hast +asked for what was not good for thee, or because thou hast ceased +asking." Since, however, a man cannot condignly merit eternal life +for another, as stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 6), it follows that +sometimes one cannot condignly merit for another things that pertain +to eternal life. For this reason we are not always heard when we pray +for others, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2, 3). Hence it is that four +conditions are laid down; namely, to ask--"for ourselves--things +necessary for salvation--piously--perseveringly"; when all these four +concur, we always obtain what we ask for. + +Reply Obj. 3: Prayer depends chiefly on faith, not for its efficacy +in meriting, because thus it depends chiefly on charity, but for its +efficacy in impetrating, because it is through faith that man comes +to know of God's omnipotence and mercy, which are the source whence +prayer impetrates what it asks for. +_______________________ + +SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 16] + +Whether Sinners Impetrate Anything from God by Their Prayers? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sinners impetrate nothing from God by +their prayers. It is written (John 9:31): "We know that God doth not +hear sinners"; and this agrees with the saying of Prov. 28:9, "He +that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be +an abomination." Now an abominable prayer impetrates nothing from +God. Therefore sinners impetrate nothing from God. + +Obj. 2: Further, the just impetrate from God what they merit, as +stated above (A. 15, ad 2). But sinners cannot merit anything since +they lack grace and charity which is the "power of godliness," +according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of +godliness, but denying the power thereof." and so their prayer is +impious, and yet piety is required in order that prayer may be +impetrative, as stated above (A. 15, ad 2). Therefore sinners +impetrate nothing by their prayers. + +Obj. 3: Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xiv in the Opus Imperfectum +falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "The Father is +unwilling to hear the prayer which the Son has not inspired." Now in +the prayer inspired by Christ we say: "Forgive us our trespasses as +we forgive them that trespass against us": and sinners do not fulfil +this. Therefore either they lie in saying this, and so are unworthy +to be heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because +they do not observe the form of prayer instituted by Christ. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super Joan.): "If God +were not to hear sinners, the publican would have vainly said: Lord, +be merciful to me a sinner"; and Chrysostom [*Hom. xviii of the same +Opus Imperfectum] says: "Everyone that asketh shall receive, that is +to say whether he be righteous or sinful." + +_I answer that,_ In the sinner, two things are to be considered: his +nature which God loves, and the sin which He hates. Accordingly when +a sinner prays for something as sinner, i.e. in accordance with a +sinful desire, God hears him not through mercy but sometimes through +vengeance when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For +"God refuses in mercy what He grants in anger," as Augustine declares +(Tract. lxxiii in Joan.). On the other hand God hears the sinner's +prayer if it proceed from a good natural desire, not out of justice, +because the sinner does not merit to be heard, but out of pure mercy +[*Cf. A. 15, ad 1], provided however he fulfil the four conditions +given above, namely, that he beseech for himself things necessary for +salvation, piously and perseveringly. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine states (Tract. xliv super Joan.), these +words were spoken by the blind man before being anointed, i.e. +perfectly enlightened, and consequently lack authority. And yet there +is truth in the saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which +sense also the sinner's prayer is said to be an abomination. + +Reply Obj. 2: There can be no godliness in the sinner's prayer as +though his prayer were quickened by a habit of virtue: and yet his +prayer may be godly in so far as he asks for something pertaining to +godliness. Even so a man who has not the habit of justice is able to +will something just, as stated above (Q. 59, A. 2). And though his +prayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, because merit +depends on justice, whereas impetration rests on grace. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 7, ad 1) the Lord's Prayer is +pronounced in the common person of the whole Church: and so if anyone +say the Lord's Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbor's +trespasses, he lies not, although his words do not apply to him +personally: for they are true as referred to the person of the +Church, from which he is excluded by merit, and consequently he is +deprived of the fruit of his prayer. Sometimes, however, a sinner is +prepared to forgive those who have trespassed against him, wherefore +his prayers are heard, according to Ecclus. 28:2, "Forgive thy +neighbor if he hath hurt thee, and then shall thy sins be forgiven to +thee when thou prayest." +_______________________ + +SEVENTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 17] + +Whether the Parts of Prayer Are Fittingly Described As Supplications, +Prayers, Intercessions, and Thanksgivings? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prayer are unfittingly +described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and +thanksgivings. Supplication would seem to be a kind of adjuration. +Yet, according to Origen (Super Matth. Tract. xxxv), "a man who +wishes to live according to the gospel need not adjure another, for +if it be unlawful to swear, it is also unlawful to adjure." Therefore +supplication is unfittingly reckoned a part of prayer. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "to +pray is to ask becoming things of God." Therefore it is unfitting to +distinguish "prayers" from "intercessions." + +Obj. 3: Further, thanksgivings regard the past, while the others +regard the future. But the past precedes the future. Therefore +thanksgivings are unfittingly placed after the others. + +_On the contrary,_ suffices the authority of the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:1). + +_I answer that,_ Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First, +that the person who prays should approach God Whom he prays: this is +signified in the word "prayer," because prayer is "the raising up of +one's mind to God." The second is that there should be a petition, +and this is signified in the word "intercession." In this case +sometimes one asks for something definite, and then some say it is +"intercession" properly so called, or we may ask for some thing +indefinitely, for instance to be helped by God, or we may simply +indicate a fact, as in John 11:3, "Behold, he whom Thou lovest is +sick," and then they call it "insinuation." The third condition is +the reason for impetrating what we ask for: and this either on the +part of God, or on the part of the person who asks. The reason of +impetration on the part of God is His sanctity, on account of which +we ask to be heard, according to Dan. 9:17, 18, "For Thy own sake, +incline, O God, Thy ear"; and to this pertains "supplication" +(_obsecratio_) which means a pleading through sacred things, as when +we say, "Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord." The reason for +impetration on the part of the person who asks is "thanksgiving"; +since "through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to +receive yet greater benefits," as we say in the collect [*Ember +Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor +Bishop]. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 2:1 says that "in the Mass, the +consecration is preceded by supplication," in which certain sacred +things are called to mind; that "prayers are in the consecration +itself," in which especially the mind should be raised up to God; and +that "intercessions are in the petitions that follow, and +thanksgivings at the end." + +We may notice these four things in several of the Church's collects. +Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday the words, "Almighty eternal +God" belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words, "Who hast +given to Thy servants," etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words, +"grant, we beseech Thee," belong to intercession; and the words at +the end, "Through Our Lord," etc. belong to supplication. + +In the _Conferences of the Fathers_ (ix, cap. 11, seqq.) we read: +"Supplication is bewailing one's sins; prayer is vowing something to +God; intercession is praying for others; thanksgiving is offered by +the mind to God in ineffable ecstasy." The first explanation, +however, is the better. + +Reply Obj. 1: "Supplication" is an adjuration not for the purpose of +compelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore mercy. + +Reply Obj. 2: "Prayer" in the general sense includes all the things +mentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it denotes +properly the ascent to God. + +Reply Obj. 3: Among things that are diverse the past precedes the +future; but the one and same thing is future before it is past. Hence +thanksgiving for other benefits precedes intercession: but one and +the same benefit is first sought, and finally, when it has been +received, we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer +whereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer is preceded by +supplication, whereby through the consideration of God's goodness we +dare approach Him. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 84 + +OF ADORATION (In Three Articles) + +In due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria, and in +the first place, adoration whereby one uses one's body to reverence +God; secondly, those acts whereby some external thing is offered to +God; thirdly, those acts whereby something belonging to God is +assumed. + +Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether adoration is an act of latria? + +(2) Whether adoration denotes an internal or an external act? + +(3) Whether adoration requires a definite place? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 84, Art. 1] + +Whether Adoration Is an Act of Latria or Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that adoration is not an act of latria or +religion. The worship of religion is due to God alone. But adoration +is not due to God alone: since we read (Gen. 18:2) that Abraham +adored the angels; and (3 Kings 1:23) that the prophet Nathan, when +he was come in to king David, "worshiped him bowing down to the +ground." Therefore adoration is not an act of religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, the worship of religion is due to God as the object +of beatitude, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3): whereas +adoration is due to Him by reason of His majesty, since a gloss on +Ps. 28:2, "Adore ye the Lord in His holy court," says: "We pass from +these courts into the court where we adore His majesty." Therefore +adoration is not an act of latria. + +Obj. 3: Further, the worship of one same religion is due to the three +Persons. But we do not adore the three Persons with one adoration, +for we genuflect at each separate invocation of Them [*At the +adoration of the Cross, on Good Friday]. Therefore adoration is nol +an act of latria. + +_On the contrary,_ are the words quoted Matt. 4:10: "The Lord thy God +shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou serve." + +_I answer that,_ Adoration is directed to the reverence of the person +adored. Now it is evident from what we have said (Q. 81, AA. 2, 4) +that it is proper to religion to show reverence to God. Hence the +adoration whereby we adore God is an act of religion. + +Reply Obj. 1: Reverence is due to God on account of His excellence, +which is communicated to certain creatures not in equal measure, but +according to a measure of proportion; and so the reverence which we +pay to God, and which belongs to latria, differs from the reverence +which we pay to certain excellent creatures; this belongs to dulia, +and we shall speak of it further on (Q. 103). And since external +actions are signs of internal reverence, certain external tokens +significative of reverence are offered to creatures of excellence, +and among these tokens the chief is adoration: yet there is one thing +which is offered to God alone, and that is sacrifice. Hence Augustine +says (De Civ. Dei x, 4): "Many tokens of Divine worship are employed +in doing honor to men, either through excessive humility, or through +pernicious flattery; yet so that those to whom these honors are given +are recognized as being men to whom we owe esteem and reverence and +even adoration if they be far above us. But who ever thought it his +duty to sacrifice to any other than one whom he either knew or deemed +or pretended to be a God?" Accordingly it was with the reverence due +to an excellent creature that Nathan adored David; while it was the +reverence due to God with which Mardochai refused to adore Aman +fearing "lest he should transfer the honor of his God to a man" +(Esther 13:14). + +Again with the reverence due to an excellent creature Abraham adored +the angels, as did also Josue (Jos. 5:15): though we may understand +them to have adored, with the adoration of latria, God Who appeared +and spoke to them in the guise of an angel. It was with the reverence +due to God that John was forbidden to adore the angel (Apoc. 22:9), +both to indicate the dignity which he had acquired through Christ, +whereby man is made equal to an angel: wherefore the same text goes +on: "I am thy fellow-servant and of thy brethren"; as also to exclude +any occasion of idolatry, wherefore the text continues: "Adore God." + +Reply Obj. 2: Every Divine excellency is included in His majesty: to +which it pertains that we should be made happy in Him as in the +sovereign good. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since there is one excellence of the three +Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is due to them and +consequently one adoration. It is to represent this that where it is +related (Gen. 18:2) that three men appeared to Abraham, we are told +that he addressed one, saying: "Lord, if I have found favor in thy +sight," etc. The triple genuflection represents the Trinity of +Persons, not a difference of adoration. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 84, Art. 2] + +Whether Adoration Denotes an Action of the Body? + +Objection 1: It would seem that adoration does not denote an act of +the body. It is written (John 4:23): "The true adorers shall adore +the Father in spirit and in truth." Now what is done in spirit has +nothing to do with an act of the body. Therefore adoration does not +denote an act of the body. + +Obj. 2: Further, the word adoration is taken from _oratio_ (prayer). +But prayer consists chiefly in an interior act, according to 1 Cor. +14:15, "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the +understanding." Therefore adoration denotes chiefly a spiritual act. + +Obj. 3: Further, acts of the body pertain to sensible knowledge: +whereas we approach God not by bodily but by spiritual sense. +Therefore adoration does not denote an act of the body. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ex. 20:5, "Thou shalt not adore them, +nor serve them," says: "Thou shalt neither worship them in mind, nor +adore them outwardly." + +_I answer that,_ As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 12), since we +are composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and sensible, we offer +God a twofold adoration; namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in +the internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which +consists in an exterior humbling of the body. And since in all acts +of latria that which is without is referred to that which is within +as being of greater import, it follows that exterior adoration is +offered on account of interior adoration, in other words we exhibit +signs of humility in our bodies in order to incite our affections to +submit to God, since it is connatural to us to proceed from the +sensible to the intelligible. + +Reply Obj. 1: Even bodily adoration is done in spirit, in so far as +it proceeds from and is directed to spiritual devotion. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as prayer is primarily in the mind, and +secondarily expressed in words, as stated above (Q. 83, A. 12), so +too adoration consists chiefly in an interior reverence of God, but +secondarily in certain bodily signs of humility; thus when we +genuflect we signify our weakness in comparison with God, and when we +prostrate ourselves we profess that we are nothing of ourselves. + +Reply Obj. 3: Though we cannot reach God with the senses, our mind is +urged by sensible signs to approach God. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 84, Art. 3] + +Whether Adoration Requires a Definite Place? + +Objection 1: It would seem that adoration does not require a definite +place. It is written (John 4:21): "The hour cometh, when you shall +neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, adore the Father"; and +the same reason seems to apply to other places. Therefore a definite +place is not necessary for adoration. + +Obj. 2: Further, exterior adoration is directed to interior +adoration. But interior adoration is shown to God as existing +everywhere. Therefore exterior adoration does not require a definite +place. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same God is adored in the New as in the Old +Testament. Now in the Old Testament they adored towards the west, +because the door of the Tabernacle looked to the east (Ex. 26:18 +seqq.). Therefore for the same reason we ought now to adore towards +the west, if any definite place be requisite for adoration. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 56:7): "My house shall be +called the house of prayer," which words are also quoted (John 2:16). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the chief part of adoration +is the internal devotion of the mind, while the secondary part is +something external pertaining to bodily signs. Now the mind +internally apprehends God as not comprised in a place; while bodily +signs must of necessity be in some definite place and position. Hence +a definite place is required for adoration, not chiefly, as though it +were essential thereto, but by reason of a certain fittingness, like +other bodily signs. + +Reply Obj. 1: By these words our Lord foretold the cessation of +adoration, both according to the rite of the Jews who adored in +Jerusalem, and according to the rite of the Samaritans who adored on +Mount Garizim. For both these rites ceased with the advent of the +spiritual truth of the Gospel, according to which "a sacrifice is +offered to God in every place," as stated in Malach. 1:11. + +Reply Obj. 2: A definite place is chosen for adoration, not on +account of God Who is adored, as though He were enclosed in a place, +but on account of the adorers; and this for three reasons. First, +because the place is consecrated, so that those who pray there +conceive a greater devotion and are more likely to be heard, as may +be seen in the prayer of Solomon (3 Kings 8). Secondly, on account of +the sacred mysteries and other signs of holiness contained therein. +Thirdly, on account of the concourse of many adorers, by reason of +which their prayer is more likely to be heard, according to Matt. +18:20, "Where there are two or three gathered together in My name, +there am I in the midst of them." + +Reply Obj. 3: There is a certain fittingness in adoring towards the +east. First, because the Divine majesty is indicated in the movement +of the heavens which is from the east. Secondly, because Paradise was +situated in the east according to the Septuagint version of Gen. 2:8, +and so we signify our desire to return to Paradise. Thirdly, on +account of Christ Who is "the light of the world" [*John 8:12; 9:5], +and is called "the Orient" (Zech. 6:12); "Who mounteth above the +heaven of heavens to the east" (Ps. 67:34), and is expected to come +from the east, according to Matt. 24:27, "As lightning cometh out of +the east, and appeareth even into the west; so shall also the coming +of the Son of Man be." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 85 + +OF SACRIFICE +(In Four Articles) + +In due sequence we must consider those acts whereby external things +are offered to God. These give rise to a twofold consideration: +(1) Of things given to God by the faithful; (2) Of vows, whereby +something is promised to Him. + +Under the first head we shall consider sacrifices, oblations, +first-fruits, and tithes. About sacrifices there are four points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature? + +(2) Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone? + +(3) Whether the offering of a sacrifice is a special act of virtue? + +(4) Whether all are bound to offer sacrifice? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 1] + +Whether Offering a Sacrifice to God Is of the Law of Nature? + +Objection 1: It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not of +the natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common among +all men. Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read of +some, e.g. Melchisedech (Gen. 14:18), offering bread and wine in +sacrifice, and of certain animals being offered by some, and others +by others. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the natural +law. + +Obj. 2: Further, things that are of the natural law were observed by +all just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor +that Adam did so, of whom nevertheless it is written (Wis. 10:2) that +wisdom "brought him out of his sin." Therefore the offering of +sacrifice is not of the natural law. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5, 19) that +sacrifices are offered in signification of something. Now words which +are chief among signs, as he again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), +"signify, not by nature but by convention," according to the +Philosopher (Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the +natural law. + +_On the contrary,_ At all times and among all nations there has +always been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by +all is seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of +the natural law. + +_I answer that,_ Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a +higher being, on account of the defects which he perceives in +himself, and in which he needs help and direction from someone above +him: and whatever this superior being may be, it is known to all +under the name of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are +naturally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural +reason in accordance with man's natural inclination that he should +tender submission and honor, according to his mode, to that which is +above man. Now the mode befitting to man is that he should employ +sensible signs in order to signify anything, because he derives his +knowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural reason +that man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in +sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those who make +certain offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority. Now +this is what we mean by a sacrifice, and consequently the offering of +sacrifice is of the natural law. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 95, A. 2), certain things +belong generically to the natural law, while their determination +belongs to the positive law; thus the natural law requires that +evildoers should be punished; but that this or that punishment should +be inflicted on them is a matter determined by God or by man. In like +manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the natural +law, and consequently all are agreed on this point, but the +determination of sacrifices is established by God or by man, and this +is the reason for their difference. + +Reply Obj. 2: Adam, Isaac and other just men offered sacrifice to God +in a manner befitting the times in which they lived, according to +Gregory, who says (Moral. iv, 3) that in olden times original sin was +remitted through the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture +mention all the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have +something special connected with them. Perhaps the reason why we read +of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may be that, as the origin of +sin is ascribed to him, the origin of sanctification ought not to be +represented as typified in him. Isaac was a type of Christ, being +himself offered in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should +be represented as offering a sacrifice. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is natural to man to express his ideas by signs, but +the determination of those signs depends on man's pleasure. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 2] + +Whether Sacrifice Should Be Offered to God Alone? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sacrifice should not be offered to +the most high God alone. Since sacrifice ought to be offered to God, +it would seem that it ought to be offered to all such as are +partakers of the Godhead. Now holy men are made "partakers of the +Divine nature," according to 2 Pet. 1:4; wherefore of them is it +written (Ps. 81:6): "I have said, You are gods": and angels too are +called "sons of God," according to Job 1:6. Thus sacrifice should +be offered to all these. + +Obj. 2: Further, the greater a person is the greater the honor due to +him from man. Now the angels and saints are far greater than any +earthly princes: and yet the subjects of the latter pay them much +greater honor, by prostrating before them, and offering them gifts, +than is implied by offering an animal or any other thing in +sacrifice. Much more therefore may one offer sacrifice to the angels +and saints. + +Obj. 3: Further, temples and altars are raised for the offering of +sacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised to angels and saints. +Therefore sacrifices also may be offered to them. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:20): "He that sacrificeth to +gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a sacrifice is offered in +order that something may be represented. Now the sacrifice that is +offered outwardly represents the inward spiritual sacrifice, whereby +the soul offers itself to God according to Ps. 50:19, "A sacrifice to +God is an afflicted spirit," since, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 7; Q. +84, A. 2), the outward acts of religion are directed to the inward +acts. Again the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God as its +beginning by creation, and its end by beatification: and according to +the true faith God alone is the creator of our souls, as stated in +the First Part (QQ. 90, A. 3; 118, A. 2), while in Him alone the +beatitude of our soul consists, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 8; Q. +2, A. 8; Q. 3, AA. 1, 7, 8). Wherefore just as to God alone ought we +to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to offer outward +sacrifices to Him alone: even so "in our prayers and praises we +proffer significant words to Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the +things which we designate thereby," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei +x, 19). Moreover we find that in every country the people are wont to +show the sovereign ruler some special sign of honor, and that if this +be shown to anyone else, it is a crime of high-treason. Therefore, in +the Divine law, the death punishment is assigned to those who offer +Divine honor to another than God. + +Reply Obj. 1: The name of the Godhead is communicated to certain +ones, not equally with God, but by participation; hence neither is +equal honor due to them. + +Reply Obj. 2: The offering of a sacrifice is measured not by the +value of the animal killed, but by its signification, for it is done +in honor of the sovereign Ruler of the whole universe. Wherefore, as +Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), "the demons rejoice, not in the +stench of corpses, but in receiving divine honors." + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 19), "we do not +raise temples and priesthoods to the martyrs, because not they but +their God is our God. Wherefore the priest says not: I offer +sacrifice to thee, Peter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their +triumphs, and urge ourselves to imitate them." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 3] + +Whether the Offering of Sacrifice Is a Special Act of Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the offering of sacrifice is not a +special act of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "A true +sacrifice is any work done that we may cleave to God in holy +fellowship." But not every good work is a special act of some +definite virtue. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special +act of a definite virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, the mortification of the body by fasting belongs to +abstinence, by continence belongs to chastity, by martyrdom belongs +to fortitude. Now all these things seem to be comprised in the +offering of sacrifice, according to Rom. 12:1, "Present your bodies a +living sacrifice." Again the Apostle says (Heb. 13:16): "Do not +forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor +is obtained." Now it belongs to charity, mercy and liberality to do +good and to impart. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a +special act of a definite virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, a sacrifice is apparently anything offered to God. +Now many things are offered to God, such as devotion, prayer, tithes, +first-fruits, oblations, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not +appear to be a special act of a definite virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The law contains special precepts about +sacrifices, as appears from the beginning of Leviticus. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7), where an +act of one virtue is directed to the end of another virtue it +partakes somewhat of its species; thus when a man thieves in order to +commit fornication, his theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of +fornication, so that even though it were not a sin otherwise, it +would be a sin from the very fact that it was directed to +fornication. Accordingly, sacrifice is a special act deserving of +praise in that it is done out of reverence for God; and for this +reason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But it happens +that the acts of the other virtues are directed to the reverence of +God, as when a man gives alms of his own things for God's sake, or +when a man subjects his own body to some affliction out of reverence +for God; and in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called +sacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not deserving +of praise save through being done out of reverence for God: such acts +are properly called sacrifices, and belong to the virtue of religion. + +Reply Obj. 1: The very fact that we wish to cling to God in a +spiritual fellowship pertains to reverence for God: and consequently +the act of any virtue assumes the character of a sacrifice through +being done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man's good is threefold. There is first his soul's good +which is offered to God in a certain inward sacrifice by devotion, +prayer and other like interior acts: and this is the principal +sacrifice. The second is his body's good, which is, so to speak, +offered to God in martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third +is the good which consists of external things: and of these we offer +a sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our possession to God +immediately, and indirectly when we share them with our neighbor for +God's sake. + +Reply Obj. 3: A "sacrifice," properly speaking, requires that +something be done to the thing which is offered to God, for instance +animals were slain and burnt, the bread is broken, eaten, blessed. +The very word signifies this, since "sacrifice" is so called because +a man does something sacred (_facit sacrum_). On the other hand an +"oblation" is properly the offering of something to God even if +nothing be done thereto, thus we speak of offering money or bread at +the altar, and yet nothing is done to them. Hence every sacrifice is +an oblation, but not conversely. "First-fruits" are oblations, +because they were offered to God, according to Deut. 26, but they are +not a sacrifice, because nothing sacred was done to them. "Tithes," +however, are neither a sacrifice nor an oblation, properly speaking, +because they are not offered immediately to God, but to the ministers +of Divine worship. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 4] + +Whether All Are Bound to Offer Sacrifices? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all are not bound to offer +sacrifices. The Apostle says (Rom. 3:19): "What things soever the Law +speaketh, it speaketh to them that are in the Law." Now the law of +sacrifices was not given to all, but only to the Hebrew people. +Therefore all are not bound to offer sacrifices. + +Obj. 2: Further, sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify +something. But not everyone is capable of understanding these +significations. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices. + +Obj. 3: Further, priests [*_Sacerdotes:_ Those who give or administer +sacred things (_sacra dantes_): cf. 1 Cor. 4:1] are so called because +they offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. Therefore not +all are bound to offer sacrifices. + +_On the contrary,_ The offering of sacrifices of is of the natural +law, as stated above (A. 1). Now all are bound to do that which is of +the natural law. Therefore all are bound to offer sacrifice to God. + +_I answer that,_ Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above (A. 2). The +first and principal is the inward sacrifice, which all are bound to +offer, since all are obliged to offer to God a devout mind. The other +is the outward sacrifice, and this again is twofold. There is a +sacrifice which is deserving of praise merely through being offered +to God in protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation +of offering this sacrifice was not the same for those under the New +or the Old Law, as for those who were not under the Law. For those +who are under the Law are bound to offer certain definite sacrifices +according to the precepts of the Law, whereas those who were not +under the Law were bound to perform certain outward actions in God's +honor, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not definitely to +this or that action. The other outward sacrifice is when the outward +actions of the other virtues are performed out of reverence for God; +some of which are a matter of precept; and to these all are bound, +while others are works of supererogation, and to these all are not +bound. + +Reply Obj. 1: All were not bound to offer those particular +sacrifices which were prescribed in the Law: but they were bound to +some sacrifices inward or outward, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Though all do not know explicitly the power of +the sacrifices, they know it implicitly, even as they have implicit +faith, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 6, 7). + +Reply Obj. 3: The priests offer those sacrifices which are +specially directed to the Divine worship, not only for themselves but +also for others. But there are other sacrifices, which anyone can +offer to God for himself as explained above (AA. 2, 3). +_______________________ + +QUESTION 86 + +OF OBLATIONS AND FIRST-FRUITS +(In Four Articles) + +We must next consider oblations and first-fruits. Under this head +there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether any oblations are necessary as a matter of precept? + +(2) To whom are oblations due? + +(3) of what things they should be made? + +(4) In particular, as to first-fruits, whether men are bound to offer +them? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 1] + +Whether Men Are Under a Necessity of Precept to Make Oblations? + +Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to make +oblations. Men are not bound, at the time of the Gospel, to observe +the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above (I-II, Q. +103, AA. 3, 4). Now the offering of oblations is one of the +ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, since it is written (Ex. 23:14): +"Three times every year you shall celebrate feasts with Me," and +further on (Ex. 23:15): "Thou shalt not appear empty before Me." +Therefore men are not now under a necessity of precept to make +oblations. + +Obj. 2: Further, before they are made, oblations depend on man's +will, as appears from our Lord's saying (Matt. 5:23), "If . . . thou +offer thy gift at the altar," as though this were left to the choice +of the offerer: and when once oblations have been made, there is no +way of offering them again. Therefore in no way is a man under a +necessity of precept to make oblations. + +Obj. 3: Further, if anyone is bound to give a certain thing to the +Church, and fails to give it, he can be compelled to do so by being +deprived of the Church's sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to +refuse the sacraments of the Church to those who refuse to make +oblations according to a decree of the sixth council [*Can. Trullan, +xxiii, quoted I, qu. i, can. Nullus]: "Let none who dispense Holy +Communion exact anything of the recipient, and if they exact anything +let them be deposed." Therefore it is not necessary that men should +make oblations. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says [*Gregory VII; Concil. Roman. v, can. +xii]: "Let every Christian take care that he offer something to God +at the celebration of Mass." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 85, A. 3, ad 3), the term +"oblation" is common to all things offered for the Divine worship, so +that if a thing be offered to be destroyed in worship of God, as +though it were being made into something holy, it is both an oblation +and a sacrifice. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 29:18): "Thou shalt +offer the whole ram for a burnt-offering upon the altar; it is an +oblation to the Lord, a most sweet savor of the victim of the Lord"; +and (Lev. 2:1): "When anyone shall offer an oblation of sacrifice to +the Lord, his offering shall be of fine flour." If, on the other +hand, it be offered with a view to its remaining entire and being +deputed to the worship of God or to the use of His ministers, it will +be an oblation and not a sacrifice. Accordingly it is essential to +oblations of this kind that they be offered voluntarily, according to +Ex. 25:2, of "every man that offereth of his own accord you shall +take them." Nevertheless it may happen in four ways that one is bound +to make oblations. First, on account of a previous agreement: as when +a person is granted a portion of Church land, that he may make +certain oblations at fixed times, although this has the character of +rent. Secondly, by reason of a previous assignment or promise; as +when a man offers a gift among the living, or by will bequeaths to +the Church something whether movable or immovable to be delivered at +some future time. Thirdly, on account of the need of the Church, for +instance if her ministers were without means of support. Fourthly, on +account of custom; for the faithful are bound at certain solemn +feasts to make certain customary oblations. In the last two cases, +however, the oblation remains voluntary, as regards, to wit, the +quantity or kind of the thing offered. + +Reply Obj. 1: Under the New Law men are not bound to make oblations +on account of legal solemnities, as stated in Exodus, but on account +of certain other reasons, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Some are bound to make oblations, both before making +them, as in the first, third, and fourth cases, and after they have +made them by assignment or promise: for they are bound to offer in +reality that which has been already offered to the Church by way of +assignment. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those who do not make the oblations they are +bound to make may be punished by being deprived of the sacraments, not +by the priest himself to whom the oblations should be made, lest he +seem to exact, something for bestowing the sacraments, but by someone +superior to him. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 2] + +Whether Oblations Are Due to Priests Alone? + +Objection 1: It would seem that oblations are not due to priests +alone. For chief among oblations would seem to be those that are +deputed to the sacrifices of victims. Now whatever is given to the +poor is called a "victim" in Scripture according to Heb. 13:16, "Do +not forget to do good and to impart, for by such victims [Douay: +'sacrifices'] God's favor is obtained." Much more therefore are +oblations due to the poor. + +Obj. 2: Further, in many parishes monks have a share in the +oblations. Now "the case of clerics is distinct from the case of +monks," as Jerome states [*Ep. xiv, ad Heliod.]. Therefore oblations +art not due to priests alone. + +Obj. 3: Further, lay people with the consent of the Church buy +oblations such as loaves and so forth, and they do so for no other +reason than that they may make use thereof themselves. Therefore +oblations may have reference to the laity. + +_On the contrary,_ A canon of Pope Damasus [*Damasus I] quoted X, qu. +i [*Can. Hanc consuetudinem], says: "None but the priests whom day by +day we see serving the Lord may eat and drink of the oblations which +are offered within the precincts of the Holy Church: because in the +Old Testament the Lord forbade the children of Israel to eat the +sacred loaves, with the exception of Aaron and his sons" (Lev. 24:8, +9). + +_I answer that,_ The priest is appointed mediator and stands, so to +speak, _between_ the people and God, as we read of Moses (Deut. 5:5), +wherefore it belongs to him to set forth the Divine teachings and +sacraments before the people; and besides to offer to the Lord things +appertaining to the people, their prayers, for instance, their +sacrifices and oblations. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): "Every +high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things +that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for +sins." Hence the oblations which the people offer to God concern the +priests, not only as regards their turning them to their own use, but +also as regards the faithful dispensation thereof, by spending them +partly on things appertaining to the Divine worship, partly on things +touching their own livelihood (since they that serve the altar +partake with the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13), and partly for the +good of the poor, who, as far as possible, should be supported from +the possessions of the Church: for our Lord had a purse for the use +of the poor, as Jerome observes on Matt. 17:26, "That we may not +scandalize them." + +Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is given to the poor is not a sacrifice +properly speaking; yet it is called a sacrifice in so far as it is +given to them for God's sake. In like manner, and for the same +reason, it can be called an oblation, though not properly speaking, +since it is not given immediately to God. Oblations properly so +called fall to the use of the poor, not by the dispensation of the +offerers, but by the dispensation of the priests. + +Reply Obj. 2: Monks or other religious may receive oblations under +three counts. First, as poor, either by the dispensation of the +priests, or by ordination of the Church; secondly, through being +ministers of the altar, and then they can accept oblations that are +freely offered; thirdly, if the parishes belong to them, and they can +accept oblations, having a right to them as rectors of the Church. + +Reply Obj. 3: Oblations when once they are consecrated, such +as sacred vessels and vestments, cannot be granted to the use of the +laity: and this is the meaning of the words of Pope Damasus. But those +which are unconsecrated may be allowed to the use of layfolk by +permission of the priests, whether by way of gift or by way of sale. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 3] + +Whether a Man May Make Oblations of Whatever He Lawfully Possesses? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man may not make oblations of +whatever he lawfully possesses. According to human law [*Dig. xii, v, +de Condict. ob. turp. vel iniust. caus. 4] "the whore's is a shameful +trade in what she does but not in what she takes," and consequently +what she takes she possesses lawfully. Yet it is not lawful for her +to make an oblation with her gains, according to Deut. 23:18, "Thou +shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of the Lord +thy God." Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever +one possesses lawfully. + +Obj. 2: Further, in the same passage it is forbidden to offer "the +price of a dog" in the house of God. But it is evident that a man +possesses lawfully the price of a dog he has lawfully sold. Therefore +it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever we possess lawfully. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Malachi 1:8): "If you offer the lame +and the sick, is it not evil?" Yet an animal though lame or sick is a +lawful possession. Therefore it would seem that not of every lawful +possession may one make an oblation. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 3:9): "Honor the Lord with +thy substance." Now whatever a man possesses lawfully belongs to his +substance. Therefore he may make oblations of whatever he possesses +lawfully. + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. cxiii), +"shouldst thou plunder one weaker than thyself and give some of the +spoil to the judge, if he should pronounce in thy favor, such is the +force of justice that even thou wouldst not be pleased with him: and +if this should not please thee, neither does it please thy God." +Hence it is written (Ecclus. 34:21): "The offering of him that +sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten is stained." Therefore it is +evident that an oblation must not be made of things unjustly acquired +or possessed. In the Old Law, however, wherein the figure was +predominant, certain things were reckoned unclean on account of their +signification, and it was forbidden to offer them. But in the New Law +all God's creatures are looked upon as clean, as stated in Titus +1:15: and consequently anything that is lawfully possessed, +considered in itself, may be offered in oblation. But it may happen +accidentally that one may not make an oblation of what one possesses +lawfully; for instance if it be detrimental to another person, as in +the case of a son who offers to God the means of supporting his +father (which our Lord condemns, Matt. 15:5), or if it give rise to +scandal or contempt, or the like. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the Old Law it was forbidden to make an offering of +the hire of a strumpet on account of its uncleanness, and in the New +Law, on account of scandal, lest the Church seem to favor sin if she +accept oblations from the profits of sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the Law, a dog was deemed an unclean +animal. Yet other unclean animals were redeemed and their price could +be offered, according to Lev. 27:27, "If it be an unclean animal, he +that offereth it shall redeem it." But a dog was neither offered nor +redeemed, both because idolaters used dogs in sacrifices to their +idols, and because they signify robbery, the proceeds of which cannot +be offered in oblation. However, this prohibition ceased under the +New Law. + +Reply Obj. 3: The oblation of a blind or lame animal was declared +unlawful for three reasons. First, on account of the purpose for +which it was offered, wherefore it is written (Malach. 1:8): "If you +offer the blind in sacrifice, is it not evil?" and it behooved +sacrifices to be without blemish. Secondly, on account of contempt, +wherefore the same text goes on (Malach. 1:12): "You have profaned" +My name, "in that you say: The table of the Lord is defiled and that +which is laid thereupon is contemptible." Thirdly, on account of a +previous vow, whereby a man has bound himself to offer without +blemish whatever he has vowed: hence the same text says further on +(Malach. 1:14): "Cursed is the deceitful man that hath in his flock a +male, and making a vow offereth in sacrifice that which is feeble to +the Lord." The same reasons avail still in the New Law, but when they +do not apply the unlawfulness ceases. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 4] + +Whether Men Are Bound to Pay First-fruits? + +Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to pay +first-fruits. After giving the law of the first-born the text +continues (Ex. 13:9): "It shall be as a sign in thy hand," so that, +apparently, it is a ceremonial precept. But ceremonial precepts are +not to be observed in the New Law. Neither therefore ought +first-fruits to be paid. + +Obj. 2: Further, first-fruits were offered to the Lord for a special +favor conferred on that people, wherefore it is written (Deut. 26:2, +3): "Thou shalt take the first of all thy fruits . . . and thou shalt +go to the priest that shall be in those days, and say to him: I +profess this day before the Lord thy God, that I am come into the +land, for which He swore to our fathers, that He would give it us." +Therefore other nations are not bound to pay first-fruits. + +Obj. 3: That which one is bound to do should be something definite. +But neither in the New Law nor in the Old do we find mention of a +definite amount of first-fruits. Therefore one is not bound of +necessity to pay them. + +_On the contrary,_ It is laid down (16, qu. vii, can. Decimas): "We +confirm the right of priests to tithes and first-fruits, and +everybody must pay them." + +_I answer that,_ First-fruits are a kind of oblation, because they +are offered to God with a certain profession (Deut. 26); where the +same passage continues: "The priest taking the basket containing the +first-fruits from the hand of him that bringeth the first-fruits, +shall set it before the altar of the Lord thy God," and further on +(Deut. 26:10) he is commanded to say: "Therefore now I offer the +first-fruits of the land, which the Lord hath given me." Now the +first-fruits were offered for a special reason, namely, in +recognition of the divine favor, as though man acknowledged that he +had received the fruits of the earth from God, and that he ought to +offer something to God in return, according to 1 Paral 29:14, "We +have given Thee what we received of Thy hand." And since what we +offer God ought to be something special, hence it is that man was +commanded to offer God his first-fruits, as being a special part of +the fruits of the earth: and since a priest is "ordained for the +people in the things that appertain to God" (Heb. 5:1), the +first-fruits offered by the people were granted to the priest's use. +Wherefore it is written (Num. 18:8): "The Lord said to Aaron: Behold +I have given thee the charge of My first-fruits." Now it is a point +of natural law that man should make an offering in God's honor out of +the things he has received from God, but that the offering should be +made to any particular person, or out of his first-fruits, or in such +or such a quantity, was indeed determined in the Old Law by divine +command; but in the New Law it is fixed by the declaration of the +Church, in virtue of which men are bound to pay first-fruits +according to the custom of their country and the needs of the +Church's ministers. + +Reply Obj. 1: The ceremonial observances were properly speaking signs +of the future, and consequently they ceased when the foreshadowed +truth was actually present. But the offering of first-fruits was for +a sign of a past favor, whence arises the duty of acknowledgment in +accordance with the dictate of natural reason. Hence taken in a +general sense this obligation remains. + +Reply Obj. 2: First-fruits were offered in the Old Law, not only on +account of the favor of the promised land given by God, but also on +account of the favor of the fruits of the earth, which were given by +God. Hence it is written (Deut. 26:10): "I offer the first-fruits of +the land which the Lord hath given me," which second motive is common +among all people. We may also reply that just as God granted the land +of promise to the Jews by a special favor, so by a general favor He +bestowed the lordship of the earth on the whole of mankind, according +to Ps. 113:24, "The earth He has given to the children of men." + +Reply Obj. 3: As Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezech. 45:13, 14; cf. Cap. +Decimam, de Decim. Primit. et Oblat.]: "According to the tradition of +the ancients the custom arose for those who had most to give the +priests a fortieth part, and those who had least, one sixtieth, in +lieu of first-fruits." Hence it would seem that first-fruits should +vary between these limits according to the custom of one's country. +And it was reasonable that the amount of first-fruits should not be +fixed by law, since, as stated above, first-fruits are offered by way +of oblation, a condition of which is that it should be voluntary. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 87 + +OF TITHES +(In Four Articles) + +Next we must consider tithes, under which head there are four points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether men are bound by precept to pay tithes? + +(2) Of what things ought tithes to be paid? + +(3) To whom ought they to be paid? + +(4) Who ought to pay tithes? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 1] + +Whether Men Are Bound to Pay Tithes Under a Necessity of Precept? + +Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to pay +tithes. The commandment to pay tithes is contained in the Old Law +(Lev. 27:30), "All tithes of the land, whether of corn or of the +fruits of trees, are the Lord's," and further on (Lev. 27:32): "Of +all the tithes of oxen and sheep and goats, that pass under the +shepherd's rod, every tenth that cometh shall be sanctified to the +Lord." This cannot be reckoned among the moral precepts, because +natural reason does not dictate that one ought to give a tenth part, +rather than a ninth or eleventh. Therefore it is either a judicial or +a ceremonial precept. Now, as stated above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 3; Q. +104, A. 3), during the time of grace men are hound neither to the +ceremonial nor to the judicial precepts of the Old Law. Therefore men +are not bound now to pay tithes. + +Obj. 2: Further, during the time of grace men are bound only to those +things which were commanded by Christ through the Apostles, according +to Matt. 28:20, "Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I +have commanded you"; and Paul says (Acts 20:27): "I have not spared +to declare unto you all the counsel of God." Now neither in the +teaching of Christ nor in that of the apostles is there any mention +of the paying of tithes: for the saying of our Lord about tithes +(Matt. 23:23), "These things you ought to have done" seems to refer +to the past time of legal observance: thus Hilary says (Super Matth. +can. xxiv): "The tithing of herbs, which was useful in foreshadowing +the future, was not to be omitted." Therefore during the time of +grace men are not bound to pay tithes. + +Obj. 3: Further, during the time of grace, men are not more bound to +the legal observances than before the Law. But before the Law tithes +were given, by reason not of a precept but of a vow. For we read +(Gen. 28:20, 22) that Jacob "made a vow" saying: "If God shall be +with me, and shall keep me in the way by which I walk . . . of all +the things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee." +Neither, therefore, during the time of grace are men bound to pay +tithes. + +Obj. 4: Further, in the Old Law men were bound to pay three kinds of +tithe. For it is written (Num. 18:23, 24): "The sons of Levi . . . +shall . . . be content with the oblation of tithes, which I have +separated for their uses and necessities." Again, there were other +tithes of which we read (Deut. 14:22, 23): "Every year thou shalt set +aside the tithes of all thy fruits, that the earth bringeth forth +year by year; and thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God in the place +which He shall choose." And there were yet other tithes, of which it +is written (Deut. 14:28): "The third year thou shalt separate another +tithe of all things that grow to thee at that time, and shalt lay it +up within thy gates. And the Levite that hath no other part nor +possession with thee, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the +widow, that are within thy gates, shall . . . eat and be filled." Now +during the time of grace men are not bound to pay the second and +third tithes. Neither therefore are they bound to pay the first. + +Obj. 5: Further, a debt that is due without any time being fixed for +its payment, must be paid at once under pain of sin. Accordingly if +during the time of grace men are bound, under necessity of precept, +to pay tithes in those countries where tithes are not paid, they +would all be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the +ministers of the Church for dissembling. But this seems unreasonable. +Therefore during the time of grace men are not bound under necessity +of precept to pay tithes. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Append. Serm. cclxxcii], whose words +are quoted 16, qu. i [*Can. Decimae], says: "It is a duty to pay +tithes, and whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to +another." + +_I answer that,_ In the Old Law tithes were paid for the sustenance +of the ministers of God. Hence it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring +all the tithes into My [Vulg.: 'the'] store-house that there may be +meat in My house." Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was +partly moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly +judicial, deriving its force from its divine institution. Because +natural reason dictates that the people should administer the +necessaries of life to those who minister the divine worship for the +welfare of the whole people even as it is the people's duty to +provide a livelihood for their rulers and soldiers and so forth. +Hence the Apostle proves this from human custom, saying (1 Cor. 9:7): +"Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge? Who planteth +a vineyard and eateth not of the fruit thereof?" But the fixing of +the proportion to be offered to the ministers of divine worship does +not belong to the natural law, but was determined by divine +institution, in accordance with the condition of that people to whom +the law was being given. For they were divided into twelve tribes, +and the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was engaged exclusively +in the divine ministry and had no possessions whence to derive a +livelihood: and so it was becomingly ordained that the remaining +eleven tribes should give one-tenth part of their revenues to the +Levites [*Num. 18:21] that the latter might live respectably; and +also because some, through negligence, would disregard this precept. +Hence, so far as the tenth part was fixed, the precept was judicial, +since all institutions established among this people for the special +purpose of preserving equality among men, in accordance with this +people's condition, are called "judicial precepts." Nevertheless by +way of consequence these institutions foreshadowed something in the +future, even as everything else connected with them, according to 1 +Cor. 12, "All these things happened to them in figure." In this +respect they had something in common with the _ceremonial precepts,_ +which were instituted chiefly that they might be signs of the future. +Hence the precept about paying tithes foreshadowed something in the +future. For ten is, in a way, the perfect number (being the first +numerical limit, since the figures do not go beyond ten but begin +over again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth, which is +the sign of perfection, reserving the nine other parts for himself, +acknowledged by a sign that imperfection was his part, and that the +perfection which was to come through Christ was to be hoped for from +God. Yet this proves it to be, not a ceremonial but a judicial +precept, as stated above. + +There is this difference between the ceremonial and judicial precepts +of the Law, as we stated above (I-II, Q. 104, A. 3), that it is +unlawful to observe the ceremonial precepts at the time of the New +Law, whereas there is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during +the time of grace although they are not binding. Indeed they are +bound to be observed by some, if they be ordained by the authority of +those who have power to make laws. Thus it was a judicial precept of +the Old Law that he who stole a sheep should restore four sheep (Ex. +22:1), and if any king were to order this to be done his subjects +would be bound to obey. In like manner during the time of the New Law +the authority of the Church has established the payment of tithe; +thus showing a certain kindliness, lest the people of the New Law +should give less to the ministers of the New Testament than did the +people of the Old Law to the ministers of the Old Testament; for the +people of the New Law are under greater obligations, according to +Matt. 5:20, "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes +and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," and, +moreover, the ministers of the New Testament are of greater dignity +than the ministers of the Old Testament, as the Apostle shows (2 Cor. +3:7, 8). + +Accordingly it is evident that man's obligation to pay tithes arises +partly from natural law, partly from the institution of the Church; +who, nevertheless, in consideration of the requirements of time and +persons might ordain the payment of some other proportion. + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: The precept about paying tithes, in so far as it was a +moral precept, was given in the Gospel by our Lord when He said +(Matt. 10:10) [*The words as quoted are from Luke 10:7: Matthew has +'meat' instead of 'hire']: "The workman is worthy of his hire," and +the Apostle says the same (1 Cor. 9:4 seqq.). But the fixing of the +particular proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church. + +Reply Obj. 3: Before the time of the Old Law the ministry of the +divine worship was not entrusted to any particular person; although +it is stated that the first-born were priests, and that they received +a double portion. For this very reason no particular portion was +directed to be given to the ministers of the divine worship: but when +they met with one, each man of his own accord gave him what he deemed +right. Thus Abraham by a kind of prophetic instinct gave tithes to +Melchisedech, the priest of the Most High God, according to Gen. +14:20, and again Jacob made a vow to give tithes [*Gen. 28:20], +although he appears to have vowed to do so, not by paying them to +ministers, but for the purpose of the divine worship, for instance +for the fulfilling of sacrifices, hence he said significantly: "I +will offer tithes to Thee." + +Reply Obj. 4: The second kind of tithe, which was reserved for the +offering of sacrifices, has no place in the New Law, since the legal +victims had ceased. But the third kind of tithe which they had to eat +with the poor, is increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded us +to give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our surplus, +according to Luke 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms." Moreover +the tithes that are given to the ministers of the Church should be +dispensed by them for the use of the poor. + +Reply Obj. 5: The ministers of the Church ought to be more +solicitous for the increase of spiritual goods in the people, than for +the amassing of temporal goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to +make use of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his +livelihood from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest he should +occasion a hindrance to the Gospel of Christ [*1 Cor. 9:12]. Nor did +they sin who did not contribute to his upkeep, else the Apostle would +not have omitted to reprove them. In like manner the ministers of the +Church rightly refrain from demanding the Church's tithes, when they +could not demand them without scandal, on account of their having +fallen into desuetude, or for some other reason. Nevertheless those +who do not give tithes in places where the Church does not demand them +are not in a state of damnation, unless they be obstinate, and +unwilling to pay even if tithes were demanded of them. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 2] + +Whether Men Are Bound to Pay Tithes of All Things? + +Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to give tithes of +all things. The paying of tithes seems to be an institution of the +Old Law. Now the Old Law contains no precept about personal tithes, +viz. those that are payable on property acquired by one's own act, +for instance by commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is bound to +pay tithes on such things. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is not right to make oblations of that which is +ill-gotten, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 3). Now oblations, being +offered to God immediately, seem to be more closely connected with +the divine worship than tithes which are offered to the ministers. +Therefore neither should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods. + +Obj. 3: Further, in the last chapter of Leviticus (30, 32) the +precept of paying tithes refers only to "corn, fruits of trees" and +animals "that pass under the shepherd's rod." But man derives a +revenue from other smaller things, such as the herbs that grow in his +garden and so forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound +to pay tithes. + +Obj. 4: Further, man cannot pay except what is in his power. Now a +man does not always remain in possession of all his profit from land +and stock, since sometimes he loses them by theft or robbery; +sometimes they are transferred to another person by sale; sometimes +they are due to some other person, thus taxes are due to princes, and +wages due to workmen. Therefore one ought not to pay tithes on such +like things. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 28:22): "Of all things that +Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee." + +_I answer that,_ In judging about a thing we should look to its +principle. Now the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt +whereby carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things, +according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:11), "If we have +sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your +carnal things?" [thus implying that on the contrary "it is no great +matter if we reap your carnal things"] [*The phrase in the brackets +is omitted in the Leonine edition]. For this debt is the principle on +which is based the commandment of the Church about the payment of +tithes. Now whatever man possesses comes under the designation of +carnal things. Therefore tithes must be paid on whatever one +possesses. + +Reply Obj. 1: In accordance with the condition of that people there +was a special reason why the Old Law did not include a precept about +personal tithes; because, to wit, all the other tribes had certain +possessions wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient +livelihood for the Levites who had no possessions, but were not +forbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations as the +other Jews did. On the other hand the people of the New Law are +spread abroad throughout the world, and many of them have no +possessions, but live by trade, and these would contribute nothing to +the support of God's ministers if they did not pay tithes on their +trade profits. Moreover the ministers of the New Law are more +strictly forbidden to occupy themselves in money-making trades, +according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man being a soldier to God, entangleth +himself with secular business." Wherefore in the New Law men are +bound to pay personal tithes, according to the custom of their +country and the needs of the ministers: hence Augustine, whose words +are quoted 16, qu. 1, cap. Decimae, says [*Append. Serm. cclxxvii]: +"Tithes must be paid on the profits of soldiering, trade or craft." + +Reply Obj. 2: Things are ill-gotten in two ways. First, because the +getting itself was unjust: such, for instance, are things gotten by +robbery, theft or usury: and these a man is bound to restore, and not +to pay tithes on them. If, however, a field be bought with the +profits of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce, +because the latter is not gotten usuriously but given by God. On the +other hand certain things are said to be ill-gotten, because they are +gotten of a shameful cause, for instance of whoredom or +stage-playing, and the like. Such things a man is not bound to +restore, and consequently he is bound to pay tithes on them in the +same way as other personal tithes. Nevertheless the Church must not +accept the tithe so long as those persons remain in sin, lest she +appear to have a share in their sins: but when they have done +penance, tithes may be accepted from them on these things. + +Reply Obj. 3: Things directed to an end must be judged according to +their fittingness to the end. Now the payment of tithes is due not +for its own sake, but for the sake of the ministers, to whose dignity +it is unbecoming that they should demand minute things with careful +exactitude, for this is reckoned sinful according to the Philosopher +(Ethic. iv, 2). Hence the Old Law did not order the payment of tithes +on such like minute things, but left it to the judgment of those who +are willing to pay, because minute things are counted as nothing. +Wherefore the Pharisees who claimed for themselves the perfect +justice of the Law, paid tithes even on these minute things: nor are +they reproved by our Lord on that account, but only because they +despised greater, i.e. spiritual, precepts; and rather did He show +them to be deserving of praise in this particular, when He said +(Matt. 23:23): "These things you ought to have done," i.e. during the +time of the Law, according to Chrysostom's [*Hom. xliv in the Opus +Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commentary. This +also seems to denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore +now too men are not bound to pay tithes on such minute things, except +perhaps by reason of the custom of one's country. + +Reply Obj. 4: A man is not bound to pay tithes on what he has lost by +theft or robbery, before he recovers his property: unless he has +incurred the loss through his own fault or neglect, because the +Church ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat +that has not been tithed, the Church can command the tithes due to +her, both from the buyer who has a thing due to the Church, and from +the seller, because so far as he is concerned he has defrauded the +Church: yet if one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on +the fruits of the earth, in so far as these fruits are the gift of +God. Wherefore tithes do not come under a tax, nor are they subject +to workmen's wages. Hence it is not right to deduct one's taxes and +the wages paid to workmen, before paying tithes: but tithes must be +paid before anything else on one's entire produce. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 4] + +Whether Tithes Should Be Paid to the Clergy? + +Objection 1: It would seem that tithes should not be paid to the +clergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the Old Testament, because +they had no portion in the people's possessions, according to Num. +18:23, 24. But in the New Testament the clergy have possessions not +only ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover they +receive first-fruits, and oblations for the living and the dead. +Therefore it is unnecessary to pay tithes to them. + +Obj. 2: Further, it sometimes happens that a man dwells in one +parish, and farms in another; or a shepherd may take his flock within +the bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the +bounds of another parish during the other part of the year; or he may +have his sheepfold in one parish, and graze the sheep in another. Now +in all these and similar cases it seems impossible to decide to which +clergy the tithes ought to be paid. Therefore it would seem that no +fixed tithe ought to be paid to the clergy. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is the general custom in certain countries for +the soldiers to hold the tithes from the Church in fee; and certain +religious receive tithes. Therefore seemingly tithes are not due only +to those of the clergy who have care of souls. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Num. 18:21): "I have given to the +sons of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the +ministry wherewith they serve Me in the Tabernacle." Now the clergy +are the successors of the sons of Levi in the New Testament. +Therefore tithes are due to the clergy alone. + +_I answer that,_ Two things have to be considered with regard to +tithes: namely, the right to receive tithes, and the things given in +the name of tithes. The right to receive tithes is a spiritual thing, +for it arises from the debt in virtue of which the ministers of the +altar have a right to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal +things are due to those who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns +none but the clergy who have care of souls, and so they alone are +competent to have this right. + +On the other hand the things given in the name of tithes are +material, wherefore they may come to be used by anyone, and thus it +is that they fall into the hands of the laity. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the Old Law, as stated above (A. 1, ad 4), special +tithes were earmarked for the assistance of the poor. But in the New +Law the tithes are given to the clergy, not only for their own +support, but also that the clergy may use them in assisting the poor. +Hence they are not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations and +first-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary for this same +purpose. + +Reply Obj. 2: Personal tithes are due to the church in whose parish a +man dwells, while predial tithes seem more reasonably to belong to +the church within whose bounds the land is situated. The law, +however, prescribes that in this matter a custom that has obtained +for a long time must be observed [*Cap. Cum sint, and Cap. Ad +apostolicae, de Decimis, etc.]. The shepherd who grazes his flock at +different seasons in two parishes, should pay tithe proportionately +to both churches. And since the fruit of the flock is derived from +the pasture, the tithe of the flock is due to the church in whose +lands the flock grazes, rather than to the church on whose land the +fold is situated. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as the Church can hand over to a layman the things +she receives under the title of tithe, so too can she allow him to +receive tithes that are yet to be paid, the right of receiving being +reserved to the ministers of the Church. The motive may be either the +need of the Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers +through being granted to them in fee by the Church, or it may be the +succoring of the poor; thus certain tithes have been granted by way +of alms to certain lay religious, or to those that have no care of +souls. Some religious, however, are competent to receive tithes, +because they have care of souls. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 4] + +Whether the Clergy Also Are Bound to Pay Tithes? + +Objection 1: It would seem that clerics also are bound to pay tithes. +By common law [*Cap. Cum homines, de Decimis, etc.] the parish church +should receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory. +Now it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain lands of their +own on the territory of some parish church, or that one church has +ecclesiastical property on the territory of another. Therefore it +would seem that the clergy are bound to pay predial tithes. + +Obj. 2: Further, some religious are clerics; and yet they are bound +to pay tithes to churches on account of the lands which they +cultivate even with their own hands [*Cap. Ex parte, and Cap. +Nuper.]. Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune from +the payment of tithes. + +Obj. 3: Further, in the eighteenth chapter of Numbers (26, 28), it is +prescribed not only that the Levites should receive tithes from the +people, but also that they should themselves pay tithes to the +high-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the +Sovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to +the clergy. + +Obj. 4: Further, tithes should serve not only for the support of the +clergy, but also for the assistance of the poor. Therefore, if the +clergy are exempt from paying tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the +latter is not true. Therefore the former is false. + +_On the contrary,_ A decretal of Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says: "It +is a new form of exaction when the clergy demand tithes from the +clergy" [*Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc.]. + +_I answer that,_ The cause of giving cannot be the cause of +receiving, as neither can the cause of action be the cause of +passion; yet it happens that one and the same person is giver and +receiver, even as agent and patient, on account of different causes +and from different points of view. Now tithes are due to the clergy +as being ministers of the altar and sowers of spiritual things among +the people. Wherefore those members of the clergy as such, i.e. as +having ecclesiastical property, are not bound to pay tithes; whereas +from some other cause through holding property in their own right, +either by inheriting it from their kindred, or by purchase, or in any +other similar manner, they are bound to the payment of tithes. + +Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, because the clergy +like anyone else are bound to pay tithes on their own lands to the +parish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church, +because to possess a thing as one's private property is not the same +as possessing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even +though they be within the boundaries of another parish. + +Reply Obj. 2: Religious who are clerics, if they have care of souls, +and dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to pay +tithes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other +religious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the +people; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay +tithes, but they are somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions +granted by the Apostolic See [*Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad +audientiam, de Decimis, etc.]. + +Reply Obj. 3: In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the priests, +and tithes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below the +priests, the Lord commanded that the former should pay the +high-priest "the tenth part of the tenth" [*Num. 18:26] instead of +first-fruits: wherefore for the same reason the clergy are bound now +to pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For +natural reason dictates that he who has charge of the common estate +of a multitude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be +able to carry out whatever is necessary for the common welfare. + +Reply Obj. 4: Tithes should be employed for the assistance of the +poor, through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have no +reason for accepting tithes, but they are bound to pay them. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 88 + +OF VOWS +(In Twelve Articles) + +We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God. +Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry: + +(1) What is a vow? + +(2) What is the matter of a vow? + +(3) Of the obligation of vows; + +(4) Of the use of taking vows; + +(5) Of what virtue is it an act? + +(6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than +without a vow? + +(7) Of the solemnizing of a vow; + +(8) Whether those who are under another's power can take vows? + +(9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion? + +(10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation? + +(11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of +continence? + +(12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a +dispensation from a vow? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 1] + +Whether a Vow Consists in a Mere Purpose of the Will? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a +purpose of the will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. +Aur. III, xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], "a vow is +a conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind, +whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain +thing." But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may +consist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a +mere purpose of the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from +_voluntas_ (will), for one is said to do a thing _proprio voto_ (by +one's own vow) when one does it voluntarily. Now to _purpose_ is an +act of the will, while to _promise_ is an act of the reason. +Therefore a vow consists in a mere act of the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, our Lord said (Luke 9:62): "No man putting his hand +to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." Now +from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts +his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting +from his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God. +Therefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even +without making a promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow +consists in a mere purpose of the will. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed +anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish +promise displeaseth Him." Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow +is a promise. + +_I answer that,_ A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some +particular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a +promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to +direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a +fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs +what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between man and +man can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs; +whereas a promise can be made to God by the mere inward thought, +since according to 1 Kings 16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear, +but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Yet we express words outwardly +sometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with +regard to prayer (Q. 83, A. 12), or to call others to witness, so +that one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of +God, but also through respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome +from a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes +deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly +three things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation; the +second is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein +is completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two other +things are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow, namely, +pronouncement by word of mouth, according to Ps. 65:13, "I will pay +Thee my vows which my lips have uttered"; and the witnessing of +others. Hence the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a vow is "the +witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and +about things relating to God": although the "witnessing" may strictly +refer to the inward protestation. + +Reply Obj. 1: The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by +the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a +promise. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man's will moves the reason to promise something +relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from +the will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that puts his hand to the plough does something +already; while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing +so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about doing, +although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts +his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches +out his hand for the purpose of ploughing. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 2] + +Whether a Vow Should Always Be About a Better Good? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a vow need not be always about a +better good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation. +But vows are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about +matters of salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil +and his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps. +75:12, "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God"; and Jacob vowed (Gen. +28:21) that the Lord should be his God. Now this above all is +necessary for salvation. Therefore vows are not only about a better +good. + +Obj. 2: Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Heb. 11:32). +Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges +11). Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better +good, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not +only about a better good, but also about something unlawful. + +Obj. 3: Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or +that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good. +Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which +tend to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent +matters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not +always about a better good. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 23:22): "If thou wilt not +promise thou shalt be without sin." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to +God. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for +someone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say +that one would do something against someone. In like manner it would +be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore, +as every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God +unless it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or +indifferent, but only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a +vow. But as a vow denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity +excludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to +be or not to be, can nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would be +foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not fly. + +On the other hand, if a thing be necessary, not absolutely but on the +supposition of an end--for instance if salvation be unattainable +without it--it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done +voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it. +But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the +supposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most +properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good +in comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation. +Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good. + +Reply Obj. 1: Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the faith of +Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these things +are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation. The +same answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also be explained +that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by giving +Him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for instance +by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the same +passage. + +Reply Obj. 2: Certain things are good, whatever be their result; such +are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter +of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as those +things which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the +matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and +as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result, +in which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of +Jephte, who as related in Judges 11:30, 31, "made a vow to the Lord, +saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, +whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and +shall meet me when I return in peace . . . the same will I offer a +holocaust to the Lord." For this could have an evil result if, as +indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be +unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome +says [*Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii: +Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist. +Scholast.]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion, +and in keeping his vow he was wicked." Yet it is premised (Judges +11:29) that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," because his faith +and devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy +Ghost; and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also +by reason of the victory which he obtained, and because it is +probable that he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless +foreshadowed something good. + +Reply Obj. 3: The mortification of one's own body, for instance by +vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it +is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due +discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without +overburdening nature. On this condition such things may be the matter +of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1), "Present your +bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," adds, "your +reasonable service." Since, however, man is easily mistaken in +judging of matters concerning himself, such vows as these are more +fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a +superior, yet so that, should a man find that without doubt he is +seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to +appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about +vain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 3] + +Whether All Vows Are Binding? + +Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man +needs things that are done by another, more than God does, since He +has no need for our goods (Ps. 15:2). Now according to the +prescription of human laws [*Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i] a simple +promise made to a man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed +on account of the changeableness of the human will. Much less binding +therefore is a simple promise made to God, which we call a vow. + +Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now +sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, +either because it depends on another's decision, as when, for +instance, a man vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse +to receive him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance +when a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a +man vows to give a sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a +vow is not always binding. + +Obj. 3: Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at +once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if it +be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a +vow is not always binding. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3, 4): "Whatsoever thou +hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a +vow not to perform the things promised." + +_I answer that,_ For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's +promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [*Ep. xxxii, 2: De +Mendac. xx] faith takes its name "from a man's deed agreeing with his +word" [*_Fides . . . fiunt dicta._ Cicero gives the same etymology +(De Offic. i, 7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to God above all, +both on account of God's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he +has received from God. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the +vows he has made to God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes +to God. On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of +infidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows should be +paid to God, because "an unfaithful . . . promise displeaseth Him" +[*Eccles. 5:3]. + +Reply Obj. 1: Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he +makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the natural +law. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a promise +he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although God needs +not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so that +a vow made to Him is most binding. + +Reply Obj. 2: If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible +to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that +he have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has +vowed to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power +to be received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself +to enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this +particular form of religious life, or this place, as being most +agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received +there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his principal +intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious +life, or to this particular place, because the one or the other +pleases him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another +religious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into this +particular one. On the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of +fulfilling his vow through his own fault, he is bound over and above +to do penance for his past fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity +and is afterwards violated, she is bound not only to observe what is +in her power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of what +she has lost by sinning. + +Reply Obj. 3: The obligation of a vow is caused by our own +will and intention, wherefore it is written (Deut. 23:23): "That which +is once gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou +hast promised to the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will +and with thy own mouth." Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one's +intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound +to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain +time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate +fulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to +bind oneself, for it is written (Deut. 23:21): "When thou hast made a +vow to the Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the +Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed +to thee for a sin." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Expedient to Take Vows? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It +is not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God +has given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man +is liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity +implicated in a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to +take vows. + +Obj. 2: Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But whoever +takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before +taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of +danger to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence +Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Since thou hast +vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou +dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have +been hadst thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less +great, not less good: whereas now if thou breakest faith with God +(which God forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have +been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow." Therefore it is not expedient +to take vows. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of +me, as I also am of Christ." But we do not read that either Christ or +the Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to +take vows. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye and pay to the +Lord your God." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made +to God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God +under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own +profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and +that we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that +service: whereas we make promises to God not for His but for our own +profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "He +is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our +payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him." And just as +what we give God is useful not to Him but to us, since "what is given +Him is added to the giver," as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. +et Paulin.), so also a promise whereby we vow something to God, does +not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but +it conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills +immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient +to take vows. + +Reply Obj. 1: Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being +unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will firmly +fixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God and +the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a +certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence, +Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that "happy is +the necessity that compels us to do the better things." + +Reply Obj. 2: When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is +not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering +bridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed, +the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient to +mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the +horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, that +may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. +11:4): "He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that +considereth the clouds shall never reap." Now a man incurs danger, +not from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind +by breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et +Paulin.): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that +thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy +detriment." + +Reply Obj. 3: It was incompetent for Christ, by His very nature, to +take a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man, His will +was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a _comprehensor._ By a +kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps. 21:26): +"I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when He is +speaking of His body, which is the Church. + +The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the +state of perfection when "they left all things and followed Christ." +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 5] + +Whether a Vow Is an Act of Latria or Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or +religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem +to pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it. +Therefore a vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs to +religion to offer God worship and ceremonial rites. But he who takes +a vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it. +Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, religious worship should be offered to none but God. +But a vow is made not only to God, but also to the saints and to +one's superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their +profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 19:21): "(The Egyptians) shall +worship Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to +the Lord, and perform them." Now, the worship of God is properly the +act of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or +religion. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1), every act of +virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as +it is directed to the reverence of God which is the proper end of +latria. Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to +the commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore +the direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the +proper act of latria. + +Now, it is evident from what has been said above (AA. 1, 2) that a +vow is a promise made to God, and that a promise is nothing else than +a directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise +is made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship +or service of God. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is +properly an act of latria or religion. + +Reply Obj. 1: The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of another +virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing continency; +while sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or +praying. But promising either of them to God belongs to religion, for +the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some vows belong to +religion by reason only of the promise made to God, which is the +essence of a vow, while others belong thereto by reason also of the +thing promised, which is the matter of the vow. + +Reply Obj. 2: He who promises something gives it already in as far as +he binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when +its cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its +cause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who +promises to give. + +Reply Obj. 3: A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise may be +made to a man also: and this very promise of good, which is made to a +man, may be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a virtuous +act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow something +to the saints or to one's superiors: so that the promise made to the +saints or to one's superiors is the matter of the vow, in so far as +one vows to God to fulfil what one has promised to the saints or +one's superiors. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 6] + +Whether It Is More Praiseworthy and Meritorious to Do Something in +Fulfilment of a Vow, Than Without a Vow? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and +meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow. +Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. ii): "We should abstain or fast +without putting ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest that +which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." +Now he who vows to fast puts himself under the necessity of fasting. +Therefore it would be better for him to fast without taking the vow. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): "Everyone as he hath +determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity: for God +loveth a cheerful giver." Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have +vowed: and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the +vow, for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to _Metaph._ v +[*Ed. Did. iv, 5]. Therefore, it is better to do something without a +vow, than in fulfilment of a vow. + +Obj. 3: Further, a vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the +will on that which is vowed, as stated above (A. 4). But the will +cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that +thing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow +than without a vow. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words of Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye and +pay," says: "Vows are counseled to the will." But a counsel is +about none but a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed in +fulfilment of a vow than without a vow: since he that does it without +a vow fulfils only one counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he +that does it with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to +vow and the counsel to do it. + +_I answer that,_ For three reasons it is better and more meritorious +to do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because +to vow, as stated above (A. 5) is an act of religion which is the +chief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the +better and more meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an +inferior virtue is the better and more meritorious for being +commanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being +commanded by it, just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be +commanded by charity. Hence the works of the other moral virtues (for +instance, fasting, which is an act of abstinence; and being +continent, which is an act of chastity) are better and more +meritorious, if they be done in fulfilment of a vow, since thus they +belong to the divine worship, being like sacrifices to God. Wherefore +Augustine says (De Virg. viii) that "not even is virginity honorable +as such, but only when it is consecrated to God, and cherished by +godly continence." + +Secondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects +himself to God more than he that only does it; for he subjects +himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, +since in future he cannot do something else. Even so he gives more +who gives the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, +as Anselm [*Eadmer] observes (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we +thank even those who promise, as stated above (A. 5, ad 2). + +Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do +anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the +perfection of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4), +just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is +called a sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted should be understood as referring to +necessity of coercion which causes an act to be involuntary and +excludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly: "Lest that which we are +free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." On the other +hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the immobility +of the will, wherefore it strengthens the will and increases +devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher, necessity of coercion, in +so far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity +resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in so far as it +strengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence Augustine says +(Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): "Repent not of thy vow: thou +shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou +mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment." If, however, the very +deed, considered in itself, were to become disagreeable and +involuntary after one has taken the vow, the will to fulfil it +remaining withal, it is still more meritorious than if it were done +without the vow, since the fulfilment of a vow is an act of religion +which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is an act. + +Reply Obj. 3: He who does something without having vowed it has an +immovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and at +the time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether +fixed for the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a vow: +for the latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did +that particular deed, and perchance to do it many times. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 7] + +Whether a Vow Is Solemnized by the Reception of Holy Orders, and by +the Profession of a Certain Rule? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not solemnized by the +reception of holy orders and by the profession of a certain rule. As +stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to God. Now external +actions pertaining to solemnity seem to be directed, not to God, but +to men. Therefore they are related to vows accidentally: and +consequently a solemnization of this kind is not a proper +circumstance of a vow. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever belongs to the condition of a thing, would +seem to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now many +things may be the subject of a vow, which have no connection either +with holy orders, or to any particular rule: as when a man vows a +pilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the solemnization +that takes place in the reception of holy orders or in the profession +of a certain rule does not belong to the condition of a vow. + +Obj. 3: Further, a solemn vow seems to be the same as a public vow. +Now many other vows may be made in public besides that which is +pronounced in receiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule; +which latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not only +these vows are solemn. + +_On the contrary,_ These vows alone are an impediment to the contract +of marriage, and annul marriage if it be contracted, which is the +effect of a solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the Third +Part of this work [*Suppl., Q. 53, A. 2]. + +_I answer that,_ The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on +its nature (_conditio_): thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes +the fact in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and +arms and a concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in +another way, namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the +gathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made to God: +wherefore, the solemnization of a vow consists in something spiritual +pertaining to God; i.e. in some spiritual blessing or consecration +which, in accordance with the institution of the apostles, is given +when a man makes profession of observing a certain rule, in the +second degree after the reception of holy orders, as Dionysius states +(Eccl. Hier. vi). The reason of this is that solemnization is not +wont to be employed, save when a man gives himself up entirely to +some particular thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only +when the marriage is celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom +mutually deliver the power over their bodies to one another. In like +manner a vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself to the divine +ministry by receiving holy orders, or embraces the state of +perfection by renouncing the world and his own will by the profession +of a certain rule. + +Reply Obj. 1: This kind of solemnization regards not only men but +also God in so far as it is accompanied by a spiritual consecration +or blessing, of which God is the author, though man is the minister, +according to Num. 6:27, "They shall invoke My name upon the children +of Israel, and I will bless them." Hence a solemn vow is more binding +with God than a simple vow, and he who breaks a solemn vow sins more +grievously. When it is said that a simple vow is no less binding than +a solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either +commits a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not customary to solemnize particular acts, but +the embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Hence when a man +vows particular deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast, +such a vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as the +vow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or +service: and yet many particular works are included under this vow as +under a universal. + +Reply Obj. 3: Through being pronounced in public vows may have a +certain human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as +the aforesaid vows have, even when they are pronounced before a few +persons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 8] + +Whether Those Who Are Subject to Another's Power Are Hindered from +Taking Vows? + +Objection 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another's +power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed +by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a +lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God. +Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered +from taking vows. + +Obj. 2: Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet +children may make religious profession even without the consent of +their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows, +through being subject to another's power. + +Obj. 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are +under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to +say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore +seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows. + +Obj. 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But +subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this +forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows. + +_On the contrary,_ It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that "if a woman vow +any thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in +age," she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the +same is said there (Num. 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband. +Therefore in like manner other persons that are subject to another's +power cannot bind themselves by vow. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to +God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in +another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power. +Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is +subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it +depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent +of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those +matters wherein he is subject to another. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a +promise made to God, as stated above (A. 2). Now it is contrary to +virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as +stated above (Q. 86, A. 3). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow +are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's power +vows that which is in that other's power, except under the condition +that he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it. + +Reply Obj. 2: As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is +in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance +with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with +regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as +regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters +he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his +father. + +A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his +personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since +this would withdraw him from his master's service. + +Reply Obj. 3: A religious is subject to his superior as to his +actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even +though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not +being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there +is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow +of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither +does the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his +consent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband. + +Reply Obj. 4: Although the vow of one who is subject to another's +power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is +subject, he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood to +contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior +approve or do not gainsay it. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 9] + +Whether Children Can Bind Themselves by Vow to Enter Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by +vow to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind, +it is fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason. +But this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen. +Therefore just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to +anything by vow, so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves +by vow to enter religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be +annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or +girl before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or +guardian (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or +girl cannot validly make a vow before the age of fourteen. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [*Ch. 58] +and a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted to those +who enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation of +the vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation, +for children to be bound by vow to enter religion. + +_On the contrary,_ That which is not done aright is invalid without +being annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even +before attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled +by her parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore +even before attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be +bound by a vow to enter religion. + +_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said above (A. +7), vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as stated in +the same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a spiritual +blessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of the +Church, it follows that it comes under the Church's dispensation. Now +a simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind, +whereby one intends to put oneself under an obligation. That such an +obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through +defect of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind +themselves by vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or +imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of a vow being subject to +another's power, as stated above (A. 8). Now these two circumstances +concur in children before the age of puberty, because in most +instances they are lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under +the care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents: +wherefore in both events their vows are without force. It happens, +however, through a natural disposition which is not subject to human +laws, that the use of reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who +on this account are said to be capable of guile: and yet they are +not, for this reason, exempt in any way from the care of their +parents; for this care is subject to human law, which takes into +account that which is of most frequent occurrence. + +Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the +years of puberty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise +bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use +of reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their +own part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by +their parents, under whose care they are still subject. + +Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of +puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account +of the Church's decree [*Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et +transeunt. ad Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But +after the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind +themselves by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent +of their parents. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of children who have +not yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are invalid, +as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: The vows of persons subject to another's power contain +an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the +superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be +fulfilled, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which +are taken in profession. +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 10] + +Whether Vows Admit of Dispensation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation. +It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping +it. But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. 27:9, 10, "A +beast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall +be holy, and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a +worse for a better." Much less, therefore, do vows admit of +dispensation. + +Obj. 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters +concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially +those of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of +God, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a +vow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine +law, as shown above (A. 3), and belongs to the precepts of the First +Table since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of +dispensation. + +Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity +which a man owes to God, as stated above (A. 3). But no man can +dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one +grant a dispensation from a vow. + +_On the contrary,_ That which proceeds from the common will of many +has apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the +individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its +force from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore +it seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man. + +_I answer that,_ The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the +same sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law +because, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4), a law is +made with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances. +But since in certain cases this is not good, there is need for +someone to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be +observed. This is properly speaking to dispense in the law: for a +dispensation would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or +application of some common thing to those that are contained under +it, in the same way as a person is said to dispense food to a +household. + +In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it +were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the +majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some +particular case this is simply evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a +greater good: and this is essentially contrary to that which is the +matter of a vow, as is clear from what has been said above (A. 2). +Therefore it is necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow is +not to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular +vow is not to be observed, this is called a "dispensation" from that +vow; but if some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which +was to have been observed, the vow is said to be "commuted." Hence it +is less to commute a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however, +are in the power of the Church. + +Reply Obj. 1: An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was deemed +holy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow, being, as +it were, dedicated to the worship of God: and for this reason it +could not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange for +something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be +already consecrated, e.g. a chalice or a house. On the other hand, an +animal that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful +matter of a sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law +requires. Even so, vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has +intervened. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even as man is bound by natural law and Divine precept +to fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to obey +the law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed +from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience to that +human law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the +Divine command; but it amounts to this--that what was law is not law +in this particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a +dispensation, that which was contained under a vow is by his +authority no longer so contained, in so far as he decides that in +this case such and such a thing is not fitting matter for a vow. +Consequently when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a +vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural +or of the Divine law, but he pronounces a decision on a matter to +which a man had bound himself of his own accord, and of which he was +unable to consider every circumstance. + +Reply Obj. 3: The fidelity we owe to God does not require that we +fulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which would +be an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from +that vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow is not +contrary to the fidelity due to God. +_______________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 11] + +Whether It Is Possible to Be Dispensed from a Solemn Vow of +Continency? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a +solemn vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a +dispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good. +But a vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle +to a greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the +good of an individual. Now one man's continency may be an obstacle to +the good of the whole community, for instance, in the case where, if +certain persons who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of +their country might be procured. Therefore it seems that it is +possible to be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency. + +Obj. 2: Further, religion is a more excellent virtue than chastity. +Now if a man vows an act of religion, e.g. to offer sacrifice to God +he can be dispensed from that vow. Much more, therefore, can he be +dispensed from the vow of continency which is about an act of +chastity. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may be +a source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance of a +vow of continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be +dispensed from that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body. +Therefore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow of +continency. + +Obj. 4: Further, just as the vow of continency is part of the +religious profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the +vows of poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed +from the vows of poverty and obedience, as in the case of those who +are appointed bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems +that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy +of a continent soul." + +Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach.) at the end of the Decretal, _Cum +ad Monasterium,_ it is stated that the "renouncing of property, like +the keeping of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that +not even the Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance." + +_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in a solemn vow of +continency: first, the matter of the vow, namely, continency; +secondly, the perpetuity of the vow, namely, when a person binds +himself by vow to the perpetual observance of chastity: thirdly, the +solemnity of the vow. Accordingly, some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. +Aur. III. vii. 1, qu. 5] say that the solemn vow cannot be a matter +of dispensation, on account of the continency itself for which no +worthy price can be found, as is stated by the authority quoted +above. The reason for this is assigned by some to the fact that by +continency man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the fact that by +continency man is perfectly conformed to Christ in respect of purity +of both body and soul. But this reason does not seem to be cogent +since the goods of the soul, such as contemplation and prayer, far +surpass the goods of the body and still more conform us to God, and +yet one may be dispensed from a vow of prayer or contemplation. +Therefore, continency itself absolutely considered seems no reason +why the solemn vow thereof cannot be a matter of dispensation; +especially seeing that the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:34) exhorts us to be +continent on account of contemplation, when he says that the +unmarried woman . . . "thinketh on the things of God [Vulg.: 'the +Lord']," and since the end is of more account than the means. + +Consequently others [*Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38] find the +reason for this in the perpetuity and universality of this vow. For +they assert that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by +something altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any +vow. But this is evidently false, because just as the practice of +carnal intercourse is contrary to continency, so is eating flesh or +drinking wine contrary to abstinence from such things, and yet these +latter vows may be a matter for dispensation. + +For this reason others [*Innocent IV, on the above decretal] maintain +that one may be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency, for +the sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the +example given above (Obj. 1), of a country being restored to peace +through a certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the Decretal +quoted says explicitly that "not even the Sovereign Pontiff can +dispense a monk from keeping chastity," it follows seemingly, that we +must maintain that, as stated above (A. 10, ad 1; cf. Lev. 27:9, 10, +28), whatsoever has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to +any other use. For no ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is +sanctified to lose its consecration, not even though it be something +inanimate, for instance a consecrated chalice to be not consecrated, +so long as it remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a prelate +make a man that is consecrated to God cease to be consecrated, so +long as he lives. Now the solemnity of a vow consists in a kind of +consecration or blessing of the person who takes the vow, as stated +above (A. 7). Hence no prelate of the Church can make a man, who has +pronounced a solemn vow, to be quit of that to which he was +consecrated, e.g. one who is a priest, to be a priest no more, +although a prelate may, for some particular reason, inhibit him from +exercising his order. In like manner the Pope cannot make a man who +has made his religious profession cease to be a religious, although +certain jurists have ignorantly held the contrary. + +We must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up +with the purpose for which the vow is solemnized. Because if not, the +solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of +continency, but not if continency is essentially bound up with that +for which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing +continency is connected with Holy Orders, not essentially but by the +institution of the Church; wherefore it seems that the Church can +grant a dispensation from the vow of continency solemnized by the +reception of Holy Orders. On the other hand the obligation of +observing continency is an essential condition of the religious +state, whereby a man renounces the world and binds himself wholly to +God's service, for this is incompatible with matrimony, in which +state a man is under the obligation of taking to himself a wife, of +begetting children, of looking after his household, and of procuring +whatever is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore the Apostle says +(1 Cor. 7:33) that "he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the +things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided." +Hence the "monk" takes his name from "unity" [*The Greek _monos_] in +contrast with this division. For this reason the Church cannot +dispense from a vow solemnized by the religious profession; and the +reason assigned by the Decretal is because "chastity is bound up with +the monastic rule." + +Reply Obj. 1: Perils occasioned by human affairs should be obviated +by human means, not by turning divine things to a human use. Now a +professed religious is dead to the world and lives to God, and so he +must not be called back to the human life on the pretext of any human +contingency. + +Reply Obj. 2: A vow of temporal continency can be a matter of +dispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal +abstinence. But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a +vow of continency solemnized by profession is due, not to its being +an act of chastity, but because through the religious profession it +is already an act of religion. + +Reply Obj. 3: Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the person, +therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger to +the person: and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of +dispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is directly +ordered to the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore +to abstain from such intercourse by continency does not endanger the +person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger to the +person, this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance +by abstinence, or other corporal remedies. + +Reply Obj. 4: A religious who is made a bishop is no more absolved +from his vow of poverty than from his vow of continency, since he +must have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the +dispenser of the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither +is he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he +is not bound to obey if he have no superior; just as the abbot of a +monastery, who nevertheless is not dispensed from his vow of +obedience. + +The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary +sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the of +the flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency, +which is reckoned one of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares +(De Sanct. Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly "of a +continent soul," not "of a continent body." +_______________________ + +TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 12] + +Whether the Authority of a Prelate Is Required for the Commutation or +the Dispensation of a Vow? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not +required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may +enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by +entering religion one is absolved from the vows he made in the world, +even from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [*Cap. +Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.]. Therefore the commutation or +dispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior +prelate. + +Obj. 2: Further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in +deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the +prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does +not seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a +dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows, +as stated above (A. 10, ad 2; A. 11). Likewise, when anyone rightly +determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be +kept, he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if +it have an evil result (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a +prelate is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow. + +Obj. 3: Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant +dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all +prelates, but it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow. +Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense +from vows. + +_On the contrary,_ A vow binds one to do something, even as a law +does. Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation +from a precept of the law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, +A. 4). Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made +to God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise +something to anyone it depends on his decision whether he accept what +you promise. Again in the Church a prelate stands in God's place. +Therefore a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the +authority of a prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable +to God, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: "For [I] . . . have pardoned . . . +for your sakes . . . in the person of Christ." And he says +significantly "for your sakes," since whenever we ask a prelate for a +dispensation we should do so to honor Christ in Whose person he +dispenses, or to promote the interests of the Church which is His +Body. + +Reply Obj. 1: All other vows are about some particular works, whereas +by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's +service. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a +Decretal [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.] says that "a +man is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for +the perpetual service of religion." And yet a man who enters religion +is not bound to fulfil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or +the like, which he made when in the world, because by entering +religion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the +religious life that each one should have his own observances, and +because the burden of religion is onerous enough without requiring +the addition of other burdens. + +Reply Obj. 2: Some have held that prelates can dispense from vows at +their will, for the reason that every vow supposes as a condition +that the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated above (A. 8) +that the vow of a subject, e.g. of a slave or a son, supposes this +condition, if "the father or master consent," or "does not dissent." +And thus a subject might break his vow without any remorse of +conscience, whenever his superior tells him to. + +But this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual +prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given +"unto edification, not for destruction" (2 Cor. 10:8), and +consequently, just as he cannot command that which is in itself +displeasing to God, namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in +itself pleasing to God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely +speaking man can vow them. But it does belong to a prelate to decide +what is the more virtuous and the more acceptable to God. +Consequently in matters presenting no difficulty, the prelate's +dispensation would not excuse one from sin: for instance, if a +prelate were to dispense a person from a vow to enter the religious +life, without any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his +vow. But if some cause were to appear, giving rise, at least, to +doubt, he could hold to the prelate's decision whether of commutation +or of dispensation. He could not, however, follow his own judgment in +the matter, because he does not stand in the place of God; except +perhaps in the case when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful, +and he is unable to have recourse to the prelate. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of Christ +throughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of +dispensing from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and +inferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those +vows that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in +order that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are the vows +of pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin., de Voto et Voti redempt.), fasting +and the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the +Sovereign Pontiff [*Cap. Ex multa]. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 89 + +OF OATHS (TEN ARTICLES) + +We must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby +something Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament or +the Name of God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament +will be in the Third Part of this work: of the taking of God's Name +we shall treat now. The Name of God is taken by man in three ways. +First, by way oath in order to confirm one's own assertion: secondly, +by way of adjuration as an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of +invocation for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must +first treat of oaths: and under this head there are ten points of +inquiry: + +(1) What is an oath? + +(2) Whether it is lawful? + +(3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath? + +(4) Of what virtue is it an act? + +(5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as +something useful and good? + +(6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature? + +(7) Whether an oath is binding? + +(8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow? + +(9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation? + +(10) Who may lawfully swear, and when? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 1] + +Whether to Swear Is to Call God to Witness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that to swear is not to call God to +witness. Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to +witness, since it is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if +to swear is to call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of +Holy Writ would swear. But this is false. Therefore the antecedent is +false also. + +Obj. 2: Further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling him +to witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him for it is +written (Matt. 5:33): "Thou shall pay [Douay: 'perform'] thy oaths to +the Lord"; and Augustine says [*Serm. clxxx] that to swear (_jurare_) +is "to pay the right (_jus reddere_) of truth to God." Therefore to +swear is not to call God to witness. + +Obj. 3: Further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a +witness, as shown above (QQ. 67, 70). Now sometimes a man, by +swearing, implores the Divine judgment, according to Ps. 7:5, "If I +have rendered to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall +empty before my enemies." Therefore to swear is not to call God to +witness. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (Serm. +clxxx): "When a man says: 'By God,' what else does he mean but that +God is his witness?" + +_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), oaths are taken for +the purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive +confirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known +naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts +regarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore +propositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by +witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such +matters for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth, +for many give way to lying, according to Ps. 16:10, "Their mouth hath +spoken lies [Vulg.: 'proudly']." Secondly, on account of [his] lack +of knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret +thoughts, nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things, +and our everyday life requires that we should have some certitude +about them. Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for +neither can God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God +to witness is named _jurare_ (to swear) because it is established as +though it were a principle of law (_jure_) that what a man asserts +under the invocation of God as His witness should be accepted as +true. Now sometimes God is called to witness when we assert present +or past events, and this is termed a "declaratory oath"; while +sometimes God is called to witness in confirmation of something +future, and this is termed a "promissory oath." But oaths are not +employed in order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as come +under the investigation of reason; for it would seem absurd in a +scientific discussion to wish to prove one's point by an oath. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is one thing to employ a Divine witness already +given, as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and +another to implore God to bear witness, as in an oath. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he +performs what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he +calls upon God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal +knowledge and unerring truth. + +Reply Obj. 3: A person is called to give witness, in order that he +may make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two +ways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or +not. In one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward +inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what +was hitherto secret: in another way by punishing the lying witness, +and then He is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the liar +He makes known his lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple +contestation of God, as when a man says "God is my witness," or, "I +speak before God," or, "By God," which has the same meaning, as +Augustine states [*See argument On the contrary]; the other is by +cursing, and consists in a man binding himself or something of his to +punishment if what is alleged be not true. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Swear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing +forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden +(Matt. 5:34), "But I say to you not to swear at all"; and (James +5:12), "Above all things, my brethren, swear not." Therefore swearing +is unlawful. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful, +because according to Matt. 7:18, "neither can an evil tree bring +forth good fruit." Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written +(Matt. 5:37): "But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that +which is over and above these is of evil." Therefore swearing is +apparently unlawful. + +Obj. 3: Further, to seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt God, +and this is altogether unlawful, according to Deut. 6:16, "Thou shalt +not tempt the Lord thy God." Now he that swears seems to seek a sign +of Divine Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this +must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is +altogether unlawful. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the +Lord thy God . . . and shalt swear by His name." + +_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and +yet becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof +unbecomingly: thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that +receives it "unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself" (1 +Cor. 11:29). Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must +be stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is +proved from its origin and from its end. From its origin, because +swearing owes its introduction to the faith whereby man believes that +God possesses unerring truth and universal knowledge and foresight of +all things: and from its end, since oaths are employed in order to +justify men, and to put an end to controversy (Heb. 6:16). + +Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of +it, that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if +a man calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would +seemingly prove him to have but little reverence for God, since he +would not treat even a good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in +danger of committing perjury, because man easily offends in words, +according to James 3:2, "If any man offend not in word, the same is a +perfect man." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:9): "Let not thy +mouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls." + +Reply Obj. 1: Jerome, commenting on Matt. 5:34, says: "Observe that +our Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and earth. +For it is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of swearing +by the elements." Yet this answer does not suffice, because James +adds, "nor by any other oath." Wherefore we must reply that, as +Augustine states (De Mendacio xv), "when the Apostle employs an oath +in his epistles, he shows how we are to understand the saying, 'I say +to you, not to swear at all'; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear +easily and from swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from +swearing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he +swore only when writing, because thought brings caution and avoids +hasty words." + +Reply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i. 17): +"If you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the +infirmity of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an +evil. Accordingly He did not say: 'That which is over and above is +evil,' but 'is of evil.' For you do no evil; since you make good use +of swearing, by persuading another to a useful purpose: yet it 'comes +of the evil' of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to +swear." + +Reply Obj. 3: He who swears tempts not God, because it is not without +usefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine assistance. +Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be unwilling +to bear witness there and then: for He certainly will bear witness at +some future time, when He "will bring to light the hidden things of +darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of hearts" (1 Cor. +4:5). And this witness will be lacking to none who swears, neither +for nor against him. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 3] + +Whether Three Accompanying Conditions of an Oath Are Suitably +Assigned, Namely, Justice, Judgment, and Truth? + +Objection 1: It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are +unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things +should not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the +other. Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is a +part of justice, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and +judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (Q. 60, A. 1). +Therefore the three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably +assigned. + +Obj. 2: Further, many other things are required for an oath, namely, +devotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all things and +cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath are +insufficiently enumerated. + +Obj. 3: Further, these three are requisite in man's every deed: since +he ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without +judgment, according to 1 Tim. 5:21, "Do nothing without prejudice," +i.e. without previous judgment [*Vulg.: 'Observe these things without +prejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side.']. Therefore +these three should not be associated with an oath any more than with +other human actions. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 4:2): "Thou shalt swear: As +the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice": which +words Jerome expounds, saying: "Observe that an oath must be +accompanied by these conditions, truth, judgment and justice." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), an oath is not good except +for one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for +the good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous, +but for urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires +judgment or discretion on the part of the person who swears. +Secondly, as regards the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be +neither false, nor unlawful, and this requires both truth, so that +one employ an oath in order to confirm what is true, and justice, so +that one confirm what is lawful. A rash oath lacks judgment, a false +oath lacks truth, and a wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice. + +Reply Obj. 1: Judgment does not signify here the execution of +justice, but the judgment of discretion, as stated above. Nor is +truth here to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition +of speech. + +Reply Obj. 2: Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for the +right manner of swearing are implied by judgment: for the other two +regard the things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that +justice regards the reason for swearing. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is great danger in swearing, both on account of +the greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and on +account of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are +confirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an +oath than for other human actions. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 4] + +Whether an Oath Is an Act of Religion, or Latria? + +Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion, or +latria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths +are employed in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle +declares (Heb. 6:16). Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or +latria. + +Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as +Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). But he who swears offers +nothing to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing +is not an act of religion or latria. + +Obj. 3: Further, the end of religion or latria is to show reverence +to God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the +confirmation of some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of +religion. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the +Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt swear by His +name." Now he speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore +swearing is an act of religion. + +_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (A. 1), he +that swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says. Now +nothing is confirmed save by what is more certain and more powerful. +Therefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges +God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth and His +universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to God. For +this reason the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16) that "men swear by one +greater than themselves," and Jerome commenting on Matt. 5:34, says +that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he +swears." The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, 3) that "to swear +is to give very great honor." Now to show reverence to God belongs to +religion or latria. Wherefore it is evident that an oath is an act of +religion or latria. + +Reply Obj. 1: Two things may be observed in an oath. The witness +adduced, and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or that +which makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human. +Accordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former, and +not of the latter. + +Reply Obj. 2: In the very fact that a man takes God as witness by way +of an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains to +the reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God, +namely, reverence and honor. + +Reply Obj. 3: Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of God: +wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man, we +show reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in +God's honor that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since God +also works for His own glory and for our good. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 5] + +Whether Oaths Are Desirable and to Be Used Frequently As Something +Useful and Good? + +Objection 1: It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used +frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of +religion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious +to do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated +above (Q. 88, A. 5). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a +thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are +desirable as being good essentially. + +Obj. 2: Further, Jerome, commenting on Matt. 5:34, says that "he who +swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears." Now +reverence and love of God are desirable as something good +essentially. Therefore swearing is also. + +Obj. 3: Further, swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming or +assuring. But it is a good thing for a man to confirm his assertion. +Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 23:12): "A man that +sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity": and Augustine says (De +Mendacio xv) that "the Lord forbade swearing, in order that for your +own part you might not be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking +occasions of swearing, as though it were a good thing." + +_I answer that,_ Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an +infirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are +desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary: +this is clear in the case of medicine which is required as a remedy +for sickness. Now an oath is required as a remedy to a defect, +namely, some man's lack of belief in another man. Wherefore an oath +is not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable for their +own sake, but among those that are necessary for this life; and such +things are used unduly whenever they are used outside the bounds of +necessity. For this reason Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, +17): "He who understands that swearing is not to be held as a good +thing," i.e. desirable for its own sake, "restrains himself as far as +he can from uttering oaths, unless there be urgent need." + +Reply Obj. 1: There is no parity between a vow and an oath: because +by a vow we direct something to the honor of God, so that for this +very reason a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an +oath reverence for the name of God is taken in confirmation of a +promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason, +become an act of religion, since moral acts take their species from +the end. + +Reply Obj. 2: He who swears does indeed make use of his reverence or +love for the person by whom he swears: he does not, however, direct +his oath to the reverence or love of that person, but to something +else that is necessary for the present life. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet, the +stronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken unduly, so +too an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the +greater the reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, unless it +be employed aright; for, as it is written (Ecclus. 23:13), "if he +make it void," i.e. if he deceive his brother, "his sin shall be upon +him: and if he dissemble it," by swearing falsely, and with +dissimulation, "he offendeth double," (because, to wit, "pretended +equity is a twofold iniquity," as Augustine [*Enarr. in Ps. lxiii, 7] +declares): "and if he swear in vain," i.e. without due cause and +necessity, "he shall not be justified." +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 6] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Swear by Creatures? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear by +creatures. It is written (Matt. 5:34-36): "I say to you not to swear +at all, neither by heaven . . . nor by the earth . . . nor by +Jerusalem . . . nor by thy head": and Jerome, expounding these words, +says: "Observe that the Saviour does not forbid swearing by God, but +by heaven and earth," etc. + +Obj. 2: Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now a +punishment is appointed for one who swears by creatures: for it is +written (22, qu. i, can. Clericum): "If a cleric swears by creatures +he must be very severely rebuked: and if he shall persist in this +vicious habit we wish that he be excommunicated." Therefore it is +unlawful to swear by creatures. + +Obj. 3: Further, an oath is an act of religion, as stated above (A. +4). But religious worship is not due to any creature, according to +Rom. 1:23, 25. Therefore it is not lawful to swear by a creature. + +_On the contrary,_ Joseph swore "by the health of Pharaoh" (Gen. +42:16). Moreover it is customary to swear by the Gospel, by relics, +and by the saints. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), there are two kinds of +oath. One is uttered as a simple contestation or calling God as +witness: and this kind of oath, like faith, is based on God's truth. +Now faith is essentially and chiefly about God Who is the very truth, +and secondarily about creatures in which God's truth is reflected, as +stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). In like manner an oath is chiefly referred +to God Whose testimony is invoked; and secondarily an appeal by oath +is made to certain creatures considered, not in themselves, but as +reflecting the Divine truth. Thus we swear by the Gospel, i.e. by God +Whose truth is made known in the Gospel; and by the saints who +believed this truth and kept it. + +The other way of swearing is by cursing and in this kind of oath a +creature is adduced that the judgment of God may be wrought therein. +Thus a man is wont to swear by his head, or by his son, or by some +other thing that he loves, even as the Apostle swore (2 Cor. 1:23), +saying: "I call God to witness upon my soul." + +As to Joseph's oath by the health of Pharaoh this may be understood +in both ways: either by way of a curse, as though he pledged Pharao's +health to God; or by way of contestation, as though he appealed to +the truth of God's justice which the princes of the earth are +appointed to execute. + +Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord forbade us to swear by creatures so as to give +them the reverence due to God. Hence Jerome adds that "the Jews, +through swearing by the angels and the like, worshipped creatures +with a Divine honor." + +In the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the canons (22, +qu. i, can. Clericum, Obj. 2), for swearing by a creature, for this +savors of the blasphemy of unbelief. Hence in the next chapter, it is +said: "If any one swears by God's hair or head, or otherwise utter +blasphemy against God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be +degraded." + +This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: Religious worship is shown to one whose testimony is +invoked by oath: hence the prohibition (Ex. 23:13): "By the name of +strange gods you shall not swear." But religious worship is not given +to creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned above. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 7] + +Whether an Oath Has a Binding Force? + +Objection 1: It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath +is employed in order to confirm the truth of an assertion. But when a +person makes an assertion about the future his assertion is true, +though it may not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Cor. 1:15, +seqq.) though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1 Cor. +16:5). Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding. + +Obj. 2: Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue (Categ. viii, 22). +Now an oath is an act of virtue, as stated above (A. 4). But it would +sometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle thereto, if one were +to fulfil what one has sworn to do: for instance, if one were to +swear to commit a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action. +Therefore an oath is not always binding. + +Obj. 3: Further, sometimes a man is compelled against his will to +promise something under oath. Now, "such a person is loosed by the +Roman Pontiffs from the bond of his oath" (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. +Verum in ea quaest., etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding. + +Obj. 4: Further, no person can be under two opposite obligations. Yet +sometimes the person who swears and the person to whom he swears have +opposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:33): "Thou shalt perform +thy oaths to the Lord." + +_I answer that,_ An obligation implies something to be done or +omitted; so that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath +(which is about something present or past), nor such oaths as are +about something to be effected by some other cause (as, for example, +if one were to swear that it would rain tomorrow), but only such as +are about things to be done by the person who swears. + +Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the future or the +present, should contain the truth, so too ought the oath which is +about something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a +difference: since, in the oath that is about the past or present, +this obligation affects, not the thing that already has been or is, +but the action of the swearer, in the point of his swearing to what +is or was already true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is +made about something to be done by us, the obligation falls on the +thing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound to make true what he has +sworn, else his oath lacks truth. + +Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power, his oath is +lacking in judgment of discretion: unless perchance what was possible +when he swore become impossible to him through some mishap, as when a +man swore to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from him +by force or theft. For then he would seem to be excused from +fulfilling his oath, although he is bound to do what he can, as, in +fact, we have already stated with regard to the obligation of a vow +(Q. 88, A. 3, ad 2). If, on the other hand, it be something that he +can do, but ought not to, either because it is essentially evil, or +because it is a hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in +justice: wherefore an oath must not be kept when it involves a sin or +a hindrance to good. For in either case "its result is evil" [*Cf. +Bede, Homil. xix, in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.] + +Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is +bound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; provided always +that the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely, +judgment and justice. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is not the same with a simple assertion, and with an +oath wherein God is called to witness: because it suffices for the +truth of an assertion, that a person say what he proposes to do, +since it is already true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the +doer. But an oath should not be employed, save in a matter about +which one is firmly certain: and, consequently, if a man employ an +oath, he is bound, as far as he can, to make true what he has sworn, +through reverence of the Divine witness invoked, unless it leads to +an evil result, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways. First, +because from the very outset it has an evil result, either through +being evil of its very nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit +adultery), or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if a +man were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become a cleric, +or that he would not accept a prelacy, supposing it would be +expedient for him to accept, or in similar cases. For oaths of this +kind are unlawful from the outset: yet with a difference: because if +a man swear to commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and sins in +keeping his oath: whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater +good, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins indeed in swearing +(through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, Who is the inspirer +of good purposes), yet he does not sin in keeping his oath, though he +does much better if he does not keep it. + +Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some new and +unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath of Herod, who swore to +the damsel, who danced before him, that he would give her what she +would ask of him. For this oath could be lawful from the outset, +supposing it to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the +damsel asked what it was right to grant, but the fulfilment of the +oath was unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 50): "Sometimes +it is wrong to fulfil a promise, and to keep an oath; as Herod, who +granted the slaying of John, rather than refuse what he had promised." + +Reply Obj. 3: There is a twofold obligation in the oath which +a man takes under compulsion: one, whereby he is beholden to the +person to whom he promises something; and this obligation is cancelled +by the compulsion, because he that used force deserves that the +promise made to him should not be kept. The other is an obligation +whereby a man is beholden to God, in virtue of which he is bound to +fulfil what he has promised in His name. This obligation is not +removed in the tribunal of conscience, because that man ought rather +to suffer temporal loss, than violate his oath. He can, however, seek +in a court of justice to recover what he has paid, or denounce the +matter to his superior even if he has sworn to the contrary, because +such an oath would lead to evil results since it would be contrary to +public justice. The Roman Pontiffs, in absolving men from oaths of +this kind, did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed +the obligation for some just cause. + +Reply Obj. 4: When the intention of the swearer is not the +same as the intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due +to the swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the +sound understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence +Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 31): "However artful a man may be in +wording his oath, God Who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as +understood by the person to whom it is made." And that this refers to +the deceitful oath is clear from what follows: "He is doubly guilty +who both takes God's name in vain, and tricks his neighbor by guile." +If, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound in accordance with +his own intention. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 7): "The human +ear takes such like words in their natural outward sense, but the +Divine judgment interprets them according to our inward intention." +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 8] + +Whether an Oath Is More Binding Than a Vow? + +Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow. A +vow is a simple promise: whereas an oath includes, besides a promise, +an appeal to God as witness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a +vow. + +Obj. 2: Further, the weaker is wont to be confirmed by the stronger. +Now a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath. Therefore an oath is +stronger than a vow. + +Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow arises from the deliberation +of the mind, a stated above (Q. 88, A. 1); while the obligation of an +oath results from the truth of God Whose testimony is invoked. Since +therefore God's truth is something greater than human deliberation, +it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that of a vow. + +_On the contrary,_ A vow binds one to God while an oath sometimes +binds one to man. Now one is more bound to God than to man. Therefore +a vow is more binding than an oath. + +_I answer that,_ The obligation both of vow and of an oath arises +from something Divine; but in different ways. For the obligation of a +vow arises from the fidelity we owe God, which binds us to fulfil our +promises to Him. On the other hand, the obligation of an oath arises +from the reverence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we +promise in His name. Now every act of infidelity includes an +irreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity of a subject +to his lord would seem to be the greatest irreverence. Hence a vow by +its very nature is more binding than an oath. + +Reply Obj. 1: A vow is not any kind of promise, but a promise made to +God; and to be unfaithful to God is most grievous. + +Reply Obj. 2: An oath is added to a vow not because it is more +stable, but because greater stability results from "two immutable +things" [*Heb. 6:18]. + +Reply Obj. 3: Deliberation of the mind gives a vow its stability, on +the part of the person who takes the vow: but it has a greater cause +of stability on the part of God, to Whom the vow is offered. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 9] + +Whether Anyone Can Dispense from an Oath? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath. +Just as truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the +past or the present, so too is it required for a promissory oath, +which is about the future. Now no one can dispense a man from +swearing to the truth about present or past things. Therefore neither +can anyone dispense a man from making truth that which he has +promised by oath to do in the future. + +Obj. 2: Further, a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the +person to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot +release the other from his oath, since it would be contrary to the +reverence of God. Much less therefore can a dispensation from this +oath be granted by anyone. + +Obj. 3: Further, any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow, +except certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above (Q. +88, A. 12, ad 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits of +dispensation, any bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly +this is to be against the law [*Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem, +seqq.: Cap. Si vero, de Jurejurando]. Therefore it would seem that an +oath does not admit of dispensation. + +_On the contrary,_ A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated +above (A. 8). But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath +does also. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 10), the necessity of a +dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact +that something which is useful and morally good in itself and +considered in general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of +some particular emergency: and such a case comes under neither law +nor vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with +the matter of an oath: for if it be morally evil it is opposed to +justice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to judgment. Therefore +an oath likewise admits of dispensation. + +Reply Obj. 1: A dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission +to do anything against the oath: for this is impossible, since the +keeping of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit +of dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under an oath +no longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath, just +as we have said with regard to vows (Q. 88, A. 10, ad 2). Now the +matter of a declaratory oath, which is about something past or +present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become +unchangeable, wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter +but the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be +directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the +matter of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of +change, so that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful +or hurtful, and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore a +promissory oath admits of dispensation, since such dispensation +regards the matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine +precept about the keeping of oaths. + +Reply Obj. 2: One man may promise something under oath to another in +two ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit: for +instance, if he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from +such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made it: +for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when he +acts towards him according to his will. Secondly, one man promises +another something pertaining to God's honor or to the benefit of +others: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he +will enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. In this case +the person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made +the promise, because it was made principally not to him but to God: +unless perchance it included some condition, for instance, "provided +he give his consent" or some such like condition. + +Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory +oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is a sin, as +when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to +a greater good, as when a man swears not to enter religion: and such +an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former case a man is +bound not to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is lawful for +him to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2). +Sometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong, +useful or harmful, either in itself or under the circumstance. In +this case any bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is +promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of +this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation, +when there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in +which case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of +the Pope, who has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute +relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all +matters regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus +it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his +subjects in matters that come under his authority: for instance, a +father may annul his daughter's oath, and a husband his wife's (Num. +30:6, seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows (Q. 88, AA. 8, 9). +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 10] + +Whether an Oath Is Voided by a Condition of Person or Time? + +Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition +of person or time. An oath, according to the Apostle (Heb. 6:16), is +employed for the purpose of confirmation. Now it is competent to +anyone to confirm his assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would +seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time. + +Obj. 2: Further, to swear by God is more than to swear by the +Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum +falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "If there is a reason +for swearing, it seems a small thing to swear by God, but a great +thing to swear by the Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be +said: Nonsense! the Scriptures were made for God's sake, not God for +the sake of the Scriptures." Now men of all conditions and at all +times are wont to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to +swear by the Gospels. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same effect does not proceed from contrary +causes, since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some are +debarred from swearing on account of some personal defect; children, +for instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons who have +already committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person +ought not to be debarred from swearing either on account of his +dignity, as clerics, or on account of the solemnity of the time. + +Obj. 4: Further, in this world no living man is equal in dignity to +an angel: for it is written (Matt. 11:11) that "he that is the lesser +in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he," namely than John the +Baptist, while yet living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it +is written (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel "swore by Him that liveth for +ever and ever." Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing, +on account of his dignity. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter): +"Let a priest be examined 'by his sacred consecration,' instead of +being put on his oath": and (22, qu. v, can. Nullus): "Let no one in +ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman." + +_I answer that,_ Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is +on the part of God, whose testimony is invoked, and in this respect +we should hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason +children before the age of puberty are debarred from taking oaths +[*Caus. XXII, qu. 5, can. Parvuli], and are not called upon to swear, +because they have not yet attained the perfect use of reason, so as +to be able to take a oath with due reverence. Perjurers also are +debarred from taking an oath, because it is presumed from their +antecedents that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due +to it. For this same reason, in order that oaths might be treated +with due reverence the law says (22, qu. v, can. Honestum): "It is +becoming that he who ventures to swear on holy things should do so +fasting, with all propriety and fear of God." + +The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose +assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man's assertion needs no +confirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates +from a person's dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what +he says, wherefore "it becomes not persons of great dignity to +swear." For this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si quis +presbyter) that "priests should not swear for trifling reasons." +Nevertheless it is lawful for them to swear if there be need for it, +or if great good may result therefrom. Especially is this the case in +spiritual affairs, when moreover it is becoming that they should take +oath on days of solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves +to spiritual matters. Nor should they on such occasions take oaths +temporal matters, except perhaps in cases grave necessity. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some are unable to confirm their own assertions on +account of their own defect: and some there are whose words should be +so certain that they need no confirmation. + +Reply Obj. 2: The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and the more +binding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states (Ad +Public., Ep. xlvii): and accordingly it is a graver matter to swear +by God than the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account +of the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the Gospels might +be taken with deliberation and solemnity, and an oath by God +frivolously and without deliberation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out of +contrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this +way that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great +authority that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others are +of such little authority that their oaths have no standing. + +Reply Obj. 4: The angel's oath is adduced not on account of any +defect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word, +but in order to show that the statement made issues from God's +infallible disposition. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by +Scripture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of His +word, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:17). +_______________________ + +QUESTION 90 + +OF THE TAKING OF GOD'S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION +(In Three Articles) + +We must now consider the taking of God's name by way of adjuration: +under which head there are three points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man? + +(2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons? + +(3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 1] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Adjure a Man? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man. +Origen says (Tract. xxxv super Matth.): "I deem that a man who wishes +to live according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For +if, according to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to +swear, it is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and +consequently it is manifest that the high-priest unlawfully adjured +Jesus by the living God." + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever adjures a man, compels him after a fashion. +But it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore +seemingly it is also unlawful to adjure a man. + +Obj. 3: Further, to adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it +belongs to man's superior to induce him to swear, for the superior +imposes an oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure +their superiors. + +_On the contrary,_ Even when we pray God we implore Him by certain +holy things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful "by the mercy +of God" (Rom. 12:1): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration. +Therefore it is lawful to adjure. + +_I answer that,_ A man who utters a promissory oath, swearing by his +reverence for the Divine name, which he invokes in confirmation of +his promise, binds himself to do what he has undertaken, and so +orders himself unchangeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man +can order himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order others, +by beseeching his superiors, or by commanding his inferiors, as +stated above (Q. 83, A. 1). Accordingly when either of these +orderings is confirmed by something Divine it is an adjuration. Yet +there is this difference between them, that man is master of his own +actions but not of those of others; wherefore he can put himself +under an obligation by invoking the Divine name, whereas he cannot +put others under such an obligation unless they be his subjects, whom +he can compel on the strength of the oath they have taken. + +Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or any holy thing, +intends by this adjuration to put one who is not his subject under an +obligation to do a certain thing, in the same way as he would bind +himself by oath, such an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps +over another a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their +inferiors by this kind of adjuration, if there be need for it. + +If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name +or of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other man without +putting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully +employed in respect of anyone. + +Reply Obj. 1: Origen is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man +intends to put another under an obligation, in the same way as he +would bind himself by oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to +adjure our Lord Jesus Christ [*Matt. 26:63]. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the adjuration which imposes an +obligation. + +Reply Obj. 3: To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to +employ terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a +certain thing. + +Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another; because when we +adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence +for a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of +God Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from God through +His eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Adjure the Demons? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says +(Tract. xxxv, super Matth.): "To adjure the demons is not accordance +with the power given by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice." +Now rather than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the +power given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the +demons. + +Obj. 2: Further, many make use of necromantic incantations when +invoking the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration. +Therefore, if it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make +use of necromantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore +the antecedent is false also. + +Obj. 3: Further, whoever adjures a person, by that very fact +associates himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship +with the demons, according to 1 Cor. 10:20, "I would not that you +should be made partakers with devils." Therefore it is not lawful to +adjure the demons. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Mk. 16:17): "In My name they shall +cast out devils." Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the +sake of God's name is to adjure. Therefore it is lawful to adjure the +demons. + +_I answer that,_ As stated in the preceding article, there are two +ways of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through +reverence of some holy thing: the other by way of compulsion. In the +first way it is not lawful to adjure the demons because such a way +seems to savor of benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to +bear towards the demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, which +is by compulsion, we may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not +for others. For during the course of this life the demons are our +adversaries: and their actions are not subject to our disposal but to +that of God and the holy angels, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. +iii, 4), "the rebel spirit is ruled by the just spirit." Accordingly +we may repulse the demons, as being our enemies, by adjuring them +through the power of God's name, lest they do us harm of soul or +body, in accord with the Divine power given by Christ, as recorded by +Luke 10:19: "Behold, I have given you power to tread upon serpents +and scorpions, and upon all the power of the enemy: and nothing shall +hurt you." + +It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning +something from them, or of obtaining something through them, for this +would amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when +certain holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make use +of the demons' actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we +read of the Blessed James [*the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N.T., Hist. +Certam. Apost. vi, 19] that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to +him, by the instrumentality of the demons. + +Reply Obj. 1: Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not +authoritatively by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly +appeal. + +Reply Obj. 2: Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in order to +obtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as stated +above. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord's words to the +unclean spirit (Mk. 1:25), "Speak no more, and go out of the man," +says: "A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the +demons, however much they speak the truth." + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the adjuration whereby the +demon's help is besought in doing or learning something: for this +savors of fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the +demons by adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 3] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Adjure an Irrational Creature? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature. +An adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak to +one that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore +it is vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature. + +Obj. 2: Further, seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible, +swearing is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an +irrational creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ +adjuration towards one. + +Obj. 3: Further, there are two ways of adjuring, as explained above +(AA. 1, 2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be employed +towards irrational creatures, since they are not masters of their own +actions. The other kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion: and, +seemingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards them, because we +have not the power to command irrational creatures, but only He of +Whom it was said (Matt. 8:27): "For the winds and the sea obey Him." +Therefore in no way, apparently, is it lawful to adjure irrational +creatures. + +_On the contrary,_ Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons +and to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert. [*From the +apocryphal Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19.] + +_I answer that,_ Irrational creatures are directed to their own +actions by some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and +moved is also the action of the director and mover: thus the movement +of the arrow is an operation of the archer. Wherefore the operation +of the irrational creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and +chiefly to God, Who disposes the movements of all things. It is also +ascribed to the devil, who, by God's permission, makes use of +irrational creatures in order to inflict harm on man. + +Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two +kinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational +creature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an +irrational creature. Secondly, so that it be referred to the director +and mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of +this kind may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made to +God, and this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God: +secondly, by way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses +the irrational creature for our harm. This is the kind of adjuration +used in the exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons +is expelled from an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to +adjure the demons by beseeching them to help us. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 91 + +OF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF +PRAISE +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of +invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken +(Q. 83). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there +are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether God should be praised with the lips? + +(2) Whether God should be praised with song? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 91, Art. 1] + +Whether God Should Be Praised with the Lips? + +Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with the +lips. The Philosopher says (Ethic. 1, 12): "The best of men ere +accorded not praise, but something greater." But God transcends the +very best of all things. Therefore God ought to be given, not praise, +but something greater than praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus. +43:33) to be "above all praise." + +Obj. 2: Further, divine praise is part of divine worship, for it is +an act of religion. Now God is worshiped with the mind rather than +with the lips: wherefore our Lord quoted against certain ones the +words of Isa. 29:13, "This people . . . honors [Vulg.: 'glorifies'] +Me with their lips, but their heart is far from Me." Therefore the +praise of God lies in the heart rather than on the lips. + +Obj. 3: Further, men are praised with the lips that they may be +encouraged to do better: since just as being praised makes the wicked +proud, so does it incite the good to better things. Wherefore it is +written (Prov. 27:21): "As silver is tried in the fining-pot . . . so +a man is tried by the mouth of him that praiseth." But God is not +incited to better things by man's words, both because He is +unchangeable, and because He is supremely good, and it is not +possible for Him to grow better. Therefore God should not be praised +with the lips. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 62:6): "My mouth shall praise +Thee with joyful lips." + +_I answer that,_ We use words, in speaking to God, for one reason, +and in speaking to man, for another reason. For when speaking to man +we use words in order to tell him our thoughts which are unknown to +him. Wherefore we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or +others may learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in +consequence we may incite him to yet better things; and that we may +induce others, who hear him praised, to think well of him, to +reverence him, and to imitate him. On the other hand we employ words, +in speaking to God, not indeed to make known our thoughts to Him Who +is the searcher of hearts, but that we may bring ourselves and our +hearers to reverence Him. + +Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His +sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is +aroused towards Him, according to Ps. 49:23: "The sacrifice of praise +shall glorify Me, and there is the way by which I will show him the +salvation of God." And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends in +his affections to God, by so much is he withdrawn from things opposed +to God, according to Isa. 48:9, "For My praise I will bridle thee +lest thou shouldst perish." The praise of the lips is also profitable +to others by inciting their affections towards God, wherefore it is +written (Ps. 33:2): "His praise shall always be in my mouth," and +farther on: "Let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with +me." + +Reply Obj. 1: We may speak of God in two ways. First, with regard to +His essence; and thus, since He is incomprehensible and ineffable, He +is above all praise. In this respect we owe Him reverence and the +honor of latria; wherefore Ps. 64:2 is rendered by Jerome in his +Psalter [*Translated from the Hebrew]: "Praise to Thee is speechless, +O God," as regards the first, and as to the second, "A vow shall be +paid to Thee." Secondly, we may speak of God as to His effects which +are ordained for our good. In this respect we owe Him praise; +wherefore it is written (Isa. 63:7): "I will remember the tender +mercies of the Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things that +the Lord hath bestowed upon us." Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): +"Thou wilt find that all the sacred hymns," i.e. divine praises "of +the sacred writers, are directed respectively to the Blessed +Processions of the Thearchy," i.e. of the Godhead, "showing forth and +praising the names of God." + +Reply Obj. 2: It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if one +praise not with the heart. For the heart speaks God's praises when it +fervently recalls "the glorious things of His works" [*Cf. Ecclus. +17:7, 8]. Yet the outward praise of the lips avails to arouse the +inward fervor of those who praise, and to incite others to praise +God, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: We praise God, not for His benefit, but for ours as +stated. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 91, Art. 2] + +Whether God Should Be Praised with Song? + +Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with song. +For the Apostle says (Col. 3:16): "Teaching and admonishing one +another in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles." Now we should +employ nothing in the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on +the authority of Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising +God, we should employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles. + +Obj. 2: Further, Jerome in his commentary on Eph. 5:19, "Singing and +making melody in your hearts to the Lord," says: "Listen, young men +whose duty it is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung +not with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like +play-actors, ease your throat and jaws with medicaments, and make the +church resound with theatrical measures and airs." Therefore God +should not be praised with song. + +Obj. 3: Further, the praise of God is competent to little and great, +according to Apoc. 14, "Give praise to our God, all ye His servants; +and you that fear Him, little and great." But the great, who are in +the church, ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): +"I hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred altar +must not sing" (Cf. Decret., dist. xcii., cap. In sancta Romana +Ecclesia). Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine praises. + +Obj. 4: Further, in the Old Law God was praised with musical +instruments and human song, according to Ps. 32:2, 3: "Give praise to +the Lord on the harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument +of ten strings. Sing to Him a new canticle." But the Church does not +make use of musical instruments such as harps and psalteries, in the +divine praises, for fear of seeming to imitate the Jews. Therefore in +like manner neither should song be used in the divine praises. + +Obj. 5: Further, the praise of the heart is more important than the +praise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by +singing, both because the attention of the singers is distracted from +the consideration of what they are singing, so long as they give all +their attention to the chant, and because others are less able to +understand the things that are sung than if they were recited without +chant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine praises. + +_On the contrary,_ Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church +of Milan, as Augustine relates (Confess. ix). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the praise of the voice is +necessary in order to arouse man's devotion towards God. Wherefore +whatever is useful in conducing to this result is becomingly adopted +in the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved +in various ways according to various melodies of sound, as the +Philosopher state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De Musica, +prologue). Hence the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary +institution, that the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more +incited to devotion. Wherefore Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): "I am +inclined to approve of the usage of singing in the church, that so by +the delight of the ears the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of +devotion": and he says of himself (Confess. ix, 6): "I wept in Thy +hymns and canticles, touched to the quick by the voices of Thy +sweet-attuned Church." + +Reply Obj. 1: The name of spiritual canticle may be given not only to +those that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that are +sung outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as such like canticles arouse +spiritual devotion. + +Reply Obj. 2: Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but +reproves those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse +devotion, but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence +Augustine says (Confess. x, 33): "When it befalls me to be more moved +by the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have sinned +penally, and then had rather not hear the singer." + +Reply Obj. 3: To arouse men to devotion by teaching and preaching is +a more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons and prelates, +whom it becomes to incite men's minds towards God by means of +preaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing, lest +thereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence Gregory says +(Regist. iv, ep. 44): "It is a most discreditable custom for those +who have been raised to the diaconate to serve as choristers, for it +behooves them to give their whole time to the duty of preaching and +to taking charge of the alms." + +Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Polit. viii, 6), "Teaching +should not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial instrument +such as the harp or anything else of this kind: but only with such +things as make good hearers." For such like musical instruments move +the soul to pleasure rather than create a good disposition within it. +In the Old Testament instruments of this description were employed, +both because the people were more coarse and carnal--so that they +needed to be aroused by such instruments as also by earthly +promises--and because these material instruments were figures of +something else. + +Reply Obj. 5: The soul is distracted from that which is sung by a +chant that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the +singer chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what +he says, both because he lingers more thereon, and because, as +Augustine remarks (Confess. x, 33), "each affection of our spirit, +according to its variety, has its own appropriate measure in the +voice, and singing, by some hidden correspondence wherewith it is +stirred." The same applies to the hearers, for even if some of them +understand not what is sung, yet they understand why it is sung, +namely, for God's glory: and this is enough to arouse their devotion. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 92 + +OF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES) + +In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to +religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in +giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which +are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those +things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the +head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly +we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and +afterwards irreligion and its parts. + +Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion? + +(2) Whether it has several parts or species? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 92, Art. 1] + +Whether Superstition Is a Vice Contrary to Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary +to religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the +other. But religion is included in the definition of superstition: +for the latter is defined as being "immoderate observance of +religion," according to a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have +indeed a show of wisdom in superstition." Therefore superstition is +not a vice contrary to religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): "Cicero [*De Natura Deorum +ii, 28] states that the superstitious were so called because they +spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children +might survive (_superstites_) them." But this may be done even in +accordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is not +a vice opposed to religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But religion +admits of no excess, since, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 5, ad 3), +there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal +of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to +religion. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): "Thou +strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of +superstition hath fallen." Now the worship of one God belongs to +religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5), religion is a moral +virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral +virtue; one by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again, +the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the +circumstance called "how much," but also with regard to other +circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and +magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to +something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less, +and yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to +whom it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as +regards other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1, +2, 3). + +Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess, +not that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but +because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a +manner it ought not. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil +things--thus we speak of a good thief--so too sometimes the names of +the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus +prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Luke +16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] +in their generation than the children of light." It is in this way +that superstition is described as religion. + +Reply Obj. 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For +its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of +signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it +is applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ +sometimes: for "lapis" (a stone) takes its name from hurting the foot +(_laedere pedem_), but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it +hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow +that "superstition" means that from which the word is derived. + +Reply Obj. 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of +absolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of +proportionate quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done +in divine worship that ought not to be done. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 92, Art. 2] + +Whether There Are Various Species of Superstition? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there are not various species of +superstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), "if one +contrary includes many kinds, so does the other." Now religion, to +which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but +all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has +superstition various species. + +Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to +which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are +directed to God, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Therefore +superstition, which is opposed to religion, is not specified +according to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances +of certain human actions. + +Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have . . . a +show of wisdom in superstition," adds: "that is to say in a +hypocritical religion." Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a +species of superstition. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine assigns the various species of +superstition (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above, sins against religion consist in +going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances +(A. 1). For as we have stated (I-II, Q. 72, A. 9), not every +diversity of corrupt circumstances differentiates the species of a +sin, but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse +ends: since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified +specifically, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 2, 6). + +Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on +the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the +divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given, +namely, to the true God, but _in an undue mode,_ and this is the +first species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given, +namely, to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of +superstition, divided into many species in respect of the various +ends of divine worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first +place to give reverence to God, and in this respect the first species +of this genus is _idolatry,_ which unduly gives divine honor to a +creature. The second end of religion is that man may be taught by God +Whom he worships; and to this must be referred _divinatory_ +superstition, which consults the demons through compacts made with +them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship +is a certain direction of human acts according to the precepts of God +the object of that worship: and to this must be referred the +superstition of certain _observances._ + +Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he +says that "anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols +is superstitious," and this refers to the first species. Then he goes +on to say, "or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the +purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens," which refers to +the second species; and a little further on he adds: "To this kind +belong all sorts of amulets and such like," and this refers to the +third species. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from a +cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single +defect." Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated +above (A. 1; Q. 10, A. 5). The saying of the Philosopher is true of +opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity. + +Reply Obj. 2: Divinations and certain observances come under the head +of superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the +demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for +"religion as applied to human observances," as the gloss goes on to +explain. Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than +worship given to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man +were, in the time of grace, to wish to worship God according to the +rite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the +gloss speaks literally. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 93 + +OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) +Of the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true +God; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory +superstition; (4) of the superstition of observances. + +Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the +true God? + +(2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 93, Art. 1] + +Whether There Can Be Anything Pernicious in the Worship of the True +God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious +in the worship of the true God. It is written (Joel 2:32): "Everyone +that shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." Now +whoever worships God calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of +God is conducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just in +any age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just +worshiped God in whatever manner they pleased, without committing +mortal sin: wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special +kind of worship, as related in Genesis 28. Therefore now also no +worship of God is pernicious. + +Obj. 3: Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church. Yet +the Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore +Gregory, replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi, +ep. 64), who stated that there existed in the churches various +customs in the celebration of Mass, wrote: "I wish you to choose +carefully whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God, +whether in the Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in +any part of the Church." Therefore no way of worshiping God is +pernicious. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug.) See Opp. +August. Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted +in a gloss on Gal. 2:14) says that "after the Gospel truth had been +preached the legal observances became deadly," and yet these +observances belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be +something deadly in the divine worship. + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), "a most +pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to +Christian religion." Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that +which is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by +word, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that +the outward worship of religion consists, as shown above (Q. 81, A. +7). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship, +this worship will be pernicious. + +Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the +part of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something +discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law, +the mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious +to make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of +Christ were foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be +pernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In +the second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of +the worshiper, and especially in common worship which is offered by +ministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be +guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of another person, proffer +things that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the +guilt of falsehood who, on the part of the Church, gives worship to +God contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine +authority, and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose +[*Comment. in 1 ad1 Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard] +says: "He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than +Christ delivered it." For this reason, too, a gloss on Col. 2:23 says +that superstition is "the use of human observances under the name of +religion." + +Reply Obj. 1: Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship Him in +spirit and truth, according to John 4:23. Hence a worship that +contains falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God. + +Reply Obj. 2: Before the time of the Law the just were instructed by +an inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and others +followed them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward precepts +about this matter, and it is wicked to disobey them. + +Reply Obj. 3: The various customs of the Church in the divine worship +are in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe them, +and to disregard them is unlawful. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 93, Art. 2] + +Whether There Can Be Any Excess in the Worship of God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship +of God. It is written (Ecclus. 43:32): "Glorify the Lord as much as +ever you can, for He will yet far exceed." Now the divine worship is +directed to the glorification of God. Therefore there can be no +excess in it. + +Obj. 2: Further, outward worship is a profession of inward worship, +"whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope, and charity," as +Augustine says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in +faith, hope, and charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the +worship of God. + +Obj. 3: Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what we +have received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God. +Therefore if we do all that we possibly can for God's honor, there +will be no excess in the divine worship. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) "that +the good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies from +Holy Writ." But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there +can be superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God. + +_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First, +with regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be +excess in the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than +he owes God. Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity +of proportion, through not being proportionate to its end. Now the +end of divine worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit +to Him in mind and body. Consequently, whatever a man may do +conducing to God's glory, and subjecting his mind to God, and his +body, too, by a moderate curbing of the concupiscences, is not +excessive in the divine worship, provided it be in accordance with +the commandments of God and of the Church, and in keeping with the +customs of those among whom he lives. + +On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive +to God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb inordinate +concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the +commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the +general custom--which, according to Augustine [*Ad Casulan. Ep. +xxxvi], "has the force of law"--all this must be reckoned excessive +and superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals, +it has no connection with the internal worship of God. Hence +Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of Luke 17:21, "The +kingdom of God is within you," against the "superstitious," those, to +wit, who pay more attention to externals. + +Reply Obj. 1: The glorification of God implies that what is done is +done for God's glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by +superstition. + +Reply Obj. 2: Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God, so +that there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with +external acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers excess by way of absolute +quantity. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 94 + +OF IDOLATRY +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition? + +(2) Whether it is a sin? + +(3) Whether it is the gravest sin? + +(4) Of the cause of this sin. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 1] + +Whether Idolatry Is Rightly Reckoned a Species of Superstition? + +Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a +species of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are +idolaters. But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above (Q. +11, A. 1). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief and not +of superstition. + +Obj. 2: Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to which +superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally +applied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion. +For just as we speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and +of the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak +univocally of the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry, +and of the worship of the true God, which is the latria of true +religion. Therefore idolatry is not a species of superstition. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of any +genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says (1 +Cor. 8:4): "We know that an idol is nothing in the world," and +further on (1 Cor. 10:19): "What then? Do I say that what is offered +in sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?" +implying an answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols +belongs properly to idolatry. Therefore since idolatry is like to +nothing, it cannot be a species of superstition. + +Obj. 4: Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor to +whom that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just +as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are +reproached (Rom. 1:25) for that they "worshipped and served the +creature rather than the Creator." Therefore this species of +superstition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be +named "worship of creatures." + +_On the contrary,_ It is related (Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited +Silas and Timothy at Athens, "his spirit was stirred within him +seeing the whole city given to idolatry," and further on (Acts 17:22) +he says: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too +superstitious." Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 92, A. 2), it belongs to +superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is +done chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be +given. Now it should be given to the most high uncreated God alone, +as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1) when we were treating of religion. +Therefore it is superstition to give worship to any creature +whatsoever. + +Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by +means of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so +too was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or +shape, which is called an "idol." Yet divine worship was given to +idols in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art, +constructed images which produced certain effects by the power of the +demons: wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained +something God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to +them. This was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum, +ad Asclep.], as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others +gave divine worship not to the images, but to the creatures +represented thereby. The Apostle alludes to both of these (Rom. 1:23, +25). For, as regards the former, he says: "They changed the glory of +the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible +man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping +things," and of the latter he says: "Who worshipped and served the +creature rather than the Creator." + +These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain +men to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those +men: for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again +deemed the whole world to be one god, not by reason of its material +substance, but by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God, +for they held God to be nothing else than a soul governing the world +by movement and reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect +not of his body but of his soul. Hence they thought that divine +worship ought to be given to the whole world and to all its parts, +heaven, air, water, and to all such things: and to these they +referred the names of their gods, as Varro asserted, and Augustine +relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others, namely, the Platonists, +said that there is one supreme god, the cause of all things. After +him they placed certain spiritual substances created by the supreme +god. These they called "gods," on account of their having a share of +the godhead; but we call them "angels." After these they placed the +souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these the demons which they +stated to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these +again they placed human souls, which they believed to be taken up +into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason of the +merit of their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as +Augustine relates (De Civ . . Dei xviii, 14). + +The last two opinions were held to belong to "natural theology" which +the philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in +the schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was +said to belong to "mythical theology" which was wont to be +represented on the stage according to the fancies of poets. The +remaining opinion relating to images was held to belong to "civil +theology," which was celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples [*De +Civ. Dei vi, 5]. + +Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry. +Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): "Anything +invented by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving +Divine worship to a creature or any part of a creature, is +superstitious." + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is not faith, but a confession of +faith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief +by external worship. Such a confession is signified by the term +idolatry, but not by the term heresy, which only means a false +opinion. Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a +species of superstition. + +Reply Obj. 2: The term latria may be taken in two senses. In one +sense it may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God: and +then its signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown, +because, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not +included in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, +whether to true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax +is univocally the same, whether it is paid to the true or to a false +king. In another sense latria denotes the same as religion, and then, +since it is a virtue, it is essential thereto that divine worship be +given to whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied +equivocally to the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as +prudence is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and +to that which is carnal. + +Reply Obj. 3: The saying of the Apostle that "an idol is nothing in +the world" means that those images which were called idols, were not +animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as +though they were composed of spirit and body. In the same sense we +must understand the saying that "what is offered in sacrifice to +idols is not anything," because by being thus sacrificed the +sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles +thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held. + +Reply Obj. 4: It was owing to the general custom among the Gentiles +of worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images that the +term "idolatry" was used to signify any worship of a creature, even +without the use of images. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 2] + +Whether Idolatry Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a +sin that the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true +faith employs images for the divine worship: since both in the +Tabernacle were there images of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25, +and in the Church are images set up which the faithful worship. +Therefore idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But the +angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it +will be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the +like. + +Obj. 3: Further, the most high God should be honored with an inward +worship, according to John 4:24, "God . . . they must adore . . . in +spirit and in truth": and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that "God +is worshipped by faith, hope and charity." Now a man may happen to +worship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith +inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly +without prejudice to the divine worship. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 20:5): "Thou shalt not adore +them," i.e. outwardly, "nor serve them," i.e. inwardly, as a gloss +explains it: and it is a question of graven things and images. +Therefore it is a sin to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly. + +_I answer that,_ There has been a twofold error in this matter. For +some [*The School of Plato] have thought that to offer sacrifices and +other things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the +others aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that +divine honor should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer +to God. But this is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all +superiors, yet the same reverence is not due to them all: and +something special is due to the most high God Who excels all in a +singular manner: and this is the worship of latria. + +Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that "these visible +sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the +most high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices, +namely, the service of a pure mind, should be offered" [*Augustine, +as quoted below]. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei +x, 19), "external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible +words are signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we +utter significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the +things they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize +that we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him +Whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts." + +Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to +idols, not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but +as being in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ. +Dei vi, 10) quotes Seneca as saying: "We shall adore," says he, "in +such a way as to remember that our worship is in accordance with +custom rather than with the reality": and (De Vera Relig. v) +Augustine says that "we must not seek religion from the philosophers, +who accepted the same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave +utterance in the schools to various and contrary opinions about the +nature of their gods, and the sovereign good." This error was +embraced also by certain heretics [*The Helcesaitae], who affirmed +that it is not wrong for one who is seized in time of persecution to +worship idols outwardly so long as he keeps the faith in his heart. + +But this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of +the inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary +of what one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked +falsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the +sentiments of one's heart. Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De +Civ. Dei vi, 10) in that "his worship of idols was so much the more +infamous forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by +him that the people believed him to act honestly." + +Reply Obj. 1: Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old Law, nor +again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of latria +may be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order +that belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be impressed +and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the image of +Christ, to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as we +shall state in the Third Part (Q. 25, A. 3). + +The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what +has been said above. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 3] + +Whether Idolatry Is the Gravest of Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins. +The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior +worship, which consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than +external worship. Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God, +which are opposed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry, +which is opposed to external worship. + +Obj. 2: Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous it +is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by +blaspheming, or denying the faith, than by giving God's worship to +another, which pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial +of the faith are more grievous sins than idolatry. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with greater +evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin against +nature, as stated in Rom. 1:26. Therefore the sin against nature is a +graver sin than idolatry. + +Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): "Neither do we +say that you," viz. the Manichees, "are pagans, or a sect of pagans, +but that you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many +gods: and yet you are much worse than they are, for they worship +things that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you +worship things that exist not at all." Therefore the vice of +heretical depravity is more grievous than idolatry. + +Obj. 5: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9, "How turn you again +to the weak and needy elements?" says: "The observance of the Law, to +which they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship +of idols, to which they had been given before their conversion." +Therefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25, about the +uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: "Every +sin is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry." + +_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways. +First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most +grievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly +commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to +another than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he +disturbs the whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are +committed against God, which indeed are the greater sins, the +greatest of all seems to be for a man to give God's honor to a +creature, since, so far as he is concerned, he sets up another God in +the world, and lessens the divine sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity +of a sin may be considered on the part of the sinner. Thus the sin of +one that sins knowingly is said to be graver than the sin of one that +sins through ignorance: and in this way nothing hinders heretics, if +they knowingly corrupt the faith which they have received, from +sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin through ignorance. +Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on account of greater +contempt on the part of the sinner. + +Reply Obj. 1: Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to this it +adds undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without +internal unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated +above (A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 2: Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch as it +deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the faith +by deeds. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since it is essential to punishment that it be against +the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more +manifest, in order that it may make the man more hateful to himself +and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this +way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. +But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment +of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man abuses the +order of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he may suffer +confusion from the abuse of his own nature. + +Reply Obj. 4: Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy +is more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more +derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in +opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies +about God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their +belief in one God and worship Him alone. + +Reply Obj. 5: The observance of the Law during the time of grace is +not quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but almost +equal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 4] + +Whether the Cause of Idolatry Was on the Part of Man? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the +part of man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or +guilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man's +nature, since rather does man's natural reason dictate that there is +one God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to +inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have its cause in +man on the part of virtue, since "a good tree cannot bring forth evil +fruit," according to Matt. 7:18: nor again could it be on the part of +guilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27, "the worship of abominable +idols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil." Therefore +idolatry has no cause on the part of man. + +Obj. 2: Further, those things which have a cause in man are found +among men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated +[*Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated +either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire, +or by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped. +Among the Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus +was the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael +was the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a +great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the +part of man. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "It was not +possible to learn, for the first time, except from their" (i.e. the +demons') "teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by +what name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic +arts and their professors": and the same observation seems to apply +to idolatry. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 14:14): "By the vanity of men +they," i.e. idols, "came into the world." + +_I answer that,_ Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive +cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on +account of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men +divine honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This +cause is assigned (Wis. 14:15): "A father being afflicted with bitter +grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken +away: and him who then had died as a man he began to worship as a +god." The same passage goes on to say (Wis. 14:21) that "men serving +either their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name +[Vulg.: 'names']," i.e. of the Godhead, "to stones and wood." +Secondly, because man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as +the Philosopher observes (Poet. iv), wherefore as soon as the +uncultured man saw human images skillfully fashioned by the diligence +of the craftsman, he gave them divine worship; hence it is written +(Wis. 13:11-17): "If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree, +proper for his use, in the wood . . . and by the skill of his art +fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man . . . and then +maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his +children, or his marriage." Thirdly, on account of their ignorance of +the true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence +men gave divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their +beauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:1, 2): "All +men . . . neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was +the workman, but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the +swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun +and the moon, to be the gods that rule the world." + +The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part +of the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by +giving answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed +marvelous. Hence it is written (Ps. 95:5): "All the gods of the +Gentiles are devils." + +Reply Obj. 1: The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of +man, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect, +or disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to +guilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end +of all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not +produce at some time, either through leading expressly to that sin by +causing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a +beginning or as an end, in so far as certain sins were employed in +the worship of idols; such as homicides, mutilations, and so forth. +Nevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man +thereto. + +Reply Obj. 2: There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the +recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still +retained in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age +idolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who +triumphed over the devil. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the consummative cause of +idolatry. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 95 + +OF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head +there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether divination is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is a species of superstition? + +(3) Of the species of divination; + +(4) Of divination by means of demons; + +(5) Of divination by the stars; + +(6) Of divination by dreams; + +(7) Of divination by auguries and like observances; + +(8) Of divination by lots. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 1] + +Whether Divination Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination +is derived from something _divine:_ and things that are divine +pertain to holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that +divination is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): "Who dares to +say that learning is an evil?" and again: "I could nowise admit that +intelligence can be an evil." But some arts are divinatory, as the +Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to +pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems +that divination is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because +nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek +to foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore +divination is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10, 11): "Neither let +there be found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic +spirits, or fortune tellers": and it is stated in the Decretals (26, +qu. v, can. Qui divinationes): "Those who seek for divinations shall +be liable to a penance of five years' duration, according to the +fixed grades of penance." + +_I answer that,_ Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The +future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, secondly in +itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce +their effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects +can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their +causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes +produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most +part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future +effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of +conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow +and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians, +concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in +themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the case in the +rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to +the Philosopher [*Metaph. viii, 2, 5, 8]. Such like effects, as also +those which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority +of instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their +causes, because these causes have no determinate inclination to +produce these effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be +foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now man cannot +consider these effects in themselves except when they are present, as +when he sees Socrates running or walking: the consideration of such +things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in +His eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in +the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13; Q. 57, A. 3; Q. 86, A. 4). Hence it is +written (Isa. 41:23): "Show the things that are to come hereafter, +and we shall know that ye are gods." Therefore if anyone presume to +foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever, +except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to +God. It is for this reason that certain men are called divines: +wherefore Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): "They are called divines, as +though they were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the +Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men." + +Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things +that happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the +like can be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows +other contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then +he does not divine, i.e. cause something divine, but rather receives +something divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps +to himself, in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and +this is manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin; +and for this reason Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, seqq. +that "divination is always taken in an evil sense." + +Reply Obj. 1: Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered +share of something divine, but from an undue usurpation thereof, as +stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future +events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not +pertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the +knowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of the +devil's deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8). + +Reply Obj. 3: Man has a natural inclination to know the future by +human means, but not by the undue means of divination. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 2] + +Whether Divination Is a Species of Superstition? + +Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a species of +superstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera. +Now divination is apparently a species of curiosity, according to +Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxviii) [*Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23, +24; De Divin. Daem. 3]. Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species of +superstition. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as religion is due worship, so is superstition +undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to undue +worship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition. + +Obj. 3: Further, superstition is opposed to religion. But in true +religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to +divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition. + +_On the contrary,_ Origen says in his Peri Archon [*The quotation is +from his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers]: "There is an +operation of the demons in the administering of foreknowledge, +comprised, seemingly, under the head of certain arts exercised by +those who have enslaved themselves to the demons, by means of lots, +omens, or the observance of shadows. I doubt not that all these +things are done by the operation of the demons." Now, according to +Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20, 23), "whatever results from +fellowship between demons and men is superstitious." Therefore +divination is a species of superstition. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; QQ. 92, 94), superstition +denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of +God in two ways: in one way, it is something offered to God; as a +sacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it +is something divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to +an oath (Q. 89, A. 4, ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only +idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the +help of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But +all divination results from the demons' operation, either because the +demons are expressly invoked that the future may be made known, or +because the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings of the +future, in order to entangle men's minds with vain conceits. Of this +kind of vanity it is written (Ps. 39:5): "Who hath not regard to +vanities and lying follies." Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the +future, when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be +foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of +superstition. + +Reply Obj. 1: Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to the +end in view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind +of superstition as regards the mode of operation. + +Reply Obj. 2: This kind of divination pertains to the worship of the +demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express with +the demons. + +Reply Obj. 3: In the New Law man's mind is restrained from solicitude +about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no institution +for the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters. On the +other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises, there +were consultations about the future in connection with religious +matters. Hence where it is written (Isa. 8:19): "And when they shall +say to you: Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their +enchantments," it is added by way of answer: "Should not the people +seek of their God, a vision for the living and the dead? [*Vulg.: +'seek of their God, for the living of the dead?']" + +In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit +of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 3] + +Whether We Ought to Distinguish Several Species of Divination? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish several +species of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there +are not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality +of sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering into +compact with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore there +are not several species of divination. + +Obj. 2: Further, a human act takes its species from its end, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6). But all divination is +directed to one end, namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore +all divinations are of one species. + +Obj. 3: Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for whether +one detracts by word, writing or gestures, it is the same species of +sin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the various +signs whence the foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore +there are not several species of divination. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore enumerates various species of divination +(Etym. viii, 9). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), all divinations seek to +acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and +help of a demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his +help, or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell +certain future things unknown to men, but known to him in such +manners as have been explained in the First Part (Q. 57, A. 3). When +demons are expressly invoked, they are wont to foretell the future in +many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to human sight and hearing +by mock apparitions in order to foretell the future: and this species +is called "prestigiation" because man's eyes are blindfolded +(_praestringuntur_). Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is +called "divination by dreams": sometimes they employ apparitions or +utterances of the dead, and this species is called "necromancy," for +as Isidore observes (Etym. viii) in Greek, "_nekron_ means dead, and +_manteia_ divination, because after certain incantations and the +sprinkling of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine and to +answer questions." Sometimes they foretell the future through living +men, as in the case of those who are possessed: this is divination by +"pythons," of whom Isidore says that "pythons are so called from +Pythius Apollo, who was said to be the inventor of divination." +Sometimes they foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which +appear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear in some earthly +body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is called "geomancy," +if in water "hydromancy," if in the air "aeromancy," if in fire +"pyromancy," if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the altars +of demons, "aruspicy." + +The divination which is practiced without express invocation of the +demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain +knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of +certain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the +position and movements of the stars, this belongs to "astrologers," +who are also called "genethliacs," because they take note of the days +on which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of +birds or of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden +movements of limbs, this belongs in general to "augury," which is so +called from the chattering of birds (_avium garritu_), just as +"auspice" is derived from watching birds (_avium inspectione_). These +are chiefly wont to be observed in birds, the former by the ear, the +latter by the eye. If, however, these observations have for their +object men's words uttered unintentionally, which someone twist so as +to apply to the future that he wishes to foreknow, then it is called +an "omen": and as Valerius Maximus [*De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5] +remarks, "the observing of omens has a touch of religion mingled with +it, for it is believed to be founded not on a chance movement, but on +divine providence. It was thus that when the Romans were deliberating +whether they would change their position, a centurion happened to +exclaim at the time: 'Standard-bearer, fix the banner, we had best +stand here': and on hearing these words they took them as an omen, +and abandoned their intention of advancing further." If, however, the +observation regards the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of +figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of +divination: for the divination that is taken from observing the lines +of the hand is called "chiromancy," i.e. divination of the hand +(because _cheir_ is the Greek for hand): while the divination which +is taken from signs appearing in the shoulder-blades of an animal is +called "spatulamancy." + +To this second species of divination, which is without express +invocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced by +observing certain things done seriously by men in the research of the +occult, whether by drawing lots, which is called "geomancy"; or by +observing the shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or +by observing which of several sheets of paper, with or without +writing upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by holding out +several unequal sticks and noting who takes the greater or the +lesser, or by throwing dice, and observing who throws the highest +score; or by observing what catches the eye when one opens a book, +all of which are named "sortilege." + +Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The +first is when the demons are invoked openly, this comes under the +head of "necromancy"; the second is merely an observation of the +disposition or movement of some other being, and this belongs to +"augury"; while the third consists in doing something in order to +discover the occult; and this belongs to "sortilege." Under each of +these many others are contained, as explained above. + +Reply Obj. 1: In all the aforesaid there is the same general, but not +the same special, character of sin: for it is much more grievous to +invoke the demons than to do things that deserve the demons' +interference. + +Reply Obj. 2: Knowledge of the future or of the occult is the +ultimate end whence divination takes its general formality. But the +various species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters, +according as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things. + +Reply Obj. 3: The things observed by diviners are considered by them, +not as signs expressing what they already know, as happens in +detraction, but as principles of knowledge. Now it is evident that +diversity of principles diversifies the species, even in +demonstrative sciences. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 4] + +Whether Divination Practiced by Invoking the Demons Is Unlawful? + +Objection 1: It would seem that divination practiced by invoking the +demons is not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to 1 +Pet. 2:22, "Who did no sin." Yet our Lord asked the demon: "What is +thy name?" and the latter replied: "My name is Legion, for we are +many" (Mk. 5:9). Therefore it seems lawful to question the demons +about the occult. + +Obj. 2: Further, the souls of the saints do not encourage those who +ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter inquired +of the woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue of the +coming war (1 Kings 28:8, sqq.). Therefore the divination that +consists in questioning demons is not unlawful. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth from one who +knows, if it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know +what is hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in +the discovery of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons +is not unlawful. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10, 11): "Neither let there +there be found among you . . . anyone that consulteth soothsayers . . . +nor . . . that consulteth pythonic spirits." + +_I answer that,_ All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for +two reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination, +which is a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of +invoking him. This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written +against certain persons (Isa. 28:15): "You have said: We have entered +into a league with death, and we have made a covenant with hell." And +still more grievous would it be if sacrifice were offered or +reverence paid to the demon invoked. The second reason is gathered +from the result. For the demon who intends man's perdition endeavors, +by his answers, even though he sometimes tells the truth, to accustom +men to believe him, and so to lead him on to something prejudicial to +the salvation of mankind. Hence Athanasius, commenting on the words +of Luke 4:35, "He rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace," says: +"Although the demon confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his +speech, lest together with the truth he should publish his wickedness +and accustom us to care little for such things, however much he may +seem to speak the truth. For it is wicked, while we have the divine +Scriptures, to seek knowledge from the demons." + +Reply Obj. 1: According to Bede's commentary on Luke 8:30, "Our Lord +inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease, which +he tolerated, being made public, the power of the Healer might shine +forth more graciously." Now it is one thing to question a demon who +comes to us of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times for +the good of others, especially when he can be compelled, by the power +of God, to tell the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to +gain from him knowledge of things hidden from us. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (Ad Simplic. ii, 3), "there is +nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man, being +about to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted to +appear to him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some +occult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or +else the spirit of Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest, +but some phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the +devil, and styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the +images of things are wont to be called by the names of those things." + +Reply Obj. 3: No temporal utility can compare with the harm to +spiritual health that results from the research of the unknown by +invoking the demon. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 5] + +Whether Divination by the Stars Is Unlawful? + +Objection 1: It would seem that divination by the stars is not +unlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes: +thus a physician foretells death from the disposition of the disease. +Now the heavenly bodies are the cause of what takes place in the +world, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by +the stars is not unlawful. + +Obj. 2: Further, human science originates from experiments, according +to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Now it has been discovered through +many experiments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby +some future events may be known beforehand. Therefore it would seem +not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination. + +Obj. 3: Further, divination is declared to be unlawful in so far as +it is based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the +stars contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of +God's creatures. Therefore it would seem that this species of +divination is not unlawful. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): "Those +astrologers whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without +scruple; because they seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any +spirit for their divinations which art, however, Christian and true +piety rejects and condemns." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the operation of the +demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false +and vain opinions, in order that man's mind may become entangled in +vanity and falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion +if, by observing the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that +cannot be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider what +things can be foreknown by observing the stars: and it is evident +that those things which happen of necessity can be foreknown by this +means: even so astrologers forecast a future eclipse. + +However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired +by observing the stars there have been various opinions. For some +have stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things +foretold by means of their observation. But this is an unreasonable +statement: since every corporeal sign is either the effect of that +for which it stands (thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused), +or it proceeds from the same cause, so that by signifying the cause, +in consequence it signifies the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a +sign of fair weather, in so far as its cause is the cause of fair +weather). Now it cannot be said that the dispositions and movements +of the heavenly bodies are the effect of future events; nor again can +they be ascribed to some common higher cause of a corporeal nature, +although they are referable to a common higher cause, which is divine +providence. On the contrary the appointment of the movements and +positions of the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on a +different principle from the appointment of the occurrence of future +contingencies, because the former are appointed on a principle of +necessity, so that they always occur in the same way, whereas the +latter are appointed on a principle of contingency, so that the +manner of their occurrence is variable. Consequently it is impossible +to acquire foreknowledge of the future from an observation of the +stars, except in so far as effects can be foreknown from their causes. + +Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In +the first place all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human +affairs or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in _Metaph._ +vi [*Ed. Did. v, 3], an accidental being has no cause, least of all a +natural cause, such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what +occurs accidentally, neither is a _being_ properly speaking, nor is +_one_--for instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or +that a treasure be discovered when a man digs a grave--for these and +like occurrences are not one thing, but are simply several things. +Whereas the operation of nature has always some one thing for its +term, just as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form +of a natural thing. + +In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of +will and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the +intellect or reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and +consequently neither is the will, since it is in the reason, as the +Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 4, 9). Now no body can make an +impression on an incorporeal body. Wherefore it is impossible for +heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the intellect and +will: for this would be to deny the difference between intellect and +sense, with which position Aristotle reproaches (De Anima iii, 3) +those who held that "such is the will of man, as is the day which the +father of men and of gods," i.e. the sun or the heavens, "brings on" +[*Odyssey xviii, 135]. + +Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the +free-will's operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive cause +of an inclination to those operations, in so far as they make an +impression on the human body, and consequently on the sensitive +powers which are acts of bodily organs having an inclination for +human acts. Since, however, the sensitive powers obey reason, as the +Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 11; _Ethic._ i, 13), this does not +impose any necessity on the free-will, and man is able, by his +reason, to act counter to the inclination of the heavenly bodies. + +Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to +foreknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with +certitude future human actions, his conduct is based on a false and +vain opinion; and so the operation of the demon introduces itself +therein, wherefore it will be a superstitious and unlawful +divination. On the other hand if one were to apply the observation of +the stars in order to foreknow those future things that are caused by +heavenly bodies, for instance, drought or rain and so forth, it will +be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination. + +Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident. + +Reply Obj. 2: That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the truth by +observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because a +great number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their +actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the +inclination of the heavenly bodies: while there are few, namely, the +wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The +result is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth, +especially in public occurrences which depend on the multitude. +Secondly, because of the interference of the demons. Hence Augustine +says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17): "When astrologers tell the truth, it must +be allowed that this is due to an instinct that, unknown to man, lies +hidden in his mind. And since this happens through the action of +unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man for they are +permitted to know certain things about temporal affairs." Wherefore +he concludes: "Thus a good Christian should beware of astrologers, +and of all impious diviners, especially of those who tell the truth, +lest his soul become the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of of +partnership with them enmesh itself in their fellowship." + +This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 6] + +Whether Divination by Dreams Is Unlawful? + +Objection 1: It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful. +It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are +instructed by God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15, 16): "By a +dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and +they are sleeping in their beds, then He," God to wit, "openeth the +ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to +learn." Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of divination by +dreams. + +Obj. 2: Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make +use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting +dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of +his chief baker (Gen. 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the +king of Babylon (Dan. 2, 4). Therefore divination by dreams is not +unlawful. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of +men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of +the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams +for the purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10): "Neither let there be +found among you any one that . . . observeth dreams." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 6), divination is +superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion. +Wherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing +the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future +occurrences; for instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious +through what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do +something or avoid something: while sometimes dreams are signs of +future happenings, in so far as they are referable to some common +cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this way the +future is frequently known from dreams. We must, then, consider what +is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future +occurrences, or be cognizant of them. + +Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is +sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams +is twofold: one regards the soul, in so far as those things which +have occupied a man's thoughts and affections while awake recur to +his imagination while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a +cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related +accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any time they concur it +will be by chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards +the body: because the inward disposition of the body leads to the +formation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that +disposition; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold humors +dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this reason +physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to +discover internal dispositions. + +In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and +spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper's imagination is +affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a +heavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper, in +keeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual +cause is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to +men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Num. +12:6, "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to +him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." Sometimes, +however, it is due to the action of the demons that certain images +appear to persons in their sleep, and by this means they, at times, +reveal certain future things to those who have entered into an +unlawful compact with them. + +Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in +making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as +those dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause +inward or outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends. +But it will be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be +caused by a revelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been +made, whether explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose, +or implicit, through the divination extending beyond its possible +limits. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 7] + +Whether Divination by Auguries, Omens, and by Like Observations of +External Things Is Unlawful? + +Objection 1: It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by +like observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were +unlawful holy men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph +that he paid attention to auguries, for it is related (Gen. 44:5) +that Joseph's steward said: "The cup which you have stolen is that in +which my lord drinketh and in which he is wont to divine +(_augurari_)": and he himself afterwards said to his brethren (Gen. +44:15): "Know you not that there is no one like me in the science of +divining?" Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of this kind of +divination. + +Obj. 2: Further, birds naturally know certain things regarding future +occurrences of the seasons, according to Jer. 8:7, "The kite in the +air hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have +observed the time of their coming." Now natural knowledge is +infallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to +make use of the birds' knowledge in order to know the future, and +this is divination by augury. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11:32). +Yet Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and +interpreting of a dream (Judges 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham's +servant, acted in like manner (Gen. 24). Therefore it seems that this +kind of divination is not unlawful. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10): "Neither let there be +found among you anyone . . . that observeth omens." + +_I answer that,_ The movements or cries of birds, and whatever +dispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the +cause of future events: wherefore the future cannot be known +therefrom as from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything +future can be known from them, it will be because the causes from +which they proceed are also the causes of future occurrences or are +cognizant of them. Now the cause of dumb animals' actions is a +certain instinct whereby they are inclined by a natural movement, for +they are not masters of their actions. This instinct may proceed from +a twofold cause. In the first place it may be due to a bodily cause. +For since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive soul, every power +of which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is subject to the +disposition of surrounding bodies, and primarily to that of the +heavenly bodies. Hence nothing prevents some of their actions from +being signs of the future, in so far as they are conformed to the +dispositions of the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to +which certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must +observe two things: first, that such observations must not be applied +to the foreknowledge of future things other than those which can be +foreknown from the movements of heavenly bodies, as stated above (AA. +5, 6): secondly, that they be not applied to other matters than those +which in some way may have reference to these animals (since they +acquire through the heavenly bodies a certain natural knowledge and +instinct about things necessary for their life--such as changes +resulting from rain and wind and so forth). + +In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause, +namely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon +Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and +vomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use of these actions of dumb +animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems +to be true of all such like things; except omens, because human words +which are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the +stars, yet are they ordered according to divine providence and +sometimes according to the action of the demons. + +Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations are +superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set +according to the order of nature or of divine providence. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine [*QQ. in Genes., qu. cxlv], when +Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science of +divining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to +the common opinion about him: in this sense also spoke his steward. + +Reply Obj. 2: The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that birds +have about things concerning them; and in order to know these things +it is not unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus from +the frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will rain soon. + +Reply Obj. 3: Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation of a +dream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for his +instruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel's words, +having previously prayed to God. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 8] + +Whether Divination by Drawing Lots Is Unlawful? + +Objection 1: It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not +unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on Ps. 30:16, "My lots are in +Thy hands," says: "It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of +ascertaining the divine will when a man is in doubt." + +Obj. 2: There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances +which the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men. Now both +in the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the +casting of lots. For it is related (Jos. 7:14, sqq.) that Josue, at +the Lord's command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had +stolen of the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing lots, found that his +son Jonathan had eaten honey (1 Kings 14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when +fleeing from the face of the Lord, was discovered and thrown into the +sea (Jonah 1:7, sqq.): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense +(Luke 1:9): and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the +apostleship (Acts 1:26). Therefore it would seem that divination by +lots is not unlawful. + +Obj. 3: Further, fighting with the fists, or "monomachy," i.e. single +combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which are called +"popular" trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege, because +something unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices seem +to be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single +combat with the Philistine (1 Kings 17:32, sqq.). Therefore it would +seem that divination by lot is not unlawful. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, can. +Sortes): "We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make +up your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have +condemned, is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason +we wish them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be +mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under +pain of anathema." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), sortilege consists, properly +speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one may +come to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one +seeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a +possession, an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or +other, it is called "sortilege of allotment"; if one seeks to know +what ought to be done, it is called "sortilege of consultation"; if +one seeks to know what is going to happen, it is called "sortilege of +divination." Now the actions of man that are required for sortilege +and their results are not subject to the dispositions of the stars. +Wherefore if anyone practicing sortilege is so minded as though the +human acts requisite for sortilege depended for their result on the +dispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and false, and +consequently is not free from the interference of the demons, so that +a divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful. + +Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must +needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual cause. If +we ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in "sortilege +of allotment," it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, +as in the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the +division of something or other, are willing to draw lots for its +division, thus leaving to chance what portion each is to receive. + +If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual +cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read (Ezech. +21:21) that "the king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of +two ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired of the +idols, and consulted entrails": sortilege of this kind is unlawful, +and forbidden by the canons. + +Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Prov. +16:33, "Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the +Lord": sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine +declares [*Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2; cf. Obj.[1]]. + +Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have +recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount +to tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Luke 1:8, +says: "He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men." +Secondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to have recourse to +lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Bede says +(Super Act. Apost. i): "But if anyone, compelled by necessity, thinks +that he ought, after the apostles' example, to consult God by casting +lots, let him take note that the apostles themselves did not do so, +except after calling together the assembly of the brethren and +pouring forth prayer to God." Thirdly, if the Divine oracles be +misapplied to earthly business. Hence Augustine says (ad inquisit. +Januar. ii; Ep. lv): "Those who tell fortunes from the Gospel pages, +though it is to be hoped that they do so rather than have recourse to +consulting the demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that +anyone should wish to apply the Divine oracles to worldly matters and +to the vain things of this life." Fourthly, if anyone resort to the +drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried +out by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says +(Super Act. Apost. i): "Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias +was decided by lot," because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost was +not yet poured forth into the Church: "whereas the same deacons were +ordained not by lot but by the choice of the disciples." It is +different with earthly honors, which are directed to the disposal of +earthly things: in elections of this kind men frequently have +recourse to lots, even as in the distribution of earthly possessions. + +If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the +divine judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed. +Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), "If, at a time of +persecution, the ministers of God do not agree as to which of them is +to remain at his post lest all should flee, and which of them is to +flee, lest all die and the Church be forsaken, should there be no +other means of coming to an agreement, so far as I can see, they must +be chosen by lot." Again he says (De Doctr. Christ. xxviii): "If thou +aboundest in that which it behooves thee to give to him who hath not, +and which cannot be given to two; should two come to you, neither of +whom surpasses the other either in need or in some claim on thee, +thou couldst not act more justly than in choosing by lot to whom thou +shalt give that which thou canst not give to both." + +This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Objections. + +Reply Obj. 3: The trial by hot iron or boiling water is directed to +the investigation of someone's hidden sin, by means of something done +by a man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of lots. But in so +far as a miraculous result is expected from God, it surpasses the +common generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered +unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of the occult, +which is reserved to the divine judgment, and because such like +trials are not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a +decree of Pope Stephen V [*II, qu. v., can. Consuluist i]: "The +sacred canons do not approve of extorting a confession from anyone by +means of the trial by hot iron or boiling water, and no one must +presume, by a superstitious innovation, to practice what is not +sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers. For it is allowable +that public crimes should be judged by our authority, after the +culprit has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have been +approved, with due regard to the fear of God; but hidden and unknown +crimes must be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children +of men." The same would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, +save that it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since +no miraculous effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be +very unequal in strength or skill. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 96 + +OF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head +there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by +the magic art; + +(2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies; + +(3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling; + +(4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 1] + +Whether It Be Unlawful to Practice the Observances of the Magic Art? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to practice the +observances of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two +ways. First, by reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft: +secondly, through being directed to an evil end, as when a person +gives an alms for the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the +magic art are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist +in certain fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are directed to a +good end, namely, the acquisition of science. Therefore it is not +unlawful to practice these observances. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who +abstained, "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book, and +wisdom." Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain +fasts and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its +results through God: and consequently it is not unlawful to practice +it. + +Obj. 3: Further, seemingly, as stated above (A. 1), the reason why it +is wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future is because +they have no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet +the demons know scientific truths: because sciences are about things +necessary and invariable, and such things are subject to human +knowledge, and much more to the knowledge of demons, who are of +keener intellect, as Augustine says [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin. +Daemon. 3, 4]. Therefore it seems to be no sin to practice the magic +art, even though it achieve its result through the demons. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10, 11): "Neither let +there be found among you . . . anyone . . . that seeketh the truth +from the dead": which search relies on the demons' help. Now through +the observances of the magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought +"by means of certain signs agreed upon by compact with the demons" +[*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above Q. 92, A. 2]. +Therefore it is unlawful to practice the notary art. + +_I answer that,_ The magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is +unlawful, because the means it employs for acquiring knowledge have +not in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do +in gazing certain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, and so +forth. Wherefore this art does not make use of these things as +causes, but as signs; not however as signs instituted by God, as are +the sacramental signs. It follows, therefore, that they are empty +signs, and consequently a kind of "agreement or covenant made with +the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens" +[*Ibid.]. Wherefore the magic art is to be absolutely repudiated and +avoided by Christians, even as other arts of vain and noxious +superstition, as Augustine declares (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23). This +art is also useless for the acquisition of science. For since it is +not intended by means of this art to acquire science in a manner +connatural to man, namely, by discovery and instruction, the +consequence is that this effect is expected either from God or from +the demons. Now it is certain that some have received wisdom and +science infused into them by God, as related of Solomon (3 Kings 3 +and 2 Paralip. 1). Moreover, our Lord said to His disciples (Luke +21:15): "I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your +adversaries shall not be able to resist and gainsay." However, this +gift is not granted to all, or in connection with any particular +observance, but according to the will of the Holy Ghost, as stated in +1 Cor. 12:8, "To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of +wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, according to the same +Spirit," and afterwards it is said (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things +one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as He +will." On the other hand it does not belong to the demons to +enlighten the intellect, as stated in the First Part (Q. 109, A. 3). +Now the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom is effected by the +enlightening of the intellect, wherefore never did anyone acquire +knowledge by means of the demons. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei +x, 9): "Porphyry confesses that the intellectual soul is in no way +cleansed by theurgic inventions," i.e. the operations "of the demons, +so as to be fitted to see its God, and discern what is true," such as +are all scientific conclusions. The demons may, however, be able by +speaking to men to express in words certain teachings of the +sciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it +is not good to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that +the magic art tends. + +Reply Obj. 2: The abstinence of these children was not in +accordance with a vain observance of the notary art, but according to +the authority of the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the +meat of Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience they received +knowledge from God, according to Ps. 118:100, "I have had +understanding above the ancients, because I have sought Thy +commandments." + +Reply Obj. 3: To seek knowledge of the future from the demons +is a sin not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also on +account of the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies +to the case in point. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 2] + +Whether Observances Directed to the Alteration of Bodies, As for the +Purpose of Acquiring Health or the Like, Are Unlawful? + +Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the +alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the +like, are lawful. It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of +bodies in order to produce their proper effects. Now in the physical +order things have certain occult forces, the reason of which man is +unable to assign; for instance that the magnet attracts iron, and +many like instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Dei +xxi, 5, 7). Therefore it would seem lawful to employ such like forces +for the alteration of bodies. + +Obj. 2: Further, artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly +bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire +certain occult forces resulting from their species through the +influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g. +images, also acquire from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force +for the production of certain effects. Therefore it is not unlawful +to make use of them and of such like things. + +Obj. 3: Further, the demons too are able to alter bodies in many +ways, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 8, 9). But their power is +from God. Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the +purpose of producing these alterations. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "to +superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and +nostrums condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of +incantations or of certain cyphers which they call characters, or of +any kind of thing worn or fastened on." + +_I answer that,_ In things done for the purpose of producing some +bodily effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that +effect naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since +it is lawful to employ natural causes in order to produce their +proper effects. But, if they seem unable to produce those effects +naturally, it follows that they are employed for the purpose of +producing those effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that +they come under the head of "compact by tokens entered into with the +demons" [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ.; see above Q. 92, A. 2]. +Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "The demons are +allured by means of creatures, which were made, not by them, but by +God. They are enticed by various objects differing according to the +various things in which they delight, not as animals by meat, but as +spirits by signs, such as are to each one's liking, by means of +various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites." + +Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in employing +natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain effects such +as they are thought to have the natural power of producing. But if in +addition there be employed certain characters, words, or any other +vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, it will be +superstitious and unlawful. + +Reply Obj. 2: The natural forces of natural bodies result from their +substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of +heavenly bodies; wherefore through this same influence they acquire +certain active forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial +bodies result from the conception of the craftsman; and since they +are nothing else but composition, order and shape, as stated in +_Phys._ i, 5, they cannot have a natural active force. Consequently, +no force accrues to them from the influence of heavenly bodies, in so +far as they are artificial, but only in respect of their natural +matter. Hence it is false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine +(De Civ. Dei x, 11), that "by herbs, stones, animals, certain +particular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again by certain +movements of the stars observed in the course of the heavens it is +possible for men to fashion on earth forces capable of carrying into +effect the various dispositions of the stars," as though the results +of the magic arts were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly +bodies. In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ. Dei x, 11), "all these +things are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the souls that +are subject to them." + +Wherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy +from the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that it is +requisite to inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce +to any effect naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural +action. Yet astronomical images differ from necromantic images in +this, that the latter include certain explicit invocations and +trickery, wherefore they come under the head of explicit agreements +made with the demons: whereas in the other images there are tacit +agreements by means of tokens in certain shapes or characters. + +Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty, to Whom +the demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever +purpose He will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the +demons, to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the +contrary, it is appointed that he should wage war against the demons. +Hence in no way is it lawful for man to make use of the demons' help +by compacts either tacit or express. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 3] + +Whether Observances Directed to the Purpose of Fortune-telling Are +Unlawful? + +Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the purpose +of fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the +misfortunes that occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by +certain symptoms, which the physician observes. Therefore it seems +not unlawful to observe such like signs. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is unreasonable to deny that which nearly +everybody experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain +times, or places, hearing of certain words meetings of men or +animals, uncanny or ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to +come. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things. + +Obj. 3: Further, human actions and occurrences are disposed by divine +providence in a certain order: and this order seems to require that +precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences: +wherefore, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:6), the things that +happened to the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in +our time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds +from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to +observe these presages. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "a +thousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts +entered into with the demons: for instance, the twitching of a limb; +a stone, a dog, or a boy coming between friends walking together; +kicking the door-post when anyone passes in front of one's house; to +go back to bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on your shoes; +to return home if you trip when going forth; when the rats have +gnawed a hole in your clothes, to fear superstitiously a future evil +rather than to regret the actual damage." + +_I answer that,_ Men attend to all these observances, not as causes +but as signs of future events, good or evil. Nor do they observe them +as signs given by God, since these signs are brought forward, not on +divine authority, but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of +the malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men's minds with +such like trifles. Accordingly it is evident that all these +observances are superstitious and unlawful: they are apparently +remains of idolatry, which authorized the observance of auguries, of +lucky and unlucky days which is allied to divination by the stars, in +respect of which one day is differentiated from another: except that +these observances are devoid of reason and art, wherefore they are +yet more vain and superstitious. + +Reply Obj. 1: The causes of sickness are seated in us, and they +produce certain signs of sickness to come, which physicians lawfully +observe. Wherefore it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future +events as proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a flogging +when he sees his master's anger. Possibly the same might be said if +one were to fear for child lest it take harm from the evil eye, of +which we have spoken in the First Part (Q. 117, A. 3, ad 2). But this +does not apply to this kind of observances. + +Reply Obj. 2: That men have at first experienced a certain degree of +truth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards when a +man begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind, many +things occur in connection with them through the trickery of the +demons, "so that men, through being entangled in these observances, +become yet more curious, and more and more embroiled in the manifold +snares of a pernicious error," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. +ii, 23). + +Reply Obj. 3: Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be born, +not only words but also deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states +(Contra Faust. iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply +those deeds to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all +things, however, that occur through divine providence are ordered so +as to be signs of the future. Hence the argument does not prove. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Unlawful to Wear Divine Words at the Neck? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to wear divine +words at the neck. Divine words are no less efficacious when written +than when uttered. But it is lawful to utter sacred words for the +purpose of producing certain effects; (for instance, in order to heal +the sick), such as the "Our Father" or the "Hail Mary," or in any way +whatever to call on the Lord's name, according to Mk. 16:17, 18, "In +My name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new +tongues, they shall take up serpents." Therefore it seems to be +lawful to wear sacred words at one's neck, as a remedy for sickness +or for any kind of distress. + +Obj. 2: Further, sacred words are no less efficacious on the human +body than on the bodies of serpents and other animals. Now certain +incantations are efficacious in checking serpents, or in healing +certain other animals: wherefore it is written (Ps. 57:5): "Their +madness is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp +that stoppeth her ears, which will not hear the voice of the +charmers, nor of the wizard that charmeth wisely." Therefore it is +lawful to wear sacred words as a remedy for men. + +Obj. 3: Further, God's word is no less holy than the relics of the +saints; wherefore Augustine says (Lib. L. Hom. xxvi) that "God's word +is of no less account than the Body of Christ." Now it is lawful for +one to wear the relics of the saints at one's neck, or to carry them +about one in any way for the purpose of self-protection. Therefore it +is equally lawful to have recourse to the words of Holy Writ, whether +uttered or written, for one's protection. + +Obj. 4: On the other hand, Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii in Matth.) +[*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's +works, and falsely ascribed to him]: "Some wear round their necks a +passage in writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel read in +church and heard by all every day? How then, if it does a man no good +to have the Gospels in his ears, will he find salvation by wearing +them round his neck? Moreover, where is the power of the Gospel? In +the shapes of the letters or in the understanding of the sense? If in +the shapes, you do well to wear them round your neck; if in the +understanding, you will then do better to bear them in your heart +than to wear them round your neck." + +_I answer that,_ In every incantation or wearing of written words, +two points seem to demand caution. The first is the thing said or +written, because if it is connected with invocation of the demons it +is clearly superstitious and unlawful. In like manner it seems that +one should beware lest it contain strange words, for fear that they +conceal something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says [*Cf. the Opus +Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works, falsely +ascribed to him] that "many now after the example of the Pharisees +who enlarged their fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels, +and fasten them to their persons. Such things seem fearsome to those +who do not understand them." Again, one should take care lest it +contain anything false, because in that case also the effect could +not be ascribed to God, Who does not bear witness to a falsehood. + +In the second place, one should beware lest besides the sacred words +it contain something vain, for instance certain written characters, +except the sign of the Cross; or if hope be placed in the manner of +writing or fastening, or in any like vanity, having no connection +with reverence for God, because this would be pronounced +superstitious: otherwise, however, it is lawful. Hence it is written +in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, cap. Non liceat Christianis): "In +blending together medicinal herbs, it is not lawful to make use of +observances or incantations, other than the divine symbol, or the +Lord's Prayer, so as to give honor to none but God the Creator of +all." + +Reply Obj. 1: It is indeed lawful to pronounce divine words, or to +invoke the divine name, if one do so with a mind to honor God alone, +from Whom the result is expected: but it is unlawful if it be done in +connection with any vain observance. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even in the case of incantations of serpents or any +animals whatever, if the mind attend exclusively to the sacred words +and to the divine power, it will not be unlawful. Such like +incantations, however, often include unlawful observances, and rely +on the demons for their result, especially in the case of serpents, +because the serpent was the first instrument employed by the devil in +order to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage quoted says: "Note +that Scripture does not commend everything whence it draws its +comparisons, as in the case of the unjust judge who scarcely heard +the widow's request." + +Reply Obj. 3: The same applies to the wearing of relics, for if they +be worn out of confidence in God, and in the saints whose relics they +are, it will not be unlawful. But if account were taken in this +matter of some vain circumstance (for instance that the casket be +three-cornered, or the like, having no bearing on the reverence due +to God and the saints), it would be superstitious and unlawful. + +Reply Obj. 4: Chrysostom is speaking of the case in which more +attention is paid the written characters than to the understanding of +the words. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 97 + +OF THE TEMPTATION OF GOD +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through +lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that +they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which +pertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things. +Accordingly we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to +irreverence for God; (2) Vices pertaining to irreverence for holy +things. With regard to the first we shall consider the temptation +whereby God is tempted, and perjury, whereby God's name is taken with +irreverence. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) In what the temptation of God consists; + +(2) Whether it is a sin? + +(3) To what virtue it is opposed; + +(4) Of its comparison with other vices. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 1] + +Whether the Temptation of God Consists in Certain Deeds, Wherein the +Expected Result Is Ascribed to the Power of God Alone? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God does not +consist in certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the +power of God alone. Just as God is tempted by man so is man tempted +by God, man, and demons. But when man is tempted the result is not +always expected from his power. Therefore neither is God tempted when +the result is expected from His power alone. + +Obj. 2: Further, all those who work miracles by invoking the divine +name look for an effect due to God's power alone. Therefore, if the +temptation of God consisted in such like deeds, all who work miracles +would tempt God. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to man's perfection that he +should put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence +Ambrose, commenting on Luke 9:3, "Take nothing for your journey," +etc. says: "The Gospel precept points out what is required of him +that announces the kingdom of God, namely, that he should not depend +on worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance from his faith, he +should hold himself to be the more able to provide for himself, the +less he seeks these things." And the Blessed Agatha said: "I have +never treated my body with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus +Christ, Who restores all things by His mere word." [*Office of St. +Agatha, eighth Responsory (Dominican Breviary).] But the temptation +of God does not consist in anything pertaining to perfection. +Therefore the temptation of God does not consist in such like deeds, +wherein the help of God alone is expected. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 36): "Christ +who gave proof of God's power by teaching and reproving openly, yet +not allowing the rage of His enemies to prevail against Him, +nevertheless by fleeing and hiding, instructed human weakness, lest +it should dare to tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that +which it needs to avoid." From this it would seem that the temptation +of God consists in omitting to do what one can in order to escape +from danger, and relying on the assistance of God alone. + +_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, to tempt is to test the person +tempted. Now we put a person to the test by words or by deeds. By +words, that we may find out whether he knows what we ask, or whether +he can and will grant it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe +another's prudence, will or power. Either of these may happen in two +ways. First, openly, as when one declares oneself a tempter: thus +Samson (Judges 14:12) proposed a riddle to the Philistines in order +to tempt them. In the second place it may be done with cunning and by +stealth, as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Matt. 22:15, +sqq. Again this is sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends, +by word or deed, to put some person to the test; and sometimes +implicitly, when, to wit, though he does not intend to test a person, +yet that which he does or says can seemingly have no other purpose +than putting him to a test. + +Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds. +Now we speak with God in words when we pray. Hence a man tempts God +explicitly in his prayers when he asks something of God with the +intention of probing God's knowledge, power or will. He tempts God +explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to +experiment on God's power, good will or wisdom. But He will tempt God +implicitly, if, though he does not intend to make an experiment on +God, yet he asks for or does something which has no other use than to +prove God's power, goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man wishes his +horse to gallop in order to escape from the enemy, this is not giving +the horse a trial: but if he make the horse gallop with out any +useful purpose, it seems to be nothing else than a trial of the +horse's speed; and the same applies to all other things. Accordingly +when a man in his prayers or deeds entrusts himself to the divine +assistance for some urgent or useful motive, this is not to tempt +God: for it is written (2 Paralip 20:12): "As we know not what to do, +we can only turn our eyes to Thee." But if this be done without any +useful or urgent motive, this is to tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a +gloss on Deut. 6:16, "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God," says: +"A man tempts God, if having the means at hand, without reason he +chooses a dangerous course, trying whether he can be delivered by +God." + +Reply Obj. 1: Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds, to +test his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same +deeds. + +Reply Obj. 2: When saints work miracles by their prayers, they are +moved by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which is +an effect of the divine power. + +Reply Obj. 3: The preachers of God's kingdom dispense with temporal +aids, so as to be freer to give their time to the word of God: +wherefore if they depend on God alone, it does not follow that they +tempt God. But if they were to neglect human assistance without any +useful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine +(Contra Faust. xxii, 36) says that "Paul fled, not through ceasing to +believe in God, but lest he should tempt God, were he not to flee +when he had the means of flight." The Blessed Agatha had experience +of God's kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such +sickness as required bodily medicine, or else she felt herself +suddenly cured by God. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is a Sin to Tempt God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God +has not commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is the +same as to tempt, Him: for it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring all +the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house; +and try Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the +flood-gates of heaven." Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt +God. + +Obj. 2: Further, a man is tempted not only in order to test his +knowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will. +Now it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is +written (Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see that the Lord is sweet," and +(Rom. 12:2): "That you may prove what is the good, and the +acceptable, and the perfect will of God." Therefore it is not a sin +to tempt God. + +Obj. 3: Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from sin, +but rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because when the +Lord said: "Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God," he replied: "I will +not ask, and I will not tempt the Lord," and then it was said to him: +"Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are +grievous to my God also?" (Isa. 7:11-13). And we read of Abraham +(Gen. 15:8) that he said to the Lord: "Whereby may I know that I +shall possess it?" namely, the land which God had promised him. Again +Gedeon asked God for a sign of the victory promised to him (Judges +6:36, sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is +not a sin to tempt God. + +_On the contrary,_ It is forbidden in God's Law, for it is written +(Deut. 6:10): "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), to tempt a person is to put +him to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain. +Wherefore all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt, +either in the tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its +qualities), or in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove +it to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it +is a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which pertains to God's +perfection. Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in +order that the tempter himself may know God's power. + +On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the +divine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it +to others: this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of +urgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite +conditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might +be wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in +order, to wit, that Christ's power might be made manifest to +unbelievers. + +Reply Obj. 1: The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law, as +stated above (Q. 87, A. 1). Hence there was a motive of urgency to +pay it, through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive of +usefulness, as stated in the text quoted--"that there may be meat in +God's house": wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The +words that follow, "and try Me," are not to be understood causally, +as though they had to pay tithes in order to try if "God would open +the flood-gates of heaven," but consecutively, because, to wit, if +they paid tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which +God would shower upon them. + +Reply Obj. 2: There is a twofold knowledge of God's goodness or will. +One is speculative and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to +prove whether God's will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other +knowledge of God's will or goodness is effective or experimental and +thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God's sweetness, +and complacency in God's will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (Div. +Nom. ii) that "he learnt divine things through experience of them." +It is in this way that we are told to prove God's will, and to taste +His sweetness. + +Reply Obj. 3: God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him alone, +but for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was reproved +because, by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common +welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both because he +would have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it +was a matter relating to the common good. Abraham asked for a sign +through the divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to +have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to +be excused from sin, as a gloss observes: just as Zachary sinned in +saying to the angel (Luke 1:18): "Whereby shall I know this?" so that +he was punished for his unbelief. + +It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God +for a sign: first in order to test God's power or the truth of His +word, and this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God. +Secondly, in order to be instructed as to what is God's pleasure in +some particular matter; and this nowise comes under the head of +temptation of God. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 3] + +Whether Temptation of God Is Opposed to the Virtue of Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed +to the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a +man doubts God, as stated above (A. 2). Now doubt about God comes +under the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore +temptation of God is opposed to faith rather than to religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 18:23): "Before prayer +prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man," +that is, who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, "prays for what +God taught him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him +to do." Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to hope. +Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope. + +Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 77:18, "And they tempted God in their +hearts," says that "to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully, with +simplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts." Now deceit is +opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is +opposed, not to religion, but to truth. + +_On the contrary,_ According to the gloss quoted above "to tempt God +is to pray to Him inordinately." Now to pray to God becomingly is an +act of religion as stated above (Q. 83, A. 15). Therefore to tempt +God is a sin opposed to religion. + +_I answer that,_ As clearly shown above (Q. 81, A. 5), the end of +religion is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains +directly to irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is +evident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since +no one presumes to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it +is manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 81, A. 7), it belongs to religion +to declare one's faith by certain signs indicative of reverence +towards God. Consequently it belongs to irreligion that, through +doubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence towards +God. To tempt God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of +irreligion. + +Reply Obj. 2: He that prepares not his soul before prayer by +forgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way +disposing himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by +God, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this +implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or +indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and +without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence +towards Him. For it is written (1 Pet. 5:6): "Be you humbled . . . +under the mighty hand of God," and (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study to +present thyself approved unto God." Therefore also this kind of +temptation is a species of irreligion. + +Reply Obj. 3: A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in relation to +God, Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to man. +Wherefore deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and +consequently it does not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed +to the truth. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 4] + +Whether the Temptation of God Is a Graver Sin Than Superstition? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin +than superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment. +Now the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews +than was the sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of +superstition: since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of +their number were slain, as related in Ex. 32:28 [*Septuagint +version. The Vulgate has "twenty-three thousand."], whereas for the +sin of temptation they all without exception perished in the desert, +and entered not into the land of promise, according to Ps. 94:9, +"Your fathers tempted Me," and further on, "so I swore in My wrath +that they should not enter into My rest." Therefore to tempt God is a +graver sin than superstition. + +Obj. 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it +would seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God is a +species, is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition +which bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a +graver sin than superstition. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems to be a greater sin to behave +disrespectfully to one's parents, than to pay others the respect we +owe to our parents. Now God should be honored by us as the Father of +all (Malach. 1:6). Therefore, temptation of God whereby we behave +irreverently to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby +we give to a creature the honor we owe to God. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Deut. 17:2, "When there shall be found +among you," etc. says: "The Law detests error and idolatry above all: +for it is a very great sin to give to a creature the honor that +belongs to the Creator." + +_I answer that,_ Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is +that which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is +less opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine +excellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For +just as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his +error, than if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts more +against the reverence due to God, if by his deeds he professes an +error contrary to the divine excellence, than if he expresses a +doubt. Now the superstitious man professes an error, as shown above +(Q. 94, A. 1, ad 1), whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds +expresses a doubt of the divine excellence, as stated above (A. 2). +Therefore the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting +God. + +Reply Obj. 1: The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above +manner, as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more +severe punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is +written (Ex. 32:34): "And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this +sin also of theirs." + +Reply Obj. 2: Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as regards +the material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as regards +the end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of God, +since it implies greater irreverence for God, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 3: It belongs essentially to the divine excellence that it +is singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine reverence +to another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine +excellence. There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents, +which can without sin be given to others. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 98 + +OF PERJURY +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury? + +(2) Whether perjury is always a sin? + +(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin? + +(4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 1] + +Whether It Is Necessary for Perjury That the Statement Confirmed on +Oath Be False? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that +the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above (Q. 89, A. +3), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less +than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of +truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one +swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears +to something unjust. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the thing +confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty +than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is confirmed by +calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in +swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human +statement which is confirmed on oath. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. +clxxx): "Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are +deceived themselves"; and he gives three examples. The first is: +"Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true, +whereas it is false"; the second is: "Take the instance of another +who knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it +were true"; and the third is: "Take another, who thinks his statement +false, and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true," of +whom he says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a +perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not +necessary for perjury. + +_On the contrary,_ Perjury is defined "a falsehood confirmed by oath" +[*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5]. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 92, A. 2), moral acts take their +species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of +a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed: since +an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this +cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls +the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing, +which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood. +Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, "whichever of these three +be lacking, there is perjury," but in different order. For first and +chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in +the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for +in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very +reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to +do the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking, +since by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the +danger of lapsing into falsehood. + +Reply Obj. 2: In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since +they are in the position of active principle, as stated in _Phys._ +ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than +the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man +swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from +that kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its +end, by swearing what is false. + +Reply Obj. 3: Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the +apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it +will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. +If something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both +materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as +false, it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each +of these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in +some way, on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however, +that which is formal in anything is of greater importance than that +which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is +not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it +false. For Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "It +depends how the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is +not guilty except the mind be guilty." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 2] + +Whether All Perjury Is Sinful? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever +does not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a +perjurer. Yet sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful +(adultery, for instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a +sin. If therefore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it +would follow that he is perplexed. + +Obj. 2: Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes by +committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not +to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore +not all perjury is sinful. + +Obj. 3: Further, he that swears to do another's will would seem to be +guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that +he sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter +order him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore +seemingly not all perjury is sinful. + +Obj. 4: Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a +declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the +obligation of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus +a state may swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other +citizens come on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may +swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new +statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does +not sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. +cxxx), in speaking of perjury: "See how you should detest this +horrible beast and exterminate it from all human business." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 89, A. 1), to swear is to call +God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to +witness to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that +God ignores the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a +falsehood. Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, +to which it belongs to show reverence to God. + +Reply Obj. 1: He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty +of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep his +oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which +he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath. + +Reply Obj. 2: A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to +give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of +judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of +perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is +doing could not be a matter of an oath. + +Reply Obj. 3: When one man swears or promises to do another's will, +there is to be understood this requisite condition--that the thing +commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate. + +Reply Obj. 4: An oath is a personal act, and so when a man becomes a +citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever +the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the +nature of which obligation is that he should take his share of the +state's burdens if he takes a share of its goods. + +The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some +particular "college" is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be +made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all, +past and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of +the statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, +as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 4). +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 3] + +Whether All Perjury Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It +is laid down (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. Verum): "Referring to the +question whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in +order to safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind +than that which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have +had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations of their +oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to +avoid occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to +keep their oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for +this reason to be punished as for a mortal sin." Therefore not all +perjury is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2. Further, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on +St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, "it is a +greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels." Now it is not +always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance, +if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue +in the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it +always a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on +the Gospels. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through +committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem that +infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is +prescribed in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury +[*Cap. Cum dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.]. Therefore, seemingly, not all +perjury is a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is +a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is +written (Lev. 19:12): "Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name." +Therefore it is a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ According to the teaching of the Philosopher +(Poster. i, 2), "that which causes a thing to be such is yet more +so." Now we know that an action which is, by reason of its very +nature, a venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be +done out of contempt of God. Wherefore any action that of its nature, +implies contempt of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very +nature implies contempt of God, since, as stated above (A. 2), the +reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence +towards God. Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of its very +nature, is a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 89, A. 7, ad 3), coercion does not +deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as regards that which +can be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfil an oath which +he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally. +Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a +man from an obligation even of an oath, especially if the latter +should have been coerced into taking the oath through such fear as +may overcome a high-principled man. + +When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished +as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of +mortal sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them. + +Reply Obj. 2: He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless irreverent +to God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not +excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue, +if he adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that he is +swearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as +neither is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not +advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and +consequently is excused from the sin of perjury. + +It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels, +than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of +scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we +consider them equally in comparison with one another, it is more +grievous to commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the +Gospels. + +Reply Obj. 3: Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the +law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath +be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so +declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he +has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy +rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he +still has it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his +oath, which is not the case in a declaratory oath. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 4] + +Whether He Sins Who Demands an Oath of a Perjurer? + +Objection 1: It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer +commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that +he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for +him to demand an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for +his own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should +one enjoin an oath on another person. + +Obj. 2: Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to +impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath +from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then +seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful +to impose an oath on one who swears falsely. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Lev. 5:1): "If anyone sin, and hear +the voice of one swearing falsely [*'Falsely' is not in the Vulgate], +and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to +it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity." Hence it +would seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he +is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an +oath of such a man. + +Obj. 4: On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so is +it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an +oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad +Public. Ep. xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one +who swears falsely. + +_I answer that,_ As regards a person who demands an oath from +another, a distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he +demands the oath on his own account and of his own accord, or he +demands it on account of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If +a man demands an oath on his own account as a private individual, we +must make a distinction, as does Augustine (de Perjuriis. serm. +clxxx): "For if he knows not that the man will swear falsely, and +says to him accordingly: 'Swear to me' in order that he may be +credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human temptation" (because, to +wit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the man will +speak the truth). "This is the evil whereof Our Lord says (Matt. +5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But if he +knows the man to have done so," i.e. the contrary of what he swears +to, "and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the other +destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand of +the slayer." + +If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in +accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a +third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath +of a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly, +because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at +whose instance he demands it. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of one who demands an +oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other +will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the +fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an +oath in order that he may be more certain. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), "though we +are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the +Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others." Hence he +that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own +accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the +passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce +another's perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter +had to be denounced "to those who would do the perjurer good rather +than harm." Again, neither did he state in what order the +denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order +should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden, +especially when it does not tend to another person's injury: because +if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated +above (Q. 33, A. 7; Q. 68, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 4: It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of +good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil. +Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to +swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by +false gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who +swears falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks +the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who +swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). +Hence when a man swears falsely by the true God his oath seems to +lack any good that one may use lawfully. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 99 + +OF SACRILEGE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, +whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall +consider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) What is sacrilege? + +(2) Whether it is a special sin? + +(3) Of the species of sacrilege; + +(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 1] + +Whether Sacrilege Is the Violation of a Sacred Thing? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a +sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can. +Si quis suadente]): "They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about +the sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the +sovereign be worthy of honor." Now this seems to have no connection +with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the +violation of something sacred. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on can. +Constituit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public +offices, "he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege." +Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore +it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred +thing. + +Obj. 3: Further, God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred things +receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot be +violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the +violation of a sacred thing. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a man is said to be +sacrilegious because he selects," i.e. steals, "sacred things." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5; I-II, Q. 101, A. 4), a +thing is called "sacred" through being deputed to the divine worship. +Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed +to a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through +being deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is +due to it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever +pertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and +comes under the head of sacrilege. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common +good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the +rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers +of divine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, "Being ministers of His +kingdom, you have not judged rightly." Hence by an extension of the +term, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as +disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow +it, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness. + +Reply Obj. 2: Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments +of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "But you are washed, but you are +sanctified." Wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:9): "You are a chosen +generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people." +Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance +that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an +irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege. + +Reply Obj. 3: Violation here means any kind of irreverence or +dishonor. Now as "honor is in the person who honors and not in the +one who is honored" (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the +person who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the +object of his irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates +the sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 2] + +Whether Sacrilege Is a Special Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not a special sin. It is +stated (XVII, qu. iv) "They are guilty of sacrilege who through +ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it +by their negligence." But this is done in every sin, because sin is +"a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God," according to +Augustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general +sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of +sin. Now sacrilege is comprised under different kinds of sin, for +instance under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the +violation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place +under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not +a special sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins +as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. v, +11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other +sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as +stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin. + +_On the contrary,_ That which is opposed to a special virtue is a +special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely +religion, to which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. +Therefore sacrilege is a special sin. + +_I answer that,_ Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, +there must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is +derived chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or +subject. Now in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, +namely, the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. +Hence it is a special sin. + +Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De +Fide Orth. iv, 3), "When the purple has been made into a royal robe, +we pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned +to death," as acting against the king: and in the same way if a man +violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the +reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of irreligion. + +Reply Obj. 1: Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the +divine law who assail God's law, as heretics and blasphemers do. +These are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of +sacrilege, through perverting the words of the divine law. + +Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found +in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are +directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of +virtues commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin +a man acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a +sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin +materially. + +Reply Obj. 3: Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins, +through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a +sacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a +sacred place, for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 3] + +Whether the Species of Sacrilege Are Distinguished According to the +Sacred Things? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not +distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does +not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now +there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all +violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of +matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished +thereby. + +Obj. 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to +the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now +murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of +sin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of +sacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege +are distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, and +not according to the various sacred things. + +Obj. 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If, +therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a +sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred +person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the +sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according +to the sacred things. + +_On the contrary,_ Acts and habits are distinguished by their +objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated +above (A. 1). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished +according to the sacred things. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the sin of sacrilege +consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence +is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently +the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the +different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated +irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred +thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege. + +Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those +who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places +and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is +directed to the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place. +For it is written (2 Macc. 5:19): "God did not choose the people for +the place's sake, but the place for the people's sake." Hence +sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that +which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species +there are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of +sacred persons and places. + +In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed +against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the +differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs +to the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the +sacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore +the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest +of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the +vessels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also +sacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons +of the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these +come things connected with the apparel of the Church and its +ministers; and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are +deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any +one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege. + +Reply Obj. 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the +aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a +material, but also a formal difference. + +Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one +species in one respect, and to different species in another respect. +Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, "animal," but +differ in the species "colored thing," if one be white and the other +black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ +specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the same +species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance, +the violation of a nun by blows or by copulation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege +materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The quotation +is from St. Bernard, De Consideration. ii, 13] says that "a trifle on +a priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy." But formally and +properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege +only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a +virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is +to be said of other instances. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 4] + +Whether the Punishment of Sacrilege Should Be Pecuniary? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should +not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted +for a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it +is punished by capital sentence according to civil law [*Dig. xlviii, +13; Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.]. Therefore sacrilege should not +be awarded a pecuniary punishment. + +Obj. 2: Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment, +according to Nahum 1:9, "There shall not rise a double affliction." +But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major +excommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or +destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges. +Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:5): "Neither have we +taken an occasion of covetousness." But it seems to involve an +occasion of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be +exacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not +seem to be a fitting punishment of sacrilege. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written [*XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis +contumax]: "If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force +an escaped slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine +hundred soldi": and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis +inventus, can. 21): "Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay +thirty pounds of tried purest silver." + +_I answer that,_ In the award of punishments two points must be +considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just, +and that "by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be +tormented" (Wis. 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of +one guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred +thing, is excommunication [*Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis +contumax, quoted above] whereby sacred things are withheld from him. +The second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are +inflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist +from sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences +not sacred things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by +sacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them. +Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced to capital +punishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does +not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is +inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from sacrilege, at least +by temporal punishments. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but +excommunication in its stead. + +Reply Obj. 2: When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man +from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was +necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to +the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who +despise spiritual things. + +Reply Obj. 3: If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this +would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is +exacted for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest +utility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 100 + +ON SIMONY +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of +inquiry: + +(1) What is simony? + +(2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments? + +(3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions? + +(4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals? + +(5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or +also oral remuneration or remuneration by service? + +(6) Of the punishment of simony. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 1] + +Whether Simony Is an Intentional Will to Buy or Sell Something +Spiritual or Connected with a Spiritual Thing? + +Objection 1: It would seem that simony is not "an express will to buy +or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing." +Simony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Eos qui per +pecunias]): "The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with +him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who +are guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained +that the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of +God, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own +slave. For every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether +it be his slave or any other of his possessions." But unbelief, like +faith, is an act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above +(Q. 10, A. 2). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of +the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and +this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is an +intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin +against the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 3: Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of +heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory +says in a homily (v, in Ev.): "The kingdom of heaven is worth as much +as you possess." Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy +something spiritual. + +Obj. 4: Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of +whom we read (Acts 8:18, 19) that "he offered the apostles money" +that he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, "that on +whomsoever he imposed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost." +But we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony +is not the will to sell a spiritual thing. + +Obj. 5: Further, there are many other voluntary commutations besides +buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction [*A kind of +legal compromise--Oxford Dictionary]. Therefore it would seem that +simony is defined insufficiently. + +Obj. 6: Further, anything connected with spiritual things is itself +spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add "or connected with +spiritual things." + +Obj. 7: Further, according to some, the Pope cannot commit simony: +yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not +the will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a +spiritual thing. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory VII says (Regist. [*Caus. I, qu. i, can. +Presbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare]): "None of the faithful is ignorant +that buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the +heresy of simony." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2) an act is evil +generically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is +undue matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because +a spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as +it is said concerning wisdom (Prov. 3:15), "she is more precious than +all riches, and all things that are desired, are not to be compared +with her": and for this reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of +Simon in its very source, said (Acts 8:20): "Keep thy money to +thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift +of God may be purchased with money." + +Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor +is not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted (Obj. +1). Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of +spiritual things, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of +us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers +of God." + +Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things, +since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore Our Lord +said (Matt. 10:8): "Freely have you received, freely give." + +Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God +and divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of +irreligion. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of +faith, without, sometimes, faith being in one's heart, so too the +vices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief +without, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is +said to be a "heresy," as regards the outward protestation, since by +selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares, in a way, that he is +the owner of a spiritual gift; and this is heretical. It must, +however, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles +to sell him a grace of the Holy Ghost for money, said that the world +was not created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore states +(Etym. viii, 5): and so for this reason simoniacs are reckoned with +other heretics, as appears from Augustine's book on heretics. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 58, A. 4), justice, with all its +parts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its +subject. Hence simony is fittingly defined from its relation to the +will. This act is furthermore described as "express," in order to +signify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part +in virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Ghost that +sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin through contempt of +those things whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from sin, as stated +above (Q. 14, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man +gives what he has for God's sake. But this is to employ the term +"buying" in a wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it +reach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither +"the sufferings of this time," nor any gift or deed of ours, "are +worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed +in us" (Rom. 8:18), and because merit consists chiefly, not in an +outward gift, action or passion, but in an inward affection. + +Reply Obj. 4: Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in +order that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I, qu. iii +[*Can. Salvator]), that "Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of +the Holy Ghost, in order that he might make money by selling the +signs to be wrought by him." Hence those who sell spiritual things +are likened in intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish +to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate, +in act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read (4 Kings +5:20-24) that he received money from the leper who was healed: +wherefore the sellers of spiritual things may be called not only +"simoniacs" but also "giezites." + +Reply Obj. 5: The terms "buying" and "selling" cover all kinds of +non-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the exchange +or agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by +authority of the parties concerned without danger of committing +simony, as laid down by law [*Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.; +cap. Super, de Transact.]. Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of +his office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or +necessary reasons. + +Reply Obj. 6: Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives +through being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are +spiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while +others are called spiritual, through adhering to those others. Hence +(I, qu. iii, cap. Siquis objecerit) it is stated that "spiritual +things do not progress without corporal things, even as the soul has +no bodily life without the body." + +Reply Obj. 7: The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony, like any +other man, since the higher a man's position the more grievous is his +sin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as +dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore, +were he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for +a spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of +simony. In like manner he might commit simony by accepting from a +layman moneys not belonging to the goods of the Church. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Always Unlawful to Give Money for the Sacraments? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give +money for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as +we shall state in the Third Part (Q. 68, A. 6; Q. 73, A. 3). But +seemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for Baptism, +for instance if a priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child +without being paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or +sell the sacraments. + +Obj. 2: Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist, +which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend +or money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy +or sell the other sacraments. + +Obj. 3: Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament +consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money +when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always +unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament. + +Obj. 4: Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be +not sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that "it was +no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom." Now it +is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration of +bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange +for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that +it is not unlawful. + +Obj. 5: Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously +hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But +it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is +lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a +like ecclesiastical dignity. + +Obj. 6: Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is +given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]): +"Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from +the priesthood." + +_I answer that,_ The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most +spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on +which no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with +a non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the +ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support, +according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), "Know you not, +that they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the +holy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar?" + +Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual +grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be +excused by any custom whatever, since "custom does not prevail over +natural or divine law" [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; cf. I-II, Q. +97, A. 3]. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a +pecuniary value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the +other hand, to receive anything for the support of those who +administer the sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the +Church and approved customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it +is received not as a price of goods, but as a payment for their need. +Hence a gloss of Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the priests that rule +well," says: "They should look to the people for a supply to their +need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry." + +Reply Obj. 1: In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And since +nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize +without being paid, one must act as though there were no priest +available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the +child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be +baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water +from the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it +were an adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the +priest were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if +possible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have +recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and +should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism +of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament. + +Reply Obj. 2: The priest receives money, not as the price for +consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would +be simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The money exacted of the person absolved is not the +price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a +punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated. + +Reply Obj. 4: As stated above, "custom does not prevail over natural +or divine law" whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if +such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual +thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly +simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling +to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend recognized +by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no intention of +buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary, and +especially if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all these +cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of +simony or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess. +5:22), "From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves." + +Reply Obj. 5: It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition of +one's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any +dignity or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since +this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing. +But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust +opposition, after one has already acquired that right. + +Reply Obj. 6: Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia] +say that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no grace is +conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state +in the Third Part of the work [* Supp., Q. 42, A. 3]. Wherefore we +must reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, but +also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give money for +Matrimony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if it be +considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the law +[*Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand +anything for the Nuptial Blessing. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 3] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Give and Receive Money for Spiritual Actions? + +Objection 1: It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for +spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But +something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears +from 1 Kings 9:7, 8, and 3 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that +it is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action. + +Obj. 2: Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most spiritual +actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain the +assistance of their prayers, according to Luke 16:9, "Make unto you +friends of the mammon of iniquity." To preachers also, who sow +spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1 +Cor. 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the +divine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions: +and sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is +lawful to receive something for spiritual actions. + +Obj. 3: Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is +lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may +sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a +master the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it +would seem lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of +his spiritual power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and +so forth. + +Obj. 4: Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now +in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are +received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for +spiritual things. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can. Quidquid +invisibilis]): "It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what +is acquired by the consolation of invisible grace, whether by +demanding a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever." Now all +these spiritual things are acquired through an invisible grace. +Therefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return for them. + +_I answer that,_ Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because +they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are +called spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose +thereto. And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of +men, according to 1 Cor. 9:7, "Who serveth as a soldier at any time +at his own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk +of the flock?" Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is +spiritual in such like actions; but to receive or give something for +the support of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with +the statutes of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in +such wise that there be no intention of buying or selling, and that +no pressure be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by +withholding spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then +there would be an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual +things have been freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary +offerings and other dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling +but able to pay, if the superior authorize this to be done. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, certain +gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their livelihood, +but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked +prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from +them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent of +buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the +poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity. +Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not +as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 5:11, +"Let the priests that rule well," says: "Their need allows them to +receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this should be +given to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood +the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they +sell a great thing for a contemptible price." In like manner temporal +things are given to those who praise God by celebrating the divine +office whether for the living or for the dead, not as a price but as +a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled when alms +are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal +to do such things by contract, or with the intention of buying or +selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were decreed +in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral unless +a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance would +preclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The +ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed +that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms, +because this would not preclude its being granted to others. +Moreover, the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, +whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration. + +Reply Obj. 3: A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is +bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him +in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory +payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood. +Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his +spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor (which +he is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has +accepted), but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this +reason it is unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing +whatever, or for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for +correcting his subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the +other hand it is lawful for him to receive "procurations," when he +visits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them, but as a +means of livelihood. He that is possessed of science, without having +taken upon himself the obligation of using it for the benefit of +others can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since +this is not a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on +the other hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would +amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would sin +grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches are appointed +to instruct the clerics of that church and other poor persons, and +are in receipt of an ecclesiastical benefice for so doing, are not +allowed to receive anything in return, either for teaching, or for +celebrating or omitting any feasts. + +Reply Obj. 4: It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price +for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries, that +are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance +to the monastery is free, to accept something for the support of +those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its +revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier +in admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for +that monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other +hand, it is lawful to incite a person's regard for a monastery by +means of temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced +to enter the monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or +receive something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam +pio). +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Receive Money for Things Annexed to Spiritual +Things? + +Objection 1: It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed +to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to +spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the +sake of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what +is annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything +temporal, and this is clearly false. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual +things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a chalice +for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28). +Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things. + +Obj. 3: Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right of +burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right +of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised +the priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham +bought from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gen. 23:8, +sqq.), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gen. +25:31, sqq.). Again the right of patronage is transferred with the +property sold, and is granted "in fee." Tithes are granted to certain +soldiers, and can be redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for +themselves the revenues of prebends of which they have the +presentation, although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual +thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual +things. + +_On the contrary,_ Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii, +cap. Si quis objecerit): "Whoever sells one of two such things, that +the one is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold. +Wherefore let no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything +ecclesiastical." + +_I answer that,_ A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two +ways. First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have +ecclesiastical benefices is said to be annexed to spiritual things, +because it is not competent save to those who hold a clerical office. +Hence such things can by no means exist apart from spiritual things. +Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such things, because +the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual. Other things +are annexed to spiritual things through being directed thereto, for +instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the +presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred +vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore +such things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede +them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not +as annexed to spiritual things. + +Reply Obj. 1: All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things, as +to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but +their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful +sale. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual things as +to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their +material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the poor +provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over them, +since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sacred +vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to be made out +of the same material they would have to be consecrated again. + +Reply Obj. 3: We have no authority for supposing that the double cave +which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that +purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used +for burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be +lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even +a church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places +are looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price +as payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham +did not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary +plot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell +or buy land on which there has previously been a church, as we have +also said with regard to sacred vessels (Reply Obj. 2). Or again, +Abraham is to be excused because he thus freed himself of a +grievance. For although Ephron offered him the burial place for +nothing, Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without +prejudice to himself. + +The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God's +choice, according to Malach. 1:2, 3, "I have loved Jacob, but have +hated Esau." Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet +Jacob sinned not in buying, because he is understood to have freed +himself of his grievance. + +The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can +it be granted "in fee," but is transferred with the property sold or +granted. + +The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk, +but merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of +tithe, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 3). + +With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be +observed, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a +person to a benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of +the revenues of the benefice in question, and to spend it on some +pious object. But, on the other hand, if he were to require part of +the revenues of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, +it would be the same as though he demanded payment from him, and he +would not escape the guilt of simony. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 5] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Grant Spiritual Things in Return for an +Equivalent of Service, or for an Oral Remuneration? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual +things in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral +remuneration. Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): "It is right that +those who serve the interests of the Church should be rewarded." Now +an equivalent of service denotes serving the interests of the Church. +Therefore it seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for +services received. + +Obj. 2: Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service +received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so +on account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal +since it implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the +former simoniacal. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is done only at another's request would +seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve +simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration +denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person's +request. Therefore this is not simoniacal. + +Obj. 4: Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that +they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral +remuneration: and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony. +Therefore oral remuneration does not entail simony. + +_On the contrary,_ Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says: +"Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the +purpose for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in +consideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service +rendered or money received, is guilty of simony." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the term "money" denotes +"anything that can have a pecuniary value." Now it is evident that a +man's service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a +pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage. +Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be +rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or +promised, at which that service could be valued. Likewise, to grant a +person's request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to +some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just +as a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any +external thing which comes under the head of "real remuneration," so +too does he contract it, by receiving "oral remuneration" or an +"equivalent in service rendered." + +Reply Obj. 1: If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service, +directed to spiritual things (e.g. to the good of the Church, or +benefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical +benefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the +service, as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is +not a case of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has +in mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things +(e.g. a service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his +kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a +case of remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony. + +Reply Obj. 2: The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by +reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal, +but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it +does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which simony is +based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice with the +understanding or intention that he provide for one's kindred from the +revenue is manifest simony. + +Reply Obj. 3: Oral remuneration denotes either praise that +pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby +man's favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend +this chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an +unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention +wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made +for a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is +based on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is +granted to the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there +may be simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of +the person, but to human favor. If, however, a person asks for +himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption +renders him unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy +person. But, if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an +ecclesiastical benefice without the cure of souls. + +Reply Obj. 4: A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for +the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false +pretenses stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that +seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 6] + +Whether Those Who Are Guilty of Simony Are Fittingly Punished by +Being Deprived of What They Have Acquired by Simony? + +Objection 1: It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are +not fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired +by simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in +return for a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be +lost when once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by +a consecration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person +to be deprived of what he has acquired simoniacally. + +Obj. 2: Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained the +episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders from +him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church +tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the +power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, +if he has acquired it by simony. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one should be punished for what was done without +his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which is +voluntary, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2; Q. 77, A. 7). +Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual, +which others have procured for him without his knowledge and consent. +Therefore he should not be punished by being deprived of what has +been bestowed on him. + +Obj. 4: Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a +person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to +restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit +of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate +and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that +which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored. + +Obj. 5: Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery +by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But no one +should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he +has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the monastic +state which he has acquired by simony. + +Obj. 6: Further, in this world external punishment is not inflicted +for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is the +judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will, +wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above (A. +1, ad 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what he +has acquired by simony. + +Obj. 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less than +to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those +who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater +dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they +have received. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus): +"He that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination +or promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit +the dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money." + +_I answer that,_ No one can lawfully retain that which he has +acquired against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to +give some of his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will +and orders, the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. +Now Our Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of +churches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis, according to +Matt. 10:8, "Freely have you received, freely give." Wherefore +whosoever acquires spiritual things in return for a remuneration +cannot lawfully retain them. Moreover, those who are guilty of +simony, by either selling or buying spiritual things, as well as +those who act as go-between, are sentenced to other punishments, +namely, infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and +excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap. Si quis +Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas]. + +Reply Obj. 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally, +receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the +sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the +Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were, +and against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, +by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should +not busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others, +namely, that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his +Order, whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the +money which he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains +it. + +Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders +simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a +benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal +transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of +the law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in +secret he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself +alone, and not as regards others. + +Reply Obj. 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one knows +to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his command +or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders from +him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they are +ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a +dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive +Orders in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be +guilty of simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order +without a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, +because no one should obey a man to the extent of communicating with +him in an unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law, +suspended as regards both himself and others, confers Orders +unlawfully: wherefore no one should communicate with him, by +receiving Orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be +not certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to another's +sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to receive Orders from +him. And if the bishop has been guilty of simony otherwise than by a +simoniacal promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive +Orders from him because he is not suspended as regards others, but +only as regards himself, as stated above (ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not only the +punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of acquiring +unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it. +Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Orders or +an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he deprived of +what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his order, and +resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom, but also in +addition to this he is punished by being marked with infamy. +Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually +acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful +possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits, +allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits), +excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the +Church. + +On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by +others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise +of his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together +with fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits +which he has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. +Exception must be made in the case when his promotion has been +deceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes +the transaction, for then he is not bound to resign, unless +subsequently he agree to the transaction, by paying what was promised. + +Reply Obj. 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received, must +be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their transfer, +notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter +of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers +by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the +guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire +chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of +superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church. + +Reply Obj. 5: If there are any persons who have been simoniacally +admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the simony was +committed with their knowledge since the holding of the General +Council [*Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent III], +they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of return, +and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some house of +the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however, this +took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses of +the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into +monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they +wander about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former +rank, and must be assigned a lower place. + +On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their +knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting +they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated. + +Reply Obj. 6: In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty of +simony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is +not punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound +to repent of his evil intention. + +Reply Obj. 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one who has +knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases the +bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all +renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive +either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the +laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to +retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater +dispensation, allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor +orders; or a full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the +major orders in the same Church, but not to accept a prelacy. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 101 + +OF PIETY +(In Four Articles) + +After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which +will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of +inquiry arise with regard to piety: + +(1) To whom does piety extend? + +(2) What does piety make one offer a person? + +(3) Whether piety is a special virtue? + +(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of +religion? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 1] + +Whether Piety Extends to Particular Human Individuals? + +Objection 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human +individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes, +properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by +the term _eusebeia_. But the worship of God does not denote relation +to man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely +to certain human individuals. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): "Piety, on her day, +provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the +heart with works of mercy." Now the works of mercy are to be done to +all, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety +does not extend definitely to certain special persons. + +Obj. 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual +relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the +Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11, 12), and on each of them is +founded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of +piety, according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance +indeed of piety [Douay: 'godliness']." Therefore piety extends not +only to one's kindred and fellow-citizens. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by +piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our +country and render them faithful service." + +_I answer that,_ Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, +according to their various excellence and the various benefits +received from them. On both counts God holds first place, for He is +supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and +government. In the second place, the principles of our being and +government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth +and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents +and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion +to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second +place, to give worship to one's parents and one's country. + +The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our +kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same +parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship +given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and +to all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to +these. + +Reply Obj. 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the worship +due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a particular. +Hence it is written (Malach. 1:6): "If I be a father, where is My +honor?" Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine +worship. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "the term piety is +often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language of the +common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact that +God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him +than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word +'pious' to God Himself." + +Reply Obj. 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and +fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being +than other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to +them. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 2] + +Whether Piety Provides Support for Our Parents? + +Objection 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our +parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, "Honor thy +father and mother," belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the +giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide +support for one's parents. + +Obj. 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound +to support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), "neither +ought the children to lay up for the parents." Therefore piety does +not oblige them to support their parents. + +Obj. 3: Further, piety extends not only to one's parents, but also to +other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above (A. 1). +But one is not bound to support all one's kindred and +fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one's +parents. + +_On the contrary,_ our Lord (Matt. 15:3-6) reproved the Pharisees for +hindering children from supporting their parents. + +_I answer that,_ We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is +to say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially +that which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's +superior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes +him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, +which it befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to +him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children +should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting +that they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of +which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says (De +Invent. Rhet. ii) that "piety gives both duty and homage": "duty" +referring to service, and "homage" to reverence or honor, because, as +Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "we are said to give homage to those +whose memory or presence we honor." + +Reply Obj. 1: According to our Lord's interpretation (Matt. 15:3-6) +the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them; +and the reason for this is that support is given to one's father +because it is due to him as to one greater. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and +his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is +essentially fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently +he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life, +and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow +something on his father is accidental, arising from some momentary +necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as +for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the +successors of their children, but children of their parents. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), "we offer homage +and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country"; +not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to +others according to our means and their personal claims. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 3] + +Whether Piety Is a Special Virtue Distinct from Other Virtues? + +Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct +from other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone +proceeds from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a +distinct virtue from charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God. But +piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei +x). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and duty, +seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common +good. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1, 2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as +a part of justice. + +_I answer that,_ A special virtue is one that regards an object under +a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in +rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect +of something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing +is indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural +principle of being and government. And piety regards this principle, +inasmuch as it pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and +to those who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope and +charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety is +a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and country. + +Reply Obj. 2: God is the principle of our being and government in a +far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence +religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from +piety, which pays homage to our parents and country. But things +relating to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of +excellence and causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore, +by way of excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as +God, by way of excellence, is called "Our Father." + +Reply Obj. 3: Piety extends to our country in so far as the latter is +for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the good of +our country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal justice +has more of the character of a general virtue than piety has. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 4] + +Whether the Duties of Piety Towards One's Parents Should Be Omitted +for the Sake of Religion? + +Objection 1: It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents +should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Luke +14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother, +and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own +life also, he cannot be My disciple." Hence it is said in praise of +James and John (Matt. 4:22) that they left "their nets and father, +and followed" Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites +(Deut. 33:9): "Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do +not know you; and to his brethren: I know you not; and their own +children they have not known. These have kept Thy word." Now a man +who knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even hates them, +must needs omit the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of piety +should be omitted for the sake of religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Luke 9:59, 60) that in answer to him +who said: "Suffer me first to go and bury my father," Our Lord +replied: "Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the +kingdom of God." Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a +duty of piety to bury one's father. Therefore a duty of piety should +be omitted for the sake of religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, God is called "Our Father" by excellence. Now just +as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety so do we +worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be +omitted for the sake of the worship of religion. + +Obj. 4: Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not +break to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with +those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents, +both on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own, +and on the score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister +without the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of +piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of +religion. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord reproved the Pharisees (Matt. 15:3-6) who +taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying +one's parents the honor we owe them. + +_I answer that,_ Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is +opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his +book on the Categories (Cap. De oppos.), "good is not opposed to +good." Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually +hinder one another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of +the other. Now, as stated above (I-II, Q. 7, A. 2; Q. 18, A. 3), the +act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and +if it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of +vice. Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's +parents according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that +man should tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as +Ambrose says on Luke 12:52, "the piety of divine religion takes +precedence of the claims of kindred." + +Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the +worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship +to one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad +Heliod.): "Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy +mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of +the cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this +matter." Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's +parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives +to God. If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we +are not withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of +piety, and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of +religion. + +Reply Obj. 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says (Hom. +xxxvii in Ev.) that "when we find our parents to be a hindrance in +our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them." +For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the service +of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is +in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their +kindred, because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not the +idolaters (Ex. 32). James and John are praised for leaving their +parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to +evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another +means of livelihood, if they followed Christ. + +Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father +because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth.), "Our Lord +by so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and +worries and other things that one anticipates under these +circumstances. For after the burial the will had to be read, the +estate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly, because there +were others who could see to the funeral." Or, according to Cyril's +commentary on Luke 9, "this disciple's request was, not that he might +bury a dead father, but that he might support a yet living father in +the latter's old age, until at length he should bury him. This is +what Our Lord did not grant, because there were others, bound by the +duties of kindred, to take care of him." + +Reply Obj. 3: Whatever we give our parents out of piety is referred +by us to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform with +regard to any of our neighbors are offered to God, according to Matt. +25:40: "As long as you did it to one of . . . My least . . . you did +it to Me." Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of our +assistance, so that they have no other means of support, provided +they incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for +the sake of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves to their +service without sin, or if they can be supported without our +assistance, it is lawful to forego their service, so as to give more +time to religion. + +Reply Obj. 4: We must speak differently of one who is yet in the +world, and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he +that is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support +without him, he must not leave them and enter religion, because he +would be breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of +parents. Some say, however, that even then he might abandon them, and +leave them in God's care. But this, considered aright, would be to +tempt God: since, while having human means at hand, he would be +exposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God's assistance. On +the other hand, if the parents can find means of livelihood without +him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter religion, because +children are not bound to support their parents except in cases of +necessity, as stated above. He that has already made his profession +in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world: wherefore he +ought not, under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave the +cloister where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once more +with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound, saving his obedience +to his superiors, and his religious state withal, to make points +efforts for his parents' support. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 102 + +OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS +(In Three Articles) + +We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of +which will manifest the contrary vices. + +Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other +virtues? + +(2) What does observance offer? + +(3) Of its comparison with piety. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 1] + +Whether Observance Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Other Virtues? + +Objection 1: It seems that observance is not a special virtue, +distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their +objects. But the object of observance is not distinct from the object +of piety: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by +observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some +kind of dignity." But worship and honor are paid also by piety to our +parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct +virtue from piety. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that are +in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in +science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay +honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore +observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in +dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a +position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law, +according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute +to whom tribute is due," etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements +of the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice. +Therefore observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from +other virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance +along with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues. + +_I answer that,_ As explained above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 3; Q. 80), +according to the various excellences of those persons to whom +something is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of +virtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes +of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is +found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way, +exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of +father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of +generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the +perfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of +dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain +things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the +commander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of +learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are +designated as "fathers," on account of their being charged with like +cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him (4 Kings 5:13): +"Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing," etc. + +Therefore, just as, in a manner, beneath religion, whereby worship is +given to God, we find piety, whereby we worship our parents; so under +piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to +persons in positions of dignity. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 101, A. 3, ad 2), religion goes by +the name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety properly so +called is distinct from religion; and in the same way piety can be +called observance by way of excellence, although observance properly +speaking is distinct from piety. + +Reply Obj. 2: By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a +man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain +power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should +be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of +others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of +science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in +relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself. +Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship +and honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as +science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of +dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any +excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to +pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot +be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their +position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our +parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and +not to special justice, which is a principal virtue. + +Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above +(Q. 58, A. 6). +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 2] + +Whether It Belongs to Observance to Pay Worship and Honor to Those +Who Are in Positions of Dignity? + +Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay +worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according +to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons +whom we hold in honor, so that worship and honor would seem to be the +same. Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying +worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. + +Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe: +wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of +justice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in +positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us. +Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and +honor to all. + +Obj. 3: Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity who +are placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of +remuneration, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their +dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to +whom fear; honor to whom honor." Moreover, we owe them reverence and +subjection, according to Heb. 13:17, "Obey your prelates, and be +subject to them." Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as +paying worship and honor. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by +observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some +kind of dignity." + +_I answer that,_ It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to +govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due +end: thus a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every +mover has a certain excellence and power over that which is moved. +Wherefore, a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold +consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, +together with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the +exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there is due +to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of excellence; +and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him +worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying his +commands, and by repaying him, according to one's faculty, for the +benefits we received from him. + +Reply Obj. 1: Worship includes not only honor, but also whatever +other suitable actions are connected with the relations between man +and man. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 80), debt is twofold. One is legal +debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honor +and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed +over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a +certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honor to +persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects. + +Reply Obj. 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions +of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to +them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise +of their government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are +moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a +repayment of their labor. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 3] + +Whether Observance Is a Greater Virtue Than Piety? + +Objection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety. +For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a +father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular +governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the +state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is +greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance +is a greater virtue than piety. + +Obj. 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the +common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we +ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy +to expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common +good. Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in +positions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays +worship to one's kindred. + +Obj. 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the +first place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the +virtuous by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). +Therefore observance takes the first place after religion. + +_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. +Now, immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the +first table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers +to piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the +order of excellence. + +_I answer that,_ Something may be paid to persons in positions of +dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when +one serves them in the administration of the affairs of the state. +This no longer belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays +worship not only to one's father but also to one's fatherland. +Secondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity +refers specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this +belongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety. Therefore in +comparing observance with piety we must needs take into consideration +the different relations in which other persons stand to ourselves, +which relations both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the +persons of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin +to us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and +education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's +substance than external government, the principle of which is seated +in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety takes +precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons more +akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound. + +Reply Obj. 1: The prince is compared to the father as a universal to +a particular power, as regards external government, but not as +regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this way +the father should be compared with the divine power from which all +things derive their being. + +Reply Obj. 2: In so far as persons in positions of dignity are +related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to +observance, but to piety, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The rendering of honor or worship should be +proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered +in himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore, +though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of +honor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a +greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received +from their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay +worship and honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are +not of their kindred. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 103 + +OF DULIA +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider +(1) dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto +to those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey +their commands. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing? + +(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position? + +(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are +above us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria? + +(4) Whether it contains several species? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 1] + +Whether Honor Denotes Something Corporal? + +Objection 1: It seems that honor does not denote something corporal. +For honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may be +gathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is +something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated +above (Q. 81, A. 2, ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "honor +is the reward of virtue." Now, since virtue consists chiefly of +spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the +reward is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not +consist of corporal things. + +Obj. 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from glory. +Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor +consists of things internal and spiritual. + +_On the contrary,_ Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3, "Honor +widows that are widows indeed," and (1 Tim. 5:17), "let the priests +that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor" etc. says (Ep. ad +Ageruch.): "Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for +remuneration." Now both of these pertain to [corporal] things. +Therefore honor consists of corporal things. + +_I answer that,_ Honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence. +Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their +excellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now +witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is +the searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices. +wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere +internal movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges +either God's excellence or another man's excellence before God. But, +as regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs, +either by words, as when one proclaims another's excellence by word +of mouth, or by deeds, for instance by bowing, saluting, and so +forth, or by external things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues, +and the like. Accordingly honor consists of signs, external and +corporal. + +Reply Obj. 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the one hand +it is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one man +honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other +hand, it is the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in +order that he may be held in reverence by others. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), honor is +not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and corporal +things can be greater than honor, since these corporal things +themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling +virtue. It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they +may be made known, according to Matt. 5:15, "Neither do men light a +candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it +may shine to all that are in the house." In this sense honor is said +to be the reward of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways. +First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor +consists of any external signs, so that praise is included in honor. +Secondly, because by paying honor to a person we bear witness to a +person's excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we +bear witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise +one that works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even +to the best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived +at the end, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). + +Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our +bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes +clear to the knowledge of many. The word "glory" signifies this, for +"glory" is the same as _kleria_, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on +Rom. 16:27 observes that glory is "clear knowledge together with +praise." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 2] + +Whether Honor Is Properly Due to Those Who Are Above Us? + +Objection 1: It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are +above us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to +Matt. 11:11, "He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater +than John the Baptist." Yet an angel forbade John when the latter +wished to honor him (Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to +those who are above us. + +Obj. 2: Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his +virtue, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 63, A. 3). But sometimes those who +are above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them, as +neither is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the +order of nature. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 12:10): "With honor +preventing one another," and we read (1 Pet. 2:17): "Honor all men." +But this would not be so if honor were due to those alone who are +above us. Therefore honor is not due properly to those who are above +us. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that Tobias "had ten +talents of silver of that which he had been honored by the king": and +we read (Esther 6:11) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered +it to be proclaimed in his presence: "This honor is he worthy of whom +the king hath a mind to honor." Therefore honor is paid to those also +who are beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor is not +due properly to those who are above us. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that "honor is +due to the best." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), honor is nothing but an +acknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness. Now a person's +excellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honor +him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in +itself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is +always due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority. + +For the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those +who honor him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent than some +others, or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in +some respect and not simply. + +Reply Obj. 1: The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind of +honor, but the honor of adoration and latria, which is due to God. Or +again, he forbade him to pay the honor of dulia, in order to indicate +the dignity of John himself, for which Christ equaled him to the +angels "according to the hope of glory of the children of God": +wherefore he refused to be honored by him as though he were superior +to him. + +Reply Obj. 2: A wicked superior is honored for the excellence, not of +his virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister, and because +the honor paid to him is paid to the whole community over which he +presides. As for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and +should be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor. + +Reply Obj. 3: In every man is to be found something that makes it +possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3, +"In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves," and +thus, too, we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another. + +Reply Obj. 4: Private individuals are sometimes honored by kings, not +that they are above them in the order of dignity but on account of +some excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and +Mardochaeus were honored by kings. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 3] + +Whether Dulia Is a Special Virtue Distinct from Latria? + +Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct +from latria. For a gloss on Ps. 7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I +put my trust," says: "Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due; +God by creation, to Whom we owe latria." Now the virtue directed to +God as Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as +God. Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8), "to +be loved is like being honored." Now the charity with which we love +God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia +whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria +with which we honor God. + +Obj. 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an image +is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the thing +represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made +to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. 2:22, 23) +that "they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God created man +incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him." +Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God is +honored. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage +due to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to +obey their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct +from latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of +God." + +_I answer that,_ According to what has been stated above (Q. 101, A. +3), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there +must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude +is due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is +competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has +absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly, +which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a +certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a +particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which +pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria, +which pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a +species of observance, because by observance we honor all those who +excel in dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of +servants for their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence, +inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so again latria +is called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by +way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power to +create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this gloss +drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of +creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in +respect of lordship, which is communicated to a creature. + +Reply Obj. 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since that +which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone. Wherefore +the charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we +love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from +charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In +like manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another +for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, latria and +dulia are not the same virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to the +thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an +image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes +the movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to +the thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of +dulia regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in +respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, +yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this +to God actually. + +Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a +fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need +not be towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the +image of God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the +reverence that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to +His image. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 4] + +Whether Dulia Has Various Species? + +Objection 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we +show honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under +different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the +Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in +the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia +is divided into specifically different virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes, as +pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a +mean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures +having a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin +as being the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are +different species of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other +hyperdulia. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the image +of God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational +creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted +by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we +must distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the +more since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for +instance, to the wood of the Holy Cross. + +_On the contrary,_ Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not +divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia. + +_I answer that,_ Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be +taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account +of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and +observance, and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards +a man. Taken in this sense it will have parts differing specifically +from one another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as +denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies +servitude, as stated above (A. 3). Taken in this sense it is not +divided into different species, but is one of the species of +observance, mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason +that a servant reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his +commanding officer under another, the disciple his master under +another, and so on in similar cases. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense. + +Reply Obj. 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken in a +wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a +man by reason of his having an affinity to God. + +Reply Obj. 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational +creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are +naturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay +to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king's +robe receives the same honor as the king himself, according to +Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv). +_______________________ + +QUESTION 104 + +OF OBEDIENCE +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether one man is bound to obey another? + +(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue? + +(3) Of its comparison with other virtues; + +(4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things? + +(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things? + +(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 1] + +Whether One Man Is Bound to Obey Another? + +Objection 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For +nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has +so ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus. +15:14, "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of +his own counsel." Therefore one man is not bound to obey another. + +Obj. 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would have +to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his rule +of conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule of +human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it +acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous. +Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good +deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less +acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is +not bound to obey another. + +_On the contrary,_ It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): "Obey your prelates +and be subject to them." + +_I answer that,_ Just as the actions of natural things proceed from +natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In +natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their +actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by +God: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by +their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move +by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the +divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to +be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in +virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to +obey their superiors. + +Reply Obj. 1: God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as +though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because, +unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity +to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding +from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own +counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying +his superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), "When we humbly give +way to another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts." + +Reply Obj. 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational +wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than +another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of +the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will +of this other man who obeys him. + +Reply Obj. 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one +way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound +to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it +of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy +and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will. +Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt +will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially +before God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward +will. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q, 104, Art. 2] + +Whether Obedience Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For +disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general +sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to disobey +the divine law." Therefore obedience is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral. +But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised +under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does +not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more +obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a +special virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the +more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own." But +every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its +own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as +stated in _Ethic._ ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their +objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of +a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there +are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue, +comprising many special virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of +justice, as stated above (Q. 80). + +_I answer that,_ A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that +have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to +render a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance +with the divinely established order of things, as shown above (A. 1), +and therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and +order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. First Part, Q. +5, A. 5]. Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by +reason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations +towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their +commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience +is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or +express, because the superior's will, however it become known, is a +tacit precept, and a man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt, +forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as +he understands his superior's will. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object from +admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues +correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils +both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good +end, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord. +Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs +in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all +acts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, +A. 3). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, +and pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not +evil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be +taken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally +the aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience +a special sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that +one perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the +intention of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one +treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if +obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action +that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of +that action through any intention whatever, then obedience will be a +general virtue, and disobedience a general sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its direct +object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether expressed +or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his +will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to +Titus 3:1, "Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a +word," etc. + +It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it +observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is +measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in +so far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein +he ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (Q. +92, A. 2). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the +person who retains another's property, and deficiency in the person +who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, +4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of +him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds +in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the +superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way +obedience will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was +stated above concerning justice (Q. 58, A. 10). + +Reply Obj. 3: Obedience, like every virtue, requires the will to be +prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is +repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and +this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience makes a man's +will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of +the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for +its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable +matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to +comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own +will. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own +sake, but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as +happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is +not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says +(Moral. xxxv) that "obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds +its own in agreeable matters," because, to wit, one's own will seems +to tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to +the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that "it increases in +disagreeable or difficult matters," because there one's own will +tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as +regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the +judgment of God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in +agreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless +praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less +devotedly [*Cf. Q. 82, A. 2] to the fulfilment of the precept. + +Reply Obj. 4: Reverence regards directly the person that excels: +wherefore it admits a various species according to the various +aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the +precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one +aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account +of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one +species, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 3] + +Whether Obedience Is the Greatest of the Virtues? + +Objection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues. +For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): "Obedience is better than +sacrifices." Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, +which is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above (Q. 81, A. +6). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the +only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when +ingrafted." Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore +obedience is greater than all the virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "evil should never +be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we +should lay aside the good we are doing." Now one does not lay aside a +thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose +sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other +virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from +charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience should be +practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not +through fear of punishment, but through love of justice." Therefore +charity is a greater virtue than obedience. + +_I answer that,_ Just as sin consists in man contemning God and +adhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists +in man contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now +the end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore +if a man contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God, +his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from +his contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological, +virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the +moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in +order to adhere to God. + +Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns +that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are +three kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God's sake. The +lowest of these are external goods, the goods of the body take the +middle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among +these the chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will, +man makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the +virtue of obedience, whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake, +is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn +other goods for the sake of God. + +Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is rightly preferred +to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas +by obedience we slay our own will." Wherefore even any other acts of +virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of +obedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to +give all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to +the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to +obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if +they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from +obedience. For it is written (1 John 2:4, 5): "He who saith that he +knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he +that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is +perfected": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes. + +Reply Obj. 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship +and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under +different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding the +aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far +as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a +way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence +for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it +proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and +pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. +Wherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God +than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, "in a sacrifice we slay +another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will," as +Gregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel +spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God than to offer +in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the +commandment of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a +precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue +act causally or dispositively towards their generation and +preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. +And yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all +virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of +virtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of +virtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if +there be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept, +that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue +is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine +authority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to +God. Secondly, because infusion of grace and virtues may precede, +even in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience +is not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature. + +Reply Obj. 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to +which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so +forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of +obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of +necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake +of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to +do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), "he +who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many +others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from +starvation, through being deprived of every good." Thus the loss of +one good may be compensated by obedience and other goods. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 4] + +Whether God Ought to Be Obeyed in All Things? + +Objection 1: It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For +it is written (Matt. 9:30, 31) that our Lord after healing the two +blind men commanded them, saying: "See that no man know this. But +they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country." Yet they +are not blamed for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound +to obey God in all things. + +Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue. +Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to virtue: +thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen. 22); and the +Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which things +are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who was +an adulteress (Osee 3), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore +God is not to be obeyed in all things. + +Obj. 3: Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine +will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things +to conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 19, A. 10). Therefore man is not bound to obey +God in all things. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 24:7): "All things that the +Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), he who obeys is moved by the +command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by +their motive causes. Now just a God is the first mover of all things +that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, +as shown above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 6). Therefore just as all natural +things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too +all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the +divine command. + +Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the +miracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine +precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), "gave an example to His +servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and +yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that +others might profit by their example." + +Reply Obj. 2: Even as God does nothing contrary to nature (since "the +nature of a thing is what God does therein," according to a gloss on +Rom. 11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course +of nature; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue since +virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with +God's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to +the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to +Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since +God is the author of life and death. Nor again was it contrary to +justice that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the +Egyptians, because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He +will. Nor was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take +an adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of human +generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that +which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the persons aforesaid did +not sin, either by obeying God or by willing to obey Him. + +Reply Obj. 3: Though man is not always bound to will what God wills, +yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes +to man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man is +bound to obey God's commands in all things. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 5] + +Whether Subjects Are Bound to Obey Their Superiors in All Things? + +Objection 1: It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors +in all things. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:20): "Children, obey your +parents in all things," and farther on (Col. 3:22): "Servants, obey +in all things your masters according to the flesh." Therefore in like +manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. + +Obj. 2: Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects, +according to Deut. 5:5, "I was the mediator and stood between the +Lord and you at that time, to show you His words." Now there is no +going from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands +between. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the +commands of God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 4:14): "You . . . +received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus" and (1 Thess. +2:13): "When you had received of us the word of the hearing of God, +you received it, not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the +word of God." Therefore as man is bound to obey God in all things, so +is he bound to obey his superiors. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as religious in making their profession take +vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a +religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things. +Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 5:29): "We ought to obey God +rather than men." Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior +are against God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all +things. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 4), he who obeys is moved at +the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity of +justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its +mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by +its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance +arising from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not +burnt by fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly, +through lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since, +though it is subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is +not subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes +subject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as +regards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there are two +reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in +all things. First on account of the command of a higher power. For as +a gloss says on Rom. 13:2, "They that resist [Vulg.: 'He that +resisteth'] the power, resist the ordinance of God" (cf. St. +Augustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). "If a commissioner issue an order, +are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul? +Again if the proconsul command one thing, and the emperor another, +will you hesitate to disregard the former and serve the latter? +Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God another, you must +disregard the former and obey God." Secondly, a subject is not bound +to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something +wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis +iii): "It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man: +for the better part of him is excepted." His body is subjected and +assigned to his master but his soul is his own. Consequently in +matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound +to obey his fellow-man, but God alone. + +Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have +to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature +all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters +touching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to +the support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore +servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their +parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in +the state of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the +disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his +superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier +must obey his general in matters relating to war, a servant his +master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his +service, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his +life and the care of the household; and so forth. + +Reply Obj. 1: When the Apostle says "in all things," he refers to +matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, +both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all +things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their +superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a +particular way, in respect of which the superior stands between God +and his subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is +immediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or +by the written law. + +Reply Obj. 3: Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of +life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors: +wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may +belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for +salvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this +will belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, +such things be not contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for +obedience in this case would be unlawful. + +Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient +for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey: +secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: +thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 6] + +Whether Christians Are Bound to Obey the Secular Powers? + +Objection 1: It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the +secular power. For a gloss on Matt. 17:25, "Then the children are +free," says: "If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds +sway over that kingdom are free, then the children of that King, +under Whose sway are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom." +Now Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of God, +according to John 1:12: "He gave them power to be made the sons of +God, to them that believe in His name." Therefore they are not bound +to obey the secular power. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 7:4): "You . . . are become dead +to the law by the body of Christ," and the law mentioned here is the +divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are +subject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law +of the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become +members of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection, +whereby they were under the power of secular princes. + +Obj. 3: Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress them +with violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): "Without +justice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?" Since therefore +the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with +injustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems +that Christians ought not to obey secular princes. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Titus 3:1): "Admonish them to be +subject to princes and powers," and (1 Pet. 2:13, 14): "Be ye subject +. . . to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the +king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him." + +_I answer that,_ Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice, +according to Rom. 3:22, "The justice of God by faith of Jesus +Christ:" wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of +justice, but strengthens it. Now the order of justice requires that +subjects obey their superiors, else the stability of human affairs +would cease. Hence faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from +the obligation of obeying secular princes. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 5), subjection whereby one man is +bound to another regards the body; not the soul, which retains its +liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the grace of +Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as +the Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. 7:23) that in his +mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin. +Wherefore those that are made children of God by grace are free from +the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, +whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes +on 1 Tim. 6:1, "Whosoever are servants under the yoke," etc. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament, and +therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the comparison +with human law does not stand because thereby one man is subject to +another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man. + +Reply Obj. 3: Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this +is required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority +is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his +subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in +order to avoid scandal or danger. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 105 + +OF DISOBEDIENCE +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 105, Art. 2] + +Whether Disobedience Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For +every sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition +given above (Q. 104, A. 2, Obj. 1). Therefore if disobedience were a +mortal sin, every sin would be mortal. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is born +of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore is +disobedience. + +Obj. 3: Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does not +fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many +commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them. +Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man +cannot avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is +not a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned +(Rom. 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal sins. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5; +I-II, Q. 88, A. 1), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity +which is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and +our neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey His +commandments, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 12). Therefore to be +disobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is +contrary to the love of God. + +Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to +superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior +is a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to +Rom. 13:2, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of +God." It is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it +withdraws from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is +his due. + +Reply Obj. 1: The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin, +which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not +disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it. +Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially, +but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their +species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept, +not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is +not a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to +another species of sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Vainglory desires display of excellence. And since it +seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject to +another's command, it follows that disobedience arises from +vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out +of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal. + +Reply Obj. 3: No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore if a +superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so +that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin. +Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude of +precepts. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 105, Art. 2] + +Whether Disobedience Is the Most Grievous of Sins? + +Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins. +For it is written (1 Kings 15:23): "It is like the sin of witchcraft +to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey." But +idolatry is the most grievous of sins, as stated above (Q. 94, A. 3). +Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that removes +the obstacles of sin, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2). Now disobedience +makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything, prevents a +man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy +Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the +disobedience of one man, many were made sinners." Now the cause is +seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be +a more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby. + +_On the contrary,_ Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin +than contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very +person of the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore +disobedience is not the most grievous of sins. + +_I answer that,_ Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one +disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the +part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take +every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a +higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a +lower authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a +higher authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands, +the more grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous +to disobey God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things +commanded. For the person commanding does not equally desire the +fulfilment of all his commands: since every such person desires above +all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Wherefore +disobedience is the more grievous, according as the unfulfilled +commandment is more in the intention of the person commanding. As to +the commandments of God, it is evident that the greater the good +commanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that commandment, +because since God's will is essentially directed to the good, the +greater the good the more does God wish it to be fulfilled. +Consequently he that disobeys the commandment of the love of God sins +more grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of +our neighbor. On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to +the greater good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man, +a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a greater good, but +through setting aside that which is more in the intention of the +person commanding. + +Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with +the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which +there is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of +disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man, +apart from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this +because whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God's +commandment. And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver +matter, the sin is still more grievous. The disobedience that +contains contempt of a man's precept is less grievous than the sin +which contemns the man who made the precept, because reverence for +the person commanding should give rise to reverence for his command. +In like manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such as +blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we mentally +separate the disobedience from the sin) than would be a sin involving +contempt of God's commandment alone. + +Reply Obj. 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality but +of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God +just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more. + +Reply Obj. 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy Ghost, +but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the contempt of +any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else +the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since +any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the +Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which lead +directly to repentance and the remission of sins. + +Reply Obj. 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was +transmitted to all men, was not disobedience considered as a special +sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the +Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to +every sin. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 106 + +OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude. +Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other +virtues? + +(2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent? + +(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors? + +(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred? + +(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor +received or the disposition of the giver? + +(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 1] + +Whether Thankfulness Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Other +Virtues? + +Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue, +distinct from other virtues. For we have received the greatest +benefits from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay +to God in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor +with which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. +Therefore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other +virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative +justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose +of giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5, 4). Therefore thanksgiving, +which belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude +is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for +the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. +viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues, +since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore +thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors +received, is not a special virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of +justice (De Invent. Rhet. ii). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 3), the nature of +the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes +giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the +lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, +in that He is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is +found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our +begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that +excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is +found in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and +private favors, on account of which we are under particular +obligation to him. + +Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person +excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor +from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that +after religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we +worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons +excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we +give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing +virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that +precedes, as falling short thereof. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it +excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God +was reckoned above (Q. 83, A. 17) among things pertaining to religion. + +Reply Obj. 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, +when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted +that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to +the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt, +and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when +compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii). + +Reply Obj. 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever +there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, +and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In +this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, although +repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 2] + +Whether the Innocent Is More Bound to Give Thanks to God Than the +Penitent? + +Objection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks +to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received +from God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of +innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it +seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the +penitent. + +Obj. 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes +him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): "What man, weighing +his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to +his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had +less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn +to Thee?" And farther on he says: "And for this let him love Thee as +much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered +from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been +from the like torpor of sin preserved." Therefore the innocent is +also more bound to give thanks than the penitent. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the +greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is +more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine +says (Confess. iii): "To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, +that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I +ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not +have done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both +what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance +committed not." Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks +than the penitent. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 7:43): "To whom more is +forgiven, he loveth more [*Vulg.: 'To whom less is forgiven, he +loveth less' Luke 7:47]." Therefore for the same reason he is bound +to greater thanksgiving. + +_I answer that,_ Thanksgiving (_gratiarum actio_) in the recipient +corresponds to the favor (_gratia_) of the giver: so that when there +is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on +the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed +_gratis:_ wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater +on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and +in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he +receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more +continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be +said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in +this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the +innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously +given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received +grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, +considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent +is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a +poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And +since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to +take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such +absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of +the voluntary and the involuntary. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 3] + +Whether a Man Is Bound to Give Thanks to Every Benefactor? + +Objection 1: It seems that a man is not bound to give thanks to every +benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm +himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to +whom will he be good?" But a man cannot thank himself, since +thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore +thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor. + +Obj. 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But +some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and +grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a +benefactor. + +Obj. 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own +profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit. +Therefore thanks are not due to them. + +Obj. 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is +belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his +master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor. + +Obj. 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably +and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is +very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid +for a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the +benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would +not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be +a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man +is not always bound to repayment for favors received. + +Obj. 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is +inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that +repayment of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person +repaid. Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): "In all things give +thanks." + +_I answer that,_ Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore +Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "God turns all things to Himself +because He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs always be +directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a +benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural +order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying +the favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, +as stated above with regard to a father (Q. 31, A. 3; Q. 101, A. 2), +a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the +latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally +he owes him assistance or support, if he need it. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), "just as a man is +liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who +forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by +his own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favor +on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves +him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable." +Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for +gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing +except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken +of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to +oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11), +in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as +though they were various persons. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good +rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as +he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that +reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the +favor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, +as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) "promptness enhances, delay +discounts a favor." + +Reply Obj. 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), "it matters much +whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours, +or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and +benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a +man who seeks fodder for his cattle." And farther on: "If he has done +it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am +ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was +profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of +malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has +been the loser thereby." + +Reply Obj. 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when a slave does +what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service: +when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as +soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that +be his motive, it is no longer called service." Wherefore gratitude +is due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty. + +Reply Obj. 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what +he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the +deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says +(De Benef. ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun +to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should +be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but +everywhere." From this it is evident that however well off a man may +be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him +reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, +14): "He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want +should be repaid with money": and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi): +"There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we +happen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable +and pleasant conversation without flattery." Therefore there is no +need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor +before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi), +"it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no +favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made +you his debtor!" + +If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he +should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue +if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart +has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as +heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness +he has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. +ix, 3). + +Reply Obj. 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor +depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment +should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If, +however, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental +to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca +observes (De Benef. vii): "It is my duty to repay, and not to keep +back and safeguard my repayment." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 4] + +Whether a Man Is Bound to Repay a Favor at Once? + +Objection 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once. +For we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be +fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors, +and yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore a +man is bound to repay a favor at once. + +Obj. 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more +praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now +earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay. +Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once. + +Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that "it is proper to a +benefactor to act freely and quickly." Now repayment ought to equal +the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once. + +_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Benef. iv): "He that hastens to +repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of +indebtedness." + +_I answer that,_ Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be +considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also +must these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the +affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore +Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it +graciously." As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time +as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of +choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for +favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained +repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), "he that wishes to +repay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is +ungrateful." + +Reply Obj. 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of +justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's property +without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the +debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as +the rectitude of virtue demands. + +Reply Obj. 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be +regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall +the proper time through earnestness. + +Reply Obj. 3: Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time +and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and +the same is to be observed in repaying favors. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 5] + +Whether in Giving Thanks We Should Look at the Benefactor's +Disposition or at the Deed? + +Objection 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at +the benefactor's disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to +beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself +denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed. + +Obj. 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of +justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking. +Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather +than the disposition of the benefactor. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now God +alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to +repay a favor according to the benefactor's disposition. + +_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Benef. i): "We are sometimes under +a greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, +and has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly." + +_I answer that,_ The repayment of a favor may belong to three +virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to +justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a +loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according +to the quantity received. + +On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different +ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it +has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship +we have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the +friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made +according to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in +the friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard +for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief +requisite of virtue, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 13. And likewise, +since gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, +and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that +repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver +than on the effect. + +Reply Obj. 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly +action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of +gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and +chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): "A kindly +action consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the +giver or doer." + +Reply Obj. 2: Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species +is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of +justice, as stated above (Q. 80). Hence it does not follow that we +shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues. + +Reply Obj. 3: God alone sees man's disposition in itself: but in so +far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus +that a benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he does +the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and +readily. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 6] + +Whether the Repayment of Gratitude Should Surpass the Favor Received? + +Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of +gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to +make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as +the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt +the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to +something yet greater. + +Obj. 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has +received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his +turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor +which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that +first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and +so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, +since "the indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text. +8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor +received. + +Obj. 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is excess +of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it +seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and +opposed to justice. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should +repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them +return," and this is done by repaying more than we have received. +Therefore gratitude should incline to do something greater. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), gratitude regards the favor +received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be +deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis +without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a +moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does +not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity +of the favor received: because so long as he repays less or an +equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return +what he has received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as +possible, to pay back something more. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 3, ad 5; A. 5), in repaying favors +we must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly, +if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from +his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal +repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we +consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is +possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as +Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do +so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude. + +Reply Obj. 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the +more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. 13:8, "Owe no +man anything, but to love one another." Wherefore it is not +unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit. + +Reply Obj. 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we +consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of +wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will +gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the +beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 107 + +OF INGRATITUDE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin? + +(2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin? + +(3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin? + +(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 1] + +Whether Ingratitude Is Always a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For +Seneca says (De Benef. iii) that "he who does not repay a favor is +ungrateful." But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without +sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin. +Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems +that ingratitude is not always a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who commits +it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i), +"no man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now sometimes it is not in the +power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has +not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, +and yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that "to forget a kindness is +the height of ingratitude." Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being +unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), "Owe +no man anything." Yet "an unwilling debtor is ungrateful," as Seneca +declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim. +3:2), where it is written: "Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, +wicked." etc. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 106, A. 4, ad 1, A. 6) a debt of +gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin +from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is +evident that every ingratitude is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that helps +another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and so no +thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good will, +supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help him +in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the +repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin, +because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is +contrary to gratitude. + +Reply Obj. 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to +repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the +repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6, ad +1). + +Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed +the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not +subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as +Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when forgetfulness of favors lays +hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their +repayment." + +Reply Obj. 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love, and +from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that anyone +should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for +his benefactor. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 2] + +Whether Ingratitude Is a Special Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For +whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this +pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds of +sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin, +for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed +against a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): "It is ungrateful to +take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but +it is the height of ingratitude to forget it." Now these do not seem +to belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a +special sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or +thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special +sin. + +_I answer that,_ Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of +virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus +illiberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a +vice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for +instance if one were to show gratitude for things for which gratitude +is not due, or sooner than it is due, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 4). +But still more opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency +of gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above (Q. +106, A. 6), inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude +is properly denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now +every deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite +habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference +of sight and hearing. Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is +one special virtue, so also is ingratitude one special sin. + +It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the +things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the +favor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks, +and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time +according to one's means. And since what is last in the order of +generation is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the +first degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the +second when he declines to notice or indicate that he has received a +favor, while the third and supreme degree is when a man fails to +recognize the reception of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in +any other way. Moreover, since opposite affirmation includes +negation, it follows that it belongs to the first degree of +ingratitude to return evil for good, to the second to find fault with +a favor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though it +were unkindness. + +Reply Obj. 1: In every sin there is material ingratitude to God, +inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude. But +formal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this is +a special sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special sin +from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this way +the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: These three are not different species but different +degrees of one special sin. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 3] + +Whether Ingratitude Is Always a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For +one ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful +to God by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of +ingratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity, +as stated above (Q. 24, A. 12). But ingratitude is contrary to +charity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that virtue, as +stated above (Q. 106, A. 1, ad 3; A. 6, ad 2). Therefore ingratitude +is always a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Between the giver and +the receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should +forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget +having received." Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should +forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should +the latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that +if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a +mortal sin. + +Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ No one should be put in the way of +committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii), +"sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives +assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he +has received." But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of +ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ As appears from what we have said above (A. 2), a +man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for +instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express +his appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not +always a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6), the +debt of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, +however, he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he +does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it +arises either from some kind of negligence or from some +disinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may +happen to be a mortal sin, by reason either of inward contempt, or of +the kind of thing withheld, this being needful to the benefactor, +either simply, or in some case of necessity. + +Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay +the debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes +a mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing +that is done. + +It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a +mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it +arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character. + +Reply Obj. 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful to God +to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but +there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, in so far as it +removes a virtuous act of obedience to God. + +Reply Obj. 2: When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not contrary to, +but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of charity, +but excludes some act thereof. + +Reply Obj. 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): "When we say that a +man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a mistake +to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing +so very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we mean +that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it." + +Reply Obj. 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is not +ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do so +if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object +of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid +vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly, +wishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the +greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on +whom he is conferring the favor. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 4] + +Whether Favors Should Be Withheld from the Ungrateful? + +Objection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the +ungrateful. For it is written (Wis. 16:29): "The hope of the +unthankful shall melt away as the winter's ice." But this hope would +not melt away unless favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors +should be withheld from the ungrateful. + +Obj. 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of +committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an +occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on +the ungrateful. + +Obj. 3: Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he +is tormented" (Wis. 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he +receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be +deprived of the favor. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 6:35) that "the Highest . . . +is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil." Now we should prove +ourselves His children by imitating Him (Luke 6:36). Therefore we +should not withhold favors from the ungrateful. + +_I answer that,_ There are two points to be considered with regard to +an ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and +thus it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The +second is, what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he +should not easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca +remarks (De Benef. iii), "a man is often grateful although he repays +not," because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of +repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness +into gratitude, and if he does not achieve this by being kind to him +once, he may by being so a second time. If, however, the more he +repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes, +he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him. + +Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man +deserves to suffer. + +Reply Obj. 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords +him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the +recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to +be imputed to the bestower. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the part +of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly physician, +by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 108 + +OF VENGEANCE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether vengeance is lawful? + +(2) Whether it is a special virtue? + +(3) Of the manner of taking vengeance; + +(4) On whom should vengeance be taken? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 1] + +Whether Vengeance Is Lawful? + +Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever +usurps what is God's sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is +written (Deut. 32:35, Rom. 12:19): "Revenge to Me, and I will repay." +Therefore all vengeance is unlawful. + +Obj. 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear with +him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant. 2:2, +"As the lily among the thorns," says: "He is not a good man that +cannot bear with a wicked one." Therefore we should not take +vengeance on the wicked. + +Obj. 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which +is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of fear, +but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at +least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful. + +Obj. 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes +revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is +unlawful even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for +Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed +to St. Chrysostom] says: "Let us learn after Christ's example to bear +our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's wrongs, not +even by listening to them." Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful. + +Obj. 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the sin +of only one: for it is written (Ecclus. 26:5-7): "Of three things my +heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the +gathering together of the people, and a false calumny." But vengeance +should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Matt. +13:29, 30, "Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer +both to grow," says that "a multitude should not be excommunicated, +nor should the sovereign." Neither therefore is any other vengeance +lawful. + +_On the contrary,_ We should look to God for nothing save what is +good and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His +enemies: for it is written (Luke 18:7): "Will not God revenge His +elect who cry to Him day and night?" as if to say: "He will indeed." +Therefore vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful. + +_I answer that,_ Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil +on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we +must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is +directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance +and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because +to take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is +contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is +it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly +inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one +that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because +the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be +overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom. +12:21): "Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good." + +If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some +good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has +sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he +may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be +upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided +other due circumstances be observed. + +Reply Obj. 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with +his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes +use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of +the earthly prince that "he is God's minister, an avenger to execute +wrath upon him that doeth evil." If, however, a man takes vengeance +outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and +therefore sins. + +Reply Obj. 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, +and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but +they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on +God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v +in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: "It is +praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook +God's wrongs is most wicked." + +Reply Obj. 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and therefore +those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong to the +Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only +those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they +belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit. + +Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and +the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the +wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to +seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked +him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him +into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the +wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it +patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to +be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine +states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i). + +Reply Obj. 5: When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be taken +on them, either in respect of the whole multitude--thus the Egyptians +were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of +Israel (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed +(Gen. 19)--or as regards part of the multitude, as may be seen in the +punishment of those who worshipped the calf. + +Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the +severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the +principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord +(Num. 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the +sin of the multitude. + +On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the +multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from +the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, +that this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude +should be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the +sovereign, whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne +with, if it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude: +unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm to the +multitude, either spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal +that was feared to arise from his punishment. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 2] + +Whether Vengeance Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct +virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so +are the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of +the good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of +commutative justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not +be accounted a special virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for an +act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. Now +man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to +avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special +virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special +virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance. +Therefore it is not a special virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of +justice. + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude +to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us +through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that +virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural +inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every +definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now +there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which +reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the +concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs, +lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already +been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of +removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says +(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "vengeance we resist force, or wrong, +and in general whatever is obscure" [*_Obscurum._ Cicero wrote +_obfuturum_ but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the +parenthesis] "(i.e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by +avenging it." Therefore vengeance is a special virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to +commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from +the bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of +gratitude, so too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern +of public justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as +it is concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a +wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge. + +Reply Obj. 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an obstacle +thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the +fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far as +a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because charity +makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue proceeds +from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom. xxvii in +Ev.), "there are no green leaves on the bough of good works, unless +charity be the root." + +Reply Obj. 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of +excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the +measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency +and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written +(Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son." But the +virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of +vengeance with regard to all the circumstances. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 3] + +Whether Vengeance Should Be Wrought by Means of Punishments Customary +Among Men? + +Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means +of punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to +uproot him. But our Lord forbade (Matt. 13:29) the uprooting of the +cockle, whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. +Therefore sinners should not be put to death. + +Obj. 2: Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the +same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with +death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death: +and this is evidently false. + +Obj. 3: Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to +publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the +multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion +for sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not +be inflicted for a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ These punishments are fixed by the divine law as +appears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 105, A. 2). + +_I answer that,_ Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends +to the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive +of virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing +those things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning, +else fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for +sin should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the +things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom, +and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name. +Wherefore, according to Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi), +"Tully writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment": +namely, "death," whereby man is deprived of life; "stripes," +"retaliation," or the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his +bodily safety; "slavery," and "imprisonment," whereby he is deprived +of freedom; "exile" whereby he is banished from his country; "fines," +whereby he is mulcted in his riches; "ignominy," whereby he loses +his good name. + +Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle, when +there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But +sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without +danger, but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a +case the punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners. + +Reply Obj. 2: All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as +regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the truth of +the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more of a +medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is inflicted +on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of others. + +Reply Obj. 3: The very fact that the punishment, whether of death or +of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same time +as the sin, makes man's will avers to sin: because the fear of +punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 4] + +Whether Vengeance Should Be Taken on Those Who Have Sinned +Involuntarily? + +Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who +have sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow +from the will of another. Yet one man is punished for another, +according to Ex. 20:5, "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the +iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth +generation." Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was cursed +(Gen. 9:25) and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck +with leprosy (4 Kings 5). Again the blood of Christ lays the +descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, for they said +(Matt. 27:25): "His blood be upon us and upon our children." Moreover +we read (Josue 7) that the people of Israel were delivered into the +hands of their enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people +were overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the sons +of Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person is to be punished without +having deserved it voluntarily. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's +power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power; +thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on +account of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an +episcopal see on account of the depravity or evil of the people. +Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance is +sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of +Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their +parents (Gen. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their +children were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover, +dumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain +on account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore +vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it +involuntarily. + +Obj. 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But a +man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by +fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those +who have deserved it involuntarily. + +Obj. 5: Further Ambrose says on Luke 5 that "the ship in which Judas +was, was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm in the security +of his own merits, was in distress about those of others." But Peter +did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes +punished without having voluntarily deserved it. + +_On the contrary,_ Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is +voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i). +Therefore vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved +it voluntarily. + +_I answer that,_ Punishment may be considered in two ways. First, +under the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due +save for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice +is restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following +his own will suffers something that is contrary to this will. +Wherefore, since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, +as stated above (I-II, Q. 81, A. 1), it follows that no one is +punished in this way, except for something done voluntarily. +Secondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not only +healing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin, or +conducing to some good, and in this way a person is sometimes +punished without any fault of his own, yet not without cause. + +It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater +good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body +never blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it +is harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of +greater consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest +consequence, while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a +person is punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his +own. Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this +present life for our humiliation or probation. But no one is punished +in spiritual goods without any fault on his part, neither in this nor +in the future life, because in the latter punishment is not +medicinal, but a result of spiritual condemnation. + +Reply Obj. 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual punishment for +another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects the soul, in +respect of which each man is master of himself. But sometimes a man +is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the sin of +another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may be +the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in +punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a +belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their +master. Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another, +either by _imitation,_ as children copy the sins of their parents, +and slaves the sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater +daring; or by way of _merit,_ as the sinful subjects merit a sinful +superior, according to Job 34:30, "Who maketh a man that is a +hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people?" Hence the people of +Israel were punished for David's sin in numbering the people (2 Kings +24). This may also happen through some kind of _consent_ or +_connivance:_ thus sometimes even the good are punished in temporal +matters together with the wicked, for not having condemned their +sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Thirdly, in order to mark +the unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is bound to be +solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to inculcate horror +of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all, as though all +were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ. +sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, "Visiting the iniquity of +the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation," +seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He does not +take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in order +that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the +wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary +to take vengeance on them. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human +judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is +manifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But +human judgment cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby +He punishes certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of +theirs, since man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments +so as to know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore +according to human judgment a man should never be condemned without +fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death, +mutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even according to +human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault +on his part, but not without cause: and this in three ways. + +First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his, +disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being +infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the +Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man +is hindered from receiving sacred orders. + +Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own +but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a +certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to +the good of the clerics. + +Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of +another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his +inheritance through the sin of his parent. + +Reply Obj. 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in +temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a +possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also +in their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they +be spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus +deserve to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on +dumb animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way +their owners are punished; and also in horror of sin. + +Reply Obj. 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not +involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 6, AA. 5, 6). + +Reply Obj. 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin of +Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of +one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply Obj. 1, 2). +_______________________ + +QUESTION 109 + +OF TRUTH +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning +truth there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether truth is a virtue? + +(2) Whether it is a special virtue? + +(3) Whether it is a part of justice? + +(4) Whether it inclines to that which is less? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 1] + +Whether Truth Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of +virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object +precedes the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue, +but something prior to virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it +belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to +be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always +praiseworthy--neither in good things, since according to Prov. 27:2, +"Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth"--nor even in evil +things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Isa. +3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have +not hid it." Therefore truth is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, +or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because its object +is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) +that by "truth we faithfully represent things as they are, were, or +will be." Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues, but +their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean +between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the +better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher both in the Second and in the +Fourth Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues. + +_I answer that,_ Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by +reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a +virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this +way, truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but +a certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing +understood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as +stated in the First Part (Q. 16, A. 1; Q. 21, A. 2). Secondly, truth +may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which +sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must +needs be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and +virtue is "that which makes its possessor good, and renders his +action good." + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes truth in the first sense. + +Reply Obj. 2: To state that which concerns oneself, in so far as it +is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this does +not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite for +that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due +circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful. +Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for +that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one's sin, by +praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it +uselessly. + +Reply Obj. 3: A person who says what is true, utters certain +signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either +words, or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of +things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the +latter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far +as this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore +truth is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral +virtue. And it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways. +First, on the part of the object, secondly, on the part of the act. On +the part of the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of +equality, and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the +very reason that a man says what is true about himself, he observes +the mean between one that says more than the truth about himself, and +one that says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe +the mean is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. +Excess consists in making known one's own affairs out of season, and +deficiency in hiding them when one ought to make them known. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 2] + +Whether Truth Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the +true and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special +virtue, in fact every virtue is goodness, because "it makes its +possessor good." Therefore truth is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an act of +truth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue, +since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore +truth is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives +aright, and of which it is written (Isa. 38:3): "I beseech Thee . . . +remember how I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect +heart." Now one lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the +definition of virtue given above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore truth +is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since +hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue, +since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every +virtue. Therefore neither is truth a special virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is numbered together with other virtues (Ethic. +ii, 7). + +_I answer that,_ The nature of human virtue consists in making a +man's deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of +goodness in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto +by a special virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni +iii) good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good +will be found where there is a special order. Now there is a special +order whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered +in relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto +man is perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that +truth is a special virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: The true and the good are convertible as to subject, +since every true thing is good, and every good thing is true. But +considered logically, they exceed one another, even as the intellect +and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands the will +and many things besides, and the will desires things pertaining to +the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the _true_ considered in +its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a particular +good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner the _good_ +considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is +something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since +virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to +be a special virtue, just as the _true_ is a special good; yet it is +not possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather, +considered logically, it is the genus of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: The habits of virtue and vice take their species from +what is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental and +beside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns +himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly +intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and +beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act +bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a +consequence beside his principal intention. + +Reply Obj. 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true, +not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is +said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure, +namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity +to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue. + +Reply Obj. 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to +duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while +having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this +virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since +this belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a +man pretends one thing and intends another. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 3] + +Whether Truth Is a Part of Justice? + +Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it +seems proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling +the truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the +case in all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a +part of justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice is +in the will, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4). Therefore truth is not a +part of justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely, +"truth of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of doctrine." But +none of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all +virtues, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3): truth of justice is the same +as justice, so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine +belongs rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise +a part of justice. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among +the parts of justice. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 80), a virtue is annexed to +justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something +in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue +thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with +justice. In the first place it is directed to another, since the +manifestation, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is +directed to another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another the +things that concern himself. In the second place, justice sets up a +certain equality between things, and this the virtue of truth does +also, for it equals signs to the things which concern man himself. +Nevertheless it falls short of the proper aspect of justice, as to +the notion of debt: for this virtue does not regard legal debt, which +justice considers, but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of +equity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore +truth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary +virtue to its principal. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes +another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society. +Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they +believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence +the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due. + +Reply Obj. 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But man, by +his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters +external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the +manifestation of the truth is an act of the will. + +Reply Obj. 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs from the +truth of life, as stated in the preceding A. 2, ad 3. + +We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to +the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated +according to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of +justice differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life +a man lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man +observes the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to +another man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do +with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of +life. In another way the truth of justice may be understood as +referring to the fact that, out of justice, a man manifests the +truth, as for instance when a man confesses the truth, or gives true +evidence in a court of justice. This truth is a particular act of +justice, and does not pertain directly to this truth of which we are +now speaking, because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a +man's chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the +Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue: "We are +not speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this +apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned." + +The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths +relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain +to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in +speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern +him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are. +Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something +concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of +doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of +truth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 4] + +Whether the Virtue of Truth Inclines Rather to That Which Is Less? + +Objection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to +that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so +does one by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five, +than that four are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil, and +to be avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore +the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather +than to that which is greater. + +Obj. 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather +than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is +nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer +to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to +one extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of +equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more +incline to that which is less. + +Obj. 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems to +amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract therefrom; +and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to amount to +an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant to truth +than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible with the +denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition. Therefore it +seems that truth should incline to that which is greater rather than +to that which is less. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by this +virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is +less." + +_I answer that,_ There are two ways of declining from the truth to +that which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show +the whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so +forth. This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is +contained in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to +what is less. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), "this +seems to be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance." For +those who represent themselves as being greater than they are, are a +source of annoyance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass +others: whereas those who make less account of themselves are a +source of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by their +moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:6): "Though I should +have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the +truth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that +which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me." + +Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say +that what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this +virtue to incline to what is less, because this would imply +falsehood. And yet this would be less repugnant to the truth, not +indeed as regards the proper aspect of truth, but as regards the +aspect of prudence, which should be safeguarded in all the virtues. +For since it is fraught with greater danger and is more annoying to +others, it is more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one +has what one has not, than to think or say that one has not what one +has. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 110 + +OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: +(2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice. +Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to +truth? + +(2) Of the species of lying; + +(3) Whether lying is always a sin? + +(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 1] + +Whether Lying Is Always Opposed to Truth? + +Objection 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For +opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible +with truth, since he that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, +lies, according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying +is not opposed to truth. + +Obj. 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but +also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by +this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's +life. But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra +Mend. xii) that "a lie is a false signification by words." +Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed to the +virtue of truth. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the +"liar's sin is the desire to deceive." But this is not opposed to +truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not +opposed to truth. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt +that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a +false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie." +But this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth. + +_I answer that,_ A moral act takes its species from two things, its +object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is +the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has +its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, +and stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material +to formal, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7). + +Now it has been said above (Q. 109, A. 1, ad 3) that the virtue of +truth--and consequently the opposite vices--regards a manifestation +made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act +of reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every +representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the +reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do +not intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural +instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this +manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be +voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper +object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And +the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is +that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of +a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived. + +Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what +is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to +deceive, then there is falsehood--materially, since what is said is +false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and +effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood. + +However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal +falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is +false; wherefore also the word _mendacium_ (lie) is derived from its +being in opposition to the _mind._ Consequently if one says what is +false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not +formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the +speaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the +speaker's intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a +specific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters falsehood +formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says +be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it +contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains +the specific nature of a lie. + +That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by +deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to +perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires +its species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be +lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, +lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form. +Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to +the virtue of truth. + +Reply Obj. 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally +and essentially rather than according to what is in it materially and +accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as +a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a +falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the +truth. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold +the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a lie +is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every +kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something +false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying. + +Reply Obj. 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of +lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to +the species of its cause. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 2] + +Whether Lies Are Sufficiently Divided into Officious, Jocose, and +Mischievous Lies? + +Objection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into +"officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should +be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its +nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part. +Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting +from a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of +that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one +act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the +effect: for a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, an +"officious" lie for some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in +order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in +this way. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of +lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie that +profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party so +as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying +and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the +sixth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving his money"; the +seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from +death"; the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him +from defilement of the body." Therefore it seems that the first +division of lies is insufficient. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into +"boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which +falls short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are +not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore +it seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that +speak a lie," says "that there are three kinds of lies; for some are +told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is +another kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is +told out of malice." The first of these is called an officious lie, +the second a jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies +are divided into these three kinds. + +_I answer that,_ Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with +respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential +division of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. +iv, 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the +truth, and this belongs to "boasting," and the lie which stops short +of the truth, and this belongs to "irony." This division is an +essential division of lying itself, because lying as such is opposed +to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of +equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition. + +Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, +and with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of +lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is +aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this +is called a "mischievous" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished +if it be directed to some good--either of pleasure and then it is a +"jocose" lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the "officious" lie, +whereby it is intended to help another person, or to save him from +being injured. In this way lies are divided into the three kinds +aforesaid. + +Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to +their relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish +their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as +stated in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are +contained under "mischievous" lies, which are either against God, and +then we have the lie "in religious doctrine," or against man, and +this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is +the second kind of lie, which "profits no one, and injures someone"; +or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting +another, and this is the third kind of lie, "which profits one, and +injures another." Of these the first is the most grievous, because +sins against God are always more grievous, as stated above (I-II, Q. +73, A. 3): and the second is more grievous than the third, since the +latter's gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting another. + +After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a +fourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition or +diminution; and this is the lie which is told "out of mere lust of +lying and deceiving." This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the +Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "the liar, when he lies from +habit, delights in lying." + +The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying. +For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told "with a desire to +please": and the remaining three are comprised under the officious +lie, wherein something useful to another person is intended. This +usefulness regards either external things, and then we have the sixth +kind of lie, which "profits someone in saving his money"; or his +body, and this is the seventh kind, which "saves a man from death"; +or the morality of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which +"saves him from unlawful defilement of his body." + +Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the +sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration +of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are +enumerated in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better +than the pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and +virtue than the life of the body. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 3] + +Whether Every Lie Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident +that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet +they seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the +words of Christ and of others often differ from one another: +wherefore seemingly one of them must have given an untrue account. +Therefore not every lie is a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives +of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that "God +built them houses" (Ex. 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ +that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very +holy men that they lied. Thus (Gen. 12 and 20) we are told that +Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied +when he said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gen. +27:27-29). Again, Judith is commended (Judith 15:10, 11) although she +lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to +avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the +whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion +in a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore +a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or +another from being killed. + +Obj. 5: Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised. +Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says +(Synonym. ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill." +Therefore not every lie is a sin. + +Obj. 6: Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive +our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): "Whoever +thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives +himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he +deceives others." Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no +one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are +told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the +sake of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions +in Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): "Be not willing to +make any manner of lie." + +_I answer that,_ An action that is naturally evil in respect of its +genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an +action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good +results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single +defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in +respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter. +For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is +unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is +not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that +"lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is +good and worthy of praise." Therefore every lie is a sin, as also +Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i). + +Reply Obj. 1: It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is +contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that +the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be +deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy +Writ. That the words of certain people are variously reported in the +Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence +Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): "He that has the wit to +understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at +the sense, will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no +matter by what words that sense is expressed." Hence it is evident, +as he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that "we must not judge that +someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way +and in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or +heard." + +Reply Obj. 2: The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for +their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them to +tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): "And because the +midwives feared God, He built them houses." But the subsequent lie +was not meritorious. + +Reply Obj. 3: In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De Mend. v), +the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect +virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If, +however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must +understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic. +Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): "We must believe that +whatever is related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned +as being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically." +As to Abraham "when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to +hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since +she was the daughter of his father," Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen. +xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself +said (Gen. 20:12): "She is truly my sister, the daughter of my +father, and not the daughter of my mother," being related to him on +his father's side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's +first-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the +latter's birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of this +mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to +signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the +Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews. + +Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of +perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that +it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to +do certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for +lying to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which +end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that +her words contain truth in some mystical sense. + +Reply Obj. 4: A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's +neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above +in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything +inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as +neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except +perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore +it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any +danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth +prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x). + +Reply Obj. 5: A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what +he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in +mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without +faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two +reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful, +because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind. +Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and +the business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man +to be bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to +remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising--since he +promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for +granted--nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because +circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he +did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor. 1), did +not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him. + +Reply Obj. 6: An action may be considered in two ways. First, in +itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie, +from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive; +although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, +nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any +similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, +with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De +Mend. v), "it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because +every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a +thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it +is tendered understand it to signify." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 4] + +Whether Every Lie Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is +written (Ps. 6:7): "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," and +(Wis. 1:11): "The mouth that belieth killeth the soul." Now mortal +sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every +lie is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is a +mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: "Thou +shalt not bear false witness." Therefore every lie is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): "Every +liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person +to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith +with him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty +of iniquity." Now no one is said to break his faith or "to be guilty +of iniquity," for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal +sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for +a temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that "we learn from +the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the +reward which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might +have received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on +account of the lie of which they were guilty." Therefore even an +officious lie, such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is +the least of lies, is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that "it is a +precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to +wish to lie." Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept. +Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently +so also is a lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be +worse off than others. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy," +etc.: "There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet +are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake +of our neighbor's good." But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore +jocose and officious lies are not mortal sins. + +_I answer that,_ A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is +contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as +stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; Q. 35, A. 3). Now a lie may be contrary +to charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of +the evil intended; thirdly, accidentally. + +A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false +signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to +the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; +so that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of +charity, but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it +is a most grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false +signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a +man's good, for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science +or to moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on +one's neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion, +wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our +neighbor, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the +false opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the +knowledge of which is of no consequence, then the lie in question +does no harm to one's neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived +as to some contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore +a lie of this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin. + +As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through +being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a +mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure +one's neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and +this also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's +neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of +committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to +charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a +mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little +pleasure is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of +one's neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to +charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: +and thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were +not deterred through scandal from lying publicly. + +Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a +gloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that +speak a lie." + +Reply Obj. 2: Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to +the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 44, A. 1, ad 3; +I-II, Q. 100, A. 5, ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the +decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our +neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness +against our neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even a venial sin can be called "iniquity" in a broad +sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore it +is written (1 John 3:4): "Every sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'And sin is +iniquity.']." It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking. + +Reply Obj. 4: The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways. +First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews, and +their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition +is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in +his exposition of Isa. 65:21, 'And they shall build houses') explains +that God "built them spiritual houses." Secondly, it may be +considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they +could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal +meed, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity +of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an +eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words +of Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal +reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding +kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean. + +Reply Obj. 5: Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal +sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a +sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another +species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to +another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to +that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot +apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a +jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps +accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in this sense the +saying of Augustine that "it is a precept of perfection not only not +to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie": although Augustine says +this not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: "Unless +perhaps it is a precept," etc. Nor does it matter that they are +placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are bound +to safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or +teaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal +sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in +other matters. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 111 + +OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY +(In Four Articles) + +In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under +this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin? + +(2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation? + +(3) Whether it is opposed to truth? + +(4) Whether it is a mortal sin? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 1] + +Whether All Dissimulation Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is +written (Luke 24:28) that our Lord "pretended [Douay: 'made as +though'] he would go farther"; and Ambrose in his book on the +Patriarchs (De Abraham i) says of Abraham that he "spoke craftily to +his servants, when he said" (Gen. 22:5): "I and the boy will go with +speed as far as yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return to +you." Now to pretend and to speak craftily savor of dissimulation: +and yet it is not to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abraham. +Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in +his commentary on Gal. 2:11, "When Peter [Vulg.: 'Cephas'] was come +to Antioch:--The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest +of Baal, pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach us +that dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed"; and David +"changed his countenance before" Achis, king of Geth (1 Kings 21:13). +Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil to +simulate good, it is good to simulate evil. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is written in condemnation of certain people +(Isa. 3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they +have not hid it." Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one's sin. +Therefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is +never reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not a +sin. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Isa. 16:14, "In three years," etc., +says: "Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate +holiness." But to sin openly is always a sin. Therefore dissimulation +is always a sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 109, A. 3; Q. 110, A. 1), it +belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by outward +signs to be such as one is. Now outward signs are not only words, but +also deeds. Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by +words something different from that which is in one's mind, so also +is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify +the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is properly +denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is properly a +lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not whether +one lie in word or in any other way, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 1, +Obj. 2). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as stated above (Q. +110, A. 3), it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), "To pretend is +not always a lie: but only when the pretense has no signification, +then it is a lie. When, however, our pretense refers to some +signification, there is no lie, but a representation of the truth." +And he cites figures of speech as an example, where a thing is +"pretended," for we do not mean it to be taken literally but as a +figure of something else that we wish to say. In this way our Lord +"pretended He would go farther," because He acted as if wishing to go +farther; in order to signify something figuratively either because He +was far from their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev.); +or, as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, "as He was about +to go farther away from them by ascending into heaven, He was, so to +speak, held back on earth by their hospitality." + +Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (De Abraham i) +says that Abraham "foretold what he knew not": for he intended to +return alone after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord +expressed what He was about to do. It is evident therefore that +neither dissembled. + +Reply Obj. 2: Jerome employs the term "simulation" in a broad sense +for any kind of pretense. David's change of countenance was a +figurative pretense, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title +of Ps. 33, "I will bless the Lord at all times." There is no need to +excuse Jehu's dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked +man, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kings +10:29, 31). And yet he is praised withal and received an earthly +reward from God, not for his dissimulation, but for his zeal in +destroying the worship of Baal. + +Reply Obj. 3: Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked, because +no one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do evil +deeds, he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man +might pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but has +some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil, +both because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although +he is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the +wickedness he simulates. And because dissimulation is evil in itself, +its sinfulness is not derived from the thing simulated, whether this +be good or evil. + +Reply Obj. 4: Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that which +he is not, yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is, for +this is sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by +outward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not, +yet he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one +may hide one's sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus +that we must understand the saying of Jerome on the words of Isa. +3:9, that the "second remedy after shipwreck is to hide one's sin," +lest, to wit, others be scandalized thereby. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 2] + +Whether Hypocrisy Is the Same As Dissimulation? + +Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as +dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But +there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly, +according to Matt. 6:2, "When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a +trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do." Therefore hypocrisy is +not the same as dissimulation. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): "Some there are who +wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of +perfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks +of the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and +another to sin from malice." Now those who wear the habit of +holiness, without attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers, +since the outward habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore +dissimulation is not the same as hypocrisy. + +Obj. 3: Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our +Lord says of hypocrites (Matt. 23:5) that "all their works they do +for to be seen of men": and Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that "they +never consider what it is that they do, but how by their every action +they may please men." But dissimulation consists, not in the mere +intention, but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job 36:13, +"Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God," says that "the +dissembler simulates one thing and does another: he pretends +chastity, and delights in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and +fills his purse." Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as +dissimulation. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Hypocrite' is a Greek +word corresponding to the Latin 'simulator,' for whereas he is evil +within," he "shows himself outwardly as being good; _hypo_ denoting +falsehood, and _krisis_, judgment." + +_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x), "the word hypocrite is +derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a +disguised face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to +imitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under +the guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to +deceive the people in their acting." Hence Augustine says (De Serm. +Dom. ii) that "just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the +parts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon +is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and +in every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is +not is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just without being so in +reality." + +We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not, +however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person +simulates another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just +man. + +Reply Obj. 1: The outward deed is a natural sign of the intention. +Accordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their genus to +the service of God, and seeks by their means to please, not God but +man, he simulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore +Gregory says (Moral.) that "hypocrites make God's interests +subservient to worldly purposes, since by making a show of saintly +conduct they seek, not to turn men to God, but to draw to themselves +the applause of their approval:" and so they make a lying pretense of +having a good intention, which they have not, although they do not +pretend to do a good deed without doing it. + +Reply Obj. 2: The habit of holiness, for instance the religious or +the clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one is bound to perform +works of perfection. And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness, +with the intention of entering the state of perfection, if he fail +through weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he +is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of +holiness. If, however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in +order to make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a +dissembler. + +Reply Obj. 3: In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two things: +one by way of sign, the other by way of thing signified. Accordingly +the evil intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified, +which does not tally with the sign: and the outward words, or deeds, +or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie +as a sign. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 3] + +Whether Hypocrisy Is Contrary to the Virtue of Truth? + +Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of +truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing +signified. Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be +opposed to any special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates any virtue, +and by means of any virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms +deeds, as stated in Matt. 6:1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not +specially opposed to the virtue of truth. + +Obj. 2: Further, all dissimulation seems to proceed from guile, +wherefore it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to +prudence as above stated (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore, hypocrisy which is +dissimulation is not opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or +simplicity. + +Obj. 3: Further, the species of moral acts is taken from their end. +Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vainglory: +wherefore a gloss on Job 27:8, "What is the hope of the hypocrite, if +through covetousness he take by violence," says: "A hypocrite or, as +the Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: for through +desire of being honored for holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he +steals praise for a life which is not his." [*The quotation is from +St. Gregory's _Moralia,_ Bk XVIII.] Therefore since covetousness or +vainglory is not directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is +hypocrisy or dissimulation. + +_On the contrary,_ All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above (A. +1). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore dissimulation +or hypocrisy is also. + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. text. 13, 24, +x), "contrariety is opposition as regards form," i.e. the specific +form. Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may +be opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another +way indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be +considered with regard to the very species of the act, and this +species depends on that act's proper object. Wherefore since +hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a +character which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it +follows that it is directly opposed to truth whereby a man shows +himself in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in _Ethic._ +iv, 7. + +The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered +in relation to any accident, for instance a remote end, or an +instrument of action, or anything else of that kind. + +Reply Obj. 1: The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it as his +end, not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to have it, +but in respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it. +Hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth, +inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And +he performs acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own +sake, but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his +hypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to that +virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4, 5), the vice directly +opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it belongs to discover ways +of achieving a purpose, that are apparent and not real: while it +accomplishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds: +and it stands in relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to +simplicity. Now guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception, +and sometimes secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly to +simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this way the +virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated +above (Q. 109, A. 2, ad 4). There is, however, a mere logical +difference between them, because by truth we mean the concordance +between sign and thing signified, while simplicity indicates that one +does not tend to different things, by intending one thing inwardly, +and pretending another outwardly. + +Reply Obj. 3: Gain or glory is the remote end of the dissembler as +also of the liar. Hence it does not take its species from this end, +but from the proximate end, which is to show oneself other than one +is. Wherefore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things +of himself, for no further purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy, +as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and as also we have said +above with regard to lying (Q. 110, A. 2). +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 4] + +Whether Hypocrisy Is Always a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. For +Jerome says on Isa. 16:14: "Of the two evils it is less to sin openly +than to simulate holiness": and a gloss on Job 1:21 [*St. Augustine, +on Ps. 63:7], "As it hath pleased the Lord," etc., says that +"pretended justice is no justice, but a twofold sin": and again a +gloss on Lam. 4:6, "The iniquity . . . of my people is made greater +than the sin of Sodom," says: "He deplores the sins of the soul that +falls into hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of +Sodom." Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is +always a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 8) that hypocrites sin +out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin +against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion from +seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is +deserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, "Dissemblers and +crafty men prove the wrath of God": and the hypocrite is excluded +from seeing God, according to Job 13:16, "No hypocrite shall come +before His presence." Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of +dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed. +Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin. + +Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But +this is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself +a mortal sin. + +Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral. +xxxi, 17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither +therefore is hypocrisy. + +_I answer that,_ There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness, +and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a +person whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely, +who cares not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred +Scripture is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a +mortal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through +mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate +holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in +mortal sin, whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the +dissimulation itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a +venial sin. This will depend on the end in view; for if this be +contrary to the love of God or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal +sin: for instance if he were to simulate holiness in order to +disseminate false doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical +preferment, though unworthy, or that he may obtain any temporal good +in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be not +contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance when a +man takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of such a man it is said +in _Ethic._ iv, 7 that "he would seem to be vain rather than evil"; +for the same applies to simulation as to a lie. + +It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of +holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of +this kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated +with mortal sin. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 112 + +OF BOASTING +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the first head, +namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) To which virtue is it opposed? + +(2) Whether it is a mortal sin? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 112, Art. 1] + +Whether Boasting Is Opposed to the Virtue of Truth? + +Objection 1: It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of +truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast +even without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence. +Thus it is written (Esther 1:3, 4) that Assuerus "made a great feast +. . . that he might show the riches of the glory" and "of his +kingdom, and the greatness and boasting of his power." Therefore +boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth. + +Obj. 2: Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4) to +be one of the four species of pride, "when," to wit, "a man boasts of +having what he has not." Hence it is written (Jer. 48:29, 30): "We +have heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness, +and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I +know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is +not according to it." Moreover, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that +boasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed +to the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to +truth, but to humility. + +Obj. 3: Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches; wherefore +it is written (Wis. 5:8): "What hath pride profited us? or what +advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us?" Now excess of +riches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed +to justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 7), that +boasting is opposed to truth. + +_I answer that,_ _Jactantia_ (boasting) seems properly to denote the +uplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw +(_jactare_) a thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift +oneself, properly speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself [*Or +'tall-talking' as we should say in English]. This happens in two +ways. For sometimes a man speaks of himself, not above what he is in +himself, but above that which he is esteemed by men to be: and this +the Apostle declines to do when he says (2 Cor. 12:6): "I forbear +lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me, or +anything he heareth of me." In another way a man uplifts himself in +words, by speaking of himself above that which he is in reality. And +since we should judge of things as they are in themselves, rather +than as others deem them to be, it follows that boasting denotes more +properly the uplifting of self above what one is in oneself, than the +uplifting of self above what others think of one: although in either +case it may be called boasting. Hence boasting properly so called is +opposed to truth by way of excess. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes boasting as exceeding men's opinion. + +Reply Obj. 2: The sin of boasting may be considered in two ways. +First, with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is opposed +to truth; as stated (in the body of the article and Q. 110, A. 2). +Secondly, with regard to its cause, from which more frequently though +not always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride as its inwardly +moving and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly by +arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of great things +about himself; though sometimes a man takes to boasting, not from +arrogance, but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein, +because he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is an +uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it is not +the same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For this reason +Gregory reckons boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the +boaster frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, and +so, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its +end. + +Reply Obj. 3: Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. First, as an +occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches. +Hence (Prov. 8:18) "riches" are significantly described as "proud" +[Douay: 'glorious']. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since +according to _Ethic._ iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake of +glory, but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent stories +about themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for instance, they +pretend to be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 112, Art. 2] + +Whether Boasting Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is +written (Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth, and puffeth himself, +stirreth up quarrels." Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels, +since God hates those that sow discord, according to Prov. 6:19. +Therefore boasting is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is forbidden in God's law is a mortal sin. +Now a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, "Extol not thyself in the thoughts of thy +soul," says: "This is a prohibition of boasting and pride." Therefore +boasting is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an +officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying; +for according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), "the boaster +pretends to something greater than he is, sometimes for no further +purpose, sometimes for the sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the +sake of money." Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious +nor a jocose lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie. +Therefore seemingly it is always a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Boasting arises from vainglory, according to +Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin, +but is sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid. For +Gregory says (Moral. viii, 30) that "it belongs to the very perfect, +by outward deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are +not inwardly uplifted by the praise awarded them." Therefore boasting +is not always a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, A. 4), a mortal sin is one +that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered +in two ways. First, in itself, as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a +mortal, and sometimes a venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a +man boasts of that which is contrary to God's glory--thus it is said +in the person of the king of Tyre (Ezech. 28:2): "Thy heart is lifted +up, and thou hast said: I am God"--or contrary to the love of our +neighbor, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out into +invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee who said (Luke +18:11): "I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, +adulterers, as also is this publican." Sometimes it is a venial sin, +when, to wit, a man boasts of things that are against neither God nor +his neighbor. Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its +cause, namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and then +if it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin, +then the boasting will also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a +venial sin. Sometimes, however, a man breaks out into boasting +through desire of gain, and for this very reason he would seem to be +aiming at the deception and injury of his neighbor: wherefore +boasting of this kind is more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the +Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "a man who boasts for the sake +of gain, is viler than one who boasts for the sake of glory or +honor." Yet it is not always a mortal sin because the gain may be +such as not to injure another man. + +Reply Obj. 1: To boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal sin. But +it happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels, not +intentionally but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not be +a mortal sin on that account. + +Reply Obj. 2: This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from pride +that is a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Boasting does not always involve a mischievous lie, but +only where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbor, either +in itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere pleasure in +boasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. +iv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he +were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn God's +commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it would be against +the charity of God, in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its +last end. + +To boast for the sake of glory or gain seems to involve an officious +lie: provided it be done without injury to others, for then it would +at once become a mischievous lie. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 113 + +IRONY* +(In Two Articles) +[*Irony here must be given the signification of the Greek _eironia_, +whence it is derived: dissimulation of one's own good points.] + +We must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether irony is a sin? + +(2) Of its comparison with boasting. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 113, Art. 1] + +Whether Irony Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that irony, which consists in belittling +oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's being +strengthened by God: and yet this leads one to belittle oneself, +according to Prov. 30:1, 2: "The vision which the man spoke, with +whom is God, and who being strengthened by God, abiding with him, +said, I am the most foolish of men." Also it is written (Amos 7:14): +"Amos answered . . . I am not a prophet." Therefore irony, whereby a +man belittles himself in words, is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of the +English (Regist. xii): "It is the mark of a well-disposed mind to +acknowledge one's fault when one is not guilty." But all sin is +inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But "some belittle +themselves in words, so as to avoid pride," according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm. xxix): "If +thou liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before +lying, thou hast become one by lying." + +_I answer that,_ To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two +ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the +greater things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of +himself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle +oneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in +respect of its genus, except through corruption of one of its +circumstances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the +truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the +existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying +something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself +to possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly. For +there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly folly +annexed to it, according to 1 Cor. 3:18, "If any man among you seem +to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise." +But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text +goes on to say, "is foolishness with God." Accordingly, he that is +strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the +estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which +human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, "and the wisdom +of men is not with me," and farther on, "and I have known the science +of the saints" [*Vulg.: 'and I have not known the science of the +saints']. + +It may also be replied that "the wisdom of men" is that which is +acquired by human reason, while the "wisdom of the saints" is that +which is received by divine inspiration. + +Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not +of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, "nor am I the son of +a prophet." + +Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man tend to +perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty, not only +if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but +also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which sometimes is +not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does not +acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony. + +Reply Obj. 3: A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid +another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to +avoid pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): "Shun not +arrogance so as to forsake truth": and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3) +that "it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 113, Art. 2] + +Whether Irony Is a Less Grievous Sin Than Boasting? + +Objection 1: It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than +boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is +a kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it +any more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less +grievous sin than boasting. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), irony +sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony is +not a less grievous sin than boasting. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25): "When he shall speak +low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart." +Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a +manifold wickedness. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): "Those who +speak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, +seemingly, in their manners." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, AA. 2, 4), one lie is more +grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is +about--thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most +grievous--and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a +mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now +irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by +any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person: +so that in this respect they are equal. + +But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely, +the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man's +averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by +uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic. +iv, 7) that "boasting is a more grievous sin than irony." + +Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some +other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then +irony is more grievous. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting, according +as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its +matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal. + +Reply Obj. 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the other in +spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by outward +words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for +instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the +kind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some +spiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Matt. 6:16) +that "they disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to +fast." Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and +boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason they +sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that +it is "the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, +and to make very little of themselves": and for the same reason it is +related of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess clothes that +were either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men seek +glory. + +Reply Obj. 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, "There is one +that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit," +and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through +deceitful humility, "speaks low" wickedly. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 114 + +OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and +the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning +friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is a special virtue? + +(2) Whether it is a part of justice? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 114, Art. 1] + +Whether Friendliness Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For +the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect friendship is +that which is on account of virtue." Now any virtue is the cause of +friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as Dionysius states +(Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a +consequence of every virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind of +friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both from those he +loves and from those who are not his friends." Now it seems to +pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship +to those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue. +Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a wise man +decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): "The heart +of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where +there is mirth": wherefore "it belongs to a virtuous man to be most +wary of pleasure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship, +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), "is essentially desirous +of sharing pleasures, but fears to give pain." Therefore this kind of +friendliness is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. +Now it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): "Make thyself affable to the +congregation of the poor." Therefore affability, which is what we +mean by friendship, is a special virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; I-II, Q. 55, A. 3), +since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of +good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists +in order, as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2). And it behooves man to be +maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their +mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, +so that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence +the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this +order: and this virtue is called friendliness. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his +_Ethics._ One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves +another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in +treating of charity (Q. 23, A. 1, A. 3, ad 1; QQ. 25, 26), what +things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another +friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this +has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain +likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner +towards those with whom he is in contact. + +Reply Obj. 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a certain +general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that "every beast +loveth its like." This love is signified by signs of friendship, +which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are +strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this: +because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do +not treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to +us by special friendship. + +Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that "the heart of the wise is where +there is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his +neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy +meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to +charity": but that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, +according to Ecclus. 7:38, "Be not wanting in comforting them that +weep, and walk with them that mourn." Again, "the heart of fools is +where there is mirth," not that they may gladden others, but that +they may enjoy others' gladness. Accordingly, it belongs to the wise +man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not +lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, +according to Ps. 132:1, "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for +brethren to dwell together in unity." + +Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of +some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the +virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those +among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): "Although I +made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent," and further on (2 +Cor. 7:9), "I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but +because you were made sorrowful unto repentance." For this reason we +should not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in +order that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, +and in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written +(Ecclus. 7:26): "Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and +show not thy countenance gay towards them." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 114, Art. 2] + +Whether This Kind of Friendship Is a Part of Justice? + +Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of +justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this +virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably +towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part +of justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this +virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in +fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest +pleasures, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5; Q. 61, A. 3). +Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is +contrary to justice, as stated above (Q. 59, AA. 1, 2). Now, +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in +like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers." Therefore +this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto. + +_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a +part of justice. + +_I answer that,_ This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to +it as to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is +directed to another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of +the notion of justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt, +whereby one man is bound to another, either by legal debt, which the +law binds him to pay, or by some debt arising out of a favor +received. For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely, +that we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless at +times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them for some +good purpose. + +Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 109, A. 3, ad 1), because man +is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the +manifestation of truth without which human society could not last. +Now as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not +without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one +could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a +certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his +fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for +their good. + +Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the +senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which +have their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves +becomingly towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as +though they were noisome. + +Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that one +ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and +strangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), "it is not fitting to +please and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way." +This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all +in a fitting manner. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 115 + +OF FLATTERY +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: +(1) Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether flattery is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is a mortal sin? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 115, Art. 1] + +Whether Flattery Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery +consists in words of praise offered to another in order to please +him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov. +31:28, "Her children rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and +he praised her." Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please +others, according to 1 Cor. 10:33, "I . . . in all things please all +men." Therefore flattery is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise. But +it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise +good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a +sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore +Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against +flattery. "It must be observed," says he, "that by the wonderful +moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by +detractions but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the +voice of the flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may +humble." But detraction is an evil, as stated above (Q. 73, AA. 2, +3). Therefore flattery is a good. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, "Woe to them that sew +cushions under every elbow," says, "that is to say, sweet flattery." +Therefore flattery is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 114, A. 1, ad 3), although the +friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends +chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not +fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, +or of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish +always to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of +pleasing, and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the +mere intention of pleasing he is said to be "complaisant," according +to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the +intention of making some gain out of it, he is called a "flatterer" +or "adulator." As a rule, however, the term "flattery" is wont to be +applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing +others by words or deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their +fellows. + +Reply Obj. 1: One may praise a person both well and ill, according as +one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while observing +other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person by +praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive +to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of +friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise +a person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since +perhaps they are evil, according to Ps. 9:24, "The sinner is praised +in the desires of his soul"; or they may be uncertain, according to +Ecclus. 27:8, "Praise not a man before he speaketh," and again +(Ecclus. 11:2), "Praise not a man for his beauty"; or because there +may be fear lest human praise should incite him to vainglory, +wherefore it is written, (Ecclus. 11:30), "Praise not any man before +death." Again, in like manner it is right to wish to please a man in +order to foster charity, so that he may make spiritual progress +therein. But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of +vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil, according to +Ps. 52:6, "God hath scattered the bones of them that please men," and +according to the words of the Apostle (Gal. 1:10), "If I yet pleased +men, I should not be the servant of Christ." + +Reply Obj. 2: Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circumstances be +not observed; and so too is it to praise good. + +Reply Obj. 3: Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one +another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which +is contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as +regards the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person +flattered, whereas the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the +person defamed, since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks +rather his defamation. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 115, Art. 2] + +Whether Flattery Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according +to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is +harmful." But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, "For +the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man +is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the Lord." Wherefore Jerome says +(Ep. ad Celant): "Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as +flattery": and a gloss on Ps. 69:4, "Let them be presently turned +away blushing for shame that say to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well," says: +"The tongue of the flatterer harms more than the sword of the +persecutor." Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less +than others: wherefore it is written (Ps. 36:15): "Let their sword +enter into their own hearts." Now he that flatters another induces +him to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, "Let not the oil of +the sinner fatten my head," says: "The false praise of the flatterer +softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders +it susceptive of vice." Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin +in himself. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3): +"The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and +treachery shall be degraded from his office." Now such a punishment +as this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a +mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de +Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any +person of higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of +necessity." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 112, A. 2), a mortal sin is one +that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to +charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways. +First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises +another's sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose +justice he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he +encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Isa. +5:20. "Woe to you that call evil good." Secondly, by reason of the +intention, as when one man flatters another, so that by deceiving him +he may injure him in body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and +of this it is written (Prov. 27:6): "Better are the wounds of a +friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy." Thirdly, by way of +occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his +intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In this case it +is necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or taken, +and how grievous the consequent downfall, as may be understood from +what has been said above concerning scandal (Q. 43, AA. 3, 4). If, +however, one man flatters another from the mere craving to please +others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something +in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently +it is not a mortal but a venial sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises +another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than the +sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of +greater consequence, namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so +efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively, +being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can +be a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (Q. +43, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 8, ad 3; I-II, Q. 80, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument applies to one that flatters with the +intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than +others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning, +whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others. + +Reply Obj. 3: The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters +another treacherously, in order to deceive him. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 116 + +OF QUARRELING +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship? + +(2) Of its comparison with flattery? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 116, Art. 1] + +Whether Quarreling Is Opposed to the Virtue of Friendship or +Affability? + +Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of +friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord, +just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated +above (Q. 37, A. 1). Therefore quarreling is also. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): "An angry man stirreth +up strife." Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife or +quarreling is also. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (James 4:1): "From whence are wars and +quarrels [Douay: 'contentions'] among you? Are they not hence, from +your concupiscences which war in your members?" Now it would seem +contrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it +seems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship +(Ethic. iv, 6). + +_I answer that,_ Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely, +one person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be +observed in this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on +account of the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to +consent with him from lack of that love which unites minds together, +and this seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity. +Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being +a person to whom someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence +arises quarreling, which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or +affability, to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards those +among whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that +"those who are opposed to everything with the intent of being +disagreeable, and care for nobody, are said to be peevish and +quarrelsome." + +Reply Obj. 1: Contention pertains rather to the contradiction of +discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the +intention of displeasing. + +Reply Obj. 2: The direct opposition of virtues to vices depends, not +on their causes, since one vice may arise from many causes, but on +the species of their acts. And although quarreling arises at times +from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence it does not +follow that it is directly opposed to meekness. + +Reply Obj. 3: James speaks there of concupiscence considered as a +general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says: +"The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all +evil." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 116, Art. 2] + +Whether Quarreling Is a More Grievous Sin Than Flattery? + +Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the +contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin +does the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm +than quarreling, for it is written (Isa. 3:12): "O My people, they +that call thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of +thy steps." Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling. + +Obj. 2: Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in +flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another: +whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts +openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous +sin than quarreling. + +Obj. 3: Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a +flatterer than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous +sin than flattery. + +_On the contrary,_ The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual +state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be +more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Tim. +3:2, 3) that it "behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome"; and +(2 Tim. 3:24): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle." Therefore +quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery. + +_I answer that,_ We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In +one way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more +a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it +is. Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please +than to displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving +displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who +exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as +regards certain external motives, and thus flattery is sometimes more +grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue +honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for +instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up +the speaker to contempt. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving +secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly. +Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person +openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a +more grievous sin than theft, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 9). + +Reply Obj. 2: In human acts, the more grievous is not always the more +vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason: +wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the +reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since +they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are +committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem to arise +from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason, +although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a +greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by +deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding +from greater contempt, is apparently more grievous. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the objection, shame regards the vileness +of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more +grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more +ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more +grievous. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 117 + +OF LIBERALITY +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely, +covetousness and prodigality. + +Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether liberality is a virtue? + +(2) What is its matter? + +(3) Of its act; + +(4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take? + +(5) Whether liberality is a part of justice? + +(6) Of its comparison with other virtues. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 1] + +Whether Liberality Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue +is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination +for one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it +pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to +the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), "it is the mark of a liberal man not +to look to himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things." +Therefore liberality is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth +contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8. +Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the +liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic. +iv, 1) that "he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but +to give it away." + +Obj. 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But +liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues: +since many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing +to give; and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous +otherwise. Therefore liberality is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "the Gospel +contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated." +Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. +Therefore liberality is a virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), "it belongs +to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill." Now we may use +both well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as +the powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are +without, such as the things of this world that are granted us for our +livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these +things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp.) and Basil +(Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to some, in +order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it +suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal man +commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we +are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in +which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And +yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to +attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those +belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "It is a +commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them +to be in want." + +Reply Obj. 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his +riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal +to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence +the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the liberal man does not +neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people"; and +Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "Our Lord does not wish a man to pour +out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he do as +Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be +bound by any household cares." For this belongs to the state of +perfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Q. 184; Q. 186, A. 3). + +It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's +possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is +directed to happiness. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "those who +spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal"; and +likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence +Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "If you assist to rob others of their +possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your +liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than +of pity." Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend +much on certain evil works, are not liberal. + +Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good +uses, without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform +works of other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not +in the same way as virtuous people, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. +1). In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being +liberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, +1): "Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance," i.e. his +means, "for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit +of the giver": and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "it is the heart +that makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 2] + +Whether Liberality Is About Money? + +Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not about money. For every +moral virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to +justice to be about operations, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1. +Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is +about passions and not about money. + +Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any kind +of wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial riches, +according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5, 6). Therefore liberality +is not chiefly about money. + +Obj. 3: Further, different virtues have different matter, since +habits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are +the matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they +are not the matter of liberality. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that +"liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money." + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it +belongs to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is +also called open-handedness (_largitas_), because that which is open +does not withhold things but parts with them. The term "liberality" +seems also to allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing +he frees it (_liberat_), so to speak, from his keeping and ownership, +and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things +which are the subject of a man's free-handedness towards others are +the goods he possesses, which are denoted by the term "money." +Therefore the proper matter of liberality is money. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), liberality depends not on +the quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart of +the giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire, +and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things +given. Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of +liberality, while exterior money is the object of those same passions. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in his book _De Disciplina Christi_ +(Tract. de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth, and +whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of _pecunia_ (money), because +in olden times men's possessions consisted entirely of _pecora_ +(flocks). And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "We give the name +of money to anything that can be valued in currency." + +Reply Obj. 3: Justice establishes equality in external things, but +has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of internal +passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of liberality, and +in another way of justice. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 3] + +Whether Using Money Is the Act of Liberality? + +Objection 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality. +For different virtues have different acts. But using money is +becoming to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence. +Therefore it is not the proper act of liberality. + +Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but +also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be +connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be +unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality. + +Obj. 3: Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it but +also in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the spender, +and consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says (De +Benef. v): "A man is not liberal by giving to himself." Therefore not +every use of money belongs to liberality. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "In whatever +matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter: +Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the +best use of riches." Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good +use of money is the act of liberality. + +_I answer that,_ The species of an act is taken from its object, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Now the object or matter of +liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the +foregoing Article (ad 2). And since every virtue is consistent with +its object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is +consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful +goods, since all external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the +proper act of liberality is making use of money or riches. + +Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to liberality to make good use of +riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On +the other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under +another aspect, namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing +is due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of +riches under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed +for the fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in +relation to liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall +explain farther on (Q. 134). + +Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make +good use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide +opportunities for that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier's +fortitude not only to wield his sword against the foe, but also to +sharpen his sword and keep it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to +liberality not only to use money, but also to keep it in preparation +and safety in order to make fitting use of it. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated (A. 2, ad 1), the internal passions +whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of +liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man +should not be prevented from making any due use of money through an +inordinate affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one +consists in applying it to one's own use, and would seem to come under +the designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in +devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts. +Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an +immoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from +making suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with giving +and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). The saying +of Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving: for a man is not +said to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to himself. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 4] + +Whether It Belongs to a Liberal Man Chiefly to Give? + +Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to a liberal man +chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral virtues, is +regulated by prudence. Now it seems to belong very much to prudence +that a man should keep his riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says +(Ethic. iv, 1) that "those who have not earned money, but have +received the money earned by others, spend it more liberally, because +they have not experienced the want of it." Therefore it seems that +giving does not chiefly belong to the liberal man. + +Obj. 2: Further, no man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to do, +nor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal man is sometimes sorry +for what he has given, nor does he give to all, as stated in _Ethic._ +iv, 1. Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give. + +Obj. 3: Further, in order to accomplish what he intends chiefly, a +man employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal man is not a beggar, +as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he +might provide himself with the means of giving to others. Therefore +it seems that he does not chiefly aim at giving. + +Obj. 4: Further, man is bound to look after himself rather than +others. But by spending he looks after himself, whereas by giving he +looks after others. Therefore it belongs to a liberal man to spend +rather than to give. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "it +belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving." + +_I answer that,_ It is proper to a liberal man to use money. Now the +use of money consists in parting with it. For the acquisition of +money is like generation rather than use: while the keeping of money, +in so far as it is directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a +habit. Now in parting with a thing--for instance, when we throw +something--the farther we put it away the greater the force +(_virtus_) employed. Hence parting with money by giving it to others +proceeds from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves. +But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more perfect, +since "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). +Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving. + +Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest it be stolen +or spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is not less but more +prudent than to keep it usefully: since more things have to be +considered in money's use, which is likened to movement, than in its +keeping, which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received +money that others have earned, spend it more liberally, through not +having experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the sole +cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue of +liberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely removes the +impediment to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to +act liberally, because, not unfrequently, the fear of want that +results from the experience of want hinders those who have acquired +money from using it up by acting with liberality; as does likewise +the love they have for it as being their own effect, according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated in this and the preceding Article, it belongs +to liberality to make fitting use of money, and consequently to give +it in a fitting manner, since this is a use of money. Again, every +virtue is grieved by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids +whatever hinders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable +giving; namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given, and +giving something unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at +both: but especially at the former, since it is more opposed to his +proper act. For this reason, too, he does not give to all: since his +act would be hindered were he to give to everyone: for he would not +have the means of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him to +give. + +Reply Obj. 3: Giving and receiving are related to one another as +action and passion. Now the same thing is not the principle of both +action and passion. Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving, +it does not belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and +still less to beg. Hence the verse: + +In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many Should give +often, take seldom, ask never. + +But he makes provision in order to give certain things according as +liberality requires; such are the fruits of his own possessions, for +he is careful about realizing them that he may make a liberal use +thereof. + +Reply Obj. 4: To spend on oneself is an inclination of nature; hence +to spend money on others belongs properly to a virtue. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 5] + +Whether Liberality Is a Part of Justice? + +Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a part of justice. For +justice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing is due the +less liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is not a part of +justice, but is incompatible with it. + +Obj. 2: Further, justice is about operation as stated above (Q. 58, +A. 9; I-II, Q. 60, AA. 2, 3): whereas liberality is chiefly about the +love and desire of money, which are passions. Therefore liberality +seems to belong to temperance rather than to justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to give becomingly, +as stated (A. 4). But giving becomingly belongs to beneficence and +mercy, which pertain to charity, as state above (QQ. 30, 31). +Therefore liberality is a part of charity rather than of justice. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Justice has to do +with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is +divided into two parts, justice and beneficence, also called +liberality or kind-heartedness." Therefore liberality pertains to +justice. + +_I answer that,_ Liberality is not a species of justice, since +justice pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another +what is one's own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees +with justice: first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as +justice is; secondly, that it is concerned with external things, and +so is justice, albeit under a different aspect, a stated in this +Article and above (A. 2, ad 3). Hence it is that liberality is +reckoned by some to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to +a principal virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although liberality does not consider the legal due +that justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due is +based on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it +answers to the idea of due in the lowest degree. + +Reply Obj. 2: Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the +body. But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to +the body but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly +pertain to temperance. + +Reply Obj. 3: The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the +fact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom he +gives: wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But +the giving of liberality arises from a person being affected in a +certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so +that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his friends but also +to those whom he knows not. Hence it belong not to charity, but to +justice, which is about external things. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 6] + +Whether Liberality Is the Greatest of the Virtues? + +Objection 1: It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues. +For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now man +is likened chiefly by liberality to God, "Who giveth to all men +abundantly, and upbraideth not" (James 1:5). Therefore liberality is +the greatest of the virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "in things +that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best." Now +the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since +"the good is self-communicative," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. +iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice reclines to +severity, liberality to goodness." Therefore liberality is the +greatest of virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, men are honored and loved on account of virtue. Now +Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "bounty above all makes a man +famous": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "among the +virtuous the liberal are the most beloved." Therefore liberality is +the greatest of virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice seems to +be more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more +pleasing." The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that "brave and +just men are honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal." + +_I answer that,_ Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the +greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now +liberality tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily +and of its own nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of +its very nature it tends to set in order one's own affection towards +the possession and use of money. In this way temperance, which +moderates desires and pleasures relating to one's own body, takes +precedence of liberality: and so do fortitude and justice, which, in +a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time of peace, the +other in time of war: while all these are preceded by those virtues +which are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses +all manner of human good; and among human goods the public good +surpasses the good of the individual; and of the last named the good +of the body surpasses those goods that consist of external things. +Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way +it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not +being a lover of money, it follows that a man readily makes use of +it, whether for himself, or for the good of others, or for God's +glory. Thus it derives a certain excellence from being useful in many +ways. Since, however, we should judge of things according to that +which is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature, +rather than according to that which pertains to them. Consequently, +it remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: God's giving proceeds from His love for those to whom +He gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives, +wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues, +rather than to liberality. + +Reply Obj. 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by giving +forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are better +than money which liberality gives forth. + +Reply Obj. 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved is not +that which is based on virtue, as though he were better than others, +but that which is based on utility, because he is more useful in +external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. For the +same reason he becomes famous. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 118 + +OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF +COVETOUSNESS +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and +(1) covetousness; (2) prodigality. + +Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether covetousness is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is a special sin? + +(3) To which virtue it is opposed; + +(4) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins? + +(6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin? + +(7) Whether it is a capital vice? + +(8) Of its daughters. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 1] + +Whether Covetousness Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a sin. For +covetousness (_avaritia_) denotes a certain greed for gold (_aeris +aviditas_),* because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money, +under which all external goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for +covetousness _avaritia_ is derived from _aveo_ to desire; but the +Greek _philargyria_ signifies literally "love of money": and it is to +this that St. Thomas is alluding (cf. A. 2, Obj. 2)]. Now it is not a +sin to desire external goods: since man desires them naturally, both +because they are naturally subject to man, and because by their means +man's life is sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his +substance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, every sin is against either God, or one's neighbor, +or oneself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 4). But covetousness is +not, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is opposed +neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which man is +directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this +pertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1 +Cor. 6:18): "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own +body." In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's +neighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own. +Therefore covetousness is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now +covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect, +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness +is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 13:5): "Let your manners be +without covetousness, contented with such things as you have." + +_I answer that,_ In whatever things good consists in a due measure, +evil must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that +measure. Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in +a certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be +commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate +with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External +goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated +above (Q. 117, A. 3; I-II, Q. 2, A. 1). Hence it must needs be that +man's good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other +words, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have +external riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in +keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for +him to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them +immoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined +as "immoderate love of possessing." It is therefore evident that +covetousness is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to desire external things as means +to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as it is +held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But +covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Covetousness may signify immoderation about external +things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the +acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires +or keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly +against one's neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external +riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot +be possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify +immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches +when, for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in +them, immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against +himself, because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in +his body as do the sins of the flesh. + +As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all +mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of +temporal things. + +Reply Obj. 3: Natural inclinations should be regulated according to +reason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though +old people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as +everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are +not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with +regard to riches. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 2] + +Whether Covetousness Is a Special Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For +Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Covetousness, which in Greek is +called _philargyria_, applies not only to silver or money, but also +to anything that is desired immoderately." Now in every sin there is +immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away +from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6, Obj. 3). Therefore covetousness is a +general sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "the covetous +(_avarus_) man" is so called because he is "greedy for brass (_avidus +aeris_)," i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called +_philargyria_, i.e. "love of silver." Now silver, which stands for +money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be +measured by money, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore +covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently +seems to be a general sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, "For I had not known +concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding +concupiscence, it forbids all evil." Now the law seems to forbid +especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written +(Ex. 20:17): "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods." Therefore +the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is +a general sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Covetousness is numbered together with other +special sins (Rom. 1:29), where it is written: "Being filled with all +iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness" [Douay: 'avarice'], etc. + +_I answer that,_ Sins take their species from their objects, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1). Now the object of a sin is the good +towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a +special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind +of sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful +good. And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since +they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man. +Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an +immoderate love of having possessions, which are comprised under the +name of money, whence covetousness (_avaritia_) is denominated. + +Since, however, the verb "to have," which seems to have been +originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are +absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said +to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in _De +Praedicamentis_), consequently the term "covetousness" has been +amplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything +whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that +"covetousness is a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge +and high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after." In +this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense +Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First +Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First +Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: All those external things that are subject to the uses +of human life are comprised under the term "money," inasmuch as they +have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods +that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so +forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire +for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it +is a special vice. + +Reply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for +anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is +forbidden to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to +covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 3] + +Whether Covetousness Is Opposed to Liberality? + +Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality. +For Chrysostom, commenting on Matt. 5:6, "Blessed are they that +hunger and thirst after justice," says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that +there are two kinds of justice, one general, and the other special, +to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same +(Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality. + +Obj. 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's +exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is +appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to +justice and not to liberality. + +Obj. 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean +between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; +iv, 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according +to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1, 2). Therefore covetousness is not +opposed to liberality. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:9): "A covetous man shall +not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no +fruits from them." Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it +inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in +the desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality. + +_I answer that,_ Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to +riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition +and keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his +due, by stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to +justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. 22:27): +"Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to +shed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness." +Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for +riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or +takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In +this way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these +affections, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 3; A. 3, ad 3; A. 6). +In this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor. 9:5): "That they +would . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as +a blessing, not as covetousness," where a gloss observes: "Lest they +should regret what they had given, and give but little." + +Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of +covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is +called illiberality [*_aneleutheria_] by the Philosopher. + +Reply Obj. 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure +in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of +legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's +property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally +in the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking +and keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as +these proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from +the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which +latter depends on the rule of reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite +vice: since it consists in having more than one ought according to +justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one ought, and +this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to +liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 4] + +Whether Covetousness Is Always a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For +no one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy +of death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying +(Rom. 1:29): "Being filled with all iniquity . . . fornication, +covetousness [Douay: 'avarice']," etc. adds (Rom. 1:32): "They who do +such things are worthy of death." Therefore covetousness is a mortal +sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to one's +own inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil says +(Serm. super. Luc. xii, 18): "It is the hungry man's bread that thou +keepest back, the naked man's cloak that thou hoardest, the needy +man's money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as +thou mightest succor." + +Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is +contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore is all +covetousness a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save +through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace. +But, according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum, +falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom], "Lust for money brings darkness +on the soul." Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a +mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on 1 Cor. 3:12, "If any man build upon +this foundation," says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that +"he builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world, +how he may please the world," which pertains to the sin of +covetousness. Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not +mortally but venially, for it is said of him that "he shall be saved, +yet so as by fire." Therefore covetousness is some times a venial sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3) covetousness is twofold. In +one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in +respect of its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the +unjust taking or retaining of another's property, and this belongs to +theft or robbery, which are mortal sins, as stated above (Q. 66, AA. +6, 8). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by +reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 6, ad +3), when we were treating of theft. + +In another way covetousness may be taken as opposed to liberality: in +which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly if the +love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in +such wise that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter +to the love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a +mortal sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love +stops short of this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he +does not prefer the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling +for the sake of riches to do anything in opposition to God or his +neighbor, then covetousness is a venial sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Covetousness is numbered together with mortal sins, by +reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is bound by a +legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through fear of +their want or on account of his having too much. + +Reply Obj. 3: Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings darkness on +the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by preferring the +love of riches to the love of God. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 5] + +Whether Covetousness Is the Greatest of Sins? + +Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For +it is written (Ecclus. 10:9): "Nothing is more wicked than a covetous +man," and the text continues: "There is not a more wicked thing than +to love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale." +Tully also says (De Offic. i, under the heading, 'True magnanimity is +based chiefly on two things'): "Nothing is so narrow or little minded +as to love money." But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore +covetousness is the most grievous of sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more +grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for +Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36) that "greed is the bane of charity." +Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being +incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be +most grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an +incurable sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "old +age and helplessness of any kind make men illiberal." Therefore +covetousness is the most grievous of sins. + +Obj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:5) that covetousness is "a +serving of idols." Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous +sins. Therefore covetousness is also. + +_On the contrary,_ Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, +according to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness. +Therefore covetousness is not the most grievous of sins. + +_I answer that,_ Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil, +consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so +far as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good. +Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, +on the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and +then the greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view +a sin that is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin +that is committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin +against external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this +seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be +considered on the part of the good to which the human appetite is +inordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more +deformed is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower +than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the lowest +of human goods: since it is less than the good of the body, and this +is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine +good. From this point of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the +human appetite is subjected even to external things, has in a way a +greater deformity. Since, however, corruption or privation of good is +the formal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the +material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the +point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from that of the +good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence we must assert that +covetousness is not simply the most grievous of sins. + +Reply Obj. 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of +the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Ecclus. 10:10) it +is given as a reason that the covetous man "setteth his own soul to +sale"; because, to wit, he exposes his soul--that is, his life--to +danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues: "Because +while he liveth he hath cast away"--that is, despised--"his bowels," +in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of a +"narrow mind," namely, that one be willing to be subject to money. + +Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to +any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness: +because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch +as a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a +temporal good. + +Reply Obj. 3: The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way, +covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is +incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns +God's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby +man's sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to +the greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is +incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature +ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one +seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one +gives way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an +indication not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being +somewhat more dangerous. + +Reply Obj. 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a +certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man, like +the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in +the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external +creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects +himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use, +not for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as +grievous a sin as idolatry. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 6] + +Whether Covetousness Is a Spiritual Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For +spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of +covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore +covetousness is not a spiritual sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh. +Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from +the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through +corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore +covetousness is not a spiritual sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is +disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "He +that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." Now +covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom +(Hom. xxix in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who was +possessed by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore +covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among +spiritual vices. + +_I answer that,_ Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all +the affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure +and sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some +pleasures are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those +which are consummated in the carnal senses--for instance, the +pleasures of the table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual +pleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of +the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are +consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are consummated +in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the flesh. Such is +covetousness: for the covetous man takes pleasure in the +consideration of himself as a possessor of riches. Therefore +covetousness is a spiritual sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the +pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man +takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is +not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a +mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in +respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and +purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of +a bodily object. + +Reply Obj. 2: Movement takes its species from the term _whereto_ and +not from the term _wherefrom._ Hence a vice of the flesh is so called +from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its +originating in some defect of the flesh. + +Reply Obj. 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was +possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh +in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while +the possessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself, the +covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 7] + +Whether Covetousness Is a Capital Vice? + +Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For +covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality +as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor +prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be +reckoned a capital vice. + +Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), those vices +are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends of +other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness: +since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something +directed to an end, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 5. Therefore +covetousness is not a capital vice. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that "covetousness arises +sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who, +when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow +the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who, +wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other +people's property." Therefore covetousness arises from other vices +instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among +the capital vices. + +_I answer that,_ As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is +one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because +when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire +thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the +most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of +human life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, AA. 4, 7, 8): wherefore the +more a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more +desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it +be self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appetite at rest, as +the last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, +as Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to +the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we "use money in token of +taking possession of something," and again it is written (Eccles. +10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore covetousness, which is +desire for money, is a capital vice. + +Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice +is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive +appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to +the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal +vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality +is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the principal +good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, because it +regards money, which occupies a principal place among sensible goods, +for the reason given in the Article. + +On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is +desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack +of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a prodigal +man is a fool rather than a knave." + +Reply Obj. 2: It is true that money is directed to something else as +its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible +things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a +certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article. + +Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising +sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 4, ad 1; +I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), provided that itself be frequently the source +of others. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 8] + +Whether Treachery, Fraud, Falsehood, Perjury, Restlessness, Violence, +and Insensibility to Mercy Are Daughters of Covetousness? + +Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as +commonly stated, namely, "treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, +restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy." For covetousness +is opposed to liberality, as stated above (A. 3). Now treachery, +fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion, +restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved +object, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these +vices have no connection with covetousness. + +Obj. 2: Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to +the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore +they should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness. + +Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine +daughters of covetousness; which are "lying, fraud, theft, perjury, +greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity, +rapacity." Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is +insufficient. + +Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many kinds +of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality, +for he speaks of those who are "sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints +[*_kyminopristes_], misers [*_kimbikes_], who do illiberal deeds," +and of those who "batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers +of the dead, and robbers." Therefore it seems that the aforesaid +enumeration is insufficient. + +Obj. 5: Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects. +But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "tyrants who destroy +cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal," +i.e. covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter +of covetousness. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the +daughters mentioned above. + +_I answer that,_ The daughters of covetousness are the vices which +arise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now +since covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds +in two things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in +this respect covetousness gives rise to _insensibility to mercy,_ +because, to wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the +needy with his riches [*See Q. 30, A. 1]. In the second place it +belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect +covetousness may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought +(_affectu_). In this way it gives rise to _restlessness,_ by +hindering man with excessive anxiety and care, for "a covetous man +shall not be satisfied with money" (Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be +considered in the execution (_effectu_). In this way the covetous +man, in acquiring other people's goods, sometimes employs force, +which pertains to _violence,_ sometimes deceit, and then if he has +recourse to words, it is _falsehood,_ if it be mere words, _perjury_ +if he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and +the deceit affects things, we have _fraud_; if persons, then we have +_treachery,_ as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through +covetousness. + +Reply Obj. 1: There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to +belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of +sins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that +it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to +have species. + +Reply Obj. 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the Article. + +Reply Obj. 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For +lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false +witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind +of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy +lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence, +since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as +insensibility to mercy. + +Reply Obj. 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather +than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said +to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives +but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is +"tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be +_kyminopristes_ ("skinflint"), a cumin-seller, as it were, because he +makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is +said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and +this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful +means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of +illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such +as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to +have given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to +make little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means, +whether by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by +despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do. + +Reply Obj. 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums of money, so +is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by violence, +are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 119 + +OF PRODIGALITY +(In Three Articles) + +We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness? + +(2) Whether prodigality is a sin? + +(3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 119, Art. 1] + +Whether Prodigality Is Opposite to Covetousness? + +Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to +covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. +But some are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore +prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. + +Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But +covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions +whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not +seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected +towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality +is not opposite to covetousness. + +Obj. 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now prodigality seems always to be +directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal +squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures, +wherefore it is stated (Luke 15:13) of the prodigal son that he +"wasted his substance living riotously." Therefore it seems that +prodigality is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to +covetousness and liberality. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that +prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we +give here the name of covetousness. + +_I answer that,_ In morals vices are opposed to one another and to +virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and +prodigality differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. +Thus, as regards affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by +loving them more than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by +being less careful of them than he ought: and as regards external +action, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in +retaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, denotes +deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and retaining. Hence it +is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same +subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from +what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes +the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and +retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality +regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said +to be "prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be +"covetous." Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in +giving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes +(Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man +exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same +time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of +necessity, since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of +his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to +covetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he +gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares +not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous +in different respects. + +Reply Obj. 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money, not +as exceeding, but as deficient in them. + +Reply Obj. 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the +sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes +through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes +on account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines +to intemperance, both because through spending too much on other +things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to +which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because +through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself +pleasures of the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) +"that many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 119, Art. 2] + +Whether Prodigality Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle +says (1 Tim. 6:10): "Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the +root of all evils." But it is not the root of prodigality, since this +is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17, 18): "Charge the rich +of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others." Now +this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is +not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and +to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming +to the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord (Matt. 6:34), "Be +not . . . solicitous for tomorrow," and (Matt. 19:21), "Sell all +[Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor." Therefore +prodigality is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The prodigal son is held to blame for his +prodigality. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the opposition between +prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either +of which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and +sinful through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that +prodigality is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some expound this saying of the Apostle as referring, +not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual covetousness, +which is the concupiscence of the _fomes_ [*Cf. I-II, Q. 81, A. 3, ad +2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking of a +general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and in this +sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from covetousness; +since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good inordinately, +namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to satisfy his own +will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage correctly, it is +evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of +riches, for he had said previously (1 Tim. 6:9): "They that will +become rich," etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be "the root +of all evils," not that all evils always arise from covetousness, but +because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from +covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of +covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in +order to curry favor with certain persons from whom he may receive +riches. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and +communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does +not do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), "his +giving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought +to be. For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor, +namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give +nothing." + +Reply Obj. 3: The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not in the +total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought to be +given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal +man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those who +give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ, +and banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are +not prodigal but perfectly liberal. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 119, Art. 3] + +Whether Prodigality Is a More Grievous Sin Than Covetousness? + +Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than +covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not +communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures +himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the +wasting of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an +undoing of his very being." Now he that injures himself sins more +grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, +to whom will he be good?" Therefore prodigality is a more grievous +sin than covetousness. + +Obj. 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable +circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is +sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of +those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to +accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is +accompanied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we +ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher +observes (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin +than covetousness. + +Obj. 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated +above (Q. 56, A. 1, ad 1; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2, ad 1). Now prodigality +is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written +(Prov. 21:20): "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the +dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it": and the +Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "it is the mark of a fool to +give too much and receive nothing." Therefore prodigality is a more +grievous sin than covetousness. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "the +prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man." + +_I answer that,_ Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous +sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because +covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving, +wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than +receiving or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, +because the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, +while the covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as +stated in _Ethic._ iv, 6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily +cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is +opposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want, +since much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to +exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue +on account of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous +man is not easily cured, for the reason given above (Q. 118, A. 5, ad +3). + +Reply Obj. 1: The difference between the prodigal and the covetous +man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter +against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending +that which is his, and his means of support, and against others by +spending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the +clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to +the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like +manner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in +giving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency in spending: +wherefore it is written (Eccles. 6:2): "A man to whom God hath given +riches . . . yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof." +Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he injures both +himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man +profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his +own goods for his own profit. + +Reply Obj. 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them +according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to +prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with +regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend +too much for the sake of intemperance points already to several +additional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as +stated in _Ethic._ iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain +from taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself +to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so +it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest +he be forced to give to others. + +Reply Obj. 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues +are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence +alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 120 + +OF "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider "epikeia," under which head there are two points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether "epikeia" is a virtue? + +(2) Whether it is a part of justice? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 120, Art. 1] + +Whether "Epikeia" [*_Epieikeia_] Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that _epikeia_ is not a virtue. For no virtue +does away with another virtue. Yet _epikeia_ does away with another +virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and +seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore _epikeia_ is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "With regard +to these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when they +make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge +must pronounce judgment not on them but according to them." But +seemingly _epikeia_ pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems +that the law should not be observed in some particular case. +Therefore _epikeia_ is a vice rather than a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, apparently it belongs to _epikeia_ to consider the +intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). +But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of +the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the _Codex of Laws and +Constitutions,_ under _Law_ i: "It is fitting and lawful that We +alone should interpret between equity and law." Therefore the act of +_epikeia_ is unlawful: and consequently _epikeia_ is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a +virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6), when we were +treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned, +are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their +diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would +apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to +what commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain +cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to +the common good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires +deposits to be restored, because in the majority of cases this is +just. Yet it happens sometimes to be injurious--for instance, if a +madman were to put his sword in deposit, and demand its delivery +while in a state of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of +his deposit in order to fight against his country. In these and like +cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the +letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the +common good. This is the object of _epikeia_ which we call equity. +Therefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: _Epikeia_ does not set aside that which is just in +itself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it +opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it +ought to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought +not to be followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the _Codex of +Laws and Constitutions_ under _Law_ v: "Without doubt he transgresses +the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat +the intention of the lawgiver." + +Reply Obj. 2: It would be passing judgment on a law to say that it +was not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to be +observed in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law, +but on some particular contingency. + +Reply Obj. 3: Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases where it +is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the +interpretation of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there +is need, not of interpretation, but of execution. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 120, Art. 2] + +Whether _Epikeia_ Is a Part of Justice? + +Objection 1: It seems that _epikeia_ is not a part of justice. For, +as stated above (Q. 58, A. 7), justice is twofold, particular and +legal. Now _epikeia_ is not a part of particular justice, since it +extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner, +neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside +that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that _epikeia_ +is not a part of justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part +of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as +being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now +_epikeia_ seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as +implied by its name: for it is derived from _epi_, i.e. "above," and +_dikaion_, i.e. "just." Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems that _epikeia_ is the same as modesty. For +where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to all +men," the Greek has _epieikeia_ [*_to epieikes_]. Now, according to +Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. +Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "_epikeia_ +is a kind of justice." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue has three kinds of +parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one +of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the +whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is +predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: +and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority +and posteriority, as _being_ of substance and accident. + +Accordingly, _epikeia_ is a part of justice taken in a general sense, +for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, +10). Wherefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a subjective part of +justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being +predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the +direction of _epikeia._ Hence _epikeia_ is by way of being a higher +rule of human actions. + +Reply Obj. 1: _Epikeia_ corresponds properly to legal justice, and in +one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if +legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as +regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the +lawgiver, which is of more account, then _epikeia_ is the more +important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely +that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then +_epikeia_ is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its +general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as +exceeding it. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), "_epikeia_ is +better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which observes the +letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is +not better than all justice. + +Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to _epikeia_ to moderate something, namely, +the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is +reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life--for +instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the +term _epieikeia_ is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of +moderation. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 121 + +OF PIETY +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely, +piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost? + +(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 121, Art. 1] + +Whether Piety Is a Gift? + +Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ +from the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1). But piety is a +virtue, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 3). Therefore piety is not a gift. + +Obj. 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above +all the moral virtues, as above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Now among the +parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any +part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion +should be a gift rather than piety. + +Obj. 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6). But the act of piety cannot remain in +heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the inmost +recesses of the heart with works of mercy": and so there will be no +piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q. 30, A. +1]. Therefore piety is not a gift. + +_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh +chapter of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: "godliness"] [*_Pietas,_ whence +our English word "pity," which is the same as mercy.] + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1; Q. 69, AA. 1, +3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the +soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the +Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial +affection towards God, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the +spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)." And since +it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father, +it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we +pay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy +Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the +flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as +Father. + +Reply Obj. 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is +more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the flesh, as +the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father +is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and Lord. +Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the +gift of piety is greater than religion. + +Reply Obj. 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not +only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on +account of their being related to his father, so by the gift of piety +he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on +account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to +honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one +understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii). +Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness. +And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the +Day of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is +to revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that +this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, "Behold how they +are numbered among the children of God." The saints will also +mutually honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day, +the saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy +state. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 121, Art. 2] + +Whether the Second Beatitude, "Blessed Are the Meek," Corresponds to +the Gift of Piety? + +Objection 1: It seems that the second beatitude, "Blessed are the +meek," does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the +gift corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth +beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," +or the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," since as stated +above (A. 1, Obj. 3), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore +the second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety. + +Obj. 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of +knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts +(Isa. 11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. +Since, then, the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," +corresponds to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second +beatitude corresponds to piety. + +Obj. 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and gifts, +as stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 2). Now among the fruits, goodness +and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which +pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not +correspond to the gift of piety. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Piety +is becoming to the meek." + +_I answer that,_ In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold +congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which +they are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore +he assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and +the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," to piety, and so on. +Another congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature +of each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes +to the gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth +and fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the +second. Yet the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, +inasmuch as meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety. + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to their +proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to knowledge +and piety: but taking them according to their order, different +beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity may be +observed, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be directly +ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it removes +obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 122 + +OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there +are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice? + +(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue; + +(3) Of the second; + +(4) Of the third; + +(5) Of the fourth; + +(6) Of the other six. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 1] + +Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Precepts of Justice? + +Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not +precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the +citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in _Ethic._ +ii, 1. Wherefore, according to _Ethic._ v, 1, "the law prescribes +about all acts of all virtues." Now the precepts of the decalogue are +the first principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts +of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone. + +Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially the +judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 4). But the precepts of the decalogue +are moral precepts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3). Therefore +the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of +justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers +and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the +decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do +not properly belong to justice. + +Obj. 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into two +tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our +neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the +precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice. + +_On the contrary,_ Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we +are directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the +precepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of +them. Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice. + +_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue are the first +principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at +once, as to principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether +evident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, +appears in justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those +matters that relate to himself it would seem at a glance that man is +master of himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters +that refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under +obligation to render to another that which is his due. Hence the +precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice. Wherefore +the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the +chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety, +which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining are about +justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals. + +Reply Obj. 1: The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, +but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts +about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as +stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral +precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just as +the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in +so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are +contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the +precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice. + +Reply Obj. 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be +administered in different ways according to the difference of men. +Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the +decalogue, but among the judicial precepts. + +Reply Obj. 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as +their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, "The end of the commandment is +charity": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer +immediately to acts of justice. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 2] + +Whether the First Precept of the Decalogue Is Fittingly Expressed? + +Objection 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is +unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his +father in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, "How much more shall we +[Vulg.: 'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and +live?" Now the precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is +expressed affirmatively in these words: "Honor thy father and thy +mother." Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, +whereby all honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as +affirmation is naturally prior to negation. + +Obj. 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to +religion, as stated above (A. 1). Now religion, since it is one +virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are +forbidden: since we read first: "Thou shalt not have strange gods +before Me"; secondly, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven +thing"; and thirdly, "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them." +Therefore the first precept is unfittingly expressed. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that "the first +precept forbids the sin of superstition." But there are many wicked +superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 2). +Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture. + +_I answer that,_ It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it +behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the +order of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now +two things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is +that the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the +generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, +and in building a home the first thing to be set up is the +foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first part is +goodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes good +use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on +its object, which is its end. Wherefore since man was to be directed +to virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it +were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly directed +to God, Who is the last end of man's will. + +The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in +the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the +farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, +according to Jer. 4:3, "Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not +upon thorns." Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in +religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the +chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, +according to Matt. 6:24, "You cannot serve God and mammon." Therefore +in the first precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded. + +Reply Obj. 1: In point of fact there is one affirmative precept about +religion, namely: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day." +Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their +means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though +affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of +generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as +stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning +God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our +insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii). + +Reply Obj. 2: People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For some +served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images. +Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped +gods without using images: and this worship is first forbidden by the +words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods." Among others the worship +of false gods was observed by using certain images: and so the very +making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt +not make to thyself any graven thing," as also the worship of those +same images, by the words, "Thou shalt not adore them," etc. + +Reply Obj. 3: All other kinds of superstition proceed from some +compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood +to be forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 3] + +Whether the Second Precept of the Decalogue Is Fittingly Expressed? + +Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is +unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the +name of thy God in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7: +"Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature," so that it +forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Deut. +5:11, "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," adds, +i.e. "by giving the name of God to wood or stone," as though they +forbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of +unbelief. Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes +religion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, +whereby superstition is forbidden. + +Obj. 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes--for +instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally +speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col. +3:17, "All whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the +name of the Lord." Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of +God's name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept +forbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded it. + +Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, "Thou +shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, by +swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless +swearing, that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false +swearing, which is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is +without justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept +should rather have forbidden them. + +Obj. 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult to +God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and other +like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept. + +Obj. 5: Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not have +been said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy +God in vain." + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture. + +_I answer that,_ In one who is being instructed in virtue it is +necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing +him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two +ways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion +is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to +superstition. Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to +wit, God is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, +as stated above (Q. 97, in the preamble, and in the Article that +follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing man from +acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is +engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time give due +worship to God, according to Isa. 28:20, "The bed is straitened, so +that one must fall out," i.e. either the true God or a false god must +fall out from man's heart, "and a short covering cannot cover both." +On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from +honoring God after he has acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all +acknowledge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him we have +acknowledged. + +For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before +the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion. + +Reply Obj. 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal +explanation is that which is given Deut. 5:11: "Thou shalt not take +the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, "by swearing on that +which is not [*Vulg.: 'for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His +name upon a vain thing']." + +Reply Obj. 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of +God, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a man's +word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name more +frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in +consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by +this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the +explanation quoted in the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is +not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called +perjury, as stated above (Q. 98, A. 1, ad 3). For when a man swears +to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is +not supported by the truth. On the other hand, when a man swears +without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is +no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the +swearer. + +Reply Obj. 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we +begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law, +which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the +decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by +prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common +occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the +decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more +frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often +into the latter sin. + +Reply Obj. 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the +thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying +words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: "Thou +shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain": since it matters +not in which of God's names perjury is committed. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 4] + +Whether the Third Precept of the Decalogue, Concerning the Hallowing +of the Sabbath, Is Fittingly Expressed? + +Objection 1: It seems that the third precept of the decalogue, +concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed. +For this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in +commenting on Luke 13:14, "The ruler of the synagogue being angry +that He had healed on the Sabbath," says (Comment. iv): "The Law +forbids, not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works," +i.e. "to burden oneself with sin." Taken literally it is a ceremonial +precept, for it is written (Ex. 31:13): "See that you keep My +Sabbath: because it is a sign between Me and you in your +generations." Now the precepts of the decalogue are both spiritual +and moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of +the decalogue. + +Obj. 2: Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain "sacred +things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances," as stated above +(I-II, Q. 101, A. 4). Now sacred things comprised not only sacred +days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover, +there were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was +unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention +only that of the Sabbath. + +Obj. 3: Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins. But +in the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did not +sin--for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth +day, and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also +Elias (3 Kings 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of +God, Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who +carried the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Josue 7, +must be understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is +written (Luke 13:15): "Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day +loose his ox or his ass . . . and lead them to water?" Therefore it +is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue. + +Obj. 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be observed +also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not +observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the +Lord's day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many +like things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath +is unfittingly expressed. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture. + +_I answer that,_ The obstacles to true religion being removed by the +first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above (AA. 2, +3), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby man is +established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give +worship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior +worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is +external worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And +since for the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, +consisting in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the +Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law as necessary respecting the exterior +worship that consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the +decalogue are, so to speak, first and common principles of the Law, +and consequently the third precept of the decalogue describes the +exterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns +all. This universal boon was the work of the Creation of the world, +from which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh day: and +sign of this we are commanded to keep holy seventh day--that is, to +set it aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after the precept +about the hallowing of the Sabbath the reason for it is given: "For +in six days the Lord made heaven and earth . . . and rested on the +seventh day." + +Reply Obj. 1: The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, understood +literally, is partly moral and partly ceremonial. It is a moral +precept in the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to be +given to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to +set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as +refreshment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the +dictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual +refreshment, by which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to +have a certain time set aside for occupying oneself with Divine +things is the matter of a moral precept. But, in so far as this +precept specializes the time as a sign representing the Creation of +the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial +precept in its allegorical signification, as representative of +Christ's rest in the tomb on the seventh day: also in its moral +signification, as representing cessation from all sinful acts, and +the mind's rest in God, in which sense, too, it is a general precept. +Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its analogical signification, as +foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about +hallowing the Sabbath is placed among the precepts of the decalogue, +as a moral, but not as a ceremonial precept. + +Reply Obj. 2: The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of certain +particular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is +representative of a general boon, namely, the production of all +creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the +general precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial +precept of the Law. + +Reply Obj. 3: Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of the +Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy himself +with Divine things, and is signified in the words: "Remember that +thou keep holy the Sabbath day." For in the Law those things are said +to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other thing +is cessation from work, and is signified in the words (Ex. 20:11), +"On the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work." The kind of work +meant appears from Lev. 23:3, "You shall do no servile work on that +day [*Vulg.: 'You shall do no work on that day']." Now servile work +is so called from servitude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby +man is the servant of sin, according to John 8:34, "Whosoever +committeth sin is the servant of sin," and in this sense all sinful +acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves +another. Now one man serves another not with his mind but with his +body, as stated above (Q. 104, AA. 5, 6, ad 1). Wherefore in this +respect those works are called servile whereby one man serves +another. The third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work +of worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called a +servile work. In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the +Sabbath day, because that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath +observance: since man abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in +order that he may occupy himself with works connected with God's +service. For this reason, according to John 7:23, "a man [*Vulg.: 'If +a man,' etc.] receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law +of Moses may not be broken": and for this reason too we read (Matt. +12:5), that "on the Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the +Sabbath," i.e. do corporal works on the Sabbath, "and are without +blame." Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath +did not break the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner +it is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any +spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss +on Num 28 says that "smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath +day, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does not cease from +his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the +temple break the Sabbath, and are without blame." On the other hand, +those works that are called servile in the first or second way are +contrary to the observance of the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder +man from applying himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered +from applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by +lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast day +is more against this precept than to do some other but lawful bodily +work. Hence Augustine says (De decem chord. iii): "It would be better +if the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent his time +seditiously in the theatre: and their womenfolk would do better to be +making linen on the Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in +their feasts of the new moon." It is not, however, against this +precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not +destroy holiness. + +Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of +God, are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly to +servants; while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they +are common to those who serve and those who are free. Moreover, +everyone, be he servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries both +for himself and for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things +pertaining to the well-being of the body, according to Prov. 24:11, +"Deliver them that are led to death": secondarily as regards avoiding +damage to one's property, according to Deut. 22:1, "Thou shalt not +pass by if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but +thou shalt bring them back to thy brother." Hence a corporal work +pertaining to the preservation of one's own bodily well-being does +not profane the Sabbath: for it is not against the observance of the +Sabbath to eat and do such things as preserve the health of the body. +For this reason the Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they +fought in self-defense on the Sabbath day (1 Macc. 2), nor Elias when +he fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For this same reason +our Lord (Matt. 12:3) excused His disciples for plucking the ears of +corn on account of the need which they suffered. In like manner a +bodily work that is directed to the bodily well-being of another is +not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is +written (John 7:23): "Are you angry at Me because I have healed the +whole man on the Sabbath day?" And again, a bodily work that is done +to avoid an imminent damage to some external thing does not profane +the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says (Matt. 12:11): "What man shall +there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a +pit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up?" + +Reply Obj. 4: In the New Law the observance of the Lord's day took +the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the +precept but by the institution of the Church and the custom of +Christian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the +observance of the Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to +work on the Lord's day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and +certain works are permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on +the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again in +the New Law, dispensation is more easily granted than in the Old, in +the matter of certain forbidden works, on account of their necessity, +because the figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is +unlawful to omit even in small things; while works, considered in +themselves, are changeable in point of place and time. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 5] + +Whether the Fourth Precept, About Honoring One's Parents, Is +Fittingly Expressed? + +Objection 1: It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one's +parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining +to piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance, +gratitude, and others of which we have spoken (QQ. 101, 102, seq.). +Therefore it seems that there should not have been given a special +precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others. + +Obj. 2: Further, piety pays worship not only to one's parents, but +also to one's country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the +well-wishers of our country, as stated above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 2). +Therefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the +honoring of one's father and mother. + +Obj. 3: Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also +support. Therefore the mere honoring of one's parents is unfittingly +prescribed. + +Obj. 4: Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die young, +and on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time. +Therefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the +promise, "That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth." + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture. + +_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the +love of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our +neighbors, we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately +after the precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the +precept directing us to our parents, who are the particular principle +of our being, just as God is the universal principle: so that this +precept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the First Table. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 101, A. 2), piety directs us to pay +the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common to all. Hence, +since the precepts of the decalogue are general precepts, they ought +to contain some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of +justice, which regard some special debt. + +Reply Obj. 2: The debt to one's parents precedes the debt to one's +kindred and country since it is because we are born of our parents +that our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts +of the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct man +to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred. +Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is understood to +command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as +secondary matter included in the principal matter. + +Reply Obj. 3: Reverential honor is due to one's parents as such, +whereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for +instance, because they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as +stated above (Q. 101, A. 2). And since that which belongs to a thing +by nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among +the first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of the +decalogue, there is a special precept of honoring our parents: and +this honor, as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support +and whatever else is due to our parents. + +Reply Obj. 4: A long life is promised to those who honor their +parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present +life, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety +[Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of +the life that now is and of that which is to come." And with reason. +Because the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain +congruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and he who is +ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of +bodily life to our parents after God: wherefore he that honors his +parents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful +for that favor: while he that honors not his parents deserves to be +deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. However, +present goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except +in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 114, A. 12). Wherefore sometimes in accordance with the +hidden design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the +future reward, some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner +deprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their parents, +live longer. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 6] + +Whether the Other Six Precepts of the Decalogue Are Fittingly +Expressed? + +Objection 1: It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue +are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation +that one refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required +that one pay one's debts, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to +all men their dues." Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to +injure one's neighbor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly +expressed. + +Obj. 2: Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing and +bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on +one's neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above +(QQ. 72, seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are +unfittingly expressed. + +Obj. 3: Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as +denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. 6:21, "The desire +(_concupiscentia_) of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom": +secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 4:1, +"From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . . +from your concupiscences which war in your members?" Now the +concupiscence of the sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the +decalogue, otherwise first movements would be mortal sins, as they +would be against a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence +of the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore +it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include some +that forbid concupiscence. + +Obj. 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or +theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder. +Therefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the +desire of theft and of adultery. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture. + +_I answer that,_ Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that +which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for +some special reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays +that which is due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts +pertaining to religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after +the fourth precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due +to his parents--which duty includes the paying of all that is due for +any special reason--it was necessary in due sequence to give certain +precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all +indifferently what is due to them. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man is bound towards all persons in general to inflict +injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the doing +of those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor, had to be +given a place, as general precepts, among the precepts of the +decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are +paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not behoove +to include affirmative precepts about those duties among the precepts +of the decalogue. + +Reply Obj. 2: All other injuries that are inflicted on our neighbor +are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts, as +taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance. +For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are +understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the +principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with +one's neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be +forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of +damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with +theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as +detractions, insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden +together with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly +opposed to justice. + +Reply Obj. 3: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include +the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do not go +farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their +prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or +pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 4: Murder in itself is an object not of concupiscence but +of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of good. On the +other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e. +of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e. of +something useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of +something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft and +adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the +concupiscence of murder. +_______________________ + +TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ. 123-170) +_______________________ + +QUESTION 123 + +OF FORTITUDE +(In Twelve Articles) + +After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude. +We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts; +(3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to +it. + +Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: +(1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; +(3) the vices opposed to fortitude. + +Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue? + +(2) Whether it is a special virtue? + +(3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring? + +(4) Whether it is only about fear of death? + +(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters? + +(6) Whether endurance is its chief act? + +(7) Whether its action is directed to its own good? + +(8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action? + +(9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences? + +(10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action? + +(11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue? + +(12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 1] + +Whether Fortitude Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle +says (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue is perfected in infirmity." But fortitude +is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological, +intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the +theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be +gathered from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 2; Q. 62, A. +3). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues, +since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7, 8): "Some seem to +be brave through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers," both +of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue, +"and some are called brave on account of certain passions"; for +instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on +account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from +passion but from choice, as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). +Therefore fortitude is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it +is a "good quality of the mind," as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7, 8). +But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results +from the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems that fortitude +is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers +fortitude among the virtues. + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "virtue +is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good." +Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes +a man good, and renders his work good. Now man's good is to be in +accordance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). +Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his +work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by +rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual +virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude of reason in human +affairs, and this belongs to justice; thirdly, by removing the +obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs. +Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the +rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some object of +pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason +requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance. +Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is +in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that +presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the +mind is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as +a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles. + +Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as it +conforms man to reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the +infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the +Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear +bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue +of patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity, +and this belongs to the perfection that is called humility. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a +virtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than +virtue. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in +which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through +performing acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This may be +done in three ways. First, because they tend to that which is +difficult as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in +three ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not +perceiving the greatness of the danger; sometimes it is owing to the +fact that one is hopeful of overcoming dangers--when, for instance, +one has often experienced escape from danger; and sometimes this is +owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who, +through skill and practice in the use of arms, think little of the +dangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending +themselves against them; thus Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), "No man +fears to do what he is confident of having learned to do well." +Secondly, a man performs an act of fortitude without having the +virtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sorrow that he +wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Thirdly, through choice, not +indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, +such as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be +avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss. + +Reply Obj. 3: The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue, +as explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called from +its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with +the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to +virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above (I-II, +Q. 63, A. 1). +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 2] + +Whether Fortitude Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it +is written (Wis. 7:7): "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and +justice, and fortitude," where the text has "virtue" for "fortitude." +Since then the term "virtue" is common to all virtues, it seems that +fortitude is a general virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is not +lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues +and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on +all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled +against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a +deformity that weakens virtue"; and he says the same further on in +connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special +virtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from +firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in +_Ethic._ ii. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other +virtues. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the term +"fortitude" can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a +certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue, +or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher +states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly +and immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness +only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most +difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore +Tully says (Rhet. ii), that "fortitude is deliberate facing of +dangers and bearing of toils." In this sense fortitude is reckoned a +special virtue, because it has a special matter. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 116) the word +virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power +is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another +sense is a principle of action, as stated in _Metaph._ v, 17. And +since this latter meaning is the more common, the term "virtue," as +denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for +virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby +one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the +first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special +virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against +all kinds of assaults. + +Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as denoting +firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. Nevertheless even +as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the +assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are +most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those +which are less difficult. + +Reply Obj. 3: This objection takes fortitude in the first sense. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 3] + +Whether Fortitude Is About Fear and Daring? + +Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring. +For Gregory says (Moral. vii): "The fortitude of the just man is to +overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the lusts +of the present life." Therefore fortitude seems to be about pleasures +rather than about fear and daring. + +Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs to +fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has +nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a +man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not +about fear and daring. + +Obj. 3: Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear, +as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1, ad 2) in the treatise on +passions. Therefore fortitude should not be about daring any more +than about hope. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that +fortitude is about fear and daring. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of +fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from +following the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult +belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil +that entails difficulty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, AA. 3, 5) in +the treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of +difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the +reason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the assault of +these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to +withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them +altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the future, which +seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is +about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring. + +Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude of the just +man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all +mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted, +and then adds that which pertains properly to fortitude as a special +virtue, by saying: "To love the trials of this life for the sake of +an eternal reward." + +Reply Obj. 2: Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the +course of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear. +Hence fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but +mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those +passions. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for +hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same +object, and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1). And since fortitude properly +regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as +appears from Tully's definition quoted in the Second Objection, it +follows that fortitude properly is about fear and daring and not +about hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2). +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 4] + +Whether Fortitude Is Only About Dangers of Death? + +Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of +death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude is +love bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved": +and (Music. vi) he says that fortitude is "the love which dreads no +hardship, not even death." Therefore fortitude is not only about +danger of death, but also about other afflictions. + +Obj. 2: Further, all the passions of the soul need to be reduced to a +mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears to a +mean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear of death, but also +about other fears. + +Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is +about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in +_Ethic._ iii. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of +death. + +_On the contrary,_ Andronicus says that "fortitude is a virtue of the +irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to the virtue of +fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of +reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold +firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no +bodily good is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude +of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of +reason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm +against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less +things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of +virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful +of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods. +Wherefore Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that "the soul is +shaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body +be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done away and +destroyed." Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of +dangers of death. + +Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of +adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any +kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest +evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a +restricted sense. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates +the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of +contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money, +as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is +the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own +life is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue +modifying the fear of death. + +Reply Obj. 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right +reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with +reason is not contrary to virtue. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 5] + +Whether Fortitude Is Properly About Dangers of Death in Battle? + +Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of +death in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their +fortitude. But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle. +Therefore fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle. + +Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fortitude is +applicable both to warlike and to civil matters": and Tully (De +Offic. i), under the heading, "That it pertains to fortitude to excel +in battle rather than in civil life," says: "Although not a few think +that the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of +civil life, this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge +the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more +important and more glorious than those connected with war." Now +greater fortitude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude is not +properly concerned with death in battle. + +Obj. 3: Further, war is directed to the preservation of a country's +temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that "wars are +waged in order to insure peace." Now it does not seem that one ought +to expose oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of +one's country, since this same peace is the occasion of much license +in morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude is not +about the danger of death in battle. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fortitude +is chiefly about death in battle. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), fortitude strengthens a +man's mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now +fortitude is a virtue; and it is essential to virtue ever to tend to +good; wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not +fly from the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out of +sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not +seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good. On the other +hand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly +on account of some good, because, to wit, he is defending the common +good by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there +is the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle; +secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even +private individual does not refrain from giving a just judgment +through fear of the impending sword, or any other danger though it +threaten death. Hence it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the mind +against dangers of death, not only such as arise in a general battle, +but also such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by the +general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted that fortitude +is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle. + +Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other +kind of death; especially since man may be in danger of any kind of +death on account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a +sick friend through fear of deadly infection, or not refuse to +undertake a journey with some godly object in view through fear of +shipwreck or robbers. + +Reply Obj. 1: Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own +person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is God; +wherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the +genus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason +they are said to have been valiant in battle. [*Office of Martyrs, +ex. Heb. xi. 34.] + +Reply Obj. 2: Personal and civil business is differentiated from the +business of war that regards general wars. However, personal and +civil affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain +conflicts which are private wars, and so with regard to these also +there may be fortitude properly so called. + +Reply Obj. 3: The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it +become evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For there +are many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented by +it, such as murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those which +are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the +flesh. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 6] + +Whether Endurance Is the Chief Act of Fortitude? + +Objection 1: It seems that endurance is not the chief act of +fortitude. For virtue "is about the difficult and the good" (Ethic. +ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore +endurance is not the chief act of fortitude. + +Obj. 2: Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue greater +power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to act on +another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then +fortitude denotes perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to +fortitude to attack rather than to endure. + +Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than its +mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas to attack +denotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies +pursuit. Since then fortitude above all withdraws the mind from fear, +it seems that it regards attack rather than endurance. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "certain +persons are" said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), and according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), "fortitude is more concerned to allay +fear, than to moderate daring." For it is more difficult to allay +fear than to moderate daring, since the danger which is the object of +daring and fear, tends by its very nature to check daring, but to +increase fear. Now to attack belongs to fortitude in so far as the +latter moderates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of +fear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is +to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them. + +Reply Obj. 1: Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for three +reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being +attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is +attacking as though one were the stronger party; and it is more +difficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly, +because he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas +the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; and it is more +difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly, +because endurance implies length of time, whereas aggression is +consistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain +unmoved for a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something +arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some hurry +to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the +behavior of a brave man." + +Reply Obj. 2: Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the body, but an +action of the soul cleaving most resolutely (_fortissime_) to good, +the result being that it does not yield to the threatening passion of +the body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with +the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 7] + +Whether the Brave Man Acts for the Sake of the Good of His Habit? + +Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of +the good of his habit. For in matters of action the end, though first +in intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fortitude, in the +order of execution, follows the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is +impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his +habit. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "We love virtues for +the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be +virtuous," namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own +sake, "without loving happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor, +we shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer +love that for the sake of which alone we love virtue." But fortitude +is a virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not to +fortitude but to happiness. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude +is love ready to bear all things for God's sake." Now God is not the +habit of fortitude, but something better, since the end must needs be +better than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man does +not act for the sake of the good of his habit. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "to the +brave man fortitude itself is a good": and such is his end. + +_I answer that,_ An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the +proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that +agent's form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is +to introduce the likeness of its heat into some passive matter, and +the end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of +his art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be +called the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made, +external matter is fashioned by art, so in things done, human deeds +are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the +brave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a +likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his +habit: but his remote end is happiness or God. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First +Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were its +end, instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The +other two objections consider the ultimate end. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 8] + +Whether the Brave Man Delights in His Act? + +Objection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For +"delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit" (Ethic. x, +4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after +the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his +act. + +Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, "But the fruit of +the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," says that deeds of virtue are +called "fruits because they refresh man's mind with a holy and pure +delight." Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he +takes pleasure in his act. + +Obj. 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the +brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own +body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight +in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently +the brave man does all things with pleasure. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "the +brave man seems to have no delight in his act." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 31, AA. 3, 4, 5) where we +were treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily, +resulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from +an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results +from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason. +Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain +things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul--for instance, +the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a +natural good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and +things connected with them--but also to endure things unpleasant in +respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave +man, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as +regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end +thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual +sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence +we read (2 Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: "I suffer grievous pains in +body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I +fear Thee." + +Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the +spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God's +grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things +in which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the +Blessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said +that he felt as though he were walking on roses. + +Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely +overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes +spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the +life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the +Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that "it is not necessary for +a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices +for him not to be sad." + +Reply Obj. 1: The vehemence of the action or passion of one power +hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses +hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper +operation. + +Reply Obj. 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of +their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is +principally the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says +(Ethic. iii, 9) that "to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen +in all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end." + +Reply Obj. 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the +delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the +sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that +spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in +the presence of great bodily pain. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 9] + +Whether Fortitude Deals Chiefly with Sudden Occurrences? + +Objection 1: It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with +sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when +they are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that +"fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil." +Therefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings. + +Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "The brave man is not +unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures +beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so +as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say +afterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could possibly +happen." But it is not possible to be prepared for the future in the +case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is +not concerned with sudden happenings. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that the "brave +man is of good hope." But hope looks forward to the future, which is +inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of +fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that +"fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death." + +_I answer that,_ Two things must be considered in the operation of +fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not +about sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think +beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to +withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to +Gregory (Hom. xxv in Evang.), "the blow that is foreseen strikes with +less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we +are forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge." The other thing to +be considered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of +the virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden +occurrences, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the +habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a +habit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a person without +forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges +on account of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that +habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind. + +Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fortitude, +to prepare his mind against danger by long forethought: in the same +way as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for +the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 10] + +Whether the Brave Man Makes Use of Anger in His Action? + +Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his +action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that +which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as +to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher +says (De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does +not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not +employ anger for his action. + +Obj. 2: Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he +should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more +imperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of +fortitude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira +i): "Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for +action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than +for reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid, +the trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?" +Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of +fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or +desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild +beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and +adulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now +fortitude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore +in like manner it should not employ anger. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "anger +helps the brave." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), concerning +anger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion +between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded +anger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or +good man: whereas the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief, +ascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the +soul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed not in +reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), gave the name of passions to all the +movements of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport +themselves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the command +of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt, +they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the +other passions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of +reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to +certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite, wherefore they +called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them +altogether from virtue. + +Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but +not immoderate anger. + +Reply Obj. 1: Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is +subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will, +which would not be the case were it immoderate. + +Reply Obj. 2: Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its +assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an +instrument, just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it +unbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the principal +agent, even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover, +Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed +by him directly at Aristotle. + +Reply Obj. 3: Whereas fortitude, as stated above (A. 6), has two +acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the +act of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act, but +for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the +other passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of +sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking. +On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to the thing +that hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as +being the cause of anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 47, A. 3), or as +making a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from +sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to a +pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand +danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, in so far +as one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence the +Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "Of all the cases in which +fortitude arises from a passion, the most natural is when a man is +brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose," +i.e. for a due end; "this is true fortitude." +_______________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 11] + +Whether Fortitude Is a Cardinal Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. For, +as stated above (A. 10), anger is closely allied with fortitude. Now +anger is not accounted a principal passion; nor is daring which +belongs to fortitude. Therefore neither should fortitude be reckoned +a cardinal virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct object +of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil and +toil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii). Therefore fortitude is not +a cardinal virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the cardinal virtues are about those things upon +which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon a +hinge (_cardine_). But fortitude is about dangers of death which are +of rare occurrence in human life. Therefore fortitude should not be +reckoned a cardinal or principal virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in his commentary +on Luke 6:20, and Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), number fortitude +among the four cardinal or principal virtues. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), those +virtues are said to be cardinal or principal which have a foremost +claim to that which belongs to the virtues in common. And among other +conditions of virtue in general one is that it is stated to "act +steadfastly," according to _Ethic._ ii, 4. Now fortitude above all +lays claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm +is so much the more praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall +or recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in +accordance with reason, both by the pleasing good and the displeasing +evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For +Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is none that does not shun +pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the +most untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the +fear of pain." And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are +mostly feared which lead to death, and it is against them that the +brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Daring and anger do not cooperate with fortitude in its +act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended: for +it is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal +passion, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 2: Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it +behooves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fortitude +is directed to evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands, +and to the good of reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard. + +Reply Obj. 3: Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the +occasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account of +justice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds, +man encounters mortal adversaries. +_______________________ + +TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 12] + +Whether Fortitude Excels Among All Other Virtues? + +Objection 1: It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues. +For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is higher, so to speak, +than the rest." + +Obj. 2: Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good. +But fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is the +greatest of the virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his +possessions. But fortitude is about a man's person, for it is this +that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue: +whereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other and +external things. Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral +virtues. + +Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i): "Justice is the +most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man." + +Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): "Those virtues +must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others." Now +liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is a +greater virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), "In things that are +great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good": wherefore the +better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is man's good, +according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a +perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects +this good, since it belongs to justice to establish the order of +reason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this +good, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they lead man away +from reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude holds +the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest +power to make man recede from the good of reason: and after fortitude +comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in +hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing essentially ranks +before effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by +removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, +prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance +fourth, and after these the other virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: Ambrose places fortitude before the other virtues, in +respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both +in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he +begins by saying (De Offic. i): "Now we come to treat of fortitude, +which being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to +warlike and to civil matters." + +Reply Obj. 2: Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the +difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to +its goodness rather than its difficulty. + +Reply Obj. 3: A man does not expose his person to dangers of death +except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to +fortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. +i) that "fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since +the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker." + +The Fourth argument is granted. + +Reply Obj. 5: Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular +favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude, +since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the Philosopher +says (Rhet. i, 9) that "just and brave men are most beloved, because +they are most useful in war and peace." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 124 + +OF MARTYRDOM +(In Five Articles) + +We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue? + +(2) Of what virtue is it the act? + +(3) Concerning the perfection of this act; + +(4) The pain of martyrdom; + +(5) Its cause. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 1] + +Whether Martyrdom Is an Act of Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all +acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not +voluntary, as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for +Christ's sake, and of whom Hilary says (Super Matth. i) that "they +attained the ripe age of eternity through the glory of martyrdom." +Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is +unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above (Q. 64, A. 5), and yet +martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) +that "during persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from +those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river, +and so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is honored in the +Catholic Church with most solemn veneration." Therefore martyrdom is +not an act of virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act of +virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather would +it seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an +act of virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of +virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (Matt. 5:10): +"Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for +theirs is the kingdom of heaven." Therefore martyrdom is an act of +virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 1, 3), it belongs to +virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason +consists in the truth as its proper object, and in justice as its +proper effect, as shown above (Q. 109, AA. 1, 2; Q. 123, A. 12). And +martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and +justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident that +martyrdom is an act of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some have said that in the case of the Innocents the +use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they +suffered martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture +contains no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in +being slain obtained by God's grace the glory of martyrdom which +others acquire by their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for +Christ's sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the +case of baptized children the merit of Christ is conducive to the +acquisition of glory through the baptismal grace, so in those who +were slain for Christ's sake the merit of Christ's martyrdom is +conducive to the acquisition of the martyr's palm. Hence Augustine +says in a sermon on the Epiphany (De Diversis lxvi), as though he +were addressing them: "A man that does not believe that children are +benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being crowned +in suffering for Christ. You were not old enough to believe in +Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein you could +endure suffering of Christ Who was to suffer." + +Reply Obj. 2: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "possibly the +Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority +thus to honor the memory of those holy women [*Cf. Q. 64, A. 1, ad +2]." + +Reply Obj. 3: The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now +it has been stated (I-II, Q. 108, A. 1, ad 4) that some of the +precepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the +preparation of the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared +to do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way +certain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the preparation +of the mind, so that in such and such a case a man should act +according to reason. And this observation would seem very much to the +point in the case of martyrdom, which consists in the right endurance +of sufferings unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an +occasion of acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to +endure it in moderation. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 2] + +Whether Martyrdom Is an Act of Fortitude? + +Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For +the Greek _martyr_ signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the +faith of Christ. according to Acts 1:8, "You shall be witnesses unto +Me," etc. and Maximus says in a sermon: "The mother of martyrs is the +Catholic faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their +blood." Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of +fortitude. + +Obj. 2: Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue +which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the +act avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom: +Thus Maximus says in a sermon: "The charity of Christ is victorious +in His martyrs." Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act +of martyrdom, according to John 15:13, "Greater love than this no man +hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Moreover without +charity martyrdom avails nothing, according to 1 Cor. 13:3, "If I +should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it +profiteth me nothing." Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity +rather than of fortitude. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: "It is +easy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great +thing to imitate his faith and patience." Now that which calls +chiefly for praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which it is +the act. Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of +fortitude. + +_On the contrary,_ Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "Blessed +martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors, +how shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage?" Now +a person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs. +Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 1, seqq.), it belongs to +fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against +dangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all +against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in +martyrdom man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he +cleaves to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger +of death, the imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of +particular contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a +sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "The crowd of onlookers wondered +to see an unearthly battle, and Christ's servants fighting erect, +undaunted in speech, with souls unmoved, and strength divine." +Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for +which reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs: They "became +valiant in battle" [*Heb. 11:34]. + +Reply Obj. 1: Two things must be considered in the act of fortitude. +One is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and this is +the end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby a man +does not yield to the contraries that hinder him from achieving that +good, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as +civic fortitude strengthens a man's mind in human justice, for the +safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous +fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good of Divine justice, which +is "through faith in Christ Jesus," according to Rom. 3:22. Thus +martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is +strengthened, but to fortitude as the eliciting habit. + +Reply Obj. 2: Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as its +first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it, whereas +fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause, being +the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as +commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it +manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious, +like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails not +without charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 123, A. 6), the chief act of +fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act, which +is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves fortitude +on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that +martyrs are also praised for their patience. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 3] + +Whether Martyrdom Is an Act of the Greatest Perfection? + +Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest +perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not +of precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not +necessary for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is +necessary for salvation, since the Apostle says (Rom. 10:10), "With +the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is +made unto salvation," and it is written (1 John 3:16), that "we ought +to lay down our lives for the brethren." Therefore martyrdom does not +pertain to perfection. + +Obj. 2: Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a man +give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give +God his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says +(Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is preferable to all sacrifices." +Therefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection. + +Obj. 3: Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to +maintain oneself in good, since the "good of the nation is better +than the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher +(Ethic. i, 2). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone, +whereas he that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of +teaching and guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of +martyrdom. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers +martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore +martyrdom seems to belong to perfection in the highest degree. + +_I answer that,_ We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First, +with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue +proximately eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in +the due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous +acts, because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but +only in so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of +virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue +being the end is better. + +A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with +its first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in +this respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, +since, as the Apostle says (Col. 3:14), that "charity . . . is the +bond of perfection." Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the +greatest proof of the perfection of charity: since a man's love for a +thing is proved to be so much the greater, according as that which he +despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses +to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all +the goods of the present life man loves life itself most, and on the +other hand he hates death more than anything, especially when it is +accompanied by the pains of bodily torment, "from fear of which even +dumb animals refrain from the greatest pleasures," as Augustine +observes (QQ. 83, qu. 36). And from this point of view it is clear +that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its +genus, as being the sign of the greatest charity, according to John +15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his +life for his friends." + +Reply Obj. 1: There is no act of perfection, which is a matter of +counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being +necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug. +xiii) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency, +through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary +to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary +for salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for +salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who +through zeal for the faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to +martyrdom of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be +understood as referring to the preparation of the mind. + +Reply Obj. 2: Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of +obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (Phil. +2:8) that He became "obedient unto death." Hence it is evident that +martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered +absolutely. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers martyrdom according to the +proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all +other virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than +all virtues. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 4] + +Whether Death Is Essential to Martyrdom? + +Objection 1: It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For +Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et +Eustoch.): "I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both +virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace": and Gregory +says (Hom. iii in Evang.): "Although persecution has ceased to offer +the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom, +since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, +yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the +spirit." Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death. + +Obj. 2: Further, we read of certain women as commended for despising +life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh: +wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the +life of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been +forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian +faith, as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the +name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the +integrity of the flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if +she were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also Lucy +said: "If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity +will gain me a twofold crown." + +Obj. 3: Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs to +fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as +Augustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships +besides death, which one may suffer for Christ's faith, namely +imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in +Heb. 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint +Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is +not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death. + +Obj. 4: Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above (A. +2, ad 1; A. 3). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death. +Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential +to martyrdom. + +_On the contrary,_ Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that "in +dying for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in +living without faith." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a martyr is so called as +being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise +things visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb. +11. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to +the faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in +order to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains +the life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all +things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their +kindred and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather +than lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): "Skin +for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul" [Douay: +'life'] i.e. for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion +of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake. + +Reply Obj. 1: The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet +with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude. + +Reply Obj. 2: When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is +condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it is +not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian +faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight +of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently +this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of God, +however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a +reward, as Lucy said. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5), fortitude regards +danger of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a +person is not called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or +exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these result +in death. + +Reply Obj. 4: The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the +voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person +willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however, +that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for +Christ's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other +kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death +ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this +state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 5] + +Whether Faith Alone Is the Cause of Martyrdom? + +Objection 1: It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For +it is written (1 Pet. 4:15, 16): "Let none of you suffer as a +murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's +things. But if as a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him +glorify God in this name." Now a man is said to be a Christian +because he holds the faith of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ +gives the glory of martyrdom to those who suffer. + +Obj. 2: Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is borne +to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing +witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth, +otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a +truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems +ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. + +Obj. 3: Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most +account which are directed to the common good, since "the good of the +nation is better than the good of the individual," according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause +of martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs +who die for the defense of their country. Yet this is not consistent +with Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of +those who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of +martyrdom. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:10): "Blessed are they that +suffer persecution for justice' sake," which pertains to martyrdom, +according to a gloss, as well as Jerome's commentary on this passage. +Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice. +Therefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), martyrs are so called as +being witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear +witness to the truth; not indeed to any truth, but to the truth which +is in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ: +wherefore Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the +truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of +faith. + +But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also +outward profession, which is expressed not only by words, whereby one +confesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that +he has faith, according to James 2:18, "I will show thee, by works, +my faith." Hence it is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): "They +profess that they know God but in their works they deny Him." Thus +all virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are +professions of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires +these works of us, and rewards us for them: and in this way they can +be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the +martyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for +refusing to deny the faith, but for reproving adultery. + +Reply Obj. 1: A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person is +said to be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but +also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of +Christ, according to Rom. 8:9, "If any man have not the Spirit of +Christ, he is none of His"; and again because in imitation of Christ +he is dead to sins, according to Gal. 5:24, "They that are Christ's +have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences." Hence +to suffer as a Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the +faith, which is done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good +work, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all +comes under the head of witnessing to the faith. + +Reply Obj. 2: The truth of other sciences has no connection with the +worship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according to +godliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to +be the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as +stated above (Q. 110, AA. 3, 4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever +truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a +lie is a sin against the Divine Law. + +Reply Obj. 3: The good of one's country is paramount among human +goods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of martyrdom, +is of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since human good +may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God, it +follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may +be the cause of martyrdom. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 125 + +OF FEAR* +(In Four Articles) +[* St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently 'fear' or 'timidity.' The +translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account of the +connection with the passion of fear. Otherwise 'cowardice' would be a +better rendering.] + +We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2) +Fearlessness; (3) Daring. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether fear is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude? + +(3) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 1] + +Whether Fear Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion, +as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 42). Now we are neither +praised nor blamed for passions, as stated in _Ethic._ ii. Since then +every sin is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a +sin: since the "law of the Lord is unspotted" (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is +commanded in God's law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): "Servants, be +obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with +fear and trembling." Therefore fear is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin +is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii). Now +fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, +7) that "a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not +even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear." Therefore fear +is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Matt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them +that kill the body," and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): "Fear not, +neither be thou afraid of their words." + +_I answer that,_ A human act is said to be a sin on account of its +being inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, +as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 114, A. 1). Now this due order +requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And +reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some sought +after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be +shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that +some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a +good is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be +shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to +be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided. +Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we +should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek +for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other hand, when the +appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the +appetite is neither inordinate nor sinful. + +Reply Obj. 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in +general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or +evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the +Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame, +because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or +afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate +manner. + +Reply Obj. 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance +with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking in +the service they owe their masters. + +Reply Obj. 3: Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we +cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing. +Hence there is no sin in fearing them. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 2] + +Whether the Sin of Fear Is Contrary to Fortitude? + +Objection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to +fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated +above (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5). But the sin of fear is not always connected +with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, "Blessed are all +they that fear the Lord," says that "it is human fear whereby we +dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods." Again a +gloss on Matt. 27:44, "He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame +word," says that "evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of +pain, and fear of contempt." Therefore the sin of fear is not +contrary to fortitude. + +Obj. 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for +fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now +sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or +shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not +to be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of +fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed +thereto. + +Obj. 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed +not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1; I-II, Q. +40, A. 4). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that +timidity is opposed to fortitude. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q. 43, A. 1), +all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary +to something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular +kind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every +virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; +while inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate +love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate +fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss +of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But +the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for +its object, as we find proved in _Ethic._ iii, 6. Wherefore the +inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards +dangers of death. For this reason timidity is said to be +antonomastically* opposed to fortitude. [*Antonomasia is the figure +of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; +e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is +inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of +the danger of death.] + +Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its +generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues. + +Reply Obj. 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the +end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6): and it belongs +to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a +good. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to +escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is +contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), +that "to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or something +disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun +hardships is a mark of effeminacy." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2), fear is the +beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring. +Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation +presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some +kind of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair +results from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same +kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another +kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to +fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 3] + +Whether Fear Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1), fear is in the irascible faculty which is +a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the +sensuality, as stated above (I-II, Q. 74, A. 4). Therefore fear is +not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God. +But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, "Whosoever is +fearful," etc., says that "a man is fearful when he trembles at the +very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart, +but that he can rally and take courage." Therefore fear is not a +mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but +also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a precept, +but only from perfection; for a gloss on Deut. 20:8, "What man is +there that is fearful and fainthearted?" says: "We learn from this +that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual +warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches." +Therefore fear is not a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and +yet this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. 21:8, "But the +fearful and unbelieving and the abominable," etc., "shall have their +portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the +second death." Therefore fear is a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), fear is a sin through being +inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be +shunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of +fear is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of +the rational appetite's consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but +only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches +to the rational appetite which is called the will, which deliberately +shuns something against the dictate of reason: and this +inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. +For if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other +temporal evil is so disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit +what is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: +otherwise it is a venial sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers fear as confined to the +sensuality. + +Reply Obj. 2: This gloss also can be understood as referring to the +fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may +reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes +his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may +happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one +cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins +mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from +accomplishing what he purposed doing. + +Reply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from +a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but +for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin, +but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance +when one has a reasonable cause for fear. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 4] + +Whether Fear Excuses from Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is +a sin, as stated above (A. 1). But sin does not excuse from sin, +rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this +be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a +courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse, +because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to +be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual. +Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead of +inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal +evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the Philosopher +(Ethic. iii, 6), "one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor +anything that is not a result of one's own wickedness." Therefore it +seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q. 1, Cap. +Constat.): "A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by +heretics, has an ostensible excuse." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), fear is sinful in so far as +it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain +evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to +shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges +to be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than +the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if +through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a +robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, +rather than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the +other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according +to reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according +to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from +sin, because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the +soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body, and evils of +the body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to +incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the +body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as +loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to +avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet +one's sin would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear +is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a +certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher +(Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through fear are +not simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary. + +Reply Obj. 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but +in the point of its involuntariness. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the +shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of +fear. + +Reply Obj. 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal +goods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that temporal +evils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be +feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these temporal +things are goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion +of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be feared; +but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that which +is good according to virtue. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 126 + +OF FEARLESSNESS +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there +are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless? + +(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 126, Art. 1] + +Whether Fearlessness Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which +is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is +written in praise of the just man (Prov. 28:1): "The just, bold as a +lion, shall be without dread." Therefore it is not a sin to be +without fear. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death, +according to Matt. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body," +etc., nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Isa. +51:12, "Who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?" +Therefore it is not a sin to be fearless. + +Obj. 3: Further, fear is born of love, as stated above (Q. 125, A. +2). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing +earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "the love of +God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city." +Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly. + +_On the contrary,_ It is said of the unjust judge (Luke 18:2) that +"he feared not God nor regarded man." + +_I answer that,_ Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge +alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear +whereby one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of +temporal goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to +love his own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in +due measure, that is, to love these things not as placing his end +therein, but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence +it is contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to +fall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never +lapses entirely from this love: since what is natural cannot be +wholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says (Eph. 5:29): "No man +ever hated his own flesh." Wherefore even those that slay themselves +do so from love of their own flesh, which they desire to free from +present stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and other +temporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that he loves them* +less than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect 'se' +instead of 'ea.' We should then read: For the reason that he loves +himself less than he ought.] But that he fear none of these things +cannot result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact +that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils +contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride +of soul presuming on self and despising others, according to the +saying of Job 41:24, 25: "He [Vulg.: 'who'] was made to fear no one, +he beholdeth every high thing": and sometimes it happens through a +defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that +the "Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing." [*"A man +would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing +that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as is said +to be the case with the Celts."] It is therefore evident that +fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of +soul, or dullness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from +sin if it be invincible. + +Reply Obj. 1: The just man is praised for being without fear that +withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it +is written (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be +justified." + +Reply Obj. 2: Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man +are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they +are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as +regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others. +Hence it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and declineth +from evil." + +Reply Obj. 3: Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from +loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be +feared; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 34:16): "He that feareth the +Lord shall tremble at nothing." But temporal goods are not to be +despised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain +those things that pertain to Divine fear and love. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 126, Art. 2] + +Whether Fearlessness Is Opposed to Fortitude? + +Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude. +For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is +hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is +both brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is +not opposed to fortitude. + +Obj. 2: Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due +love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of due +love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly +to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not +opposed to fortitude. + +Obj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the +mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then +fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the +other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness +to be opposed to fortitude. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 3), fortitude is +concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the +rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Hence it +belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to +reason, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when he ought, +and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by +excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is opposed to +fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man fears what he ought +not, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by +deficiency of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to +fear. + +Reply Obj. 1: The act of fortitude is to endure death without fear, +and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the +fearless man does not do. + +Reply Obj. 2: Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean +of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But in +respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other +virtues. + +Reply Obj. 3: The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of +daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude imposes the +mean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its +having different extremes in different respects. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 127 + +OF DARING* +[*Excessive daring or foolhardiness] +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether daring is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 1] + +Whether Daring Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written +(Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory +(Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that "he goeth forth +boldly to meet armed men [*Vulg.: 'he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth +to meet armed men']." But no vice redounds to a man's praise. +Therefore it is not a sin to be daring. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), "one +should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been +counseled." But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore +daring is not sinful but praiseworthy. + +Obj. 3: Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 45, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. But hope +is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring +be accounted a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not on the way +with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils." Now no man's +fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring +is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ Daring, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 55), +is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to +reason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by +deficiency, and on this account the passion is sinful. Again, the +names of the passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess, +thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which +case it is sinful, and in the same way daring as implying excess is +accounted a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated +by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel, +which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking +counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act +rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above (Q. 58, +A. 3). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far +praiseworthy as it is directed by reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues, +as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4, 5, 6). Hence the +names of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and +virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially the +names of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the +case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good +for this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 2] + +Whether Daring Is Opposed to Fortitude? + +Objection 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For +excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But +presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore +daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude. + +Obj. 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so +far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts +himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with +daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to +injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to +fortitude but to justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as +stated above (Q. 123, A. 3). Now since timidity is opposed to +fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice +opposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is +opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will +likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring. +But there is no such vice. Therefore neither should daring be +accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books +of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 126, A. 2), it belongs to a +moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which +it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation +in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as +immoderate to moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, +implies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of +daring. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of +fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above +(Q. 122, A. 3). + +Reply Obj. 1: Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend +chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species. +Wherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same +virtue as presumption which is its cause. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend +on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm +done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition +of daring depend on this. + +Reply Obj. 3: The movement of daring consists in a man taking the +offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature +inclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is +hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the +vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only +timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of +timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), "the daring +are precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is +present," namely through fear. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 128 + +OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE + +We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider +what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each +part. +_______________________ + +ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 128, Art.] + +Whether the Parts of Fortitude Are Suitably Assigned? + +Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably +assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to +fortitude, namely _magnificence, confidence, patience,_ and +_perseverance._ Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; +since both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must +needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But +liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 5). +Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. + +Obj. 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope +does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by +itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of +fortitude. + +Obj. 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of +danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any +relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts +of fortitude. + +Obj. 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience +denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to +fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part +thereof. + +Obj. 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not +be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required +in every virtue: for it is written (Matt. 24:13): "He that shall +persevere to the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance +should not be accounted a part of fortitude. + +Obj. 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of +fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, +constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven +virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, "courage, strength of +will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore +it seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is +incomplete. + +Obj. 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of +fortitude. The first is _civic_ fortitude, which produces brave deeds +through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is _military_ +fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or +experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds +resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude +which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; +the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through +being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not +comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these +enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue can have three +kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude, +taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is +not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is +about a very special matter. + +However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it: +integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which +is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because +what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely +dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of +certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as +secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Q. 123, +AA. 3, 6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. +Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first +regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind +ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions _confidence,_ of +which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "with this the mind is much +assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings." The +second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not +failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect +Tully mentions _magnificence,_ which he describes as being "the +discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and +lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind," +so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if +these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to +dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because +without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred +to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues +specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as +secondary virtues to principal: thus _magnificence_ is referred by +the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and _magnanimity,_ +which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two +things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. +The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away +from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In +this respect he mentions _patience,_ which he describes as "the +voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for +the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that by the prolonged +suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, +according to Heb. 12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in your +minds." In this respect he mentions _perseverance,_ which accordingly +he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well +considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter of +fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be +referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from +fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal. + +Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain +greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is +the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by +fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs. + +Reply Obj. 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a +theological virtue, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 5; I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). +But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man +hopes in himself, yet under God withal. + +Reply Obj. 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, +since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although +magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or +venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection +with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger. + +Reply Obj. 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which +fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other +hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue +annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an +integral part thereof. + +Reply Obj. 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed +unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is +reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the +Article. + +Reply Obj. 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by +Tully, namely _confidence, magnificence, forbearance,_ which he puts +in the place of patience, and _firmness,_ which he substitutes for +perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely _magnanimity_ +and _security,_ are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. +But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence +denotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything +presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, +and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above (I-II, +Q. 40, A. 2) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped +for. + +A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of +hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped +for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for +sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope +is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat +contrary to hope, as stated above, (I-II, Q. 40, A. 4, ad 1). Hence +Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely +constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in +performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind. +For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in +accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in +the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may +be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and +constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles. + +Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as +the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions _perseverance_ +and _magnificence,_ and with Macrobius, _magnanimity. Strength of +will_ is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that +"strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what +ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be +endured"--i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he +defines it as "strength of soul in the accomplishment of its +purpose." Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says +that "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue." +Besides magnificence he mentions _andragathia_, i.e. manly goodness +which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence consists not +only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which +belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence +and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to +_andragathia_, strenuousness: wherefore he says that _andragathia_ is +the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works. + +Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the +four principal parts mentioned by Tully. + +Reply Obj. 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true +notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude, +they differ as to motive, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 1, ad 2); +wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 129 + +OF MAGNANIMITY* +[*Not in the ordinary restricted sense but as explained by the author] +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, +however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the +exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, +of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider +(1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. +As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its +contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether magnanimity is about honors? + +(2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors? + +(3) Whether it is a virtue? + +(4) Whether it is a special virtue? + +(5) Whether it is a part of fortitude? + +(6) Of its relation to confidence; + +(7) Of its relation to assurance; + +(8) Of its relation to goods of fortune. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 1] + +Whether Magnanimity Is About Honors? + +Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For +magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, +since "magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes +the irascible part, as appears from _De Anima_ iii, 42, where the +Philosopher says that "in the sensitive appetite are desire and +mind," i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a +concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it +seems that magnanimity is not about honors. + +Obj. 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs +be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about +operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows +that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore +magnanimity is not about honors. + +Obj. 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit +rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he +tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring +honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about +honors. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that +"magnanimity is about honor and dishonor." + +_I answer that,_ Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching +forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to +two things, first to the matter about which is the field of its +activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use +of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly +from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is +minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two +ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may +be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of +some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good +use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists +in the best use of the greatest thing. + +The things which come into man's use are external things, and among +these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin +to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated +above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2); and because it is offered to God and to the +best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid +shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be +magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and +simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that +are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about +honors. + +Reply Obj. 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard the +concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is +added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity +regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something +great or difficult. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation, +yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a +difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the +passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope: +even so, we have stated (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5) with regard to fortitude +that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of +fear and daring. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a +way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too +great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so +as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving +of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a +man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think +much of the honor accorded by man. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 2] + +Whether Magnanimity Is Essentially About Great Honors? + +Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great +honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated +above (A. 1). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore +it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness +about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either +great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to +magnanimity to be about great honor. + +Obj. 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is +dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor, +and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is +not only about great honors. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that +magnanimity is about great honors. + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), +virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the +perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that +power, as stated in _De Coelo_ i, 116. Now the perfection of a power +is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such +operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however +imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it +is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as +stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3. + +Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act +of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the +point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and +establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this +difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also +of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which +may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which +moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards +chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, +because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, +4). + +Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness +of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases +from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are +the objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great +power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive +appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to +reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions +regard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is +about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence +of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest +anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of +resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that +are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of +money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not +only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also +about that which is ordinary or little: because things external, +though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for +human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two +virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely +liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely +"magnificence." + +In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary +honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes, +which are _philotimia_, i.e. love of honor, and _aphilotimia_, i.e. +without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving +honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as +both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great +honors there is _magnanimity._ Wherefore we must conclude that the +proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous +man tends to such things as are deserving of honor. + +Reply Obj. 1: Great and little are accidental to honor considered in +itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason, +the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is +much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors. + +Reply Obj. 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest +presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any +need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are +things existing outside the soul. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more +able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous +man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even +little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot +sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence +he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them +above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are +ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, +but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 3] + +Whether Magnanimity Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every +moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean +but the greater extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself +worthy of the greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity +is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But one may have a virtue without having +magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that +"whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of +them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity +is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated +above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). But magnanimity implies certain +dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of +"a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his +utterance calm." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But +magnanimity is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems +himself worthy of great things, and despises others," according to +_Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. + +Obj. 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But +magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the +first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is +remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [*Cf. Q. 113] +towards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; +fifthly, because he holds to the barren things rather than to those +that are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc. +15:18): "Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the +greatness of courage (_animi magnitudinem_) with which they fought +for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now, +only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity +which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue. + +_I answer that,_ The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding +the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good. +Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others, +as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 11, A. 2, Obj. 3). Therefore +magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a +virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "the +magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes," in so far as he +tends to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he +follows the mean," because he tends to the greatest things according +to reason, for "he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth" +(Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts. + +Reply Obj. 2: The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to +their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts +of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming +to every virtuous man, but only to great men. On the other hand, as +regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all +virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in +the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto. +Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not +competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed +to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his +state. + +Reply Obj. 3: The movements of the body are differentiated according +to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it +happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by +way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man +being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, +whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few +and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement. +Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who +are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the +magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these +dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man +according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are +naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found +naturally. + +Reply Obj. 4: There is in man something great which he possesses +through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him +through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man +deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he +holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, +magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same +is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or +external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think +little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and +magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from +God's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do +anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and +esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's +gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. 14:4): "In +his sight a vile person is contemned [*Douay: 'The malignant is +brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the +contempt of magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear the Lord," +which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore +evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one +another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because +they proceed according to different considerations. + +Reply Obj. 5: These properties in so far as they belong to a +magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in +the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful +of those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact +that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he +repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of +gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the +acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he +is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what +becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of +works, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is +also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to +truth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not +true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he +does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number +of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says +(Ethic. iv, 3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards +persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle +class." In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with +others: this means that he is not at home with others than his +friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which +belong to littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great +and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also +said, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any, +but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to +the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to +supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 4] + +Whether Magnanimity Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For +no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher +states (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs +to the magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to +any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to +the magnanimous man. For it is stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3 that "it +belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which is an act of +prudence), "nor to act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that +he is ready to do favors" (which is an act of charity), "that he +gives his services readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he +is truthful" (which is an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not +given to complaining" (which is an act of patience). Therefore +magnanimity is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul, +according to the saying of Isa. 61:10, "He hath clothed me with the +garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride +adorned with her jewels." But magnanimity is the ornament of all the +virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general +virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it +from the other virtues. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2), it belongs to a +special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate +matter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a +determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above (AA. 1, 2): and +honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly +magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue. + +Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above +(Q. 103, A. 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it +regards all the virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great +honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a +great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on +doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to +what is worthy of great honors. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows +that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence, +and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a +man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself +ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other +virtues. On the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man +thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their +sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, +all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be +the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes +a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external +evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids +under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his +excellence or greatness. + +Reply Obj. 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster +or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment +results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through +magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in _Ethic._ +iv, 3. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 5] + +Whether Magnanimity Is a Part of Fortitude? + +Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. +For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be +the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If +magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou +shalt live in great assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a +man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far +removed from deception." Therefore magnanimity is not a part of +fortitude. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a +magnanimous man is not _philokindynos_, that is, a lover of danger. +But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore +magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a +part thereof. + +Obj. 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped +for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or +dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is +a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part +thereof. + +_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon +magnanimity as a part of fortitude. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 3), a principal +virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of +virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue +is firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every +virtue," according to _Ethic._ ii. And this is chiefly commended in +those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most +difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to +stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the +virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter. + +Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein +fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the +greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as +man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of +death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity +agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult +matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind +about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity +is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as +secondary to principal. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1, 3), "to lack evil +is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous +evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were +the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and +the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity +may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference +as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it +follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to +all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks +"many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a +magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for +the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that +are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to +danger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even +as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says +(Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not _mikrokindynos_, i.e. +endangering himself for small things, but _megalokindynos_, i.e. +endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De Quat. +Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers +like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes +the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life." + +Reply Obj. 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to +withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer +an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be +desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to +wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires +it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than +that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things +is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good +things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue +of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil, +evil is of more import in this particular respect. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 6] + +Whether Confidence Belongs to Magnanimity? + +Objection 1: It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity. +For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in +another, according to 2 Cor. 3:4, 5, "Such confidence we have, +through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think +anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." But this seems inconsistent +with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to +magnanimity. + +Obj. 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to +Isa. 12:2, "I will deal confidently and will not fear." But to be +without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also +belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity. + +Obj. 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is +due to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we +are the house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of +hope unto the end." Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from +magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius +enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i). + +_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute +confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question +(ad 6) and in the prologue to this. + +_I answer that,_ Confidence takes its name from "fides" (faith): and +it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But +confidence belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, "Thou shalt have +confidence, hope being set before thee." Wherefore confidence +apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing +the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith +signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come to have a +strong opinion about something, not only on account of another's +statement, but also on account of something we observe in another, it +follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something, +which hope we conceive through observing something either in +oneself--for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is +confident that he will live long. Or in another, for instance, +through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man +is confident that he will receive help from him. + +Now it has been stated above (A. 1, ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly +about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence +denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation +which gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, +it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to +the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the +deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a +man, hence he adds "or scarcely anything." For it surpasses man to +need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine +assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a +social animal, for he is [not] sufficient by himself to provide for +his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs +to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a +point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who +are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own ability +goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 4), +when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to +despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely good. +But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because +the latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain +strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is. +Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of +evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it +follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than +to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to +fortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to +fortitude. + +Reply Obj. 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of +hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now +the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the +act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it +to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, +confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the +conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the +parts of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified +with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral +part, as stated in the preceding Question. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 7] + +Whether Security Belongs to Magnanimity? + +Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. +For security, as stated above (Q. 128, ad 6), denotes freedom from +the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively. +Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude +does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. +Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity. + +Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be +secure because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary to +virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim. +2:15, "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God." +Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great +things in all the virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is +accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14, 18, "If thou +wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being +buried thou shalt sleep secure." Therefore security does not belong +to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: +"Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity +to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune." +But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to +magnanimity. + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a +man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he +fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of +which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom +of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. +Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly +regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to +magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude. + +It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so +is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating +of the passion (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2). Wherefore as confidence belongs +indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so +security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes +despair. + +Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes +fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of +mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same +as fortitude, but is a condition thereof. + +Reply Obj. 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one +puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not +fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and +participation of, future happiness, as stated above (I-II, Q. 5, AA. +3, 7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a +condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's +reward. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 8] + +Whether Goods of Fortune Conduce to Magnanimity? + +Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to +magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): +"virtue suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue +great, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do +not conduce to magnanimity. + +Obj. 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But +the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune: +for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists +of two things," that "a great soul is commended for despising +external things." Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods +of fortune. + +Obj. 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a great +soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his +natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle +says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at +misfortune." Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of +fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him. +Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good +fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), magnanimity regards two +things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something +great as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. +For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, +but also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the +highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those +who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful +organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily +accomplish things by means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is +evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity. + +Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it +can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order +to act more expeditiously. + +Reply Obj. 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch +as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything +unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he +esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds. + +Reply Obj. 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither +very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it. +Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external +goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them +if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 130 + +OF PRESUMPTION +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the +first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are +three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we +shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of +deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether presumption is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 130, Art. 1] + +Whether Presumption Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle +says: "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg.: +'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before." But it +seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above +oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) "we should not +listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because +we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should +relish those that make us immortal": and (Metaph. i) "that man should +pursue divine things as far as possible." Now divine and immortal +things are seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists +essentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that +presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): "Not that we are +sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." If then +presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not +sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of +anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 37:3): "O wicked +presumption, whence camest thou?" and a gloss answers: "From a +creature's evil will." Now all that comes of the root of an evil will +is a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by +the Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is +done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order +established in general throughout natural things is vicious and +sinful. Now it is established throughout all natural things, that +every action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does +any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is +vicious and sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that any +one should assume to do what is above his power: and this is what is +meant by presumption, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident +that presumption is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: [A thing may be] above the active power of a natural +thing, and yet not above the passive power of that same thing: thus +the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be +so changed as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which +surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and +presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue to +attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect +virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to +advance towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched +himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually +advancing forward. + +Reply Obj. 2: Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the +order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely the +intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. In +this respect the Philosopher says that "man ought to pursue immortal +and divine things," not that he should do what it becomes God to do, +but that he should be united to Him in intellect and will. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "what we can +do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense." Hence +since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not +altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man +to attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be +presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in +God's assistance. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 130, Art. 2] + +Whether Presumption Is Opposed to Magnanimity by Excess? + +Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity +by excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against +the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 21, A. 1). But the +sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to +charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity. + +Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem +oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous +even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his +ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity. + +Obj. 3: Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as +little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "on +account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong +others, because they deem external goods as something great." +Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but +only by deficiency. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that +the "vain man," i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a +presumptuous man, "is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1), magnanimity +observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it +tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to +anything greater than is becoming to us. + +Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not +exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he +does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous +man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is +opposed to magnanimity by excess. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin +against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine +justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter +kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it +implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or +rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in +so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability, +it can be opposed to magnanimity. + +Reply Obj. 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to +something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man +presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If, +however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption +is not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about +ordinary honor, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 3: No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so +far as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may err +in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he +has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly, +as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and +worthy of great things, by reason of something that does not make him +so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For, as the +Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things without +virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor +are rightly called magnanimous." + +Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his +ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the +case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has +exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not +simply, but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly +clothes, despising and wronging others. This savors of an excess of +magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca +says (De Quat. Virtut.) that "when magnanimity exceeds its measure, +it makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on +excelling in all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any +considerations of virtue." Thus it is evident that the presumptuous +man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although in +appearance he surpasses him. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 131 + +OF AMBITION +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 131, Art. 1] + +Whether Ambition Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition +denotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and +the greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for +honor are reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it +something deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably +desired. + +Obj. 2: Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him +as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher +states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor +is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which heartens a man to do good and disheartens +him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men to do good +and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that +"with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave in +honor": and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "honor fosters the +arts." Therefore ambition is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 13:5) that "charity is not +ambitious, seeketh not her own." Now nothing is contrary to charity, +except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2), honor denotes +reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two +things have to be considered with regard to man's honor. The first is +that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for +this is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count +honor is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point +that calls for observation is that the thing in which man excels is +given to him by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a +man ought so far to be pleased that others bear witness to his +excellence, as this enables him to profit others. + +Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when +a man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is +to desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires +honor for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's +appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of +others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is +evident that it is always a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: The desire for good should be regulated according to +reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it +is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now +those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason's +dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor. + +Reply Obj. 2: Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the +virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward: +since the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. +But it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have +nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which +honor derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to +virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as +stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened +from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be desired in due +measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an +occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man cares not by what +means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that "the +good as well as the wicked covet honors for themselves, but the one," +i.e. the good, "go about it in the right way," whereas "the other," +i.e. the wicked, "through lack of the good arts, make use of deceit +and falsehood." Yet they who, merely for the sake of honor, either do +good or avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher +(Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they who do brave things for the +sake of honor are not truly brave. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 131, Art. 2] + +Whether Ambition Is Opposed to Magnanimity by Excess? + +Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by +excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one +side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated +above (Q. 130, A. 2). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by +excess. + +Obj. 2: Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition seems +to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Macc. 4:7) that +"Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood." Therefore ambition is +not opposed to magnanimity. + +Obj. 3: Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is +written (Acts 25:27) that "Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great +pomp (_ambitione_) . . . had entered into the hall of audience" +[*'Praetorium.' The Vulgate has 'auditorium,' but the meaning is +the same], and (2 Para. 16:14) that when Asa died they "burned spices +and . . . ointments over his body" with very great pomp (_ambitione_). +But magnanimity is not about outward show. Therefore ambition is not +opposed to magnanimity. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) that "the more a man +exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate +others." But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an +excess of magnanimity. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), ambition signifies +inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes +use of them in a becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that +ambition is opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is +well ordered. + +Reply Obj. 1: Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its +end, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man +attempts in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is +opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man +attempts great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that +magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes +right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by +excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various +respects. + +Reply Obj. 2: Honor is due to those who are in a position of dignity, +on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and accordingly +inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition. For +if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity, +not for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a +dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious but +presumptuous. + +Reply Obj. 3: The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of +honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is +signified by the words of James 2:2, 3: "If there shall come into +your assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and +you . . . shall say to him: Sit thou here well," etc. Wherefore +ambition does not regard outward worship, except in so far as this +is a kind of honor. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 132 + +OF VAINGLORY +(In Five Articles) + +We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether desire of glory is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity? + +(3) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(4) Whether it is a capital vice? + +(5) Of its daughters. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 1] + +Whether the Desire of Glory Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no +one sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (Eph. +5:1): "Be ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children." Now by +seeking glory man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men: +wherefore it is written (Isa. 43:6, 7): "Bring My sons from afar, and +My daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth +on My name, I have created him for My glory." Therefore the desire +for glory is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which incites a man to do good is apparently +not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully +says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "glory inflames every man to strive +his utmost": and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works, +according to Rom. 2:7: "To them, indeed, who according to patience in +good work . . . glory and honor" [*Vulg.: 'Who will render to every +man according to his works, to them indeed who . . . seek glory and +honor and incorruption, eternal life.']. Therefore the desire for +glory is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is +"consistent good report about a person, together with praise": and +this comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), +viz. that glory is, "as it were, clear knowledge with praise." Now it +is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to +call for praise, according to Ecclus. 41:15, "Take care of a good +name," and Rom. 12:17, "Providing good things not only in the sight +of God, but also in the sight of all men." Therefore the desire of +vainglory is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): "He is better +advised who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful." + +_I answer that,_ Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore +Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that to be +"glorified is the same as to be clarified." Now clarity and +comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word glory properly +denotes the display of something as regards its seeming comely in the +sight of men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, +however, that which is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those +who are far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes +that somebody's good is known and approved by many, according to the +saying of Sallust (Catilin.) [*The quotation is from Livy: Hist., +Lib. XXII C, 39]: "I must not boast while I am addressing one man." + +But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only +consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few, +or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good +as being worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve +one's own good: for it is written (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have +received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God +that we may know the things that are given us from God." Likewise it +is not a sin to be willing to approve one's own good works: for it is +written (Matt. 5:16): "Let your light shine before men." Hence the +desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin: but the desire +for empty or vain glory denotes a sin: for it is sinful to desire +anything vain, according to Ps. 4:3, "Why do you love vanity, and +seek after lying?" + +Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the +thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that +which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for +something frail and perishable: secondly, on the part of him from +whom he seeks glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: +thirdly, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he +does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as +God's honor, or the spiritual welfare of his neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says on John 13:13, "You call Me Master +and Lord; and you say well" (Tract. lviii in Joan.): +"Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of +pride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself, +does not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not His: +nor does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows." It +is therefore evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but +for ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the +good of others, according to Matt. 5:16, "That they may see your good +works, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven." + +Reply Obj. 2: That which we receive from God is not vain but true +glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works, +and of which it is written (2 Cor. 10:17, 18): "He that glorieth let +him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved, +but he whom God commendeth." It is true that some are heartened to do +works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the +desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does +virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (De +Civ. Dei v). + +Reply Obj. 3: It is requisite for man's perfection that he should +know himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it +is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being +useful for something, either in order that God may be glorified by +men, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to +be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testimony of +others' praise the good which is in him, may himself strive to +persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is +praiseworthy that a man should "take care of his good name," and that +he should "provide good things in the sight of God and men": but not +that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 2] + +Whether Vainglory Is Opposed to Magnanimity? + +Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. +For, as stated above (A. 1), vainglory consists in glorying in things +that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and +perishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the +testimony of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to +imprudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. +Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. + +Obj. 2: Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to +magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with +vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way +presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above +(Q. 130, A. 2; Q. 131, A. 2): and these differ from vainglory. +Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. + +Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, "Let nothing be done through +contention, neither by vainglory," says: "Some among them were given +to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for the +sake of vainglory." But contention [*Cf. Q. 38] is not opposed to +magnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading, +"Magnanimity consists in two things": "We should beware of the desire +for glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should +ever strive to keep untrammeled." Therefore it is opposed to +magnanimity. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), glory is an +effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is +praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the +knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated +above (Q. 129, AA. 1, 2), it follows that it also is about glory: +seeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory +in moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly +opposed to magnanimity. + +Reply Obj. 1: To think so much of little things as to glory in them +is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the +magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him. +In like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for +honor's sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent +with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is +said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth +than for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man +to glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this +something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. +iv), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon +little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from +being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other virtues. + +Reply Obj. 2: He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth fall +short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the +magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply. +But if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man +by way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great +in his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 127, A. 2, ad 2), the opposition of +vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless contention, if +done intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no one contends +save for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. +iv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not contentious, because nothing +is great in his estimation. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 3] + +Whether Vainglory Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing +precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory +precludes the eternal reward: for it is written (Matt. 6:1): "Take +heed, that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them: +otherwise you shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in +heaven." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper +to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man appropriates +to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written (Isa. +42:8): "I will not give My glory to another," and (1 Tim. 1:17): "To +. . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore vainglory is a +mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous +and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a gloss of +Augustine on 1 Thess. 2:4, "God, Who proveth our hearts," says: +"Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not +perceive its baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to +desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to +take pleasure in it, when it is given." Chrysostom also says (Hom. +xix in Matth.) that "vainglory enters secretly, and robs us +insensibly of all our inward possessions." Therefore vainglory is a +mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus +Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "while +other vices find their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory +finds a place even in the servants of Christ." Yet in the latter +there is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; Q. 110, A. 4; Q. 112, +A. 2), a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin +of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be contrary to +charity as regards the love of one's neighbor: yet as regards the +love of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by +reason of the matter about which one glories: for instance when one +glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe +God, according to Ezech. 28:2, "Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast +said: I am God," and 1 Cor. 4:7, "What hast thou that thou hast not +received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou +hadst not received it?" Or again when a man prefers to God the +temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jer. 9:23, +24): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the +strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in +his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he +understandeth and knoweth Me." Or again when a man prefers the +testimony of man to God's; thus it is written in reproval of certain +people (John 12:43): "For they loved the glory of men more than the +glory of God." + +In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of +the one who glories, in that he refers his intention to glory as his +last end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in +order to obtain it, forbears not from doing even that which is +against God. In this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says +(De Civ. Dei v, 14) that "this vice," namely the love of human +praise, "is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory +more than it fears or loves God, that our Lord said (John 5:44): How +can you believe, who receive glory one from another, and the glory +which is from God alone, you do not seek?" + +If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not +inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter gloried in, +nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal +but a venial sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: wherefore a +virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it be done +for the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal +sin. On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply +through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is +a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, desires +the excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to God +alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man. + +Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not only on +account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to grave +sins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too +self-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward +goods. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 4] + +Whether Vainglory Is a Capital Vice? + +Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a +vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital. +But vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a +capital vice. + +Obj. 2: Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for +this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor +is not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory. + +Obj. 3: Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But +vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it +is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good, +since human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something +outside man himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the +seven capital vices. + +_I answer that,_ The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For +some reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place +vainglory among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi), +reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which +is the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: +and not without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on (Q. +152, AA. 1, 2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever +good one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence +therefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of +pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over +the other vices, and ought not to be reckoned among the special +sources of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that +are the means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most +conducive to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of +a man's goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all. +Wherefore, just as by the glory which is in God's sight man acquires +honor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of +man he acquires excellence in human things. Hence on account of its +close connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it +follows that it is most desirable. And since many vices arise from +the inordinate desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital +vice. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from +pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and I-II, Q. +84, A. 2) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices. + +Reply Obj. 2: Praise and honor, as stated above (A. 2), stand in +relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory +is compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man loves to +be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain +renown in the knowledge of others. + +Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of +desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to +be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital +vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin, +inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 5] + +Whether the Daughters of Vainglory Are Suitably Reckoned to Be +Disobedience, Boastfulness, Hypocrisy, Contention, Obstinacy, +Discord, and Love of Novelties? + +Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably +reckoned to be "disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, +obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [*_Praesumptio novitatum,_ +literally 'presumption of novelties']." For according to Gregory +(Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride. +Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way +about, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should +not be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory. + +Obj. 2: Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome +chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with +vainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of +vainglory. + +Obj. 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory +is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet +this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men. +Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter +of vainglory. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who +there assigns the above daughters to vainglory. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 34, A. 5; Q. 35, A. 4; I-II, Q. +84, AA. 3, 4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be +directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its +daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own +excellence, as stated above (AA. 1, 4): and to this end a man may +tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is +boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for +astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at +most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a man +strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not +inferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the +intellect, and thus we have _obstinacy,_ by which a man is too much +attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is +better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have _discord,_ +whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with +others. Thirdly, as regards _speech,_ and then we have _contention,_ +whereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards +deeds, and this is _disobedience,_ whereby a man refuses to carry out +the command of his superiors. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 112, A. 1, ad 2), boasting is +reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is +arrogance: but outward boasting, according to _Ethic._ iv, is +directed sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and +thus it is the result of vainglory. + +Reply Obj. 2: Anger is not the cause of discord and contention, +except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a +glorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others. + +Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory is reproved in connection with almsdeeds on +account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory +to the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the +sake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to give +alms as though this were something novel. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 133 + +OF PUSILLANIMITY +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin? + +(2) To what virtue is it opposed? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 133, Art. 1] + +Whether Pusillanimity Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin +makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a +fainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). +Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a +fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet +does not deem himself worthy of them." Now no one is worthy of great +goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says +(Ethic. iv, 3), "none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor." +Therefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently +pusillanimity is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (Ecclus. 10:15). +But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man +sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws +from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he who +deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted." +Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for +instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose +them for, which they both humbly declined (Ex. 3:11; Jer. 1:6). +Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save +sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Col. +3:21): "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they +be discouraged." Therefore pusillanimity is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a +sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a +natural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with +its power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or +inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is +proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so +pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his +power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto. +Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is +that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received +from his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear, +was punished by his master (Matt. 25; Luke 19). + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their +neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil, +because he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what +might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if +"they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged +strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they +might have done had they been less retiring." + +Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from +sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with +loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a +man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing +certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through +not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially, +sometimes mortally. + +Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great +things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he +derives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or +from external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for +virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of +pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion, +whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he +is competent. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:16): "The sluggard is +wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences." For +nothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and +having a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says +(Pastoral. i) of Moses that "perchance he would have been proud, had +he undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without misgiving: +and again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the +command of his Creator." + +Reply Obj. 4: Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which +they were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine grace: +yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness, +demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 133, Art. 2] + +Whether Pusillanimity Is Opposed to Magnanimity? + +Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to +magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that "the +fainthearted man knows not himself: for he would desire the good +things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself." Now ignorance of +self seems opposed to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to +prudence. + +Obj. 2: Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who +through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover the +Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be +slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of +prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore pusillanimity is +not opposed to magnanimity. + +Obj. 3: Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear: +hence it is written (Isa. 35:4): "Say to the fainthearted: Take +courage and fear not." It also seems to proceed from inordinate +anger, according to Col. 3:21, "Fathers, provoke not your children to +indignation, lest they be discouraged." Now inordinate fear is +opposed to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore +pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. + +Obj. 4: Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular +virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that +virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption +is. Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows +that it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary +to the saying of Ecclus. 37:3, "O wicked presumption, whence camest +thou?" Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. + +_On the contrary,_ Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness +and littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and +little are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to +magnanimity. + +_I answer that,_ Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways. +First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it +is opposed to magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little +differ in connection with the same subject. For just as the +magnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so +the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of +soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which +on the part of the intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification, +and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one +falsely deems to exceed one's ability. Thirdly, it may be considered +in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from the great things +of which one is worthy. But, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 2, ad 3), +opposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective +species than on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is +directly opposed to magnanimity. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding +from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it +is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because +ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but from +laziness in considering one's own ability, according to _Ethic._ iv, +3, or in accomplishing what is within one's power. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of +view of its effect. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor +is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers of +death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that +pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we +consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is +roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which +disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however, +we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby +the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to +pusillanimity. + +Reply Obj. 4: According to its proper species pusillanimity is a +graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good +things, which is a very great evil according to _Ethic._ iv. +Presumption, however, is stated to be "wicked" on account of pride +whence it proceeds. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 134 + +OF MAGNIFICENCE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With +regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether magnificence is a virtue? + +(2) Whether it is a special virtue? + +(3) What is its matter? + +(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 1] + +Whether Magnificence Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever +has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. +1). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence: +because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "not every liberal +man is magnificent." Therefore magnificence is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to +_Ethic._ ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean, +for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now "great" and "little" are +opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is "equal," as +stated in _Metaph._ x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but +the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but +on the contrary perfects it, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 2; Q. 117, +A. 1, Obj. 1). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the +"magnificent man is not lavish towards himself": and this is opposed +to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore +magnificence is not a virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) "act is +right reason about things to be made." Now magnificence is about +things to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence = _magna +facere_--i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an act rather +than a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. +But magnificence (_virtutis_) belongs to Divine power, according to +Ps. 47:35: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds." +Therefore magnificence is a virtue. + +_I answer that,_ According to _De Coelo_ i, 16, "we speak of virtue +in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards +the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very +nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something +great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the +very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his +actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent +deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence, +either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as +explained above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), as also (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1) +when we were treating of the connection of virtues. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if +we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean, +if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of +nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But +that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that +which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at +large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to +be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, +but because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything +regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man +accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done +once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting +nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with +a suitable dwelling, as stated in _Ethic._ iv. + +Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there must +needs be a virtue of act," i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appetite +is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what +magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 2] + +Whether Magnificence Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For +magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it +may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be +great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, +for he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is +not a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as +that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to +something great, as stated above (Q. 129, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it +belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore +magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity. + +Obj. 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is +written (Ex. 15:11): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness," +and (Ps. 95:6): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His +sanctuary." Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above (Q. +81, A. 8). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion. +Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons it with other special +virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2). + +_I answer that,_ It belongs to magnificence to do (_facere_) +something great, as its name implies [* magnificence = _magna +facere_--i.e. to make great things]. Now _facere_ may be taken in two +ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly _facere_ +means to work something in external matter, for instance to make a +house, or something of the kind; in a broad sense _facere_ is +employed to denote any action, whether it passes into external +matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand +or will. + +Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something +great, the doing (_factio_) being understood in the strict sense, it +is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in +the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of +goodness, namely that the work produced (_factum_) by the act is +something great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is +what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue. + +If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing +something great, the doing (_facere_) being understood in a broad +sense, it is not a special virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something +great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" (_facere_) be taken in +the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper +to magnificence. + +Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something +great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by +making (_faciendo_), or by any kind of action, as stated in _Ethic._ +iv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole +aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, +do something great, direct their principal intention, not to +something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the +greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the +greatness of the virtue. + +On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do +something great, "doing" (_facere_) being taken in the strict sense, +but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence +Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing +and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain +broad and noble purpose of mind," "discussion" referring to the +inward intention, and "administration" to the outward accomplishment. +Wherefore just as magnanimity intends something great in every +matter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that +can be produced in external matter (_factibili_). + +Reply Obj. 3: The intention of magnificence is the production +of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no +end of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore +magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine +honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most +commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine +sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this +reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect +is directed to religion or holiness. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 3] + +Whether the Matter of Magnificence Is Great Expenditure? + +Objection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great +expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But +liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2). +Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure. + +Obj. 2: Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv, 2). +But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure. +Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but +about gifts. + +Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external +work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing +an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending +presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of +magnificence. + +Obj. 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But +the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues do +not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for +themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore +magnificence is not about great expenditure. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that +"magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions +in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality +in scale." Therefore it is only about great expenditure. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it belongs to magnificence +to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work, +proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be +produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence +to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in +becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that +"a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal," +i.e. proportionate, "expenditure." Now expenditure is the outlay of a +sum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he +love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to +be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to +produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in +going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love +the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 129, A. 2), those virtues that are +about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from +the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned, +and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that +same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and +its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in +general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the +use of money. + +Reply Obj. 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and +the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, +inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of +money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and +expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love +of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the +magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be +produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay. + +Reply Obj. 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as +stated in _Ethic._ iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but +rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of +some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do +something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he +brings to effect what the whole state is striving for. + +Reply Obj. 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a +virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man +may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments +to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot +accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great +simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are +great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in +itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its +genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher +says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.). +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 4] + +Whether Magnificence Is a Part of Fortitude? + +Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. +For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above +(A. 3). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. +Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude. + +Obj. 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But +magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with +expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems +to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to +fortitude. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the +magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more in +common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence +should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De +Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of +fortitude. + +_I answer that,_ Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, +cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not +agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a +part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue. + +In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things +are necessary, as stated above (Q. 80). The one is that the secondary +virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some +respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with +fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous +and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is +seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls +short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude +tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, +whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its +difficulty from the dispossession of one's property, which is of much +less account than danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is +accounted a part of fortitude. + +Reply Obj. 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed +under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence +regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul, +albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in +reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the +concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving +and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the +other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by +attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in +a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, +like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in +matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it +tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as +fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear. + +Reply Obj. 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something great, +as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the +reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason +by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. +This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both +those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would +incur the risk of a great loss. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 135 + +OF MEANNESS* +(In Two Articles) +[*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just as "magnificentia" is +doing great things.] + +We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which +head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether meanness is a vice? + +(2) Of the vice opposed to it. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 135, Art. 1] + +Whether Meanness Is a Vice? + +Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice +moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore +both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But +magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue +rather than a vice. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful +reckoning is mean." But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy, +since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius +states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean man +is loth to spend money." But this belongs to covetousness or +illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the +others. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a +special vice opposed to magnificence. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6), +moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases +they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be +mean (_parvificus_) because he intends to do something little +(_parvum_). Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad +aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a +mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in +relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in +two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in +another as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man +intends principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he +intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so +that he may produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says +(Ethic. iv, 4) that "the magnificent man with equal expenditure will +produce a more magnificent result." On the other hand, the mean man +intends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says +(Ethic. iv, 2) that "he seeks how he may spend least." As a result of +this he intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink +from producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore +the Philosopher says that "the mean man after going to great expense +forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he +is unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man +fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between +expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in +failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest +that meanness is a vice. + +Reply Obj. 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule +of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the +Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but +for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little +things: hence meanness is a vice. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes us +take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings, +because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in +things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but +sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his +affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of +his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the +liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure, so +too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth +and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards +ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which +is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore meanness is less sinful +than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that +"although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not +bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm one's neighbor, nor +are they very disgraceful." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 135, Art. 2] + +Whether There Is a Vice Opposed to Meanness? + +Objection 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For +great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a +virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness. + +Obj. 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated +above (A. 1), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it +would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much, +where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to +spend much, according to _Ethic._ iv, 2, and thus they have something +of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness. + +Obj. 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as +stated above (A. 1). Now those who spend excessively, do so in order +to make a show of their wealth, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 2. But this +belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated +above (Q. 131, A. 2). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of the Philosopher who +(Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two +opposite vices. + +_I answer that,_ Great is opposed to little. Also little and great +are relative terms, as stated above (A. 1). Now just as expenditure +may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in +comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which +reason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is +manifest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend +less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion +between his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, +whereby a man exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is +proportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek _banausia_, +so called from the Greek _baunos_, because, like the fire in the +furnace, it consumes everything. It is also called _apyrokalia_, i.e. +lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but not for a +good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called _consumptio_ (waste). + +Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but +not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this +belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness. + +Reply Obj. 2: To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which +observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice +of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the +value of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend +little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great +work, which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far as +when it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing. + +Reply Obj. 3: Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species +of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas meanness +falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being directed to +the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 136 + +OF PATIENCE +(In Five Articles) + +We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether patience is a virtue? + +(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues? + +(3) Whether it can be had without grace? + +(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude? + +(5) Whether it is the same as longanimity? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 1] + +Whether Patience Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues +are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet +patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, +according to Isa. 49:10 and Apoc. 7:16, "They shall not hunger nor +thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them." Therefore +patience is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue +it is "that makes its possessor good." Yet patience is sometimes +found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many +evils patiently that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16, +"All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, +and in misery and in sorrow." Therefore patience is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 70, A. 1, ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits +(Gal. 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Patientia i): "The virtue of +the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we +even preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 1), the moral virtues +are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of +reason against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions +sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. +7:10, "The sorrow of the world worketh death," and Ecclus. 30:25, +"Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it." Hence the +necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against +sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does. +Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia ii): "A man's patience it is +whereby he bears evil with an equal mind," i.e. without being +disturbed by sorrow, "lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods +whereby he may advance to better things." It is therefore evident +that patience is a virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards +the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the +goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they +will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven. +Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling +and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain +in the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of +patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in +enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence +Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that "patience itself will not be in +heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils have to be +borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal." + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) "properly +speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without +inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those +who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither +marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may +marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them +patient." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 11, A. 1), the very notion of +fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in +themselves, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8. Now the names of the virtues +are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit +is a virtue, but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is +reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the +mind from being overcome by sorrow. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 2] + +Whether Patience Is the Greatest of the Virtues? + +Objection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. +For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now +"patience hath a perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the +greatest of the virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the +soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written +(Luke 21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls." +Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of +other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom. +xxxv in Evang.) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the +virtues." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ It is not reckoned among the four virtues which +Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call +principal. + +_I answer that,_ Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. +For it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the +latter's work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's +superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater +according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly. +Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more +directly to good than those which are a check on the things which +lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective +of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good +(thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than prudence and +justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw +man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a +greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is +fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is +concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship, +which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the +greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological +virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in +good, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from +greater obstacles to good. + +Reply Obj. 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing +hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by +patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; +thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust +injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle +is the most perfect. + +Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, +that it is more perfect simply. + +Reply Obj. 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man +is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by +the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the +soul. + +Reply Obj. 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all +the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but +merely because it removes their obstacles. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 3] + +Whether It Is Possible to Have Patience Without Grace? + +Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without +grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it +possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more +reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of +evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and +without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that +"men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they +love sinfully." Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without +the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to +be truly patient. + +Obj. 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more +abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some +heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than +betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be +truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have +patience without the help of grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much +trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the +health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. +Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure +many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly +patient. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i.e. from +God, "is my patience." + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength +of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly +undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which +gives pleasure." The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of +themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose +to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. +Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing +to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the +privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the +fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the +loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which +loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a +virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is +patient." + +But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through +grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in +our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is +clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace. + +Reply Obj. 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature +in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of +concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is +more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the +concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the +sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: +and yet it is this that pertains to true patience. + +Reply Obj. 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. I-II, Q. 61, A. 5] is +commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can +tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without +the help of God's grace [*Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 2]. On the other hand, +the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto +by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man +bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man +naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between +this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 4] + +Whether Patience Is a Part of Fortitude? + +Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a +thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as +fortitude: because, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 6), the proper act of +fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is +stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from St. +Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that "patience consists in enduring +evils inflicted by others." Therefore patience is not a part of +fortitude. + +Obj. 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above +(Q. 123, A. 3), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems +to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the +concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of +temperance. + +Obj. 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if +patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without +patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently, +but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience +is not a part of fortitude. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of +fortitude. + +_I answer that,_ Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, +because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For +it belongs to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils +inflicted by others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). +Now of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most +difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of +death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is +clear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that +it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore +patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, +for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811). + +Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed, +but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death: +whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil. + +Reply Obj. 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast +to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing +through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the +latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is +chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude +avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to +be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a +praiseworthy manner by suffering (_patiendo_) things which hurt him +here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by +them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is +in the concupiscible faculty. + +Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because +the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the +matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a +part of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because +temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures +of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and +sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other +persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows +besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that +a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, +however great they be. + +Reply Obj. 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is +an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may +patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from +this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent +with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the +man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily v. in the Opus +Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Matt. +4:10, "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient under +our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked": +and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that +"the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the +commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our +enemies." But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is +annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 5] + +Whether Patience Is the Same As Longanimity?* [*Longsuffering. It is +necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison +with magnanimity.] + +Objection 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For +Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God, +not as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the +wicked, that they may be converted." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. +5:4): "The Most High is a patient rewarder." Therefore it seems that +patience is the same as longanimity. + +Obj. 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But +impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: +for one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. +Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so +is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of +place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of +time, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct +from patience. + +Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom. +ii] on Rom. 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and +patience, and longsuffering?" says: "It seems that longanimity +differs from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather +than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while +those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be +borne patiently." + +_I answer that,_ Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to +great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something +a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to +good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their +object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in +common with magnanimity than with patience. + +Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two +reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain +evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, +endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more +difficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, +is of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, "Hope that +is deferred afflicteth the soul." Hence there may be patience in +bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly +longanimity and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so +far as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards +longanimity) and the toil which man endures in persistently +accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered +under the one aspect of grievous evil. + +For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, +says that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of +arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." By +saying "arduous" he refers to constancy in good; when he says +"difficult" he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the +proper object of patience; and by adding "continued" or "long +lasting," he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in +common with patience. + +This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections. + +Reply Obj. 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though +distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that +which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails. +Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the +point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time +coming to us. + +We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the +reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard +to bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they +persist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne +with longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride +seems to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride +are stated to be borne with patience. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 137 + +OF PERSEVERANCE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under +the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue? + +(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude? + +(3) Of its relation to constancy; + +(4) Whether it needs the help of grace? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 1] + +Whether Perseverance Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For, +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater +than perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in +_Ethic._ iv, 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to Augustine +(De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority (De +Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living, +unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a +virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should +persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in +_Ethic._ ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for +Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed and +continued persistence in a well-considered purpose." Therefore +perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that +"perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand, +and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are +indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to +omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue. + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue +is about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special +kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a +virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. +First, from the act's very species, which is considered in respect of +the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length of time, +since to persist long in something difficult involves a special +difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is +accomplished belongs to a special virtue. + +Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for +the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of +itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring +in connection with dangers of death (which also is something +difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it +consists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so +far as necessity requires. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is +found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to +endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And +evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured +for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is +not on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise. +Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures +of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: +such are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long +endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long +time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the +contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these +passions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one +who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect +virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be +taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something +imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take +perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult +good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even +if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the +more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue, +because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than +from the aspect of difficulty. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name: +thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe +without seeing." Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without +performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence +without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the +habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for +instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it. +Accordingly we must reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes +used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes +for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of +perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice +by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not +persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the +work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it +belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, +for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and +the magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are, +however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of +life, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last +end of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are +the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished +until the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of +perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance. + +Reply Obj. 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two +ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that +virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end, +belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this +as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit +to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon +every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to change." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 2] + +Whether Perseverance Is a Part of Fortitude? + +Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude. +For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance is +about pains of touch." But these belong to temperance. Therefore +perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude. + +Obj. 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain +passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply +moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the +more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. +Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, +but rather of prudence which perfects the reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose +perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore +perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal +virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part +of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance +as a part of fortitude. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, +4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed +something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it +practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most +difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been +stated (Q. 123, A. 2) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because +it observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand +firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity +that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance +of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to +principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay +in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: +nor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore +perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal +virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends +not only on the matter [*Cf. Q. 136, A. 4, ad 2], but also on the +mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter. +Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in +common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more +in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the +difficulty arising from length of time. + +Reply Obj. 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks +(Ethic. vii, 4, 7) does not moderate any passions, but consists +merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, +considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of +weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like +fortitude, is in the irascible. + +Reply Obj. 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting, +not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end, +according to Matt. 24:13, "He that shall persevere to the end, he +shall be saved." Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance +for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137. Art. 3] + +Whether Constancy Pertains to Perseverance? + +Objection 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to +perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q. +137, A. 5): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore +constancy does not pertain to perseverance. + +Obj. 2: Further, "virtue is about the difficult and the good." Now it +does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in +great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy +pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance. + +Obj. 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would +seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of +unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) +condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates +perseverance, as stated above (Q. 128, A. 6). Therefore constancy +does not pertain to perseverance. + +_On the contrary,_ One is said to be constant because one stands to a +thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as +appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy +belongs to perseverance. + +_I answer that,_ Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it +belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to +those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the +virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good, +against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the +act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against +difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence +perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude, +because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more +intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external +obstacles. + +Reply Obj. 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are +especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as +stated above (Q. 136, A. 1). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance +as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which +occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: wherefore +constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in +little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length +of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which +magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which +perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both. + +Reply Obj. 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has +something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the +point of their difference, as stated in the Article. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 4] + +Whether Perseverance Needs the Help of Grace? +[*Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 10] + +Objection 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of +grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Now +according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner +of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for +perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the harm +brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now "before +sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had +received," as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more +therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, +persevere without the help of a further grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds +of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis. 5:7): +"We . . . have walked through hard ways." Now some persevere in +sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also +persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Persev. i): "We hold that +perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in +Christ." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2; A. 2, ad 3), +perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit +of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the +gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, +it may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until +death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also +the gratuitous help of God sustaining man in good until the end of +life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 109, A. 10), when we were treating of +grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, +which changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace +bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the +free-will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, +though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our +power to choose yet not to accomplish. + +Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned, +inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is a +thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the +habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), "it was +given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere +of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to +make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ, +the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but +perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no man threatened, +of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited +so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas +these, although the world rage against their constancy, have +persevered in faith." + +Reply Obj. 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot +by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling +into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be +persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the +other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering +in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs +the help of grace for that end. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 138 + +OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which +head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Of effeminacy; + +(2) Of pertinacity. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 138, Art. 1] + +Whether Effeminacy* Is Opposed to Perseverance? +[* _Mollities,_ literally "softness"] + +Objection 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance. +For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, "Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, +nor liers with mankind," expounds the text thus: "Effeminate--i.e. +obscene, given to unnatural vice." But this is opposed to chastity. +Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "delicacy +is a kind of effeminacy." But to be delicate seems akin to +intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but +to temperance. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the man +who is fond of amusement is effeminate." Now immoderate fondness of +amusement is opposed to _eutrapelia_, which is the virtue about +pleasures of play, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy +is not opposed to perseverance. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the +persevering man is opposed to the effeminate." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, AA. 1, 2), perseverance is +deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on +account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is +directly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake +a good on account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is +what we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be +"soft" if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared +to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the +battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he +yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) +that "it is no wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and +overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he +struggles against them." Now it is evident that fear of danger is +more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De +Offic. i) under the heading "True magnanimity consists of two +things": "It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to +be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to +yield to pleasure." Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive of +attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of +withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore, +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an +effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on account of sorrow +caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion. + +Reply Obj. 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by +custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more +difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by +natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering +through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are +compared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore +those who are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being +womanish themselves, as it were. + +Reply Obj. 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it +is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the +delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that +diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Deut. 28:56): "The tender and +delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her +foot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness']." Thus delicacy is a kind +of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of +pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for +instance toil or the like. + +Reply Obj. 3: In play two things may be considered. In the +first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of +play is opposed to _eutrapelia_. Secondly, we may consider the +relaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it +belongs to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too +it belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation +inordinately. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 138, Art. 2] + +Whether Pertinacity Is Opposed to Perseverance? + +Objection 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to +perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises +from vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to +magnanimity, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 2). Therefore pertinacity is +not opposed to perseverance. + +Obj. 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either +by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess: because +the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they rejoice when they +prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected." And if it be +opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is +clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to +perseverance. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists in good against +sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures, +the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity +is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is not +opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity +is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition +is opposed to religion, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 1). Therefore +pertinacity is opposed to perseverance. + +_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be +pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious." +"Pervicacious" has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man +"perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients +called 'vicia' what we call victory." These the Philosopher (Ethic. +vii, 9) calls _ischyrognomones_, that is "head-strong," or +_idiognomones_, that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by +their opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does +so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it +is clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while +pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for +falling short of it. + +Reply Obj. 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own +opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own +excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. +Now it has been stated above (Q. 127, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 133, A. 2), that +opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on +their species. + +Reply Obj. 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately +in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain +pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man. +Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it +too much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or +effeminate man. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although the other virtues persist against the +onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in +the same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to +praise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity +is directly opposed to perseverance. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 139 + +OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE +(In Two Articles) + +We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this +is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether fortitude is a gift? + +(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 139, Art. 1] + +Whether Fortitude Is a Gift? + +Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues +differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should +not be reckoned a gift. + +Obj. 2: Further, the acts of the gifts remain in heaven, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6). But the act of fortitude does not remain +in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the +fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from +heaven." Therefore fortitude is not a gift. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is a +sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures +of the passing show." Now noisome pleasures and delights are the +concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems +that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of +fortitude. + +_On the contrary,_ Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the +Holy Ghost (Isa. 11:2). + +_I answer that,_ Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as +stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, A. 3): and this firmness of +mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially +with regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according +to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in +both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of +difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in +enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or +general virtue, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 2). + +Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that +he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils +may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in +a man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or +dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the +Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, +which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. +A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy +Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that +fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been +stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2) that the gifts regard the motion +of the mind by the Holy Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the +endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to +give confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the +fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the +way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the +end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from +toil and evil. + +Reply Obj. 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude +not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch +as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the +gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to +be concerned chiefly with the greater goods. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 139, Art. 2] + +Whether the Fourth Beatitude: "Blessed Are They That Hunger and +Thirst After Justice," Corresponds to the Gift of Fortitude? + +Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they +that hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the +gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of +fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and +thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this +beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of +fortitude. + +Obj. 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for +good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of +wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above +(Q. 45). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of +fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom. + +Obj. 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since +delight is essential to beatitude, according to _Ethic._ i, 8. Now +the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. +Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): +"Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to +enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material +things, must toil." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 121, A. 2), Augustine makes the +beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which +they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness +between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning +the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely +fortitude. + +Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A. +1), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, +not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation +of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable +desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may +understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, +which is related to all virtuous deeds according to _Ethic._ v, 1, +wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a +gift. + +Reply Obj. 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as +stated above (Q. 23, A. 8, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 4, ad 3). Hence +whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond +sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which +regards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard +the long delay and accomplishment of goods. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 140 + +OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE +(In Two Articles) + +We must next consider the precepts of fortitude: + +(1) The precepts of fortitude itself; + +(2) The precepts of its parts. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 140, Art. 1] + +Whether the Precepts of Fortitude Are Suitably Given in the Divine +Law? + +Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably +given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old +Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Deut. 20). +Therefore precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law +also. + +Obj. 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than +negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but +not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to +contain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear. + +Obj. 3: Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated +above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2). Now the precepts are +directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be +proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should +have been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the +chief precepts of the Law. + +_On the contrary,_ stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts. + +_I answer that,_ Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by +the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in +various ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so +that even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of +kingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of +the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine +Law contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, +with a view to directing the mind to God. For this reason it is +written (Deut. 20:3, 4): "Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God +is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies." + +As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and +among them we find precepts of fortitude according to the +requirements of those goods. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while +the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal, +according to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there +was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily +contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New +Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of +eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Matt. 11:12, "The +kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away." +Hence Peter commands (1 Pet. 5:8, 9): "Your adversary the devil, as a +roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist +ye, strong in faith," as also James 4:7: "Resist the devil, and he +will fly from you." Since, however, men while tending to spiritual +goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of +fortitude had to be given even in the New Law, that they might +bravely endure temporal evils, according to Matt. 10:28, "Fear ye not +them that kill the body." + +Reply Obj. 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts. But +the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the +things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the +precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 122, A. 1), the precepts of the +decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to +be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts of the +decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the +notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because +it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear +dangers of death. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 140, Art. 2] + +Whether the Precepts of the Parts of Fortitude Are Suitably Given in +the Divine Law? + +Objection 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are +unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and +perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence, +magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above (Q. 128). Now we find +precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. +Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and +magnanimity. + +Obj. 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the +guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxv). +Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience +should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De Serm. +Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind. + +Obj. 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, as +stated above (Q. 128; Q. 136, A. 4; Q. 137, A. 2). Now the precepts +of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above +(A. 1, ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance +should have been negative and not affirmative. + +The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given +by Holy Writ. + +_I answer that,_ The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such +things as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright +man needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and +annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only +about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of +the secondary and annexed virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus +of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness +which they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining +to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than under +precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather +than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity. On the other +hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain to patience +and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them, +but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of +precepts of patience and perseverance. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 3, A. 2), although affirmative +precepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but +according to place and time. Wherefore just as the affirmative +precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the +preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil +them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be +understood in the same way. + +Reply Obj. 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance, +is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution; +nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On +the other hand, patience and perseverance are about minor hardships +and toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially +in general, what is to be done in such cases. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 141 + +OF TEMPERANCE +(In Eight Articles) + +In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself; +(2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must +consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices. + +Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether temperance is a virtue? + +(2) Whether it is a special virtue? + +(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures? + +(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch? + +(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a +kind of touch? + +(6) What is the rule of temperance? + +(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue? + +(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 1] + +Whether Temperance Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue +goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a +natural aptitude for virtue," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1. Now +temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, +according to _Ethic._ ii, 3, 8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But some people have temperance without +having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet +covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as +appears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4). But +seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have +been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ. 8, 9, 19, 45, 52, 71, +139). Therefore temperance is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the +name of a virtue." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3), it is essential +to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in +accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence +human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance +with reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its +very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes. +Therefore temperance is a virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to +it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to +him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that +those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with +reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but +from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that +temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is +in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the +animal nature that is not subject to reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect +virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are +in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to +the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though +they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so +far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 63, A. 1), or acquired by habituation, which virtues, +through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear, +whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to +Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The gift of fear +has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in +this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above +(Q. 19, A. 9, ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object +whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now man stands +in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things +which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance: +wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 2] + +Whether Temperance Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. +For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to +temperance to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption +for God's sake." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore +temperance is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we observe +and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this is +common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot +separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just +is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to +temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). +Therefore temperance is not a special virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it +a special virtue. + +_I answer that,_ It is customary in human speech to employ a common +term in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things +to which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used +antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of +speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; +e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word +"temperance" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its +common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a +general virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain +temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human +operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue. +Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude, +even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance +withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying +reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those +things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason. + +On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as +withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive +to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a +special matter. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things +which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law. +Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, +like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and +secondly in a sense of excellence. + +Reply Obj. 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a +most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are +natural to man, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5). Hence +tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, +although it is a common property of all the virtues. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is +ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First, +in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a +certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we +understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). +Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold +the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his +animal nature, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5; Q. 142, A. 4), +wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In +consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above +all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty +must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral +goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute +of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who +has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is +most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring +most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q. 142, A. 4). +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 3] + +Whether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures? + +Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires +and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that +"temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other +wanton emotions of the mind." Now all the passions of the soul are +called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is +not only about desires and pleasures. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good" +[*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, +especially with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires +and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and +dangers, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore it seems +that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and +pleasures. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace of +moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27) +that "it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the +mind and to enforce moderation." Now moderation is needed, not only +in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever +pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about +desires and pleasures. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not +occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii, +and De Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby lust and +desire are kept under control." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 136, A. 1), it +belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the +passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's +passions is twofold, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2), when we +were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive +appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it +flies from sensible and bodily evils. + +The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against +reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily +goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason, +but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to +attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing +to the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in +accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral +virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good. + +On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying +from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through +being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when +a man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany +the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of +reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying +from evil to remain firm in the good of reason. + +Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very +nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz. +fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with +daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining +some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, +is chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible +goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows +that arise from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring +presupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the +absence of the aforesaid pleasures. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 25, A. +1), when we were treating of the passions, those passions which +pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions pertaining to +the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the +passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance directly +moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards good, +as a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch as +moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the +passions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is +moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the +things he desires. + +Reply Obj. 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards the +object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to +temperance. On the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind +from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which +fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and +fortitude about fears. + +Reply Obj. 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions of the +soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the +internal passions. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 4] + +Whether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures of Touch? + +Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires +and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that +"the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which +draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from +the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it +is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular +praise." Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire +for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the +other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and +again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is +written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire [*_Cupiditas,_ which the Douay version +following the Greek _philargyria_ renders 'desire of money'] is the +root of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires of +pleasures of touch. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who is +worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate, +but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or great, of +which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch, +but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only +about desires for pleasures of touch. + +Obj. 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to +pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect. +Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. +Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance. + +Obj. 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures +of the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5) in the treatise on +the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of +virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through +curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man +knowledge, saying (Gen. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and +evil." Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch. + +Obj. 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of +temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of +touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur +in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of +temperance. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that +"temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), temperance is about desires +and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring. +Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest +evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of +death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about +desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a +natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results +from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural +operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by +means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union +of the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat +and drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the +sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about +pleasures of touch. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes +temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but +as concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: +and this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also +reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can +he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to +temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and +secondarily other pleasures. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation +in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is +proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's +emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance. + +Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a different part +in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not +result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: +thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in +relation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the +other senses, not only for this reason, but also on account of the +becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about +the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch, +not principally but consequently: while in so far as the sensible +objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their +becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound, +this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature. +Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can +be referred to them antonomastically. + +Reply Obj. 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature +greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the +senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive +appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by +moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly +speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no +control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a +hindrance to another greater and more binding. + +Reply Obj. 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of +nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about +all pleasures of touch. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 5] + +Whether Temperance Is About the Pleasures Proper to the Taste? + +Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper +to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, +which are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which +regard the touch. But according to what has been said (A. 4), +temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human +life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste +rather than about those proper to the touch. + +Obj. 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than about +things themselves. Now, according to _De Anima_ ii, 3, "the touch is +the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food, +whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the +pleasing quality of the food." Therefore temperance is about the +taste rather than about the touch. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vii, 4, 7: "temperance and +intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and +incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy +pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors +which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about +pleasures proper to the taste. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that +"seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do +with the taste." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), temperance is about the +greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human +life either in the species or in the individual. In these matters +certain things are to be considered as principal and others as +secondary. The principal thing is the use itself of the necessary +means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the +species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the +preservation of the individual: while the very use of these +necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto. + +In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the +use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a +pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly +about the pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of +these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the +touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about +pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible +objects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the +necessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste +is more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that +temperance is more about the taste than about the other senses. + +Reply Obj. 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially +results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says +(De Anima ii, 3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or +cold, wet or dry." To the taste belongs the discernment of savors, +which make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of +its being suitable for nourishment. + +Reply Obj. 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to +speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use +of food and drink. + +Reply Obj. 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food, +but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in which +it is served. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 6] + +Whether the Rule of Temperance Depends on the Need of the Present +Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not +depend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not +regulated according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the +soul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of +temperance does not depend on the needs of the body. + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs +of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against +temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by +nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem +unreasonable. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the +need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin +in using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for +the sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need +of the body is not the rule of temperance. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both +Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule +forbidding him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of +them desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself +of those things with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a +lover, in so far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and +of his station." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 123, A. 12), +the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason: +because "man's good is to be in accord with reason," as Dionysius +asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by +which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good of +reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of +end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now +all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed +to some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance +takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects +of which it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of +this life requires. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, the need of this life is regarded +as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that +sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work, +thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas +sometimes the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and +rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the +thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is +useful for life is subordinate. + +Reply Obj. 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First, +it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term "necessary" +to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is +necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something +without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards +not only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore +the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires +pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound +condition of body." Other things that are not necessary for this +purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to +health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not +use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But +others are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses +moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in +keeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher +(Ethic. iii, 11) says that the "temperate man also desires other +pleasant things," those namely that are not necessary for health or a +sound condition of body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to +these things." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according +to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the +requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external +things, such as riches and station, and more still on the +requirements of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, +11) that "the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided +that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily +condition, but also that they be not inconsistent with good," i.e. +good conduct, nor "beyond his substance," i.e. his means. And +Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man +considers the need" not only "of this life" but also "of his station." +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 7] + +Whether Temperance Is a Cardinal Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue. +For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is +about those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely +about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in +_Ethic._ iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal +virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to +control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be more +impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is +written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh +forth; and who can bear the violence (_impetum_) of one provoked?" +Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance. + +Obj. 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of +desire and concupiscence, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4). But +humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore, +seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance +which controls concupiscence. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory reckons temperance among the principal +virtues (Moral. ii, 49). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 11; Q. 61, A. 3), a +principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost +claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite +for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is +requisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures +of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both because these +pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to +abstain from them, and to control the desire for them, and because +their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above +(A. 4). For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or +cardinal virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: The longer the range of its operation, the greater is +the agent's power (_virtus_) shown to be: wherefore the very fact +that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are +furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power. +This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident, +for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its +impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire +for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is +more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a +more principal virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of desire, +wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible. +But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite +with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore +temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal +virtue. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 8] + +Whether Temperance Is the Greatest of the Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the +virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and +seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and +the regard for what is beautiful." Now virtue deserves praise for +being honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest +of the virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue. +Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch +than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to +temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a +greater virtue than justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more +necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of +death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these +occur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than +fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than +fortitude. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the +"greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for +which reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just." + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good +of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual," +wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better +it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more +than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one +man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are +endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the +desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident +that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than +temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more +excellent still. + +Reply Obj. 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance, +not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance, +but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it +withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower +animals. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the +excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good, +wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein +temperance excels. + +Reply Obj. 3: That which is general because it regards the many +conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is +general because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former +way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, +although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not +only than fortitude but also than justice. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 142 + +OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head +there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether insensibility is a sin? + +(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin? + +(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity; + +(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 1] + +Whether Insensibility Is a Vice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For +those are called insensible who are deficient with regard to +pleasures of touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to +be altogether deficient in such matters: for it is written (Dan. +10:2, 3): "In those days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I +ate no desirable bread, and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth, +neither was I anointed with ointment." Therefore insensibility is not +a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, "man's good is to be in accord with reason," +according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all +pleasures of touch is most conducive to man's progress in the good of +reason: for it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who took +pulse for their food (Dan. 1:12), "God gave knowledge, and +understanding in every book and wisdom." Therefore insensibility, +which rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding sin +would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in +avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to +insensibility. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that "if we +deny ourselves pleasures we are less liable to sin." Therefore there +is nothing vicious in insensibility. + +_On the contrary,_ Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now +insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a +vice. + +_I answer that,_ Whatever is contrary to the natural order is +vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that +are necessary for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires +that man should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are +necessary for man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of +the individual or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to +reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary +for nature's preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the +order of nature. And this pertains to the vice of insensibility. + +It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and +even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures +as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's +health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and +sex; as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes +and soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to +fulfil their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to +recover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, +as a kind of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up +to contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal +things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of +insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any +horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some +praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights +of contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the +text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately +afterwards. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive +powers, which need a bodily organ, as stated in the First Part (Q. +84, AA. 7, 8), man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use +his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that +afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if +he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of +the body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less +the powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore +it is commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving +themselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual +good, by a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from +many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily +occupations and carnal procreation. + +Reply Obj. 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not +altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 2] + +Whether Intemperance Is a Childish Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin. +For Jerome in commenting on Matt. 18:3, "Unless you be converted, and +become as little children," says that "a child persists not in anger, +is unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful +woman," all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore +intemperance is not a childish sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now "in +respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a +childish sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished: whereas +concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is concerned, +are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col. 3:5, +"Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . . +concupiscence" [*Vulg.: 'your members which are upon the earth, +fornication . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a +childish sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "we +apply the term intemperance* to childish faults." [*_Akolasia_ which +Aristotle refers to _kolazo_ to punish, so that its original sense +would be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint.'] + +_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be childish for two reasons. +First, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does +not mean that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense. +Secondly. by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of +intemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is +one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three +ways. First, as regards that which they both desire, for like a child +concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human +affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason. +Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading "Comeliness +is twofold," that "the beautiful is that which is in keeping with +man's excellence in so far as his nature differs from other animals." +Now a child does not attend to the order of reason; and in like +manner "concupiscence does not listen to reason," according to +_Ethic._ vii, 6. Secondly, they are alike as to the result. For a +child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed: hence it is +written (Ecclus. 30:8): "A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a +child left to himself will become headstrong." So, too, +concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine +says (Confess. viii, 5): "Lust served became a custom, and custom not +resisted became necessity." Thirdly, as to the remedy which is +applied to both. For a child is corrected by being restrained; hence +it is written (Prov. 23:13, 14): "Withhold not correction from a +child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from +Hell." In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it +according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he +says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual +things, and remain fixed "thereon, the impulse of custom," i.e. +carnal concupiscence, "is broken, and being suppressed is gradually +weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not +wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it." Hence +the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child ought to live +according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible +to accord with reason." + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the term "childish" as denoting +what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of +intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as +stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First, +with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are +about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex, +which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a desire +may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that +nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does not +happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for +nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no +sin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to +quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to +natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). + +There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and +these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity +[*Cf. Q. 167], such as the nice (_curiosa_) preparation of food, or +the adornment of women. And though children do not affect these +things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason +given above. + +Reply Obj. 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and +fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason +in them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 3] + +Whether Cowardice* Is a Greater Vice Than Intemperance? +[*Cf. Q. 125] + +Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than +intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to +the good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a +more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 141, +A. 8). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. + +Obj. 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the +less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher +says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable, +if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains." +Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other +passions; hence it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, that "it is more +difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would +seem to be stronger than fear." Therefore intemperance, which is +overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is +overcome by fear. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now +cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires +to be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death, +which pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous +sin than intemperance. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that +"intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice." +Therefore it is more sinful. + +_I answer that,_ one may be compared with another in two ways. First, +with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man +who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than +cowardice. + +First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, +to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving +life. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire +of which is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because, +as stated above (A. 2, ad 2), intemperance is more about certain +annexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures. +Now the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin. +Wherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the +part of the object or motive matter. + +In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for +three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the +more grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who +are demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of +death, stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive +of intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the +graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than +cowardice has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions +done through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external +agent, so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in +_Ethic._ iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are +simply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an +intemperate man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary +generically. For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is +enticed by individual pleasures which make of him an intemperate man. +Hence the most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell +on the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in +matters relating to cowardice: because the particular action that +imposes itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside +his shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more +voluntary, for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is +more voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes +place, is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply +more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it +is easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since +pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are +of everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by +frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas +dangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for +man to encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward. + +Reply Obj. 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with +temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard +to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is +directed to the common good more than temperance is. And from this +point of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance, +since by cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common +good. Secondly, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more +difficult to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any +pleasures whatever: and from this point of view there is no need for +cowardice to take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a +greater strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on the +other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof of a lesser +vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the proof of a greater +vice. + +Reply Obj. 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one +shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures +whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of +life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of +death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex: +although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow, +and fear, occasioned by certain other evils. + +Reply Obj. 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a +general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases +we have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 4] + +Whether Intemperance Is the Most Disgraceful of Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most +disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to +sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance +murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the +most disgraceful of sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are seemingly +less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins of +intemperance are most common, because they are about things connected +with the common use of human life, and in which many happen to sin. +Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most disgraceful. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance and +intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain +desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and +pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as +the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not +the most disgraceful of sins. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that +"intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices." + +_I answer that,_ Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. +Now honor is due to excellence, as stated above (Q. 103, A. 1), and +glory denotes clarity (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3). Accordingly intemperance +is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most +repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common to +us and the lower animals, as stated above (Q. 141, AA. 2, 3). +Wherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): "Man, when he was in honor, did +not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made +like to them." Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's +clarity or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of +intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and +beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as +being most slavish. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12] "the sins of the +flesh," which are comprised under the head of intemperance, although +less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that culpability +is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while disgrace +regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of +the sin in respect of the sinner. + +Reply Obj. 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the shamefulness and +disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as regards the +nature of the vices themselves. + +Reply Obj. 3: When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we +mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are +connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in +conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode +of human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices +are apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of +excess: for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in +committing the unnatural vice. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 143 + +OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL + +We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these +same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular. +_______________________ + +ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 143, Art.] + +Whether the Parts of Temperance Are Rightly Assigned? + +Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) +unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to +be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to +be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is +comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of +temperance. + +Obj. 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But +temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, +as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4). Therefore mildness is not a part of +temperance. + +Obj. 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the +Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now +external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Q. 58, +A. 8). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of +temperance. + +Obj. 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more +parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty, +shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness, +sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the +companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, +simplicity, refinement, method, contentment." [*_Per-se-sufficientiam_ +which could be rendered "self-sufficiency," but for the fact that +this is taken in a bad sense. See Q. 169, A. 1.] Therefore it seems +that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (QQ. 48, 128), a cardinal virtue may +have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and +potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the +concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect +there are two integral parts of temperance, _shamefacedness,_ whereby +one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and +_honesty,_ whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated +above (Q. 141, A. 2, ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue +lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance +excel others in disgrace. + +The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of +a virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of +matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which +are of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these +as regards meat, there is _abstinence,_ and as regards drink properly +there is _sobriety._ Other pleasures are directed to the power of +procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the +act itself of procreation, there is _chastity,_ and as to the +pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from +kissing, touching, or fondling, we have _purity._ + +The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary +virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some +principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein +moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to +moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. +Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter +or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards +something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed +thereto. + +This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the +soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body; +thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of +concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in +the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first +place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse +of passion: and this movement is restrained by _continence,_ the +effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate +concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward +movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the +resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by _humility._ +The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and +this is restrained by _meekness_ or _mildness._ + +With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint +is the effect of _modesty,_ which, according to Andronicus, has three +parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what +not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what +we do: this he assigns to _method._ The second is that a man observe +decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to _refinement._ The +third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse +between a man and his friends, and this is called _gravity._ + +With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be +observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius +assigns _lowliness,_ and Andronicus _contentment_; secondly, we must +not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes +_moderation,_ Andronicus _simplicity._ + +Reply Obj. 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as +imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (Q. 165, +A. 1); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has +something in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is +about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of +restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance. + +Reply Obj. 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance +not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the +mode of restraint and moderation as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: In the matter of external action justice considers what +is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain +moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of +temperance. + +Reply Obj. 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the +moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the +moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 144 + +OF SHAMEFACEDNESS +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in +the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and +honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue? + +(2) What is its object? + +(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed? + +(4) What kind of people are ashamed? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 1] + +Whether Shamefacedness Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is +proper to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is +clear from the definition of virtue given in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now +shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher +observes (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or +something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy. +But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, +since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part +of justice. Since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas +justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of +fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and +aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from +something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is +about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as +the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. +ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible +according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of +honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is +the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, +a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the +support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful." Therefore +shamefacedness is a virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices +are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate +prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue. + +Obj. 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to _Ethic._ +ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from +many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is +a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore +shamefacedness is a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that +shamefacedness is not a virtue. + +_I answer that,_ Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and +in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in +_Phys._ vii, 17, 18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with +perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue. +Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the +fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence +Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of +a base action." Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult +good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 40, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3), when we were treating +of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does +not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as +being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to +avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of +disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a +virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue. + +Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and +praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way +shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a +praiseworthy passion. + +Reply Obj. 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of +virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue's +definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be "an +elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice. Now +shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its +movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it +falls short of the notion of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and +disgrace. Now it has been stated (Q. 142, A. 4) that the vice of +intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness +pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of +its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the +species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the +vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful, +shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues. + +Reply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which +is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of +honesty. + +Reply Obj. 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is +sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow +that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every +vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence +shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of +disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance. + +Reply Obj. 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an +acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the +object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their +regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man +would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of +shamefacedness. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 2] + +Whether Shamefacedness Is About a Disgraceful Action? + +Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a +disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that +"shamefacedness is fear of disgrace." Now sometimes those who do +nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, "For thy sake I +have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face." Therefore +shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is +sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance +when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that +shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action. + +Obj. 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most +beautiful according to _Ethic._ i, 8. Yet sometimes people are +ashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Luke 9:26, "He that shall +be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be +ashamed," etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful +action. + +Obj. 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful +action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more +ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser +sins, while he glories in those which are most grievous, according to +Ps. 51:3, "Why dost thou glory in malice?" Therefore shamefacedness +is not properly about a disgraceful action. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of +Nyssa [*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that "shamefacedness is fear +of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3), +when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an +arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace +is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in +the deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has +not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the +will alone does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability: +wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the +Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of +fear. + +The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in +the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory +consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the +character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an +arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards +first and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is +properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that +shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the +Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those +defects which are not the result of any fault of his own." + +Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man +refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a +man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear +of reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa +(Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person "blushing," in the +latter we say that he is "ashamed." Hence he says that "the man who +is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced." + +Reply Obj. 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin +which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) +that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the +cause." Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is +subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the +Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it +said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that "they (the apostles) went from +the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted +worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus." It is owing to +imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the +reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more +virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good +or evil. Wherefore it is written (Isa. 51:7): "Fear ye not the +reproach of men." + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 63, A. 3), though honor is not +really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence: +and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly due to +sin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind of +defect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and +the like. + +Reply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such. +Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either +because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or +because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical +for doing virtuous deeds. + +Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either +because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison +with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance +of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than +of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of +power. The same applies to other sins. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 3] + +Whether Man Is More Shamefaced of Those Who Are More Closely +Connected with Him? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those +who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in _Rhet._ +ii, 6 that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire +approbation." Now men desire this especially from people of the +better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man +is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with +him. + +Obj. 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who +perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those +whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to +_Rhet._ ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does +himself." Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most +closely connected with him. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men take +more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as +jokers and fable-tellers." But those who are more closely connected +with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take +shame chiefly from them. + +Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are +most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done +nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first +time; by those whose friends they wish to become." Now these are less +closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by +those who are more closely united to him. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made most +ashamed by those who are to be continually with him." + +_I answer that,_ Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor +denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the +excellence which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of +which is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect, +especially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a +person's attestation is considered to be, the more does he make +another person ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered +as being more weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or +because of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's +attestations for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of +his judgement, as in the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man +is more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a +greater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower animals inspire +no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on +account of his knowledge of the matter attested, because "everyone +judges well of what is known to him" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we +are more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us, +since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers +and persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do, +inspire us with no shame at all. + +An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some +advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more +desirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are +more liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some +harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons +connected with us make us more ashamed, since we are to be +continually in their society, as though this entailed a continual +harm to us: whereas the harm that comes from strangers and passersby +ceases almost at once. + +Reply Obj. 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same +reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just +as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they +have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments +hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom +we live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in +detail. + +Reply Obj. 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are connected +with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they +look upon our defect as disgraceful. + +Reply Obj. 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm +they do by making many think ill of us. + +Reply Obj. 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us +more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to +wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again +because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition +seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in +one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more +disgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom +we ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, +is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our +request, or by failing to become their friends. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 4] + +Whether Even Virtuous Men Can Be Ashamed? + +Objection 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For +contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness +are not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, "Thou hadst a harlot's +forehead, thou wouldst not blush." Therefore those who are virtuous +are more inclined to be ashamed. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are +ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this +happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed. + +Obj. 3: Further, shamefacedness is "fear of disgrace" [*Ethic. iv, +9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if +they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly. +Therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed. + +Obj. 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated +above (Q. 143). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since +then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is +also. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a +"virtuous man is not shamefaced." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2) shamefacedness is fear of +some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not +feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because +one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult +to avoid. + +Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First, +because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him +to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are +without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast +of them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to +themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous +are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were +anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore +the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shame is in the virtuous +hypothetically." + +Reply Obj. 1: Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men +through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average +men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and +yet are not altogether free from evil. + +Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice, +but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1 Thess. +5:22, "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." The +Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should +avoid "not only what is really evil, but also those things that are +regarded as evil." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 1, ad 1) the virtuous man despises +ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore +he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, +shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason. + +Reply Obj. 4: Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though +it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore +Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness lays the first +foundation of temperance," by inspiring man with the horror of +whatever is disgraceful. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 145 + +OF HONESTY* +(In Four Articles) +[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with +moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum.] + +We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points +of inquiry: + +(1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous; + +(2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral +goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty]; + +(3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant; + +(4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 1] + +Whether Honesty Is the Same As Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. +For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is +desired for its own sake." Now virtue is desired, not for its own +sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. +i, 9) that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue." Therefore +honesty is not the same as virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) "honesty means an +honorable state." Now honor is due to many things besides virtue, +since "it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. i, 12). +Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior +choice," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems +to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40, +"Let all things be done decently (_honeste_) and according to order" +among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth. +According to Ecclus. 11:14, "good things and evil, life and death +[poverty and riches] are from God" [*The words in brackets are +omitted in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has +_honestas_]. But virtue does not consist in external wealth. +Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides +honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also +divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x) "honesty means an +honorable state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through +being worthy of honor. Now honor, as stated above (Q. 144, A. 2, ad +2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged +chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in _Phys._ vii, 17. +Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as +virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those +things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for +their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such +as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only +for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in +themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but +also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive +to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable +for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) +that "some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by +their own worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge." And this suffices +to give a thing the character of honest. + +Reply Obj. 2: Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are +more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like +things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we +practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of +honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in so far +as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank, power, +and riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) +that these things "are honored by some people, but in truth it is +only the good man who is worthy of honor." Now a man is good in +respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the +latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is +due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the +character of honesty. + +Reply Obj. 3: As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is +due. Now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence, as stated +above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2). But one attests only to what one knows; and +the internal choice is not made known save by external actions. +Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as +it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists +radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the +external conduct. + +Reply Obj. 4: It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly +regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes the name +of honesty is given to external prosperity. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 2] + +Whether the Honest Is the Same As the Beautiful? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the honest is not the same as the +beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, +since the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" [*Cicero, De +Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty +of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the +same as the honest. + +Obj. 2: Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is +characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then +honor and glory differ, as stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), it +seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ. + +Obj. 3: Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above (A. +1). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it is +written (Ezech. 16:15): "Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the +harlot because of thy renown." Therefore the honest is not the same +as the beautiful. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:23, 24): "Those that +are our uncomely (_inhonesta_) parts, have more abundant comeliness +(_honestatem_), but our comely (_honesta_) parts have no need." Now +by uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the +beautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are +apparently the same. + +_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div. +Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of +clarity and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be +beautiful, as being "the cause of the harmony and clarity of the +universe." Hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his +bodily limbs well proportioned, together with a certain clarity of +color. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or +actions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity +of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which we have stated +(A. 1) to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates +according to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore +"honesty is the same as spiritual beauty." Hence Augustine says (QQ. +83, qu. 30): "By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, which we +properly designate as spiritual," and further on he adds that "many +things are beautiful to the eye, which it would be hardly proper to +call honest." + +Reply Obj. 1: The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended +good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is +apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good. Hence +Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the beautiful and the good are +beloved by all." Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies +spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully +says (De Offic. i, 5): "Thou perceivest the form and the features, so +to speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as +Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom." + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), glory is the +effect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a person +acquires clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the same +thing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest +and beautiful. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument applies to the beauty of the body: +although it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to +play the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to +Ezech. 28:17, "Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast +lost thy wisdom in thy beauty." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 3] + +Whether the Honest Differs from the Useful and the Pleasant? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the +useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for its +own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired +for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes +to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore +the honest does not differ from the pleasant. + +Obj. 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good: +for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is a thing that +attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very +nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility": and "that is +money." Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written +(Ecclus. 11:14): "Poverty and riches (_honestas_) are from God," and +(Ecclus. 13:2): "He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship +with one more honorable," i.e. richer, "than himself." Therefore the +honest differs not from the useful. + +Obj. 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be +useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De +Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Q. 83, qu. 30): "The honest is +that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies +reference to something else." + +_I answer that,_ The honest concurs in the same subject with the +useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as +stated above (A. 2), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it +has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever +is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man. +Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is +becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to +man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue +(Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing +may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason. +A pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which perfects +his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is +referred to something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly +the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject. + +Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest +as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its +spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest +to desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant, +however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since +whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas +the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3). + +Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its +own sake by the rational appetite, which tends to that which is in +accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is +desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite. + +Reply Obj. 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion +of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be the +instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). + +Reply Obj. 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible +with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it +is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in accordance with +reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with +regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every +useful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 4] + +Whether Honesty Should Be Reckoned a Part of Temperance? + +Objection 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part +of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and +whole in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of +honesty," according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore +honesty is not a part of temperance. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that "wine . . . makes +all thoughts honest." But the use of wine, especially in excess, in +which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to +intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a +part of temperance. + +Obj. 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now +"it is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according to +the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to +temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar +said as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: "I suffer an honorable (_honesta_) +death, for the most venerable and most holy laws." + +_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a +part of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as +pertaining especially to temperance. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), honesty is a kind of +spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: +and opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly +honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels +that which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal +lusts. Hence by its very name temperance is most significative of the +good of reason to which it belongs to moderate and temper evil +desires. Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason +to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective +part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition +attaching thereto. + +Reply Obj. 1: Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty +taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a +part of temperance. + +Reply Obj. 2: When a man is intoxicated, "the wine makes his thoughts +honest" according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great +and deserving of honor [*Cf. Q. 148, A. 6]. + +Reply Obj. 3: Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to +temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet +greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds +in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus +honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule +given by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he says that "our uncomely +parts have more abundant comeliness," which, namely, destroys +whatever is uncomely. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 146 + +OF ABSTINENCE +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those +which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about +pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence, +which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically +about drink. + +With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: +(1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite +vice which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether abstinence is a virtue? + +(2) Whether it is a special virtue? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 146, Art. 1] + +Whether Abstinence Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the +Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech but +in power (_virtute_)." Now the kingdom of God does not consist in +abstinence, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:17): "The kingdom of God is +not meat and drink," where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. +ii, qu. 11] observes that "justice consists neither in abstaining nor +in eating." Therefore abstinence is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself +to God: "This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take +food as physic." Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art +to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one's +food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art. + +Obj. 3: Further, every virtue "observes the mean," as stated in +_Ethic._ ii, 6, 7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean +but to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore +abstinence is not a virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence +excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that +"impatience not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its +peaceful seclusion." Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that +"sometimes the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer," +so that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a +virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 1:5, 6): "Join with your +faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge +abstinence"; where abstinence is numbered among other virtues. +Therefore abstinence is a virtue. + +_I answer that,_ Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of +food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as +denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it +signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something +indifferent. Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and +then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is +the meaning of Peter's words quoted above, where he says that we +ought "to join abstinence with knowledge," namely that in abstaining +from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he +lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of health. + +Reply Obj. 1: The use of and abstinence from food, considered in +themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle +says (1 Cor. 8:8): "Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if +we eat not [*Vulg.: 'Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not'], +shall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more," i.e. +spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, in +so far as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: The regulation of food, in the point of quantity and +quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the +body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good +of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ. Evang. +ii, qu. 11): "It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how +much food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for the +people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the +requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and +uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity +to abstain." + +Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which +are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to +strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of +reason. Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a +certain excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their +name, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which +all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part +of temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the +mean, in so far as it is in accord with right reason. + +Reply Obj. 4: Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is +not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain +as one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e. +for God's glory and not one's own. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 146, Art. 1] + +Whether Abstinence Is a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue. +For every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not +praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "the +virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other +virtues." Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii) +that "the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature +of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body." Now this +belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore abstinence +is not a special virtue distinct from chastity. + +Obj. 3: Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so +should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Tim. +6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should +be [Vulg.: 'are'] content." Now there is no special virtue in being +content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in +abstinence which moderates food. + +_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons +abstinence as a special part of temperance. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 136, A. 1; Q. 141, A. 3) moral +virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the +passions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion +departs from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue. +Now pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the +good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is +necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he +desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special +virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Wherefore one virtue receives help and +commendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in +this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of +the other virtues. + +Reply Obj. 2: The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only +against the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony: +since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the +onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to +them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue +through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps another. + +Reply Obj. 3: The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use +of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special +virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 147 + +OF FASTING +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue? + +(2) Of what virtue is it the act? + +(3) Whether it is a matter of precept? + +(4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept? + +(5) The time of fasting; + +(6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once? + +(7) The hour of eating for those who fast; + +(8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 1] + +Whether Fasting Is an Act of Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For +every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always +acceptable to God, according to Isa. 58:3, "Why have we fasted and +Thou hast not regarded?" Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now +fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of +abstinence takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of +nature, whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else +those who do not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence. +Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is competent to all, both good and evil, +is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one is +fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts +(2 Cor. 6:5, 6) where the Apostle says: "In fasting, in knowledge, in +chastity, etc. [Vulg.: 'in chastity, in knowledge']." + +_I answer that,_ An act is virtuous through being directed by reason +to some virtuous (_honestum_) [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1] good. Now this is +consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold +purpose. First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore +the Apostle says (2 Cor. 6:5, 6): "In fasting, in chastity," since +fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome +[*Contra Jov. ii.] "Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not +there," that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and +drink. Secondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind +may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence +it is related (Dan. 10) of Daniel that he received a revelation from +God after fasting for three weeks. Thirdly, in order to satisfy for +sins: wherefore it is written (Joel 2:12): "Be converted to Me with +all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning." The same +is declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [*Serm. +lxxii] (ccxxx, de Tempore)): "Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the +mind, subjects one's flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite +and humble, scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire +of lust, kindles the true light of chastity." + +Reply Obj. 1: An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered +vicious by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence the text +goes on to say: "Behold in the day of your fast your own will is +founded," and a little further on (Isa. 58:4): "You fast for debates +and strife and strike with the fist wickedly." These words are +expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii, 19) as follows: "The will +indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the flesh +restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be +wrecked by vice." And Augustine says (in the same sermon) that +"fasting loves not many words, deems wealth superfluous, scorns +pride, commends humility, helps man to perceive what is frail and +paltry." + +Reply Obj. 2: The mean of virtue is measured not according to +quantity but according to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. +Now reason judges it expedient, on account of some special motive, +for a man to take less food than would be becoming to him under +ordinary circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or +in order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and much +more does reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and +the pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much +from one's food as to refuse nature its necessary support: thus +Jerome says:* "It matters not whether thou art a long or a short time +in destroying thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately, +whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping +too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen goods." [*The quotation +is from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De +Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there ascribes the quotation to +St. Jerome, but it is not to be found in the saint's works.] In like +manner right reason does not retrench so much from a man's food as to +render him incapable of fulfilling his duty. Hence Jerome says (in +the same reference) "Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets +fasting before chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of +his senses." + +Reply Obj. 3: The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is +said to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure +negation, wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is +only the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for a +reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting +(_jejunium jejunii_) [*Literally the 'fast of fasting']: while the +latter is called the faster's fast, because he fasts for a purpose. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 2] + +Whether Fasting Is an Act of Abstinence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence. +For Jerome [*The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the +reference is lacking] commenting on Matt. 17:20, "This kind of devil" +says: "To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all +manner of lusts." Now this belongs to every virtue. Therefore fasting +is not exclusively an act of abstinence. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang.) that +"the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year." Now paying tithes is +an act of religion, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 1). Therefore fasting +is an act of religion and not of abstinence. + +Obj. 3: Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated above +(QQ. 143, 146, A. 1, ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with +fortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems +very applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of +abstinence. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "fasting is +frugality of fare and abstinence from food." + +_I answer that,_ Habit and act have the same matter. Wherefore every +virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that +appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food, +wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident +that fasting is an act of abstinence. + +Reply Obj. 1: Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining from +food, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from anything +harmful, and such especially is sin. + +We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence +from all manner of lust, since, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1), an act +ceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice. + +Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging to +another virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that +virtue, as explained above (Q. 32, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 85, A. 3). +Accordingly there is no reason why fasting should not be an act of +religion, or of chastity, or of any other virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to endure, +not any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the danger of +death. To endure hardships resulting from privation of pleasure of +touch, belongs to temperance and its parts: and such are the +hardships of fasting. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 3] + +Whether Fasting Is a Matter of Precept? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept. +For precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are a +matter of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it +would have to be equally observed at all places and times. Therefore +fasting is not a matter of precept. + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin. +Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not fast +would sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that "the Wisdom +of God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of +freedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the +community of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude, +should be bound together in subjection to one God." Now the liberty +of the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number of +observances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For +Augustine says (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv) that "whereas God in His +mercy wished our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the +evidence and small number of its solemn sacraments, some people +render it oppressive with slavish burdens." Therefore it seems that +the Church should not have made fasting a matter of precept. + +_On the contrary,_ Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting +says: "Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the +commands of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles." +Therefore fasting is a matter of precept. + +_I answer that,_ Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make +legal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal +in temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to +prescribe by statute those things that concern the common weal of the +faithful in spiritual goods. + +Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that fasting is useful as atoning +for and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual things. +And everyone is bound by the natural dictate of reason to practice +fasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore +fasting in general is a matter of precept of the natural law, while +the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and +profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept of +positive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is +the Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed by nature. + +Reply Obj. 1: Fasting considered in itself denotes something not +eligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is useful +to some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding under +precept, but it is binding under precept to each one that stands in +need of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this +remedy, both because "in many things we all offend" (James 3:2), and +because "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal. 5:17), it was +fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by +all in common. In doing this the Church does not make a precept of a +matter of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is +of general obligation. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those commandments which are given under the form of a +general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but subject +to the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver. It will be a +mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt of the +lawgiver's authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate +the end intended by him: but it is not a mortal sin if one fails to +keep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and especially +if the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were +present. Hence it is that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the +Church, sin mortally. + +Reply Obj. 3: Augustine is speaking there of those things "that are +neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found +among the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the +custom of the universal Church." On the other hand, the fasts that +are of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are +sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. Nor are they +opposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in +hindering the slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom, +of which it is written (Gal. 5:13): "You, brethren, have been called +unto liberty; only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 4] + +Whether All Are Bound to Keep the Fasts of the Church? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of +the Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as +the commandments of God, according to Luke 10:16, "He that heareth +you heareth Me." Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God. +Therefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts appointed by +the Church. + +Obj. 2: Further, children especially are seemingly not exempt from +fasting, on account of their age: for it is written (Joel 2:15): +"Sanctify a fast," and further on (Joel 2:16): "Gather together the +little ones, and them that suck the breasts." Much more therefore are +all others bound to keep the fasts. + +Obj. 3: Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal, +and necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily +works are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed +to spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since +fasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary +thing by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts of +the Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or +bodily works. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than through +necessity, as stated in 2 Cor. 9:7. Now the poor are wont to fast +through necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought +they to fast willingly. + +_On the contrary,_ It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast. +For the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to +Christ's teaching. But our Lord said (Luke 5:34) that "the children +of the bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them +[*Vulg.: 'Can you make the children of the bridegroom fast, whilst +the bridegroom is with them?']." Now He is with all the righteous by +dwelling in them in a special manner [*Cf. I, Q. 8, A. 3], wherefore +our Lord said (Matt. 28:20): "Behold I am with you . . . even to the +consummation of the world." Therefore the righteous are not bound by +the commandment of the Church to fast. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 98, AA. 2, +6), general precepts are framed according to the requirements of the +many. Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver considers what +happens generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the +precept to be binding on a person in whom for some special reason +there is something incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet +discretion must be brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be +evident, it is lawful for a man to use his own judgment in omitting +to fulfil the precept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it +be difficult for him to have recourse to superior authority. On the +other hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to +the superior who has power to grant a dispensation in such cases. And +this must be done in the fasts appointed by the Church, to which all +are bound in general, unless there be some special obstacle to this +observance. + +Reply Obj. 1: The commandments of God are precepts of the natural +law, which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the +commandments of the Church are about matters which are necessary for +salvation, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of the +Church. Hence there may be certain obstacles on account of which +certain persons are not bound to keep the fasts in question. + +Reply Obj. 2: In children there is a most evident reason for not +fasting, both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which +they need to take food frequently, and not much at a time, and +because they need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth, +which results from the residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as +the stage of growth lasts, which as a rule lasts until they have +completed the third period of seven years, they are not bound to keep +the Church fasts: and yet it is fitting that even during that time +they should exercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in +accordance with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity +threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of more +severe penance, according to Jonah 3:7, "Let neither men nor +beasts . . . taste anything . . . nor drink water." + +Reply Obj. 3: Apparently a distinction should be made with regard to +pilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work +can be conveniently deferred or lessened without detriment to the +bodily health and such external conditions as are necessary for the +upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no reason for omitting +the fasts of the Church. But if one be under the necessity of +starting on the pilgrimage at once, and of making long stages, or of +doing much work, either for one's bodily livelihood, or for some need +of the spiritual life, and it be impossible at the same time to keep +the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because in +ordering fasts the Church would not seem to have intended to prevent +other pious and more necessary undertakings. Nevertheless, in such +cases one ought seemingly, to seek the superior's dispensation; +except perhaps when the above course is recognized by custom, since +when superiors are silent they would seem to consent. + +Reply Obj. 4: Those poor who can provide themselves with sufficient +for one meal are not excused, on account of poverty, from keeping the +fasts of the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to be exempt +who beg their food piecemeal, since they are unable at any one time +to have a sufficiency of food. + +Reply Obj. 5: This saying of our Lord may be expounded in three ways. +First, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says that +"the disciples, who are called children of the bridegroom, were as +yet of a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared to an old +garment." Hence while Christ was with them in body they were to be +fostered with kindness rather than drilled with the harshness of +fasting. According to this interpretation, it is fitting that +dispensations should be granted to the imperfect and to beginners, +rather than to the elders and the perfect, according to a gloss on +Ps. 130:2, "As a child that is weaned is towards his mother." +Secondly, we may say with Jerome [*Bede, Comment. in Luc. v] that our +Lord is speaking here of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law. +Wherefore our Lord means to say that the apostles were not to be held +back by the old observances, since they were to be filled with the +newness of grace. Thirdly, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. +ii, 27), who states that fasting is of two kinds. One pertains to +those who are humbled by disquietude, and this is not befitting +perfect men, for they are called "children of the bridegroom"; hence +when we read in Luke: "The children of the bridegroom cannot fast +[*Hom. xiii, in Matth.]," we read in Matt. 9:15: "The children of the +bridegroom cannot mourn [*Vulg.: 'Can the children of the bridegroom +mourn?']." The other pertains to the mind that rejoices in adhering +to spiritual things: and this fasting is befitting the perfect. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 5] + +Whether the Times for the Church Fast Are Fittingly Ascribed? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the times for the Church fast are +unfittingly appointed. For we read (Matt. 4) that Christ began to +fast immediately after being baptized. Now we ought to imitate +Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16, "Be ye followers of me, as I also +am of Christ." Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the +Epiphany when Christ's baptism is celebrated. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to observe the +ceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to the solemnities of the +Old Law to fast in certain particular months: for it is written +(Zech. 8:19): "The fast of the fourth month and the fast of the +fifth, and the fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall +be to the house of Judah, joy and gladness and great solemnities." +Therefore the fast of certain months, which are called Ember days, +are unfittingly kept in the Church. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), +just as there is a fast "of sorrow," so is there a fast "of joy." Now +it is most becoming that the faithful should rejoice spiritually in +Christ's Resurrection. Therefore during the five weeks which the +Church solemnizes on account of Christ's Resurrection, and on Sundays +which commemorate the Resurrection, fasts ought to be appointed. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the general custom of the Church. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3), fasting is directed to +two things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of the mind to +heavenly things. Wherefore fasting ought to be appointed specially +for those times, when it behooves man to be cleansed from sin, and +the minds of the faithful to be raised to God by devotion: and these +things are particularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when +sins are loosed by baptism, which is solemnly conferred on +Easter-eve, on which day our Lord's burial is commemorated, because +"we are buried together with Christ by baptism unto death" (Rom. +6:4). Moreover at the Easter festival the mind of man ought to be +devoutly raised to the glory of eternity, which Christ restored by +rising from the dead, and so the Church ordered a fast to be observed +immediately before the Paschal feast; and for the same reason, on the +eve of the chief festivals, because it is then that one ought to make +ready to keep the coming feast devoutly. Again it is the custom in +the Church for Holy Orders to be conferred every quarter of the year +(in sign whereof our Lord fed four thousand men with seven loaves, +which signify the New Testament year as Jerome says [*Comment. in +Marc. viii]): and then both the ordainer, and the candidates for +ordination, and even the whole people, for whose good they are +ordained, need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the +ordination. Hence it is related (Luke 6:12) that before choosing His +disciples our Lord "went out into a mountain to pray": and Ambrose +[*Exposit. in Luc.] commenting on these words says: "What shouldst +thou do, when thou desirest to undertake some pious work, since +Christ prayed before sending His apostles?" + +With regard to the forty day's fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi +in Evang.) there are three reasons for the number. First, "because +the power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the +Holy Gospels: since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four." +Or "because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body +through whose lusts we transgress the Lord's commandments which are +delivered to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should +punish that same body forty times. Or, because, just as under the Law +it was commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive +to pay God a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three +hundred and sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves for thirty-six +days" (namely, the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) "we pay +God a tithe of our year." According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. +ii, 16) a fourth reason may be added. For the Creator is the +_Trinity,_ Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: while the number _three_ +refers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded to love God, +with our whole heart, with our whole soul, and with our whole mind: +and the number _four_ refers to the visible creature, by reason of +heat, cold, wet and dry. Thus the number _ten_ [*Ten is the sum of +three, three, and four] signifies all things, and if this be +multiplied by four which refers to the body whereby we make use of +things, we have the number forty. + +Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of +the number of months in each season: or on account of the number of +Holy orders which are conferred at these times. + +Reply Obj. 1: Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but in +order to commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him to +fast, not before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to +fast before our baptism. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the very +same time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted in +July, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the +first), because it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai +broke the tables of the Law (Ex. 32), and that, according to Jer. +39:2, "the walls of the city were first broken through." In the fifth +month, which we call August, they fasted because they were commanded +not to go up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on +account of the spies (Num. 14): also in this month the temple of +Jerusalem was burnt down by Nabuchodonosor (Jer. 52) and afterwards +by Titus. In the seventh month which we call October, Godolias was +slain, and the remnants of the people were dispersed (Jer. 51). In +the tenth month, which we call January, the people who were with +Ezechiel in captivity heard of the destruction of the temple (Ezech. +4). + +Reply Obj. 3: The "fasting of joy" proceeds from the instigation of +the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore this fasting +should not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by +the commandment of the Church are rather "fasts of sorrow" which are +inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not ordered +by the Church during the whole of the Paschal season, nor on Sundays: +and if anyone were to fast at these times in contradiction to the +custom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi) +"is to be considered as law," or even through some erroneous opinion +(thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of +obligation)--he would not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting +considered in itself is commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote +(Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi): "Would that we might fast always." +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 6] + +Whether It Is Requisite for Fasting That One Eat but Once? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that +one eat but once. For, as stated above (A. 2), fasting is an act of +the virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not +less than the number of meals. Now the quantity of food is not +limited for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of +meals be limited. + +Obj. 2: Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by drink: +wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot +receive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to +drink at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should +not be forbidden to eat several times. + +Obj. 3: Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take +them on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential to +fasting to take only one meal. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the common custom of the Christian people. + +_I answer that,_ Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to +bridle concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one +meal is seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is +able to satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from +concupiscence by minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is +appointed by the Church, in her moderation, that those who fast +should take one meal in the day. + +Reply Obj. 1: It was not possible to fix the same quantity of food +for all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result +being that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for +the most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal. + +Reply Obj. 2: Fasting is of two kinds [*Cf. A. 1, ad 3]. One is the +natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This is +broken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not +lawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church is another +kind and is called the "fasting of the faster," and this is not +broken save by such things as the Church intended to forbid in +instituting the fast. Now the Church does not intend to command +abstinence from drink, for this is taken more for bodily refreshment, +and digestion of the food consumed, although it nourishes somewhat. +It is, however, possible to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by +partaking of too much drink: as also by eating immoderately at one +meal. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not taken +chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not break +one's fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were to +take digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity and +by way of food. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 7] + +Whether the Ninth Hour Is Suitably Fixed for the Faster's Meal? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed +for the faster's meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect +than the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted +until evening, for it is written (Lev. 23:32): "It is a sabbath . . . +you shall afflict your souls," and then the text continues: "From +evening until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths." Much more +therefore under the New Testament should the fast be ordered until +the evening. + +Obj. 2: Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all. +But all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore it +seems that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the +commandment to fast. + +Obj. 3: Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as +stated above (A. 2). Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply in +the same way to all, since what is much for one is little for +another, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should +not be fixed for those who fast. + +_On the contrary,_ The Council of Chalons [*The quotation is from the +Capitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and +is said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De +Consecratione] says: "During Lent those are by no means to be +credited with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of +Vespers," which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth hour. +Therefore we ought to fast until the ninth hour. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3, 5), fasting is directed +to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add +something to the common custom, yet so as not to be a heavy burden to +nature. Now the right and common custom is for men to eat about the +sixth hour: both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natural +heat being withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the +surrounding cold of the night), and the humor spread about through +the limbs (to which result the heat of the day conduces until the sun +has reached its zenith), and again because it is then chiefly that +the nature of the human body needs assistance against the external +heat that is in the air, lest the humors be parched within. Hence, in +order that those who fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for +their sins, the ninth hour is suitably fixed for their meal. + +Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ's Passion, +which was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when "bowing His +head, He gave up the ghost" (John 19:30): because those who fast by +punishing their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ, +according to Gal. 5:24, "They that are Christ's, have crucified their +flesh with the vices and concupiscences." + +Reply Obj. 1: The state of the Old Testament is compared to the +night, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day, +according to Rom. 13:12, "The night is passed and the day is at +hand." Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but +not in the New Testament. + +Reply Obj. 2: Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a strict +calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be +about the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain. + +Reply Obj. 3: A little more or a little less cannot do much harm. Now +it is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which men for +the most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is fixed +for those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do +much harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however +this were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of sickness, +age, or some similar reason, he should be dispensed from fasting, or +be allowed to forestall the hour by a little. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 8] + +Whether It Is Fitting That Those Who Fast Should Be Bidden to Abstain +from Flesh Meat, Eggs, and Milk Foods? + +Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be +bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has +been stated above (A. 6) that fasting was instituted as a curb on the +concupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking +wine more than by eating flesh; according to Prov. 20:1, "Wine is a +luxurious thing," and Eph. 5:18, "Be not drunk with wine, wherein is +luxury." Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine, +it seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh meat. + +Obj. 2: Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh of +certain animals. Now "concupiscence is desire of the delectable," as +stated above (I-II, Q. 30, A. 1). Therefore since fasting which was +instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the +eating of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat. + +Obj. 3: Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs and +cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the Lenten +fast. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the common custom of the faithful. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), fasting was instituted by +the Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which +regard pleasures of touch in connection with food and sex. Wherefore +the Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which +both afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great +incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest +on the earth, and of those that breathe the air and their products, +such as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds. +For, since such like animals are more like man in body, they afford +greater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body, +so that from their consumption there results a greater surplus +available for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great +incentive to lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to +abstain especially from these foods. + +Reply Obj. 1: Three things concur in the act of procreation, namely, +heat, spirit [*Cf. P. I., Q. 118, A. 1, ad 3], and humor. Wine and +other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat: flatulent +foods seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital spirit: but +it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most productive of +nourishment, that conduces to the production of humor. Now the +alteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital spirits are +of short duration, whereas the substance of the humor remains a long +time. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of flesh meat rather +than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods. + +Reply Obj. 2: In the institution of fasting, the Church takes account +of the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating flesh +meat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not +always the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh +meat, rather than to eat fish. + +Reply Obj. 3: Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who fast, +for as much as they originate from animals that provide us with +flesh: wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of +the prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the +most solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of Christ, +and because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the mysteries of our +redemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is forbidden in +every fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on +eggs and milk foods. As to the use of the latter things in other +fasts the custom varies among different people, and each person is +bound to conform to that custom which is in vogue with those among +whom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says [*Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii, +18; cf. De Nat. et Grat. lxvii]: "Let each province keep to its own +practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they +were the laws of the apostles." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 148 + +OF GLUTTONY +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether gluttony is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? + +(4) Its species; + +(5) Whether it is a capital sin? + +(6) Its daughters. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 1] + +Whether Gluttony Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord +said (Matt. 15:11): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a +man." Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore, +since every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid" [*Ep. lxxi, ad +Lucin.]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid +this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "Since in eating pleasure +and necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of +necessity and the seduction of pleasure," and Augustine says +(Confess. x, 31): "Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more +than necessary?" Therefore gluttony is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin. +But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and +thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that "unless we +first tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous +appetite, we have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual +combat." But man's inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and +drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be +inordinate through leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of +moral virtue consists: and a thing is said to be a sin through being +contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: That which goes into man by way of food, by reason of +its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually. But the +Jews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed +certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their +signification, but by reason of their nature [*Cf. I-II, Q. 102, A. +6, ad 1]. It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man +spiritually. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not regard +the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being regulated +by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from +desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this +pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a +case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in +eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate. + +Reply Obj. 3: The appetite is twofold. There is the natural appetite, +which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these powers +virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to +reason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from the +powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and +thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the +sensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite +that the vice of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of +gluttony denotes inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and this +is not without sin. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 2] + +Whether Gluttony Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For +every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this, +apparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a +mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated +above (Q. 132, A. 3). But gluttony is not opposed to charity, neither +as regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of one's +neighbor. Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Cf. +Append. to St. Augustine's works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)]: +"Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he +should know that this is one of the lesser sins." But this pertains +to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that +is to say venial, sins. + +Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "As long as +the vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done +valiantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is +unrestrained, all virtue comes to naught." But virtue is not done +away save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the vice of gluttony +properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of +reason in regulating the concupiscence may be considered from two +points of view. First, with regard to things directed to the end, +inasmuch as they may be incommensurate and consequently +improportionate to the end; secondly, with regard to the end itself, +inasmuch as concupiscence turns man away from his due end. +Accordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in gluttony be found to +turn man away from the last end, gluttony will be a mortal sin. This +is the case when he adheres to the pleasure of gluttony as his end, +for the sake of which he contemns God, being ready to disobey God's +commandments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other hand, +if the inordinate concupiscence in the vice of gluttony be found to +affect only such things as are directed to the end, for instance when +a man has too great a desire for the pleasures of the palate, yet +would not for their sake do anything contrary to God's law, it is a +venial sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by turning +man away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of reduction, +it is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands +us to rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not all directly +opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which +contain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain +specially to justice and its parts, as stated above (Q. 122, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 2: In so far as it turns man away from his last end, +gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our +last end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a +mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as denoting +inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed to the +end. + +Reply Obj. 4: Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not so much +on its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from it. +For Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): "When the belly is distended by +gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 3] + +Whether Gluttony Is the Greatest of Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For +the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the +punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for +Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in Matth.]: "Gluttony turned Adam out of +Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of +Noah." According to Ezech. 16:49, "This was the iniquity of Sodom, +thy sister . . . fulness of bread," etc. Therefore the sin of +gluttony is the greatest of all. + +Obj. 2: Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful. Now +gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on Ps. +135:10, "Who smote Egypt with their first-born," says: "Lust, +concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony." Therefore +gluttony is the greatest of sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, man should love himself in the first place after +God, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 4). Now man, by the vice of gluttony, +inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (Ecclus. 37:34): "By +surfeiting many have perished." Therefore gluttony is the greatest of +sins, at least excepting those that are against God. + +_On the contrary,_ The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is +reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii). + +_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways. +First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is +committed: and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine +things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the +greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment +of the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person who +sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished +rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking +food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and +moderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the point of view of the +result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity, +inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby. + +Reply Obj. 1: These punishments are to be referred to the vices that +resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang, +rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from +Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to an act of +gluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom +were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony. + +Reply Obj. 2: This objection argues from the standpoint of the sins +that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more powerful, +unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but +the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other vices. + +Reply Obj. 3: The glutton intends, not the harm to his body, but the +pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is +accidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of +gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man +incur some bodily injury through taking too much food. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 4] + +Whether the Species of Gluttony Are Fittingly Distinguished? + +Objection 1: It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly +distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): "The vice of +gluttony tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of +need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food +to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of +refreshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of +an immoderate appetite"--which are contained in the following verse: +"Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily." + +For the above are distinguished according to diversity of +circumstance. Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do +not differentiate its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are +not distinguished according to the aforesaid. + +Obj. 2: Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then +gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that +there should likewise be others in respect of place and other +circumstances. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so do +the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the +other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various +circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony +distinguished thus. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory quoted above. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), gluttony denotes inordinate +concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in +eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly, +the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, +with regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance +or species of food a man seeks "sumptuous"--i.e. costly food; as +regards its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely--i.e. +"daintily"; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating "too much." + +Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the +consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time +for eating, which is to eat "hastily," or one fails to observe the +due manner of eating, by eating "greedily." + +Isidore [*De Summo Bon. ii, 42] comprises the first and second under +one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in "what" he eats, +or in "how much," "how" or "when he eats." + +Reply Obj. 1: The corruption of various circumstances causes the +various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by +reason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For +in him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the +very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time +concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth. + +Reply Obj. 2: Place and other circumstances include no special motive +connected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony. + +Reply Obj. 3: In all other vices, whenever different circumstances +correspond to different motives, the difference of circumstances +argues a specific difference of vice: but this does not apply to all +circumstances, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 9). +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 5] + +Whether Gluttony Is a Capital Vice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For +capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause, +other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has +not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but +for the body's nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice. + +Obj. 2: Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain +pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, +which, in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins, +seeing that it is most akin to what is [according to nature]. +Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice. + +Obj. 3: Further, sin results from a man forsaking the [good] of +virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or +pleasing to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of +utility, there is but one capital vice, namely covetousness. +Therefore, seemingly, there would be but one capital vice in respect +of pleasures: and this is lust, which is a greater vice than +gluttony, and is about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a +capital vice. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among +the capital vices. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3), a capital vice +denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e. as having a +most desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring +that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered +most desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness +which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to +happiness, according to _Ethic._ i, 8; x, 3, 7, 8. Therefore the vice +of gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost +among other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is true that food itself is directed to something as +its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most +desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it +follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil +of man's life is directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7, "All the +labor of man is for his mouth." Yet gluttony seems to be about +pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as +Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), "with such food as is good for +the worthless body, men desire to be fed," wherein namely the +pleasure consists, "rather than to be filled: since the whole end of +that desire is this--not to thirst and not to hunger." + +Reply Obj. 2: In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the +conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the +aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has +the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity. + +Reply Obj. 3: That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and +consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital +vices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is +useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something +else: wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of +desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such +things. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 6] + +Whether [Five] Daughters Are Fittingly Assigned to Gluttony? + +Objection 1: It would seem that [five] daughters are unfittingly +assigned to gluttony, to wit, "unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness, +loquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding." +For unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14, +"Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked +things." Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin, +according to Prov. 14:22, "They err that work evil." Therefore they +are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony. + +Obj. 2: Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of +gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Isa. +28:8, "All tables were full of vomit and filth." But this seems to be +not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter +of counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, "If thou hast been forced to +eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee." +Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony. + +Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as a +daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the +daughters of gluttony. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters +to gluttony. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), gluttony consists +properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore +those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are +the results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be +accounted for either on the part of the soul or on the part of the +body. On the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, +as regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat +and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, +"dullness of sense in the understanding," on account of the fumes of +food disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence +conduces to the penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles. +2:3, "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I +might turn my mind in wisdom." Secondly, as regards the appetite, +which is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating and +drinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm, and in this +respect "unseemly joy" is reckoned, because all the other inordinate +passions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5. +To this we must refer the saying of 3 Esdr. 3:20, that "wine . . . +gives every one a confident and joyful mind." Thirdly, as regards +inordinate words, and thus we have "loquaciousness," because as +Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), "unless gluttons were carried away by +immoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted +sumptuously every day would not have been so tortured in his tongue." +Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we have +"scurrility," i.e. a kind of levity resulting from lack of reason, +which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also to restrain +outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:4, "Or foolish talking or +scurrility," says that "fools call this geniality--i.e. jocularity, +because it is wont to raise a laugh." Both of these, however, may be +referred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason +of excess which belongs to "loquaciousness," or by reason of +unbecomingness, which belongs to "scurrility." + +On the part of the body, mention is made of "uncleanness," which may +refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities, +or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph. +5:3, "But fornication and all uncleanness," says: "That is, any kind +of incontinence that has reference to lust." + +Reply Obj. 1: Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin, +especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous +joy which is described as "unseemly" arises chiefly from immoderate +partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that dullness of +sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas +dullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from +gluttony, for the reason given above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although it does one good to vomit after eating too +much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by +immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting +as a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it. + +Reply Obj. 3: Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not +from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be +referred to either vice. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 149 + +OF SOBRIETY +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely +drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) What is the matter of sobriety? + +(2) Whether it is a special virtue? + +(3) Whether the use of wine is lawful? + +(4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 1] + +Whether Drink Is the Matter of Sobriety? + +Objection 1: It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to +sobriety. For it is written (Rom. 12:3): "Not to be more wise than it +behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." Therefore +sobriety is also about wisdom, and not only about drink. + +Obj. 2: Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wis. +8:7) that "she teacheth sobriety [Douay: 'temperance'], and prudence, +and justice, and fortitude," where sobriety stands for temperance. +Now temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and +sexual matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink. + +Obj. 3: Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from "measure" +[*_Bria,_ a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's +_Lexicon_]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things +appertaining to us: for it is written (Titus 2:12): "We should live +soberly and justly and godly," where a gloss remarks: "Soberly, in +ourselves"; and (1 Tim. 2:9): "Women . . . in decent apparel, +adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety." Consequently it would +seem that sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things +appertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter +proper to sobriety. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): "Wine taken with +sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou +shalt be sober." + +_I answer that,_ When a virtue is denominated from some condition +common to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that +in which it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that +condition of virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and +temperance about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from +"measure," for a man is said to be sober because he observes the +_bria,_ i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to +that matter wherein the observance of the measure is most deserving +of praise. Such matter is the drinking of intoxicants, because the +measured use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess +therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of reason even more +than excessive eating. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 31:37, 38): +"Sober drinking is health to soul and body; wine drunken with excess +raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins." For this reason sobriety +is especially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but that +which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the brain, +such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may be +employed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter, as stated +above (Q. 123, A. 2; Q. 141, A. 2) with regard to fortitude and +temperance. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his +body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is +said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its +delight, according to Ps. 22:5, "My chalice which inebriateth me, how +goodly is it!" Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in +speaking of the contemplation of wisdom. + +Reply Obj. 2: All the things that belong properly to temperance are +necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore +it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the +business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to +designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than +in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with +drink. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety +is not properly employed in connection with all things, but only in +those wherein there is most need for a measure. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 2] + +Whether Sobriety Is by Itself a Special Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special +virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now +there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, +which is about drink, a special virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch +as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make +food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment. +Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink +is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats and +of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue, +seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each +different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it +would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons sobriety +to be a special part of temperance. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 146, A. 2), it belongs to moral +virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may +hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason, +there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating +drink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch +as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove +this hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is sobriety, is +requisite. + +Reply Obj. 1: Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good +of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and in +this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But +intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above, +wherefore it requires a special virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink, +considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does +not follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds +of food. + +Reply Obj. 3: In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of +hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks +bears an accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does +not call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the +difference of meats. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 3] + +Whether the Use of Wine Is Altogether Unlawful? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the use of wine is altogether +unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of +salvation: since it is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him +that dwelleth with wisdom," and further on (Wis. 9:19): "By wisdom +they were healed, whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the +beginning." Now the use of wine is a hindrance to wisdom, for it is +written (Eccles. 2:3): "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh +from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom." Therefore +wine-drinking is altogether unlawful. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): "It is good not to +eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is +offended or scandalized, or made weak." Now it is sinful to forsake +the good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one's brethren. +Therefore it is unlawful to make use of wine. + +Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i] that "after the +deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last of +the ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning." +Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian law. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:23): "Do not still +drink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thy +frequent infirmities"; and it is written (Ecclus. 31:36): "Wine +drunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart." + +_I answer that,_ No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful, +according to Matt. 15:11, "Not that which goeth into the mouth +defileth a man." Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such. +Yet it may become unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a +circumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily +the worse for taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to +drink wine: sometimes it results from the mode of drinking, because +to wit he exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on +account of others who would be scandalized thereby. + +Reply Obj. 1: A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a general +way, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way it +is required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain +altogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use. +Secondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in +this way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly, it is requisite for +certain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this +depends on circumstances of certain persons and places. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to +abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would +give scandal to certain people. + +Reply Obj. 3: Christ withdraws us from some things as being +altogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to +perfection. It is in the latter way that he withdraws some from the +use of wine, that they may aim at perfection, even as from riches and +the like. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 4] + +Whether Sobriety Is More Requisite in Persons of Greater Standing? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons +of greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing; +wherefore honor and reverence are due to the old, according to Lev. +19:32, "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the +aged man." Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should be +exhorted to sobriety, according to Titus 2:2, "That the aged man be +sober." Therefore sobriety is most requisite in persons of standing. + +Obj. 2: Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and +the Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 1 Tim. 3:2, "It +behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife, +sober, prudent," etc. Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in +persons of high standing. + +Obj. 3: Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is +forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs: +while it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction, +according to Prov. 31:4, "Give not wine to kings," and further on +(Prov. 31:6), "Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to +them that are grieved in mind." Therefore sobriety is more requisite +in persons of standing. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:11): "The women in like +manner, chaste . . . sober," etc., and (Titus 2:6) "Young men in like +manner exhort that they be sober." + +_I answer that,_ Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the +contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads. +Accordingly a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons +for two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the +concupiscences which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the +vices which are removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most +requisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence of +pleasure thrives in the young on account of the heat of youth, while +in women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist +concupiscence. Hence, according to Valerius Maximus [*Dict. Fact. +Memor. ii, 1] among the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Secondly, +sobriety is more requisite in certain persons, as being more +necessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of +wine is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety +is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should be vigorous +in instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church, +who should fulfil their spiritual duties with a devout mind; and to +kings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 150 + +OF DRUNKENNESS +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether drunkenness is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(3) Whether it is the most grievous sin? + +(4) Whether it excuses from sin? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 1] + +Whether Drunkenness Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a sin. For every +sin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to +daring, and presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to +drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, every sin is voluntary [*Augustine, De Vera Relig. +xiv]. But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be +deprived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, whoever causes another to sin, sins himself. +Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a +sin to ask a man to drink that which makes him drunk, which would +seem very hard. + +Obj. 4: Further, every sin calls for correction. But correction is +not applied to drunkards: for Gregory [*Cf. Canon Denique, dist. 4 +where Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of +Canterbury] says that "we must forbear with their ways, lest they +become worse if they be compelled to give up the habit." Therefore +drunkenness is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:13): "Not in rioting and +drunkenness." + +_I answer that,_ Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it +may signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking +much wine, the consequence being that he loses the use of reason. In +this sense drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect +resulting from a fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by +which a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunkenness in two +ways. In one way, through the wine being too strong, without the +drinker being cognizant of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may +occur without sin, especially if it is not through his negligence, +and thus we believe that Noah was made drunk as related in Gen. 9. In +another way drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and +use of wine: in this way it is accounted a sin, and is comprised +under gluttony as a species under its genus. For gluttony is divided +into "surfeiting [Douay: 'rioting'] and drunkenness," which are +forbidden by the Apostle (Rom. 13:13). + +Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11), insensibility +which is opposed to temperance "is not very common," so that like its +species which are opposed to the species of intemperance it has no +name. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and yet if a +man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting +nature grievously, he would not be free from sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: This objection regards the resulting defect which is +involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is +in this that the sin consists. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows not the +strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to drink +excused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind of +person to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be +lacking neither is excused from sin. + +Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be +foregone, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 6). Hence Augustine says in +a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), "Meseems, such things are cured +not by bitterness, severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than +commanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be +followed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should +be treated with severity." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 2] + +Whether Drunkenness Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For +Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the Appendix +to St. Augustine's works] that "drunkenness if indulged in +assiduously, is a mortal sin." Now assiduity denotes a circumstance +which does not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot +aggravate a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as +shown above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 5). Therefore if drunkenness is not a +mortal sin for some other reason, neither is it for this. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St. +Augustine's works]: "Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is +necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins." Now +the lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is +caused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of +medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician, +that they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink +drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli, +xlii): "A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or +gambling, or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed; +a subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either +give them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity." +Now such punishments are not inflicted save for mortal sins. +Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing +Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine. +Now this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows +not the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness +may be without sin, as stated above (A. 1). Secondly, so that he +perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be +intoxicating, and then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Thirdly, +it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate +and intoxicating, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from +drink. Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals +take their species not from things that occur accidentally and beside +the intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way +drunkenness is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and +knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs +virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running +the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De +Abraham i.]): "We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which +prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For the things we avoid when +sober, we unknowingly commit through drunkenness." Therefore +drunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on +account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is +impossible for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing +himself to drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many +times experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to +drunkenness. + +Reply Obj. 2: To take more meat or drink than is necessary belongs to +the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but knowingly +to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin. +Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Drunkenness is far from me: +Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full feeding +sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 141, A. 6), meat and drink should +be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body's health. +Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink which +are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so too +it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man is +moderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or +drinks much at the physician's advice in order to provoke vomiting, +he is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There +is, however, no need for intoxicating drink in order to procure +vomiting, since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore +this is no sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 3] + +Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins. +For Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that "nothing gains the +devil's favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the +vices." And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante +omnia): "Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by +the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the vices." + +Obj. 2: Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good of +reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of +drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its +punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely; for +Ambrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that "there would be no +slavery, were there no drunkards." Therefore drunkenness is the +greatest of sins. + +_On the contrary,_ According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), +spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one +of the carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins. + +_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be evil because it removes a +good. Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver +the evil. Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a +human good. Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are +graver than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the +good of human reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because such +like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this +reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not +for being graver than other sins, but because they occur more +frequently among men. + +Reply Obj. 2: The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way +by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes +away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more +the character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of +reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by +drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue, +which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason, are +always good. + +Reply Obj. 3: Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery, in so +far as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants, for +having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But +slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 4] + +Whether Drunkenness Excuses from Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin. +For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "the drunkard deserves +double punishment." Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of +excusing from it. + +Obj. 2: Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases it. +Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as +man's reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence. But +concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is +drunkenness. + +_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43), +Lot was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness. + +_I answer that,_ Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as +stated above (A. 1), namely the resulting defect and the preceding +act. On the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is +fettered, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it +causes an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of +the preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if +the drunkenness that results from that act be without sin, the +subsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case +of Lot. If, however, the preceding act was sinful, the person is not +altogether excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is +rendered voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding act, +inasmuch as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into +the subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished, +even as the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore +Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that "Lot's guilt is to be +measured, not by the incest, but by his drunkenness." + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard deserves +more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment for +his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the +law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered +"those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished +than if they had been sober, because they do wrong in more ways than +one." In this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), "he seems to +have considered the advantage," namely of the prevention of wrong, +"rather than the leniency which one should have for drunkards," +seeing that they are not in possession of their faculties. + +Reply Obj. 2: Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the point +of its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that +results from it, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the reason, as +drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to make a man +insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it +is less grievous to sin through weakness than through malice. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 151 + +OF CHASTITY +(In Four Articles) + +We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity: +(2) virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the +contrary vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether chastity is a virtue? + +(2) Whether it is a general virtue? + +(3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence? + +(4) Of its relation to purity. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 1] + +Whether Chastity Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we +are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs +to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in +a certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body. +Therefore chastity is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, virtue is "a voluntary habit," as stated in _Ethic._ +ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can be +taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore +it seems that chastity is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some +unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But +chastity is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore chastity +is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de +Tempore]): "Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since +chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust, +while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious." + +_I answer that,_ Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason +"chastises" concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the +Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue +consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above +(I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a +virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject, +though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that a +man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the +judgment of his reason and the choice of his will. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), "so long as her +mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even in +body, not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her body of +its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering continency." He +also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "in the mind there is a virtue +which is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved to suffer +any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil." + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "it is +impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is +it possible to be just unless one live by faith." Whence he argues +that in unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other +virtue, because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as +he adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) "virtues are distinguished from vices +not by their functions," i.e. their acts, "but by their ends." + +Reply Obj. 4: Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in +accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it +is reckoned among the fruits. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 2] + +Whether Chastity Is a General Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For +Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that "chastity of the mind is the +well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to +the greater things." But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore +chastity is a general virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Chastity" takes its name from "chastisement" [*Cf. +A. 1]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be chastised +by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the +appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity. + +Obj. 3: Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But fornication +seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (Ps. 72:27): +"Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.: 'hast destroyed'] all them that go +awhoring from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee." Therefore chastity is +a general virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be +a part of temperance. + +_I answer that,_ The word "chastity" is employed in two ways. First, +properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter, +namely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly, +the word "chastity" is employed metaphorically: for just as a +mingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper +matter of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the +spiritual union of the mind with certain things conduces to a +pleasure which is the matter of a spiritual chastity metaphorically +speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication likewise +metaphorically so called. For if the human mind delight in the +spiritual union with that to which it behooves it to be united, +namely God, and refrains from delighting in union with other things +against the requirements of the order established by God, this may be +called a spiritual chastity, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have +espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste +virgin to Christ." If, on the other hand, the mind be united to any +other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the Divine +order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to Jer. +3:1, "But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers." Taking +chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue +withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful +things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists +principally in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the +human mind is united to God. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical sense. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 1; Q. 142, A. 2), the concupiscence +of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child, +because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of +pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature. +Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered +by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a +child left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these +pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and +consequently chastity is applied antonomastically to such like +concupiscences, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we +stand in the greatest need of strength of mind. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers spiritual fornication +metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity, +as stated. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 3] + +Whether Chastity Is a Distinct Virtue from Abstinence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue +from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same, +one virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the +same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate +which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are +the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity +is not a distinct virtue from abstinence. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of +intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now "chastity" +takes its name from "chastisement" of the contrary vices. Since then +certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is +chastity. + +Obj. 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of +temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are +the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the +matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are +the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. +Cf. Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on Titus 1:7, "Not given to +wine, no striker," etc.: "The belly and the organs of generation are +neighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their +complicity in vice." Therefore abstinence and chastity are not +distinct virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5, 6) reckons "chastity" +together with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4), temperance is +properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that +where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different +virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate +to the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in _Ethic._ ix, +4, 5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food +whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically +from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the +nature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is +about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which +is about pleasures of the palate. + +Reply Obj. 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as +regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch, which +judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as +regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, +10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in +character. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though +they regard the one sense. + +Reply Obj. 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more +oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and +therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, +since if one consent to them this increases the force of +concupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine +says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the +manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those +bodily contacts which belong to the married state." + +Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the +maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are directed to +pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there +is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of +the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are +essentially directed to the preservation of man's life: wherefore by +their very nature they have a special virtue, although this virtue +which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 4] + +Whether Purity Belongs Especially to Chastity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that purity does not belong especially to +chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity is a +virtue of the soul." Therefore it is not something belonging to +chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity. + +Obj. 2: Further, _pudicitia_ (purity) is derived from _pudor,_ which +is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De Fide +Orth. ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all +sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to the +other virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "every +kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach." Now it would +seem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach. +Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not +especially to chastity. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): "We must +give praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none +but a lawful use the organs intended for procreation." Now the use of +these organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity +belongs properly to chastity. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Obj. 2), _pudicitia_ (purity) takes +its name from _pudor,_ which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs +be properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men +are most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei +xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by +the honesty [*Cf. Q. 145] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and +this because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject +to the command of reason, as are the movements of the other external +members. Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of +all the signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6). +Consequently purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially +the signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And +since the latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather +these external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union. +Therefore purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct +therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless +the one is sometimes used to designate the other. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is here speaking of purity as designating +chastity. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the vices +of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above (Q. 142, +A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 3: Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins are most +deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination of the +genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason is +absorbed. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 152 + +OF VIRGINITY +(In Five Articles) + +We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five +points of inquiry: + +(1) In what does virginity consist? + +(2) Whether it is lawful? + +(3) Whether it is a virtue? + +(4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage; + +(5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 1] + +Whether Virginity Consists in Integrity of the Flesh? + +Objection 1: It would seem that virginity does not consist in +integrity of the flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.) [*The +quotation is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii] that "virginity is the +continual meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh." But +meditation does not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not +situated in the flesh. + +Obj. 2: Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine +says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity dwells in the soul." Therefore +virginity is not incorruption of the flesh. + +Obj. 3: Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in +the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken without +loss of virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "those +organs may be injured through being wounded by mischance. Physicians, +too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder +to see: and a midwife has been known to destroy by touch the proof of +virginity that she sought." And he adds: "Nobody, I think, would be +so foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily +sanctity, though she lost the integrity of that organ." Therefore +virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh. + +Obj. 4: Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in +resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation, +whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost +without copulation: for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that +"virginal integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual +intercourse is the portion of angels." Therefore virginity does not +consist in incorruption of the flesh. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "virginity +is continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated +and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh." + +_I answer that,_ Virginity takes its name apparently from _viror_ +(freshness), and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining +its freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so +too, virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared +by the heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the +greatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence, +Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 5) that "virginal chastity is integrity +free of pollution." + +Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The +first is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of +virginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the +soul and that which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of +the semen, causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the +part of the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of +these three the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such +must be considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the +relation of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions are +the matters of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of +form and complement, because the essence of morality is perfected in +that which concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists in +freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity +of the bodily organ is accidental to virginity; while freedom from +pleasure in resolution of the semen is related thereto materially; +and the purpose of perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the +formal and completive element in virginity. + +Reply Obj. 1: This definition of Augustine's expresses directly that +which is formal in virginity. For "meditation" denotes reason's +purpose; and the addition "perpetual" does not imply that a virgin +must always retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear +in mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material +element is expressed indirectly by the words "on incorruption in a +corruptible body." This is added to show the difficulty of virginity: +for if the flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to +maintain a perpetual meditation on incorruption. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in the +soul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same +with virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that +"although virginity resides in the flesh," and for this reason is a +bodily quality, "yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency +fosters and preserves." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ is +accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely +abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily +organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other +way, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of +a hand or foot. + +Reply Obj. 4: Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise +in two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it destroys +virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine, however, +mentions copulation, because such like resolution is the ordinary and +natural result thereof. In another way this may happen beside the +purpose of the mind, either during sleep, or through violence and +without the mind's consent, although the flesh derives pleasure from +it, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case of those who +are subject to a flow of semen. In such cases virginity is not +forfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity +which excludes virginity. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 2] + +Whether Virginity Is Unlawful? + +Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever +is contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as +the words of Gen. 2:16, "Of every tree" that is in "paradise, thou +shalt eat," indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to +the preservation of the individual, so also the words of Gen. 1:28, +"Increase and multiply, and fill the earth," express a precept of the +natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species. +Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this +would be to act counter to the good of the individual, so too it is a +sin to abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to +act against the good of the species. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is +apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue, +since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher +says (Ethic. ii, 2), that "he who revels in every pleasure, and +abstains from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from +all is loutish and insensible." Therefore virginity is something +sinful. + +Obj. 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden +times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius +Maximus asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to +Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato "is said to have sacrificed to +nature, in order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as +though it were a sin." Therefore virginity is a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But +virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor. +7:25): "Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I +give counsel." Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing. + +_I answer that,_ In human acts, those are sinful which are against +right reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an +end should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, +man's good is threefold as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8; one consisting in +external things, for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily +goods; the third, consisting in the goods of the soul among which the +goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the +active life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord +declared (Luke 10:42), "Mary hath chosen the better part." Of these +goods those that are external are directed to those which belong to +the body, and those which belong to the body are directed to those +which belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to the +active life are directed to those which belong to the life of +contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use +external goods in a measure proportionate to the body, and in like +manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from +possessing certain things (which otherwise it were good for him to +possess), for the sake of his body's good, or of the contemplation of +truth, this is not sinful, but in accord with right reason. In like +manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely +to give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance +with the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains from all +venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine +contemplation: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34): "The unmarried +woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may +be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that is married thinketh +on the things of the world, how she may please her husband." +Therefore it follows that virginity instead of being sinful is worthy +of praise. + +Reply Obj. 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above (Q. 122, A. +1). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be +fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside +without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and +the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the +multitude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be +discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one person doing +this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law +which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual, +otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the +precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which +needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually. +Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if +some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while others abstaining +from this betake themselves to the contemplation of Divine things, +for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus too in an +army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and others +fight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the +multitude, although they cannot be done by one person. + +Reply Obj. 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right reason, +abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for +pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does +not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is +venereal: and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated +above. Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to +quantity but to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6: wherefore +it is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that "in point of +quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point of becomingness he +follows the mean." + +Reply Obj. 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more +frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone +refrained from all venereal pleasure through love of the +contemplation of truth: as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence +it was not through thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, +but "because he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow +countrymen," as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii). +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 3] + +Whether Virginity Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For "no +virtue is in us by nature," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). +Now virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born. +Therefore virginity is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Yet some have other virtues without having +virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without +virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would involve +the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But virginity +is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii ad +Eustoch.]: "Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin +after her downfall." Therefore seemingly virginity is not a virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost +without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue. + +Obj. 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal +purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity is not +a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of virginity +moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we +should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the formal and completive +element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal +pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so +far, to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine +things: while the material element in virginity is integrity of the +flesh free of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest +that where a good action has a special matter through having a +special excellence, there is a special kind of virtue: for example, +magnificence which is about great expenditure is for this reason a +special virtue distinct from liberality, which is about all uses of +money in general. Now to keep oneself free from the experience of +venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own deserving of greater +praise than keeping oneself free from inordinate venereal pleasure. +Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related to chastity as +magnificence to liberality. + +Reply Obj. 1: Men have from their birth that which is material in +virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal +experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, +namely the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake, +which purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence +Augustine says (De Virgin. xi): "Nor do we praise virgins for being +virgins, but, because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy +continency." + +Reply Obj. 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that which +is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as +stated above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), but not by reason of that which is +material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing +the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus +a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of +magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues +lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the +flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity, +his mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding +this same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do +so: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the +purpose of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a +position to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in +mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which +preparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous. + +Reply Obj. 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that +which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material +therein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he +does not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a +person who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the +matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity. + +As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be +miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, +which we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something +else which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who +has experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that +experience. For God cannot make that which is done not to have been +done, as stated in the First Part (Q. 25, A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by +vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin. +viii) that "by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed, +consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and +flesh." Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin. + +Reply Obj. 5: Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because +it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to +it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds +something to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that +which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from +venereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity +alone is accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is +reckoned above liberality. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 4] + +Whether Virginity Is More Excellent Than Marriage? + +Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than +marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): "Continence was +equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who +begot children." Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore +virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity. + +Obj. 2: Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his +virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence, +it would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than +any married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not +preferable to marriage. + +Obj. 3: Further, the common good takes precedence of the private +good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is +directed to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. +xvi): "What food is to a man's wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse +to the welfare of the human race." On the other hand, virginity is +ordered to the individual good, namely in order to avoid what the +Apostle calls the "tribulation of the flesh," to which married people +are subject (1 Cor. 7:28). Therefore virginity is not greater than +conjugal continence. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): "Both solid +reason and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage +sinful, nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or +even to that of widowhood." + +_I answer that,_ According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of +Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to +marriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ +Who both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a +virgin, and by the teaching of the Apostle who (1 Cor. 7) counsels +virginity as the greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both +because a Divine good takes precedence of a human good, and because +the good of the soul is preferable to the good of the body, and again +because the good of the contemplative life is better than that of the +active life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in +respect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking "on the +things of God" [Vulg.: 'the Lord'], whereas marriage is directed to +the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the human race, +and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace +the married life have to think "on the things of the world," as the +Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is +preferable to conjugal continence. + +Reply Obj. 1: Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but +still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so +disposed, that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in +keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal +continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of +John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards the +accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that +both "the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought +Christ's battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but John +was continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in +habit." + +Reply Obj. 2: Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a +married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First, on +the part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married person is more +prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be expedient, +than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono +Conjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: "I am no better than +Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the +chastity of marriage." Further on he gives the reason for this: "For +what I do now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him +to do it then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved +me now to do it." Secondly, because perhaps the person who is not a +virgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De +Virgin. xliv): "Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to +the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on +account of some mental fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom, +whereas this woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is +already able to drink the chalice of the Lord?" + +Reply Obj. 3: The common good takes precedence of the private good, +if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is +better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated +to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (De +Virgin. ix): "It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the +flesh, even of those women who in these times seek naught else from +marriage but children in order to make them servants of Christ, +cannot compensate for lost virginity." +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 5] + +Whether Virginity Is the Greatest of Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues. +For Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg.]): "We address +ourselves now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less +exalted is their vocation. They are a flower of the Church's sowing, +the pride and ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion +of Christ's flock." + +Obj. 2: Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue. Now +the greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold +fruit, according to a gloss on Matt. 13:23. Therefore virginity is +the greatest of the virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the greater +it is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is +declared in the Apocalypse (14:4) that virgins "follow the Lamb +whithersoever He goeth," and (Apoc. 14:3) that they sing "a new +canticle," which "no" other "man" could say. Therefore virginity is +the greatest of the virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): "No one, +methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom," and (De Virgin. +xlv): "The authority of the Church informs the faithful in no +uncertain manner, so that they know in what place the martyrs and the +holy virgins who have departed this life are commemorated in the +Sacrament of the Altar." By this we are given to understand that +martyrdom, and also the monastic state, are preferable to virginity. + +_I answer that,_ A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in +some particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely +in the genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of +widowhood and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to +chastity antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is +ascribed to chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 7): "Can +anyone esteem any beauty greater than a virgin's, since she is +beloved of her King, approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, +consecrated to her God?" Secondly, a thing may be most excellent +simply, and in this way virginity is not the most excellent of the +virtues. Because the end always excels that which is directed to the +end; and the more effectively a thing is directed to the end, the +better it is. Now the end which renders virginity praiseworthy is +that one may have leisure for Divine things, as stated above (A. 4). +Wherefore the theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion, +the acts of which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are +preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in +order to cleave to God--since for this end they hold their own life +in contempt; and those who dwell in monasteries--since for this end +they give up their own will and all that they may possess--than +virgins who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose. +Therefore virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: Virgins are "the more honored portion of Christ's +flock," and "their glory more sublime" in comparison with widows and +married women. + +Reply Obj. 2: The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity, +according to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.], on account of its +superiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, +and to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But +according to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), "the hundredfold fruit +is given to martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to +married persons." Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is +simply the greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other +degrees of chastity. + +Reply Obj. 3: Virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth," +because they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but +also of the flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore +they follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they +follow more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more +closely by imitation of the mind. The "new hymn" which virgins alone +sing, is their joy at having preserved integrity of the flesh. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 153 + +OF LUST +(In Five Articles) + +We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity: +(1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are +five points of inquiry: + +(1) What is the matter of lust? + +(2) Whether all copulation is unlawful? + +(3) Whether lust is a mortal sin? + +(4) Whether lust is a capital vice? + +(5) Concerning its daughters. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 1] + +Whether the Matter of Lust Is Only Venereal Desires and Pleasures? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of lust is not only +venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) +that "lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance." But surfeit +regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore +lust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:1): "Wine is a lustful +[Douay: 'luxurious'] thing." Now wine is connected with pleasure of +meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust. + +Obj. 3: Further, lust is defined "as the desire of wanton pleasure" +[*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure +regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore +lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures. + +_On the contrary,_ To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii +[*Written by St. Augustine]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the +flesh shall reap corruption." Now the sowing of the flesh refers to +venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust. + +_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x), "a lustful man is one who +is debauched with pleasures." Now venereal pleasures above all +debauch a man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with +such like pleasures. + +Reply Obj. 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to +pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is +referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal +pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a +man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters +pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says "lust is any +kind of surfeit." + +Reply Obj. 2: Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense +in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the +use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the +name of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to +which also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks +(De Civ. xiv, 15, 16). +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 2] + +Whether No Venereal Act Can Be Without Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. +For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal +act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, +10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its +height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts." +Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason +is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and "deficiency" +as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is +excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is +incompatible with the act of understanding," as the Philosopher +observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.; +Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of +the prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy. +Therefore no venereal act can be without sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now +original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without +which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et +Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a +sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no +sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, +nor a commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse +between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not +every venereal act is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the +order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering +everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if +one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a +fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, +provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the +preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, +so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a +very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the +preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal +acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence +Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's well +being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human +race." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be +taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the +body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided +they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of +human procreation. + +Reply Obj. 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways. +First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this +nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the +perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by +that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual +intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, +i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. +viii): "Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about +serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the +word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna's conjugal +chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more +that of the Virgin Mary." + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 152, A. 2, ad 2; I-II, Q. 64, A. +2), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with +right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a +venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean +of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of +pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the +disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior +appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the +act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free +act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with +the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act +of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in +accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person +to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are +not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the +punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling +against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as +Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13). + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the child, +shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which +is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin." +Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that +it contains something penal resulting from the first sin. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 3] + +Whether the Lust That Is About Venereal Acts Can Be a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a +sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is +the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. +i, 18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other +superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal +acts. + +Obj. 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of +what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own, +except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in +venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no +vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now +wine is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the +Apostle (Eph. 5:18), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay: +'luxury']." Therefore lust is forbidden. + +Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19 +[Douay: 'luxury']. + +_I answer that,_ The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves +one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more +sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of +venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary +for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race. +Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for observing the order of +reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection +against the dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust +consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the +matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener. +Anim. i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed." For it is said +to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the +nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative +power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not +to be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided +one observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the +emission of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting +the end for which it is needed. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:20) in speaking against +lust, "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in +your body." Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a +man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine +says (De Decem. Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): "God Who thus +governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and +commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which +thou hast begun to be." + +Reply Obj. 3: The opposite of lust is not found in many, since men +are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised +under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for +sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 4] + +Whether Lust Is a Capital Vice? + +Objection 1: It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is +apparently the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on Eph. +5:3 (Cf. 2 Cor. 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony, +according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a +capital vice. + +Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as pride +of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind +safeguard the chastity of the flesh." Now it is seemingly contrary to +the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore +lust is not a capital vice. + +Obj. 3: Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Eph. 4:19, +"Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness." But +despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of +sloth, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4, ad 2). Much less, therefore, is +lust a capital vice. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the +capital vices. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 148, A. 5; I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, +4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that +through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all +of which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. +Now the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. +Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive +appetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and +because such like concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is +evident that lust is a capital vice. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 148, A. 6), according to some, the +uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain +uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point. +If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it +is caused by gluttony materially--in so far as gluttony provides the +bodily matter of lust--and not under the aspect of final cause, in +which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the cause of +others. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 132, A. 4, ad 1), when we were +treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all +sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom. + +Reply Obj. 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly +through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair, +so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle +thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary +for a capital vice. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 5] + +Whether the Daughters of Lust Are Fittingly Described? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly +reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, +rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence +or despair of a future world." For mental blindness, thoughtlessness +and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every +sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not +be reckoned especially as daughters of lust. + +Obj. 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated +above (Q. 128, ad 6; Q. 137, A. 3). But lust is contrary, not to +fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter +of lust. + +Obj. 3: Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the +origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). +Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust. + +Obj. 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four, +namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking." +There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). + +_I answer that,_ When the lower powers are strongly moved towards +their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and +disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that +the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently +intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of +the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely +the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust. + +Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is +simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act +is hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived +thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart." In this respect we have +"blindness of mind." The second act is counsel about what is to be +done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the +concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1), +speaking of lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor +moderation, thou canst not control it by counseling." In this respect +there is "rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated +above (Q. 53, A. 3). The third act is judgment about the things to be +done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the +lustful old men (Dan. 13:9): "They perverted their own mind . . . +that they might not . . . remember just judgments." In this respect +there is "thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's command +about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so +far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered +from doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" +must be referred.] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the +Leonine edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man +who declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear +will undo those words." + +On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One +is the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which +regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the +other hand there is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the +desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed +to the end. With regard to this there is "love of this world," whose +pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is +"despair of a future world," because through being held back by +carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since +they are distasteful to him. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), +intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices +opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal +species of intemperance. + +Reply Obj. 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards +hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from +pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as +stated above (Q. 143). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto +is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first +named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles +a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee 4:11, +"Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay: +'understanding']." Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the +less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death." +Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the +daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. Q. 35, A. +4, ad 2; Q. 118, A. 8, ad 1; Q. 148, A. 6). + +Reply Obj. 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires +for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special +point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a +daughter of lust. + +Reply Obj. 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external +acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold +inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer +"obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart the +mouth speaketh" (Matt. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full +of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly, +on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and +rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or +giving a thought to his words, which are described as "scurrilous." +Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks +pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to +"wanton words." Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by +his words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a +man's sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for +instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to +anything else. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 154 + +OF THE PARTS OF LUST +(In Twelve Articles) + +We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are +twelve points of inquiry: + +(1) Into what parts is lust divided? + +(2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin? + +(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? + +(4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like +seduction? + +(5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin? + +(6) Of seduction; + +(7) Of rape; + +(8) Of adultery; + +(9) Of incest; + +(10) Of sacrilege; + +(11) Of the sin against nature; + +(12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 1] + +Whether Six Species Are Fittingly Assigned to Lust? + +Objection 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned +to lust, namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, +rape, and the unnatural vice." For diversity of matter does not +diversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard +to diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has +intercourse is married or a virgin, or of some other condition. +Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified in this +way. + +Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not +differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery +does not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man +having intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an +injustice. Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a +species of lust. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a +woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that +a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow. +Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as +adultery is. + +Obj. 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another +woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter +sin is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among +the species thereof. + +Obj. 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): "Lest again, when I +come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them that sinned +before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication +and lasciviousness that they have committed." Therefore it seems that +also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of +lust, as well as fornication. + +Obj. 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among +its parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is +written (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are +fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']." +Therefore it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species +of lust. + +_On the contrary,_ The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals +36, qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 153, A. 3), the sin of lust +consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right +reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter +wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due +matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a +circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is +derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the +species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object. + +Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways. +First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. +In this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the +_vice against nature,_ which attaches to every venereal act from +which generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing +and advancement of the child when born, there is _simple +fornication,_ which is the union of an unmarried man with an +unmarried woman. Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is +consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other +persons; and this in two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with +whom a man has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to +her; and thus there is _incest,_ which consists in the misuse of a +woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with +regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed: and +if she be under the authority of a husband, it is _adultery,_ if +under the authority of her father, it is _seduction,_ in the absence +of violence, and _rape_ if violence be employed. + +These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than +of the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is +by way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been +stated above (Obj. 1) that the aforesaid species are assigned with +regard to a difference of matter. + +Reply Obj. 1: The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a +formal difference of object, which difference results from different +modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 7), nothing hinders +the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in +this way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this +deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust +that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby +shown to be more grievous. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a +spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the +violation of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner, +the other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced +to other species of lust. + +Reply Obj. 4: The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected +with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not +constitute the species of a moral act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, +A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 5: As a gloss says on this passage, "uncleanness" stands +for lust against nature, while "lasciviousness" is a man's abuse of +boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also +reply that "lasciviousness" relates to certain acts circumstantial to +the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth. + +Reply Obj. 6: According to a gloss on this passage "lust" there +signifies any kind of excess. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 2] + +Whether Simple Fornication Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal +sin. For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a +par with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as +things that are not mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29): +"That you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, +and from things strangled, and from fornication." But there is not +mortal sin in these observances, according to 1 Tim. 4:4, "Nothing is +rejected that is received with thanksgiving." Therefore fornication +is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But +the Lord commanded (Osee 1:2): "Go take thee a wife of fornications, +and have of her children of fornications." Therefore fornication is +not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without +disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without +disapprobation by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus +we read (Gen. 16:4) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and +further on (Gen. 30:5, 9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the +handmaids of his wives; and again (Gen. 38:18) that Juda was with +Thamar whom he thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication +is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple +fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love +of God, since it is not a sin directly against God, nor as regards +the love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore +simple fornication is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 5: Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But +simple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose +[*The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to +St. Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, +"Godliness is profitable to all things," says: "The whole of +Christian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man +conforms to this, even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the +flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish." +Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that "what food +is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to the +welfare of the human race." But inordinate use of food is not always +a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse; +and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which +is the least grievous of the aforesaid species. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:13): "Take heed to keep +thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure +to know a crime." Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore +fornication and all intercourse with other than one's wife is a +mortal sin. + +Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom. But +fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Gal. +5:21), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, +adds: "They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." +Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin. + +Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can. +Praedicandum): "They should know that the same penance is to be +enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder +and other criminal offenses." Therefore simple fornication is a +criminal or mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to +be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in +Deut., qu. 37] on Deut. 23:17, says: "This is a prohibition against +going with whores, whose vileness is venial." For instead of "venial" +it should be "venal," since such is the wanton's trade. In order to +make this evident, we must take note that every sin committed +directly against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication +implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the +offspring to be born of this union. For we find in all animals where +the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female, +that these come together not indeterminately, but the male with a +certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all +birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where the +female alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing, the union is +indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is +evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the +mother's care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his +father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods +both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an +indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be +united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time +or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human race the +male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because +on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and this certainly would +cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate. + +This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which +for the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, +however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the +whole human race, and common goods depend on the law for their +determination, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2), it follows that +this union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, is determined +by some law. What this determination is for us will be stated in the +Third Part of this work (Suppl., Q. 50, seqq.), where we shall treat +of the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an +indeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with +matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child's upbringing, and +consequently it is a mortal sin. + +Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by +fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the +child: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law +is judged according to what happens in general, and not according to +what may happen in a particular case. + +Reply Obj. 1: Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these +things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because +the matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute +between Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing +unanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed +unlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason: whereas +the Jews, taught by the Divine law, considered it to be unlawful. +The other things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom +introduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles +forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were +unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the Jews, +as stated above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 4, ad 3). + +Reply Obj. 2: Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary +to right reason. Now man's reason is right, in so far as it is ruled +by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which +a man does by God's will and in obedience to His command, is not +contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general +order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously by the +Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the +usual course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in +being willing to slay his innocent son, because he obeyed God, +although considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason +in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by +God's command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called +fornication, though it be so called in reference to the general +course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "When God +commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any +people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be +done"; and afterwards he adds: "For as among the powers of human +society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, +so must God in preference to all." + +Reply Obj. 3: Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no +purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of +matrimony (Suppl., Q. 65, A. 5, ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to +excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold. + +Reply Obj. 4: Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our +neighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, +as we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a +manner disadvantageous to the future child. + +Reply Obj. 5: A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to +the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far +as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and +because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy; +but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal +inconstancy impenitent until death. + +Reply Obj. 6: One copulation may result in the begetting of a man, +wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future +child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only +as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one +meal does not hinder the good of a man's whole life, wherefore the +act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would, +however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a +food which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the +case with Adam. + +Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised +under lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous +pleasure is a lesser sin. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 3] + +Whether Fornication Is the Most Grievous of Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of +sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it +proceeds from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous +pleasure is in fornication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the +"flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust." Therefore it +seems that fornication is the gravest of sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against +a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more +grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. +Now according to 1 Cor. 6:18, "He that committeth fornication sinneth +against his own body," which is most intimately connected with a man. +Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be +the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly +opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was +said in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according +to 1 Cor. 6:15, "Shall I . . . take the members of Christ, and make +them the members of a harlot?" Therefore fornication is the most +grievous of sins. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of +the flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins. + +_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, +first with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some +accident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin +itself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to +the good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to +the good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to +its species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods, +such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those +which are directly against God, and sins that are injurious to the +life of one already born, such as murder. + +Reply Obj. 1: The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that +which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure +that is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the +less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a +greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure +is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano [*Serm. +ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine's works]) that of +all a Christian's conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of +chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and +Isidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "mankind is subjected to +the devil by carnal lust more than by anything else," because, to +wit, the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome. + +Reply Obj. 2: The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not +merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the +flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts +against the good of his own body by an undue resolution and +defilement thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does +it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin, +because in man reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if +there be a sin more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous. + +Reply Obj. 3: The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the +human race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual +begetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an +actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of the +species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point +of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind +of lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human species. +Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and +therefore those sins also that are against God are more grievous. +Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though +the fornicator intended to offend God, but consequently, in the same +way as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are +Christ's members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, according to +1 Cor. 6:17, "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." Wherefore +also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 4] + +Whether There Can Be Mortal Sin in Touches and Kisses? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and +kisses. For the Apostle says (Eph. 5:3): "Fornication and all +uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among +you, as becometh saints," then he adds: "Or obscenity" (which a gloss +refers to "kissing and fondling"), "or foolish talking" (as "soft +speeches"), "or scurrility" (which "fools call geniality--i.e. +jocularity"), and afterwards he continues (Eph. 5:5): "For know ye +this and understand that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous +person (which is the serving of idols), hath inheritance in the +kingdom of Christ and of God," thus making no further mention of +obscenity, as neither of foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore +these are not mortal sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being +prejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and +upbringing. But these are not affected by kisses and touches or +blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these. + +Obj. 3: Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never +be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done +sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in +themselves. + +_On the contrary,_ A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a +kiss. But according to Matt. 5:28, "Whosoever shall look on a woman +to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his +heart." Much more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things +mortal sins. + +Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), "By their +very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their +embraces, those who are associated in a sleep that knows neither +honor nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime." Therefore by +doing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be a mortal sin in two ways. +First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or +touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is +possible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being +the custom of one's country, or on account of some obligation or +reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by +reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead +someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt +intention. Now it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 74, A. 8), that it +is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the +delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a mortal +sin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in +such like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the +pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and +caresses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are +mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lustful. +Therefore in so far as they are lustful, they are mortal sins. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle makes no further mention of these three +because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had +mentioned before. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature +hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which +is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are +mortally sinful. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that such things are not mortal +sins in their species. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 5] + +Whether Nocturnal Pollution Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the +same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit +while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep +obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord (3 Kings 3:2, Par. 1). +Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal +pollution would seem to be a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has +the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently +discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one +thing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, +so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a +sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot +act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is +instructed and reproved by God, according to Job 33:15, 16, "By a +dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of +men [*Vulg.: 'When deep sleep falleth upon men.' St. Thomas is +apparently quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly +above, Q. 95, A. 6, Obj. 1.] . . . Then He openeth the ears of men, +and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore a +man, while asleep, can act according to or against his reason, and +this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that +nocturnal pollution is a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): "When the +same image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to +the mind of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish +the imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once +moved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet +there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore +thinking about such things while one is awake." + +_I answer that,_ Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways. +First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For +every sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first +movement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far +as it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of +reason's judgment, there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has +not a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not +regard some of the images formed by his imagination as though they +were real, as stated above in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 8, ad 2). +Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's +judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as neither are the actions +of a maniac or an imbecile. + +Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its +cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there +is excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is +disintegrated either through overheating of the body or some other +disturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the +discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing +happens when nature is cumbered with other superfluities, so that +phantasms relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed +in the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a +sinful cause (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal +pollution has the character of sin from its cause: whereas if the +excess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a +sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in itself +nor in its cause. + +A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and +the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account +of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was +awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks +about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while +sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of +concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt +to arise from thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such +pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul, +so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent +to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher says +(Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as certain movements in some degree +pass" from the waking state to the state of sleep, "the dreams of +good men are better than those of any other people": and Augustine +says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that "even during sleep, the soul may +have conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition." Thus it +is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its +cause. On the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution +ensues after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were +speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, +neither in itself nor in its cause. + +The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the +work of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce +the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous +sin, namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil. +Hence the words of the hymn at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our +bodies no uncleanness know" [*Translation W. K. Blount]. + +On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part, +and through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the +_Collationes Patrum_ (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to +suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil +brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy +Communion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a +sin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while +he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It is +for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to +God (3 Kings 3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15). + +Reply Obj. 2: The use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep, +according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by +sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations. +Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to +elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the First Part (Q. +84, A. 8, ad 2). Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as +a sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Reason's apprehension is not hindered during sleep to +the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason +turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human +thought. Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep from +apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his +previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or again through +Divine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 6] + +Whether Seduction Should Be Reckoned a Species of Lust? + +Objection 1: It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a +species of lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a +virgin, according to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) [*Append. Grat. ad +can. Lex illa]. But this may occur between an unmarried man and an +unmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction +should not be reckoned a species of lust, distinct from fornication. + +Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 4]): +"Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery." Now +a species is not contained under another that is differentiated in +opposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species of lust, it +seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust. + +Obj. 3: Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to +injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury to +another, namely the violated maiden's father, who "can take the +injury as personal to himself" [*Gratian, ad can. Lex illa], and sue +the seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a +species of lust. + +_On the contrary,_ Seduction consists properly in the venereal act +whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about +venereal actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust. + +_I answer that,_ When the matter of a vice has a special deformity, +we must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust +is a sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above (Q. 153, A. +1). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who +is under her father's care: both on the part of the maid, who through +being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both +hindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to +a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the +seal of virginity: and on the part of the father, who is her +guardian, according to Ecclus. 42:11, "Keep a sure watch over a +shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a +laughing-stock to thy enemies." Therefore it is evident that +seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, while +still under the guardianship of her parents, is a determinate species +of lust. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage, +she is not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal of +virginity is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in +that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not +simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots, +women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2 +Cor. 12: "And have not done penance for the uncleanness and +fornication," etc. + +Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as +applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, +in the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man +and any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding: +"Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not." In +this sense, too, we are to understand the words of Num. 5:13: "If +[Vulg.: 'But'] the adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by +witnesses, because she was not found in adultery (_stupro_)." + +Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity +through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a +greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the +concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it +refrains not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an +injustice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the +part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, is +nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is bound to compensation. +Hence it is written (Ex. 22:16, 17): "If a man seduce a virgin not +yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to +wife. If the maid's father will not give her to him, he shall give +money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive." The +other injury is done to the maid's father: wherefore the seducer is +bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written (Deut. +22:28, 29): "If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not +espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to +judgment: he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid +fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he +hath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of his life": +and this, lest he should prove to have married her in mockery, as +Augustine observes. [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xxxiv.] +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 7] + +Whether Rape Is a Species of Lust, Distinct from Seduction? + +Objection 1: It would seem that rape is not a species of lust, +distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that +"seduction (_stuprum_), or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful +intercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption: +wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer." Therefore it seems +that rape should not be reckoned a species of lust distinct from +seduction. + +Obj. 2: Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated +in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that +"rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her +father's house that after being violated she may be taken to wife." +But the employment of force is accidental to lust, for this +essentially regards the pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems +that rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust. + +Obj. 3: Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is +written (1 Cor. 7:2): "For fear of fornication, let every man have +his own wife." Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it +was enacted in the council of Meaux: "We decree that those who are +guilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not have +those women in marriage, although they should have subsequently +married them with the consent of their parents." Therefore rape is +not a determinate species of lust distinct from seduction. + +Obj. 4: Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife +without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he take +her away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal knowledge +of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species +of lust. + +_On the contrary,_ Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore +states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore +rape is a species of lust. + +_I answer that,_ Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a +species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes +there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape. + +They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate +a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin +and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to +the virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by +force from her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape +differs in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by +force from her parents' house, and is forcibly violated: while +sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated, +but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act +of marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is +employed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or +one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says [*Ep. v ad +Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2], "We abhor abductors +whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of +their crime." + +There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force, +violates a virgin unlawfully. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one +is sometimes used to signify the other. + +Reply Obj. 2: The employment of force would seem to arise from the +greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear +to endanger himself by offering violence. + +Reply Obj. 3: The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to +be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For +one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, +who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that +is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her +father's care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her +parents' consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever +steals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not +dissolve a marriage already contracted, although it is an impediment +to its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, +it was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abrogated. +Wherefore Jerome [*The quotation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2] +declares the contrary: "Three kinds of lawful marriage," says he, +"are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden +given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a +man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal knowledge of +her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her according to +the father's estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity [*Cf. +Deut. 22:23-29]. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from +such a man, and is given to another at the father's will." + +We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to +others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words +in the present tense. + +Reply Obj. 4: The man who is just married has, in virtue of the +betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by +using violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope +Gelasius says [*Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: "This law +of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with +regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken +away by force." +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 8] + +Whether Adultery Is Determinate Species of Lust, Distinct from the +Other Species? + +Objection 1: It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species +of lust, distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its name +from a man having intercourse "with a woman who is not his own [ad +alteram]," according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de +Divers. lxiii] on Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not one's own may be +of various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father's +care, or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems +that adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others. + +Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not for +what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the +Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is +an adulterer," and in like manner one who is over enamored of any +woman. Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore +adultery is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be +reckoned a species of lust. + +Obj. 3: Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there +would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is +the same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either +case a woman is violated who is under another person's authority. +Therefore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct +from the others. + +_On the contrary,_ Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf. +Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that "adultery +is sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of +the marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own lust, +or with the consent of the other party." Now this implies a special +deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of +lust. + +_I answer that,_ Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to +another's marriage-bed (_ad alienum torum_)" [*Cf. Append. Gratian, +ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a +twofold offense against chastity and the good of human procreation. +First, by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, +which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his own children. +Secondly, by accession to a woman who is united to another in +marriage, and thus he hinders the good of another's children. The +same applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery. +Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:32, 33): "Every woman . . . that +leaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath +been unfaithful to the law of the Most High" (since there it is +commanded: "Thou shalt not commit adultery"); "and secondly, she hath +offended against her husband," by making it uncertain that the +children are his: "thirdly, she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath +gotten children of another man," which is contrary to the good of her +offspring. The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins, +while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery. +Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust, +through having a special deformity in venereal acts. + +Reply Obj. 1: If a married man has intercourse with another woman, +his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is +always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of +marriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse; +and thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has +intercourse with another's wife; and sometimes it has the character +of seduction, or of some other sin, according to various conditions +affecting the woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been +stated above (A. 1) that the species of lust correspond to the +various conditions of women. + +Reply Obj. 2: Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human +offspring, as stated above (A. 2). But adultery is specially opposed +to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is +due between husband and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a +lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her +indecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be +called an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a +lover of another woman. + +Reply Obj. 3: The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to +him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's authority, as +one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery +is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin of +seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ +specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in +the Third Part [* Cf. Suppl., Q. 59, A. 3; QQ. 60, 62], when we treat +of matrimony. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 9] + +Whether Incest Is a Determinate Species of Lust? + +Objection 1: It would seem that incest is not a determinate species +of lust. For incest [* _Incestus_ is equivalent to _in-castus_ = +"unchaste"] takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But +all kinds of lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that +incest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself in general. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf. +Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is intercourse between +a man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity." Now affinity +differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several +species of lust. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity, +does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse +between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not, +of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have been +lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust. + +_On the contrary,_ The species of lust are distinguished according to +the various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful +intercourse. Now incest implies a special condition on the part of +the woman, because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by +consanguinity or affinity as stated (Obj. 2). Therefore incest is a +determinate species of lust. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 6) wherever we find +something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there +must needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse +with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to +venereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a +certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood +relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so +much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates +[*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was not deemed right for a son to +bathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now +from what has been said (Q. 142, A. 4; Q. 151, A. 4), it is evident +that in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent +with respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is +unseemly that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse. +This reason seems to be indicated (Lev. 18:7) where we read: "She is +thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness," and the same is +expressed further on with regard to others. + +The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close +touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from +venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very +frequent and thus men's minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in +the Old Law [*Lev. 18] the prohibition was apparently directed +specially to those persons who must needs live together. + +The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many +friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his +wife's relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, +as though they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine +says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most perfectly +satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties +of friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and +becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one, +but each should have one." + +Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural +that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to +this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, +his love would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive +to lust: and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that +incest is a determinate species of lust. + +Reply Obj. 1: Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one +another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the +opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love, +as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between +such persons is called "incest" antonomastically. + +Reply Obj. 2: Persons are related by affinity through one who is +related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the +other, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of +unbecomingness. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary +to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by +blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and +immediately related to one another, since children naturally owe +their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De +Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and threw +itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done, +because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have +begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness +attaching to other persons who are related to one another not +directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or +unbecomingness varies according to custom, and human or Divine law: +because, as stated above (A. 2), sexual intercourse, being directed +to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says +(De Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes +back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation +when religion forbade it. +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 1] + +Whether Sacrilege Can Be a Species of Lust? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of +lust. For the same species is not contained under different genera +that are not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species +of irreligion, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 2). Therefore sacrilege +cannot be reckoned a species of lust. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. +Lex illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are +reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species +of lust. + +Obj. 3: Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done +by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is not +reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice. +Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that "if it is +wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how +much more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds +of morals!" Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters +is a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to +overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred +matters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is +a species of lust. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7), the act of +a virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or +vice, assumes the latter's species: thus, theft committed for the +sake of adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is +evident that as Augustine states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of +chastity, by being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of +religion, as in the case of those who vow and keep chastity. +Wherefore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something +pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the species of +sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a species of +lust. + +Reply Obj. 1: Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end, +becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also +a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus. + +Reply Obj. 2: The enumeration referred to, includes those sins which +are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a +species of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its +end, and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful +intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual +relationship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse +with a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of +Christ, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her +father's authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and if force be +employed it will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil +law punishes more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian +says [*Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: "If any man dare, I will +not say to rape, but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view +to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment." + +Reply Obj. 3: Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a +consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for +sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired +for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may +also come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an +injury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a +sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless, +sacrilege is ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to +chastity for the observance of which certain persons are specially +consecrated. +_______________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 11] + +Whether the Unnatural Vice Is a Species of Lust? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species +of lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the +enumeration given above (A. 1, Obj. 1). Therefore it is not a species +of lust. + +Obj. 2: Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised +under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice, but +under bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5). +Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust. + +Obj. 3: Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation, as +stated above (Q. 153, A. 2): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts +from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is +not a species of lust. + +_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned together with the other species of +lust (2 Cor. 12:21) where we read: "And have not done penance for the +uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a gloss +says: "Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 6, 9) wherever there occurs a +special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered +unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in +two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is +common to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is +contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the +human race: and this is called "the unnatural vice." This may happen +in several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any +copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the +sin of "uncleanness" which some call "effeminacy." Secondly, by +copulation with a thing of undue species, and this is called +"bestiality." Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with +male, or female with female, as the Apostle states (Rom. 1:27): and +this is called the "vice of sodomy." Fourthly, by not observing the +natural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to +other monstrous and bestial manners of copulation. + +Reply Obj. 1: There we enumerated the species of lust that are not +contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted. + +Reply Obj. 2: Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed +to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue, +and therefore is reducible to the same genus. + +Reply Obj. 3: The lustful man intends not human generation but +venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts +from which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought +in the unnatural vice. +_______________________ + +TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12] + +Whether the Unnatural Vice Is the Greatest Sin Among the Species of +Lust? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the +greatest sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is +contrary to charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and +rape which are injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary +to the love of our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other +person is injured. Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest +among the species of lust. + +Obj. 2: Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the most +grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since it +is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver +sin than the unnatural vice. + +Obj. 3: Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according +as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin is +committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more +those persons who are united to him--and such are those whom he +defiles by incest--than persons who are not connected with him, and +whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore +incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice. + +Obj. 4: Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it +is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin of +uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature, +since it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and +patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow +that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not +true. Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins +of lust. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [*The quotation +is from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono +Conjugali, viii.]) that "of all these," namely the sins belonging to +lust, "that which is against nature is the worst." + +_I answer that,_ In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of +the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason +are those things that are according to nature, because reason +presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of other +things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in +speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in +speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that +which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on +man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act +against things as determined by nature. Therefore, since by the +unnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by +nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in +this matter this sin is gravest of all. After it comes incest, which, +as stated above (A. 9), is contrary to the natural respect which we +owe persons related to us. + +With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression +merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the +presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more +against reason to make use of the venereal act not only with +prejudice to the future offspring, but also so as to injure another +person besides. Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed +without injustice to another person, is the least grave among the +species of lust. Then, it is a greater injustice to have intercourse +with a woman who is subject to another's authority as regards the act +of generation, than as regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore +adultery is more grievous than seduction. And both of these are +aggravated by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver +than seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery. And all these are +aggravated by coming under the head of sacrilege, as stated above (A. +10, ad 2). + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, +so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins +contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an +injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says +(Confess. iii, 8): "Those foul offenses that are against nature +should be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as +were those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit, +they should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God +which hath not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For +even that very intercourse which should be between God and us is +violated, when that same nature, of which He is the Author, is +polluted by the perversity of lust." + +Reply Obj. 2: Vices against nature are also against God, as stated +above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of +sacrilege, as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and +more firm than any subsequently established order. + +Reply Obj. 3: The nature of the species is more intimately united to +each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against +the specific nature are more grievous. + +Reply Obj. 4: Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing +than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against +nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which +consists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While the +most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due +species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gen. 37:2, "He accused his +brethren of a most wicked crime," says that "they copulated with +cattle." After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right +sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right +manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the +"vas" than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other +circumstances. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 155 + +OF CONTINENCE +(In Four Articles) + +We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: +(1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we +must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence +there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether continence is a virtue? + +(2) What is its matter? + +(3) What is its subject? + +(4) Of its comparison with temperance. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 1] + +Whether Continence Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For +species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division. +But continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1, 9). Therefore continence is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to +Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19), "a virtue is a thing that no one +makes ill use of." Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for +instance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing +it. Therefore continence is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful, +but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23, "Faith, +modesty," etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from +things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a +virtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] +that "continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure." Therefore +continence is a virtue. + +_I answer that,_ The word "continence" is taken by various people in +two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from +all venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity +(Gal. 5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the +first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies +to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated +above (Q. 152, A. 3) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand +continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires, +which in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes +continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the +Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii, 10, 11). In this way +continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to +wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, lest it +be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature +of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to +reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in +the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) +that "continence is not a virtue but a mixture," inasmuch as it has +something of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue. + +If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of +commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the same +division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is according to +reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds (_tenet se_) to +that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself. +Now whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to +reason. Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to +that which is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is +in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right +reason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason. +Wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds to right +reason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to +perverse reason, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter +should rather be said to be obstinate in evil. + +Reply Obj. 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense, +as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful +goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in +order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 2] + +Whether Desires for Pleasures of Touch Are the Matter of Continence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are +not the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): +"General decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is +virtuous is restrained* in its every action." [*"Continentem" +according to St. Thomas' reading; St. Ambrose wrote "concinentem = +harmonious"]. + +Obj. 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for +the good of right reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Now other +passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence +than the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of +mortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him +behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore +continence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of +touch. + +Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): "It is +continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel." +Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather +than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10, +"Cupidity [Douay: 'The desire of money'] (_philargyria_), is the root +of all evils." Therefore continence is not properly about the desires +for pleasures of touch. + +Obj. 4: Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal +matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only +to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of +touch is not its proper matter. + +Obj. 5: Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but +bestial, both as regards food--for instance, the pleasure of eating +human flesh; and as regards venereal matters--for instance the abuse +of animals or boys. But continence is not about such like things, as +stated in _Ethic._ vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch +are not the proper matter of continence. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that +"continence and incontinence are about the same things as temperance +and intemperance." Now temperance and intemperance are about the +desires for pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4). +Therefore continence and incontinence are also about that same matter. + +_I answer that,_ Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain +curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from following his +passions. Hence continence is properly said in reference to those +passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein +it is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing: +whereas it is not properly about those passions, such as fear and the +like, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in these it is +praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates, as +stated above (Q. 123, AA. 3, 4). Now it is to be observed that +natural inclinations are the principles of all supervening +inclinations, as stated above (I, Q. 60, A. 2). Wherefore the more +they follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the +passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines +chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the +maintenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance +of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain +to the touch. Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to +desires for pleasures of touch. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in +connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter +wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly +speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to +contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a +general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and +in this sense Ambrose speaks of continence. + +Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in +relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude +implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the +pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the +soul--in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured +him--rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be +said to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply. + +Reply Obj. 3: External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as +the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in +themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of +nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak of a person as +being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding +that they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth, or honor +and so forth. Hence Tully either understood continence in a general +sense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a +restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch. + +Reply Obj. 4: Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of +the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and +incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in +reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are +applicable to both. + +Reply Obj. 5: Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it +regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the +Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that "if a man were to lay hold of a +child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion +whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent +[*See A. 4], not absolutely, but relatively." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 3] + +Whether the Subject of Continence Is the Concupiscible Power? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of continence is the +concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be +proportionate to the virtue's matter. Now the matter of continence, +as stated (A. 2), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which +pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the +concupiscible power. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Opposites are referred to one same thing" [*Categ. +viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions +overcome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that +"incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by +following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to +reason." Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible. + +Obj. 3: Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the reason, +or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the +concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason, +for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will, +since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor +again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the +passions of the irascible, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore it +follows that it is in the concupiscible. + +_On the contrary,_ Every virtue residing in a certain power removes +the evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil +act of the concupiscible: since "the continent man has evil desires," +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is +not in the concupiscible power. + +_I answer that,_ Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that +subject have a different disposition from that which it has while +subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same +disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent, +since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires. +Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible +as its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both, +since both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and +each of them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow +his unlawful desires. Now the primary difference between them is to +be found in their choice: since the continent man, though subject to +vehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason; +whereas the incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his +reason forbids. Hence continence must needs reside in that power of +the soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated +above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures +of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which is +in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them. +For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of +one thing against another. + +Reply Obj. 2: The will stands between reason and the concupiscible, +and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the +reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible. +Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover, +and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong +immediately to the will as their proper subject. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although the passions are not in the will as their +subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it +is that the will of the continent man resists desires. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 4] + +Whether Continence Is Better Than Temperance? + +Objection 1: It would seem that continence is better than temperance. +For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of a continent +soul." Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence. + +Obj. 2: Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater +the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward; for +it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned, except he +strive lawfully," and the continent man, since he is subject to +vehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom +these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater +virtue than temperance. + +Obj. 3: Further, the will is a more excellent power than the +concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is +in the concupiscible, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore continence is +a greater virtue than temperance. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus +[*De Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to +a principal virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), continence has a twofold +signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal +pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater +than temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what +we said above (Q. 152, A. 5) concerning the preeminence of virginity +over chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be +taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when +they are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far +greater than continence, because the good of a virtue derives its +praise from that which is in accord with reason. Now the good of +reason flourishes more in the temperate man than in the continent +man, because in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient to +reason, being tamed by reason so to speak, whereas in the continent +man the sensitive appetite strongly resists reason by its evil +desires. Hence continence is compared to temperance, as the imperfect +to the perfect. + +Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted may be understood in two ways. First +in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence from +all things venereal: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of a +continent soul," in the genus of chastity; since not even the +fruitfulness of the flesh which is the purpose of marriage is +equalled to the continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated +above (Q. 152, AA. 4, 5). Secondly it may be understood in reference +to the general sense in which continence denotes any abstinence from +things unlawful: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of a +continent soul," because its value is not measured with gold or +silver, which are appreciable according to weight. + +Reply Obj. 2: The strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed +from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause: because +some people by their natural temperament are more prone to +concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure which +inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for +others. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas +strength of concupiscence increases it. On the other hand, weakness +or strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual +cause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or the strength of +reason, as in the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of +concupiscence, by reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas +strength of concupiscence diminishes it. + +Reply Obj. 3: The will is more akin to the reason than the +concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason--on account of +which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to +the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the +temperate man--is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the +will, as in the case of one who is continent. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 156 + +OF INCONTINENCE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body? + +(2) Whether incontinence is a sin? + +(3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance; + +(4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in +desire? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 1] + +Whether Incontinence Pertains to the Soul or to the Body? + +Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul +but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but +from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: +for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described +either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence +pertains not to the soul but to the body. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from +the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily +temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is +especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose +incontinence is one of unbridled desire." Therefore incontinence +regards the body. + +Obj. 3: Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the +vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because "the flesh +lusteth against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence +pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul. + +_On the contrary,_ Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the +soul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for +we ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the +Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly +on the part of the soul. + +_I answer that,_ Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather +than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the +part of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since +it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise +in the sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet +these passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient +cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so +long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his +passions. If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take +away the use of reason altogether--as in the case of those who become +insane through the vehemence of their passions--the essential +conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people +do not retain the judgment of reason, which the continent man follows +and the incontinent forsakes. From this it follows that the direct +cause of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which fails to +resist a passion by the reason. This happens in two ways, according +to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to +the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is +called "unbridled incontinence" or "impetuosity": secondly, when a +man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding +weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is +called "weakness." Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains +chiefly to the soul. + +Reply Obj. 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain +powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these +organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are +accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the +intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from +the senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive +appetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak +temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds +to, she holds to it weakly; although in rare cases the opposite +occurs, according to Prov. 31:10, "Who shall find a valiant woman?" +And since small and weak things "are accounted as though they were +not" [*Aristotle, _Phys._ ii, 5] the Philosopher speaks of women as +though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the +contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that "we do not +describe women as being continent, because they are vacillating" +through being unstable of reason, and "are easily led" so that they +follow their passions readily. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at +once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the +impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious +persons [*Cf. I-II, Q. 46, A. 5], or from its vehemence, as in the +melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most +vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand +to that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion +by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with +regard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic +temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are +due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not +a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh +overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain +negligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 2] + +Whether Incontinence Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as +Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot +avoid." Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to +Wis. 8:21, "I know [Vulg.: 'knew'] that I could not . . . be +continent, except God gave it." Therefore incontinence is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But +the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore +incontinence is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man +becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for +Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of +divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I" (Gal. 2:20). Therefore +incontinence is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim. +3:3) where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc. +Therefore incontinence is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two +ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus +incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as +intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (Q. 155, +A. 2). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first, +because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord +with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures. +Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "incontinence is +censurable not only because it is wrong"--that is, by straying from +reason--"but also because it is wicked"--that is, by following evil +desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is considered, +properly--inasmuch as it is a straying from reason--but not simply; +for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his +desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in +themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but +relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence (Q. +155, A. 2, ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the +fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to +observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of +themselves desirable. + +Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but +metaphorically, for instance about the desires for things of which +one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may +be said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because +just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even +so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with +reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the +perfection of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God's +help, according to John 15:5: "Without Me you can do nothing." +Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be +continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in +_Ethic._ iii, 3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a +way, ourselves." + +Reply Obj. 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent +man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a +certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting +the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not +properly. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 3] + +Whether the Incontinent Man Sins More Gravely Than the Intemperate? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely +than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his +conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Luke 12:47, "That +servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall +be beaten with many stripes." Now the incontinent man would seem to +act against his conscience more than the intemperate because, +according to _Ethic._ vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how +wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, +whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good. +Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. + +Obj. 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable +it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave, +are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would +appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a +person's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly +are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong, +and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate +man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be +admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins +more gravely than the intemperate. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his +sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, +since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which +the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent +man sins more gravely than the intemperate. + +_On the contrary,_ Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore +Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12, 13) that "impenitence is +a sin against the Holy Ghost." Now according to the Philosopher +(Ethic. vii, 8) "the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, +for he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined +to repentance." Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than +the incontinent. + +_I answer that,_ According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin +is chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live +aright" [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater +inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the +intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own +choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas +in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a +passion. And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a +disposition difficult to remove," the result is that the incontinent +man repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so +the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because +the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit. +Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14) +that "they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most +wicked things." Hence it follows that "the intemperate man is much +worse than the incontinent," as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic. +vii, 7). + +Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the +inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the +ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in +so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in +the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and +then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, +because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be +greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man, +ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something, +either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the +intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the +intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards +duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only +while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever +lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the +intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance +of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic +disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect +the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing +ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some +particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must +choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's +ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing +good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed. +Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7, 8) that "the incontinent +man is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best +principle [*_To beltiston, e arche_, 'the best thing, i.e. the +principle']," to wit, the right estimate of the end. + +Reply Obj. 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent +man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches +concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of +admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his +desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (Q. 142, +A. 2). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his +curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part +of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, +which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now +it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to +the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who +errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the +inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds +from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination +of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily +suppressed. + +Reply Obj. 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is +greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained +above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite +is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin +except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man +sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it. +Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the +intemperate man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or +with calm," i.e. slight desire. "For what would he have done if he +had desired it with passion?" +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 4] + +Whether the Incontinent in Anger Is Worse Than the Incontinent in Desire? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse +than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to +resist the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: +wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful, +indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and +overwhelming pleasures or pains." Now, "as Heraclitus says, it is +more difficult to resist desire than anger" [*Ethic. ii. 3]. +Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence +of anger. + +Obj. 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be +so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the +case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is +incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one +who is incontinent in desire: since "anger listens to reason +somewhat, but desire does not" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, +6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent +in desire. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is. +Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it +leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more +grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads. +Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that +"incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of +desire." + +_I answer that,_ The sin of incontinence may be considered in two +ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall +of reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than +incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more +inordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for +this, and the Philosopher indicates them, _Ethic._ vii, 6: First, +because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the +angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates +this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly, +because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. On the other +hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and +nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of anger +results more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of +the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by +bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than +one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: +wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who +are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the +children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed +to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition +of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because +anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise +itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject +to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as +though forced by a certain previous displeasure. + +Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to +the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus +incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because +it leads to things that are harmful to one's neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly +than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it +is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness. + +Reply Obj. 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as +though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because +nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it +is more disgraceful. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard to its +result. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 157 + +OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS +(In Four Articles) + +We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices. +Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical? + +(2) Whether each of them is a virtue? + +(3) Whether each is a part of temperance? + +(4) Of their comparison with the other virtues. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 1] + +Whether Clemency and Meekness Are Absolutely the Same? + +Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely +the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher +(Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet. +ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency "is leniency of a superior in +inflicting punishment on an inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia +ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem +that clemency and meekness are the same. + +Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "clemency +is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when +unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently +clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi], +hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and +clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely +the same. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues. +But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and +clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are +absolutely the same. + +_On the contrary,_ According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca +(Obj. 1) "clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior": +whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each +to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the +same. + +_I answer that,_ As stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, a moral virtue is +"about passions and actions." Now internal passions are principles of +external actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore +virtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards +the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they +differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain +man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire +of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality +concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from +theft. This applies to the case in point; because through the passion +of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment, while +it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this +might be prevented by excessive anger. + +Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of +anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ +from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment, +while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger. + +Reply Obj. 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of +vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is +applied externally for the purpose of vengeance. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man's affections incline to the moderation of things +that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man +loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's punishment +in itself, but only as directed to something else, for instance +justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes +one quick to mitigate punishment--and this pertains to +clemency--while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this +reason Tully says that "the mind provoked to hatred" that is to +punish too severely, "is restrained by clemency," from inflicting too +severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred +but punishment. + +Reply Obj. 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the +passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly +concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in +punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are +called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in +punishing." Those who delight in a man's punishment for its own sake +may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling +that leads one man to love another. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 2] + +Whether Both Clemency and Meekness Are Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a +virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these +are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore +neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect" [*Ethic. +ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease; +for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger. +Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Matt. 5:4) among +the beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues +differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not +comprised under virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): "Every good man +is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness." Now it is virtue +properly that belongs to a good man, since "virtue it is that makes +its possessor good, and renders his works good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). +Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues. + +_I answer that,_ The nature of moral virtue consists in the +subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. +i, 13). Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For +clemency, in mitigating punishment, "is guided by reason," according +to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates +anger according to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 5. +Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for +meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the +external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem +rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external +punishing, as stated above (A. 1). Yet they are not really opposed to +one another, since they are both according to right reason. For +severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right +reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also +according to right reason, when and where this is requisite. +Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about +the same thing. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), "the habit +that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is +denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the +name of meekness." For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to +excess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for +injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since +"scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself," as Sallust +observes [*Cf. Q. 120]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not +in respect of that which is according to right reason, but as regards +that which is according to common law, which is the object of legal +justice: yet on account of some particular consideration, it +mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to +be punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1): +"Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets +free are declared immune from all further punishment; and remission +of punishment due amounts to a pardon." Wherefore it is clear that +clemency is related to severity as equity [the Greek _epieikeia_ +[*Cf. Q. 120]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as +regards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet +clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A. 3, ad +1). + +Reply Obj. 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are +delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being +reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 3] + +Whether the Aforesaid Virtues Are Parts of Temperance? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts +of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above (A. +2). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which +pertains to justice, as stated above (Q. 120, A. 2). Therefore +seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance. + +Obj. 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas +meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and +vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance. + +Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): "A man may be said +to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty." Now this is +opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is +opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of +prudence rather than of temperance. + +_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is +temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge." +Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of +temperance. + +_I answer that,_ Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so +far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode +whence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the +mode and name of justice consist in a certain _equality,_ those of +fortitude in a certain _strength of mind,_ those of temperance in a +certain _restraint,_ inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement +concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness +likewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates +punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above (AA. 1, +2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as +principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof. + +Reply Obj. 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation of +punishment. One is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance +with the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter +of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other +point is a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that +he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs +properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that +"it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking +revenge." This moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of +disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful +to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency +is a certain smoothness of the soul"; for, on the other hand, there +would seem to be a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to +pain others. + +Reply Obj. 2: The annexation of secondary to principal virtues +depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form +of the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency +agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not +in matter. + +Reply Obj. 3: _Unsoundness_ is corruption of _soundness._ Now just as +soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition +due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind +lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs +both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason, +and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses that +humane feeling whereby "every man is naturally friendly towards all +other men" (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes +the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes +pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind, +is because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane +feeling which gives rise to clemency. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 4] + +Whether Clemency and Meekness Are the Greatest Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the +greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because +it directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. +Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is +written (James 1:21): "With meekness receive the ingrafted word," and +(Ecclus. 5:13): "Be meek to hear the word" of God. Again, Dionysius +says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) that "Moses was deemed worthy of the +Divine apparition on account of his great meekness." Therefore +meekness is the greatest of virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as +it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to be +most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34, 35): "That +which is agreeable" to God is "faith and meekness"; wherefore Christ +expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Matt. 11:29), +where He says: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart"; +and Hilary declares [*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that "Christ dwells +in us by our meekness of soul." Again, it is most acceptable to men; +wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): "My son, do thy works in +meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men": for +which reason it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King's +"throne is strengthened by clemency." Therefore meekness and clemency +are the greatest of virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that +"the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but +overcome evil by good." Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety +which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of +Ambrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Piety [Douay: +'Godliness'] is profitable to all things," observes that "piety is +the sum total of the Christian religion." Therefore meekness and +clemency are the greatest virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but +are annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue. + +_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain virtues from being +greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a +particular genus. It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be +absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the +fact that they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or +punishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. +Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise +prudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely +greater virtues than clemency and meekness. + +Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain +restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil +inclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on +account of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's free +judgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man +self-possessed. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 10:31): "My son, keep +thy soul in meekness." Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of +touch are more shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which +reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as +stated above (Q. 141, A. 7, ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it +mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, +the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our +neighbor, and hinder his evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by +removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes +man self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; +secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not +contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed +by anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To be +meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it +condemn our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know +better and have a clearer insight of the truth." + +Reply Obj. 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and +men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the +virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our +neighbor's evils. + +Reply Obj. 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency +by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our +neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety +relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior, for +instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil, +because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon +it as affecting oneself, as stated above (Q. 30, A. 2): and this +results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for +the same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to +vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far +as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 158 + +OF ANGER +(In Eight Articles) + +We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed +to meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning +anger there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry? + +(2) Whether anger is a sin? + +(3) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins? + +(5) Of its species; + +(6) Whether anger is a capital vice? + +(7) Of its daughters; + +(8) Whether it has a contrary vice? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 1] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Be Angry? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For +Jerome in his exposition on Matt. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his +brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without cause.' However, in +the genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is +forbidden altogether." Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's +evil is to be without reason." Now anger is always without reason: +for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen +perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "when +anger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends +it by its riot"; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): "From +whatever cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the +eye of the mind." Therefore it is always evil to be angry. + +Obj. 3: Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet. +ii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, "Thou shalt not hate thy +brother in thy heart." Now it would seem unlawful to desire +vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Deut. +32:35, "Revenge is Mine." Therefore it would seem that to be angry is +always an evil. + +Obj. 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is +evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since +God judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be +angry is always an evil. + +_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, +falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry +without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, +shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, +judgments unstable, crimes unchecked." Therefore to be angry is not +always an evil. + +_I answer that,_ Properly speaking anger is a passion of the +sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 46, A. 1) when we were treating of the +passions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be +observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason +of the passion's very species, which is derived from the passion's +object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since +it is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in +itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks +(Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention of envy denotes something evil." +Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge, +since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is +found in a passion in respect of the passion's quantity, that is in +respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in +anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason +demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's +anger is deserving of praise. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions +as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they +deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above +(I-II, Q. 24, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. It is in +this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger +whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing +him a wrong.--But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion +Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions +of the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be +moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not +always evil. + +Reply Obj. 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First, +antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and +has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch +as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice +and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called +"zealous anger." Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "We must +beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it +overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of +following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey." +This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason +in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of +reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger +troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it." Nor is +it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be +interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since +art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about +what has to be done, while having to act. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil +to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire +vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to +this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved +thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with +the order of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to +punish "is God's minister," as stated in Rom. 13:4. + +Reply Obj. 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for +good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our +desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the +movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. +v, 45) that "anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it +bows to the command of reason." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 2] + +Whether Anger Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by +sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do +we incur blame thereby," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5. Consequently no +passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above (I-II, Q. +46, A. 1) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a +sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable +good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to +a person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine +asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger, for a +gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "The movement of +anger is not in our power." Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. +vii, 6) that "the angry man acts with displeasure." Now displeasure +is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene +[*De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature to +be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible; +wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach.] that +"to be angry is the property of man." Therefore it is not a sin to be +angry. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): "Let all indignation +and anger [*Vulg.: 'Anger and indignation'] . . . be put away from +you." + +_I answer that,_ Anger, as stated above (A. 1), is properly the name +of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far +as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order +of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be +considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the +appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore +if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of +reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called "zealous +anger" [*Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire +the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of +reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not +deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order +prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of +justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will +be sinful, and this is called sinful anger. + +Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in +relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of +anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor +externally; and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack +sin, even though just vengeance be desired. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated +by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not +include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as +regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of +praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may +be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says +(Ethic. ii, 5) that "it is he who is angry in a certain way, that is +praised or blamed." + +Reply Obj. 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its +own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite +turns as to a mutable good. + +Reply Obj. 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment of +his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that +judgment, it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e. +so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each +one, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger +is not in man's power, to the extent namely that no such movement +arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not +entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the +Philosopher that "the angry man acts with displeasure," means that he +is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he +deems done to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to +seek vengeance. + +Reply Obj. 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his +reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in +accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is +contrary to man's nature. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 3] + +Whether All Anger Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is +written (Job 5:2): "Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg.: 'Anger +indeed killeth the foolish']," and he speaks of the spiritual killing, +whence mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal +condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord +said (Matt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in +danger of the judgment": and a gloss on this passage says that "the +three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and +hell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state +of eternal damnation corresponding to various sins." Therefore anger +is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal sin. +Now anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares in his +commentary on Matt. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his brother," etc. +where he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor. +Therefore anger is a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," +says: "Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action." + +_I answer that,_ The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful +in two ways, as stated above (A. 2). First, on the part of the +appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger +is a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to +charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a +venial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This +imperfection is considered either in relation to the subject desirous +of vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment +of his reason; or in relation to the desired object, as when one +desires to be avenged in a trifling matter, which should be deemed of +no account, so that even if one proceeded to action, it would not be +a mortal sin, for instance by pulling a child slightly by the hair, +or by some other like action. Secondly, the movement of anger may be +inordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if one be too +fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the outward signs of +anger. In this way anger is not a mortal sin in the point of its +genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin, for instance if through +the fierceness of his anger a man fall away from the love of God and +his neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 1: It does not follow from the passage quoted that all +anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually by +anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their +reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God +or by doing injury to their neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition to the +words of the Law: "Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the +judgment" (Matt. 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the +movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave +injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to +this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a +mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we have +said. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 4] + +Whether Anger Is the Most Grievous Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For +Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that "nothing is more +repulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a +ruthless* face, and most of all than a cruel soul." [*_Severo_. The +correct text is _Si vero._ The translation would then run thus . . . +"and nothing uglier." And if his "face is ugly, how much uglier is +his soul!"]. Therefore anger is the most grievous sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem +to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is +said to be evil because it hurts." Now anger is most hurtful, because +it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for +Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that "anger differs in no way +from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome +than one harassed by a demon." Therefore anger is the most grievous +sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their +outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most +grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the +beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger grow +into hatred and a mote become a beam." Therefore anger is not the +most grievous sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the inordinateness of +anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an +undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to +the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the +least of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some +person, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the +part of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those +sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred; +but while hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such, and the +envious man desires another's evil through desire of his own glory, +the angry man desires another's evil under the aspect of just +revenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than +envy, and envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an +evil, than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such as +honor or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On +the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man desires +an evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a +good. In this respect again, absolutely speaking, the sin of anger is +apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the +good of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the +pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of +concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that +"the incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent +in anger." + +On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of +being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on +account of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to +Prov. 27:4, "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: +and who can bear the violence of one provoked?" Hence Gregory says +(Moral. v, 45): "The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is +convulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles itself, the face +is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those +whom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no sense +in its utterance." + +Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the +outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement of +anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from +anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the +aspect of justice, as stated above. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 5] + +Whether the Philosopher Suitably Assigns the Species of Anger? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably +assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some +angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered" +or "stern." According to him, a person is said to be "sullen" whose +anger "is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time." But this +apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems +that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the +other circumstances. + +Obj. 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or +"stern" persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without +revenge, or punishment." Now this also pertains to the +unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is +the same as bitterness. + +Obj. 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He +says (Matt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in +danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, +shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his +brother, "Thou fool." But these degrees are not referable to the +aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of +anger is not fitting. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi] +says "there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger +which is called wrath [*_Fellea,_ i.e. like gall. But in I-II, Q. +46, A. 8, St. Thomas quoting the same authority has _Cholos_ which we +render 'wrath']," and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind, and +"rancour." Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid. +For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning and movement," and the +Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to "choleric" persons: +"ill-will" he describes as "an anger that endures and grows old," and +this the Philosopher ascribes to "sullenness"; while he describes +"rancour" as "reckoning the time for vengeance," which tallies with +the Philosopher's description of the "ill-tempered." The same +division is given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the +aforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting. + +_I answer that,_ The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to +the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated +when treating of the passions (I-II, Q. 46, A. 8) how it is to be +applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is +chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, +however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its +application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher. + +For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two +things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards +"choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight +cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger +endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, +because the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too +long in a man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a +lasting displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to +himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a +man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or +"stern" people, who do not put aside their anger until they have +inflicted punishment. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger, or his +pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the +aforesaid species. + +Reply Obj. 2: Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a +long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person +has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he +holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the +outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does +he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear +away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger +of "ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense +desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can +be quelled only by revenge. + +Reply Obj. 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer +to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of +the human act [*Cf. I-II, Q. 46, A. 8, Obj. 3]. For the first degree +is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever +is angry with his brother." The second degree is when the anger is +manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect; +and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his +brother, Raca!" which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is +when the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the +effect of anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and +the least of hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in +reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou +fool!" Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first, +and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal +sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A. 3, ad +2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation +is assigned as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case +"judgment" is assigned, and this is the least severe, for as +Augustine says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be +delivered, there is an opportunity for defense": in the second case +"council" is assigned, "whereby the judges deliberate together on the +punishment to be inflicted": to the third case is assigned +"hell-fire," i.e. "decisive condemnation." +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 6] + +Whether Anger Should Be Reckoned Among the Capital Vices? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among +the capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice +known by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a +capital vice. + +Obj. 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it +should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger. + +Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, "An angry [Douay: +'passionate'] man provoketh quarrels," says: "Anger is the door to +all vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the +virtues; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime." Now no +capital vice is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite +ones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the +capital vices. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3, 4), a capital +vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two +reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on +the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, +in so far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*, +which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above (A. 4). +[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with +moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q. 145, A. 1.] +The second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates +the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident +that anger is a capital vice. + +Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most +part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results +from an injury inflicted. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 118, A. 7; Q. 148, A. 5; Q. 153, A. +4; I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to +have a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through +the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of +good, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter +desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a +capital vice than hatred is. + +Reply Obj. 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices +accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the +judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, +however, directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called +its daughters. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 7] + +Whether Six Daughters Are Fittingly Assigned to Anger? + +Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly +assigned to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind, +contumely, clamor, indignation and blasphemy." For blasphemy is +reckoned by Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of +pride. Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger. + +Obj. 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his +rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of +anger. + +Obj. 3: Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as pride. +Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of all +vices," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of +the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters +to anger. + +_I answer that,_ Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as +consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. One is on +the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems +unworthy (_indignum_) of acting thus towards him, and this is called +"indignation." The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in +so far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like +thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, "Will a wise +man . . . fill his stomach with burning heat?" And thus we have +"swelling of the mind." + +Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a +twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his +anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A. 5, ad 3) of the +man who says to his brother, "Raca": and this refers to "clamor," +which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is +when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against +God, it is "blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely." + +Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus +anger gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand all +manner of injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger. + +Reply Obj. 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately +proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God: +since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride of man +is to fall off from God," i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is +the first part of pride [*Cf. Q. 162, A. 7, ad 2]; and this gives +rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out +through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a +previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely +displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. +Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes +to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from +sloth rather than from anger. + +Reply Obj. 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical +with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take +vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 8] + +Whether There Is a Vice Opposed to Anger Resulting from Lack of Anger? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a vice opposed to anger, +resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now +by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who +judges "with tranquillity" (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is +not a vice to be altogether without anger. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless. +But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca proves +in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it +seems that lack of anger is not a vice. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "man's evil +is to be without reason." Now the judgment of reason remains +unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack +of anger amounts to a vice. + +_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus +Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who +is not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable +patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and +incites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong." + +_I answer that,_ Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as +a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not +through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus +without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which +anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in +Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John +Chrysostom): "Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. +For anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion": and +when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: +wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger +is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with +passion resulting from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a +necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, since the +lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher +appetite, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in +the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the +movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack +of the passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement +in the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be +angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's +punishing by judgment. + +Reply Obj. 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of the +sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt +execution [*Cf. I-II, Q. 24, A. 3] of reason's dictate: else, the +sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas "nature +does nothing without purpose" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4]. + +Reply Obj. 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his +reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also +of the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore +just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is +removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason +is lacking. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 159 + +OF CRUELTY +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency? + +(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 159, Art. 1] + +Whether Cruelty Is Opposed to Clemency? + +Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. +For Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel +who exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency +is reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore +apparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): "They are cruel, and will +have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now +mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above (Q. 157, A. 4, ad +3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency. + +Obj. 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of +punishment, as stated above (Q. 157, A. 1): whereas cruelty applies +to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17, "But he +that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred." Therefore cruelty is +not opposed to clemency. + +_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the +opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness +of heart in exacting punishment." + +_I answer that,_ Cruelty apparently takes its name from _cruditas_ +(rawness). Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to +have an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a +disagreeable and bitter taste. Now it has been stated above (Q. 157, +A. 3, ad 1; A. 4, ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or +sweetness of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. +Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment +according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one +to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards +the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the +hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment, +belongs to cruelty. + +Reply Obj. 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both +shun and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For +it belongs to mercy [*Cf. Q. 30, A. 1] to relieve another's +unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to +mitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And +since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more +directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the +mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for +mercilessness. + +Reply Obj. 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which +is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of +beneficence is in itself a punishment. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 159, Art. 2] + +Whether Cruelty Differs from Savagery or Brutality? + +Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or +brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one +virtue. Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way +of excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the +same. + +Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it were +savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending +to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of +punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety. Now +this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A. 1, ad 1). Therefore +cruelty is the same as savagery. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way +of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency, +which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to +the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to +deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission +or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there be love, but +not that which enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, +let there be zeal without unseemly savagery, let there be piety +without undue clemency." Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty. + +_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who +is angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is +not said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage." + +_I answer that,_ "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a +likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For +animals of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and +not for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to +reason alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery +applies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a +default of the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive +from a man's torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised +under bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial, +and resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt +nature, as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not +only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the +mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or +brutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in +_Ethic._ vii, 5. + +Reply Obj. 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed +to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But savagery or +brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly +opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the +Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which +according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy +Ghost. Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to +the gift of piety. + +Reply Obj. 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because +this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards the +truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined +to mitigate punishment. + +Reply Obj. 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it +disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished +on account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other +hand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission +of punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 160 + +OF MODESTY +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of +its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance? + +(2) What is the matter of modesty? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 160, Art. 1] + +Whether Modesty Is a Part of Temperance? + +Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance. +For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every +virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to +Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order." +Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be +reckoned a part of temperance. + +Obj. 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise +chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its +name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its +parts. + +Obj. 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our +neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24, 25, "The servant of the Lord must +not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty +admonishing them that resist the truth." Now admonishing wrong-doers +is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 1). +Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of +temperance. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as +a part of temperance. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4; Q. 157, A. 3), +temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most +difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of +touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of +very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters +of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by +the virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above (Q. +134, A. 3, ad 1), that while magnificence is about great expenditure, +there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned with +ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate +other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This +virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its +principal. + +Reply Obj. 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes +appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of +angel is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, +mode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially +appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest +things. + +Reply Obj. 2: Some things need tempering on account of their +strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in +all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong +passions, and modesty about weaker passions. + +Reply Obj. 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation +which is necessary in all virtues. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 160, Art. 2] + +Whether Modesty Is Only About Outward Actions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward +actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to +other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty +be known to all men." Therefore modesty is only about outward actions. + +Obj. 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are +distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is +seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it +will not be concerned with inward passions. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining +to the appetite--which is proper to the moral virtues--and about +things pertaining to knowledge--which is proper to the intellectual +virtues--and again about things pertaining to the irascible and +concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it +cannot be about all these things. + +_On the contrary,_ In all these things it is necessary to observe the +"mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all +of them. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), modesty differs from +temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where +restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that +present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various +opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of +good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the +province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is +clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a +special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from +modesty. + +In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) +considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of +punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held +modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require +moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. One is the movement of +the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by +_humility._ The second is the desire of things pertaining to +knowledge, and this is moderated by _studiousness_ which is opposed +to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which +require to be done becomingly and honestly [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1], +whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, +for instance in dress and the like. + +To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed +certain special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions +"meekness, simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which +we have spoken above (Q. 143); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) +assigned _eutrapelia_ to pleasures in games, as stated above (I-II, +Q. 60, A. 5). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by +Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also +inward actions. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals. +Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain +outward signs. + +Reply Obj. 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities are +comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from +regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not +so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there +is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which +is about passions, because in actions and passions that present no +great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of +moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of +moderation. + +Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 161 + +OF HUMILITY +(In Six Articles) + +We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride +which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite, +Curiosity; (3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as +affecting outward attire. + +Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether humility is a virtue? + +(2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason? + +(3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men? + +(4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance? + +(5) Of its comparison with the other virtues; + +(6) Of the degrees of humility. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 1] + +Whether Humility Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue +conveys the notion of a good. But humility conveys the notion of a +penal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, "They humbled his feet in +fetters." Therefore humility is not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility +seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23): "There +is one that humbleth himself wickedly." Therefore humility is not a +virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility +is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims at +great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem +that humility is not a virtue. + +Obj. 4: Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is perfect" +(Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the +imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be +subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue. + +Obj. 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions, +according to _Ethic._ ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the +Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it +comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would +seem not to be a virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Origen commenting on Luke 1:48, "He hath regarded +the humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in Luc.): "One of the +virtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our +Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.'" + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2) when we were +treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive +to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something +repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In +respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in +respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been +stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 2) that for those appetitive movements +which are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a +moderating and restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a +kind of recoil, there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a +moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold +virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper +and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and +this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the +mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things +according to right reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is +evident that humility is a virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a humble man is so +called because he is, as it were, _humo acclinis"_ [*Literally, "bent +to the ground"], i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen +in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance when +one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment. +Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done +sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own +failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus +Abraham said to the Lord (Gen. 18:27), "I will speak to my Lord, +whereas I am dust and ashes." In this way humility is a virtue. +Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for instance when man, "not +understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts, and +becomes like to them" (Ps. 48:13). + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a +virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the +lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs +and pretense: wherefore this is "false humility," of which Augustine +says in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous pride," since to +wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, +this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way, +properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does +not consist in externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the +mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5). + +Reply Obj. 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great +things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to +great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that +magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this, +that each is according to right reason. + +Reply Obj. 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First +absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature +nor in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To +Him humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only +as regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be +perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature +or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in +comparison with God his perfection is found wanting, according to the +word of Isa. 40:17, "All nations are before Him as if they had no +being at all." In this way humility may be competent to every man. + +Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as +directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another +is defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is +a matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special +virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake +he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 2] + +Whether Humility Has to Do with the Appetite? + +Objection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite +but the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now +pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says +(Moral. xxxiv, 22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly to the +body, is first of all shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written +(Ps. 130:1), "Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty." +Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem +that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks +little of oneself. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "almost the +whole of Christian teaching is humility." Consequently nothing +contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now +Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according +to 1 Cor. 12:31, "Be zealous for the better gifts." Therefore it +belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things +but the estimate thereof. + +Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain +excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive +withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul +against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against +the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore +if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow +that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is +evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire +but with the estimate of great things. + +Obj. 4: Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to +outward show; for he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding +excessive expenditure and parade." Therefore it is not concerned with +the movement of the appetite. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that +"the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of +the Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners." But choice +concerns the appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite +rather than with the estimative power. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs properly to +humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that +which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion +to that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own +deficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite. +Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and +consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking, +moderates the movement of the appetite. + +Reply Obj. 1: Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes +respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially +wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves +with others. But it does not follow from this that humility is +essentially concerned with knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things +through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater things +through confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility; +especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is +one exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): +"It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to raise +oneself up against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He +raiseth up; he that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth +down." + +Reply Obj. 3: In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining +daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason +in both cases is that man should set the good of reason before +dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope +which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for +strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for +strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's +proper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good +which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing +presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man +ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him +according to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore +humility would seem to denote in the first place man's subjection to +God; and for this reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) +ascribes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the +gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows that the +relation of fortitude to daring differs from that of humility to +hope. Because fortitude uses daring more than it suppresses it: so +that excess of daring is more like fortitude than lack of daring is. +On the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self +more than it uses it; wherefore excessive self-confidence is more +opposed to humility than lack of confidence is. + +Reply Obj. 4: Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be +done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility. +Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, +as signs of the inward movement of the appetite. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 3] + +Whether One Ought, by Humility, to Subject Oneself to All Men? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to +subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3), +humility consists chiefly in man's subjection to God. Now one ought +not to offer to a man that which is due to God, as is the case with +all acts of religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not +to subject oneself to man. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv): "Humility +should take the part of truth, not of falsehood." Now some men are of +the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves +to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject +oneself to all men. + +Obj. 3: Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the +detriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject +himself to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to +whom he subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise +the other. Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest through +excessive humility the superior lose his authority." Therefore a man +ought not, by humility, to subject himself to all. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:3): "In humility, let each +esteem others better than themselves." + +_I answer that,_ We may consider two things in man, namely that which +is God's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is +man's: but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is +God's, according to the saying of Osee 13:9, "Destruction is thy own, +O Israel; thy help is only in Me." Now humility, as stated above (A. +1, ad 5; A. 2, ad 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is +subject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his +own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that +which the latter has of God's: but humility does not require a man to +subject what he has of God's to that which may seem to be God's in +another. For those who have a share of God's gifts know that they +have them, according to 1 Cor. 2:12: "That we may know the things +that are given us from God." Wherefore without prejudice to humility +they may set the gifts they have received from God above those that +others appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (Eph. +3:5): "(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it +is now revealed to His holy apostles." In like manner, humility does +not require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that +which his neighbor has of man's: otherwise each one would have to +esteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle +says without prejudice to humility (Gal. 2:15): "We by nature are +Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners." Nevertheless a man may +esteem his neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself, or +himself to have some evil which another has not: by reason of which, +he may subject himself to him with humility. + +Reply Obj. 1: We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that +which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of +reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves +with humility to all our neighbors for God's sake, according to 1 +Pet. 2:13, "Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's +sake"; but to God alone do we owe the worship of latria. + +Reply Obj. 2: If we set what our neighbor has of God's above that +which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a +gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on Phil. 2:3, "Esteem +others better than themselves," says: "We must not esteem by +pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for +another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he +is better than we are, although our own good whereby we are +apparently better than he, be not hidden." + +Reply Obj. 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly +in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may +subject himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion +of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means +in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "With fear, the superior should prostrate +himself at your feet in the sight of God." On the other hand, due +moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as +of other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If, +however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an +occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with +humility; since he does not give scandal, although others take it. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 4] + +Whether Humility Is a Part of Modesty or Temperance? + +Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or +temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is +subject to God, as stated above (A. 3). Now it belongs to a +theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility +should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of +temperance or modesty. + +Obj. 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility +would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to +it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently +humility is not a part of temperance or modesty. + +Obj. 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object, +as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not +of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 5). +Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or +modesty. + +_On the contrary,_ Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): "If thou wilt +hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the +philosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as +what they called _metriotes_, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this +evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a +part of modesty or temperance. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3, +ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the +likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of +temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or +suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues +restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity +of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as +meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress +the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at +great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part +of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says +that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not +magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble. +Moreover, for the reason given above (Q. 160, A. 2), among the +various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is +comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, +54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of +spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 3:4): "In the +incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit." + +Reply Obj. 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last end, +which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes +of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by +reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or +temperance. + +Reply Obj. 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a +sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated +above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3, ad 2). Consequently, +although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned +as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, +they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a +part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 5] + +Whether Humility Is the Greatest of the Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the +virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the +publican (Luke 18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.] that "if +humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it +overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it +not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the +angels by the judgment seat of God." Hence it is clear that humility +is set above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all +the virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher +(Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. [*S. 10, C. +1]): "Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality? +Attend first of all to the foundation of humility." Now this would +seem to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue. +Therefore apparently it is greater than the other virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now +the greatest reward is due to humility, since "he that humbleth +himself shall be exalted" (Luke 14:11). Therefore humility is the +greatest of virtues. + +Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16), +"Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through +the human nature which He assumed." Now He especially proposed His +humility for our example, saying (Matt. 11:29): "Learn of Me, because +I am meek and humble of heart." Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii, +1) that the "lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption +is the humility of God." Therefore humility would seem to be the +greatest of virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ Charity is set above all the virtues, according to +Col. 3:14, "Above all . . . things have charity." Therefore humility +is not the greatest of virtues. + +_I answer that,_ The good of human virtue pertains to the order of +reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end: +wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have +the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered +in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance, +as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but +by participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and +this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. +Now humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and +in all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some +special matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the +intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after +justice, especially legal justice, humility stands before all others. + +Reply Obj. 1: Humility is not set before justice, but before that +justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue; even +so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is +said of the publican (Luke 18:14) that through the merit of his +humility "he went down into his house justified." Hence Chrysostom +says [*De incompr. Nat. Dei, Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse +chariots: in the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin +with humility: and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not +by its own strength, but by that of humility: while you will see the +other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but by the weight +and size of pride." + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by reason +of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that which is +the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the +foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now +the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in +the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way +of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place, +inasmuch as it expels pride, which "God resisteth," and makes man +submissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence +it is written (James 4:6): "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace +to the humble." In this sense humility is said to be the foundation +of the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues +directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first +step towards God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh +to God must believe." In this sense faith is the foundation in a more +excellent way than humility. + +Reply Obj. 3: To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things +are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who +despise earthly riches, according to Matt. 6:19, 20, "Lay not up to +yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves +treasures in heaven." Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to +those who despise worldly joys, according to Matt. 4:5, "Blessed are +they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." In the same way +spiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone +merits it, but because it is proper to it to despise earthly +uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]): +"Think not that he who humbles himself remains for ever abased, for +it is written: 'He shall be exalted.' And do not imagine that his +exaltation in men's eyes is effected by bodily uplifting." + +Reply Obj. 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us, +was because it especially removes the obstacle to man's spiritual +welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, +in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly +things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our +spiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that +outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were, +a disposition to man's untrammeled access to spiritual and divine +goods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition, so +charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are +greater than humility. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 6] + +Whether Twelve Degrees of Humility Are Fittingly Distinguished in the +Rule of the Blessed Benedict? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that +are set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict [*St. Thomas gives +these degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict] +are unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be "humble not only in +heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on +the ground"; the second is "to speak few and sensible words, and not +to be loud of voice"; the third is "not to be easily moved, and +disposed to laughter"; the fourth is "to maintain silence until one +is asked"; the fifth is "to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by +the common rule of the monastery"; the sixth is "to believe and +acknowledge oneself viler than all"; the seventh is "to think oneself +worthless and unprofitable for all purposes"; the eighth is "to +confess one's sin"; the ninth is "to embrace patience by obeying +under difficult and contrary circumstances"; the tenth is "to subject +oneself to a superior"; the eleventh is "not to delight in fulfilling +one's own desires"; the twelfth is "to fear God and to be always +mindful of everything that God has commanded." For among these there +are some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience +and patience. Again there are some that seem to involve a false +opinion--and this is inconsistent with any virtue--namely to declare +oneself more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe +oneself to be in all ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these +are unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility. + +Obj. 2: Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do +other virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which +concern outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which +pertain to inward actions. + +Obj. 3: Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) gives seven degrees of +humility, the first of which is "to acknowledge oneself +contemptible"; the second, "to grieve for this"; the third, "to +confess it"; the fourth, "to convince others of this, that is to wish +them to believe it"; the fifth, "to bear patiently that this be said +of us"; the sixth, "to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt"; +the seventh, "to love being thus treated." Therefore the aforesaid +degrees would seem to be too numerous. + +Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Matt. 3:15 says: "Perfect humility has +three degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are +above us, and not to set ourselves above our equals: this is +sufficient. The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set +ourselves before our inferiors; this is called abundant humility. The +third degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is +perfect righteousness." Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to +be too numerous. + +Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "The measure of +humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It is +imperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to +be entrapped." Now the measure of a man's greatness cannot be fixed +according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem +that it is not possible to assign the aforesaid degrees to humility. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2) humility has essentially to +do with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of +his soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is +in the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be +above what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these +things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of +humility leads to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and +gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as happens also +with the other virtues. For "a man is known by his look, and a wise +man, when thou meetest him, by his countenance" (Ecclus. 19:26). +Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility include something +regarding the root of humility, namely the twelfth degree, "that a +man fear God and bear all His commandments in mind." + +Again, they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest +one aim inordinately at one's own excellence. This is done in three +ways. First, by not following one's own will, and this pertains to +the eleventh degree; secondly, by regulating it according to one's +superior judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by +not being deterred from this on account of the difficulties and +hardships that come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree. + +Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man +forms in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three ways. +First by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs +to the eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great +things, and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in +this respect one should put others before oneself, and this belongs +to the sixth degree. + +Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of +these regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should not depart +from the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others +have reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to +speak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not +immoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The others have to +do with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks, +which regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other +signs of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow +oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults +which we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which +others have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): "Bethink you +that some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although +outwardly you are better than they." Again, without falsehood one may +avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in +respect of one's own capability, so as to refer all one's sufficiency +to God, according to 2 Cor. 3:5, "Not that we are sufficient to think +anything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from +God." And there is nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those +things that pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises +from another, so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue +proceeds from the act of another. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and chiefly +by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the +outward man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of +all restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking +out the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees +of humility are here enumerated. + +Reply Obj. 3: All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to +knowledge, avowal, and desire of one's own abasement. For the first +degree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency; but since it +would be wrong for one to love one's own failings, this is excluded +by the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal +of one's own deficiency; namely that not merely one simply assert +one's failing, but that one convince another of it. The other three +degrees have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward +excellence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity, +whether it consist of words or deeds. For as Gregory says (Regist. +ii, 10, Ep. 36), "there is nothing great in being humble towards +those who treat us with regard, for even worldly people do this: but +we should especially be humble towards those who make us suffer," and +this belongs to the fifth and sixth degrees: or the appetite may even +go so far as lovingly to embrace external abasement, and this +pertains to the seventh degree; so that all these degrees are +comprised under the sixth and seventh mentioned above. + +Reply Obj. 4: These degrees refer, not to the thing itself, namely +the nature of humility, but to the degrees among men, who are either +of higher or lower or of equal degree. + +Reply Obj. 5: This argument also considers the degrees of humility +not according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which the +aforesaid degrees are assigned, but according to the various +conditions of men. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 162 + +OF PRIDE +(In Eight Articles) + +We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first +man's sin, which we hold to have been pride. Under the first head +there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether pride is a sin? + +(2) Whether it is a special vice? + +(3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject? + +(4) Of its species; + +(5) Whether it is a mortal sin? + +(6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins? + +(7) Of its relation to other sins; + +(8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 1] + +Whether Pride Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the +object of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what He will do; +and He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the +Divine promises: for it is written (Isa. 60:15): "I will make thee to +be an everlasting pride [Douay: 'glory'], a joy unto generation and +generation." Therefore pride is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for +every creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does +this become the rational creature which is made to God's image and +likeness. Now it is said in Prosper's Lib. Sent. 294, that "pride is +love of one's own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is +supremely excellent." Hence Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Pride +imitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all." +Therefore pride is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to a +contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice +is found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:14): "Never suffer pride to +reign in thy mind or in thy words." + +_I answer that,_ Pride (_superbia_) is so called because a man +thereby aims higher (_supra_) than he is; wherefore Isidore says +(Etym. x): "A man is said to be proud, because he wishes to appear +above (super) what he really is"; for he who wishes to overstep +beyond what he is, is proud. Now right reason requires that every +man's will should tend to that which is proportionate to him. +Therefore it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to right +reason, and this shows it to have the character of sin, because +according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), "the soul's evil is to be +opposed to reason." Therefore it is evident that pride is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Pride (_superbia_) may be understood in two ways. +First, as overpassing (_supergreditur_) the rule of reason, and in +this sense we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply +denominate "super-abundance"; in which sense any super-abundant thing +may be called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as +significant of super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on the +same passage (Isa. 61:6) says that "there is a good and an evil +pride"; or "a sinful pride which God resists, and a pride that +denotes the glory which He bestows." + +It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those +things in which men may take pride. + +Reply Obj. 2: Reason has the direction of those things for which man +has a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from the rule +of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is +the case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now +pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason. +Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that pride is the +"desire for inordinate exaltation": and hence it is that, as he +asserts (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), "pride imitates God +inordinately: for it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and +wishes to usurp His dominion over our fellow-creatures." + +Reply Obj. 3: Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility, +which, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as magnanimity, +as stated above (Q. 161, A. 1, ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride +by default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by +default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge +the mind to great things against despair, so it belongs to humility +to withdraw the mind from the inordinate desire of great things +against presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for a +deficiency in pursuing great things, is properly opposed to +magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind's attachment +to things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to +humility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In +the same way, on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both +to magnanimity and humility, from different points of view: to +humility, inasmuch as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch +as it tends to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride +implies a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility, +even as pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul in tending +towards great things, is more directly opposed to magnanimity. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 2] + +Whether Pride Is a Special Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For +Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "you will find no sin +that is not labelled pride"; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii, +2) that "without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible." +Therefore pride is a general sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, "That He may withdraw man from +wickedness [*Vulg.: 'From the things that he is doing, and may +deliver him from pride']," says that "a man prides himself when he +transgresses His commandments by sin." Now according to Ambrose [*De +Parad. viii], "every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a +disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin is +pride. + +Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. +But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral. +xxxiv, 23): "Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one +virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and +like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body"; +and Isidore says (Etym. [*De Summo Bono ii, 38]) that it is "the +downfall of all virtues." Therefore pride is not a special sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride +has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "one +man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by +mean and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues." +Therefore pride is not a special but a general sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): "If he +look into the question carefully, he will find that, according to +God's law, pride is a very different sin from other vices." Now the +genus is not different from its species. Therefore pride is not a +general but a special sin. + +_I answer that,_ The sin of pride may be considered in two ways. +First with regard to its proper species, which it has under the +aspect of its proper object. In this way pride is a special sin, +because it has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's +own excellence, as stated (A. 1, ad 2). Secondly, it may be +considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In this +way it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may +arise from pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins +being directed to the end of pride which is one's own excellence, to +which may be directed anything that is inordinately desired. +Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, that is by removing +an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which +hinders him from sinning, according to Jer. 2:20, "Thou hast broken +My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve." + +It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride +admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes, +but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For +though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin, +through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always +break the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through +ignorance, and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason +Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "many things are done +amiss which are not done through pride." + +Reply Obj. 1: These words are introduced by Augustine into his book +_De Nat. et Grat.,_ not as being his own, but as those of someone +with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the +assertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride. +We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as +referring to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the +commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act +of pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, +not always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, +sometimes through weakness, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not +affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a +parricide effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend +it. Accordingly he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride +himself against God, effectively always, but not always affectively. + +Reply Obj. 3: A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one way by +direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every +virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the +special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another +way a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and +thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an occasion +of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to +excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin. + +Reply Obj. 4: Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which +aspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love of +one's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 3] + +Whether the Subject of Pride Is the Irascible Faculty? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of pride is not the +irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): "A swollen +mind is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light." +Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the +rational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that "the proud +observe other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath +them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with +pride": wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue +observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the +rational faculty. + +Obj. 3: Further, pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible +things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it +consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus. +10:14, "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God." +Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite, +cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot +be in the irascible. + +Obj. 4: Further, as stated in Prosper's _Liber Sententiarum,_ sent. +294, "Pride is love of one's own excellence." But love is not in the +irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the +irascible. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift +of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the +irascible. + +_I answer that,_ The subject of any virtue or vice is to be +ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act +cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of +both. Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for +pride is the desire of one's own excellence, as stated above (AA. 1, +2). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible +faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a +strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even +as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite. +Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to +belong also to the intellective appetite, to which also anger is +sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the +angels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice +pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this +broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated +above in the First Part (Q. 59, A. 4; I-II, Q. 82, A. 5, ad 1 and 2). + +Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, +were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite +might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of +the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has +in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must +needs say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only +strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in +its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite. +Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons. + +Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely +speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause. +For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may +receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Matt. 11:25, +"Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent," i.e. from +the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, "and hast +revealed them to little ones," i.e. to the humble. + +Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written +(Ecclus. 6:34): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive +instruction." The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is +directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in +their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory +says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden +truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their +sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them." Hence +it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom." + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 161, AA. 2, 6), humility observes +the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now +pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems +himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate +desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe what +he desires very much, the result being that his appetite is borne +towards things higher than what become him. Consequently whatsoever +things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and +one of those is the observing of other people's failings, just as, on +the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), "holy +men, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others +above themselves." Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in +the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the +sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification, +as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), "love +precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause," +wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It +is in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own +excellence," inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his +superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 4] + +Whether the Four Species of Pride Are Fittingly Assigned by Gregory? + +Objection 1: It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly +assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four +marks by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; +either when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they +believe it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their +own merits; or when they boast of having what they have not, or +despise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what +they have." For pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as +humility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to +unbelief, if a man deem that he has not received his good from God, +or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore +this should not be reckoned a species of pride. + +Obj. 2: Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species of +different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as +stated above (Q. 110, A. 2; Q. 112). Therefore it should not be +accounted a species of pride. + +Obj. 3: Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride, which +are not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says that +"nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful": +and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it belongs to pride to +excuse oneself of a sin one has committed." Again, presumption +whereby one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much +to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not +sufficiently account for the different species of pride. + +Obj. 4: Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm +[*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq.] divides the uplifting of pride, +saying that there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of +deed." Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.] also reckons +twelve degrees of pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind, +senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, +defense of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, +sinful habit." Now these apparently are not comprised under the +species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be +assigned unfittingly. + +_On the contrary,_ The authority of Gregory suffices. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), pride denotes +immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is +not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all +excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be +considered in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that +the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that +one derives from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good +greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his +own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency: and thus we +have the third species of pride, namely "boasting of having what one +has not." + +Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as +to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of +another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another +as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is +borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of +one's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus +we have the first two species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he +has from himself that which he has from God," or "when he believes +that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits." + +Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it, +in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some +good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his +appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus +we have the fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises +others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous." + +Reply Obj. 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First, +universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is +destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice, +and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication, +judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit +fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to +say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question +in point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that +there is a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men +for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and +not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one's own excellence, +to boast of one's goods as though one had them of oneself, or of +one's own merits. + +Reply Obj. 2: Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the +outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has +not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned +by Gregory to be a species of pride. + +Reply Obj. 3: The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from +another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to +ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to +the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the +good of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is +above one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which +consists in wishing to be preferred to others. + +Reply Obj. 4: The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the +progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in +thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed. + +The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of +opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken +above (Q. 161, A. 6). For the first degree of humility is to "be +humble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes +fixed on the ground": and to this is opposed "curiosity," which +consists in looking around in all directions curiously and +inordinately. The second degree of humility is "to speak few and +sensible words, and not to be loud of voice": to this is opposed +"frivolity of mind," by which a man is proud of speech. The third +degree of humility is "not to be easily moved and disposed to +laughter," to which is opposed "senseless mirth." The fourth degree +of humility is "to maintain silence until one is asked," to which is +opposed "boasting". The fifth degree of humility is "to do nothing +but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery," to +which is opposed "singularity," whereby a man wishes to seem more +holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is "to believe and +acknowledge oneself viler than all," to which is opposed "arrogance," +whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of +humility is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all +purposes," to which is opposed "presumption," whereby a man thinks +himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of +humility is "to confess one's sins," to which is opposed "defense of +one's sins." The ninth degree is "to embrace patience by obeying +under difficult and contrary circumstances," to which is opposed +"deceitful confession," whereby a man being unwilling to be punished +for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility +is "obedience," to which is opposed "rebelliousness." The eleventh +degree of humility is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own +desires"; to this is opposed "license," whereby a man delights in +doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is "fear +of God": to this is opposed "the habit of sinning," which implies +contempt of God. + +In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated, +but also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have +stated above with regard to humility (Q. 161, A. 6). +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 5] + +Whether Pride Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a +gloss on Ps. 7:4, "O Lord my God, if I have done this thing," says: +"Namely, the universal sin which is pride." Therefore if pride were a +mortal sin, so would every sin be. + +Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride +is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of God, +nor as to the love of one's neighbor, because the excellence which, +by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to God's +honor, or our neighbor's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is +not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as +Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), "sometimes a man is elated by +sublime and heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not a mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "pride is a +most evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the +elect." But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins. +Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly +regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above (Q. 161, A. 1, +ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so +far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him +according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the +Apostle (2 Cor. 10:13), "But we will not glory beyond our measure; +but according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to +us." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the +pride of man is to fall off from God" because, to wit, the root of +pride is found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to +God and His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is +of its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away +from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin. +Nevertheless just as in other sins which are mortal by their genus +(for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain motions +that are venial by reason of their imperfection (through forestalling +the judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so too in the +matter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial +sins, when reason does not consent to them. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 2) pride is a general sin, not by +its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all sins may +have their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all sins +are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have +stated to be a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Pride is always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch +as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he +ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor; +when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and +this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has +established order among men, so that one ought to be subject to +another. + +Reply Obj. 3: Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct +cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a +virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from +being the accidental cause of another, as stated in _Phys._ viii, 1. +Hence some are even proud of their humility. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 6] + +Whether Pride Is the Most Grievous of Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of +sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it +would seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine +says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "Other sins find their vent in the +accomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good +deeds to destroy them." Therefore pride is not the most grievous of +sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater good," +as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to which +pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (Q. +61, A. 5). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, +such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are +more grievous sins than pride. + +Obj. 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil. +But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rom. 1:28, +where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men of +science were delivered "to a reprobate sense, to do those things +which are not convenient." Therefore pride is not the most grievous +of sins. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 118:51, "The proud did +iniquitously," says: "The greatest sin in man is pride." + +_I answer that,_ Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to +a mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion +from the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and +complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for +pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride +covets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the +good of virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme +gravity, because in other sins man turns away from God, either +through ignorance or through weakness, or through desire for any +other good whatever; whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply +through being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence +Boethius [*Cf. Cassian, de Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says that "while all +vices flee from God, pride alone withstands God"; for which reason it +is specially stated (James 4:6) that "God resisteth the proud." +Wherefore aversion from God and His commandments, which is a +consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very +nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And since that which +belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than +that which belongs to it through something else, it follows that +pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds +in aversion which is the formal complement of sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First, on +account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in +its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and "still more +difficult is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its +connaturality," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, 9. A difficulty of this +kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man +sins the more grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous +temptation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12, 15). + +Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being +hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes +occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A. 5, ad 3). Hence +Augustine says pointedly that it "lies in wait for good deeds"; and +it is written (Ps. 141:4): "In the way wherein I walked, the proud +[*Cf. Ps. 139:6, 'The proud have hidden a net for me.'] [Vulg.: +'they'] have hidden a snare for me." Hence no very great gravity +attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and +before it is discovered by the judgment of reason: but once +discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, both by considering one's +own infirmity, according to Ecclus. 10:9, "Why is earth and ashes +proud?" and by considering God's greatness, according to Job 15:13, +"Why doth thy spirit swell against God?" as well as by considering +the imperfection of the goods on which man prides himself, according +to Isa. 40:6, "All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the +flower of the field"; and farther on (Isa. 64:6), "all our justices" +are become "like the rag of a menstruous woman." + +Reply Obj. 2: Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from +the object, which is considered on the part of conversion. In this +way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has +humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the +part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For +unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud contempt, is +rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance or +weakness. The same applies to despair and the like. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible +conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more +evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God +punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh, +which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence +Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that "pride is the worst of all +vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest +and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous +deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. On the other hand, +carnal lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a +shameful nature: and yet, under God's dispensation, it is less +grievous than pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels +it not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he +may rise from his abasement." + +From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a +wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient +to contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown +to be more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows +men to fall into other sins. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 7] + +Whether Pride Is the First Sin of All? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. +For the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not +accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says +(De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done "amiss which are not +done with pride." Therefore pride is not the first sin of all. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that the "beginning of +. . . pride is to fall off from God." Therefore falling away from God +precedes pride. + +Obj. 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the +order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all +virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13): "Evil men and seducers +shall grow worse and worse"; so that apparently man's beginning of +wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of +sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the +first sin. + +Obj. 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now +the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "pride apes fortitude and +daring." Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the +beginning of all sin." + +_I answer that,_ The first thing in every genus is that which is +essential. Now it has been stated above (A. 6) that aversion from +God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride +essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride +fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is "the beginning of all +sins," as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 2), when we were treating of +the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part +of sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Pride is said to be "the beginning of all sin," not as +though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin +is naturally liable to arise from pride. + +Reply Obj. 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of +pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being +the first part of pride. For it has been said above (A. 5) that pride +regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence +it scorns to be subject to a creature for God's sake. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is no need for the order of virtues to be the +same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that +which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore +as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to +which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. 136:7, +"Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof," says that "by +heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief," and the +Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:19) that "some rejecting a good conscience +have made shipwreck concerning the faith." + +Reply Obj. 4: Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because +that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride +is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride +there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed through +ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is +pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous. +And as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the +withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13, "I shall be cleansed from +the greatest sin," says: "Namely from the sin of pride, which is the +last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw +from God." + +Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher associates pride with feigned +fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man +thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be +daring or brave. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 8] + +Whether Pride Should Be Reckoned a Capital Vice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital +vice, since Isidore [*Comment. in Deut. xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst. +Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices. + +Obj. 2: Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since +both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice. +Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "pride +begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion." Now envy is +reckoned a capital vice, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 4). Much more +therefore is pride a capital vice. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride +among the capital vices. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 5, ad 1) pride may be +considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin; +secondly, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the +capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many +kinds of sin arise. Wherefore some, considering pride in the light of +a special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But +Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all +vices, as explained above (A. 2, Obj. 3), did not place it among the +capital vices, but held it to be the "queen and mother of all the +vices." Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): "Pride, the queen of vices, +when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it +into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that +they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds." + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause +thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory +covets the outward show of excellence. + +Reply Obj. 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises +from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it +is still more principal than the capital vices themselves. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 163 + +OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his +sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin? + +(2) What the first man coveted by sinning? + +(3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins? + +(4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 1] + +Whether Pride Was the First Man's First Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pride was not the first man's first +sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the disobedience of +one man many were made sinners." Now the first man's first sin is the +one by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin. +Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Luke 4:3, "And the devil +said to Him," that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same +order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to +gluttony, as appears from Matt. 4:3, where it was said to Him: "If +thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread." +Therefore the first man's first sin was not pride but gluttony. + +Obj. 3: Further, man sinned at the devil's suggestion. Now the devil +in tempting man promised him knowledge (Gen. 3:5). Therefore +inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which +pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the +first sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 1 Tim. +2:14, "The woman being seduced was in the transgression," says: "The +Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to +accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them +to touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they +would be like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them +the godhead . . ." Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a +thing. Therefore man's first sin was unbelief and not pride. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the +beginning of all sin." Now man's first sin is the beginning of all +sin, according to Rom. 5:12, "By one man sin entered into this +world." Therefore man's first sin was pride. + +_I answer that,_ Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the +character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is +first found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward +movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the body; +since, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the +body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. +Also, among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the +end before being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of +the end; and consequently man's first sin was where it was possible +for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so +appointed in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of +the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the +first inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his +coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh +tends against the order of reason. It remains therefore that the +first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting +inordinately some spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it +inordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established +by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man's first sin consisted +in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this +pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man's first sin was +pride. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not willed +by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one +presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he +willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he +coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his +disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the +statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4]) +that "man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and +scorned God's commands." + +Reply Obj. 2: Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first +parents. For it is written (Gen. 3:6): "The woman saw that the tree +was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and +she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat." Yet the very goodness +and beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but +the persuasive words of the serpent, who said (Gen. 3:5): "Your eyes +shall be opened and you shall be as Gods": and it was by coveting +this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony +resulted from the sin of pride. + +Reply Obj. 3: The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents +from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began +by saying: "You shall be as Gods," and added: "Knowing good and evil." + +Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30), "the +woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were +debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not +already filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud +self-presumption." This does not mean that pride preceded the +promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken +his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being +that she believed the demon to have spoken truly. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 2] + +Whether the First Man's Pride Consisted in His Coveting God's Likeness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist +in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that +which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness +is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gen. +1:26): "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Therefore he did +not sin by coveting God's likeness. + +Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in +order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was +the serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and +evil." Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to +the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, +1: "All men naturally desire knowledge." Therefore he did not sin by +coveting God's likeness. + +Obj. 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first +man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, "He filled +them with the knowledge of understanding." Since then every sin +consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would +seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. +But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying +of Ex. 15:11, "Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?" +Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 [*Enarr. in Ps. +68], "Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away," +says: "Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost +happiness." + +_I answer that,_ likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute +equality [*Cf. I, Q. 93, A. 1]: and such a likeness to God our first +parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not +conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man. + +The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a +creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates +somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius +says (Div. Nom. ix): "The same things are like and unlike to God; +like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; +unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause." Now every +good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first +good. + +Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above +his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he +coveted God's likeness inordinately. + +It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite +is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the +rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be +considered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being: +and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their +creation, both on man--of whom it is written (Gen. 1:26) that God +made man "to His image and likeness"--and on the angel, of whom it is +written (Ezech. 28:12): "Thou wast the seal of resemblance." +Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the +angel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just +quoted, "Thou wast the seal of resemblance," we read: "Full of +wisdom." But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received +this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the +power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness +actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there +remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness. + +Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted +God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a +likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting +God's likeness as regards "knowledge of good and evil," according to +the serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he +might decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again +that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would +befall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as +regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural +power he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says +(Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman's mind was filled with love of +her own power." On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's +likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. +13) that "he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God's." +Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as +each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine +rule. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man +did not sin by coveting this, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to +knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that +is, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on +Ps. 70:18, "O God, who is like Thee?" says: "He who desires to be of +himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. +Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man +who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command." + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 7] + +Whether the Sin of Our First Parents Was More Grievous Than Other Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more +grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15): +"Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid +sin." Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, +because they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore +the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin of +our first parents was most severely punished, since by it "death +entered into this world," as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12). Therefore +that sin was more grievous than other sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest +(Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first parents +was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest. + +_On the contrary,_ Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: "I think that a +man who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall +suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little." Now +our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade. +Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins. + +_I answer that,_ There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. +one results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that +adultery is a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity +of sin results from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The +former gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment: +hence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather +than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first man's sin +was not graver than all other sins of men, as regards the species of +the sin. For though pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence +over other sins, yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God +is greater than the pride whereby one covets God's likeness +inordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as stated (A. +2). + +But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that +sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We +must accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively +but not simply. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting +from the person of the sinner. + +Reply Obj. 2: The severity of the punishment awarded to that first +sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its +species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed +the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence +brought disorder upon the whole human nature. + +Reply Obj. 3: Where things are directly subordinate, the first must +needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one +follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that +the first sin is the greatest. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 4] + +Whether Adam's Sin Was More Grievous Than Eve's? + +Objection 1: It would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than +Eve's. For it is written (1 Tim. 2:14): "Adam was not seduced, but +the woman being seduced was in the transgression": and so it would +seem that the woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through +assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to +Luke 12:47, 48, "That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and +did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: but +he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten +with few stripes." Therefore Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3 [*Serm. ix; xcvi +de Temp.]): "If the man is the head, he should live better, and give +an example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him." Now +he who ought to do better, sins more grievously, if he commit a sin. +Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve. + +Obj. 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be the +most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy Ghost, +because while sinning he relied on God's mercy [*Cf. Q. 21, A. 2, +Obj. 3. St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter +Lombard quoted there], and this pertains to the sin of presumption. +Therefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve. + +_On the contrary,_ Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was +more grievously punished than the man, as appears from Gen. 3. +Therefore she sinned more grievously than the man. + +_I answer that,_ As stated (A. 3), the gravity of a sin depends on +the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we +must assert that, if we consider the condition attaching to these +persons, the man's sin is the more grievous, because he was more +perfect than the woman. + +As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered +to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad +lit. xi, 35): "Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex, +though parity of pride." + +But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more +grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up +than the man. For the woman believed in the serpent's persuasive +words, namely that God had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest +they should become like to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God's +likeness by eating of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the +height of desiring to obtain something against God's will. On the +other hand, the man did not believe this to be true; wherefore he did +not wish to attain to God's likeness against God's will: but his +pride consisted in wishing to attain thereto by his own power. +Secondly, the woman not only herself sinned, but suggested sin to the +man; wherefore she sinned against both God and her neighbor. Thirdly, +the man's sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augustine says +(Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), "he consented to the sin out of a certain +friendly good-will, on account of which a man sometimes will offend +God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to +have done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine sentence." + +It is therefore evident that the woman's sin was more grievous than +the man's. + +Reply Obj. 1: The woman was deceived because she was first of all +puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but +aggravated her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed +up with still greater pride. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the circumstance of personal +condition, on account of which the man's sin was more grievous than +the woman's. + +Reply Obj. 3: The man's reliance on God's mercy did not reach to +contempt of God's justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy +Ghost, but as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi [*De Civ. Dei xiv, +11]), it was due to the fact that, "having had no experience of God's +severity, he thought the sin to be venial," i.e. easily forgiven +[*Cf. I-II, Q. 89, A. 3, ad 1]. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 164 + +OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this +head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common +punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 164, Art. 1] + +Whether Death Is the Punishment of Our First Parents' Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that death is not the punishment of our +first parents' sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called +a punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates +it. Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the +fact that his body is composed of contraries, and because "mortal" is +included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a +punishment of our first parents' sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly found +in man as well as in other animals, according to Eccles. 3:19, "The +death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both +equal." But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin. +Therefore neither is it so in men. + +Obj. 3: Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of +particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human +nature. Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our +first parents' sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, all are equally descended from our first parents. +Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents' sin, it +would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But +this is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more +painfully, than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the +first sin. + +Obj. 5: Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated above +(I, Q. 48, A. 6; Q. 49, A. 2). But death, apparently, is not from +God: for it is written (Wis. 1:13): "God made not death." Therefore +death is not the punishment of the first sin. + +Obj. 6: Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since +merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now death +is sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death. +Therefore it would seem that death is not a punishment. + +Obj. 7: Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death +apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he is +dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is +not a punishment of sin. + +Obj. 8: Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have +followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents +lived a long time after their sin (Gen. 5:5). Therefore, seemingly, +death is not a punishment of sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin +entered into this world, and by sin death." + +_I answer that,_ If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of +a favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment +of that fault. Now as we stated in the First Part (Q. 95, A. 1; Q. +97, A. 1), God bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state, +that as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his +soul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul. +But inasmuch as through sin man's mind withdrew from subjection to +God, the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject +to his reason, whence there followed so great a rebellion of the +carnal appetite against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject +to the soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life +and soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul, +as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the +other hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the body are due to +the lack of the body's subjection to the soul. + +It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite +against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents' sin, so also +are death and all defects of the body. + +Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the +principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form +and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of +itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part +of his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of +contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and +in this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached +to the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity, +since it was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch, +and consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was +impossible, were it not composed of contraries, as the Philosopher +states (De Anima ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not +attached to the adaptability of matter to form because, if it were +possible, since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather +be incorruptible. In the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this +being suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make +it fit for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary +result of such a matter and is not according to the agent's choice; +for, if the craftsman were able, of the iron he would make a saw that +would not rust. Now God Who is the author of man is all-powerful, +wherefore when He first made man, He conferred on him the favor of +being exempt from the necessity resulting from such a matter: which +favor, however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents. +Accordingly death is both natural on account of a condition attaching +to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the Divine favor +preserving man from death [*Cf. I-II, Q. 85, A. 6]. + +Reply Obj. 2: This likeness of man to other animals regards a +condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of +contraries. But it does not regard the form, for man's soul is +immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal. + +Reply Obj. 3: Our first parents were made by God not only as +particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human +nature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with +the Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their sin +the entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their +posterity, incurred death. + +Reply Obj. 4: A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a +punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal in +those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that +which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that +one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed, +should fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to +the sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot +foresee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for +the first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was the +withdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of +human nature was maintained. But the defects resulting from this +withdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life. +Wherefore these punishments need not be equal in those to whom the +first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all +future events, Divine providence has so disposed that these penalties +are apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on +account of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen +held [*Peri Archon ii, 9]: for this is contrary to the words of Rom. +9:11, "When they . . . had not done any good or evil"; and also +contrary to statements made in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 4; Q. 118, +A. 3), namely that the soul is not created before the body: but +either in punishment of their parents' sins, inasmuch as the child is +something belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often +punished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended for +the spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these penalties, to +wit that he may thus be turned away from his sins, or lest he take +pride in his virtues, and that he may be crowned for his patience. + +Reply Obj. 5: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an evil +of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect befalling +man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely +as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore +Augustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death, +except in so far as it is a punishment. + +Reply Obj. 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), "just as the +wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous +make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is +that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is good, +while good men die well, although death is an evil." Wherefore +inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them +meritorious. + +Reply Obj. 7: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the +privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the +privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of +sense but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting +the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may +speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as +being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which +life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has +no pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken as including +the previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in +motion towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered, while +in motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death +may be painful. + +Reply Obj. 8: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. [*De Pecc. Mer. et +Rem. i, 16. Cf. Gen. ad lit. ii. 32]), "although our first parents +lived thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when they +heard the death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 164, Art. 2] + +Whether the Particular Punishments of Our First Parents Are Suitably +Appointed in Scripture? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the particular punishments of our +first parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which +would have occurred even without sin should not be described as a +punishment for sin. Now seemingly there would have been "pain in +child-bearing," even had there been no sin: for the disposition of +the female sex is such that offspring cannot be born without pain to +the bearer. Likewise the "subjection of woman to man" results from +the perfection of the male, and the imperfection of the female sex. +Again it belongs to the nature of the earth "to bring forth thorns +and thistles," and this would have occurred even had there been no +sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of the first sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to a person's dignity does not, +seemingly, pertain to his punishment. But the "multiplying of +conceptions" pertains to a woman's dignity. Therefore it should not +be described as the woman's punishment. + +Obj. 3: Further, the punishment of our first parents' sin is +transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard to death (A. 1). +But all "women's conceptions" are not "multiplied," nor does "every +man eat bread in the sweat of his face." Therefore these are not +suitable punishments of the first sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, the place of paradise was made for man. Now nothing +in the order of things should be without purpose. Therefore it would +seem that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable +punishment of man. + +Obj. 5: Further, this place of the earthly paradise is said to be +naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other +obstacles in the way lest man should return thither, to wit the +cherubim, and the "flaming sword turning every way." + +Obj. 6: Further, immediately after his sin man was subject to the +necessity of dying, so that he could not be restored to immortality +by the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid +him to eat of the tree of life, as instanced by the words of Gen. +3:22: "See, lest perhaps he . . . take . . . of the tree of +life . . . and live for ever." + +Obj. 7: Further, to mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy +and clemency, which are most of all ascribed to God in Scripture, +according to Ps. 144:9, "His tender mercies are over all His works." +Therefore God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents, +already reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of Gen. +3:22, "Behold Adam is become as one of Us, knowing good and evil." + +Obj. 8: Further, clothes are necessary to man, like food, according +to 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these +we are content." Therefore just as food was appointed to our first +parents before their sin, so also should clothing have been ascribed +to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable to say that God +made for them garments of skin. + +Objection 9: Further, the punishment inflicted for a sin should +outweigh in evil the gain realized through the sin: else the +punishment would not deter one from sinning. Now through sin our +first parents gained in this, that their eyes were opened, according +to Gen. 3:7. But this outweighs in good all the penal evils which are +stated to have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting +from our first parents' sin are unsuitably described. + +_On the contrary,_ These punishments were appointed by God, Who does +all things, "in number, weight, and measure [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast +ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.']" (Wis. +11:21). + +_I answer that,_ As stated in the foregoing Article, on account of +their sin, our first parents were deprived of the Divine favor, +whereby the integrity of human nature was maintained in them, and by +the withdrawal of this favor human nature incurred penal defects. +Hence they were punished in two ways. In the first place by being +deprived of that which was befitting the state of integrity, namely +the place of the earthly paradise: and this is indicated (Gen. 3:23) +where it is stated that "God sent him out of the paradise of +pleasure." And since he was unable, of himself, to return to that +state of original innocence, it was fitting that obstacles should be +placed against his recovering those things that were befitting his +original state, namely food (lest he should take of the tree of life) +and place; for "God placed before . . . paradise . . . Cherubim, and +a flaming sword." Secondly, they were punished by having appointed to +them things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid favor: and +this as regards both the body and the soul. With regard to the body, +to which pertains the distinction of sex, one punishment was +appointed to the woman and another to the man. To the woman +punishment was appointed in respect of two things on account of which +she is united to the man; and these are the begetting of children, +and community of works pertaining to family life. As regards the +begetting of children, she was punished in two ways: first in the +weariness to which she is subject while carrying the child after +conception, and this is indicated in the words (Gen. 3:16), "I will +multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions"; secondly, in the pain +which she suffers in giving birth, and this is indicated by the words +(Gen. 3:16), "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth." As regards family +life she was punished by being subjected to her husband's authority, +and this is conveyed in the words (Gen. 3:16), "Thou shalt be under +thy husband's power." + +Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in +matters relating to the family life, so it belongs to the husband to +provide the necessaries of that life. In this respect he was punished +in three ways. First, by the barrenness of the earth, in the words +(Gen. 3:17), "Cursed is the earth in thy work." Secondly, by the +cares of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the +earth; hence the words (Gen. 3:17), "With labor and toil shalt thou +eat thereof all the days of thy life." Thirdly, by the obstacles +encountered by the tillers of the soil, wherefore it is written (Gen. +3:18), "Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee." + +Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the +soul. First, by reason of the confusion they experienced at the +rebellion of the flesh against the spirit; hence it is written (Gen. +3:7): "The eyes of them both were opened; and . . . they perceived +themselves to be naked." Secondly, by the reproach for their sin, +indicated by the words (Gen. 3:22), "Behold Adam is become as one of +Us." Thirdly, by the reminder of their coming death, when it was said +to him (Gen. 3:19): "Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return." +To this also pertains that God made them garments of skin, as a sign +of their mortality. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the state of innocence child-bearing would have been +painless: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Just as, in +giving birth, the mother would then be relieved not by groans of +pain, but by the instigations of maturity, so in bearing and +conceiving the union of both sexes would be one not of lustful desire +but of deliberate action" [*Cf. I, Q. 98, A. 2]. + +The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as +inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship (since +even before sin the man was the "head" and governor "of the woman"), +but as to her having now to obey her husband's will even against her +own. + +If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and +thistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish man, because +their growth would bring no labor or punishment for the tiller of the +soil, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 18). Alcuin [*Interrog. et +Resp. in Gen. lxxix], however, holds that, before sin, the earth +brought forth no thorns and thistles, whatever: but the former +opinion is the better. + +Reply Obj. 2: The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed as a +punishment to the woman, not on account of the begetting of children, +for this would have been the same even before sin, but on account of +the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject, through +carrying her offspring after conception. Hence it is expressly +stated: "I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions." + +Reply Obj. 3: These punishments affect all somewhat. For any woman +who conceives must needs suffer sorrows and bring forth her child +with pain: except the Blessed Virgin, who "conceived without +corruption, and bore without pain" [*St. Bernard, Serm. in Dom. inf. +oct. Assum. B. V. M.], because her conceiving was not according to +the law of nature, transmitted from our first parents. And if a woman +neither conceives nor bears, she suffers from the defect of +barrenness, which outweighs the aforesaid punishments. Likewise +whoever tills the soil must needs eat his bread in the sweat of his +brow: while those who do not themselves work on the land, are busied +with other labors, for "man is born to labor" (Job 5:7): and thus +they eat the bread for which others have labored in the sweat of +their brow. + +Reply Obj. 4: Although the place of the earthly paradise avails not +man for his use, it avails him for a lesson; because he knows himself +deprived of that place on account of sin, and because by the things +that have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed in +things pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to which is +prepared for man by Christ. + +Reply Obj. 5: Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual +interpretation, this place would seem to be inaccessible, chiefly on +account of the extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the +nighness of the sun. This is denoted by the "flaming sword," which is +described as "turning every way," as being appropriate to the +circular movement that causes this heat. And since the movements of +corporal creatures are set in order through the ministry of the +angels, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4), it was fitting +that, besides the sword turning every way, there should be cherubim +"to keep the way of the tree of life." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad +lit. xi, 40): "It is to be believed that even in the visible paradise +this was done by heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery +guard set there by the ministry of angels." + +Reply Obj. 6: After sin, if man had [eaten] of the tree of life, he +would not thereby have recovered immortality, but by means of that +beneficial food he might have prolonged his life. Hence in the words +"And live for ever," "for ever" signifies "for a long time." For it +was not expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of this +life. + +Reply Obj. 7: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 39), "these +words of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a +deterrent to others, for whose benefit these things are written, lest +they be proud likewise, because Adam not only failed to become that +which he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he was made." + +Reply Obj. 8: Clothing is necessary to man in his present state of +unhappiness for two reasons. First, to supply a deficiency in respect +of external harm caused by, for instance, extreme heat or cold. +Secondly, to hide his ignominy and to cover the shame of those +members wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most +manifest. Now these two motives do not apply to the primitive state. +because then man's body could not be hurt by any outward thing, as +stated in the First Part (Q. 97, A. 2), nor was there in man's body +anything shameful that would bring confusion on him. Hence it is +written (Gen. 2:23): "And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his +wife, and were not ashamed." The same cannot be said of food, which +is necessary to entertain the natural heat, and to sustain the body. + +Reply Obj. 9: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 31), "We must not +imagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed, +especially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was +fair, and good to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were opened so +that they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their +minds before, this was a mutual concupiscence such as they had not +hitherto." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 165 + +OF OUR FIRST PARENTS' TEMPTATION +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider our first parents' temptation, concerning which +there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil? + +(2) Of the manner and order of that temptation. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 165, Art. 1] + +Whether It Was Fitting for Man to Be Tempted by the Devil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for man to be +tempted by the devil. For the same final punishment is appointed to +the angels' sin and to man's, according to Matt. 25:41, "Go [Vulg.: +'Depart from Me'] you cursed into everlasting fire, which was +prepared for the devil and his angels." Now the angels' first sin did +not follow a temptation from without. Therefore neither should man's +first sin have resulted from an outward temptation. + +Obj. 2: Further, God, Who foreknows the future, knew that through the +demon's temptation man would fall into sin, and thus He knew full +well that it was not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it +would seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems to savor of punishment that anyone should +have an assailant, just as on the other hand the cessation of an +assault is akin to a reward. Now punishment should not precede fault. +Therefore it was unfitting for man to be tempted before he sinned. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 34:11): "He that hath not +been tempted [Douay: 'tried'], what manner of things doth he know?" + +_I answer that,_ God's wisdom "orders all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1), +inasmuch as His providence appoints to each one that which is +befitting it according to its nature. For as Dionysius says (Div. +Nom. iv), "it belongs to providence not to destroy, but to maintain, +nature." Now it is a condition attaching to human nature that one +creature can be helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it was +fitting that God should both allow man in the state of innocence to +be tempted by evil angels, and should cause him to be helped by good +angels. And by a special favor of grace, it was granted him that no +creature outside himself could harm him against his own will, whereby +he was able even to resist the temptation of the demon. + +Reply Obj. 1: Above the human nature there is another that +admits of the possibility of the evil of fault: but there is not above +the angelic nature. Now only one that is already become evil through +sin can tempt by leading another into evil. Hence it was fitting that +by an evil angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according to +the order of nature he is moved forward to perfection by means of a +good angel. An angel could be perfected in good by something above +him, namely by God, but he could not thus be led into sin, because +according to James 1:13, "God is not a tempter of evils." + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as God knew that man, through being +tempted, would fall into sin, so too He knew that man was able, by his +free will, to resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to man's +nature required that he should be left to his own will, according to +Ecclus. 15:14, "God left" man "in the hand of his own counsel." Hence +Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 4): "It seems to me that man would +have had no prospect of any special praise, if he were able to lead a +good life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an +evil life; since both by nature he had the power, and in his power he +had the will, not to consent to the persuader." + +Reply Obj. 3: An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist +it: but, in the state of innocence, man was able, without any +difficulty, to resist temptation. Consequently the tempter's assault +was not a punishment to man. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 165, Art. 2] + +Whether the Manner and Order of the First Temptation Was Fitting? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the manner and order of the first +temptation was not fitting. For just as in the order of nature the +angel was above man, so was the man above the woman. Now sin came +upon man through an angel: therefore in like manner it should have +come upon the woman through the man; in other words the woman should +have been tempted by the man, and not the other way about. + +Obj. 2: Further, the temptation of our first parents was by +suggestion. Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without +making use of an outward sensible creature. Since then our first +parents were endowed with a spiritual mind, and adhered less to +sensible than to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting +for man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead of an outward, +temptation. + +Obj. 3: Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an evil except through +some apparent good. But many other animals have a greater appearance +of good than the serpent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted +by the devil through a serpent. + +Obj. 4: Further, the serpent is an irrational animal. Now wisdom, +speech, and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal. +Therefore the serpent is unfittingly described (Gen. 3:1) as "more +subtle than any of the beasts of the earth," or as "the most prudent +of all beasts" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: and +likewise is unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman, and to +have been punished by God. + +_On the contrary,_ That which is first in any genus should be +proportionate to all that follow it in that genus. Now in every kind +of sin we find the same order as in the first temptation. For, +according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12), it begins with the +concupiscence of sin in the sensuality, signified by the serpent; +extends to the lower reason, by pleasure, signified by the woman; and +reaches to the higher reason by consent in the sin, signified by the +man. Therefore the order of the first temptation was fitting. + +_I answer that,_ Man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective +and sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempting man, made use of a +twofold incentive to sin: one on the part of the intellect, by +promising the Divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge +which man naturally desires to have; the other on the part of sense. +This he did by having recourse to those sensible things, which are +most akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the woman who +was akin to him in the same species; partly by tempting the woman +through the serpent, who was akin to them in the same genus; partly +by suggesting to them to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin +to them in the proximate genus. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the act of tempting the devil was by way of +principal agent; whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of +temptation in bringing about the downfall of the man, both because +the woman was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable to be +deceived, and because, on account of her union with man, the devil +was able to deceive the man especially through her. Now there is no +parity between principal agent and instrument, because the principal +agent must exceed in power, which is not requisite in the +instrumental agent. + +Reply Obj. 2: A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to +man spiritually, shows the devil to have more power against man than +outward suggestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least, +man's imagination is changed by the devil [*Cf. First Part, Q. 91, A. +3]; whereas by an outward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on +an outward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power against man +before sin, wherefore he was unable to tempt him by inward +suggestion, but only by outward suggestion. + +Reply Obj. 3: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 3), "we are +not to suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of +temptation; but as he was possessed of the lust of deceit, he could +only do so by the animal he was allowed to use for that purpose." + +Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29), "the +serpent is described as most prudent or subtle, on account of the +cunning of the devil, who wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of +a prudent or cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of a +prudent or cunning man in advising something prudently or cunningly. +Nor indeed (Gen. ad lit. xi, 28) did the serpent understand the +sounds which were conveyed through it to the woman; nor again are we +to believe that its soul was changed into a rational nature, since +not even men, who are rational by nature, know what they say when a +demon speaks in them. Accordingly (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29) the serpent +spoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat spoke to him, +except that the former was the work of a devil, whereas the latter +was the work of an angel. Hence (Gen. ad lit. xi, 36) the serpent was +not asked why it had done this, because it had not done this in its +own nature, but the devil in it, who was already condemned to +everlasting fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed to +the serpent were directed to him who wrought through the serpent." + +Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. contra Manich. ii, 17, +18), "his, that is, the devil's, punishment mentioned here is that +for which we must be on our guard against him, not that which is +reserved till the last judgment. For when it was said to him: 'Thou +art cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth,' the cattle are +set above him, not in power, but in the preservation of their nature, +since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had +it, but they continue to live in the nature which they received." It +is also said to him: "'Upon thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,'" +according to another version [*The Septuagint] "Here the breast +signifies pride, because it is there that the impulse of the soul +dominates, while the belly denotes carnal desire, because this part +of the body is softest to the touch: and on these he creeps to those +whom he wishes to deceive." The words, "'Earth shalt thou eat all the +days of thy life' may be understood in two ways. Either 'Those shall +belong to thee, whom thou shalt deceive by earthly lust,' namely +sinners who are signified under the name of earth, or a third kind of +temptation, namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat +earth is to look into things deep and dark." The putting of enmities +between him and the woman "means that we cannot be tempted by the +devil, except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects +the likeness of a woman. The seed of the devil is the temptation to +evil, the seed of the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the +temptation to evil is resisted. Wherefore the serpent lies in wait +for the woman's heel, that if at any time she fall away towards what +is unlawful, pleasure may seize hold of her: and she watches his head +that she may shut him out at the very outset of the evil temptation." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 166 + +OF STUDIOUSNESS +(In Two Articles) + +We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity. +Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) What is the matter of studiousness? + +(2) Whether it is a part of temperance? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 166, Art. 1] + +Whether the Proper Matter of Studiousness Is Knowledge? + +Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of +studiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies +study to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every +matter, in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore +seemingly knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness. + +Obj. 2: Further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now curiosity, +which is derived from _cura_ (care), may also refer to elegance of +apparel and other such things, which regard the body; wherefore the +Apostle says (Rom. 13:14): "Make not provision (_curam_) for the +flesh in its concupiscences." + +Obj. 3: Further it is written (Jer. 6:13): "From the least of them +even to the greatest, all study [Douay: 'are given to'] +covetousness." Now covetousness is not properly about knowledge, but +rather about the possession of wealth, as stated above (Q. 118, A. +2). Therefore studiousness, which is derived from "study," is not +properly about knowledge. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 27:11): "Study wisdom, my +son, and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him +that reproacheth." Now study, which is commended as a virtue, is the +same as that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is +properly about _knowledge._ + +_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of +the mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except +by knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind's application to knowledge +precedes its application to those things to which man is directed by +his knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and +as a result it regards any other things the working of which requires +to be directed by knowledge. Now the virtues lay claim to that matter +about which they are first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned +about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch. +Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing can be done aright as regards other matters, +except in so far as is previously directed by the knowing reason. +Hence studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior +regard for knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man's mind is drawn, on account of his affections, +towards the things for which he has an affection, according to Matt. +6:21, "Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also." And since man +has special affection for those things which foster the flesh, it +follows that man's thoughts are concerned about things that foster +his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best sustain his +body. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be about things +pertaining to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 3: Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and for +this it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things. +Accordingly studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to +covetousness. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 166, Art. 2] + +Whether Studiousness Is a Part of Temperance? + +Objection 1: It would seem that studiousness is not a part of +temperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his +studiousness. Now all virtuous persons without exception are called +studious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the +term "studious" (_spoudaios_) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4, 8, 9). +[*In the same sense Aristotle says in _Ethic._ iii, 2, that "every +vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do."] Therefore +studiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of temperance. + +Obj. 2: Further, studiousness, as stated (A. 1), pertains to +knowledge. But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues +which are in the appetitive part of the soul, and pertains rather to +the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore +solicitude is an act of prudence as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). +Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance. + +Obj. 3: Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a principal +virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not +resemble temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name +from being a kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the +vice that is in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from +being the application of the mind to something, so that it would seem +to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of +study, rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity. +wherefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore says +(Etym. x) that "a studious man is one who is curious to study." +Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "We are +forbidden to be curious: and this is a great gift that temperance +bestows." Now curiosity is prevented by moderate studiousness. +Therefore studiousness is a part of temperance. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, AA. 3, 4, 5), it belongs to +temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it tend +excessively to that which is desired naturally. Now just as in +respect of his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures +of food and sex, so, in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to +know something; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his +_Metaphysics_ (i, 1): "All men have a natural desire for knowledge." + +The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness; +wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of +temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue. +Moreover, it is comprised under modesty for the reason given above +(Q. 160, A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 1: Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as +stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Consequently, in so far as the knowledge +of prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term "studiousness," +which properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues. + +Reply Obj. 2: The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the +appetitive power, which moves all the powers, as stated above (I-II, +Q. 9, A. 1). Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is +connected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to +the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate +about each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the +appetitive power, and consists in man's appetite being directed +aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or +that thing. And this belongs to the virtue of seriousness. Wherefore +it is reckoned among the moral virtues. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in order to be +virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally +inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us chiefly to fear +dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is +chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such +dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the +flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. For +on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of +things; and so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint +on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the +part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of +seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination +studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it +is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, +this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in +seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The +former is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the +desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is +directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to +knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by +that which removes an obstacle. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 167 + +OF CURIOSITY +(In Two Articles) + +We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge? + +(2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 167, Art. 1] + +Whether Curiosity Can Be About Intellective Knowledge? + +Objection 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about +intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. +ii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are +essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good: +because man's perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being +reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge +of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the good of the +human soul is to be in accordance with reason," whose perfection +consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot +be about intellective knowledge. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he +receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge +is from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, "All wisdom is from the Lord +God," and Wis. 7:17, "He hath given me the true knowledge of things +that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues +of the elements," etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to +God, since "all things are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb. 4:13), +and "the Lord is a God of all knowledge" (1 Kings 2:3). Therefore +however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good. +Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity +cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth. + +Obj. 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of +intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical +sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: +for Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): "Those who refused to partake of +the king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had +considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful, +would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful": and +Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that "if the philosophers +made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from +unjust possessors." Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge +cannot be sinful. + +_On the contrary,_ Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says: +"Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the +dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the +heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?" Now +vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore +curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 166, A. 2, ad 2) studiousness is +directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study +in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the +knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit +of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly +speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some +result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth, +according to 1 Cor. 8:1, "Knowledge puffeth up," or because one uses +the knowledge of truth in order to sin. + +On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of +truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to +the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for +instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride +in their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "Some +there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of +the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they +are doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness +they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So +great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in +the very heavens about which they argue." In like manner, those who +study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful +study, according to the saying of Jer. 9:5, "They have taught their +tongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity." + +Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study +directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this +in four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable +study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence +Jerome says [*Epist. xxi ad Damas]: "We see priests forsaking the +gospels and the prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love +songs of pastoral idylls." Secondly, when a man studies to learn of +one, by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who +seek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious +curiosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): "Maybe, the +philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity +in seeking knowledge from the demons." + +Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, +without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge +of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that "in studying +creatures, we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity; +but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things." + +Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of +his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error: +wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:22): "Seek not the things that are +too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . . +and in many of His works be not curious," and further on (Ecclus. +3:26), "For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath +detained their minds in vanity." + +Reply Obj. 1: Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet +man's sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but +in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher +states (Ethic. x, 7, 8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of +certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not +directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth, +wherein supreme happiness consists. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although this argument shows that the knowledge of +truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing +the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the +knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good +should be regulated in due manner. + +Reply Obj. 3: The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and +commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired +through God revealing it to them, as stated in Rom. 1:19. Since, +however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the +faith, the Apostle says (Col. 2:8): "Beware lest any man cheat you by +philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . . +and not according to Christ": and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad +Polycarp.) of certain philosophers that "they make an unholy use of +divine things against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom +strive to destroy the worship of God." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 167, Art. 2] + +Whether the Vice of Curiosity Is About Sensitive Knowledge? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about +sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense +of sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and +taste. Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not +curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the +vice of curiosity about things known by the sight. + +Obj. 2: Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games; +wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when "a fall occurred +in the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly, +and overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes." But it does not +seem to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on +account of the representation, wherein man takes a natural delight, +as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity +is not about the knowledge of sensible objects. + +Obj. 3: Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire +into our neighbor's actions, as Bede observes [*Comment. in 1 John +2:16]. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of +others, because according to Ecclus. 17:12, God "gave to every one of +them commandment concerning his neighbor." Therefore the vice of +curiosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular +sensible objects. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that +"concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious." Now according to Bede +(Comment. in 1 John 2:16) "concupiscence of the eyes refers not only +to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the +discovery and dispraise of our neighbor's faults," and all these are +particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the +eves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, +which are members of the same division (1 John 2:16), it seems that +the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things. + +_I answer that,_ The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two +things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it +is directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this +kind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek +those things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. In the +second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to +intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly +to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be +sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not +directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful +consideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), "I go no more +to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open country, +if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract me from +some weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and unless Thou, +having made me see my weakness, didst speedily admonish me, I become +foolishly dull." Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is +directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to +lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people's actions is +directed to detraction. On the other hand, if one be ordinately +intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity +of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible +truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is +virtuous. + +Reply Obj. 1: Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the +use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising +from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to +Augustine (Confess. x, 35) "it is called concupiscence of the eyes" +because "the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge, +so that all sensible things are said to be seen," and as he says +further on: "By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein +pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for +pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory, +soft; but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of +these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust +of experiment and knowledge." + +Reply Obj. 2: Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man +prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees +represented. Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.] that such +sights make men adulterers and shameless. + +Reply Obj. 3: One may watch other people's actions or inquire into +them, with a good intent, either for one's own good--that is in order +to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor--or for +our neighbor's good--that is in order to correct him, if he do +anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of +one's position. This is praiseworthy, according to Heb. 10:24, +"Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works." But +to observe our neighbor's faults with the intention of looking down +upon them, or of detracting them, or even with no further purpose +than that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written (Prov. +24:15), "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of +the just, nor spoil his rest." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 168 + +OF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY +(In Four Articles) + +We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements +of the body, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of +the body that are done seriously? + +(2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions? + +(3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play; + +(4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 1] + +Whether Any Virtue Regards the Outward Movements of the Body? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no virtue regards the outward +movements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual +beauty of the soul, according to Ps. 44:14, "All the glory of the +king's daughter is within," and a gloss adds, "namely, in the +conscience." Now the movements of the body are not within, but +without. Therefore there can be no virtue about them. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Virtues are not in us by nature," as the +Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are +in man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some +slow of movement, and the same applies to other differences of +outward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of +this kind. + +Obj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is either about actions directed +to another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance and +fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another +person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is connected with +them. + +Obj. 4: Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue, as +stated above (Q. 166, A. 1, Obj. 1; A. 2, ad 1). Now it is censurable +to apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements: for +Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "A becoming gait is one that reflects +the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the +foot-print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor +affectation, but natural and artless movement." Therefore seemingly +there is no virtue about the style of outward movements. + +_On the contrary,_ The beauty of honesty [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1] pertains +to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty +of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "The sound of the +voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether they +be unduly soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be +our model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of +honesty." Therefore there is a virtue about the style of outward +movement. + +_I answer that,_ Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to +man being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward +movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members +are set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that +there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these +movements. + +Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold +standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly, +in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or +place. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Beauty of conduct +consists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex +and person," and this regards the first. As to the second, he adds: +"This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish +becoming to every action." + +Hence Andronicus [*De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these +outward movements: namely "taste" (_ornatus_) which regards what is +becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of +what is becoming in movement and behavior; and "methodicalness" +(_bona ordinatio_) which regards what is becoming to the business in +hand, and to one's surroundings, wherefore he calls it "the practical +knowledge of separation," i.e. of the distinction of "acts." + +Reply Obj. 1: Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition, +according to Ecclus. 19:27, "The attire of the body, and the laughter +of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is"; and Ambrose +says (De Offic. i, 18) that "the habit of mind is seen in the gesture +of the body," and that "the body's movement is an index of the soul." + +Reply Obj. 2: Although it is from natural disposition that a man is +inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what +is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence +Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let nature guide the movement: and +if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated (ad 1) outward movements are indications of +the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the +soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that "from these +things," i.e. the outward movements, "the man that lies hidden in our +hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or +on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from blemish." It is +moreover from our outward movements that other men form their +judgment about us, according to Ecclus. 19:26, "A man is known by his +look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his +countenance." Hence moderation of outward movements is directed +somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in +his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "In all your movements, let nothing be done to +offend the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the +holiness of your state." Wherefore the moderation of outward +movements may be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher +mentions in _Ethic._ iv, 6, 7. For, in so far as by outward movements +we are directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward +movements belongs to "friendliness or affability" [*Cf. Q. 114, A. +1]. This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds +in reference to others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so +far as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition, their +moderation belongs to the virtue of truthfulness [*Cf. Q. 9], whereby +a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly. + +Reply Obj. 4: It is censurable to study the style of one's outward +movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they do +not agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one +to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may be +corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let them be without +artifice, but not without correction." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 2] + +Whether There Can Be a Virtue About Games? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games. +For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord said: 'Woe to you who +laugh, for you shall weep.' Wherefore I consider that all, and not +only excessive, games should be avoided." Now that which can be done +virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be +a virtue about games. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us," +as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in +Matth.]: "It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun. +Listen to what happened to those who played: 'The people sat down to +eat and drink, and they rose up to play.'" Therefore there can be no +virtue about games. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that "playful +actions are not directed to something else." But it is a requisite of +virtue that the agent in choosing should "direct his action to +something else," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore +there can be no virtue about games. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I pray thee, +spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax +the high pressure of his attention to work." Now this relaxation of +the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it +becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at +times. Moreover the Philosopher [*Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8] assigns to +games the virtue of _eutrapelia_, which we may call "pleasantness." + +_I answer that,_ Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's +refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is +finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it +with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount +of work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain +work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when +the soul works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the +intellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs. +Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the +soul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations +of reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of soul, +whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the +practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater +if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby +it is raised higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain +outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. +In either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than another, +according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now +just as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so +weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and +the soul's rest is pleasure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2; +I-II, Q. 31, A. 1, ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of +soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by +slackening the tension of the reason's study. Thus in the +_Conferences of the Fathers_ (xxiv, 21), it is related of Blessed +John the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized on +finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have +told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the +latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do +it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it, +the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that +in like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never +relaxed. + +Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than +the soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is +necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it +were, to the soul. This is in agreement with the statement of the +Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life +there is a kind of rest that is associated with games": and +consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things. + +Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points +which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the +pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious +deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that "one kind +of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene." Another +thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind +altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We should beware +lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony +which is the concord of good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i, +29), that, "just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute +freedom in their games, but only that which is consistent with good +behavior, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright +mind." Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other human actions, to +conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take due account +of other circumstances, so that our fun "befit the hour and the man," +as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29). + +Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a +habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there +can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of +wittiness (_eutrapelia_), and a man is said to be pleasant through +having a happy turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a +cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from +immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. [*_Eutrapelia_ is +derived from _trepein_ = "to turn"]. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, fun should fit with business and +persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that "when the +audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something +novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the +gravity of the subject." Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with +things of the greatest moment, according to Prov. 8:6, "Hear, for I +will speak of great things." Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether +exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he +begins by saying: "Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant, +nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; +since how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in +Holy Writ?" + +Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use +of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end; +of whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): "They have accounted our life a +pastime." Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "We are so +begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun, +but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and +moment." + +Reply Obj. 3: Playful actions themselves considered in their species +are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such +actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and +accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use +of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed lawful to +make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to +sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty +by grave and serious matters." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 3] + +Whether There Can Be Sin in the Excess of Play? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the excess of +play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful. +Now play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be +grave sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they be done in +fun, are either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems +that there is no sin in excessive play. + +Obj. 2: Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven capital +vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play does +not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would +seem not to be a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in play, +since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if excess of +play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover all +those who employ them, as well as those who make them any payment, +would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue; +for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; viii. 63) that +is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain jester would +be with him in the life to come. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Prov. 14:13, "Laughter shall be mingled +with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy," remarks: "A +mourning that will last for ever." Now there is inordinate laughter +and inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin +therein, since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning. + +_I answer that,_ In all things dirigible according to reason, the +excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which +falls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated (A. 2) that +playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason. +Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of +reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very +species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of +jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be +"discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene," when to wit a man, +for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such +as are injurious to his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal +sins. And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin. + +Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due +circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue +times or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or +persons. This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong +attachment to play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives +therefrom to the love of God, so as to be willing to disobey a +commandment of God or of the Church rather than forego, such like +amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for instance +where a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its +sake to do anything in disobedience to God. + +Reply Obj. 1: Certain things are sinful on account of the intention +alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such an +intention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of +which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from +sin, or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to +their species, such as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is +no excuse for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and obscene. + +Reply Obj. 2: Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which +Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it +is written (Ex. 32:6): "The people sat down to eat and drink, and +they rose up to play." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated (A. 2), play is necessary for the intercourse +of human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse may have a +lawful employment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of +play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is not +unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that +their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words or +deeds in order to amuse, and that they do not introduce play into +undue matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have +no other occupation in reference to other men, nevertheless in +reference to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both +serious and virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation of their own +passions and operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor. +Wherefore those who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act +justly, by rewarding them for their services. On the other hand, if a +man spends too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians who +practice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging them in their sin. +Hence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that "to give one's +property to comedians is a great sin, not a virtue"; unless by chance +some play-actor were in extreme need, in which case one would have to +assist him, for Ambrose says (De Offic. [*Quoted in Canon Pasce, +dist. 86]): "Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst +save a man by feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain +him." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 4] + +Whether There Is a Sin in Lack of Mirth? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For +no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a +penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [*Spurious]: "Let him +refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to +obtain the grace of a full pardon." Therefore there is no sin in lack +of mirth. + +Obj. 2: Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy men. +But some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth; for it +is written (Jer. 15:17): "I sat not in the assembly of jesters," and +(Tobias 3:17): "Never have I joined myself with them that play; +neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in +lightness." Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth. + +Obj. 3: Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the +virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives +nor receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the +lack of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than +sinful. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the +lack of mirth to be a vice. + +_I answer that,_ In human affairs whatever is against reason is a +sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, +by offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment. +Wherefore Seneca [*Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De +Continentia] says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): "Let your +conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude, or +despise you as a cad." Now a man who is without mirth, not only is +lacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he +is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are +vicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher +states (Ethic. iv, 8). + +Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and +pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are +not in quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as +stated in _Ethic._ x, 6, it follows that "lack of mirth is less +sinful than excess thereof." Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, +10): "We should make few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but +little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt +suffices for our meat." + +Reply Obj. 1: Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called +upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in default, +because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with +reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the times, the +state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he adds: "I +sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats." The words of +Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his +adding: "Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in +lightness." + +Reply Obj. 3: Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures, +but only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore it would +seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6) +calls "friendliness," or _eutrapelia_, otherwise wittiness. +Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement +with temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 169 + +OF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel, +and under this head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward +apparel? + +(2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 169, Art. 1] + +Whether There Can Be Virtue and Vice in Connection with Outward +Apparel? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be virtue and vice in +connection with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not +belong to us by nature, wherefore it varies according to different +times and places. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12) +that "among the ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a +cloak with sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is +scandalous for anyone hailing from a reputable place to be without +them." Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1) there is in us +a natural aptitude for the virtues. Therefore there is no virtue or +vice about such things. + +Obj. 2: Further, if there were virtue and vice in connection with +outward attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess in +outward attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of +the altar use most precious vestments in the sacred ministry. +Likewise it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it +is said in praise of certain people (Heb. 11:37): "They wandered +about in sheepskins and in goatskins." Therefore it seems that there +cannot be virtue and vice in this matter. + +Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or moral, or +intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is not conversant with +matter of this kind, since it is a perfection regarding the knowledge +of truth. Nor is there a theological virtue connected therewith, +since that has God for its object; nor are any of the moral virtues +enumerated by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), connected with it. +Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection +with this kind of attire. + +_On the contrary,_ Honesty [*Cf. Q. 145] pertains to virtue. Now a +certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says +(De Offic. i, 19): "The body should be bedecked naturally and without +affectation, with simplicity, with negligence rather than nicety, not +with costly and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that +nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity, yet nothing be added to +increase its beauty." Therefore there can be virtue and vice in the +outward attire. + +_I answer that,_ It is not in the outward things themselves which man +uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them +immoderately. This lack of moderation occurs in two ways. First, in +comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore +Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "Those offenses which are contrary +to the customs of men, are to be avoided according to the customs +generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by +custom or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the +lawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner. For any part, +which harmonizeth not with its whole, is offensive." Secondly, the +lack of moderation in the use of these things may arise from the +inordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a man +sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, either in accordance +with the custom of those among whom he dwells or contrary to such +custom. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "We must +avoid excessive pleasure in the use of things, for it leads not only +wickedly to abuse the customs of those among whom we dwell, but +frequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay hidden, +while under the restraint of established morality, it displays its +deformity in a most lawless outbreak." + +In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways. +First when a man seeks glory from excessive attention to dress; in so +far as dress and such like things are a kind of ornament. Hence +Gregory says (Hom. xl in Ev.): "There are some who think that +attention to finery and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were +no fault, the word of God would not say so expressly that the rich +man who was tortured in hell had been clothed in purple and fine +linen. No one, forsooth, seeks costly apparel" (such, namely, as +exceeds his estate) "save for vainglory." Secondly, when a man seeks +sensuous pleasure from excessive attention to dress, in so far as +dress is directed to the body's comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too +solicitous [*Cf. Q. 55, A. 6] in his attention to outward apparel. + +Accordingly Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons three virtues in +connection with outward attire; namely "humility," which excludes the +seeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is "the habit of +avoiding excessive expenditure and parade"; "contentment" [*Cf. Q. +143, Obj. 4], which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure, +wherefore he says that "contentedness is the habit that makes a man +satisfied with what is suitable, and enables him to determine what is +becoming in his manner of life" (according to the saying of the +Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:8): "Having food and wherewith to be covered, with +these let us be content;"--and "simplicity," which excludes excessive +solicitude about such things, wherefore he says that "simplicity is a +habit that makes a man contented with what he has." + +In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate attachment in two +ways. First, through a man's neglect to give the requisite study or +trouble to the use of outward apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says +(Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is a mark of effeminacy to let one's cloak +trail on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up." Secondly, +by seeking glory from the very lack of attention to outward attire. +Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "not only +the glare and pomp of outward things, but even dirt and the weeds of +mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as +being a decoy under the guise of God's service"; and the Philosopher +says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "both excess and inordinate defect are a +subject of ostentation." + +Reply Obj. 1: Although outward attire does not come from nature, it +belongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are naturally +inclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates outward +raiment. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those who are placed in a position of dignity, or again +the ministers of the altar, are attired in more costly apparel than +others, not for the sake of their own glory, but to indicate the +excellence of their office or of the Divine worship: wherefore this +is not sinful in them. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, +12): "Whoever uses outward things in such a way as to exceed the +bounds observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either +signifies something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he +uses these things for sensual pleasure or ostentation." + +Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: although it is +not always a sin to wear coarser clothes than other people. For, if +this be done through ostentation or pride, in order to set oneself +above others, it is a sin of superstition; whereas, if this be done +to tame the flesh, or to humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue +of temperance. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): +"Whoever uses transitory things with greater restraint than is +customary with those among whom he dwells, is either temperate or +superstitious." Especially, however, is the use of coarse raiment +befitting to those who by word and example urge others to repentance, +as did the prophets of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage +quoted. Wherefore a gloss on Matt. 3:4, says: "He who preaches +penance, wears the garb of penance." + +Reply Obj. 3: This outward apparel is an indication of man's estate; +wherefore excess, deficiency, and mean therein, are referable to the +virtue of truthfulness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) assigns +to deeds and words, which are indications of something connected with +man's estate. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 169, Art. 2] + +Whether the Adornment of Women Is Devoid of Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the adornment of women is not devoid +of mortal sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine +law is a mortal sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a +precept of the Divine law; for it is written (1 Pet. 3:3): "Whose," +namely women's, "adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of the +hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel." +Wherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: "Those who are clothed in silk and +purple cannot sincerely put on Christ: those who are bedecked with +gold and pearls and trinkets have forfeited the adornments of mind +and body." Now this is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the +adornment of women cannot be devoid of mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.): "I hold that not +only virgins and widows, but also wives and all women without +exception, should be admonished that nowise should they deface God's +work and fabric, the clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of +yellow pigments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye that +alters the natural features." And afterwards he adds: "They lay hands +on God, when they strive to reform what He has formed. This is an +assault on the Divine handiwork, a distortion of the truth. Thou +shalt not be able to see God, having no longer the eyes that God +made, but those the devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on +whose account thou art bedecked." But this is not due except to +mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal +sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear man's +clothes, so is it unbecoming for her to adorn herself inordinately. +Now the former is a sin, for it is written (Deut. 22:5): "A woman +shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use +woman's apparel." Therefore it seems that also the excessive +adornment of women is a mortal sin. + +Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ If this were true it would seem that the +makers of these means of adornment sin mortally. + +_I answer that,_ As regards the adornment of women, we must bear in +mind the general statements made above (A. 1) concerning outward +apparel, and also something special, namely that a woman's apparel +may incite men to lust, according to Prov. 7:10, "Behold a woman +meeteth him in harlot's attire, prepared to deceive souls." + +Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her husband, lest +through despising her he fall into adultery. Hence it is written (1 +Cor. 7:34) that the woman "that is married thinketh on the things of +the world, how she may please her husband." Wherefore if a married +woman adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do this +without sin. + +But those women who have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are +in a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot without sin +desire to give lustful pleasure to those men who see them, because +this is to incite them to sin. And if indeed they adorn themselves +with this intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally; +whereas if they do so from frivolity, or from vanity for the sake of +ostentation, it is not always mortal, but sometimes venial. And the +same applies to men in this respect. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv +ad Possid.): "I do not wish you to be hasty in forbidding the wearing +of gold or costly attire except in the case of those who being +neither married nor wishful to marry, should think how they may +please God: whereas the others think on the things of the world, +either husbands how they may please their wives, or wives how they +may please their husbands, except that it is unbecoming for women +though married to uncover their hair, since the Apostle commands them +to cover the head." Yet in this case some might be excused from sin, +when they do this not through vanity but on account of some contrary +custom: although such a custom is not to be commended. + +Reply Obj. 1: As a gloss says on this passage, "The wives of those +who were in distress despised their husbands, and decked themselves +that they might please other men": and the Apostle forbids this. +Cyprian is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid married +women to adorn themselves in order to please their husbands, lest the +latter be afforded an occasion of sin with other women. Hence the +Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:9): "Women . . . in ornate [Douay: 'decent'] +apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with +plaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire": whence we are +given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn themselves +soberly and moderately but to do so excessively, shamelessly, and +immodestly. + +Reply Obj. 2: Cyprian is speaking of women painting themselves: this +is a kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin. Wherefore +Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "To dye oneself with paints in +order to have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying counterfeit. +I doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be deceived by it, +by whom alone" (i.e. the husbands) "are they to be permitted, but not +ordered, to adorn themselves." However, such painting does not always +involve a mortal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of +sensuous pleasure or in contempt of God, and it is to like cases that +Cyprian refers. + +It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to counterfeit a +beauty one has not, and another to hide a disfigurement arising from +some cause such as sickness or the like. For this is lawful, since +according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23), "such as we think to be the +less honorable members of the body, about these we put more abundant +honor." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the foregoing Article, outward apparel +should be consistent with the estate of the person, according to the +general custom. Hence it is in itself sinful for a woman to wear +man's clothes, or vice versa; especially since this may be a cause of +sensuous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (Deut. +22) because the Gentiles used to practice this change of attire for +the purpose of idolatrous superstition. Nevertheless this may be done +sometimes without sin on account of some necessity, either in order +to hide oneself from enemies, or through lack of other clothes, or +for some similar motive. + +Reply Obj. 4: In the case of an art directed to the production of +goods which men cannot use without sin, it follows that the workmen +sin in making such things, as directly affording others an occasion +of sin; for instance, if a man were to make idols or anything +pertaining to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the +products of which may be employed by man either for a good or for an +evil use, such as swords, arrows, and the like, the practice of such +an art is not sinful. These alone should be called arts; wherefore +Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlix super Matth.]: "The name of art should be +applied to those only which contribute towards and produce +necessaries and mainstays of life." In the case of an art that +produces things which for the most part some people put to an evil +use, although such arts are not unlawful in themselves, nevertheless, +according to the teaching of Plato, they should be extirpated from +the State by the governing authority. Accordingly, since women may +lawfully adorn themselves, whether to maintain the fitness of their +estate, or even by adding something thereto, in order to please their +husbands, it follows that those who make such means of adornment do +not sin in the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing +means that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysostom says +(Super Matth.) that "even the shoemakers' and clothiers' arts stand +in need of restraint, for they have lent their art to lust, by +abusing its needs, and debasing art by art." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 170 + +OF THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE +(In Two Articles) + +We must next consider the precepts of temperance: + +(1) The precepts of temperance itself; + +(2) The precepts of its parts. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 170, Art. 1] + +Whether the Precepts of Temperance Are Suitably Given in the Divine +Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of temperance are +unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater +virtue than temperance, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 141, A. 8; +I-II, Q. 66, A. 4). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the +precepts of the decalogue, which are the most important among the +precepts of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include among the +precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of adultery, which is +contrary to temperance, as stated above (Q. 154, AA. 1, 8). + +Obj. 2: Further, temperance is not only about venereal matters, but +also about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the +decalogue include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of +meat and drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore, +should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to +venereal pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, in the lawgiver's intention inducement to virtue +precedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in order +that obstacles to virtue may be removed. Now the precepts of the +decalogue are the most important in the Divine law. Therefore the +precepts of the decalogue should have included an affirmative precept +directly prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather than a negative +precept forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue +(Ex. 20:14, 17). + +_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the +commandment is charity," which is enjoined upon us in the two +precepts concerning the love of God and of our neighbor. Wherefore +the decalogue contains those precepts which tend more directly to the +love of God and of our neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to +temperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to the love of +our neighbor, since thereby a man lays hold of another's property for +his own use, by abusing his neighbor's wife. Wherefore the precepts +of the decalogue include a special prohibition of adultery, not only +as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought. + +Reply Obj. 1: Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude there +is not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our neighbor as +adultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to temperance. +And yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude, is wont to +be sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one of the +precepts of the decalogue: for it is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not +on the way with a bold man lest he burden thee with his evils." + +Reply Obj. 2: Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our +neighbor, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust, +for a father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over +whom he has no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of +his wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her body [*1 +Cor. 7:4]. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 122, AA. 1, 4) the precepts of the +decalogue are universal principles of the Divine law; hence they need +to be common precepts. Now it was not possible to give any common +affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of +temperance varies according to different times, as Augustine remarks +(De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according to different human laws and +customs. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 170, Art. 2] + +Whether the Precepts of the Virtues Annexed to Temperance Are +Suitably Given in the Divine Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the virtues annexed +to temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. For the +precepts of the Decalogue, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), are certain +universal principles of the whole Divine law. Now "pride is the +beginning of all sin," according to Ecclus. 10:15. Therefore among +the precepts of the Decalogue there should have been one forbidding +pride. + +Obj. 2: Further, a place before all should have been given in the +decalogue to those precepts by which men are especially induced to +fulfil the Law, because these would seem to be the most important. +Now since humility subjects man to God, it would seem most of all to +dispose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore obedience +is accounted one of the degrees of humility, as stated above (Q. 161, +A. 6); and the same apparently applies to meekness, the effect of +which is that a man does not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as +Augustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7). Therefore it seems that +the Decalogue should have contained precepts of humility and meekness. + +Obj. 3: Further, it was stated in the foregoing Article that adultery +is forbidden in the decalogue, because it is contrary to the love of +our neighbor. But inordinateness of outward movements, which is +contrary to modesty, is opposed to neighborly love: wherefore +Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxii): "In all your movements let +nothing be done to offend the eye of any person whatever." Therefore +it seems that this kind of inordinateness should also have been +forbidden by a precept of the Decalogue. + +_On the contrary,_ suffices the authority of Scripture. + +_I answer that,_ The virtues annexed to temperance may be considered +in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, in their effects. +Considered in themselves they have no direct connection with the love +of God or of our neighbor; rather do they regard a certain moderation +of things pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects, +they may regard the love of God or of our neighbor: and in this +respect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to the +prohibition of the effects of the vices opposed to the parts of +temperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is opposed to meekness, +is sometimes that a man goes on to commit murder (and this is +forbidden in the Decalogue), and sometimes that he refuses due honor +to his parents, which may also be the result of pride, which leads +many to transgress the precepts of the first table. + +Reply Obj. 1: Pride is the beginning of sin, but it lies hidden in +the heart; and its inordinateness is not perceived by all in common. +Hence there was no place for its prohibition among the precepts of +the Decalogue, which are like first self-evident principles. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those precepts which are essentially an inducement to +the observance of the Law presuppose the Law to be already given, +wherefore they cannot be first precepts of the Law so as to have a +place in the Decalogue. + +Reply Obj. 3: Inordinate outward movement is not injurious to one's +neighbor, if we consider the species of the act, as are murder, +adultery, and theft, which are forbidden in the decalogue; but only +as being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above (Q. 168, +A. 1, ad 1, 3). +_______________________ + +TREATISE ON GRATUITOUS GRACES (QQ. 171-182) +_______________________ + +QUESTION 171 + +OF PROPHECY +(In Six Articles) + +After treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain +to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those +things which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple +difference between men as regards things connected with the soul's +habits and acts. First, in reference to the various gratuitous +graces, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, 7: "There are diversities of graces +. . . and to one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to +another the word of knowledge," etc. Another difference arises from +the diversities of life, namely the active and the contemplative +life, which correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it +is stated (1 Cor. 12:4, 7) that "there are diversities of +operations." For the purpose of operation in Martha, who "was busy +about much serving," which pertains to the active life, differed from +the purpose of operation in Mary, "who sitting . . . at the Lord's +feet, heard His word" (Luke 10:39, 40), which pertains to the +contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various +duties and states of life, as expressed in Eph. 4:11, "And He gave +some apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and +other some pastors and doctors": and this pertains to diversity of +ministries, of which it is written (1 Cor. 12:5): "There are +diversities of ministries." + +With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be +considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to +knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things +pertaining to knowledge may be comprised under _prophecy,_ since +prophetic revelation extends not only to future events relating to +man, but also to things relating to God, both as to those which are +to be believed by all and are matters of _faith,_ and as to yet +higher mysteries, which concern the perfect and belong to _wisdom._ +Again, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to spiritual +substances, by whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to +the _discernment of spirits._ Moreover it extends to the direction of +human acts, and this pertains to _knowledge,_ as we shall explain +further on (Q. 177). Accordingly we must first of all consider +prophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy. + +Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence; +(2) its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4) the division +of prophecy. + +Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge? + +(2) Whether it is a habit? + +(3) Whether it is only about future contingencies? + +(4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy? + +(5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the +gift of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit? + +(6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 1] + +Whether Prophecy Pertains to Knowledge? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy does not pertain to +knowledge. For it is written (Ecclus. 48:14) that after death the +body of Eliseus prophesied, and further on (Ecclus. 49:18) it is said +of Joseph that "his bones were visited, and after death they +prophesied." Now no knowledge remains in the body or in the bones +after death. Therefore prophecy does not pertain to knowledge. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 14:3): "He that prophesieth, +speaketh to men unto edification." Now speech is not knowledge +itself, but its effect. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does +not pertain to knowledge. + +Obj. 3: Further, every cognitive perfection excludes folly and +madness. Yet both of these are consistent with prophecy; for it is +written (Osee 9:7): "Know ye, O Israel, that the prophet was foolish +and mad [*Vulg.: 'the spiritual man was mad']." Therefore prophecy is +not a cognitive perfection. + +Obj. 4: Further, just as revelation regards the intellect, so +inspiration regards, apparently, the affections, since it denotes a +kind of motion. Now prophecy is described as "inspiration" or +"revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prolog. super Psalt. i]. +Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to the +intellect more than to the affections. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Kings 9:9): "For he that is now +called a prophet, in time past was called a seer." Now sight pertains +to knowledge. Therefore prophecy pertains to knowledge. + +_I answer that,_ Prophecy first and chiefly consists in knowledge, +because, to wit, prophets know things that are far (_procul_) removed +from man's knowledge. Wherefore they may be said to take their name +from _phanos_, "apparition," because things appear to them from afar. +Wherefore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), "in the Old Testament, +they were called Seers, because they saw what others saw not, and +surveyed things hidden in mystery." Hence among heathen nations they +were known as _vates,_ "on account of their power of mind (_vi +mentis_)," [*The Latin _vates_ is from the Greek _phates_, and may +be rendered "soothsayer"] (ibid. viii, 7). + +Since, however, it is written (1 Cor. 12:7): "The manifestation of +the Spirit is given to every man unto profit," and further on (1 Cor. +14:12): "Seek to abound unto the edification of the Church," it +follows that prophecy consists secondarily in speech, in so far as +the prophets declare for the instruction of others, the things they +know through being taught of God, according to the saying of Isa. +21:10, "That which I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of +Israel, I have declared unto you." Accordingly, as Isidore says +(Etym. viii, 7), "prophets" may be described as _praefatores_ +(foretellers), "because they tell from afar (_porro fantur_)," that +is, speak from a distance, "and foretell the truth about things to +come." + +Now those things above human ken which are revealed by God cannot be +confirmed by human reason, which they surpass as regards the +operation of the Divine power, according to Mk. 16:20, "They . . . +preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word +with signs that followed." Hence, thirdly, prophecy is concerned with +the working of miracles, as a kind of confirmation of the prophetic +utterances. Wherefore it is written (Deut. 34:10, 11): "There arose +no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face +to face, in all the signs and wonders." + +Reply Obj. 1: These passages speak of prophecy in reference to the +third point just mentioned, which regards the proof of prophecy. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the prophetic +utterances. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those prophets who are described as foolish and mad are +not true but false prophets, of whom it is said (Jer. 3:16): "Hearken +not to the words of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive +you; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth +of the Lord," and (Ezech. 13:3): "Woe to the foolish prophets, that +follow their own spirit, and see nothing." + +Reply Obj. 4: It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of the +mind be raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is +written (Ezech. 2:1): "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will +speak to thee." This raising of the intention is brought about by the +motion of the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: "And the +Spirit entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet." After the +mind's intention has been raised to heavenly things, it perceives the +things of God; hence the text continues: "And I heard Him speaking to +me." Accordingly inspiration is requisite for prophecy, as regards +the raising of the mind, according to Job 32:8, "The inspiration of +the Almighty giveth understanding": while revelation is necessary, as +regards the very perception of Divine things, whereby prophecy is +completed; by its means the veil of darkness and ignorance is +removed, according to Job 12:22, "He discovereth great things out of +darkness." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 2] + +Whether Prophecy Is a Habit? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is a habit. For according to +_Ethic._ ii, 5, "there are three things in the soul, power, passion, +and habit." Now prophecy is not a power, for then it would be in all +men, since the powers of the soul are common to them. Again it is not +a passion, since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 22, A. 2); whereas prophecy pertains +principally to knowledge, as stated in the foregoing Article. +Therefore prophecy is a habit. + +Obj. 2: Further, every perfection of the soul, which is not always in +act, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection of the soul; and it is +not always in act, else a prophet could not be described as asleep. +Therefore seemingly prophecy is a habit. + +Obj. 3: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. +Now grace is something in the soul, after the manner of a habit, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 110, A. 2). Therefore prophecy is a habit. + +_On the contrary,_ A habit is something "whereby we act when we +will," as the Commentator [*Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198] says +(De Anima iii). But a man cannot make use of prophecy when he will, +as appears in the case of Eliseus (4 Kings 3:15), "who on Josaphat +inquiring of him concerning the future, and the spirit of prophecy +failing him, caused a minstrel to be brought to him, that the spirit +of prophecy might come down upon him through the praise of psalmody, +and fill his mind with things to come," as Gregory observes (Hom. i +super Ezech.). Therefore prophecy is not a habit. + +_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13), "all that is made +manifest is light," because, to wit, just as the manifestation of the +material sight takes place through material light, so too the +manifestation of intellectual sight takes place through intellectual +light. Accordingly manifestation must be proportionate to the light +by means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate +to its cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowledge that +surpasses natural reason, as stated above (A. 1), it follows that +prophecy requires an intellectual light surpassing the light of +natural reason. Hence the saying of Micah 7:8: "When I sit in +darkness, the Lord is my light." Now light may be in a subject in two +ways: first, by way of an abiding form, as material light is in the +sun, and in fire; secondly, by way of a passion, or passing +impression, as light is in the air. Now the prophetic light is not in +the prophet's intellect by way of an abiding form, else a prophet +would always be able to prophesy, which is clearly false. For Gregory +says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is +lacking to the prophet, nor is it always within the call of his mind, +yet so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due to a +gift." Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4 Kings 4:27): "Her +soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not +told me." The reason for this is that the intellectual light that is +in a subject by way of an abiding and complete form, perfects the +intellect chiefly to the effect of knowing the principle of the +things manifested by that light; thus by the light of the active +intellect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all +things known naturally. Now the principle of things pertaining to +supernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God +Himself, Whom the prophets do not see in His essence, although He is +seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by way of an +abiding and complete form, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we +shall see light." + +It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet's +soul by way of a passion or transitory impression. This is indicated +Ex. 33:22: "When my glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of +the rock," etc., and 3 Kings 19:11: "Go forth and stand upon the +mount before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth," etc. Hence it is +that even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too +the prophet's mind is always in need of a fresh revelation; thus a +disciple who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to +have every detail explained to him. Wherefore it is written (Isa. +1:4): "In the morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a +master." This is also indicated by the very manner in which +prophecies are uttered: thus it is stated that "the Lord spake to +such and such a prophet," or that "the word of the Lord," or "the +hand of the Lord was made upon him." + +But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that, +properly speaking, prophecy is not a habit. + +Reply Obj. 1: This division of the Philosopher's does not comprise +absolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be +principles of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion, +sometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of +those who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before +having the habit of that action. + +However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand +passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense the +Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is, in a way, +to be passive." For just as, in natural knowledge, the possible +intellect is passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in +prophetic knowledge the human intellect is passive to the +enlightening of the Divine light. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as in corporeal things, when a passion ceases, +there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the passion--thus +wood once ignited is more easily ignited again, so too in the +prophet's intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased, there +remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew--thus when the mind has +once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its +former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9) +that our prayers need to be frequent, "lest devotion be extinguished +as soon as it is kindled." + +We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even +while his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of +his being deputed by God, according to Jer. 1:5, "And I made thee a +prophet unto the nations." + +Reply Obj. 3: Every gift of grace raises man to something above human +nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the substance +of the act--for instance, the working of miracles, and the knowledge +of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom--and for such +acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a thing +is above human nature as to the mode but not the substance of the +act--for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror of His +creatures--and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 3] + +Whether Prophecy Is Only About Future Contingencies? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is only about future +contingencies. For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super Psalt. i] that +"prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue +of things with unchangeable truth." Now issues pertain to future +contingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future +contingencies alone. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the grace of prophecy is +differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things; +and from the discernment of spirits, which is about created spirits; +and from knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts +are differentiated by their objects, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. +2). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected +with any of the above. Therefore it follows that it is about future +contingencies alone. + +Obj. 3: Further, difference of object causes difference of species, +as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Therefore, if one prophecy is +about future contingencies, and another about other things, it would +seem to follow that these are different species of prophecy. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that some +prophecies are "about the future, for instance (Isa. 7:14), 'Behold a +virgin shall conceive, and bear a son'"; some are "about the past, as +(Gen. 1:1), 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth'"; some +are "about the present," as (1 Cor. 14:24, 25), "If all prophesy, and +there come in one that believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart +are made manifest." Therefore prophecy is not about future +contingencies alone. + +_I answer that,_ A manifestation made by means of a certain light can +extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the +body's sight extends to all colors, and the soul's natural knowledge +extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active intellect. +Now prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is +possible to know all things both Divine and human, both spiritual and +corporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to them +all. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation +concerning the perfections of God and the angels was made to Isa. +6:1, where it is written, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high +and elevated." Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring to +natural bodies, according to the words of Isa. 40:12, "Who hath +measured the waters in the hollow of His hand," etc. It also contains +matters relating to human conduct, according to Isa. 58:1, "Deal thy +bread to the hungry," etc.; and besides this it contains things +pertaining to future events, according to Isa. 47:9, "Two things +shall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness and widowhood." + +Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge, +it must be observed that the more remote things are from our +knowledge the more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things +there are three degrees. One degree comprises things remote from the +knowledge, either sensitive or intellective, of some particular man, +but not from the knowledge of all men; thus a particular man knows by +sense things present to him locally, which another man does not know +by human sense, since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew +prophetically what his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4 +Kings 5:26), and in like manner the secret thoughts of one man are +manifested prophetically to another, according to 1 Cor. 14:25; and +again in this way what one man knows by demonstration may be revealed +to another prophetically. + +The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge +of all men without exception, not that they are in themselves +unknowable, but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such as +the mystery of the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim +saying: "Holy, Holy, Holy," etc. (Isa. 6:3). + +The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all +men, through being in themselves unknowable; such are future +contingencies, the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that +which is predicated universally and by its very nature, takes +precedence of that which is predicated in a limited and relative +sense, it follows that revelation of future events belongs most +properly to prophecy, and from this prophecy apparently takes its +name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "And since a prophet +is so called because he foretells the future, his name loses its +significance when he speaks of the past or present." + +Reply Obj. 1: Prophecy is there defined according to its proper +signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from +the other gratuitous graces. + +Reply Obj. 2: This is evident from what has just been said. We might +also reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy have +the common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine +revelation; whereas those that are the matter of _wisdom, knowledge,_ +and the _interpretation of speeches,_ can be known by man through +natural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through the +enlightening of the Divine light. As to _faith,_ although it is about +things invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of +the things believed, but with a man's certitude of assent to things +known by others. + +Reply Obj. 3: The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the Divine +light, which being one, gives unity of species to prophecy, although +the things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 4] + +Whether by the Divine Revelation a Prophet Knows All That Can Be +Known Prophetically? + +Objection 1: It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet +knows all that can be known prophetically. For it is written (Amos +3:7): "The Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His +servants the prophets." Now whatever is revealed prophetically is +something done by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is +revealed to the prophet. + +Obj. 2: Further, "God's works are perfect" (Deut. 32:4). Now prophecy +is a "Divine revelation," as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it is +perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible matters of +prophecy were revealed prophetically, since "the perfect is that +which lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters +of prophecy are revealed to the prophet. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy is more +powerful than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human +science. Now a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains +to that science; thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar. +Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that "sometimes +the spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet's mind +and nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but +to the future." Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of +prophecy. + +_I answer that,_ Things which differ from one another need not exist +simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are +connected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above +(I-II, Q. 65, AA. 1, 2) that all the virtues must needs exist +simultaneously on account of prudence and charity. Now all the things +that are known through some principle are connected in that principle +and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as +regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all +that can be known through that principle; whereas if the common +principle is unknown, or known only in a general way, it does not +follow that one knows all those things at the same time, but each of +them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of +them may be known, and some not. + +Now the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested +by the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets do not see +in itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible +matters of prophecy; but each one knows some of them according to the +special revelation of this or that matter. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that are +necessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every +one, but some to one, and some to another. + +Reply Obj. 2: Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect in the +genus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (1 Cor. 13:8) that +"prophecies shall be made void," and that "we prophesy in part," i.e. +imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its perfection +in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 Cor. 113:10): "When +that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done +away." Consequently it does not follow that nothing is lacking to +prophetic revelation, but that it lacks none of those things to which +prophecy is directed. + +Reply Obj. 3: He who has a science knows the principles of that +science, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends; +wherefore to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know +whatever is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle +of prophetic knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy; +wherefore the comparison fails. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 5] + +Whether the Prophet Always Distinguishes What He Says by His Own +Spirit from What He Says by the Prophetic Spirit? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the prophet always distinguishes what +he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit. +For Augustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said "she +could, through a certain feeling, which in words she could not +express, discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her +own soul." Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated above (A. +3). Therefore the prophet always distinguishes what he says by the +spirit of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit. + +Obj. 2: Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome +[*Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome] +says. Now the prophets were commanded (Jer. 23:28): "The prophet that +hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him +speak My word with truth." Therefore the prophet can distinguish what +he has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise. + +Obj. 3: Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is +greater than that which results from the light of natural reason. Now +he that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain +that he has it. Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is +much more certain that he has it. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "It must be +observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter +certain things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to +prophesying, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit." + +_I answer that,_ The prophet's mind is instructed by God in two ways: +in one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most +mysterious instinct to "which the human mind is subjected without +knowing it," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the +prophet has the greatest certitude about those things which he knows +by an express revelation, and he has it for certain that they are +revealed to him by God; wherefore it is written (Jer. 26:15): "In +truth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all these words in your +hearing." Else, were he not certain about this, the faith which +relies on the utterances of the prophet would not be certain. A sign +of the prophet's certitude may be gathered from the fact that Abraham +being admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his +only-begotten son, which he nowise would have done had he not been +most certain of the Divine revelation. + +On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by +instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully +whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own +spirit. And those things which we know by Divine instinct are not all +manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something +imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are to +understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to +error, "they are very soon set aright by the Holy Ghost [*For +instance, cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq.], and from Him they hear the truth, +so that they reproach themselves for having said what was untrue," as +Gregory adds (Hom. i super Ezech.). + +The arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation +that is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the +objections is clear. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 6] + +Whether Things Known or Declared Prophetically Can Be False? + +Objection 1: It would seem that things known or declared +prophetically can be false. For prophecy is about future +contingencies, as stated above (A. 3). Now future contingencies may +possibly not happen; else they would happen of necessity. Therefore +the matter of prophecy can be false. + +Obj. 2: Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (Isa. 38:1): +"Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not +live," and yet fifteen years were added to his life (4 Kings 20:6). +Again the Lord said (Jer. 18:7, 8): "I will suddenly speak against a +nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to +destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent +of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to +do them." This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites, +according to John 3:10: "The Lord [Vulg.: 'God'] had mercy with +regard to the evil which He had said that He would do to them, and He +did it not." Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false. + +Obj. 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the +antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely +necessary, because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands +in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the +premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary +always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in I +Poster. 6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the +following conditional proposition must needs be true: "If a thing has +been prophesied, it will be." Now the antecedent of this conditional +proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past. +Therefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet this is +unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies. +Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false. + +_On the contrary,_ Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that +"prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue +of things with invariable truth." Now the truth of prophecy would not +be invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing false +can come under prophecy. + +_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said (AA. 1, +3, 5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the form of +teaching on the prophet's intellect, by Divine revelation. Now the +truth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the +knowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the +teacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is +a likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense +when he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that "prophecy is the seal +of the Divine foreknowledge." Consequently the same truth must needs +be in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge, +under which nothing false can possibly come, as stated in the First +Part (Q. 16, A. 8). Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13) the +certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the +contingency of future singular events, because that knowledge regards +the future as present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore +prophecy also, which is an "impressed likeness" or "seal of the +Divine foreknowledge," does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the +contingency of future things. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two +ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it sees +them in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch +as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects. And +though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are +determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, they +are not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again, +though this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine +intellect, it is not always united in the prophetic revelation, +because an imprint made by an active cause is not always on a par +with the virtue of that cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic +revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in +so far as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves: and +such things happen in the same way as foretold, for example this +saying of Isa. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive." Sometimes, +however, the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the +Divine foreknowledge as knowing the order of causes to effects; and +then at times the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy +does not cover a falsehood, for the meaning of the prophecy is that +inferior causes, whether they be natural causes or human acts, are so +disposed as to lead to such a result. In this way we are to +understand the saying of Isa. 38:1: "Thou shalt die, and not live"; +in other words, "The disposition of thy body has a tendency to +death": and the saying of Jonah 3:4, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh +shall be destroyed," that is to say, "Its merits demand that it +should be destroyed." God is said "to repent," metaphorically, +inasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by +"changing His sentence, although He changes not His counsel" [*Cf. I, +Q. 19, A. 7, ad 2]. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as +the truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional +proposition: "If this was prophesied, it will be," is true in the same +way as the proposition: "If this was foreknown, it will be": for in +both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the +consequent is necessary, considered, not as something future in our +regard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in +the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13, ad 2). +_______________________ + +QUESTION 172 + +OF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are +six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether prophecy is natural? + +(2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels? + +(3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy? + +(4) Whether a good life is requisite? + +(5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons? + +(6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 1] + +Whether Prophecy Can Be Natural? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory +says (Dial. iv, 26) that "sometimes the mere strength of the soul is +sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things": and Augustine says +(Gen. ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according as it is +withdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future +[*Cf. I, Q. 86, A. 4, ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy. Therefore +the soul can acquire prophecy naturally. + +Obj. 2: Further, the human soul's knowledge is more alert while one +wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally +foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil. +[*De Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work quoted]). +Much more therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future. + +Obj. 3: Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb +animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things +that concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is +evident from their gathering grain into their nest before the rain +commences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be +gathered from their movements in avoiding places exposed to storm. +Much more therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns +themselves, and of such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes +from nature. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18): "When prophecy shall +fail, the people shall be scattered abroad"; wherefore it is evident +that prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now +"nature does not fail in necessaries" [*Aristotle, _De Anima_ iii, +9]. Therefore it seems that prophecy is from nature. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 1:21): "For prophecy came +not by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke, +inspired by the Holy Ghost." Therefore prophecy comes not from +nature, but through the gift of the Holy Ghost. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 171, A. 6, ad 2) prophetic +foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as +they are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes. +Now, to foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper +to the Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as +stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13). Wherefore such like +foreknowledge of the future cannot come from nature, but from Divine +revelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be foreknown +in their causes with a natural knowledge even by man: thus a +physician foreknows future health or death in certain causes, through +previous experimental knowledge of the order of those causes to such +effects. Such like knowledge of the future may be understood to be in +a man by nature in two ways. In one way that the soul, from that +which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus Augustine +says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "Some have deemed the human soul to +contain a certain power of divination." This seems to be in accord +with the opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit. vi], who held that +our souls have knowledge of all things by participating in the ideas; +but that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with the body; +yet in some more, in others less, according to a difference in bodily +purity. According to this it might be said that men, whose souls are +not much obscured through union with the body, are able to foreknow +such like future things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion +Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "How is it that the soul +cannot always have this power of divination, since it always wishes +to have it?" + +Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of +Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as stated +in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 6), it is better to have recourse to +another explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge +of the future, but that they can acquire it by means of experience, +wherein they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends +on the perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of +his understanding. + +Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two +ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First, +because the former can be about any events whatever, and this +infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can be had +naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may +extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is "according to the +unchangeable truth" [*Q. 171, A. 3, Obj. 1], while the latter is not, +and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not the +latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above (Q. +171, A. 3), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally surpass +human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy strictly so +called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine revelation. + +Reply Obj. 1: When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things, it +becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual substances +[*Cf. I, Q. 88, A. 4, ad 2], and also is more inclined to receive the +subtle motions which take place in the human imagination through the +impression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving +them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial. +iv, 26) that "the soul, at the approach of death, foresees certain +future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature," inasmuch as +it is receptive even of slight impressions. Or again, it knows future +things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own power, +because according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), "if this were +so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed," +which is clearly false. + +Obj. 2: Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either from +the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause, as +stated above (Q. 95, A. 6), when we were treating of divination. Now +both these causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than +while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied with external +sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle impressions +either of spiritual substances, or even of natural causes; although +as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more alert in +waking than in sleeping. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future +events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their +imagination is moved more than man's, because man's imagination, +especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than +according to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects +much more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes +effects in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy +assists man still more. + +Reply Obj. 4: The prophetic light extends even to the direction of +human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government +of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this +nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 2] + +Whether Prophetic Revelation Comes Through the Angels? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prophetic revelation does not come +through the angels. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine wisdom +"conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, +and the prophets." Now wisdom makes the friends of God immediately. +Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the +medium of the angels. + +Obj. 2: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. +But the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1 +Cor. 12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." +Therefore the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel. + +Obj. 3: Further, Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i] says that prophecy +is a "Divine revelation": whereas if it were conveyed by the angels, +it would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is not +bestowed by means of the angels. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "Our glorious +fathers received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers"; and +he is speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic +revelation is conveyed by means of the angels. + +_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), "Things that are of +God are well ordered [*Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of +God.']." Now the Divine ordering, according to Dionysius [*Coel. +Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v], is such that the lowest things are directed +by middle things. Now the angels hold a middle position between God +and men, in that they have a greater share in the perfection of the +Divine goodness than men have. Wherefore the Divine enlightenments +and revelations are conveyed from God to men by the angels. Now +prophetic knowledge is bestowed by Divine enlightenment and +revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is conveyed by the angels. + +Reply Obj. 1: Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a +perfection of the will, in which God alone can form an impression; +whereas prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel +also can form an impression, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, A. +1), wherefore the comparison fails between the two. + +Reply Obj. 2: The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as +their first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men by +means of the angels. + +Reply Obj. 3: The work of the instrument is ascribed to the principal +agent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a minister is +like an instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the +ministry of the angels, is said to be Divine. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 3] + +Whether a Natural Disposition Is Requisite for Prophecy? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite +for prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to +the disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos +1:2, "The Lord will roar from Sion," says: "Anyone who wishes to make +a comparison naturally turns to those things of which he has +experience, and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors +compare their enemies to the winds, and their losses to a shipwreck. +In like manner Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to +that which is inspired by the lion's roar." Now that which is +received by a thing according to the mode of the recipient requires a +natural disposition. Therefore prophecy requires a natural +disposition. + +Obj. 2: Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty than +those of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders the +considerations of acquired science, since many are prevented by +natural indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculations of +science. Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for +the contemplation of prophecy. + +Obj. 3: Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle +than an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy are +hindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his +commentary on Matthew [*The quotation is from Origen, Hom. vi in +Num.] that "at the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy +Ghost will not be vouchsafed, even though it be a prophet that +fulfils the duty of procreation." Much more therefore does a natural +indisposition hinder prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good +natural disposition is requisite for prophecy. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in +Ev.): "He," namely the Holy Ghost, "fills the boy harpist and makes +him a Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes +him a prophet." Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition, +but depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is +written (1 Cor. 12:2): "All these things, one and the same Spirit +worketh, dividing to every one according as He will." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), prophecy in its true and +exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes +from a natural cause is not called prophecy except in a relative +sense. Now we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient +cause requires neither previous matter nor previous disposition of +matter in His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant +to bring into being matter and disposition and form, so neither does +He require a previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is +able to produce both the spiritual effect and at the same time the +fitting disposition as requisite according to the order of nature. +More than this, He is able at the same time, by creation, to produce +the subject, so as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the +prophetic grace, at the very instant of its creation. + +Reply Obj. 1: It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons the +thing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no +change in a prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him +incompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power. + +Reply Obj. 2: The considerations of science proceed from a natural +cause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in +matter. This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy. + +Reply Obj. 3: A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be an +obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were +altogether deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man +might be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong +passion, whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by +any other passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is +removed by the Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 4] + +Whether a Good Life Is Requisite for Prophecy? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a good life is requisite for +prophecy. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that the wisdom of God +"through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the +friends of God, and prophets." Now there can be no holiness without a +good life and sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without +a good life and sanctifying grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend, according +to John 15:15, "But I have called you friends, because all things +whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you." Now +God reveals His secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore it +would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is +impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly prophecy cannot be +without charity; and charity is impossible without sanctifying grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 7:15): "Beware of false +prophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they +are ravening wolves." Now all who are without grace are likened +inwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false +prophets. Therefore no man is a true prophet except he be good by +grace. + +Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*Cf. De +Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted]) that "if +interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be +bestowed on any but the best." Now it is evident that the gift of +prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed +only to the best men. + +_On the contrary,_ To those who had said, "Lord, have we not +prophesied in Thy name?" this reply is made: "I never knew you" +(Matt. 7:22, 23). Now "the Lord knoweth who are His" (2 Tim. 2:19). +Therefore prophecy can be in those who are not God's by grace. + +_I answer that,_ A good life may be considered from two points of +view. First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying +grace. Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and +the outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order +that man's soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine +says (De Trin. xv, 18): "A man is not transferred from the left side +to the right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a +lover of God and of his neighbor." Hence whatever can be without +charity can be without sanctifying grace, and consequently without +goodness of life. Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is +clear on two counts. First, on account of their respective acts: for +prophecy pertains to the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the +will, which power is perfected by charity. For this reason the +Apostle (1 Cor. 13) reckons prophecy with other things pertinent to +the intellect, that can be had without charity. Secondly, on account +of their respective ends. For prophecy like other gratuitous graces +is given for the good of the Church, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, "The +manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and +is not directly intended to unite man's affections to God, which is +the purpose of charity. Therefore prophecy can be without a good +life, as regards the first root of this goodness. + +If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of +the soul, and external actions, from this point of view an evil life +is an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be +raised very high in order to contemplate spiritual things, and this +is hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of +external things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kings +4:38) that they "dwelt together with [Vulg.: 'before']" Eliseus, +leading a solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should +be a hindrance to the gift of prophecy. + +Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man both +for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind; and +such are those whom Divine wisdom, "conveying itself" by sanctifying +grace to their minds, "maketh the friends of God, and prophets." +Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the good of +others. Hence Jerome commenting on Matt. 7:22, says: "Sometimes +prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons +are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but +either to the invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of +those who invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear." + +Reply Obj. 2: Gregory [*Hom. xxvii in Ev.] expounding this passage +[*John 15:15] says: "Since we love the lofty things of heaven as soon +as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love is +to know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because +having renounced earthly desires they were kindled by the torches of +perfect love." In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed +to prophets. + +Reply Obj. 3: Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, but only those +whose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. +in Matth., Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom, and +falsely ascribed to him] that "Catholic teachers, though they be +sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves, +because they do not purpose the destruction of Christians." And since +prophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest that such +are false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God. + +Reply Obj. 4: God's gifts are not always bestowed on those who are +simply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best +as regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants +the gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 5] + +Whether Any Prophecy Comes from the Demons? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons. +For prophecy is "a Divine revelation," according to Cassiodorus +[*Prol. in Psalt. i]. But that which is done by a demon is not +Divine. Therefore no prophecy can be from a demon. + +Obj. 2: Further, some kind of enlightenment is requisite for +prophetic knowledge, as stated above (Q. 171, AA. 2, 3). Now the +demons do not enlighten the human intellect, as stated above in the +First Part (Q. 119, A. 3). Therefore no prophecy can come from the +demons. + +Obj. 3: Further, a sign is worthless if it betokens contraries. Now +prophecy is a sign in confirmation of faith; wherefore a gloss on +Rom. 12:6, "Either prophecy to be used according to the rule of +faith," says: "Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with +prophecy, which is the first proof of the reasonableness of our +faith; since believers, after receiving the Spirit, prophesied." +Therefore prophecy cannot be bestowed by the demons. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (3 Kings 18:19): "Gather unto me all +Israel unto mount Carmel, and the prophets of Baal four hundred and +fifty, and the prophets of the grove four hundred, who eat at +Jezebel's table." Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it +would seem that there is also a prophecy from the demons. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 171, A. 1), prophecy denotes +knowledge far removed from human knowledge. Now it is evident that an +intellect of a higher order can know some things that are far removed +from the knowledge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human +intellect there is not only the Divine intellect, but also the +intellects of good and bad angels according to the order of nature. +Hence the demons, even by their natural knowledge, know certain +things remote from men's knowledge, which they can reveal to men: +although those things which God alone knows are remote simply and +most of all. + +Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by Divine +revelations alone; yet the revelation which is made by the demons may +be called prophecy in a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom +something is revealed by the demons are styled in the Scriptures as +prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance as "false +prophets," or "prophets of idols." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. +xii, 19): "When the evil spirit lays hold of a man for such purposes +as these," namely visions, "he makes him either devilish, or +possessed, or a false prophet." + +Reply Obj. 1: Cassiodorus is here defining prophecy in its proper and +simple acceptation. + +Reply Obj. 2: The demons reveal what they know to men, not by +enlightening the intellect, but by an imaginary vision, or even by +audible speech; and in this way this prophecy differs from true +prophecy. + +Reply Obj. 3: The prophecy of the demons can be distinguished from +Divine prophecy by certain, and even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom +says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John +Chrysostom] that "some prophesy by the spirit of the devil, such as +diviners, but they may be discerned by the fact that the devil +sometimes utters what is false, the Holy Ghost never." Wherefore it +is written (Deut. 18:21, 22): "If in silent thought thou answer: How +shall I know the word that the Lord hath spoken? Thou shalt have this +sign: Whatsoever that same prophet foretelleth in the name of the +Lord, and it come not to pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken." +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 6] + +Whether the Prophets of the Demons Ever Foretell the Truth? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets of the demons never +foretell the truth. For Ambrose [*Hilary the Deacon (Ambrosiaster) on +1 Cor. 12:3] says that "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from +the Holy Ghost." Now the prophets of the demons do not speak from the +Holy Ghost, because "there is no concord between Christ and Belial +[*'What concord hath Christ with Belial?']" (2 Cor. 6:15). Therefore +it would seem that they never foretell the truth. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as true prophets are inspired by the Spirit of +truth, so the prophets of the demons are inspired by the spirit of +untruth, according to 3 Kings 22:22, "I will go forth, and be a lying +spirit in the mouth of all his prophets." Now the prophets inspired +by the Holy Ghost never speak false, as stated above (Q. 111, A. 6). +Therefore the prophets of the demons never speak truth. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is said of the devil (John 8:44) that "when he +speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for the devil is a liar, and +the father thereof," i.e. of lying. Now by inspiring his prophets, +the devil speaks only of his own, for he is not appointed God's +minister to declare the truth, since "light hath no fellowship with +darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath light with darkness?']" (2 +Cor. 6:14). Therefore the prophets of the demons never foretell the +truth. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Num. 22:14, says that "Balaam was a +diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons +and the magic art." Now he foretold many true things, for instance +that which is to be found in Num. 24:17: "A star shall rise out of +Jacob, and a scepter shall spring up from Israel." Therefore even the +prophets of the demons foretell the truth. + +_I answer that,_ As the good is in relation to things, so is the true +in relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one +that is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for +any knowledge to be wholly false, without some mixture of truth. +Hence Bede says [*Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12; Cf. Augustine, QQ. +Evang. ii, 40] that "no teaching is so false that it never mingles +truth with falsehood." Hence the teaching of the demons, with which +they instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is +rendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to falsehood by +the semblance of truth, even as the will is seduced to evil by the +semblance of goodness. Wherefore Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in +Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "The +devil is allowed sometimes to speak true things, in order that his +unwonted truthfulness may gain credit for his lie." + +Reply Obj. 1: The prophets of the demons do not always speak from the +demons' revelation, but sometimes by Divine inspiration. This was +evidently the case with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke +to him (Num. 22:12), though he was a prophet of the demons, because +God makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good. Hence He +foretells certain truths even by the demons' prophets, both that the +truth may be rendered more credible, since even its foes bear witness +to it, and also in order that men, by believing such men, may be more +easily led on to truth. Wherefore also the Sibyls foretold many true +things about Christ. + +Yet even when the demons' prophets are instructed by the demons, they +foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of their own nature, the +author of which is the Holy Ghost, and sometimes by revelation of the +good spirits, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): so that +even then this truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 2: A true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit of +truth, in Whom there is no falsehood, wherefore He never says what is +not true; whereas a false prophet is not always instructed by the +spirit of untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth. Even +the very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things, sometimes +false, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those things are called the demons' own, which they +have of themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of +themselves but of God, those things which belong to them by nature: +and it is by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell +the truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes use of them to +make known the truth which is to be accomplished through them, by +revealing Divine mysteries to them through the angels, as already +stated (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19; I, Q. 109, A. 4, ad 1). +_______________________ + +QUESTION 173 + +OF THE MANNER IN WHICH PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE IS CONVEYED +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the manner in which prophetic knowledge is +conveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the prophets see God's very essence? + +(2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the infusion of +certain species, or by the infusion of Divine light alone? + +(3) Whether prophetic revelation is always accompanied by abstraction +from the sense? + +(4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by knowledge of the things +prophesied? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 1] + +Whether the Prophets See the Very Essence of God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets see the very essence of +God, for a gloss on Isa. 38:1, "Take order with thy house, for thou +shalt die and not live," says: "Prophets can read in the book of +God's foreknowledge in which all things are written." Now God's +foreknowledge is His very essence. Therefore prophets see God's very +essence. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 7) that "in that +eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we see with +the mind's eye the type both of our being and of our actions." Now, +of all men, prophets have the highest knowledge of Divine things. +Therefore they, especially, see the Divine essence. + +Obj. 3: Further, future contingencies are foreknown by the prophets +"with unchangeable truth." Now future contingencies exist thus in God +alone. Therefore the prophets see God Himself. + +_On the contrary,_ The vision of the Divine essence is not made void +in heaven; whereas "prophecy is made void" (1 Cor. 13:8). Therefore +prophecy is not conveyed by a vision of the Divine essence. + +_I answer that,_ Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge as existing afar +off. Wherefore it is said of the prophets (Heb. 11:13) that "they +were beholding . . . afar off." But those who are in heaven and in +the state of bliss see, not as from afar off, but rather, as it were, +from near at hand, according to Ps. 139:14, "The upright shall dwell +with Thy countenance." Hence it is evident that prophetic knowledge +differs from the perfect knowledge, which we shall have in heaven, so +that it is distinguished therefrom as the imperfect from the perfect, +and when the latter comes the former is made void, as appears from +the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 13:10). + +Some, however, wishing to discriminate between prophetic knowledge +and the knowledge of the blessed, have maintained that the prophets +see the very essence of God (which they call the "mirror of +eternity") [*Cf. De Veritate, xii, 6; Sent. II, D, XI, part 2, art. +2, ad 4], not, however, in the way in which it is the object of the +blessed, but as containing the types [*Cf. I, Q. 15] of future +events. But this is altogether impossible. For God is the object of +bliss in His very essence, according to the saying of Augustine +(Confess. v, 4): "Happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not +these," i.e. creatures. Now it is not possible to see the types of +creatures in the very essence of God without seeing It, both because +the Divine essence is Itself the type of all things that are +made--the ideal type adding nothing to the Divine essence save only a +relationship to the creature--and because knowledge of a thing in +itself--and such is the knowledge of God as the object of heavenly +bliss--precedes knowledge of that thing in its relation to something +else--and such is the knowledge of God as containing the types of +things. Consequently it is impossible for prophets to see God as +containing the types of creatures, and yet not as the object of +bliss. Therefore we must conclude that the prophetic vision is not +the vision of the very essence of God, and that the prophets do not +see in the Divine essence Itself the things they do see, but that +they see them in certain images, according as they are enlightened by +the Divine light. + +Wherefore Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), in speaking of prophetic +visions, says that "the wise theologian calls that vision divine +which is effected by images of things lacking a bodily form through +the seer being rapt in divine things." And these images illumined by +the Divine light have more of the nature of a mirror than the Divine +essence: since in a mirror images are formed from other things, and +this cannot be said of God. Yet the prophet's mind thus enlightened +may be called a mirror, in so far as a likeness of the truth of the +Divine foreknowledge is formed therein, for which reason it is called +the "mirror of eternity," as representing God's foreknowledge, for +God in His eternity sees all things as present before Him, as stated +above (Q. 172, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: The prophets are said to read the book of God's +foreknowledge, inasmuch as the truth is reflected from God's +foreknowledge on the prophet's mind. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man is said to see in the First Truth the type of his +existence, in so far as the image of the First Truth shines forth on +man's mind, so that he is able to know himself. + +Reply Obj. 3: From the very fact that future contingencies are in God +according to unalterable truth, it follows that God can impress a +like knowledge on the prophet's mind without the prophet seeing God +in His essence. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 2] + +Whether, in Prophetic Revelation, New Species of Things Are Impressed +on the Prophet's Mind, or Merely a New Light? + +Objection 1: It would seem that in prophetic revelation no new +species of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, but only a new +light. For a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2 says that "prophets draw +comparisons from things with which they are conversant." But if +prophetic vision were effected by means of species newly impressed, +the prophet's previous experience of things would be inoperative. +Therefore no new species are impressed on the prophet's soul, but +only the prophetic light. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "it is +not imaginative but intellective vision that makes the prophet"; +wherefore it is declared (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of +understanding in a vision." Now intellective vision, as stated in the +same book (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6) is not effected by means of images, +but by the very truth of things. Therefore it would seem that +prophetic revelation is not effected by impressing species on the +soul. + +Obj. 3: Further, by the gift of prophecy the Holy Ghost endows man +with something that surpasses the faculty of nature. Now man can by +his natural faculties form all kinds of species of things. Therefore +it would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species of things +are impressed, but merely an intellectual light. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied" +their "visions, and I have used similitudes, by the ministry of the +prophets." Now multiplicity of visions results, not from a diversity +of intellectual light, which is common to every prophetic vision, but +from a diversity of species, whence similitudes also result. +Therefore it seems that in prophetic revelation new species of things +are impressed, and not merely an intellectual light. + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "prophetic +knowledge pertains most of all to the intellect." Now two things have +to be considered in connection with the knowledge possessed by the +human mind, namely the acceptance or representation of things, and +the judgment of the things represented. Now things are represented to +the human mind under the form of species: and according to the order +of nature, they must be represented first to the senses, secondly to +the imagination, thirdly to the passive intellect, and these are +changed by the species derived from the phantasms, which change +results from the enlightening action of the active intellect. Now in +the imagination there are the forms of sensible things not only as +received from the senses, but also transformed in various ways, +either on account of some bodily transformation (as in the case of +people who are asleep or out of their senses), or through the +coordination of the phantasms, at the command of reason, for the +purpose of understanding something. For just as the various +arrangements of the letters of the alphabet convey various ideas to +the understanding, so the various coordinations of the phantasms +produce various intelligible species of the intellect. + +As to the judgment formed by the human mind, it depends on the power +of the intellectual light. + +Now the gift of prophecy confers on the human mind something which +surpasses the natural faculty in both these respects, namely as to +the judgment which depends on the inflow of intellectual light, and +as to the acceptance or representation of things, which is effected +by means of certain species. Human teaching may be likened to +prophetic revelation in the second of these respects, but not in the +first. For a man represents certain things to his disciple by signs +of speech, but he cannot enlighten him inwardly as God does. + +But it is the first of these two that holds the chief place in +prophecy, since judgment is the complement of knowledge. Wherefore if +certain things are divinely represented to any man by means of +imaginary likenesses, as happened to Pharaoh (Gen. 41:1-7) and to +Nabuchodonosor (Dan. 4:1-2), or even by bodily likenesses, as +happened to Balthasar (Dan. 5:5), such a man is not to be considered +a prophet, unless his mind be enlightened for the purpose of +judgment; and such an apparition is something imperfect in the genus +of prophecy. Wherefore some [*Rabbi Moyses, Doct. Perplex. II, xxxvi] +have called this "prophetic ecstasy," and such is divination by +dreams. And yet a man will be a prophet, if his intellect be +enlightened merely for the purpose of judging of things seen in +imagination by others, as in the case of Joseph who interpreted +Pharaoh's dream. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), +"especially is he a prophet who excels in both respects, so," to wit, +"as to see in spirit likenesses significant of things corporeal, and +understand them by the quickness of his intellect." + +Now sensible forms are divinely presented to the prophet's mind, +sometimes externally by means of the senses--thus Daniel saw the +writing on the wall (Dan. 5:25)--sometimes by means of imaginary +forms, either of exclusively Divine origin and not received through +the senses (for instance, if images of colors were imprinted on the +imagination of one blind from birth), or divinely coordinated from +those derived from the senses--thus Jeremiah saw the "boiling caldron +. . . from the face of the north" (Jer. 1:13)--or by the direct +impression of intelligible species on the mind, as in the case of +those who receive infused scientific knowledge or wisdom, such as +Solomon or the apostles. + +But intellectual light is divinely imprinted on the human +mind--sometimes for the purpose of judging of things seen by others, +as in the case of Joseph, quoted above, and of the apostles whose +understanding our Lord opened "that they might understand the +scriptures" (Luke 24:45); and to this pertains the "interpretation of +speeches"--sometimes for the purpose of judging according to Divine +truth, of the things which a man apprehends in the ordinary course of +nature--sometimes for the purpose of discerning truthfully and +efficaciously what is to be done, according to Isa. 63:14, "The +Spirit of the Lord was their leader." + +Hence it is evident that prophetic revelation is conveyed sometimes +by the mere infusion of light, sometimes by imprinting species anew, +or by a new coordination of species. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, sometimes in prophetic revelation +imaginary species previously derived from the senses are divinely +coordinated so as to accord with the truth to be revealed, and then +previous experience is operative in the production of the images, but +not when they are impressed on the mind wholly from without. + +Reply Obj. 2: Intellectual vision is not effected by means of bodily +and individual images, but by an intelligible image. Hence Augustine +says (De Trin. ix, 11) that "the soul possesses a certain likeness of +the species known to it." Sometimes this intelligible image is, in +prophetic revelation, imprinted immediately by God, sometimes it +results from pictures in the imagination, by the aid of the prophetic +light, since a deeper truth is gathered from these pictures in the +imagination by means of the enlightenment of the higher light. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is true that man is able by his natural powers to +form all kinds of pictures in the imagination, by simply considering +these pictures, but not so that they be directed to the +representation of intelligible truths that surpass his intellect, +since for this purpose he needs the assistance of a supernatural +light. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 3] + +Whether the Prophetic Vision Is Always Accompanied by Abstraction +from the Senses? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the prophetic vision is always +accompanied by abstraction from the senses. For it is written (Num. +12:6): "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to +him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." Now a gloss says +at the beginning of the Psalter, "a vision that takes place by dreams +and apparitions consists of things which seem to be said or done." +But when things seem to be said or done, which are neither said nor +done, there is abstraction from the senses. Therefore prophecy is +always accompanied by abstraction from the senses. + +Obj. 2: Further, when one power is very intent on its own operation, +other powers are drawn away from theirs; thus men who are very intent +on hearing something fail to see what takes place before them. Now in +the prophetic vision the intellect is very much uplifted, and intent +on its act. Therefore it seems that the prophetic vision is always +accompanied by abstraction from the senses. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same thing cannot, at the same time, tend in +opposite directions. Now in the prophetic vision the mind tends to +the acceptance of things from above, and consequently it cannot at +the same time tend to sensible objects. Therefore it would seem +necessary for prophetic revelation to be always accompanied by +abstraction from the senses. + +Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 14:32): "The spirits +of the prophets are subject to the prophets." Now this were +impossible if the prophet were not in possession of his faculties, +but abstracted from his senses. Therefore it would seem that +prophetic vision is not accompanied by abstraction from the senses. + +_I answer that,_ As stated in the foregoing Article, the prophetic +revelation takes place in four ways: namely, by the infusion of an +intelligible light, by the infusion of intelligible species, by +impression or coordination of pictures in the imagination, and by the +outward presentation of sensible images. Now it is evident that there +is no abstraction from the senses, when something is presented to the +prophet's mind by means of sensible species--whether these be +divinely formed for this special purpose, as the bush shown to Moses +(Ex. 3:2), and the writing shown to Daniel (Dan. 5:)--or whether they +be produced by other causes; yet so that they are ordained by Divine +providence to be prophetically significant of something, as, for +instance, the Church was signified by the ark of Noah. + +Again, abstraction from the external senses is not rendered necessary +when the prophet's mind is enlightened by an intellectual light, or +impressed with intelligible species, since in us the perfect judgment +of the intellect is effected by its turning to sensible objects, +which are the first principles of our knowledge, as stated in the +First Part (Q. 84, A. 6). + +When, however, prophetic revelation is conveyed by images in the +imagination, abstraction from the senses is necessary lest the things +thus seen in imagination be taken for objects of external sensation. +Yet this abstraction from the senses is sometimes complete, so that a +man perceives nothing with his senses; and sometimes it is +incomplete, so that he perceives something with his senses, yet does +not fully discern the things he perceives outwardly from those he +sees in imagination. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): +"Those images of bodies which are formed in the soul are seen just as +bodily things themselves are seen by the body, so that we see with +our eyes one who is present, and at the same time we see with the +soul one who is absent, as though we saw him with our eyes." + +Yet this abstraction from the senses takes place in the prophets +without subverting the order of nature, as is the case with those who +are possessed or out of their senses; but is due to some well-ordered +cause. This cause may be natural--for instance, sleep--or +spiritual--for instance, the intenseness of the prophets' +contemplation; thus we read of Peter (Acts 10:9) that while he was +praying in the supper-room [*Vulg.: 'the house-top' or +'upper-chamber'] "he fell into an ecstasy"--or he may be carried away +by the Divine power, according to the saying of Ezechiel 1:3: "The +hand of the Lord was upon him." + +Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted refers to prophets in whom imaginary +pictures were formed or coordinated, either while asleep, which is +denoted by the word "dream," or while awake, which is signified by +the word "vision." + +Reply Obj. 2: When the mind is intent, in its act, upon distant +things which are far removed from the senses, the intensity of its +application leads to abstraction from the senses; but when it is +intent, in its act, upon the coordination of or judgment concerning +objects of sense, there is no need for abstraction from the senses. + +Reply Obj. 3: The movement of the prophetic mind results not from its +own power, but from a power acting on it from above. Hence there is +no abstraction from the senses when the prophet's mind is led to +judge or coordinate matters relating to objects of sense, but only +when the mind is raised to the contemplation of certain more lofty +things. + +Reply Obj. 4: The spirit of the prophets is said to be subject to the +prophets as regards the prophetic utterances to which the Apostle +refers in the words quoted; because, to wit, the prophets in +declaring what they have seen speak their own mind, and are not +thrown off their mental balance, like persons who are possessed, as +Priscilla and Montanus maintained. But as regards the prophetic +revelation itself, it would be more correct to say that the prophets +are subject to the spirit of prophecy, i.e. to the prophetic gift. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 4] + +Whether Prophets Always Know the Things Which They Prophesy? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets always know the things +which they prophesy. For, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), +"those to whom signs were shown in spirit by means of the likenesses +of bodily things, had not the gift of prophecy, unless the mind was +brought into action, so that those signs were also understood by +them." Now what is understood cannot be unknown. Therefore the +prophet is not ignorant of what he prophesies. + +Obj. 2: Further, the light of prophecy surpasses the light of natural +reason. Now one who possesses a science by his natural light, is not +ignorant of his scientific acquirements. Therefore he who utters +things by the prophetic light cannot ignore them. + +Obj. 3: Further, prophecy is directed for man's enlightenment; +wherefore it is written (2 Pet. 1:19): "We have the more firm +prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that +shineth in a dark place." Now nothing can enlighten others unless it +be lightsome in itself. Therefore it would seem that the prophet is +first enlightened so as to know what he declares to others. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 11:51): "And this he" +(Caiphas) "spoke, not of himself, but being the High Priest of that +year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation," etc. Now +Caiphas knew this not. Therefore not every prophet knows what he +prophesies. + +_I answer that,_ In prophetic revelation the prophet's mind is moved +by the Holy Ghost, as an instrument that is deficient in regard to +the principal agent. Now the prophet's mind is moved not only to +apprehend something, but also to speak or to do something; sometimes +indeed to all these three together, sometimes to two, sometimes to +one only, and in each case there may be a defect in the prophet's +knowledge. For when the prophet's mind is moved to think or apprehend +a thing, sometimes he is led merely to apprehend that thing, and +sometimes he is further led to know that it is divinely revealed to +him. + +Again, sometimes the prophet's mind is moved to speak something, so +that he understands what the Holy Ghost means by the words he utters; +like David who said (2 Kings 23:2): "The Spirit of the Lord hath +spoken by me"; while, on the other hand, sometimes the person whose +mind is moved to utter certain words knows not what the Holy Ghost +means by them, as was the case with Caiphas (John 11:51). + +Again, when the Holy Ghost moves a man's mind to do something, +sometimes the latter understands the meaning of it, like Jeremias who +hid his loin-cloth in the Euphrates (Jer. 13:1-11); while sometimes +he does not understand it--thus the soldiers, who divided Christ's +garments, understood not the meaning of what they did. + +Accordingly, when a man knows that he is being moved by the Holy +Ghost to think something, or signify something by word or deed, this +belongs properly to prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his +knowing it, this is not perfect prophecy, but a prophetic instinct. +Nevertheless it must be observed that since the prophet's mind is a +defective instrument, as stated above, even true prophets know not +all that the Holy Ghost means by the things they see, or speak, or +even do. + +And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections, since the +arguments given at the beginning refer to true prophets whose minds +are perfectly enlightened from above. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 174 + +OF THE DIVISION OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES) + +We must now consider the division of prophecy, and under this head +there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) The division of prophecy into its species; + +(2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which is without +imaginative vision? + +(3) The various degrees of prophecy; + +(4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets? + +(5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet? + +(6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time went on? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 1] + +Whether Prophecy Is Fittingly Divided into the Prophecy of Divine +Predestination, of Foreknowledge, and of Denunciation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is unfittingly divided +according to a gloss on Matt. 1:23, "Behold a virgin shall be with +child," where it is stated that "one kind of prophecy proceeds from +the Divine predestination, and must in all respects be accomplished +so that its fulfillment is independent of our will, for instance the +one in question. Another prophecy proceeds from God's foreknowledge: +and into this our will enters. And another prophecy is called +denunciation, which is significative of God's disapproval." For that +which results from every prophecy should not be reckoned a part of +prophecy. Now all prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge, +since the prophets "read in the book of foreknowledge," as a gloss +says on Isa. 38:1. Therefore it would seem that prophecy according to +foreknowledge should not be reckoned a species of prophecy. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as something is foretold in denunciation, so is +something foretold in promise, and both of these are subject to +alteration. For it is written (Jer. 18:7, 8): "I will suddenly speak +against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull +down, and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken +shall repent of their evil, I also will repent"--and this pertains to +the prophecy of denunciation, and afterwards the text continues in +reference to the prophecy of promise (Jer. 18:9, 10): "I will +suddenly speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build up and plant +it. If it shall do evil in My sight . . . I will repent of the good +that I have spoken to do unto it." Therefore as there is reckoned to +be a prophecy of denunciation, so should there be a prophecy of +promise. + +Obj. 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8): "There are seven kinds +of prophecy. The first is an ecstasy, which is the transport of the +mind: thus Peter saw a vessel descending from heaven with all manner +of beasts therein. The second kind is a vision, as we read in Isaias, +who says (Isa. 6:1): 'I saw the Lord sitting,' etc. The third kind is +a dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder. The fourth kind is from +the midst of a cloud: thus God spake to Moses. The fifth kind is a +voice from heaven, as that which called to Abraham saying (Gen. +22:11): 'Lay not thy hand upon the boy.' The sixth kind is taking up +a parable, as in the example of Balaam (Num. 23:7; 24:15). The +seventh kind is the fullness of the Holy Ghost, as in the case of +nearly all the prophets." Further, he mentions three kinds of vision; +"one by the eyes of the body, another by the soul's imagination, a +third by the eyes of the mind." Now these are not included in the +aforesaid division. Therefore it is insufficient. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Jerome to whom the gloss +above quoted is ascribed. + +_I answer that,_ The species of moral habits and acts are +distinguished according to their objects. Now the object of prophecy +is something known by God and surpassing the faculty of man. +Wherefore, according to the difference of such things, prophecy is +divided into various species, as assigned above. Now it has been +stated above (Q. 71, A. 6, ad 2) that the future is contained in the +Divine knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we +have the prophecy of _denunciation,_ which is not always fulfilled. +but it foretells the relation of cause to effect, which is sometimes +hindered by some other occurrence supervening. Secondly, God +foreknows certain things in themselves--either as to be accomplished +by Himself, and of such things is the prophecy of _predestination,_ +since, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30), "God +predestines things which are not in our power"--or as to be +accomplished through man's free-will, and of such is the prophecy of +_foreknowledge._ This may regard either good or evil, which does not +apply to the prophecy of predestination, since the latter regards +good alone. And since predestination is comprised under +foreknowledge, the gloss in the beginning of the Psalter assigns only +two species to prophecy, namely of _foreknowledge,_ and of +_denunciation._ + +Reply Obj. 1: Foreknowledge, properly speaking, denotes precognition +of future events in themselves, and in this sense it is reckoned a +species of prophecy. But in so far as it is used in connection with +future events, whether as in themselves, or as in their causes, it is +common to every species of prophecy. + +Reply Obj. 2: The prophecy of promise is included in the prophecy of +denunciation, because the aspect of truth is the same in both. But it +is denominated in preference from denunciation, because God is more +inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised blessings. + +Reply Obj. 3: Isidore divides prophecy according to the manner of +prophesying. Now we may distinguish the manner of prophesying--either +according to man's cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination, +and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision mentioned +both by him and by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7)--or according +to the different ways in which the prophetic current is received. +Thus as regards the enlightening of the intellect there is the +"fullness of the Holy Ghost" which he mentions in the seventh place. +As to the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he mentions +three, namely "dreams," to which he gives the third place; "vision," +which occurs to the prophet while awake and regards any kind of +ordinary object, and this he puts in the second place; and "ecstasy," +which results from the mind being uplifted to certain lofty things, +and to this he assigns the first place. As regards sensible signs he +reckons three kinds of prophecy, because a sensible sign is--either a +corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as "a cloud," +which he mentions in the fourth place--or a "voice" sounding from +without and conveyed to man's hearing--this he puts in the fifth +place--or a voice proceeding from a man, conveying something under a +similitude, and this pertains to the "parable" to which he assigns +the sixth place. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 2] + +Whether the Prophecy Which Is Accompanied by Intellective and +Imaginative Vision Is More Excellent Than That Which Is Accompanied +by Intellective Vision Alone? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the prophecy which has intellective +and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is +accompanied by intellective vision alone. For Augustine says (Gen. ad +lit. xii, 9): "He is less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing but +the signs representative of things, by means of the images of things +corporeal: he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed with the +understanding of these signs; but most of all is he a prophet, who +excels in both ways," and this refers to the prophet who has +intellective together with imaginative vision. Therefore this kind of +prophecy is more excellent. + +Obj. 2: Further, the greater a thing's power is, the greater the +distance to which it extends. Now the prophetic light pertains +chiefly to the mind, as stated above (Q. 173, A. 2). Therefore +apparently the prophecy that extends to the imagination is greater +than that which is confined to the intellect. + +Obj. 3: Further, Jerome (Prol. in Lib. Reg.) distinguishes the +"prophets" from the "sacred writers." Now all those whom he calls +prophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias, and the like) had intellective +together with imaginative vision: but not those whom he calls sacred +writers, as writing by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost (such as +Job, David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore it would seem more +proper to call prophets those who had intellective together with +imaginative vision, than those who had intellective vision alone. + +Obj. 4: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is +impossible for the Divine ray to shine on us, except as screened +round about by the many-colored sacred veils." Now the prophetic +revelation is conveyed by the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore +it seems that it cannot be without the veils of phantasms. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter that +"the most excellent manner of prophecy is when a man prophesies by +the mere inspiration of the Holy Ghost, apart from any outward +assistance of deed, word, vision, or dream." + +_I answer that,_ The excellence of the means is measured chiefly by +the end. Now the end of prophecy is the manifestation of a truth that +surpasses the faculty of man. Wherefore the more effective this +manifestation is, the more excellent the prophecy. But it is evident +that the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare +contemplation of the truth itself, is more effective than that which +is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it +approaches nearer to the heavenly vision whereby the truth is seen in +God's essence. Hence it follows that the prophecy whereby a +supernatural truth is seen by intellectual vision, is more excellent +than that in which a supernatural truth is manifested by means of the +similitudes of corporeal things in the vision of the imagination. + +Moreover the prophet's mind is shown thereby to be more lofty: even +as in human teaching the hearer, who is able to grasp the bare +intelligible truth the master propounds, is shown to have a better +understanding than one who needs to be taken by the hand and helped +by means of examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in +commendation of David's prophecy (2 Kings 23:3): "The strong one of +Israel spoke to me," and further on (2 Kings 23:4): "As the light of +the morning, when the sun riseth, shineth in the morning without +clouds." + +Reply Obj. 1: When a particular supernatural truth has to be revealed +by means of corporeal images, he that has both, namely the +intellectual light and the imaginary vision, is more a prophet than +he that has only one, because his prophecy is more perfect; and it is +in this sense that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the +prophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is revealed is greater +than all. + +Reply Obj. 2: The same judgment does not apply to things that are +sought for their own sake, as to things sought for the sake of +something else. For in things sought for their own sake, the agent's +power is the more effective according as it extends to more numerous +and more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more of, if +he is able to heal more people, and those who are further removed +from health. On the other hand, in things sought only for the sake of +something else, that agent would seem to have greater power, who is +able to achieve his purpose with fewer means and those nearest to +hand: thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to heal a +sick person by means of fewer and more gentle remedies. Now, in the +prophetic knowledge, imaginary vision is required, not for its own +sake, but on account of the manifestation of the intelligible truth. +Wherefore prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it +less. + +Reply Obj. 3: The fact that a particular predicate is applicable to +one thing and less properly to another, does not prevent this latter +from being simply better than the former: thus the knowledge of the +blessed is more excellent than the knowledge of the wayfarer, +although faith is more properly predicated of the latter knowledge, +because faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In like manner +prophecy implies a certain obscurity, and remoteness from the +intelligible truth; wherefore the name of prophet is more properly +applied to those who see by imaginary vision. And yet the more +excellent prophecy is that which is conveyed by intellectual vision, +provided the same truth be revealed in either case. If, however, the +intellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he may +know some supernatural things, but that he may be able to judge, with +the certitude of divine truth, of things that can be known by human +reason, such intellectual prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed +by an imaginary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this +kind of prophecy that all those had who are included in the ranks of +the prophets, who moreover were called prophets for the special +reason that they exercised the prophetic calling officially. Hence +they spoke as God's representatives, saying to the people: "Thus +saith the Lord": but not so the authors of the _sacred writings,_ +several of whom treated more frequently of things that can be known +by human reason, not in God's name, but in their own, yet with the +assistance of the Divine light withal. + +Reply Obj. 4: In the present life the enlightenment by the divine ray +is not altogether without any veil of phantasms, because according to +his present state of life it is unnatural to man not to understand +without a phantasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to have +phantasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses without any +imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus prophetic vision is +said to be without imaginary vision. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 3] + +Whether the Degrees of Prophecy Can Be Distinguished According to the +Imaginary Vision? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy cannot be +distinguished according to the imaginary vision. For the degrees of a +thing bear relation to something that is on its own account, not on +account of something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual vision is +sought on its own account, and imaginary vision on account of +something else, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore it would seem +that the degrees of prophecy are distinguished not according to +imaginary, but only according to intellectual, vision. + +Obj. 2: Further, seemingly for one prophet there is one degree of +prophecy. Now one prophet receives revelation through various +imaginary visions. Therefore a difference of imaginary visions does +not entail a difference of prophecy. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to a gloss [*Cassiodorus, super Prolog. +Hieron. in Psalt.], prophecy consists of words, deeds, dreams, and +visions. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should not be +distinguished according to imaginary vision, to which vision and +dreams pertain, rather than according to words and deeds. + +_On the contrary,_ The medium differentiates the degrees of +knowledge: thus science based on direct [*_Propter quid_] proofs is +more excellent than science based on indirect [*_Quia_] premises or +than opinion, because it comes through a more excellent medium. Now +imaginary vision is a kind of medium in prophetic knowledge. +Therefore the degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according +to imaginary vision. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 173, A. 2), the prophecy +wherein, by the intelligible light, a supernatural truth is revealed +through an imaginary vision, holds the mean between the prophecy +wherein a supernatural truth is revealed without imaginary vision, +and that wherein through the intelligible light and without an +imaginary vision, man is directed to know or do things pertaining to +human conduct. Now knowledge is more proper to prophecy than is +action; wherefore the lowest degree of prophecy is when a man, by an +inward instinct, is moved to perform some outward action. Thus it is +related of Samson (Judges 15:14) that "the Spirit of the Lord came +strongly upon him, and as the flax [*_Lina._ St. Thomas apparently +read _ligna_ ('wood')] is wont to be consumed at the approach of +fire, so the bands with which he was bound were broken and loosed." +The second degree of prophecy is when a man is enlightened by an +inward light so as to know certain things, which, however, do not go +beyond the bounds of natural knowledge: thus it is related of Solomon +(3 Kings 4:32, 33) that "he spoke . . . parables . . . and he treated +about trees from the cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that +cometh out of the wall, and he discoursed of beasts and of fowls, and +of creeping things and of fishes": and all of this came from divine +inspiration, for it was stated previously (3 Kings 4:29): "God gave +to Solomon wisdom and understanding exceeding much." + +Nevertheless these two degrees are beneath prophecy properly so +called, because they do not attain to supernatural truth. The +prophecy wherein supernatural truth is manifested through imaginary +vision is differentiated first according to the difference between +dreams which occur during sleep, and vision which occurs while one is +awake. The latter belongs to a higher degree of prophecy, since the +prophetic light that draws the soul away to supernatural things while +it is awake and occupied with sensible things would seem to be +stronger than that which finds a man's soul asleep and withdrawn from +objects of sense. Secondly the degrees of this prophecy are +differentiated according to the expressiveness of the imaginary signs +whereby the intelligible truth is conveyed. And since words are the +most expressive signs of intelligible truth, it would seem to be a +higher degree of prophecy when the prophet, whether awake or asleep, +hears words expressive of an intelligible truth, than when he sees +things significative of truth, for instance "the seven full ears of +corn" signified "seven years of plenty" (Gen. 41:22, 26). In such +like signs prophecy would seem to be the more excellent, according as +the signs are more expressive, for instance when Jeremias saw the +burning of the city under the figure of a boiling cauldron (Jer. +1:13). Thirdly, it is evidently a still higher degree of prophecy +when a prophet not only sees signs of words or deeds, but also, +either awake or asleep, sees someone speaking or showing something to +him, since this proves the prophet's mind to have approached nearer +to the cause of the revelation. Fourthly, the height of a degree of +prophecy may be measured according to the appearance of the person +seen: for it is a higher degree of prophecy, if he who speaks or +shows something to the waking or sleeping prophet be seen by him +under the form of an angel, than if he be seen by him under the form +of man: and higher still is it, if he be seen by the prophet whether +asleep or awake, under the appearance of God, according to Isa. 6:1, +"I saw the Lord sitting." + +But above all these degrees there is a third kind of prophecy, wherein +an intelligible and supernatural truth is shown without any imaginary +vision. However, this goes beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so +called, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3); and consequently the degrees of +prophecy are properly distinguished according to imaginary vision. + +Reply Obj. 1: We are unable to know how to distinguish the +intellectual light, except by means of imaginary or sensible signs. +Hence the difference in the intellectual light is gathered from the +difference in the things presented to the imagination. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 171, A. 2), prophecy is by way, not +of an abiding habit, but of a transitory passion; wherefore there is +nothing inconsistent if one and the same prophet, at different times, +receive various degrees of prophetic revelation. + +Reply Obj. 3: The words and deeds mentioned there do not pertain to +the prophetic revelation, but to the announcement, which is made +according to the disposition of those to whom that which is revealed +to the prophet is announced; and this is done sometimes by words, +sometimes by deeds. Now this announcement, and the working of +miracles, are something consequent upon prophecy, as stated above (Q. +171, A. 1). +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 4] + +Whether Moses Was the Greatest of the Prophets? + +Objection 1: It would seem that Moses was not the greatest of the +prophets. For a gloss at the beginning of the Psalter says that +"David is called the prophet by way of excellence." Therefore Moses +was not the greatest of all. + +Obj. 2: Further, greater miracles were wrought by Josue, who made the +sun and moon to stand still (Josh. 10:12-14), and by Isaias, who made +the sun to turn back (Isa. 38:8), than by Moses, who divided the Red +Sea (Ex. 14:21). In like manner greater miracles were wrought by +Elias, of whom it is written (Ecclus. 48:4, 5): "Who can glory like +to thee? Who raisedst up a dead man from below." Therefore Moses was +not the greatest of the prophets. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 11:11) that "there hath not +risen, among them that are born of women, a greater than John the +Baptist." Therefore Moses was not greater than all the prophets. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 34:10): "There arose no more +a prophet in Israel like unto Moses." + +_I answer that,_ Although in some respect one or other of the +prophets was greater than Moses, yet Moses was simply the greatest +of all. For, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 171, A. 1), in prophecy we +may consider not only the knowledge, whether by intellectual or by +imaginary vision, but also the announcement and the confirmation by +miracles. Accordingly Moses was greater than the other prophets. +First, as regards the intellectual vision, since he saw God's very +essence, even as Paul in his rapture did, according to Augustine +(Gen. ad lit. xii, 27). Hence it is written (Num. 12:8) that he saw +God "plainly and not by riddles." Secondly, as regards the imaginary +vision, which he had at his call, as it were, for not only did he +hear words, but also saw one speaking to him under the form of God, +and this not only while asleep, but even when he was awake. Hence it +is written (Ex. 33:11) that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as +a man is wont to speak to his friend." Thirdly, as regards the +working of miracles which he wrought on a whole nation of +unbelievers. Wherefore it is written (Deut. 34:10, 11): "There arose +no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face +to face: in all the signs and wonders, which He sent by him, to do in +the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants, and to his +whole land." + +Reply Obj. 1: The prophecy of David approaches near to the vision of +Moses, as regards the intellectual vision, because both received a +revelation of intelligible and supernatural truth, without any +imaginary vision. Yet the vision of Moses was more excellent as +regards the knowledge of the Godhead; while David more fully knew and +expressed the mysteries of Christ's incarnation. + +Reply Obj. 2: These signs of the prophets mentioned were greater as +to the substance of the thing done; yet the miracles of Moses were +greater as regards the way in which they were done, since they were +wrought on a whole people. + +Reply Obj. 3: John belongs to the New Testament, whose ministers take +precedence even of Moses, since they are spectators of a fuller +revelation, as stated in 2 Cor. 3. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 6] + +Whether There Is a Degree of Prophecy in the Blessed? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is a degree of prophecy in the +blessed. For, as stated above (A. 4), Moses saw the Divine essence, +and yet he is called a prophet. Therefore in like manner the blessed +can be called prophets. + +Obj. 2: Further, prophecy is a "divine revelation." Now divine +revelations are made even to the blessed angels. Therefore even +blessed angels can be prophets. + +Obj. 3: Further, Christ was a comprehensor from the moment of His +conception; and yet He calls Himself a prophet (Matt. 13:57), when He +says: "A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country." +Therefore even comprehensors and the blessed can be called prophets. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is written of Samuel (Ecclus. 46:23): "He lifted +up his voice from the earth in prophecy to blot out the wickedness of +the nation." Therefore other saints can likewise be called prophets +after they have died. + +_On the contrary,_ The prophetic word is compared (2 Pet. 1:19) to a +"light that shineth in a dark place." Now there is no darkness in the +blessed. Therefore they cannot be called prophets. + +_I answer that,_ Prophecy denotes vision of some supernatural truth +as being far remote from us. This happens in two ways. First, on the +part of the knowledge itself, because, to wit, the supernatural truth +is not known in itself, but in some of its effects; and this truth +will be more remote if it be known by means of images of corporeal +things, than if it be known in its intelligible effects; and such +most of all is the prophetic vision, which is conveyed by images and +likenesses of corporeal things. Secondly, vision is remote on the +part of the seer, because, to wit, he has not yet attained completely +to his ultimate perfection, according to 2 Cor. 5:6, "While we are in +the body, we are absent from the Lord." + +Now in neither of these ways are the blessed remote; wherefore they +cannot be called prophets. + +Reply Obj. 1: This vision of Moses was interrupted after the manner +of a passion, and was not permanent like the beatific vision, +wherefore he was as yet a seer from afar. For this reason his vision +did not entirely lose the character of prophecy. + +Reply Obj. 2: The divine revelation is made to the angels, not as +being far distant, but as already wholly united to God; wherefore +their revelation has not the character of prophecy. + +Reply Obj. 3: Christ was at the same time comprehensor and wayfarer +[*Cf. III, QQ. 9, seqq.]. Consequently the notion of prophecy is not +applicable to Him as a comprehensor, but only as a wayfarer. + +Reply Obj. 4: Samuel had not yet attained to the state of +blessedness. Wherefore although by God's will the soul itself of +Samuel foretold to Saul the issue of the war as revealed to him by +God, this pertains to the nature of prophecy. It is not the same with +the saints who are now in heaven. Nor does it make any difference +that this is stated to have been brought about by the demons' art, +because although the demons are unable to evoke the soul of a saint, +or to force it to do any particular thing, this can be done by the +power of God, so that when the demon is consulted, God Himself +declares the truth by His messenger: even as He gave a true answer by +Elias to the King's messengers who were sent to consult the god of +Accaron (4 Kings 1). + +It might also be replied [*The Book of Ecclesiasticus was not as yet +declared by the Church to be Canonical Scripture; Cf. I, Q. 89, A. 8, +ad 2] that it was not the soul of Samuel, but a demon impersonating +him; and that the wise man calls him Samuel, and describes his +prediction as prophetic, in accordance with the thoughts of Saul and +the bystanders who were of this opinion. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 6] + +Whether the Degrees of Prophecy Change As Time Goes On? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy change as +time goes on. For prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine +things, as stated above (A. 2). Now according to Gregory (Hom. in +Ezech.), "knowledge of God went on increasing as time went on." +Therefore degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to +the process of time. + +Obj. 2: Further, prophetic revelation is conveyed by God speaking to +man; while the prophets declared both in words and in writing the +things revealed to them. Now it is written (1 Kings 3:1) that before +the time of Samuel "the word of the Lord was precious," i.e. rare; +and yet afterwards it was delivered to many. In like manner the books +of the prophets do not appear to have been written before the time of +Isaias, to whom it was said (Isa. 8:1): "Take thee a great book and +write in it with a man's pen," after which many prophets wrote their +prophecies. Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree +of prophecy made progress. + +Obj. 3: Further, our Lord said (Matt. 11:13): "The prophets and the +law prophesied until John"; and afterwards the gift of prophecy was +in Christ's disciples in a much more excellent manner than in the +prophets of old, according to Eph. 3:5, "In other generations" the +mystery of Christ "was not known to the sons of men, as it is now +revealed to His holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit." Therefore +it would seem that in course of time the degree of prophecy advanced. + +_On the contrary,_ As stated above (A. 4), Moses was the greatest of +the prophets, and yet he preceded the other prophets. Therefore +prophecy did not advance in degree as time went on. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), prophecy is directed to the +knowledge of Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not +only instructed in faith, but also guided in our actions, according +to Ps. 42:3, "Send forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted +me." Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the true +knowledge of God, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh to God must +believe that He is"; secondly, in the mystery of Christ's +incarnation, according to John 14:1, "You believe in God, believe +also in Me." Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy as directed to the +Godhead as its end, it progressed according to three divisions of +time, namely before the law, under the law, and under grace. For +before the law, Abraham and the other patriarchs were prophetically +taught things pertinent to faith in the Godhead. Hence they are +called prophets, according to Ps. 104:15, "Do no evil to My +prophets," which words are said especially on behalf of Abraham and +Isaac. Under the Law prophetic revelation of things pertinent to +faith in the Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than +hitherto, because then not only certain special persons or families +but the whole people had to be instructed in these matters. Hence the +Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2, 3): "I am the Lord that appeared to +Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God almighty, and My +name Adonai I did not show to them"; because previously the +patriarchs had been taught to believe in a general way in God, one +and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the simplicity +of the Divine essence, when it was said to him (Ex. 3:14): "I am Who +am"; and this name is signified by Jews in the word "Adonai" on +account of their veneration for that unspeakable name. Afterwards in +the time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by the Son +of God Himself, according to Matt. 28:19: "Going . . . teach ye all +nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, +and of the Holy Ghost." + +In each state, however, the most excellent revelation was that which +was given first. Now the first revelation, before the Law, was given +to Abraham, for it was at that time that men began to stray from +faith in one God by turning aside to idolatry, whereas hitherto no +such revelation was necessary while all persevered in the worship of +one God. A less excellent revelation was made to Isaac, being founded +on that which was made to Abraham. Wherefore it was said to him (Gen. +26:24): "I am the God of Abraham thy father," and in like manner to +Jacob (Gen. 28:13): "I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the God +of Isaac." Again in the state of the Law the first revelation which +was given to Moses was more excellent, and on this revelation all the +other revelations to the prophets were founded. And so, too, in the +time of grace the entire faith of the Church is founded on the +revelation vouchsafed to the apostles, concerning the faith in one +God and three Persons, according to Matt. 16:18, "On this rock," i.e. +of thy confession, "I will build My Church." + +As to the faith in Christ's incarnation, it is evident that the +nearer men were to Christ, whether before or after Him, the more +fully, for the most part, were they instructed on this point, and +after Him more fully than before, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 3:5). + +As regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic revelation +varied not according to the course of time, but according as +circumstances required, because as it is written (Prov. 29:18), "When +prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad." Wherefore +at all times men were divinely instructed about what they were to do, +according as it was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the elect. + +Reply Obj. 1: The saying of Gregory is to be referred to the time +before Christ's incarnation, as regards the knowledge of this mystery. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 27), "just as in +the early days of the Assyrian kingdom promises were made most +explicitly to Abraham, so at the outset of the western Babylon," +which is Rome, "and under its sway Christ was to come, in Whom were +to be fulfilled the promises made through the prophetic oracles +testifying in word and writing to that great event to come," the +promises, namely, which were made to Abraham. "For while prophets +were scarcely ever lacking to the people of Israel from the time that +they began to have kings, it was exclusively for their benefit, not +for that of the nations. But when those prophetic writings were being +set up with greater publicity, which at some future time were to +benefit the nations, it was fitting to begin when this city," Rome to +wit, "was being built, which was to govern the nations." + +The reason why it behooved that nation to have a number of prophets +especially at the time of the kings, was that then it was not +over-ridden by other nations, but had its own king; wherefore it +behooved the people, as enjoying liberty, to have prophets to teach +them what to do. + +Reply Obj. 3: The prophets who foretold the coming of Christ could +not continue further than John, who with his finger pointed to Christ +actually present. Nevertheless as Jerome says on this passage, "This +does not mean that there were no more prophets after John. For we +read in the Acts of the apostles that Agabus and the four maidens, +daughters of Philip, prophesied." John, too, wrote a prophetic book +about the end of the Church; and at all times there have not been +lacking persons having the spirit of prophecy, not indeed for the +declaration of any new doctrine of faith, but for the direction of +human acts. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 26) that "the emperor +Theodosius sent to John who dwelt in the Egyptian desert, and whom he +knew by his ever-increasing fame to be endowed with the prophetic +spirit: and from him he received a message assuring him of victory." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 175 + +OF RAPTURE +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider rapture. Under this head there are six points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine? + +(2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the appetitive +power? + +(3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God? + +(4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses? + +(5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separated from +his body? + +(6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 1] + +Whether the Soul of Man Is Carried Away to Things Divine? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of man is not carried away +to things divine. For some define rapture as "an uplifting by the +power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to +that which is above nature" [*Reference unknown; Cf. De Veritate +xiii, 1]. Now it is in accordance with man's nature that he be +uplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the beginning of his +Confessions: "Thou madest us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is +restless, till it rest in Thee." Therefore man's soul is not carried +away to things divine. + +Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) that "God's justice +is seen in this that He treats all things according to their mode and +dignity." But it is not in accordance with man's mode and worth that +he be raised above what he is according to nature. Therefore it would +seem that man's soul is not carried away to things divine. + +Obj. 3: Further, rapture denotes violence of some kind. But God rules +us not by violence or force, as Damascene says [*De Fide Orth. ii, +30]. Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:2): "I know a man in +Christ . . . rapt even to the third heaven." On which words a gloss +says: "Rapt, that is to say, uplifted contrary to nature." + +_I answer that,_ Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above +(Obj. 3); and "the violent is that which has its principle without, +and in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all" (Ethic. +iii, 1). Now everything concurs in that to which it tends in +accordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural. +Wherefore he who is carried away by some external agent, must be +carried to something different from that to which his inclination +tends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way from the end of +the inclination--for instance a stone, which is naturally inclined to +be borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in another way from the +manner of tending--for instance a stone may be thrown downwards with +greater velocity than consistent with its natural movement. + +Accordingly man's soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold +manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in one way, as +regards the term of transport--as when it is carried away to +punishment, according to Ps. 49:22, "Lest He snatch you away, and +there be none to deliver you"; in another way, as regards the manner +connatural to man, which is that he should understand the truth +through sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the +apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though +he be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally: provided +this be not done intentionally, as when a man betakes himself to +sleep which is in accordance with nature, wherefore sleep cannot be +called rapture, properly speaking. + +This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold +cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those who suffer +abstraction from the senses through weakness: secondly, by the power +of the demons, as in those who are possessed: thirdly, by the power +of God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a +man is uplifted by the spirit of God to things supernatural, and +withdrawn from his senses, according to Ezech. 8:3, "The spirit +lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the +vision of God into Jerusalem." + +It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be +carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his senses, but +also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was +attending, as when a person's mind wanders contrary to his purpose. +But this is to use the expression in a less proper signification. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to tend to divine things through +the apprehension of things sensible, according to Rom. 1:20, "The +invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by +the things that are made." But the mode, whereby a man is uplifted to +divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man. + +Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to man's mode and dignity that he be +uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to +God's image. And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the faculty +of man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine assistance +which is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not +contrary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that man's mind +be thus uplifted in rapture by God. + +Reply Obj. 3: The saying of Damascene refers to those things which a +man does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond the +scope of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger +operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we +consider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to +which man is directed both by nature and by his intention. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 2] + +Whether Rapture Pertains to the Cognitive Rather Than to the +Appetitive Power? + +Objection 1: It would seem that rapture pertains to the appetitive +rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. +iv): "The Divine love causes ecstasy." Now love pertains to the +appetitive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that "he who fed the +swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life; +whereas Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into +ecstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself." Now the prodigal +son sank into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who +are carried up into the heights it is the appetite that is affected. + +Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 30:1, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped, +let me never be confounded," says in explaining the title [*Unto the +end, a psalm for David, in an ecstasy]: "_Ekstasis_ in Greek +signifies in Latin _excessus mentis,_ an aberration of the mind. This +happens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things or +through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this +lower world." Now dread of earthly things pertains to the appetite. +Therefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in +opposition to this dread, also pertains to the appetite. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 115:2, "I said in my excess: Every +man is a liar," says: "We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders +through fear, but when it is carried aloft on the wings of +revelation." Now revelation pertains to the intellective power. +Therefore ecstasy or rapture does also. + +_I answer that,_ We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with +regard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture +cannot pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power. +For it was stated (A. 1) that rapture is outside the inclination of +the person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appetitive power +is an inclination to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking, +in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved by himself. + +Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and +thus it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive power. For +from the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards +something, it may happen, owing to the violence of his affection, +that a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an +effect on the appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in +the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was +rapt, not only "to the third heaven"--which pertains to the +contemplation of the intellect--but also into "paradise," which +pertains to the appetite. + +Reply Obj. 1: Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means +simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one's proper +order [*Cf. I-II, Q. 28, A. 3]; while rapture denotes a certain +violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the +appetitive power, as when a man's appetite tends to something outside +him, and in this sense Dionysius says that "the Divine love causes +ecstasy," inasmuch as it makes man's appetite tend to the object +loved. Hence he says afterwards that "even God Himself, the cause of +all things, through the overflow of His loving goodness, goes outside +Himself in His providence for all beings." But even if this were said +expressly of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause +of rapture. + +Reply Obj. 2: There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the +intellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive +appetite known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his +lower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher +move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the +appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man's intellective appetite +tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things +whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus Dionysius says +(Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of +Divine love" exclaimed: "I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me." + +In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the +lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is +thus that "he who fed the swine debased himself"; and this latter +kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin +than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite +is more proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower +appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite, +it is more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to +him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will is +able to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of +rapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that it takes away +entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with +anger or love. + +It must be observed, however, that both these excesses affecting the +appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power, either because +the mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through +being drawn away from objects of sense, or because it is caught up +into some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as love is a movement of the appetite with regard +to good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to evil. +Wherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and +all the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (De Civ. +Dei xiv, 7, 9). +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 3] + +Whether Paul, When in Rapture, Saw the Essence of God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, did not see +the essence of God. For just as we read of Paul that he was rapt to +the third heaven, so we read of Peter (Acts 10:10) that "there came +upon him an ecstasy of mind." Now Peter, in his ecstasy, saw not +God's essence but an imaginary vision. Therefore it would seem that +neither did Paul see the essence of God. + +Obj. 2: Further, the vision of God is beatific. But Paul, in his +rapture, was not beatified; else he would never have returned to the +unhappiness of this life, but his body would have been glorified by +the overflow from his soul, as will happen to the saints after the +resurrection, and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when +in rapture saw not the essence of God. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to 1 Cor. 13:10-12, faith and hope are +incompatible with the vision of the Divine essence. But Paul when in +this state had faith and hope. Therefore he saw not the essence of +God. + +Obj. 4: Further, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7), +"pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary vision." Now Paul is +stated (2 Cor. 12:2, 4) to have seen certain pictures in his rapture, +for instance of the "third heaven" and of "paradise." Therefore he +would seem to have been rapt to an imaginary vision rather than to +the vision of the Divine essence. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Ep. CXLVII, 13; ad Paulin., de videndo +Deum) concludes that "possibly God's very substance was seen by some +while yet in this life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in +rapture heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto man to +utter." + +_I answer that,_ Some have said that Paul, when in rapture, saw "not +the very essence of God, but a certain reflection of His clarity." +But Augustine clearly comes to an opposite decision, not only in his +book (De videndo Deum), but also in Gen. ad lit. xii, 28 (quoted in a +gloss on 2 Cor. 12:2). Indeed the words themselves of the Apostle +indicate this. For he says that "he heard secret words, which it is +not granted unto man to utter": and such would seem to be words +pertaining to the vision of the blessed, which transcends the state +of the wayfarer, according to Isa. 64:4, "Eye hath not seen, O God, +besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that love +[Vulg.: 'wait for'] Thee" [*1 Cor. 2:9]. Therefore it is more +becoming to hold that he saw God in His essence. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man's mind is rapt by God to the contemplation of +divine truth in three ways. First, so that he contemplates it through +certain imaginary pictures, and such was the ecstasy that came upon +Peter. Secondly, so that he contemplates the divine truth through its +intelligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said (Ps. +115:11): "I said in my excess: Every man is a liar." Thirdly, so that +he contemplates it in its essence. Such was the rapture of Paul, as +also of Moses [*Cf. Q. 174, A. 4]; and not without reason, since as +Moses was the first Teacher of the Jews, so was Paul the first +"Teacher of the gentiles" [*Cf. I, Q. 68, A. 4]. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Divine essence cannot be seen by a created +intellect save through the light of glory, of which it is written +(Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we shall see light." But this light can be +shared in two ways. First by way of an abiding form, and thus it +beatifies the saints in heaven. Secondly, by way of a transitory +passion, as stated above (Q. 171, A. 2) of the light of prophecy; and +in this way that light was in Paul when he was in rapture. Hence this +vision did not beatify him simply, so as to overflow into his body, +but only in a restricted sense. Consequently this rapture pertains +somewhat to prophecy. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since, in his rapture, Paul was beatified not as to the +habit, but only as to the act of the blessed, it follows that he had +not the act of faith at the same time, although he had the habit. + +Reply Obj. 4: In one way by the third heaven we may understand +something corporeal, and thus the third heaven denotes the empyrean +[*1 Tim. 2:7; Cf. I, Q. 12, A. 11, ad 2], which is described as the +"third," in relation to the aerial and starry heavens, or better +still, in relation to the aqueous and crystalline heavens. Moreover +Paul is stated to be rapt to the "third heaven," not as though his +rapture consisted in the vision of something corporeal, but because +this place is appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence +the gloss on 2 Cor. 12 says that the "third heaven is a spiritual +heaven, where the angels and the holy souls enjoy the contemplation +of God: and when Paul says that he was rapt to this heaven he means +that God showed him the life wherein He is to be seen forevermore." + +In another way the third heaven may signify a supra-mundane vision. +Such a vision may be called the third heaven in three ways. First, +according to the order of the cognitive powers. In this way the first +heaven would indicate a supramundane bodily vision, conveyed through +the senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall (Dan. +5:5); the second heaven would be an imaginary vision such as Isaias +saw, and John in the Apocalypse; and the third heaven would denote an +intellectual vision according to Augustine's explanation (Gen. ad +lit. xii, 26, 28, 34). Secondly, the third heaven may be taken +according to the order of things knowable, the first heaven being +"the knowledge of heavenly bodies, the second the knowledge of +heavenly spirits, the third the knowledge of God Himself." Thirdly, +the third heaven may denote the contemplation of God according to the +degrees of knowledge whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees +belongs to the angels of the lowest hierarchy [*Cf. I, Q. 108, A. 1], +the second to the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the +angels of the highest hierarchy, according to the gloss on 2 Cor. 12. + +And since the vision of God cannot be without delight, he says that he +was not only "rapt to the third heaven" by reason of his +contemplation, but also into "Paradise" by reason of the consequent +delight. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 4] + +Whether Paul, When in Rapture, Was Withdrawn from His Senses? + +Objection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, was not +withdrawn from his senses. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28): +"Why should we not believe that when so great an apostle, the teacher +of the gentiles, was rapt to this most sublime vision, God was +willing to vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to +take the place of the present life?" Now in that future life after +the resurrection the saints will see the Divine essence without being +withdrawn from the senses of the body. Therefore neither did such a +withdrawal take place in Paul. + +Obj. 2: Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer, and also enjoyed an +uninterrupted vision of the Divine essence, without, however, being +withdrawn from His senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be +withdrawn from his senses in order for him to see the essence of God. + +Obj. 3: Further, after seeing God in His essence, Paul remembered +what he had seen in that vision; hence he said (2 Cor. 12:4): "He +heard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter." Now the +memory belongs to the sensitive faculty according to the Philosopher +(De Mem. et Remin. i). Therefore it seems that Paul, while seeing the +essence of God, was not withdrawn from his senses. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27): "Unless a +man in some way depart this life, whether by going altogether out of +his body or by turning away and withdrawing from his carnal senses, +so that he truly knows not as the Apostle said, whether he be in the +body or out of the body, he is not rapt and caught up into that +vision.*" [*The text of St. Augustine reads: "when he is rapt," etc.] + +_I answer that,_ The Divine essence cannot be seen by man through any +cognitive power other than the intellect. Now the human intellect +does not turn to intelligible objects except by means of the +phantasms [*Cf. I, Q. 84, A. 7] which it takes from the senses +through the intelligible species; and it is in considering these +phantasms that the intellect judges of and coordinates sensible +objects. Hence in any operation that requires abstraction of the +intellect from phantasms, there must be also withdrawal of the +intellect from the senses. Now in the state of the wayfarer it is +necessary for man's intellect, if it see God's essence, to be +withdrawn from phantasms. For God's essence cannot be seen by means +of a phantasm, nor indeed by any created intelligible species [*Cf. +I, Q. 12, A. 2], since God's essence infinitely transcends not only +all bodies, which are represented by phantasms, but also all +intelligible creatures. Now when man's intellect is uplifted to the +sublime vision of God's essence, it is necessary that his mind's +whole attention should be summoned to that purpose in such a way that +he understand naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely in +God. Therefore it is impossible for man while a wayfarer to see God +in His essence without being withdrawn from his senses. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 3, Obj. 2), after the resurrection, +in the blessed who see God in His essence, there will be an overflow +from the intellect to the lower powers and even to the body. Hence it +is in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision that the soul +will turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is no +such overflow in those who are raptured, as stated (A. 3, Obj. 2, ad +2), and consequently the comparison fails. + +Reply Obj. 2: The intellect of Christ's soul was glorified by the +habit of the light of glory, whereby He saw the Divine essence much +more fully than an angel or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on +account of the passibility of His body, in respect of which He was +"made a little lower than the angels" (Heb. 2:9), by dispensation, +and not on account of any defect on the part of His intellect. Hence +there is no comparison between Him and other wayfarers. + +Reply Obj. 3: Paul, after seeing God in His essence, remembered what +he had known in that vision, by means of certain intelligible species +that remained in his intellect by way of habit; even as in the +absence of the sensible object, certain impressions remain in the +soul which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so this +was the knowledge that he was unable wholly to think over or express +in words. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 5] + +Whether, While in This State, Paul's Soul Was Wholly Separated from +His Body? + +Objection 1: It would seem that, while in this state, Paul's soul was +wholly separated from his body. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6, 7): +"While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by +faith, and not by sight" [*_Per speciem,_ i.e. by an intelligible +species]. Now, while in that state, Paul was not absent from the +Lord, for he saw Him by a species, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore +he was not in the body. + +Obj. 2: Further, a power of the soul cannot be uplifted above the +soul's essence wherein it is rooted. Now in this rapture the +intellect, which is a power of the soul, was withdrawn from its +bodily surroundings through being uplifted to divine contemplation. +Much more therefore was the essence of the soul separated from the +body. + +Obj. 3: Further, the forces of the vegetative soul are more material +than those of the sensitive soul. Now in order for him to be rapt to +the vision of God, it was necessary for him to be withdrawn from the +forces of the sensitive soul, as stated above (A. 4). Much more, +therefore, was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces +of the vegetative soul. Now when these forces cease to operate, the +soul is no longer in any way united to the body. Therefore it would +seem that in Paul's rapture it was necessary for the soul to be +wholly separated from the body. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. CXLVII, 13, ad Paulin.; de +videndo Deum): "It is not incredible that this sublime revelation" +(namely, that they should see God in His essence) "was vouchsafed +certain saints, without their departing this life so completely as to +leave nothing but a corpse for burial." Therefore it was not +necessary for Paul's soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated +from his body. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, Obj. 1), in the rapture of +which we are speaking now, man is uplifted by God's power, "from that +which is according to nature to that which is above nature." +Wherefore two things have to be considered: first, what pertains to +man according to nature; secondly, what has to be done by God in man +above his nature. Now, since the soul is united to the body as its +natural form, it belongs to the soul to have a natural disposition to +understand by turning to phantasms; and this is not withdrawn by the +divine power from the soul in rapture, since its state undergoes no +change, as stated above (A. 3, ad 2, 3). Yet, this state remaining, +actual conversion to phantasms and sensible objects is withdrawn from +the soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which +transcends all phantasms, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore it was +not necessary that his soul in rapture should be so separated from +the body as to cease to be united thereto as its form; and yet it was +necessary for his intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms and the +perception of sensible objects. + +Reply Obj. 1: In this rapture Paul was absent from the Lord as +regards his state, since he was still in the state of a wayfarer, but +not as regards the act by which he saw God by a species, as stated +above (A. 3, ad 2, 3). + +Reply Obj. 2: A faculty of the soul is not uplifted by the natural +power above the mode becoming the essence of the soul; but it can be +uplifted by the divine power to something higher, even as a body by +the violence of a stronger power is lifted up above the place +befitting it according to its specific nature. + +Reply Obj. 3: The forces of the vegetative soul do not operate +through the soul being intent thereon, as do the sensitive forces, +but by way of nature. Hence in the case of rapture there is no need +for withdrawal from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose +operations would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellective +knowledge. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 6] + +Did Paul Know Whether His Soul Were Separated from His Body? + +Objection 1: It would seem that Paul was not ignorant whether his +soul were separated from his body. For he says (2 Cor. 12:2): "I know +a man in Christ rapt even to the third heaven." Now man denotes +something composed of soul and body; and rapture differs from death. +Seemingly therefore he knew that his soul was not separated from his +body by death, which is the more probable seeing that this is the +common opinion of the Doctors. + +Obj. 2: Further, it appears from the same words of the Apostle that +he knew whither he was rapt, since it was "to the third heaven." Now +this shows that he knew whether he was in the body or not, for if he +knew the third heaven to be something corporeal, he must have known +that his soul was not separated from his body, since a corporeal +thing cannot be an object of sight save through the body. Therefore +it would seem that he was not ignorant whether his soul were +separated from his body. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28) that "when in +rapture, he saw God with the same vision as the saints see Him in +heaven." Now from the very fact that the saints see God, they know +whether their soul is separated from their body. Therefore Paul too +knew this. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Cor. 12:3): "Whether in the body, +or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth." + +_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question must be gathered +from the Apostle's very words, whereby he says he knew something, +namely that he was "rapt even to the third heaven," and that +something he knew not, namely "whether" he were "in the body or out +of the body." This may be understood in two ways. First, the words +"whether in the body or out of the body" may refer not to the very +being of the man who was rapt (as though he knew not whether his soul +were in his body or not), but to the mode of rapture, so that he +ignored whether his body besides his soul, or, on the other hand, his +soul alone, were rapt to the third heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated +(Ezech. 8:3) to have been "brought in the vision of God into +Jerusalem." This was the explanation of a certain Jew according to +Jerome (Prolog. super Daniel.), where he says that "lastly our +Apostle" (thus said the Jew) "durst not assert that he was rapt in +his body, but said: 'Whether in the body or out of the body, I know +not.'" + +Augustine, however, disapproves of this explanation (Gen. ad lit. +xii, 3 seqq.) for this reason that the Apostle states that he knew he +was rapt even to the third heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really +the third heaven to which he was rapt, and not an imaginary likeness +of the third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third heaven to +an imaginary third heaven, in the same way he might state that he was +rapt in the body, meaning, by body, an image of his body, such as +appears in one's dreams. Now if he knew it to be really the third +heaven, it follows that either he knew it to be something spiritual +and incorporeal, and then his body could not be rapt thither; or he +knew it to be something corporeal, and then his soul could not be +rapt thither without his body, unless it were separated from his +body. Consequently we must explain the matter otherwise, by saying +that the Apostle knew himself to be rapt both in soul and body, but +that he ignored how his soul stood in relation to his body, to wit, +whether it were accompanied by his body or not. + +Here we find a diversity of opinions. For some say that the Apostle +knew his soul to be united to his body as its form, but ignored +whether it were abstracted from its senses, or again whether it were +abstracted from the operations of the vegetative soul. But he could +not but know that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that he +knew himself to be rapt; and as to his being abstracted from the +operation of the vegetative soul, this was not of such importance as +to require him to be so careful in mentioning it. It follows, then, +that the Apostle ignored whether his soul were united to his body as +its form, or separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this +say that the Apostle did not consider the matter while he was in +rapture, because he was wholly intent upon God, but that afterwards +he questioned the point, when taking cognizance of what he had seen. +But this also is contrary to the Apostle's words, for he there +distinguishes between the past and what happened subsequently, since +he states that at the present time he knows that he was rapt +"fourteen years ago," and that at the present time he knows not +"whether he was in the body or out of the body." + +Consequently we must assert that both before and after he ignored +whether his soul were separated from his body. Wherefore Augustine +(Gen. ad lit. xii, 5), after discussing the question at length, +concludes: "Perhaps then we must infer that he ignored whether, when +he was rapt to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the +same way as the soul is in the body, when we speak of a living body +either of a waking or of a sleeping man, or of one that is withdrawn +from his bodily senses during ecstasy), or whether his soul went out +of his body altogether, so that his body lay dead." + +Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes by the figure of synecdoche a part of man, +especially the soul which is the principal part, denotes a man. Or +again we might take this to mean that he whom he states to have been +rapt was a man not at the time of his rapture, but fourteen years +afterwards: for he says "I know a man," not "I know a rapt man." +Again nothing hinders death brought about by God being called +rapture; and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3): "If the +Apostle doubted the matter, who of us will dare to be certain about +it?" Wherefore those who have something to say on this subject speak +with more conjecture than certainty. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle knew that either the heaven in question was +something incorporeal, or that he saw something incorporeal in that +heaven; yet this could be done by his intellect, even without his +soul being separated from his body. + +Reply Obj. 3: Paul's vision, while he was in rapture, was like the +vision of the blessed in one respect, namely as to the thing seen; +and, unlike, in another respect, namely as to the mode of seeing, +because he saw not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence +Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 36): "Although, when the Apostle +was rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he lacked that +full and perfect knowledge of things which is in the angels, in that +he knew not whether he was in the body, or out of the body, this will +surely not be lacking after reunion with the body in the resurrection +of the dead, when this corruptible will put on incorruption." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 176 + +OF THE GRACE OF TONGUES +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider those gratuitous graces that pertain to speech, +and (1) the grace of tongues; (2) the grace of the word of wisdom and +knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether by the grace of tongues a man acquires the knowledge of +all languages? + +(2) Of the comparison between this gift and the grace of prophecy. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 176, Art. 1] + +Whether Those Who Received the Gift of Tongues Spoke in Every +Language? + +Objection 1: It seems that those who received the gift of tongues did +not speak in every language. For that which is granted to certain +persons by the divine power is the best of its kind: thus our Lord +turned the water into good wine, as stated in John 2:10. Now those +who had the gift of tongues spoke better in their own language; since +a gloss on Heb. 1, says that "it is not surprising that the epistle +to the Hebrews is more graceful in style than the other epistles, +since it is natural for a man to have more command over his own than +over a strange language. For the Apostle wrote the other epistles in +a foreign, namely the Greek, idiom; whereas he wrote this in the +Hebrew tongue." Therefore the apostles did not receive the knowledge +of all languages by a gratuitous grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one is +sufficient; and much less does God Whose work is more orderly than +nature's. Now God could make His disciples to be understood by all, +while speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on Acts 2:6, "Every man +heard them speak in his own tongue," says that "they spoke in every +tongue, or speaking in their own, namely the Hebrew language, were +understood by all, as though they spoke the language proper to each." +Therefore it would seem that they had not the knowledge to speak in +all languages. + +Obj. 3: Further, all graces flow from Christ to His body, which is +the Church, according to John 1:16, "Of His fullness we all have +received." Now we do not read that Christ spoke more than one +language, nor does each one of the faithful now speak save in one +tongue. Therefore it would seem that Christ's disciples did not +receive the grace to the extent of speaking in all languages. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 2:4) that "they were all +filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers +tongues, according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak"; on which +passage a gloss of Gregory [*Hom. xxx in Ev.] says that "the Holy +Ghost appeared over the disciples under the form of fiery tongues, +and gave them the knowledge of all tongues." + +_I answer that,_ Christ's first disciples were chosen by Him in order +that they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His +faith everywhere, according to Matt. 28:19, "Going . . . teach ye all +nations." Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to +teach others should need to be taught by others, either as to how +they should speak to other people, or as to how they were to +understand those who spoke to them; and all the more seeing that +those who were being sent were of one nation, that of Judea, +according to Isa. 27:6, "When they shall rush out from Jacob [*Vulg.: +'When they shall rush in unto Jacob,' etc.] . . . they shall fill +the face of the world with seed." Moreover those who were being sent +were poor and powerless; nor at the outset could they have easily +found someone to interpret their words faithfully to others, or to +explain what others said to them, especially as they were sent to +unbelievers. Consequently it was necessary, in this respect, that God +should provide them with the gift of tongues; in order that, as the +diversity of tongues was brought upon the nations when they fell away +to idolatry, according to Gen. 11, so when the nations were to be +recalled to the worship of one God a remedy to this diversity might +be applied by the gift of tongues. + +Reply Obj. 1: As it is written (1 Cor. 12:7), "the manifestation of +the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and consequently both +Paul and the other apostles were divinely instructed in the languages +of all nations sufficiently for the requirements of the teaching of +the faith. But as regards the grace and elegance of style which human +art adds to a language, the Apostle was instructed in his own, but +not in a foreign tongue. Even so they were sufficiently instructed in +wisdom and scientific knowledge, as required for teaching the faith, +but not as to all things known by acquired science, for instance the +conclusions of arithmetic and geometry. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although either was possible, namely that, while +speaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they +should speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should +speak in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection of +their knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also +to understand what was said by others. Whereas if their one language +were intelligible to all, this would either have been due to the +knowledge of those who understood their speech, or it would have +amounted to an illusion, since a man's words would have had a +different sound in another's ears, from that with which they were +uttered. Hence a gloss says on Acts 2:6 that "it was a greater +miracle that they should speak all kinds of tongues"; and Paul says +(1 Cor. 14:18): "I thank my God I speak with all your tongues." + +Reply Obj. 3: Christ in His own person purposed preaching to only one +nation, namely the Jews. Consequently, although without any doubt He +possessed most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there was no +need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore, as Augustine +says (Tract. xxxii in Joan.), "whereas even now the Holy Ghost is +received, yet no one speaks in the tongues of all nations, because +the Church herself already speaks the languages of all nations: since +whoever is not in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 176, Art. 2] + +Whether the Gift of Tongues Is More Excellent Than the Grace of Prophecy? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent +than the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper +to better persons, according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now +the gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing in +the sequence of Pentecost [*The sequence: _Sancti Spiritus adsit +nobis gratia_ ascribed to King Robert of France, the reputed author +of the _Veni Sancte Spiritus._ Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI]: "On +this day Thou gavest Christ's apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to +all time": whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament, +according to Heb. 1:1, "God Who at sundry times and in divers manners +spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets." Therefore it +would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift +of prophecy. + +Obj. 2: Further, that whereby we are directed to God is seemingly +more excellent than that whereby we are directed to men. Now, by the +gift of tongues, man is directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is +directed to man; for it is written (1 Cor. 14:2, 3): "He that +speaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . but +he that prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto edification." Therefore +it would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the +gift of prophecy. + +Obj. 3: Further, the gift of tongues abides like a habit in the +person who has it, and "he can use it when he will"; wherefore it is +written (1 Cor. 14:18): "I thank my God I speak with all your +tongues." But it is not so with the gift of prophecy, as stated above +(Q. 171, A. 2). Therefore the gift of tongues would seem to be more +excellent than the gift of prophecy. + +Obj. 4: Further, the "interpretation of speeches" would seem to be +contained under prophecy, because the Scriptures are expounded by the +same Spirit from Whom they originated. Now the interpretation of +speeches is placed after "divers kinds of tongues" (1 Cor. 12:10). +Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than +the gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part of the latter. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:5): "Greater is he +that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues." + +_I answer that,_ The gift of prophecy surpasses the gift of tongues, +in three ways. First, because the gift of tongues regards the +utterance of certain words, which signify an intelligible truth, and +this again is signified by the phantasms which appear in an imaginary +vision; wherefore Augustine compares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 8) the gift +of tongues to an imaginary vision. On the other hand, it has been +stated above (Q. 173, A. 2) that the gift of prophecy consists in the +mind itself being enlightened so as to know an intelligible truth. +Wherefore, as the prophetic enlightenment is more excellent than the +imaginary vision, as stated above (Q. 174, A. 2), so also is prophecy +more excellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself. +Secondly, because the gift of prophecy regards the knowledge of +things, which is more excellent than the knowledge of words, to which +the gift of tongues pertains. + +Thirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more profitable. The Apostle +proves this in three ways (1 Cor. 14); first, because prophecy is +more profitable to the edification of the Church, for which purpose +he that speaketh in tongues profiteth nothing, unless interpretation +follow (1 Cor. 14:4, 5). Secondly, as regards the speaker himself, +for if he be enabled to speak in divers tongues without understanding +them, which pertains to the gift of prophecy, his own mind would not +be edified (1 Cor. 14:7-14). Thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose +especial benefit the gift of tongues seems to have been given; since +perchance they might think those who speak in tongues to be mad (1 +Cor. 14:23), for instance the Jews deemed the apostles drunk when the +latter spoke in various tongues (Acts 2:13): whereas by prophecies +the unbeliever is convinced, because the secrets of his heart are +made manifest (Acts 2:25). + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 174, A. 3, ad 1), it belongs to the +excellence of prophecy that a man is not only enlightened by an +intelligible light, but also that he should perceive an imaginary +vision: and so again it belongs to the perfection of the Holy Ghost's +operation, not only to fill the mind with the prophetic light, and +the imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in the Old +Testament, but also to endow the tongue with external erudition, in +the utterance of various signs of speech. All this is done in the New +Testament, according to 1 Cor. 14:26, "Every one of you hath a psalm, +hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation," i.e. a prophetic +revelation. + +Reply Obj. 2: By the gift of prophecy man is directed to God in his +mind, which is more excellent than being directed to Him in his +tongue. "He that speaketh in a tongue" is said to speak "not unto +men," i.e. to men's understanding or profit, but unto God's +understanding and praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is +directed both to God and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect +gift. + +Reply Obj. 3: Prophetic revelation extends to the knowledge of all +things supernatural; wherefore from its very perfection it results +that in this imperfect state of life it cannot be had perfectly by +way of habit, but only imperfectly by way of passion. On the other +hand, the gift of tongues is confined to a certain particular +knowledge, namely of human words; wherefore it is not inconsistent +with the imperfection of this life, that it should be had perfectly +and by way of habit. + +Reply Obj. 4: The interpretation of speeches is reducible to the gift +of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened so as to understand +and explain any obscurities of speech arising either from a +difficulty in the things signified, or from the words uttered being +unknown, or from the figures of speech employed, according to Dan. +5:16, "I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret obscure +things, and resolve difficult things." Hence the interpretation of +speeches is more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from +the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 14:5), "Greater is he that +prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues; unless perhaps he +interpret." Yet the interpretation of speeches is placed after the +gift of tongues, because the interpretation of speeches extends even +to the interpretation of divers kinds of tongues. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 177 + +OF THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of +which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit is +given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge." Under +this head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words? + +(2) To whom is the grace becoming? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 177, Art. 1] + +Whether Any Gratuitous Grace Attaches to Words? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a gratuitous grace does not attach to +words. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of +nature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a +man is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade, as +Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the +grace of words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of words is +not a gratuitous grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, all grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the +Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech, but +in power." Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with +words. + +Obj. 3: Further, no grace is given through merit, since "if by grace, +it is not now of works" (Rom. 11:6). But the word is sometimes given +to a man on his merits. For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in +explanation of Ps. 118:43, "Take not Thou the word of truth utterly +out of my mouth" that "the word of truth is that which Almighty God +gives to them that do it, and takes away from them that do it not." +Therefore it would seem that the gift of the word is not a gratuitous +grace. + +Obj. 4: Further, it behooves man to declare in words things +pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to +the gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom +and the word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of +faith should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 6:5): "A gracious tongue in +a good man shall abound [Vulg.: 'aboundeth']." Now man's goodness is +by grace. Therefore graciousness in words is also by grace. + +_I answer that,_ The gratuitous graces are given for the profit of +others, as stated above (I-II, Q. 111, AA. 1, 4). Now the knowledge a +man receives from God cannot be turned to another's profit, except by +means of speech. And since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything +that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the +members of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not only +speaks so as to be understood by different people, which pertains to +the gift of tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains +to the grace _of the word._ + +This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the +intellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as _to teach._ +Secondly, in order to move the affections, so that a man willingly +hearkens to the word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as +_to please_ his hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but +in order to draw them to listen to God's word. Thirdly, in order that +men may love that which is signified by the word, and desire to +fulfill it, and this is the case when a man so speaks as _to sway_ +his hearers. In order to effect this the Holy Ghost makes use of the +human tongue as of an instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work +within. Hence Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (Hom. xxx in +Ev.): "Unless the Holy Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain +does the voice of the teacher resound in the ears of the body." + +Reply Obj. 1: Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a more +excellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the +Holy Ghost effects more excellently by the grace of words that which +art can effect in a less efficient manner. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the word that relies +on human eloquence without the power of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore he +says just before (1 Cor. 4:19): "I . . . will know, not the speech of +them that are puffed up, but the power": and of himself he had +already said (1 Cor. 2:4): "My speech and my preaching was not in the +persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit +and power." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, the grace of the word is given to a +man for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes through +the fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the +speaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this grace +directly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying +grace also is withdrawn on account of a person's fault, and yet he +does not merit it by his good works, which, however, remove the +obstacles to grace. + +Reply Obj. 4: As stated above, the grace of the word is directed to +the profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith to others +this is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence Augustine says +(De Trin. xiv, 1) that "to know how faith may profit the godly and be +defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the Apostle means by +knowledge." Hence it was not necessary for him to mention the word of +faith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the word of knowledge +and of wisdom. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 177, Art. 2] + +Whether the Grace of the Word of Wisdom and Knowledge Is Becoming to +Women? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of the word of wisdom and +knowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to +this grace, as stated in the foregoing Article. Now it is becoming to +a woman to teach; for it is written (Prov. 4:3, 4): "I was an only +son in the sight of my mother, and she taught me [*Vulg.: 'I was my +father's son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother. +And he taught me.']." Therefore this grace is becoming to women. + +Obj. 2: Further, the grace of prophecy is greater than the grace of +the word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than its +utterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah +(Judges 4:4), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4 +Kings 22:14), and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts 21:9). +Moreover the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:5): "Every woman praying or +prophesying," etc. Much more therefore would it seem that the grace +of the word is becoming to a woman. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet. 4:10): "As every man hath +received grace ministering the same one to another." Now some women +receive the grace of wisdom and knowledge, which they cannot minister +to others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the +word is becoming to women. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34): "Let women keep +silence in the churches," and (1 Tim. 2:12): "I suffer not a woman to +teach." Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word. +Therefore the grace of the word is not becoming to women. + +_I answer that,_ Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way +privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this +respect the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another +way, publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this is +not permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the +condition attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be +subject to man, as appears from Gen. 3:16. Now teaching and +persuading publicly in the church belong not to subjects but to the +prelates (although men who are subjects may do these things if they +be so commissioned, because their subjection is not a result of their +natural sex, as it is with women, but of some thing supervening by +accident). Secondly, lest men's minds be enticed to lust, for it is +written (Ecclus. 9:11): "Her conversation burneth as fire." Thirdly, +because as a rule women are not perfected in wisdom, so as to be fit +to be intrusted with public teaching. + +Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks of private teaching whereby a +father instructs his son. + +Reply Obj. 2: The grace of prophecy consists in God enlightening the +mind, on the part of which there is no difference of sex among men, +according to Col. 3:10, 11, "Putting on the new" man, "him who is +renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that created +him, where there is neither male nor female [*Vulg.: 'Neither Gentile +nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian, +bond nor free.' Cf. I, Q. 93, A. 6, ad 2 footnote]." Now the grace of +the word pertains to the instruction of men among whom the difference +of sex is found. Hence the comparison fails. + +Reply Obj. 3: The recipients of a divinely conferred grace administer +it in different ways according to their various conditions. Hence +women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can +administer it by teaching privately but not publicly. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 178 + +OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES +(In Two Articles) + +We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there +are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles? + +(2) To whom is it becoming? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 178, Art. 1] + +Whether There Is a Gratuitous Grace of Working Miracles? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no gratuitous grace is directed to +the working of miracles. For every grace puts something in the one to +whom it is given (Cf. I-II, Q. 90, A. 1). Now the working of miracles +puts nothing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles +are wrought at the touch even of a dead body. Thus we read (4 Kings +13:21) that "some . . . cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus. +And when it had touched the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life, +and stood upon his feet." Therefore the working of miracles does not +belong to a gratuitous grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, +according to 1 Cor. 12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the +same Spirit." Now the working of miracles is effected even by the +unclean spirit, according to Matt. 24:24, "There shall arise false +Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders." +Therefore it would seem that the working of miracles does not belong +to a gratuitous grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, miracles are divided into "signs," "wonders" or +"portents," and "virtues." [*Cf. 2 Thess. 2:9, where the Douay +version renders _virtus_ by "power." The use of the word "virtue" in +the sense of a miracle is now obsolete, and the generic term +"miracle" is elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 1 Cor. 12:10, 28; Heb. +2:4; Acts 2:22]. Therefore it is unreasonable to reckon the "working +of miracles" a gratuitous grace, any more than the "working of signs" +and "wonders." + +Obj. 4: Further, the miraculous restoring to health is done by the +power of God. Therefore the grace of healing should not be +distinguished from the working of miracles. + +Obj. 5: Further, the working of miracles results from faith--either +of the worker, according to 1 Cor. 13:2, "If I should have all faith, +so that I could remove mountains," or of other persons for whose sake +miracles are wrought, according to Matt. 13:58, "And He wrought not +many miracles there, because of their unbelief." Therefore, if faith +be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superfluous to reckon in +addition the working of signs as another gratuitous grace. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:9, 10) says that among +other gratuitous graces, "to another" is given "the grace of healing +. . . to another, the working of miracles." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 177, A. 1), the Holy Ghost +provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto +salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous graces are directed. Now +just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be +brought to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and +the grace of the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed +in order that it be rendered credible. This is done by the working of +miracles, according to Mk. 16:20, "And confirming the word with signs +that followed": and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive +at the intelligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore +just as man led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some +knowledge of God through His natural effects, so is he brought to a +certain degree of supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by +certain supernatural effects which are called miracles. Therefore the +working of miracles belongs to a gratuitous grace. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known +supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that +can be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine +omnipotence which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is +impossible for the principle of working miracles to be a quality +abiding as a habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as the +prophet's mind is moved by divine inspiration to know something +supernaturally, so too is it possible for the mind of the miracle +worker to be moved to do something resulting in the miraculous effect +which God causes by His power. Sometimes this takes place after +prayer, as when Peter raised to life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40): +sometimes without any previous prayer being expressed, as when Peter +by upbraiding the lying Ananias and Saphira delivered them to death +(Acts 5:4, 9). Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 30) that "the saints +work miracles, sometimes by authority, sometimes by prayer." In +either case, however, God is the principal worker, for He uses +instrumentally either man's inward movement, or his speech, or some +outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a dead body. Thus +when Josue had said as though authoritatively (Josh. 10:12): "Move +not, O sun, toward Gabaon," it is said afterwards (Josh. 10:14): +"There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying the +voice of a man." + +Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be +wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (2 +Thess. 2:9) that the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the +working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." To +quote the words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), "it is a matter of +debate whether they are called signs and lying wonders, because he +will deceive the senses of mortals by imaginary visions, in that he +will seem to do what he does not, or because, though they be real +wonders, they will seduce into falsehood them that believe." They are +said to be real, because the things themselves will be real, just as +Pharaoh's magicians made real frogs and real serpents; but they will +not be real miracles, because they will be done by the power of +natural causes, as stated in the First Part (Q. 114, A. 4); whereas +the working of miracles which is ascribed to a gratuitous grace, is +done by God's power for man's profit. + +Reply Obj. 3: Two things may be considered in miracles. One is that +which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature, +and in this respect miracles are called "virtues." The other thing is +the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation +of something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly +called "signs": but on account of some excellence they receive the +name of "wonder" or "prodigy," as showing something from afar +(_procul_). + +Reply Obj. 4: The "grace of healing" is mentioned separately, because +by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on man in +addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely the +bringing of men to the knowledge of God. + +Reply Obj. 5: The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for two +reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of faith, +secondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence on which faith +relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the grace +of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the faith, +so too is the grace of miracles necessary that people may be +confirmed in their faith. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 178, Art. 2] + +Whether the Wicked Can Work Miracles? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For +miracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). +Now the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to John 9:31, +"We know that God doth not hear sinners," and Prov. 28:9, "He that +turneth away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an +abomination." Therefore it would seem that the wicked cannot work +miracles. + +Obj. 2: Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to Matt. +17:19, "If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to +this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove." Now +"faith without works is dead," according to James 2:20, so that, +seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would +seem that the wicked, since they do not good works, cannot work +miracles. + +Obj. 3: Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to Heb. +2:4, "God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and divers +miracles": wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain +persons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear +witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men +cannot work miracles. + +Obj. 4: Further, the good are more closely united to God than the +wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore do +the wicked. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should have +all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I +am nothing." Now whosoever has not charity is wicked, because "this +gift alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the +kingdom from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. +xv, 18). Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work +miracles. + +_I answer that,_ Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds, +because they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while +others are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true +miracle, because they are done by the power of some natural cause. +Both of these can be done by the demons, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). + +True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God +works them for man's benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for +the confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a +person's holiness, which God desires to propose as an example of +virtue. In the first way miracles can be wrought by any one who +preaches the true faith and calls upon Christ's name, as even the +wicked do sometimes. In this way even the wicked can work miracles. +Hence Jerome commenting on Matt. 7:22, "Have not we prophesied in Thy +name?" says: "Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the +casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do +these things, but to the invoking of Christ's name, that men may +honor God, by invoking Whom such great miracles are wrought." + +In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints, +since it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought +during their lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by +others. For we read (Acts 19:11, 12) that "God wrought by the hand of +Paul . . . miracles" and "even there were brought from his body to +the sick, handkerchiefs . . . and the diseases departed from them." +In this way indeed there is nothing to prevent a sinner from working +miracles by invoking a saint; but the miracle is ascribed not to him, +but to the one in proof of whose holiness such things are done. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 83, A. 16) when we were treating of +prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but on God's +mercy, which extends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers even +of sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says (Tract. +xliv in Joan.) that "the blind man spoke these words before he was +anointed," that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; "since God +does hear sinners." When it is said that the prayer of one who hears +not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the +sinner's merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for +the spiritual welfare of the one who prays--as the publican was heard +(Luke 18:14)--or for the good of others and for God's glory. + +Reply Obj. 2: Faith without works is said to be dead, as regards the +believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace. But +nothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead +instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while +employing instrumentally the faith of a sinner. + +Reply Obj. 3: Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose for +which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine +never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although +sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ's name which they +invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If +they teach a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as +confirming their teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness. +Hence Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): "Magicians work miracles +in one way, good Christians in another, wicked Christians in another. +Magicians by private compact with the demons, good Christians by +their manifest righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of +righteousness." + +Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), "the reason +why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most baneful +error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply greater +gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is +obtained." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 179 + +OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE +(In Two Articles) + +We must next consider active and contemplative life. This +consideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into +active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the +active life; (4) Of the comparison between the active and the +contemplative life. + +Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative? + +(2) Whether this is an adequate division? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 179, Art. 1] + +Whether Life Is Fittingly Divided into Active and Contemplative? + +Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into +active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by +its essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in +living things to live is to be." Now the soul is the principle of +action and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that +life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative. + +Obj. 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is +unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and +contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of +the intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to +understand," since "to live" comes first to living things through the +vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). +Therefore life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative. + +Obj. 3: Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to +Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in +rest, according to Wis. 8:16: "When I enter into my house, I shall +repose myself with her." Therefore it would seem that life is +unfittingly divided into active and contemplative. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): "There is a +twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the +active life and the contemplative." + +_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, those things are said to live +whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which +is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which +is most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing +gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, +and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to +consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in +sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding +and acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of +every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on +which he is most intent; thus especially does he wish "to associate +with his friends" (Ethic. ix, 12). + +Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the +contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on +external actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided +into active and contemplative. + +Reply Obj. 1: Each thing's proper form that makes it actually _to be_ +is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence _to live_ is, +in living things, _to be,_ because living things through having +_being_ from their form, act in such and such a way. + +Reply Obj. 2: Life in general is not divided into active and +contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from +having an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect +and human life. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external +movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the +intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement; +in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation +and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is +defined "the act of a perfect thing." In this way Dionysius (Div. +Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, +namely, "straight," "circular," and "oblique" [*Cf. Q. 180, A. 6]. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 179, Art. 2] + +Whether Life Is Adequately Divided into Active and Contemplative? + +Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into +active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that +there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure," +the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the +"contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and +contemplative would seem to be inadequate. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1, 2, 3, 19) mentions +three kinds of life, namely the life of "leisure" which pertains to +the contemplative, the "busy" life which pertains to the active, and +a third "composed of both." Therefore it would seem that life is +inadequately divided into active and contemplative. + +Obj. 3: Further, man's life is diversified according to the divers +actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two +occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life +should be divided into more kinds than the active and the +contemplative. + +_On the contrary,_ These two lives are signified by the two wives of +Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the +two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the +active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom. xiv +in Ezech.]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were +more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active +and contemplative. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), this division applies +to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is +divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective +knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to +the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains +to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is +adequately divided into active and contemplative. + +Reply Obj. 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures +of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the +Philosopher says (Ethic. _Ethic._ i, 5), it is the life "of a beast." +Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into +active and contemplative. + +Reply Obj. 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore +it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale +in white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise +that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one +of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life +sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds. + +Reply Obj. 3: All the occupations of human actions, if +directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right +reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities +of the present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the +other hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong +to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life. +Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of +truth belong to the contemplative life. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 180 + +OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there +are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or +also to the affections? + +(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life? + +(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in +several? + +(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the +contemplative life? + +(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to +the vision of God? + +(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. +Nom. iv); + +(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation; + +(8) Of the duration of contemplation. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 1] + +Whether the Contemplative Life Has Nothing to Do with the Affections, +and Pertains Wholly to the Intellect? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to +do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the +Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that "the end +of contemplation is truth." Now truth pertains wholly to the +intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly +regards the intellect. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.) +that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or +rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from _rah_ and _irzn_; +Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.], signifies the contemplative life." Now the +vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore +the contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to +the contemplative life, "to rest from external action." Now the +affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore +it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the +appetitive power. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the +contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God +and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator." Now +desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 26, A. 2). Therefore the +contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or +appetitive power. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) theirs is said to be +the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of +truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (I-II, Q. +12, A. 1), because intention is of the end which is the object of the +will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of +the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive +cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which +moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as +stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1). + +Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the +senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen +because, as it is written (Matt. 6:21), "where thy treasure is, there +is thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one +acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative +life to consist in the "love of God," inasmuch as through loving God +we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when +he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life +terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the +result being that love also becomes more intense. + +Reply Obj. 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of +contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable +and delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive +power. + +Reply Obj. 2: We are urged to the vision of the first +principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says +(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life tramples on all +cares and longs to see the face of its Creator." + +Reply Obj. 3: The appetitive power moves not only the bodily +members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to +practice the act of contemplation, as stated above. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 2] + +Whether the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Contemplative Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the +contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the +contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor +with the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are +prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of +God and of our neighbor, for "love . . . is the fulfilling of the +Law" (Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues +belong to the contemplative life. + +Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the +contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the +mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its +Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart, +which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf. Q. 8, A. 7]. For it is +written (Matt. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall +see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, +without which no man shall see God." Therefore it would seem that the +moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the +contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is +signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gen. 29:17) that she was "of +a beautiful countenance." Now the beauty of the soul consists in the +moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i, +43, 45, 46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the +contemplative life. + +_On the contrary,_ The moral virtues are directed to external +actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. A. 1, +Obj. 3]) that it belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from +external action." Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the +contemplative life. + +_I answer that,_ A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two +ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong +to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the +contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the +Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which pertains to the +consideration of truth, "has little influence on the moral virtues": +wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to +active but not to contemplative happiness. + +On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life +dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the +contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the +impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's intention from +intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the +moral virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the +disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong +dispositively to the contemplative life. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the contemplative life has its +motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the +love of God and our neighbor is requisite to the contemplative life. +Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but +dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral +virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life. + +Reply Obj. 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues +that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the +reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations, +according to Isa. 32:17, "The work of justice shall be peace": since +he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of +quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the +contemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of heart. + +Reply Obj. 3: Beauty, as stated above (Q. 145, A. 2), consists in a +certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found +radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty +seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to +reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the +reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; +wherefore it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I +became a lover of her beauty." + +On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, +in so far as they participate in the order of reason; and especially +is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which +especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of +chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal +pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as +Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10). +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 3] + +Whether There Are Various Actions Pertaining to the Contemplative +Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining +to the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. +Contempl. i, 3, 4] distinguishes between "contemplation," +"meditation," and "cogitation." Yet all these apparently pertain +to contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there are various +actions pertaining to the contemplative life. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): "But we . . . +beholding (_speculantes_) the glory of the Lord with open face, are +transformed into the same clarity [*Vulg.: 'into the same image from +glory to glory.']." Now this belongs to the contemplative life. +Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision (_speculatio_) +belongs to the contemplative life. + +Obj. 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first and +greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty." Now according +to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear. +Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the +contemplative life. + +Obj. 4: Further, "Prayer," "reading," and "meditation" [*Hugh of St. +Victor, Alleg. in N.T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the +contemplative life. Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative +life: since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is +signified) "sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Luke +10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for +the contemplative life. + +_On the contrary,_ Life signifies here the operation on which a man +is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the +contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative +lives. + +_I answer that,_ We are now speaking of the contemplative life as +applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between +man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the +truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception +of a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, +then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally +completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it +derives its unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this +final act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles, from +which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned +with deducing from the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which +is sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself +of the truth. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation" would +seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a +person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may +comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance +of certain effects, but also the imaginations. And again the reason's +discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the +truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7), +cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect. +"Meditation" would seem to be the process of reason from certain +principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and +"consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De +Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, +1), every operation of the intellect may be called "consideration." +But "contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth; +wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that +"contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object +of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in +searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is +prone to wander." + +Reply Obj. 2: According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of Augustine +on this passage, "beholding" (_speculatio_) denotes "seeing in a +mirror (_speculo_), not from a watch-tower (_specula_)." Now to see a +thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its +likeness is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible +to meditation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the +apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it +results from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was +stated above (A. 1) that contemplation terminates in the affections. + +Reply Obj. 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First, +by means of things received from another. In this way, as regards the +things he receives from God, he needs _prayer,_ according to Wis. +7:7, "I called upon" God, "and the spirit of wisdom came upon me": +while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs _hearing,_ +in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and _reading,_ in so +far as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ. Secondly, he +needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires +_meditation._ +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 4] + +Whether the Contemplative Life Consists in the Mere Contemplation of +God, or Also in the Consideration of Any Truth Whatever? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not +only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of +any truth. For it is written (Ps. 138:14): "Wonderful are Thy works, +and my soul knoweth right well." Now the knowledge of God's works is +effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem +that it pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only +the divine truth, but also any other. + +Obj. 2: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "contemplation +consists in admiration first of God's majesty, secondly of His +judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises." Now of +these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the other +three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life +consists not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also +in the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects. + +Obj. 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 6] +distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to "the +imagination alone," and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The +second is in "the imagination guided by reason," and consists in +considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third +is in "the reason based on the imagination"; when, to wit, from the +consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is +in "the reason and conducted by the reason," when the mind is intent +on things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The +fifth is "above the reason," but not contrary to reason, when by +divine revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be +comprehended by the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and +contrary to reason"; when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know +things that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of +the mystery of the Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to +pertain to the divine truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth +regards not only the divine truth, but also that which is considered +in creatures. + +Obj. 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of truth +is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a +perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life +consists in the contemplation of any truth. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in +contemplation we seek the principle which is God." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a thing may belong to the +contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or +dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative +life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this +contemplation is the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine +says (De Trin. i, 8) that "the contemplation of God is promised us as +being the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of +our joys." This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, +when we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make us +perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is +competent to us imperfectly, namely "through a glass" and "in a dark +manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate +beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life to +come; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's ultimate +happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good. + +Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation +of God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20, "The invisible things of +God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are +made," it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also +belongs to the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby +to the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix) +that "in the study of creatures we must not exercise an empty and +futile curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things +unperishable and everlasting." + +Accordingly it is clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2, 3) that +four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life; +first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of +contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; +fourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation of the +divine truth itself. + +Reply Obj. 1: David sought the knowledge of God's works, so that he +might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps. 142:5, +6): "I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy +hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee." + +Reply Obj. 2: By considering the divine judgments man is guided to +the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the +divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's +mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be +vouchsafed. + +Reply Obj. 3: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by means +of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists +in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step +consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the +third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible +things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible +objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is +the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable +by means of sensibles, but which the reason is able to grasp; the +sixth step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the +reason can neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime +contemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately +perfected. + +Reply Obj. 4: The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the +divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to +the divine truth. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 5] + +Whether in the Present State of Life the Contemplative Life Can Reach +to the Vision of the Divine Essence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that in the present state of life the +contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence. +For, as stated in Gen. 32:30, Jacob said: "I have seen God face to +face, and my soul has been saved." Now the vision of God's face is +the vision of the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the +present life one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in +His essence. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "contemplative men +withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things, nor +do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if +these follow them they prudently drive them away: but being desirous +of seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of +their limited comprehension, and through longing to reach what is +above them, they overcome that which they are." Now man is not +hindered from seeing the Divine essence, which is the +incomprehensible light, save by the necessity of turning to corporeal +phantasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of the +present life can extend to the vision of the incomprehensible light +in its essence. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): "All creatures are +small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of +God," the blessed Benedict, to wit, "saw a fiery globe in the tower +and angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such +things by the light of God." Now the blessed Benedict was still in +this life. Therefore the contemplation of the present life can extend +to the vision of the essence of God. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "As long as we +live in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of +contemplation as to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of +incomprehensible light." + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), "no one +seeing God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have +their play: and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by +going altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal +senses, he is not caught up into that vision." This has been +carefully discussed above (Q. 175, AA. 4, 5), where we spoke of +rapture, and in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 2), where we treated of the +vision of God. + +Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways. +First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually making use of +the bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can +nowise attain to the vision of God's essence. Secondly, one may be in +this life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, +when the soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as to +make use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination, +as happens in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the +present life can attain to the vision of the Divine essence. +Consequently the highest degree of contemplation in the present life +is that which Paul had in rapture, whereby he was in a middle state +between the present life and the life to come. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad Caium. Monach.), "if anyone +seeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but +something belonging to God." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): +"By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul sees +something of lower degree, and is thereby refreshed so that +afterwards it may attain to the glory of vision." Accordingly the +words of Jacob, "I saw God face to face" do not imply that he saw +God's essence, but that he saw some shape [*Cf. I, Q. 12, A. 11, ad +1], imaginary of course, wherein God spoke to him. Or, "since we know +a man by his face, by the face of God he signified his knowledge of +Him," according to a gloss of Gregory on the same passage. + +Reply Obj. 2: In the present state of life human contemplation is +impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see +the intelligible species in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states +(De Anima iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the +phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of +the intelligible truth: and this not only in natural knowledge, but +also in that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius says (Coel. +Hier. i) that "the Divine glory shows us the angelic hierarchies +under certain symbolic figures, and by its power we are brought back +to the single ray of light," i.e. to the simple knowledge of the +intelligible truth. It is in this sense that we must understand the +statement of Gregory that "contemplatives do not carry along with +them the shadows of things corporeal," since their contemplation is +not fixed on them, but on the consideration of the intelligible truth. + +Reply Obj. 3: By these words Gregory does not imply that the blessed +Benedict, in that vision, saw God in His essence, but he wishes to +show that because "all creatures are small to him that sees God," it +follows that all things can easily be seen through the enlightenment +of the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: "For however little he may +see of the Creator's light, all created things become petty to him." +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 6] + +Whether the Operation of Contemplation Is Fittingly Divided into a +Threefold Movement, Circular, Straight and Oblique? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the operation of contemplation is +unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, "circular," +"straight," and "oblique" (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation pertains +exclusively to rest, according to Wis. 8:16, "When I go into my +house, I shall repose myself with her." Now movement is opposed to +rest. Therefore the operations of the contemplative life should not +be described as movements. + +Obj. 2: Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the +intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes +these movements as being different in the angels from what they are +in the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "circular" movement +in the angel is "according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and +the good." On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the +soul to several things: the first of which is the "withdrawal of the +soul into itself from externals"; the second is "a certain +concentration of its powers, whereby it is rendered free of error and +of outward occupation"; and the third is "union with those things +that are above it." Again, he describes differently their respective +straight movements. For he says that the straight movement of the +angel is that by which he proceeds to the care of those things that +are beneath him. On the other hand, he describes the straight +movement of the soul as being twofold: first, "its progress towards +things that are near it"; secondly, "its uplifting from external +things to simple contemplation." Further, he assigns a different +oblique movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the +angels to the fact that "while providing for those who have less they +remain unchanged in relation to God": whereas he assigns the oblique +movement of the soul to the fact that "the soul is enlightened in +Divine knowledge by reasoning and discoursing." Therefore it would +seem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned +according to the ways mentioned above. + +Obj. 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl. i, 5) mentions +many other different movements in likeness to the birds of the air. +"For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another +swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the +right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag +behind many times; others fly in a circle now more now less extended; +and others remain suspended almost immovably in one place." Therefore +it would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 119, A. 1, ad 3), the operation +of the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists, is +called a movement, in so far as movement is the act of a perfect +thing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 1). Since, +however, it is through sensible objects that we come to the knowledge +of intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take +place without movement, the result is that even intelligible +operations are described as movements, and are differentiated in +likeness to various movements. Now of bodily movements, local +movements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in _Phys._ +viii, 7; wherefore the foremost among intelligible operations are +described by being likened to them. These movements are of three +kinds; for there is the "circular" movement, by which a thing moves +uniformly round one point as center, another is the "straight" +movement, by which a thing goes from one point to another; the third +is "oblique," being composed as it were of both the others. +Consequently, in intelligible operations, that which is simply +uniform is compared to circular movement; the intelligible operation +by which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the +straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites +something of uniformity with progress to various points is compared +to the oblique movement. + +Reply Obj. 1: External bodily movements are opposed to the quiet of +contemplation, which consists in rest from outward occupations: but +the movements of intellectual operations belong to the quiet of +contemplation. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man is like the angels in intellect generically, but +the intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man. +Consequently these movements must be ascribed to souls and angels in +different ways, according as they are differently related to +uniformity. For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two +respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from +the variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands +the truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple +intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires +intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a +certain discoursing of the reason. + +Wherefore Dionysius assigns the "circular" movement of the angels to +the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and unceasing, having +neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither +beginning nor end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the +part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack +of uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which arises from the +variety of external things: this is removed by the soul withdrawing +from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the +circular movement of the soul is "the soul's withdrawal into itself +from external objects." Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires +to be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discoursing of +reason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the +simple contemplation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated +by his saying in the second place that "the soul's intellectual +powers must be uniformly concentrated," in other words that +discoursing must be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the +contemplation of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul +there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the +understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition. +Afterwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly the +uniformity which is like that of the angels, for then all things +being laid aside, the soul continues in the contemplation of God +alone. This he expresses by saying: "Then being thus made uniform +unitedly," i.e. conformably, "by the union of its powers, it is +conducted to the good and the beautiful." The "straight" movement of +the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to another by +considering them, but only to the order of his providence, namely to +the fact that the higher angel enlightens the lower angels through +the angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he says: +"The angel's movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to the +care of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things +are direct," i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct +order. Whereas he ascribes the "straight" movement in the soul to the +soul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of +intelligible objects. The "oblique" movement in the angels he +describes as being composed of the straight and circular movements, +inasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with +their contemplation of God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul +he also declares to be partly straight and partly circular, in so far +as in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God. + +Reply Obj. 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from the +distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and +backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either +straight [or] oblique movement, because they all denote discursions +of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or +from the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to +below: if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to +left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and +forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near at hand +or far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of +reason from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to +the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if +it be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the +oblique movement as explained above (ad 2). That alone which he +describes as immobility belongs to the circular movement. + +Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of +contemplation with much greater fulness and depth. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 7] + +Whether There Is Delight in Contemplation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. +For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation +resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there +is no delight in contemplation. + +Obj. 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight. +Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory says +(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when the soul strives to contemplate God, +it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes, +because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the +incomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs, +because even while tasting, it fails." Therefore there is no delight +in contemplation. + +Obj. 3: Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as +stated in _Ethic._ x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is +imperfect, according to 1 Cor. 13:12, "We see now through a glass in +a dark manner." Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the +contemplative life. + +Obj. 4: Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight. Now +contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated +(Gen. 32) that after Jacob had said (Gen. 32:30), "'I have seen God +face to face' . . . he halted on his foot (Gen. 32:31) . . . because +he touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank" (Gen. 32:32). +Therefore seemingly there is no delight in contemplation. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. +8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any +tediousness, but joy and gladness": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in +Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly +lovable." + +_I answer that,_ There may be delight in any particular contemplation +in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [*Cf. I-II, Q. +3, A. 5], because each individual delights in the operation which +befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of +the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: +the result being that "all men naturally desire to know," so that +consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more +delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom +and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without +difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of +its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even +as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is +pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. +Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the +contemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, as stated above +(AA. 1, 2, ad 1), it follows that there is delight in the +contemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself, +but also by reason of the Divine love. + +In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight, +both because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5), when we were treating of the +passions, and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity +surpasses all love. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see +that the Lord is sweet." + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the contemplative life consists chiefly in an +act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it +is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And +since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term +also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the +appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very +delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore +Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when we see one whom we love, +we are so aflame as to love him more." And this is the ultimate +perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be +not only seen but also loved. + +Reply Obj. 2: Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of an +external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights not +in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he +strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal, he +delights yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that +"the more peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the +triumph." But there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the +part of the truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part +of our defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags +us down to lower things, according to Wis. 9:15, "The corruptible +body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth +down the mind that museth upon many things." Hence it is that when +man attains to the contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more, +while he hates the more his own deficiency and the weight of his +corruptible body, so as to say with the Apostle (Rom. 7:24): "Unhappy +man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" +Wherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "When God is once known +by desire and understanding, He withers all carnal pleasure in us." + +Reply Obj. 3: The contemplation of God in this life is imperfect in +comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the +delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as compared with +the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written (Ps. +35:9): "Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure." +Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to be had by +wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other +contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that +which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. +i, 5): "We may happen to have our own little theories about those +sublime beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but +feebly, nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us +more delight than any of those things that are round about us": and +Gregory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The +contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries +the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and discovers the +spiritual world to the eyes of the mind." + +Reply Obj. 4: After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot, +"because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax +strong in the love of God," as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.). +"Thus when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot sound +while the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans +only on that foot which is sound." +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 8] + +Whether the Contemplative Life Is Continuous? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is not +continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things +pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of +this life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. 13:8, "Whether +prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge +shall be destroyed." Therefore the contemplative life is made void. + +Obj. 2: Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by +snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says +(Confess. x, 40), "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in +my inmost soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous +weight I sink down again." Again, Gregory commenting on the words of +Job 4:15, "When a spirit passed before me," says (Moral. v, 33): "The +mind does not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward +contemplation, for it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the +very immensity of the light." Therefore the contemplative life is not +continuous. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be +continuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher +(Ethic. x, 7), "is better than the life which is according to man." +Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous. + +_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Luke 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the +best part, which shall not be taken away from her," since as Gregory +says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.), "the contemplative life begins here so +that it may be perfected in our heavenly home." + +_I answer that,_ A thing may be described as continuous in two ways: +first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is +evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for +two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and +unchangeable things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there +is nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in +_Topic._ i, 13. But even in our regard contemplative life is +continuous--both because it is competent to us in respect of the +incorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it +can endure after this life--and because in the works of the +contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the +more able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher +observes (Ethic. x, 7). + +Reply Obj. 1: The manner of contemplation is not the same here as in +heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of +charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory +speaks in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The contemplative life +begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the +fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater +love when we see Him Whom we love." + +Reply Obj. 2: No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now the +highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine +contemplation, according to Dionysius [*Cf. Coel. Hier. iii], and as +we have stated above (A. 6, ad 2). Hence although contemplation +cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as +regards the other contemplative acts. + +Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher declares the contemplative life to be +above man, because it befits us "so far as there is in us something +divine" (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is incorruptible +and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure longer. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 181 + +OF THE ACTIVE LIFE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the active life, under which head there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active +life? + +(2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life? + +(3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life? + +(4) Of the duration of the active life. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 1] + +Whether All the Actions of the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Active +Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not +all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards +only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv +in Ezech.) that "the active life is to give bread to the hungry," and +after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other +people he adds finally, "and to give to each and every one whatever +he needs." Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all +the acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its +parts, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. 2, 8; I-II, Q. 60, AA. 2, 3). +Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the +active life. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that Lia who was +blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which "being +occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor +both by word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous +offspring of good deeds." Now this would seem to belong to charity, +whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to the moral virtues. +Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the +active life. + +Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 2), the moral virtues +dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection +belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the moral +virtues do not pertain to the active life. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): "In the +active life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice +of good works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye +being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine +light." Now all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral +virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the +active life. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) the active and the +contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of +men intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the +consideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative +life, while the other is external work to which the active life is +directed. + +Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not +to the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the +Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of +little or no avail." Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong +essentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher +(Ethic. x, 8) subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness. + +Reply Obj. 1: The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one +man is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher +proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described with +reference to our relations with other people, because it consists in +these things, not exclusively, but principally. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtues, +for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this is what +Gregory here ascribes to the active life. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of +another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter +virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the +active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are +comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we +practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves, +and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues +belong to the active life. + +It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a +disposition to the contemplative life. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 2] + +Whether Prudence Pertains to the Active Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the +active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the +cognitive power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power. +Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive +power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the "active +life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it is signified +by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that +one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems that +prudence does not pertain to the active life. + +Obj. 3: Further, prudence stands between the moral and the +intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the +active life, as stated above (A. 1), so do the intellectual virtues +pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that +prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative +life, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes +mention (De Civ. Dei xix, 2, 3, 19). + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence +pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 6), if +one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially +in moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is +directed: for instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is +a thief rather than an adulterer," according to the Philosopher +(Ethic. v, 2). Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is +directed to the works of the moral virtues as its end, since it is +"right reason applied to action" (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of +the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher +says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was stated above (A. 1, ad +3) that the moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of +contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of +prudence, which is of itself directed to the works of the moral +virtues, belongs directly to the active life, provided we take +prudence in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it. + +If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any +kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part +thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De +Offic. i, 5) says that "the man who is able most clearly and quickly +to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be +considered most prudent and wise." + +Reply Obj. 1: Moral works take their species from their end, as +stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), wherefore the knowledge +pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the +very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through +having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the +active life. + +Reply Obj. 2: External occupation makes a man see less in +intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with +which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the +external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more +clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence, +both on account of experience, and on account of the mind's +attention, since "brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sallust +observes [*Bell. Catilin., LI]. + +Reply Obj. 3: Prudence is said to be intermediate between the +intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same +subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same +matter as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is +intermediate between the active and the contemplative life as regards +the things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied +sometimes with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal +things. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 811, Art. 3] + +Whether Teaching Is a Work of the Active or of the Contemplative Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active +but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) +that "the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, +at least through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose +minds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty." But this +pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the +contemplative life. + +Obj. 2: Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the same +kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher +says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an indication of +knowledge." Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the +contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the +contemplative life. + +Obj. 3: Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the +contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another, +belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it +belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by +teaching him, of the truth we have meditated. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active +life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words +of wisdom." + +_I answer that,_ The act of teaching has a twofold object. For +teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the +interior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or +object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching +belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. +It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, +so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to +the contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in +the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says +(De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the +better part," namely the contemplative life, "let them be busy with +the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with +salutary knowledge," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to +the contemplative life. + +The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and +thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all +doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain. + +Reply Obj. 1: The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to +its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and +love of truth. + +Reply Obj. 2: Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument +clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains +to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far +as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to +bring another man to understand the truth. + +Reply Obj. 3: He who prays for another does nothing towards the man +for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible +truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by +external action. Hence the comparison fails. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 4] + +Whether the Active Life Remains After This Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the active life remains after this +life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as +stated above (A. 1). But the moral virtues endure after this life +according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life +remains after this life. + +Obj. 2: Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as +stated above (A. 3). But in the life to come when "we shall be like +the angels," teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in +the angels of whom one "enlightens, cleanses, and perfects" [*Coel. +Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the "receiving of +knowledge," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it +would seem that the active life remains after this life. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more is +it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly +more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "we +can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to +maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life." Therefore the +active life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after +this life. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active +life ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to +be perfected in our heavenly home." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the active life has its end +in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of +contemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative +life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of +external actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at +all, these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as +Augustine says at the end of _De Civitate Dei_ xxii, 30, "there we +shall rest and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and +praise." And he had said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "there +God will be seen without end, loved without wearying, praised without +tiring: such will be the occupation of all, the common love, the +universal activity." + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 136, A. 1, ad 1), the moral virtues +will remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as +to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are those that +conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted +above Augustine denotes by "rest," and this rest excludes not only +outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the passions. + +Reply Obj. 2: The contemplative life, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 4), +consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and as to this, one +angel does not teach another, since according to Matt. 18:10, "the +little ones' angels," who belong to the lower order, "always see the +face of the Father"; and so, in the life to come, no man will teach +another of God, but "we shall" all "see Him as He is" (1 John 3:2). +This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremiah 31:34: "They shall +teach no more every man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord: for +all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest." + +But as regards things pertaining to the "dispensation of the +mysteries of God," one angel teaches another by cleansing, +enlightening, and perfecting him: and thus they have something of +the active life so long as the world lasts, from the fact that they +are occupied in administering to the creatures below them. This is +signified by the fact that Jacob saw angels "ascending" the +ladder--which refers to contemplation--and "descending"--which refers +to action. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), "they do +not wander abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the +joys of inward contemplation." Hence in them the active life does not +differ from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the +works of the active life are a hindrance to contemplation. + +Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the +administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to us not by +reason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of +our seeing God. + +Reply Obj. 3: That the durability of the active life in the +present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life +arises not from any property of either life considered in itself, but +from our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of +contemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral. +ii, 3) that "the mind through its very weakness being repelled from +that immense height recoils on itself." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 182 + +OF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the active life in comparison with the +contemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence? + +(2) Which of them has the greater merit? + +(3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life? + +(4) Of their order. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 1] + +Whether the Active Life Is More Excellent Than the Contemplative? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is more excellent +than the contemplative. For "that which belongs to better men would +seem to be worthier and better," as the Philosopher says (Top. iii, +1). Now the active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely +prelates, who are placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore +Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "in our actions we must not +love honor or power in this life." Therefore it would seem that the +active life is more excellent than the contemplative. + +Obj. 2: Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the +more important; thus the military art, being the more important, +directs the art of the bridle-maker [*Ethic. i, 1]. Now it belongs to +the active life to direct and command the contemplative, as appears +from the words addressed to Moses (Ex. 19:21), "Go down and charge +the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the" fixed "limits +to see the Lord." Therefore the active life is more excellent than +the contemplative. + +Obj. 3: Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing in +order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. +12:31): "Be zealous for the better gifts." Now some are taken away +from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the +active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state +of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more +excellent than the contemplative. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Luke 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the +best part, which shall not be taken away from her." Now Mary figures +the contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is more +excellent than the active. + +_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent +in themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect. +Accordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more +excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight +reasons (Ethic. x, 7, 8). The first is, because the contemplative +life becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the +intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things +intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals. +Hence Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is +interpreted "the vision of the principle," [*Or rather, 'One seeing +the principle,' if derived from _rah_ and _irzn_; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. +Hebr.] whereas as Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is +signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. The second reason is because the +contemplative life can be more continuous, although not as regards +the highest degree of contemplation, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 8, +ad 2; Q. 181, A. 4, ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative +life is signified, is described as "sitting" all the time "at the +Lord's feet." Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more +delightful than the active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. +Serm. ciii) that "Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted." Fourthly, +because in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since +he needs fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Luke +10:41): "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many +things." Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved more for +its own sake, while the active life is directed to something else. +Hence it is written (Ps. 36:4): "One thing I have asked of the Lord, +this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all +the days of my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord." +Sixthly, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, +according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still and see that I am God." Seventhly, +because the contemplative life is according to Divine things, whereas +active life is according to human things; wherefore Augustine says +(De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): "'In the beginning was the Word': to Him +was Mary hearkening: 'The Word was made flesh': Him was Martha +serving." Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according to +that which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; whereas in +the works of the active life the lower powers also, which are common +to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore (Ps. 35:7) after the +words, "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord," that which is +special to man is added (Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we shall see +light." + +Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Luke 10:42) when He says: "Mary hath +chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," which +words Augustine (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: "Not--Thou +hast chosen badly but--She has chosen better. Why better? +Listen--because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden +of necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the +sweetness of truth is eternal." + +Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer +the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too +the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): "It is better to be wise than +to be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich . . ." + +Reply Obj. 1: Not only the active life concerns prelates, they should +also excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, +1): "A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted than +others in contemplation." + +Reply Obj. 2: The contemplative life consists in a certain liberty of +mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the contemplative +life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal +but of eternal things." And Boethius says (De Consol. v, 2): "The +soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze on the +Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things." Wherefore +it is evident that the active life does not directly command the +contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life +as dispositions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly +serves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says +(Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the active life is bondage, whereas the +contemplative life is freedom." + +Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a man is called away from the contemplative +life to the works of the active life, on account of some necessity of +the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake +contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): +"The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity +undertake an honest toil," the work namely of the active life. "If no +one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the +research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we +must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must +not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive +ourselves of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us." Hence it +is clear that when a person is called from the contemplative life to +the active life, this is done by way not of subtraction but of +addition. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 2] + +Whether the Active Life Is of Greater Merit Than the Contemplative? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit +than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed +is due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, "Every man shall receive +his own reward according to his own labor." Now labor is ascribed to +the active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says +(Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "Whosoever is converted to God must first of +all sweat from labor, i.e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may +rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle." Therefore +the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative. + +Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the +happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on John 21:22, "So +I will have him to remain till I come," says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.): +"This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me +conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun +here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall +come." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "contemplation +begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home." Now the +life to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving the +reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to +have less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the +character of reward. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that "no sacrifice +is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls." Now by the zeal for +souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it +would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than +the active. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are the +merits of the active life, but greater still those of the +contemplative." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4), the root of +merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), charity +consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by +itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated +above (Q. 27, A. 8). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to +the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which +pertains directly to the love of our neighbor for God's sake. Now the +contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of +God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the love of" the +Divine "truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative +life, for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life +seeks, as stated above (Q. 181, A. 4, ad 2). On the other hand, the +active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor, +because it is "busy about much serving" (Luke 10:40). Wherefore the +contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active +life. This is moreover asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "The +contemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the +latter labors under the stress of present work," by reason of the +necessity of assisting our neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt +relish has a foretaste of the coming rest," i.e. the contemplation of +God. + +Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of +the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. +For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then +suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the +time being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. +Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 9:3): "I wished myself to be an anathema +from Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom expounds as +follows (De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis.]): "His +mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired +above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he +pleased Christ." + +Reply Obj. 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the +accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the +essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor +borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign +thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this +life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation. + +Reply Obj. 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived at +perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and +if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the +greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without +some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it +does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on +account of the practice of greater Divine charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when +something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially +accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in +sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his +soul, according to Ecclus. 30:24, "Have pity on thy own soul, +pleasing God"; in the second place, the souls of others, according to +Apoc. 22:17, "He that heareth, let him say: Come." And the more +closely a man unites his own or another's soul to God, the more +acceptable is his sacrifice to God; wherefore it is more acceptable +to God that one apply one's own soul and the souls of others to +contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that "no +sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls," does not +mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of +the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to +God one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external +gifts. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 3] + +Whether the Contemplative Life Is Hindered by the Active Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by +the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain +stillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still, and see that I +am God"; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to +Luke 10:41, "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many +things." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative. + +Obj. 2: Further, clearness of vision is a requisite for the +contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance to clear vision; +for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it "is blear-eyed and +fruitful, because the active life, being occupied with work, sees +less." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative. + +Obj. 3: Further, one contrary hinders the other. Now the active and +the contemplative life are apparently contrary to one another, since +the active life is busy about many things, while the contemplative +life attends to the contemplation of one; wherefore they differ in +opposition to one another. Therefore it would seem that the +contemplative life is hindered by the active. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to +hold the fortress of contemplation, must first of all train in the +camp of action." + +_I answer that,_ The active life may be considered from two points of +view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external +works: and thus it is evident that the active life hinders the +contemplative, in so far as it is impossible for one to be busy with +external action, and at the same time give oneself to Divine +contemplation. Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting +and directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point +of view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the +latter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions. +Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the +fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp of +action. Thus after careful study they will learn whether they no +longer wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity the +wrongs their neighbors do to them, whether their soul is neither +overcome with joy in the presence of temporal goods, nor cast down +with too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way +they will know when they withdraw within themselves, in order to +explore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with them the +shadows of the things corporeal, or, if these follow them, whether +they prudently drive them away." Hence the work of the active life +conduces to the contemplative, by quelling the interior passions +which give rise to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for these arguments +consider the occupation itself of external actions, and not the effect +which is the quelling of the passions. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 4] + +Whether the Active Life Precedes the Contemplative? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the active life does not precede the +contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the +love of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our +neighbor. Now the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor, +since we love our neighbor for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the +contemplative life also precedes the active life. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "It should be +observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to +contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the +contemplative to the active life." Therefore the active is not simply +prior to the contemplative. + +Obj. 3: Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any +order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now the +active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects; +for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Often those who were able to +contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when +pressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live +advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures +are killed by the sword of their inaction." + +_I answer that,_ A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with +regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes +the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and +are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active +life. For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is +compared to the lower reason which is assigned to action, and the +husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband, +as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3, 7, 12). + +Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first +in the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the +contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above +(A. 1; Q. 181, A. 1, ad 3); and, in the order of generation, +disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and +according to its nature. + +Reply Obj. 1: The contemplative life is directed to the love of God, +not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the active +life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor. Hence +Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "Without the contemplative life it +is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit not the +good actions we are able to do; but we cannot enter therein without +the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do." + +From this it is also evident that the active precedes the +contemplative life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the +order of generation, that which is proper to the perfect. + +Reply Obj. 2: Progress from the active to the contemplative life is +according to the order of generation; whereas the return from the +contemplative life to the active is according to the order of +direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the +contemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the +acquired habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, +7. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that is prone to yield to his passions on account +of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life by +reason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) +that "there be some so restless that when they are free from labor +they labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for +thought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear." Others, on +the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they +are apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves +wholly to action, this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore +Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "some are so slothful of mind that +if they chance to have any hard work to do they give way at the very +outset." Yet, as he adds further on, "often . . . love stimulates +slothful souls to work, and fear restrains souls that are disturbed +in contemplation." Consequently those who are more adapted to the +active life can prepare themselves for the contemplative by the +practice of the active life; while none the less, those who are more +adapted to the contemplative life can take upon themselves the works +of the active life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation. +_______________________ + +TREATISE ON THE STATES OF LIFE (QQ. 183-189) +_______________________ + +OF MAN'S VARIOUS DUTIES AND STATES IN GENERAL +(In Four Articles) + +We must next consider man's various states and duties. We shall +consider (1) man's duties and states in general; (2) the state of the +perfect in particular. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) What constitutes a state among men? + +(2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties? + +(3) Of the diversity of duties; + +(4) Of the diversity of states. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 1] + +Whether the Notion of a State Denotes a Condition of Freedom or +Servitude? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the notion of a state does not denote +a condition of freedom or servitude. For "state" takes its name from +"standing." Now a person is said to stand on account of his being +upright; and Gregory says (Moral. vii, 17): "To fall by speaking +harmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness." But +a man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his will to God; +wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," says: +"The upright are those who direct their heart according to God's +will." Therefore it would seem that obedience to the Divine +commandments suffices alone for the notion of a state. + +Obj. 2: Further, the word "state" seems to denote immobility +according to 1 Cor. 15:48, "Be ye steadfast (_stabiles_) and +immovable"; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xxi in Ezech.): "The stone +is foursquare, and is stable on all sides, if no disturbance will +make it fall." Now it is virtue that enables us "to act with +immobility," according to _Ethic._ ii, 4. Therefore it would seem +that a state is acquired by every virtuous action. + +Obj. 3: Further, the word "state" seems to indicate height of a kind; +because to stand is to be raised upwards. Now one man is made higher +than another by various duties; and in like manner men are raised +upwards in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore the +mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for a +difference of states. + +_On the contrary,_ It is thus laid down in the Decretals (II, qu. vi, +can. Si Quando): "Whenever anyone intervene in a cause where life or +state is at stake he must do so, not by a proxy, but in his own +person"; and "state" here has reference to freedom or servitude. +Therefore it would seem that nothing differentiates a man's state, +except that which refers to freedom or servitude. + +_I answer that,_ "State," properly speaking, denotes a kind of +position, whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility in a +manner according with its nature. For it is natural to man that his +head should be directed upwards, his feet set firmly on the ground, +and his other intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and +this is not the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only when +he stands upright: nor again is he said to stand, if he move, but +only when he is still. Hence it is again that even in human acts, a +matter is said to have stability (_statum_) in reference to its own +disposition in the point of a certain immobility or restfulness. +Consequently matters which easily change and are extrinsic to them do +not constitute a state among men, for instance that a man be rich or +poor, of high or low rank, and so forth. Wherefore in the civil law +[*Dig. I, IX, De Senatoribus] (Lib. Cassius ff. De Senatoribus) it is +said that if a man be removed from the senate, he is deprived of his +dignity rather than of his state. But that alone seemingly pertains +to a man's state, which regards an obligation binding his person, in +so far, to wit, as a man is his own master or subject to another, not +indeed from any slight or unstable cause, but from one that is firmly +established; and this is something pertaining to the nature of +freedom or servitude. Therefore state properly regards freedom or +servitude whether in spiritual or in civil matters. + +Reply Obj. 1: Uprightness as such does not pertain to the notion of +state, except in so far as it is connatural to man with the addition +of a certain restfulness. Hence other animals are said to stand +without its being required that they should be upright; nor again are +men said to stand, however upright their position be, unless they be +still. + +Reply Obj. 2: Immobility does not suffice for the notion of state; +since even one who sits or lies down is still, and yet he is not said +to stand. + +Reply Obj. 3: Duty implies relation to act; while grades denote an +order of superiority and inferiority. But state requires immobility +in that which regards a condition of the person himself. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 2] + +Whether There Should Be Different Duties or States in the Church? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there should not be different duties +or states in the Church. For distinction is opposed to unity. Now the +faithful of Christ are called to unity according to John 17:21, 22: +"That they . . . may be one in Us . . . as We also are one." +Therefore there should not be a distinction of duties and states in +the Church. + +Obj. 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one +suffices. But the working of grace is much more orderly than the +working of nature. Therefore it were more fitting for things +pertaining to the operations of grace to be administered by the same +persons, so that there would not be a distinction of duties and +states in the Church. + +Obj. 3: Further, the good of the Church seemingly consists chiefly in +peace, according to Ps. 147:3, "Who hath placed peace in thy +borders," and 2 Cor. 13:11, "Have peace, and the God of peace . . . +shall be with you." Now distinction is a hindrance to peace, for +peace would seem to result from likeness, according to Ecclus. 13:19, +"Every beast loveth its like," while the Philosopher says (Polit. +vii, 5) that "a little difference causes dissension in a state." +Therefore it would seem that there ought not to be a distinction of +states and duties in the Church. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written in praise of the Church (Ps. 44:10) +that she is "surrounded with variety": and a gloss on these words +says that "the Queen," namely the Church, "is bedecked with the +teaching of the apostles, the confession of martyrs, the purity of +virgins, the sorrowings of penitents." + +_I answer that,_ The difference of states and duties in the Church +regards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection of +the Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection, +which in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found in the created +universe except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, the +fulness of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, flows forth to +His members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the +Church. This is the meaning of the Apostle's words (Eph. 4:11, 12): +"He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some +evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of +the saints." Secondly, it regards the need of those actions which are +necessary in the Church. For a diversity of actions requires a +diversity of men appointed to them, in order that all things may be +accomplished without delay or confusion; and this is indicated by the +Apostle (Rom. 12:4, 5), "As in one body we have many members, but all +the members have not the same office, so we being many are one body +in Christ." Thirdly, this belongs to the dignity and beauty of the +Church, which consist in a certain order; wherefore it is written (3 +Kings 10:4, 5) that "when the queen of Saba saw all the wisdom of +Solomon . . . and the apartments of his servants, and the order of +his ministers . . . she had no longer any spirit in her." Hence the +Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:20) that "in a great house there are not only +vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth." + +Reply Obj. 1: The distinction of states and duties is not an obstacle +to the unity of the Church, for this results from the unity of faith, +charity, and mutual service, according to the saying of the Apostle +(Eph. 4:16): "From whom the whole body being compacted," namely by +faith, "and fitly joined together," namely by charity, "by what every +joint supplieth," namely by one man serving another. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as nature does not employ many means where one +suffices, so neither does it confine itself to one where many are +required, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), "If +the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing?" Hence there +was need in the Church, which is Christ's body, for the members to be +differentiated by various duties, states, and grades. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as in the natural body the various members are +held together in unity by the power of the quickening spirit, and are +dissociated from one another as soon as that spirit departs, so too +in the Church's body the peace of the various members is preserved by +the power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of the Church, as +stated in John 6:64. Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 4:3): "Careful to +keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." Now a man departs +from this unity of spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an +earthly kingdom peace ceases when the citizens seek each man his own. +Besides, the peace both of mind and of an earthly commonwealth is the +better preserved by a distinction of duties and states, since thereby +the greater number have a share in public actions. Wherefore the +Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:24, 25) that "God hath tempered (_the body_) +together that there might be no schism in the body, but the members +might be mutually careful one for another." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 3] + +Whether Duties Differ According to Their Actions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that duties do not differ according to +their actions. For there are infinite varieties of human acts both in +spirituals and in temporals. Now there can be no certain distinction +among things that are infinite in number. Therefore human duties +cannot be differentiated according to a difference of acts. + +Obj. 2: Further, the active and the contemplative life differ +according to their acts, as stated above (Q. 179, A. 1). But the +distinction of duties seems to be other than the distinction of +lives. Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts. + +Obj. 3: Further, even ecclesiastical orders, states, and grades +seemingly differ according to their acts. If, then, duties differ +according to their acts it would seem that duties, grades, and states +differ in the same way. Yet this is not true, since they are divided +into their respective parts in different ways. Therefore duties do +not differ according to their acts. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "_officium_ +(duty) takes its name from _efficere_ (to effect), as though it were +instead of _efficium,_ by the change of one letter for the sake of +the sound." But effecting pertains to action. Therefore duties differ +according to their acts. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), difference among the members +of the Church is directed to three things: perfection, action, and +beauty; and according to these three we may distinguish a threefold +distinction among the faithful. One, with regard to perfection, and +thus we have the difference of states, in reference to which some +persons are more perfect than others. Another distinction regards +action and this is the distinction of duties: for persons are said to +have various duties when they are appointed to various actions. A +third distinction regards the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and +thus we distinguish various grades according as in the same state or +duty one person is above another. Hence according to a variant text +[*The Septuagint] it is written (Ps. 47:4): "In her grades shall God +be known." + +Reply Obj. 1: The material diversity of human acts is infinite. It is +not thus that duties differ, but by their formal diversity which +results from diverse species of acts, and in this way human acts are +not infinite. + +Reply Obj. 2: Life is predicated of a thing absolutely: wherefore +diversity of lives results from a diversity of acts which are +becoming to man considered in himself. But efficiency, whence we have +the word "office" (as stated above), denotes action tending to +something else according to _Metaph._ ix, text. 16 [*Ed. Did. viii, +8]. Hence offices differ properly in respect of acts that are +referred to other persons; thus a teacher is said to have an office, +and so is a judge, and so forth. Wherefore Isidore says (Etym. vi, +19) that "to have an office is to be officious," i.e. harmful "to no +one, but to be useful to all." + +Reply Obj. 3: Differences of state, offices and grades are taken from +different things, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Yet these three +things may concur in the same subject: thus when a person is +appointed to a higher action, he attains thereby both office and +grade, and sometimes, besides this, a state of perfection, on account +of the sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The +ecclesiastical orders are particularly distinct according to divine +offices. For Isidore says (Etym. vi): "There are various kinds of +offices; but the foremost is that which relates to sacred and Divine +things." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 4] + +Whether the Difference of States Applies to Those Who Are Beginning, +Progressing, or Perfect? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the difference of states does not +apply to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect. For +"diverse genera have diverse species and differences" [*Aristotle, +Categ. ii]. Now this difference of beginning, progress, and +perfection is applied to the degrees of charity, as stated above (Q. +24, A. 9), where we were treating of charity. Therefore it would seem +that the differences of states should not be assigned in this manner. + +Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1), state regards a condition of +servitude or freedom, which apparently has no connection with the +aforesaid difference of beginning, progress, and perfection. +Therefore it is unfitting to divide state in this way. + +Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of beginning, progress, and +perfection seems to refer to _more_ and _less,_ and this seemingly +implies the notion of grades. But the distinction of grades differs +from that of states, as we have said above (AA. 2, 3). Therefore +state is unfittingly divided according to beginning, progress, and +perfection. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 11): "There are three +states of the converted, the beginning, the middle, and the +perfection"; and (Hom. xv in Ezech.): "Other is the beginning of +virtue, other its progress, and other still its perfection." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) state regards freedom or +servitude. Now in spiritual things there is a twofold servitude and a +twofold freedom: for there is the servitude of sin and the servitude +of justice; and there is likewise a twofold freedom, from sin, and +from justice, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Rom. 6:20, +22), "When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice +. . . but now being made free from sin," you are . . . "become +servants to God." + +Now the servitude of sin or justice consists in being inclined to +evil by a habit of sin, or inclined to good by a habit of justice: +and in like manner freedom from sin is not to be overcome by the +inclination to sin, and freedom from justice is not to be held back +from evil for the love of justice. Nevertheless, since man, by his +natural reason, is inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to +natural reason, it follows that freedom from sin is true freedom +which is united to the servitude of justice, since they both incline +man to that which is becoming to him. In like manner true servitude +is the servitude of sin, which is connected with freedom from +justice, because man is thereby hindered from attaining that which is +proper to him. That a man become the servant of justice or sin +results from his efforts, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 6:16): "To +whom you yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants you are whom +you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto +justice." Now in every human effort we can distinguish a beginning, a +middle, and a term; and consequently the state of spiritual servitude +and freedom is differentiated according to these things, namely, the +beginning--to which pertains the state of beginners--the middle, to +which pertains the state of the proficient--and the term, to which +belongs the state of the perfect. + +Reply Obj. 1: Freedom from sin results from charity which "is poured +forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom. +5:5). Hence it is written (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the +Lord is, there is liberty." Wherefore the same division applies to +charity as to the state of those who enjoy spiritual freedom. + +Reply Obj. 2: Men are said to be beginners, proficient, and perfect +(so far as these terms indicate different states), not in relation to +any occupation whatever, but in relation to such occupations as +pertain to spiritual freedom or servitude, as stated above (A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: As already observed (A. 3, ad 3), nothing hinders grade +and state from concurring in the same subject. For even in earthly +affairs those who are free, not only belong to a different state from +those who are in service, but are also of a different grade. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 184 + +OF THE STATE OF PERFECTION IN GENERAL +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider those things that pertain to the state of +perfection whereto the other states are directed. For the +consideration of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the +legislator; and in relation to the sacred ministry it comes under the +consideration of orders of which we shall treat in the Third Part +[*Suppl., Q. 34]. + +Concerning the state of the perfect, a three-fold consideration +presents itself: (1) The state of perfection in general; (2) Things +relating to the perfection of bishops; (3) Things relating to the +perfection of religious. + +Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether perfection bears any relation to charity? + +(2) Whether one can be perfect in this life? + +(3) Whether the perfection of this life consists chiefly in observing +the counsels or the commandments? + +(4) Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection? + +(5) Whether especially prelates and religious are in the state of +perfection? + +(6) Whether all prelates are in the state of perfection? + +(7) Which is the more perfect, the episcopal or the religious state? + +(8) The comparison between religious and parish priests and +archdeacons. +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 1] + +Whether the Perfection of the Christian Life Consists Chiefly in +Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the perfection of the Christian life +does not consist chiefly in charity. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. +14:20): "In malice be children, but in sense be perfect." But charity +regards not the senses but the affections. Therefore it would seem +that the perfection of the Christian life does not chiefly consist in +charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Eph. 6:13): "Take unto you the armor +of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day, and to stand +in all things perfect"; and the text continues (Eph. 6:14, 16), +speaking of the armor of God: "Stand therefore having your loins girt +about with truth, and having on the breast-plate of justice . . . in +all things taking the shield of faith." Therefore the perfection of +the Christian life consists not only in charity, but also in other +virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, virtues like other habits, are specified by their +acts. Now it is written (James 1:4) that "patience hath a perfect +work." Therefore seemingly the state of perfection consists more +specially in patience. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 3:14): "Above all things have +charity, which is the bond of perfection," because it binds, as it +were, all the other virtues together in perfect unity. + +_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be perfect in so far as it +attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection thereof. Now +it is charity that unites us to God, Who is the last end of the human +mind, since "he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in +him" (1 John 4:16). Therefore the perfection of the Christian life +consists radically in charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: The perfection of the human senses would seem to +consist chiefly in their concurring together in the unity of truth, +according to 1 Cor. 1:10, "That you be perfect in the same mind +(_sensu_), and in the same judgment." Now this is effected by charity +which operates consent in us men. Wherefore even the perfection of +the senses consists radically in the perfection of charity. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man may be said to be perfect in two ways. First, +simply: and this perfection regards that which belongs to a thing's +nature, for instance an animal may be said to be perfect when it +lacks nothing in the disposition of its members and in such things as +are necessary for an animal's life. Secondly, a thing is said to be +perfect relatively: and this perfection regards something connected +with the thing externally, such as whiteness or blackness or +something of the kind. Now the Christian life consists chiefly in +charity whereby the soul is united to God; wherefore it is written (1 +John 3:14): "He that loveth not abideth in death." Hence the +perfection of the Christian life consists simply in charity, but in +the other virtues relatively. And since that which is simply, is +paramount and greatest in comparison with other things, it follows +that the perfection of charity is paramount in relation to the +perfection that regards the other virtues. + +Reply Obj. 3: Patience is stated to have a perfect work in relation +to charity, in so far as it is an effect of the abundance of charity +that a man bears hardships patiently, according to Rom. 8:35, +"Who . . . shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall +tribulation? Or distress?" etc. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 2] + +Whether Any One Can Be Perfect in This Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that none can be perfect in this life. For +the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which is perfect is come, +that which is in part shall be done away." Now in this life that +which is in part is not done away; for in this life faith and hope, +which are in part, remain. Therefore none can be perfect in this life. + +Obj. 2: Further, "The perfect is that which lacks nothing" (Phys. +iii, 6). Now there is no one in this life who lacks nothing; for it +is written (James 3:2): "In many things we all offend"; and (Ps. +138:16): "Thy eyes did see my imperfect being." Therefore none is +perfect in this life. + +Obj. 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life, as stated (A. +1), relates to charity, which comprises the love of God and of our +neighbor. Now, neither as to the love of God can one have perfect +charity in this life, since according to Gregory (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) +"the furnace of love which begins to burn here, will burn more +fiercely when we see Him Whom we love"; nor as to the love of our +neighbor, since in this life we cannot love all our neighbors +actually, even though we love them habitually; and habitual love is +imperfect. Therefore it seems that no one can be perfect in this life. + +_On the contrary,_ The Divine law does not prescribe the impossible. +Yet it prescribes perfection according to Matt. 5:48, "Be you . . . +perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect." Therefore +seemingly one can be perfect in this life. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the perfection of the +Christian life consists in charity. Now perfection implies a certain +universality because according to _Phys._ iii, 6, "the perfect is +that which lacks nothing." Hence we may consider a threefold +perfection. One is absolute, and answers to a totality not only on +the part of the lover, but also on the part of the object loved, so +that God be loved as much as He is lovable. Such perfection as this +is not possible to any creature, but is competent to God alone, in +Whom good is wholly and essentially. + +Another perfection answers to an absolute totality on the part of the +lover, so that the affective faculty always actually tends to God as +much as it possibly can; and such perfection as this is not possible +so long as we are on the way, but we shall have it in heaven. + +The third perfection answers to a totality neither on the part of the +object served, nor on the part of the lover as regards his always +actually tending to God, but on the part of the lover as regards the +removal of obstacles to the movement of love towards God, in which +sense Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII, qu. 36) that "carnal desire is the +bane of charity; to have no carnal desires is the perfection of +charity." Such perfection as this can be had in this life, and in two +ways. First, by the removal from man's affections of all that is +contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and there can be no charity +apart from this perfection, wherefore it is necessary for salvation. +Secondly, by the removal from man's affections not only of whatever +is contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders the mind's +affections from tending wholly to God. Charity is possible apart from +this perfection, for instance in those who are beginners and in those +who are proficient. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking there of heavenly perfection +which is not possible to those who are on the way. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those who are perfect in this life are said to "offend +in many things" with regard to venial sins, which result from the +weakness of the present life: and in this respect they have an +"imperfect being" in comparison with the perfection of heaven. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the conditions of the present life do not allow of a +man always tending actually to God, so neither does it allow of his +tending actually to each individual neighbor; but it suffices for him +to tend to all in common and collectively, and to each individual +habitually and according to the preparedness of his mind. Now in the +love of our neighbor, as in the love of God we may observe a twofold +perfection: one without which charity is impossible, and consisting +in one's having in one's affections nothing that is contrary to the +love of one's neighbor; and another without which it is possible to +have charity. The latter perfection may be considered in three ways. +First, as to the extent of love, through a man loving not only his +friends and acquaintances but also strangers and even his enemies, +for as Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) this is a mark of the +perfect children of God. Secondly, as to the intensity of love, which +is shown by the things which man despises for his neighbor's sake, +through his despising not only external goods for the sake of his +neighbor, but also bodily hardships and even death, according to John +15:13, "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his +life for his friends." Thirdly, as to the effect of love, so that a +man will surrender not only temporal but also spiritual goods and +even himself, for his neighbor's sake, according to the words of the +Apostle (2 Cor. 12:15), "But I most gladly will spend and be spent +myself for your souls." +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 3] + +Whether, in This Life, Perfection Consists in the Observance of the +Commandments or of the Counsels? + +Objection 1: It would seem that, in this life, perfection consists in +the observance not of the commandments but of the counsels. For our +Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all +[Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, +follow Me." Now this is a counsel. Therefore perfection regards the +counsels and not the precepts. + +Obj. 2: Further, all are bound to the observance of the commandments, +since this is necessary for salvation. Therefore, if the perfection +of the Christian life consists in observing the commandments, it +follows that perfection is necessary for salvation, and that all are +bound thereto; and this is evidently false. + +Obj. 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life is gauged +according to charity, as stated above (A. 1). Now the perfection of +charity, seemingly, does not consist in the observance of the +commandments, since the perfection of charity is preceded both by its +increase and by its beginning, as Augustine says (Super Canonic. +Joan. Tract. ix). But the beginning of charity cannot precede the +observance of the commandments, since according to John 14:23, "If +any one love Me, he will keep My word." Therefore the perfection of +life regards not the commandments but the counsels. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the +Lord thy God with thy whole heart," and (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt +love thy neighbor [Vulg.: 'friend'] as thyself"; and these are the +commandments of which our Lord said (Matt. 22:40): "On these two +commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets." Now the +perfection of charity, in respect of which the Christian life is said +to be perfect, consists in our loving God with our whole heart, and +our neighbor as ourselves. Therefore it would seem that perfection +consists in the observance of the precepts. + +_I answer that,_ Perfection is said to consist in a thing in two +ways: in one way, primarily and essentially; in another, secondarily +and accidentally. Primarily and essentially the perfection of the +Christian life consists in charity, principally as to the love of +God, secondarily as to the love of our neighbor, both of which are +the matter of the chief commandments of the Divine law, as stated +above. Now the love of God and of our neighbor is not commanded +according to a measure, so that what is in excess of the measure be a +matter of counsel. This is evident from the very form of the +commandment, pointing, as it does, to perfection--for instance in the +words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart": since +"the whole" is the same as "the perfect," according to the +Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6), and in the words, "Thou shalt love thy +neighbor as thyself," since every one loves himself most. The reason +of this is that "the end of the commandment is charity," according to +the Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5); and the end is not subject to a measure, +but only such things as are directed to the end, as the Philosopher +observes (Polit. i, 3); thus a physician does not measure the amount +of his healing, but how much medicine or diet he shall employ for the +purpose of healing. Consequently it is evident that perfection +consists essentially in the observance of the commandments; wherefore +Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii): "Why then should not this +perfection be prescribed to man, although no man has it in this life?" + +Secondarily and instrumentally, however, perfection consists in the +observance of the counsels, all of which, like the commandments, are +directed to charity; yet not in the same way. For the commandments, +other than the precepts of charity, are directed to the removal of +things contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity is +incompatible, whereas the counsels are directed to the removal of +things that hinder the act of charity, and yet are not contrary to +charity, such as marriage, the occupation of worldly business, and so +forth. Hence Augustine says (Enchiridion cxxi): "Whatever things God +commands, for instance, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' and +whatever are not commanded, yet suggested by a special counsel, for +instance, 'It is good for a man not to touch a woman,' are then done +aright when they are referred to the love of God, and of our neighbor +for God's sake, both in this world and in the world to come." Hence +it is that in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, cap. vii) the +abbot Moses says: "Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, +penury and loss of all one's wealth, these are not perfection but +means to perfection, since not in them does the school of perfection +find its end, but through them it achieves its end," and he had +already said that "we endeavor to ascend by these steps to the +perfection of charity." + +Reply Obj. 1: In this saying of our Lord something is indicated as +being the way to perfection by the words, "Go, sell all thou hast, +and give to the poor"; and something else is added wherein perfection +consists, when He said, "And follow Me." Hence Jerome in his +commentary on Matt. 19:27, says that "since it is not enough merely +to leave, Peter added that which is perfect: 'And have followed +Thee'"; and Ambrose, commenting on Luke 5:27, "Follow Me," says: "He +commands him to follow, not with steps of the body, but with devotion +of the soul, which is the effect of charity." Wherefore it is evident +from the very way of speaking that the counsels are means of +attaining to perfection, since it is thus expressed: "If thou wilt be +perfect, go, sell," etc., as though He said: "By so doing thou shalt +accomplish this end." + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii) "the +perfection of charity is prescribed to man in this life, because one +runs not right unless one knows whither to run. And how shall we know +this if no commandment declares it to us?" And since that which is a +matter of precept can be fulfilled variously, one does not break a +commandment through not fulfilling it in the best way, but it is +enough to fulfil it in any way whatever. Now the perfection of Divine +love is a matter of precept for all without exception, so that even +the perfection of heaven is not excepted from this precept, as +Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii [*Cf. De Spir. et Lit. XXXVI]), +and one escapes transgressing the precept, in whatever measure one +attains to the perfection of Divine love. The lowest degree of Divine +love is to love nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally +with God, and whoever fails from this degree of perfection nowise +fulfils the precept. There is another degree of the Divine love, +which cannot be fulfilled so long as we are on the way, as stated +above (A. 2), and it is evident that to fail from this is not to be a +transgressor of the precept; and in like manner one does not +transgress the precept, if one does not attain to the intermediate +degrees of perfection, provided one attain to the lowest. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as man has a certain perfection of his nature as +soon as he is born, which perfection belongs to the very essence of +his species, while there is another perfection which he acquires by +growth, so again there is a perfection of charity which belongs to +the very essence of charity, namely that man love God above all +things, and love nothing contrary to God, while there is another +perfection of charity even in this life, whereto a man attains by a +kind of spiritual growth, for instance when a man refrains even from +lawful things, in order more freely to give himself to the service of +God. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 4] + +Whether Whoever Is Perfect Is in the State of Perfection? + +Objection 1: It would seem that whoever is perfect is in the state of +perfection. For, as stated above (A. 3, ad 3), just as bodily +perfection is reached by bodily growth, so spiritual perfection is +acquired by spiritual growth. Now after bodily growth one is said to +have reached the state of perfect age. Therefore seemingly also after +spiritual growth, when one has already reached spiritual perfection, +one is in the state of perfection. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to _Phys._ v, 2, movement "from one +contrary to another" has the same aspect as "movement from less to +more." Now when a man is changed from sin to grace, he is said to +change his state, in so far as the state of sin differs from the +state of grace. Therefore it would seem that in the same manner, when +one progresses from a lesser to a greater grace, so as to reach the +perfect degree, one is in the state of perfection. + +Obj. 3: Further, a man acquires a state by being freed from +servitude. But one is freed from the servitude of sin by charity, +because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12). Now one is said to +be perfect on account of charity, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore, +seemingly, whoever has perfection, for this very reason has the state +of perfection. + +_On the contrary,_ Some are in the state of perfection, who are +wholly lacking in charity and grace, for instance wicked bishops or +religious. Therefore it would seem that on the other hand some have +the perfection of life, who nevertheless have not the state of +perfection. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 183, A. 1), state properly +regards a condition of freedom or servitude. Now spiritual freedom or +servitude may be considered in man in two ways: first, with respect +to his internal actions; secondly, with respect to his external +actions. And since according to 1 Kings 16:7, "man seeth those things +that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart," it follows that with +regard to man's internal disposition we consider his spiritual state +in relation to the Divine judgment, while with regard to his external +actions we consider man's spiritual state in relation to the Church. +It is in this latter sense that we are now speaking of states, namely +in so far as the Church derives a certain beauty from the variety of +states [*Cf. Q. 183, A. 2]. + +Now it must be observed, that so far as men are concerned, in order +that any one attain to a state of freedom or servitude there is +required first of all an obligation or a release. For the mere fact +of serving someone does not make a man a slave, since even the free +serve, according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one +another": nor again does the mere fact of ceasing to serve make a man +free, as in the case of a runaway slave; but properly speaking a man +is a slave if he be bound to serve, and a man is free if he be +released from service. Secondly, it is required that the aforesaid +obligation be imposed with a certain solemnity; even as a certain +solemnity is observed in other matters which among men obtain a +settlement in perpetuity. + +Accordingly, properly speaking, one is said to be in the state of +perfection, not through having the act of perfect love, but through +binding himself in perpetuity and with a certain solemnity to those +things that pertain to perfection. Moreover it happens that some +persons bind themselves to that which they do not keep, and some +fulfil that to which they have not bound themselves, as in the case +of the two sons (Matt. 21:28, 30), one of whom when his father said: +"Work in my vineyard," answered: "I will not," and "afterwards . . . +he went," while the other "answering said: I go . . . and he went +not." Wherefore nothing hinders some from being perfect without being +in the state of perfection, and some in the state of perfection +without being perfect. + +Reply Obj. 1: By bodily growth a man progresses in things pertaining +to nature, wherefore he attains to the state of nature; especially +since "what is according to nature is," in a way, "unchangeable" +[*Ethic. v, 7], inasmuch as nature is determinate to one thing. In +like manner by inward spiritual growth a man reaches the state of +perfection in relation to the Divine judgment. But as regards the +distinctions of ecclesiastical states, a man does not reach the state +of perfection except by growth in respect of external actions. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument also regards the interior state. Yet when +a man passes from sin to grace, he passes from servitude to freedom; +and this does not result from a mere progress in grace, except when a +man binds himself to things pertaining to grace. + +Reply Obj. 3: Again this argument considers the interior state. +Nevertheless, although charity causes the change of condition from +spiritual servitude to spiritual freedom, an increase of charity has +not the same effect. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 5] + +Whether Religious and Prelates Are in the State of Perfection? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prelates and religious are not in the +state of perfection. For the state of perfection differs from the +state of the beginners and the proficient. Now no class of men is +specially assigned to the state of the proficient or of the +beginners. Therefore it would seem that neither should any class of +men be assigned to the state of perfection. + +Obj. 2: Further, the outward state should answer to the inward, else +one is guilty of lying, "which consists not only in false words, but +also in deceitful deeds," according to Ambrose in one of his sermons +(xxx de Tempore). Now there are many prelates and religious who have +not the inward perfection of charity. Therefore, if all religious and +prelates are in the state of perfection, it would follow that all of +them that are not perfect are in mortal sin, as deceivers and liars. + +Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (A. 1), perfection is measured +according to charity. Now the most perfect charity would seem to be +in the martyrs, according to John 15:13, "Greater love than this no +man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends": and a gloss +on Heb. 12:4, "For you have not yet resisted unto blood," says: "In +this life no love is more perfect than that to which the holy martyrs +attained, who strove against sin even unto blood." Therefore it would +seem that the state of perfection should be ascribed to the martyrs +rather than to religious and bishops. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) ascribes perfection to +bishops as being perfecters, and (Eccl. Hier. vi) to religious (whom +he calls monks or _therapeutai_, i.e. servants of God) as being +perfected. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), there is required for the +state of perfection a perpetual obligation to things pertaining to +perfection, together with a certain solemnity. Now both these +conditions are competent to religious and bishops. For religious bind +themselves by vow to refrain from worldly affairs, which they might +lawfully use, in order more freely to give themselves to God, wherein +consists the perfection of the present life. Hence Dionysius says +(Eccl. Hier. vi), speaking of religious: "Some call them +_therapeutai_," i.e. servants, "on account of their rendering pure +service and homage to God; others call them _monachoi_" [*i.e. +solitaries; whence the English word 'monk'], "on account of the +indivisible and single-minded life which by their being wrapped in," +i.e. contemplating, "indivisible things, unites them in a Godlike +union and a perfection beloved of God" [*Cf. Q. 180, A. 6]. Moreover, +the obligation in both cases is undertaken with a certain solemnity +of profession and consecration; wherefore Dionysius adds (Eccl. Hier. +vi): "Hence the holy legislation in bestowing perfect grace on them +accords them a hallowing invocation." + +In like manner bishops bind themselves to things pertaining to +perfection when they take up the pastoral duty, to which it belongs +that a shepherd "lay down his life for his sheep," according to John +10:15. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:12): "Thou . . . hast +confessed a good confession before many witnesses," that is to say, +"when he was ordained," as a gloss says on this passage. Again, a +certain solemnity of consecration is employed together with the +aforesaid profession, according to 2 Tim. 1:6: "Stir up the grace of +God which is in thee by the imposition of my hands," which the gloss +ascribes to the grace of the episcopate. And Dionysius says (Eccl. +Hier. v) that "when the high priest," i.e. the bishop, "is ordained, +he receives on his head the most holy imposition of the sacred +oracles, whereby it is signified that he is a participator in the +whole and entire hierarchical power, and that not only is he the +enlightener in all things pertaining to his holy discourses and +actions, but that he also confers this on others." + +Reply Obj. 1: Beginning and increase are sought not for their own +sake, but for the sake of perfection; hence it is only to the state +of perfection that some are admitted under certain obligations and +with solemnity. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those who enter the state of perfection do not profess +to be perfect, but to tend to perfection. Hence the Apostle says +(Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I had already attained, or were already +perfect; but I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend": and +afterwards (Phil. 3:15): "Let us therefore as many as are perfect, be +thus minded." Hence a man who takes up the state of perfection is not +guilty of lying or deceit through not being perfect, but through +withdrawing his mind from the intention of reaching perfection. + +Reply Obj. 3: Martyrdom is the most perfect act of charity. But an +act of perfection does not suffice to make the state of perfection, +as stated above (A. 4). +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 6] + +Whether All Ecclesiastical Prelates Are in the State of Perfection? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all ecclesiastical prelates are +in a state of perfection. For Jerome commenting on Titus 1:5, +"Ordain . . . in every city," etc. says: "Formerly priest was the +same as bishop," and afterwards he adds: "Just as priests know that +by the custom of the Church they are subject to the one who is placed +over them, so too, bishops should recognize that, by custom rather +than by the very ordinance of our Lord, they are above the priests, +and are together the rightful governors of the Church." Now bishops +are in the state of perfection. Therefore those priests also are who +have the cure of souls. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as bishops together with their consecration +receive the cure of souls, so also do parish priests and archdeacons, +of whom a gloss on Acts 6:3, "Brethren, look ye out . . . seven men +of good reputation," says: "The apostles decided here to appoint +throughout the Church seven deacons, who were to be of a higher +degree, and as it were the supports of that which is nearest to the +altar." Therefore it would seem that these also are in the state of +perfection. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as bishops are bound to "lay down their life +for their sheep," so too are parish priests and archdeacons. But this +belongs to the perfection of charity, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3). +Therefore it would seem that parish priests and archdeacons also are +in the state of perfection. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v): "The order of +pontiffs is consummative and perfecting, that of the priests is +illuminative and light-giving, that of the ministers is cleansing and +discretive." Hence it is evident that perfection is ascribed to +bishops only. + +_I answer that,_ In priests and deacons having cure of souls two +things may be considered, namely their order and their cure. Their +order is directed to some act in the Divine offices. Wherefore it has +been stated above (Q. 183, A. 3, ad 3) that the distinction of orders +is comprised under the distinction of offices. Hence by receiving a +certain order a man receives the power of exercising certain sacred +acts, but he is not bound on this account to things pertaining to +perfection, except in so far as in the Western Church the receiving +of a sacred order includes the taking of a vow of continence, which +is one of the things pertaining to perfection, as we shall state +further on (Q. 186, A. 4). Therefore it is clear that from the fact +that a man receives a sacred order a man is not placed simply in the +state of perfection, although inward perfection is required in order +that one exercise such acts worthily. + +In like manner, neither are they placed in the state of perfection on +the part of the cure which they take upon themselves. For they are +not bound by this very fact under the obligation of a perpetual vow +to retain the cure of souls; but they can surrender it--either by +entering religion, even without their bishop's permission (cf. +Decret. xix, qu. 2, can. Duae sunt)--or again an archdeacon may with +his bishop's permission resign his arch-deaconry or parish, and +accept a simple prebend without cure, which would be nowise lawful, +if he were in the state of perfection; for "no man putting his hand +to the plough and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God" (Luke +9:62). On the other hand bishops, since they are in the state of +perfection, cannot abandon the episcopal cure, save by the authority +of the Sovereign Pontiff (to whom alone it belongs also to dispense +from perpetual vows), and this for certain causes, as we shall state +further on (Q. 185, A. 4). Wherefore it is manifest that not all +prelates are in the state of perfection, but only bishops. + +Reply Obj. 1: We may speak of priest and bishop in two ways. First, +with regard to the name: and thus formerly bishops and priests were +not distinct. For bishops are so called "because they watch over +others," as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei xix, 19); while the +priests according to the Greek are "elders." [*Referring to the Greek +_episkopos_ and _presbyteros_ from which the English 'bishop' and +'priest' are derived.] Hence the Apostle employs the term "priests" +in reference to both, when he says (1 Tim. 5:17): "Let the priests +that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor"; and again he uses +the term "bishops" in the same way, wherefore addressing the priests +of the Church of Ephesus he says (Acts 20:28): "Take heed to +yourselves" and "to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath +placed you bishops, to rule the church of God." + +But as regards the thing signified by these terms, there was always a +difference between them, even at the time of the apostles. This is +clear on the authority of Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), and of a gloss +on Luke 10:1, "After these things the Lord appointed," etc. which +says: "Just as the apostles were made bishops, so the seventy-two +disciples were made priests of the second order." Subsequently, +however, in order to avoid schism, it became necessary to distinguish +even the terms, by calling the higher ones bishops and the lower ones +priests. But to assert that priests nowise differ from bishops is +reckoned by Augustine among heretical doctrines (De Heres. liii), +where he says that the Arians maintained that "no distinction existed +between a priest and a bishop." + +Reply Obj. 2: Bishops have the chief cure of the sheep of their +diocese, while parish priests and archdeacons exercise an inferior +ministry under the bishops. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 12:28, "to one, +helps, to another, governments [*Vulg.: 'God hath set some in the +church . . . helps, governments,' etc.]," says: "Helps, namely +assistants to those who are in authority," as Titus was to the +Apostle, or as archdeacons to the bishop; "governments, namely +persons of lesser authority, such as priests who have to instruct the +people": and Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) that "just as we see the +whole hierarchy culminating in Jesus, so each office culminates in +its respective godlike hierarch or bishop." Also it is said (XVI, qu. +i, can. Cunctis): "Priests and deacons must all take care not to do +anything without their bishop's permission." Wherefore it is evident +that they stand in relation to their bishop as wardens or mayors to +the king; and for this reason, just as in earthly governments the +king alone receives a solemn blessing, while others are appointed by +simple commission, so too in the Church the episcopal cure is +conferred with the solemnity of consecration, while the archdeacon or +parish priest receives his cure by simple appointment; although they +are consecrated by receiving orders before having a cure. + +Reply Obj. 3: As parish priests and archdeacons have not the chief +cure, but a certain ministry as committed to them by the bishop, so +the pastoral office does not belong to them in chief, nor are they +bound to lay down their life for the sheep, except in so far as they +have a share in their cure. Hence we should say that they have an +office pertaining to perfection rather than that they attain the +state of perfection. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 7] + +Whether the Religious State Is More Perfect Than That of Prelates? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the religious state is more perfect +than that of prelates. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt +be perfect, go" and "sell" all [Vulg.: 'what'] "thou hast, and give +to the poor"; and religious do this. But bishops are not bound to do +so; for it is said (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): "Bishops, if +they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired +property, and whatever belongs to them personally." Therefore +religious are in a more perfect state than bishops. + +Obj. 2: Further, perfection consists more especially in the love of +God than in the love of our neighbor. Now the religious state is +directly ordered to the love of God, wherefore it takes its name from +"service and homage to God," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi); +[*Quoted above A. 5] whereas the bishop's state would seem to be +ordered to the love of our neighbor, of whose cure he is the +"warden," and from this he takes his name, as Augustine observes (De +Civ. Dei. xix, 19). Therefore it would seem that the religious state +is more perfect than that of bishops. + +Obj. 3: Further, the religious state is directed to the contemplative +life, which is more excellent than the active life to which the +episcopal state is directed. For Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7) that +"Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the +active life desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias, who +was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator, exclaimed against +being sent to preach." Therefore it would seem that the religious +state is more perfect than the episcopal state. + +_On the contrary,_ It is not lawful for anyone to pass from a more +excellent to a less excellent state; for this would be to look back +[*Cf. Luke 9:62]. Yet a man may pass from the religious to the +episcopal state, for it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that +"the holy ordination makes a monk to be a bishop." Therefore the +episcopal state is more perfect than the religious. + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), "the agent +is ever more excellent than the patient." Now in the genus of +perfection according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v, vi), bishops are in +the position of "perfecters," whereas religious are in the position +of being "perfected"; the former of which pertains to action, and the +latter to passion. Whence it is evident that the state of perfection +is more excellent in bishops than in religious. + +Reply Obj. 1: Renunciation of one's possessions may be considered in +two ways. First, as being actual: and thus it is not essential, but a +means, to perfection, as stated above (A. 3). Hence nothing hinders +the state of perfection from being without renunciation of one's +possessions, and the same applies to other outward practices. +Secondly, it may be considered in relation to one's preparedness, in +the sense of being prepared to renounce or give away all: and this +belongs directly to perfection. Hence Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. +ii, qu. 11): "Our Lord shows that the children of wisdom understand +righteousness to consist neither in eating nor in abstaining, but in +bearing want patiently." Wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:12): "I +know . . . both to abound and to suffer need." Now bishops especially +are bound to despise all things for the honor of God and the +spiritual welfare of their flock, when it is necessary for them to do +so, either by giving to the poor of their flock, or by suffering +"with joy the being stripped of" their "own goods" [*Heb. 10:34]. + +Reply Obj. 2: That bishops are busy about things pertaining to the +love of their neighbor, arises out of the abundance of their love of +God. Hence our Lord asked Peter first of all whether he loved Him, +and afterwards committed the care of His flock to him. And Gregory +says (Pastor. i, 5): "If the pastoral care is a proof of love, he who +refuses to feed God's flock, though having the means to do so, is +convicted of not loving the supreme Pastor." And it is a sign of +greater love if a man devotes himself to others for his friend's +sake, than if he be willing only to serve his friend. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1), "a prelate +should be foremost in action, and more uplifted than others in +contemplation," because it is incumbent on him to contemplate, not +only for his own sake, but also for the purpose of instructing others. +Hence Gregory applies (Hom. v in Ezech.) the words of Ps. 144:7, "They +shall publish the memory . . . of Thy sweetness," to perfect men +returning after their contemplation. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 8] + +Whether Parish Priests and Archdeacons Are More Perfect Than +Religious? + +Objection 1: It would seem that also parish priests and archdeacons +are more perfect than religious. For Chrysostom says in his Dialogue +(De Sacerdot. vi): "Take for example a monk, such as Elias, if I may +exaggerate somewhat, he is not to be compared with one who, cast +among the people and compelled to carry the sins of many, remains +firm and strong." A little further on he says: "If I were given the +choice, where would I prefer to please, in the priestly office, or in +the monastic solitude, without hesitation I should choose the +former." Again in the same book (ch. 5) he says: "If you compare the +toils of this project, namely of the monastic life, with a +well-employed priesthood, you will find them as far distant from one +another as a common citizen is from a king." Therefore it would seem +that priests who have the cure of souls are more perfect than +religious. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (ad Valerium, Ep. xxi): "Let thy +religious prudence observe that in this life, and especially at these +times, there is nothing so difficult, so onerous, so perilous as the +office of bishop, priest, or deacon; while in God's sight there is no +greater blessing, if one engage in the fight as ordered by our +Commander-in-chief." Therefore religious are not more perfect than +priests or deacons. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Ep. lx, ad Aurel.): "It would be +most regrettable, were we to exalt monks to such a disastrous degree +of pride, and deem the clergy deserving of such a grievous insult," +as to assert that "'a bad monk is a good clerk,' since sometimes even +a good monk makes a bad clerk." And a little before this he says that +"God's servants," i.e. monks, "must not be allowed to think that they +may easily be chosen for something better," namely the clerical +state, "if they should become worse thereby," namely by leaving the +monastic state. Therefore it would seem that those who are in the +clerical state are more perfect than religious. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is not lawful to pass from a more perfect to a +less perfect state. Yet it is lawful to pass from the monastic state +to a priestly office with a cure attached, as appears (XVI, qu. i, +can. Si quis monachus) from a decree of Pope Gelasius, who says: "If +there be a monk, who by the merit of his exemplary life is worthy of +the priesthood, and the abbot under whose authority he fights for +Christ his King, ask that he be made a priest, the bishop shall take +him and ordain him in such place as he shall choose fitting." And +Jerome says (Ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "In the monastery so live +as to deserve to be a clerk." Therefore parish priests and +archdeacons are more perfect than religious. + +Obj. 5: Further, bishops are in a more perfect state than religious, +as shown above (A. 7). But parish priests and archdeacons, through +having cure of souls, are more like bishops than religious are. +Therefore they are more perfect. + +Obj. 6: Further, virtue "is concerned with the difficult and the +good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to lead a good life in +the office of parish priest or archdeacon than in the religious +state. Therefore parish priests and archdeacons have more perfect +virtue than religious. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duce): "If a man +while governing the people in his church under the bishop and leading +a secular life is inspired by the Holy Ghost to desire to work out +his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical rule, since he +is led by a private law, there is no reason why he should be +constrained by a public law." Now a man is not led by the law of the +Holy Ghost, which is here called a "private law," except to something +more perfect. Therefore it would seem that religious are more perfect +than archdeacons or parish priests. + +_I answer that,_ When we compare things in the point of +super-eminence, we look not at that in which they agree, but at that +wherein they differ. Now in parish priests and archdeacons three +things may be considered, their state, their order, and their office. +It belongs to their state that they are seculars, to their order that +they are priests or deacons, to their office that they have the cure +of souls committed to them. + +Accordingly, if we compare these with one who is a religious by +state, a deacon or priest by order, having the cure of souls by +office, as many monks and canons regular have, this one will excel in +the first point, and in the other points he will be equal. But if the +latter differ from the former in state and office, but agree in +order, such as religious priests and deacons not having the cure of +souls, it is evident that the latter will be more excellent than the +former in state, less excellent in office, and equal in order. + +We must therefore consider which is the greater, preeminence of state +or of office; and here, seemingly, we should take note of two things, +goodness and difficulty. Accordingly, if we make the comparison with +a view to goodness, the religious state surpasses the office of +parish priest or archdeacon, because a religious pledges his whole +life to the quest of perfection, whereas the parish priest or +archdeacon does not pledge his whole life to the cure of souls, as a +bishop does, nor is it competent to him, as it is to a bishop, to +exercise the cure of souls in chief, but only in certain particulars +regarding the cure of souls committed to his charge, as stated above +(A. 6, ad 2). Wherefore the comparison of their religious state with +their office is like the comparisons of the universal with the +particular, and of a holocaust with a sacrifice which is less than a +holocaust according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence it is said +(XIX, qu. i, can. Clerici qui monachorum.): "Clerics who wish to take +the monastic vows through being desirous of a better life must be +allowed by their bishops the free entrance into the monastery." + +This comparison, however, must be considered as regarding the genus +of the deed; for as regards the charity of the doer it happens +sometimes that a deed which is of less account in its genus is of +greater merit if it be done out of greater charity. + +On the other hand, if we consider the difficulty of leading a good +life in religion, and in the office of one having the cure of souls, +in this way it is more difficult to lead a good life together with +the exercise of the cure of souls, on account of outward dangers: +although the religious life is more difficult as regards the genus of +the deed, by reason of the strictness of religious observance. If, +however, the religious is also without orders, as in the case of +religious lay brethren, then it is evident that the pre-eminence of +order excels in the point of dignity, since by holy orders a man is +appointed to the most august ministry of serving Christ Himself in +the sacrament of the altar. For this requires a greater inward +holiness than that which is requisite for the religious state, since +as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) the monastic order must follow the +priestly orders, and ascend to Divine things in imitation of them. +Hence, other things being equal, a cleric who is in holy orders, sins +more grievously if he do something contrary to holiness than a +religious who is not in holy orders: although a religious who is not +in orders is bound to regular observance to which persons in holy +orders are not bound. + +Reply Obj. 1: We might answer briefly these quotations from +Chrysostom by saying that he speaks not of a priest of lesser order +who has the cure of souls, but of a bishop, who is called a +high-priest; and this agrees with the purpose of that book wherein he +consoles himself and Basil in that they were chosen to be bishops. We +may, however, pass this over and reply that he speaks in view of the +difficulty. For he had already said: "When the pilot is surrounded by +the stormy sea and is able to bring the ship safely out of the +tempest, then he deserves to be acknowledged by all as a perfect +pilot"; and afterwards he concludes, as quoted, with regard to the +monk, "who is not to be compared with one who, cast among the people +. . . remains firm"; and he gives the reason why, because "both in +the calm and in the storm he piloted himself to safety." This proves +nothing more than that the state of one who has the cure of souls is +fraught with more danger than the monastic state; and to keep oneself +innocent in face of a greater peril is proof of greater virtue. on +the other hand, it also indicates greatness of virtue if a man avoid +dangers by entering religion; hence he does not say that "he would +prefer the priestly office to the monastic solitude," but that "he +would rather please" in the former than in the latter, since this is +a proof of greater virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: This passage quoted from Augustine also clearly refers +to the question of difficulty which proves the greatness of virtue in +those who lead a good life, as stated above (ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: Augustine there compares monks with clerics as regards +the pre-eminence of order, not as regards the distinction between +religious and secular life. + +Reply Obj. 4: Those who are taken from the religious state to receive +the cure of souls, being already in sacred orders, attain to +something they had not hitherto, namely the office of the cure, yet +they do not put aside what they had already. For it is said in the +Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): "With regard to those monks +who after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of +clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose." + +On the other hand, parish priests and archdeacons, when they enter +religion, resign their cure, in order to enter the state of +perfection. This very fact shows the excellence of the religious +life. When religious who are not in orders are admitted to the +clerical state and to the sacred orders, they are clearly promoted to +something better, as stated: this is indicated by the very way in +which Jerome expresses himself: "So live in the monastery as to +deserve to be a clerk." + +Reply Obj. 5: Parish priests and archdeacons are more like bishops +than religious are, in a certain respect, namely as regards the cure +of souls which they have subordinately; but as regards the obligation +in perpetuity, religious are more like a bishop, as appears from what +we have said above (AA. 5, 6). + +Reply Obj. 6: The difficulty that arises from the arduousness of the +deed adds to the perfection of virtue; but the difficulty that +results from outward obstacles sometimes lessens the perfection of +virtue--for instance, when a man loves not virtue so much as to wish +to avoid the obstacles to virtue, according to the saying of the +Apostle (1 Cor. 9:25), "Everyone that striveth for the mastery +refraineth himself from all things": and sometimes it is a sign of +perfect virtue--for instance, when a man forsakes not virtue, +although he is hindered in the practice of virtue unawares or by some +unavoidable cause. In the religious state there is greater difficulty +arising from the arduousness of deeds; whereas for those who in any +way at all live in the world, there is greater difficulty resulting +from obstacles to virtue, which obstacles the religious has had the +foresight to avoid. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 185 + +OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE EPISCOPAL STATE +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider things pertaining to the episcopal state. Under +this head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop? + +(2) Whether it is lawful to refuse the office of bishop definitively? + +(3) Whether the better man should be chosen for the episcopal office? + +(4) Whether a bishop may pass over to the religious state? + +(5) Whether he may lawfully abandon his subjects in a bodily manner? + +(6) Whether he can have anything of his own? + +(7) Whether he sins mortally by not distributing ecclesiastical goods +to the poor? + +(8) Whether religious who are appointed to the episcopal office are +bound to religious observances? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 1] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Desire the Office of a Bishop? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to desire the office of +a bishop. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:1): "He that desires [Vulg.: +'If a man desire'] the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work." +Now it is lawful and praiseworthy to desire a good work. Therefore it +is even praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop. + +Obj. 2: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the +religious, as we have said above (Q. 184, A. 7). But it is +praiseworthy to desire to enter the religious state. Therefore it is +also praiseworthy to desire promotion to the episcopal state. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 11:26): "He that hideth up corn +shall be cursed among the people; but a blessing upon the head of +them that sell." Now a man who is apt, both in manner of life and by +knowledge, for the episcopal office, would seem to hide up the +spiritual corn, if he shun the episcopal state, whereas by accepting +the episcopal office he enters the state of a dispenser of spiritual +corn. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a +bishop, and blameworthy to refuse it. + +Obj. 4: Further, the deeds of the saints related in Holy Writ are set +before us as an example, according to Rom. 15:4, "What things soever +were written, were written for our learning." Now we read (Isa. 6:8) +that Isaias offered himself for the office of preacher, which belongs +chiefly to bishops. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire +the office of a bishop. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The higher +place, without which the people cannot be ruled, though it be filled +becomingly, is unbecomingly desired." + +_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in the episcopal +office. One is principal and final, namely the bishop's work, whereby +the good of our neighbor is intended, according to John 21:17, "Feed +My sheep." Another thing is the height of degree, for a bishop is +placed above others, according to Matt. 24:45, "A faithful and a wise +servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." The third is +something resulting from these, namely reverence, honor, and a +sufficiency of temporalities, according to 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the +priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor." +Accordingly, to desire the episcopal office on account of these +incidental goods is manifestly unlawful, and pertains to covetousness +or ambition. Wherefore our Lord said against the Pharisees (Matt. +23:6, 7): "They love the first places at feasts, and the first chairs +in the synagogues, and salutations in the market-place, and to be +called by men, Rabbi." As regards the second, namely the height of +degree, it is presumptuous to desire the episcopal office. Hence our +Lord reproved His disciples for seeking precedence, by saying to them +(Matt. 20:25): "You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it +over them." Here Chrysostom says (Hom. lxv in Matth.) that in these +words "He points out that it is heathenish to seek precedence; and +thus by comparing them to the gentiles He converted their impetuous +soul." + +On the other hand, to desire to do good to one's neighbor is in +itself praiseworthy, and virtuous. Nevertheless, since considered as +an episcopal act it has the height of degree attached to it, it would +seem that, unless there be manifest and urgent reason for it, it +would be presumptuous for any man to desire to be set over others in +order to do them good. Thus Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8) that "it was +praiseworthy to seek the office of a bishop when it was certain to +bring one into graver dangers." Wherefore it was not easy to find a +person to accept this burden, especially seeing that it is through +the zeal of charity that one divinely instigated to do so, according +to Gregory, who says (Pastor. i, 7) that "Isaias being desirous of +profiting his neighbor, commendably desired the office of preacher." + +Nevertheless, anyone may, without presumption, desire to do such like +works if he should happen to be in that office, or to be worthy of +doing them; so that the object of his desire is the good work and not +the precedence in dignity. Hence Chrysostom* says: "It is indeed good +to desire a good work, but to desire the primacy of honor is vanity. +For primacy seeks one that shuns it, and abhors one that desires it." +[*The quotation is from the Opus Imperfectum in Matth. (Hom. xxxv), +falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom.] + +Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), "when the Apostle said +this he who was set over the people was the first to be dragged to +the torments of martyrdom," so that there was nothing to be desired +in the episcopal office, save the good work. Wherefore Augustine says +(De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that when the Apostle said, "'Whoever desireth +the office of bishop, desireth a good work,' he wished to explain +what the episcopacy is: for it denotes work and not honor: since +_skopos_ signifies 'watching.' Wherefore if we like we may render +_episkopein_ by the Latin _superintendere_ (to watch over): thus a +man may know himself to be no bishop if he loves to precede rather +than to profit others." For, as he observed shortly before, "in our +actions we should seek, not honor nor power in this life, since all +things beneath the sun are vanity, but the work itself which that +honor or power enables us to do." Nevertheless, as Gregory says +(Pastor. i, 8), "while praising the desire" (namely of the good work) +"he forthwith turns this object of praise into one of fear, when he +adds: It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless," as though to say: +"I praise what you seek, but learn first what it is you seek." + +Reply Obj. 2: There is no parity between the religious and the +episcopal state, for two reasons. First, because perfection of life +is a prerequisite of the episcopal state, as appears from our Lord +asking Peter if he loved Him more than the others, before committing +the pastoral office to him, whereas perfection is not a prerequisite +of the religious state, since the latter is the way to perfection. +Hence our Lord did not say (Matt. 19:21): "If thou art perfect, go, +sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast," but "If thou wilt be perfect." +The reason for this difference is because, according to Dionysius +(Eccl. Hier. vi), perfection pertains actively to the bishop, as the +"perfecter," but to the monk passively as one who is "perfected": and +one needs to be perfect in order to bring others to perfection, but +not in order to be brought to perfection. Now it is presumptuous to +think oneself perfect, but it is not presumptuous to tend to +perfection. Secondly, because he who enters the religious state +subjects himself to others for the sake of a spiritual profit, and +anyone may lawfully do this. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei +xix, 19): "No man is debarred from striving for the knowledge of +truth, since this pertains to a praiseworthy ease." On the other +hand, he who enters the episcopal state is raised up in order to +watch over others, and no man should seek to be raised thus, +according to Heb. 5:4, "Neither doth any man take the honor to +himself, but he that is called by God": and Chrysostom says: "To +desire supremacy in the Church is neither just nor useful. For what +wise man seeks of his own accord to submit to such servitude and +peril, as to have to render an account of the whole Church? None save +him who fears not God's judgment, and makes a secular abuse of his +ecclesiastical authority, by turning it to secular uses." + +Reply Obj. 3: The dispensing of spiritual corn is not to be carried +on in an arbitrary fashion, but chiefly according to the appointment +and disposition of God, and in the second place according to the +appointment of the higher prelates, in whose person it is said (1 +Cor. 4:1): "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, +and the dispensers of the mysteries of God." Wherefore a man is not +deemed to hide spiritual corn if he avoids governing or correcting +others, and is not competent to do so, neither in virtue of his +office nor of his superior's command; thus alone is he deemed to hide +it, when he neglects to dispense it while under obligation to do so +in virtue of his office, or obstinately refuses to accept the office +when it is imposed on him. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, +19): "The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity +undertake an honest labor. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we +must devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but +if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of +us." + +Reply Obj. 4: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "Isaias, who wishing to +be sent, knew himself to be already cleansed by the live coal taken +from the altar, shows us that no one should dare uncleansed to +approach the sacred ministry. Since, then, it is very difficult for +anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed, it is safer to decline +the office of preacher." +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful for a Man to Refuse Absolutely an Appointment to +the Episcopate? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to refuse absolutely an +appointment to the episcopate. For as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), +"Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the +active life, desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias who +was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator by contemplation +exclaimed against being sent to preach." Now no man sins by being +unwilling to forgo better things in order to adhere to things that +are not so good. Since then the love of God surpasses the love of our +neighbor, and the contemplative life is preferable to the active, as +shown above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 2; Q. 182, A. 1) it would seem +that a man sins not if he refuse absolutely the episcopal office. + +Obj. 2: Further, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "it is very +difficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed: nor +should anyone uncleansed approach the sacred ministry." Therefore if +a man perceives that he is not cleansed, however urgently the +episcopal office be enjoined him, he ought not to accept it. + +Obj. 3: Further, Jerome (Prologue, super Marc.) says that "it is +related of the Blessed Mark* that after receiving the faith he cut +off his thumb that he might be excluded from the priesthood." [*This +prologue was falsely ascribed to St. Jerome, and the passage quoted +refers, not to St. Mark the Evangelist, but to a hermit of that name. +(Cf. Baronius, Anno Christi, 45, num. XLIV)] Likewise some take a vow +never to accept a bishopric. Now to place an obstacle to a thing +amounts to the same as refusing it altogether. Therefore it would +seem that one may, without sin, refuse the episcopal office +absolutely. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. xlviii ad Eudox.): "If Mother +Church requires your service, neither accept with greedy conceit, nor +refuse with fawning indolence"; and afterwards he adds: "Nor prefer +your ease to the needs of the Church: for if no good men were willing +to assist her in her labor, you would seek in vain how we could be +born of her." + +_I answer that,_ Two things have to be considered in the acceptance +of the episcopal office: first, what a man may fittingly desire +according to his own will; secondly, what it behooves a man to do +according to the will of another. As regards his own will it becomes +a man to look chiefly to his own spiritual welfare, whereas that he +look to the spiritual welfare of others becomes a man according to +the appointment of another having authority, as stated above (A. 1, +ad 3). Hence just as it is a mark of an inordinate will that a man of +his own choice incline to be appointed to the government of others, +so too it indicates an inordinate will if a man definitively refuse +the aforesaid office of government in direct opposition to the +appointment of his superior: and this for two reasons. + +First, because this is contrary to the love of our neighbor, for +whose good a man should offer himself according as place and time +demand: hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the demands +of charity undertake an honest labor." Secondly, because this is +contrary to humility, whereby a man submits to his superior's +commands: hence Gregory says (Pastor. i, 6): "In God's sight humility +is genuine when it does not obstinately refuse to submit to what is +usefully prescribed." + +Reply Obj. 1: Although simply and absolutely speaking the +contemplative life is more excellent than the active, and the love of +God better than the love of our neighbor, yet, on the other hand, the +good of the many should be preferred to the good of the individual. +Wherefore Augustine says in the passage quoted above: "Nor prefer +your own ease to the needs of the Church," and all the more since it +belongs to the love of God that a man undertake the pastoral care of +Christ's sheep. Hence Augustine, commenting on John 21:17, "Feed My +sheep," says (Tract. cxxiii in Joan.): "Be it the task of love to +feed the Lord's flock, even as it was the mark of fear to deny the +Shepherd." + +Moreover prelates are not transferred to the active life, so as to +forsake the contemplative; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, +19) that "if the burden of the pastoral office be imposed, we must +not abandon the delights of truth," which are derived from +contemplation. + +Reply Obj. 2: No one is bound to obey his superior by doing what is +unlawful, as appears from what was said above concerning obedience +(Q. 104, A. 5). Accordingly it may happen that he who is appointed to +the office of prelate perceive something in himself on account of +which it is unlawful for him to accept a prelacy. But this obstacle +may sometimes be removed by the very person who is appointed to the +pastoral cure--for instance, if he have a purpose to sin, he may +abandon it--and for this reason he is not excused from being bound to +obey definitely the superior who has appointed him. Sometimes, +however, he is unable himself to remove the impediment that makes the +pastoral office unlawful to him, yet the prelate who appoints him can +do so--for instance, if he be irregular or excommunicate. In such a +case he ought to make known his defect to the prelate who has +appointed him; and if the latter be willing to remove the impediment, +he is bound humbly to obey. Hence when Moses had said (Ex. 4:10): "I +beseech thee, Lord, I am not eloquent from yesterday, and the day +before," the Lord answered (Ex. 4:12): "I will be in thy mouth, and I +will teach thee what thou shalt speak." At other times the impediment +cannot be removed, neither by the person appointing nor by the one +appointed--for instance, if an archbishop be unable to dispense from +an irregularity; wherefore a subject, if irregular, would not be +bound to obey him by accepting the episcopate or even sacred orders. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is not in itself necessary for salvation to accept +the episcopal office, but it becomes necessary by reason of the +superior's command. Now one may lawfully place an obstacle to things +thus necessary for salvation, before the command is given; else it +would not be lawful to marry a second time, lest one should thus +incur an impediment to the episcopate or holy orders. But this would +not be lawful in things necessary for salvation. Hence the Blessed +Mark did not act against a precept by cutting off his finger, +although it is credible that he did this by the instigation of the +Holy Ghost, without which it would be unlawful for anyone to lay +hands on himself. If a man take a vow not to accept the bishop's +office, and by this intend to bind himself not even to accept it in +obedience to his superior prelate, his vow is unlawful; but if he +intend to bind himself, so far as it lies with him, not to seek the +episcopal office, nor to accept it except under urgent necessity, his +vow is lawful, because he vows to do what it becomes a man to do. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 3] + +Whether He That Is Appointed to the Episcopate Ought to Be Better +Than Others? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one who is appointed to the +episcopate ought to be better than others. For our Lord, when about +to commit the pastoral office to Peter, asked him if he loved Him +more than the others. Now a man is the better through loving God the +more. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be appointed to +the episcopal office except he be better than others. + +Obj. 2: Further, Pope Symmachus says (can. Vilissimus I, qu. 1): "A +man is of very little worth who though excelling in dignity, excels +not in knowledge and holiness." Now he who excels in knowledge and +holiness is better. Therefore a man ought not to be appointed to the +episcopate unless he be better than others. + +Obj. 3: Further, in every genus the lesser are governed by the +greater, as corporeal things are governed by things spiritual, and +the lower bodies by the higher, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 3). +Now a bishop is appointed to govern others. Therefore he should be +better than others. + +_On the contrary,_ The Decretal [*Can. Cum dilectus, de Electione] +says that "it suffices to choose a good man, nor is it necessary to +choose the better man." + +_I answer that,_ In designating a man for the episcopal office, +something has to be considered on the part of the person designate, +and something on the part of the designator. For on the part of the +designator, whether by election or by appointment, it is required +that he choose such a one as will dispense the divine mysteries +faithfully. These should be dispensed for the good of the Church, +according to 1 Cor. 14:12, "Seek to abound unto the edifying of the +Church"; and the divine mysteries are not committed to men for their +own meed, which they should await in the life to come. Consequently +he who has to choose or appoint one for a bishop is not bound to take +one who is best simply, i.e. according to charity, but one who is +best for governing the Church, one namely who is able to instruct, +defend, and govern the Church peacefully. Hence Jerome, commenting on +Titus 1:5, says against certain persons that "some seek to erect as +pillars of the Church, not those whom they know to be more useful to +the Church, but those whom they love more, or those by whose +obsequiousness they have been cajoled or undone, or for whom some +person in authority has spoken, and, not to say worse than this, have +succeeded by means of gifts in being made clerics." + +Now this pertains to the respect of persons, which in such matters is +a grave sin. Wherefore a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. clxvii ad Hieron.] +on James 2:1, "Brethren, have not . . . with respect of persons," +says: "If this distinction of sitting and standing be referred to +ecclesiastical honors, we must not deem it a slight sin to 'have the +faith of the Lord of glory with respect of persons.' For who would +suffer a rich man to be chosen for the Church's seat of honor, in +despite of a poor man who is better instructed and holier?" + +On the part of the person appointed, it is not required that he +esteem himself better than others, for this would be proud and +presumptuous; but it suffices that he perceive nothing in himself +which would make it unlawful for him to take up the office of +prelate. Hence although Peter was asked by our Lord if he loved Him +more than the others, he did not, in his reply, set himself before +the others, but answered simply that he loved Christ. + +Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord knew that, by His own bestowal, Peter was in +other respects fitted to govern the Church: wherefore He questioned +him about his greater love, to show that when we find a man otherwise +fitted for the government of the Church, we must look chiefly to his +pre-eminence in the love of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: This statement refers to the pursuits of the man who is +placed in authority. For he should aim at showing himself to be more +excellent than others in both knowledge and holiness. Wherefore +Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1) "the occupations of a prelate ought to +excel those of the people, as much as the shepherd's life excels that +of his flock." But he is not to be blamed and looked upon as +worthless if he excelled not before being raised to the prelacy. + +Reply Obj. 3: According to 1 Cor. 12:4 seqq., "there are diversities +of graces . . . and . . . of ministries . . . and . . . of +operations." Hence nothing hinders one from being more fitted for the +office of governing, who does not excel in the grace of holiness. It +is otherwise in the government of the natural order, where that which +is higher in the natural order is for that very reason more fitted to +dispose of those that are lower. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 4] + +Whether a Bishop May Lawfully Forsake the Episcopal Cure, in Order to +Enter Religion? + +Objection 1: It seems that a bishop cannot lawfully forsake his +episcopal cure in order to enter religion. For no one can lawfully +pass from a more perfect to a less perfect state; since this is "to +look back," which is condemned by the words of our Lord (Luke 9:62), +"No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for +the kingdom of God." Now the episcopal state is more perfect than the +religious, as shown above (Q. 184, A. 7). Therefore just as it is +unlawful to return to the world from the religious state, so is it +unlawful to pass from the episcopal to the religious state. + +Obj. 2: Further, the order of grace is more congruous than the order +of nature. Now according to nature a thing is not moved in contrary +directions; thus if a stone be naturally moved downwards, it cannot +naturally return upwards from below. But according to the order of +grace it is lawful to pass from the religious to the episcopal state. +Therefore it is not lawful to pass contrariwise from the episcopal to +the religious state. + +Obj. 3: Further, in the works of grace nothing should be inoperative. +Now when once a man is consecrated bishop he retains in perpetuity +the spiritual power of giving orders and doing like things that +pertain to the episcopal office: and this power would seemingly +remain inoperative in one who gives up the episcopal cure. Therefore +it would seem that a bishop may not forsake the episcopal cure and +enter religion. + +_On the contrary,_ No man is compelled to do what is in itself +unlawful. Now those who seek to resign their episcopal cure are +compelled to resign (Extra, de Renunt. cap. Quidam). Therefore +apparently it is not unlawful to give up the episcopal cure. + +_I answer that,_ The perfection of the episcopal state consists in +this that for love of God a man binds himself to work for the +salvation of his neighbor, wherefore he is bound to retain the +pastoral cure so long as he is able to procure the spiritual welfare +of the subjects entrusted to his care: a matter which he must not +neglect--neither for the sake of the quiet of divine contemplation, +since the Apostle, on account of the needs of his subjects, suffered +patiently to be delayed even from the contemplation of the life to +come, according to Phil. 1:22-25, "What I shall choose I know not, +but I am straitened between two, having a desire to be dissolved, and +to be with Christ, a thing by far better. But to abide still in the +flesh is needful for you. And having this confidence, I know that I +shall abide"; nor for the sake of avoiding any hardships or of +acquiring any gain whatsoever, because as it is written (John 10:11), +"the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep." + +At times, however, it happens in several ways that a bishop is +hindered from procuring the spiritual welfare of his subjects. +Sometimes on account of his own defect, either of conscience (for +instance if he be guilty of murder or simony), or of body (for +example if he be old or infirm), or of irregularity arising, for +instance, from bigamy. Sometimes he is hindered through some defect +in his subjects, whom he is unable to profit. Hence Gregory says +(Dial. ii, 3): "The wicked must be borne patiently, when there are +some good who can be succored, but when there is no profit at all for +the good, it is sometimes useless to labor for the wicked. Wherefore +the perfect when they find that they labor in vain are often minded +to go elsewhere in order to labor with fruit." Sometimes again this +hindrance arises on the part of others, as when scandal results from +a certain person being in authority: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. +8:13): "If meat scandalize my brother, I will never eat flesh": +provided, however, the scandal is not caused by the wickedness of +persons desirous of subverting the faith or the righteousness of the +Church; because the pastoral cure is not to be laid aside on account +of scandal of this kind, according to Matt. 15:14, "Let them alone," +those namely who were scandalized at the truth of Christ's teaching, +"they are blind, and leaders of the blind." + +Nevertheless just as a man takes upon himself the charge of authority +at the appointment of a higher superior, so too it behooves him to be +subject to the latter's authority in laying aside the accepted charge +for the reasons given above. Hence Innocent III says (Extra, de +Renunt., cap. Nisi cum pridem): "Though thou hast wings wherewith +thou art anxious to fly away into solitude, they are so tied by the +bonds of authority, that thou art not free to fly without our +permission." For the Pope alone can dispense from the perpetual vow, +by which a man binds himself to the care of his subjects, when he +took upon himself the episcopal office. + +Reply Obj. 1: The perfection of religious and that of bishops are +regarded from different standpoints. For it belongs to the perfection +of a religious to occupy oneself in working out one's own salvation, +whereas it belongs to the perfection of a bishop to occupy oneself in +working for the salvation of others. Hence so long as a man can be +useful to the salvation of his neighbor, he would be going back, if +he wished to pass to the religious state, to busy himself only with +his own salvation, since he has bound himself to work not only for +his own but also for others' salvation. Wherefore Innocent III says +in the Decretal quoted above that "it is more easily allowable for a +monk to ascend to the episcopacy, than for a bishop to descend to the +monastic life. If, however, he be unable to procure the salvation of +others it is meet he should seek his own." + +Reply Obj. 2: On account of no obstacle should a man forego the work +of his own salvation, which pertains to the religious state. But +there may be an obstacle to the procuring of another's salvation; +wherefore a monk may be raised to the episcopal state wherein he is +able also to work out his own salvation. And a bishop, if he be +hindered from procuring the salvation of others, may enter the +religious life, and may return to his bishopric should the obstacle +cease, for instance by the correction of his subjects, cessation of +the scandal, healing of his infirmity, removal of his ignorance by +sufficient instruction. Again, if he owed his promotion to simony of +which he was in ignorance, and resigning his episcopate entered the +religious life, he can be reappointed to another bishopric [*Cap. +Post translat., de Renunt.]. On the other hand, if a man be deposed +from the episcopal office for some sin, and confined in a monastery +that he may do penance, he cannot be reappointed to a bishopric. +Hence it is stated (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy synod +orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity +to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means +rise again to the episcopate." + +Reply Obj. 3: Even in natural things power remains inactive on +account of a supervening obstacle, for instance the act of sight +ceases through an affliction of the eye. So neither is it +unreasonable if, through the occurrence of some obstacle from +without, the episcopal power remain without the exercise of its act. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 5] + +Whether It Is Lawful for a Bishop on Account of Bodily Persecution to +Abandon the Flock Committed to His Care? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful for a bishop, on +account of some temporal persecution, to withdraw his bodily presence +from the flock committed to his care. For our Lord said (John 10:12) +that he is a hireling and no true shepherd, who "seeth the wolf +coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv +in Ev.) that "the wolf comes upon the sheep when any man by his +injustice and robbery oppresses the faithful and the humble." +Therefore if, on account of the persecution of a tyrant, a bishop +withdraws his bodily presence from the flock entrusted to his care, +it would seem that he is a hireling and not a shepherd. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 6:1): "My son, if thou be +surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a +stranger," and afterwards (Prov. 6:3): "Run about, make haste, stir +up thy friend." Gregory expounds these words and says (Pastor. iii, +4): "To be surety for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by +engaging oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an +example to the lives of others, is warned not only to watch but even +to rouse his friend." Now he cannot do this if he withdraw his bodily +presence from his flock. Therefore it would seem that a bishop should +not on account of persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his +flock. + +Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the perfection of the bishop's state +that he devote himself to the care of his neighbor. Now it is +unlawful for one who has professed the state of perfection to forsake +altogether the things that pertain to perfection. Therefore it would +seem unlawful for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the +execution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of devoting +himself to works of perfection in a monastery. + +_On the contrary,_ our Lord commanded the apostles, whose successors +bishops are (Matt. 10:23): "When they shall persecute you in this +city, flee into another." + +_I answer that,_ In any obligation the chief thing to be considered +is the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind themselves to fulfil +the pastoral office for the sake of the salvation of their subjects. +Consequently when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal +presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal +presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal +advantage, nor even on account of some impending danger to his +person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his +sheep. + +On the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can be +sufficiently provided for by another person in the absence of the +pastor, it is lawful for the pastor to withdraw his bodily presence +from his flock, either for the sake of some advantage to the Church, +or on account of some danger to his person. Hence Augustine says (Ep. +ccxxviii ad Honorat.): "Christ's servants may flee from one city to +another, when one of them is specially sought out by persecutors: in +order that the Church be not abandoned by others who are not so +sought for. When, however, the same danger threatens all, those who +stand in need of others must not be abandoned by those whom they +need." For "if it is dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship +when the sea is calm, how much more so when it is stormy," as Pope +Nicholas I says (cf. VII, qu. i, can. Sciscitaris). + +Reply Obj. 1: To flee as a hireling is to prefer temporal advantage +or one's bodily welfare to the spiritual welfare of one's neighbor. +Hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev.): "A man cannot endanger himself +for the sake of his sheep, if he uses his authority over them not +through love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore he +fears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what he loves." But +he who, in order to avoid danger, leaves the flock without +endangering the flock, does not flee as a hireling. + +Reply Obj. 2: If he who is surety for another be unable to fulfil his +engagement, it suffices that he fulfil it through another. Hence if a +superior is hindered from attending personally to the care of his +subjects, he fulfils his obligation if he do so through another. + +Reply Obj. 3: When a man is appointed to a bishopric, he +embraces the state of perfection as regards one kind of perfection; +and if he be hindered from the practice thereof, he is not bound to +another kind of perfection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious +state. Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention of +devoting himself to his neighbor's salvation, should an opportunity +offer, and necessity require it of him. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 6] + +Whether It Is Lawful for a Bishop to Have Property of His Own? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for a bishop to have +property of his own. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt +be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the +poor . . . and come, follow Me"; whence it would seem to follow that +voluntary poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the +state of perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for them to +possess anything as their own. + +Obj. 2: Further, bishops take the place of the apostles in the +Church, according to a gloss on Luke 10:1. Now our Lord commanded the +apostles to possess nothing of their own, according to Matt. 10:9, +"Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses"; +wherefore Peter said for himself and the other apostles (Matt. +19:27): "Behold we have left all things and have followed Thee." +Therefore it would seem that bishops are bound to keep this command, +and to possess nothing of their own. + +Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): "The Greek +_kleros_ denotes the Latin _sors._ Hence clerics are so called either +because they are of the Lord's estate, or because the Lord Himself is +the estate, i.e. portion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord, +can have nothing besides God; and if he have gold and silver, +possessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the Lord +does not vouchsafe to be his portion also." Therefore it would seem +that not only bishops but even clerics should have nothing of their +own. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): +"Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or +acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally." + +_I answer that,_ No one is bound to works of supererogation, unless +he binds himself specially thereto by vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep. +cxxvii ad Paulin. et Arment.): "Since you have taken the vow, you +have already bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before +you were bound by the vow, you were free to submit." Now it is +evident that to live without possessing anything is a work of +supererogation, for it is a matter not of precept but of counsel. +Wherefore our Lord after saying to the young man: "If thou wilt enter +into life, keep the commandments," said afterwards by way of +addition: "If thou wilt be perfect go sell" all "that thou hast, and +give to the poor" (Matt. 19:17, 21). Bishops, however, do not bind +themselves at their ordination to live without possessions of their +own; nor indeed does the pastoral office, to which they bind +themselves, make it necessary for them to live without anything of +their own. Therefore bishops are not bound to live without +possessions of their own. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1) the perfection of +the Christian life does not essentially consist in voluntary poverty, +but voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the perfection of +life. Hence it does not follow that where there is greater poverty +there is greater perfection; indeed the highest perfection is +compatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it was said +(Gen. 17:1): "Walk before Me and be perfect," is stated to have been +rich (Gen. 13:2). + +Reply Obj. 2: This saying of our Lord can be understood in three +ways. First, mystically, that we should possess neither gold nor +silver means that the preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal +wisdom and eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage. + +Secondly, according to Augustine's explanation (De Consens. Ev. ii, +30), we are to understand that our Lord said this not in command but +in permission. For he permitted them to go preaching without gold or +silver or other means, since they were to receive the means of +livelihood from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added: "For +the workman is worthy of his meat." And yet if anyone were to use his +own means in preaching the Gospel, this would be a work of +supererogation, as Paul says in reference to himself (1 Cor. 9:12, +15). + +Thirdly, according to the exposition of Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Rom. +xvi, 3, we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands on His +disciples in reference to the mission on which they were sent to +preach to the Jews, so that they might be encouraged to trust in His +power, seeing that He provided for their wants without their having +means of their own. But it does not follow from this that they, or +their successors, were obliged to preach the Gospel without having +means of their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor. 11:8) that he +"received wages" of other churches for preaching to the Corinthians, +wherefore it is clear that he possessed something sent to him by +others. And it seems foolish to say that so many holy bishops as +Athanasius, Ambrose, and Augustine would have disobeyed these +commandments if they believed themselves bound to observe them. + +Reply Obj. 3: Every part is less than the whole. Accordingly a man +has other portions together with God, if he becomes less intent on +things pertaining to God by occupying himself with things of the +world. Now neither bishops nor clerics ought thus to possess means of +their own, that while busy with their own they neglect those that +concern the worship of God. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 7] + +Whether Bishops Sin Mortally If They Distribute Not to the Poor the +Ecclesiastical Goods Which Accrue to Them? + +Objection 1: It would seem that bishops sin mortally if they +distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which they +acquire. For Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. lxiv, de Temp., among the +supposititious works of St. Jerome] expounding Luke 12:16, "The land +of a certain . . . man brought forth plenty of fruits," says: "Let no +man claim as his own that which he has taken and obtained by violence +from the common property in excess of his requirements"; and +afterwards he adds: "It is not less criminal to take from him who +has, than, when you are able and have plenty to refuse him who has +not." Now it is a mortal sin to take another's property by violence. +Therefore bishops sin mortally if they give not to the poor that +which they have in excess. + +Obj. 2: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Isa. 3:14, "The spoil of the +poor is in your house," says that "ecclesiastical goods belong to the +poor." Now whoever keeps for himself or gives to others that which +belongs to another, sins mortally and is bound to restitution. +Therefore if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations +or friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would seem that +they are bound to restitution. + +Obj. 3: Further, much more may one take what is necessary for oneself +from the goods of the Church, than accumulate a surplus therefrom. +Yet Jerome says in a letter to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Can. Clericos, +cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam; cause. xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv, +among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]: "It is right that +those clerics who receive no goods from their parents and relations +should be supported from the funds of the Church. But those who have +sufficient income from their parents and their own possessions, if +they take what belongs to the poor, they commit and incur the guilt +of sacrilege." Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:16): "If any of +the faithful have widows, let him minister to them, and let not the +Church be charged, that there may be sufficient for them that are +widows indeed." Much more therefore do bishops sin mortally if they +give not to the poor the surplus of their ecclesiastical goods. + +_On the contrary,_ Many bishops do not give their surplus to the +poor, but would seem commendably to lay it out so as to increase the +revenue of the Church. + +_I answer that,_ The same is not to be said of their own goods which +bishops may possess, and of ecclesiastical goods. For they have real +dominion over their own goods; wherefore from the very nature of the +case they are not bound to give these things to others, and may +either keep them for themselves or bestow them on others at will. +Nevertheless they may sin in this disposal by inordinate affection, +which leads them either to accumulate more than they should, or not +to assist others, in accordance with the demands of charity; yet they +are not bound to restitution, because such things are entrusted to +their ownership. + +On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or +trustees. For Augustine says (Ep. clxxxv ad Bonif.): "If we possess +privately what is enough for us, other things belong not to us but to +the poor, and we have the dispensing of them; but we can claim +ownership of them only by wicked theft." Now dispensing requires good +faith, according to 1 Cor. 4:2, "Here now it is required among the +dispensers that a man be found faithful." Moreover ecclesiastical +goods are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to +the divine worship and the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said +(XII, qu. ii, can. de reditibus): "Of the Church's revenues or the +offerings of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the +bishop, two parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of +suspension, for the ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit of the +poor; the remaining part is to be divided among the clergy according +to their respective merits." Accordingly if the goods which are +assigned to the use of the bishop are distinct from those which are +appointed for the use of the poor, or the ministers, or for the +ecclesiastical worship, and if the bishop keeps back for himself part +of that which should be given to the poor, or to the ministers for +their use, or expended on the divine worship, without doubt he is an +unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally, and is bound to restitution. + +But as regards those goods which are deputed to his private use, the +same apparently applies as to his own property, namely that he sins +through immoderate attachment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds +moderation in what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others +according to the demands of charity. + +On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods, +their distribution is entrusted to his good faith; and if he fail or +exceed in a slight degree, this may happen without prejudice to his +good faith, because in such matters a man cannot possibly decide +precisely what ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be +very great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently he would +seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty of mortal sin. For it +is written (Matt. 24:48-51) that "if that evil servant shall say in +his heart: My lord is long a-coming," which shows contempt of God's +judgment, "and shall begin to strike his fellow-servants," which is a +sign of pride, "and shall eat and drink with drunkards," which +proceeds from lust, "the lord of that servant shall come in a day +that he hopeth not . . . and shall separate him," namely from the +fellowship of good men, "and appoint his portion with hypocrites," +namely in hell. + +Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Ambrose refers to the administration not +only of ecclesiastical things but also of any goods whatever from +which a man is bound, as a duty of charity, to provide for those who +are in need. But it is not possible to state definitely when this +need is such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal sin, as +is the case in other points of detail that have to be considered in +human acts: for the decision in such matters is left to human +prudence. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above the goods of the Church have to be +employed not only for the use of the poor, but also for other +purposes. Hence if a bishop or cleric wish to deprive himself of that +which is assigned to his own use, and give it to his relations or +others, he sins not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit, +that they cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby. +Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "It is a commendable liberality +if you overlook not your kindred when you know them to be in want; +yet not so as to wish to make them rich with what you can give to the +poor." + +Reply Obj. 3: The goods of churches should not all be given to the +poor, except in a case of necessity: for then, as Ambrose says (De +Offic. ii, 28), even the vessels consecrated to the divine worship +are to be sold for the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the +poor. In such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to +maintain himself on the goods of the Church, always supposing him to +have a patrimony of his own on which to support himself. + +Reply Obj. 4: The goods of the churches should be employed for the +good of the poor. Consequently a man is to be commended if, there +being no present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the +surplus from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays it by +for some future use connected with the Church or the needs of the +poor. But if there be a pressing need for helping the poor, to lay by +for the future is a superfluous and inordinate saving, and is +forbidden by our Lord Who said (Matt. 6:34): "Be . . . not solicitous +for the morrow." +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 8] + +Whether Religious Who Are Raised to the Episcopate Are Bound to +Religious Observances? + +Objection 1: It would seem that religious who are raised to the +episcopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said +(XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that a "canonical election loosens a +monk from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic profession, +and the holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop." Now the regular +observances pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore religious who +are appointed bishops are not bound to religious observances. + +Obj. 2: Further, he who ascends from a lower to a higher degree is +seemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower +degree: thus it was stated above (Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1) that a +religious is not bound to keep the vows he made in the world. But a +religious who is appointed to the episcopate ascends to something +greater, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7). Therefore it would seem that +a bishop is not bound to those things whereto he was bound in the +state of religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, religious would seem to be bound above all to +obedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious +who are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of +their order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound +to poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (Obj. 1) "when +the holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the right, +as the lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance." Moreover +they are sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less therefore are +they bound to other regular observances. + +_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De +Monachis): "With regard to those who after long residence in a +monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay +aside their former purpose." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2) the religious state +pertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while the +episcopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of +perfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal +state, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to +perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of +perfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with +perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with +perfection, it is confirmed the more. Thus when the scholar has +become a professor it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it +becomes him to read and meditate even more than before. Accordingly +we must assert that if there be among religious observances any that +instead of being an obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard +of perfection, such as continence, poverty, and so forth, a +religious, even after he has been made a bishop, remains bound to +observe these, and consequently to wear the habit of his order, which +is a sign of this obligation. + +On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious +observances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for +instance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or +watchings and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the +episcopal office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them, +according to the needs of his person or office, and the manner of +life of those among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious +superiors dispense themselves in such matters. + +Reply Obj. 1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is loosened +from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything, but in +those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated +above. + +Reply Obj. 2: The vows of those who are living in the world are +compared to the vows of religion as the particular to the universal, +as stated above (Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1). But the vows of religion are +compared to the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now +the particular is superfluous when one has the universal, whereas the +disposition is still necessary when perfection has been attained. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is accidental that religious who are bishops are not +bound to obey the superiors of their order, because, to wit, they +have ceased to be their subjects; even as those same religious +superiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains virtually, +so that if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be bound +to obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both the statutes of +their rule in the way mentioned above, and their superiors if they +have any. + +As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal +inheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is +added (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that after he has been ordained +bishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed +according to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire. + +Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with +the sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with +his death, after which a testament comes into force according to the +Apostle (Heb. 9:17). If, however, by the Pope's permission he make a +will, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but +we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power of his +administration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his +death. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 186 + +OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS STATE PROPERLY CONSISTS +(In Ten Articles) + +We must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which +consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider +those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly, +those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the +different kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the +religious state. + +Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the religious state is perfect? + +(2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels? + +(3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state? + +(4) Whether continency is necessary? + +(5) Whether obedience is necessary? + +(6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow? + +(7) Of the sufficiency of these vows; + +(8) Of their comparison one with another; + +(9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a +statute of his rule? + +(10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more +grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 1] + +Whether Religion Implies a State of Perfection? + +Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of +perfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not +seemingly pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for +salvation, whether because "thereby we are bound (_religamur_) to the +one almighty God," as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because +it takes its name from "our returning (_religimus_) to God Whom we +had lost by neglecting Him" [*Cf. Q. 81, A. 1], according to +Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that religion +does not denote the state of perfection. + +Obj. 2: Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, +53) is that "which offers worship and ceremony to the Divine nature." +Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain +to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of +states, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 2; Q. 183, A. 3). Therefore it +would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection. + +Obj. 3: Further, the state of perfection is distinct from the state +of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also some +are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does not +denote the state of perfection. + +Obj. 4: Further, religion would seem a place of repentance; for it is +said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy synod +orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity +to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means +rise again to the episcopate." Now a place of repentance is opposed +to the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi) places +penitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be +cleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of +perfection. + +_On the contrary,_ In the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. i, 7) +abbot Moses speaking of religious says: "We must recognize that we +have to undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil, +privation, reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these +degrees to mount to the perfection of charity." Now things pertaining +to human acts are specified and denominated from the intention of the +end. Therefore religious belong to the state of perfection. + +Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those who are called +servants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and +subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 2) that which is +applicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to +that to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of +"fortitude" is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of +the mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of +"temperance," by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures. +Now religion as stated above (Q. 81, A. 2; A. 3, ad 2) is a virtue +whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of God. +Wherefore those are called religious antonomastically, who give +themselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust +to God. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): "Some there are who +keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their +tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess." Now +the perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated +above (Q. 184, A. 2), and in this sense religion denotes the state of +perfection. + +Reply Obj. 1: To offer something to the worship of God is necessary +for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one's possessions to +the worship of God belongs to perfection. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4, ad 1, 2; Q. +85, A. 3) when we were treating of the virtue of religion, religion +has reference not only to the offering of sacrifices and other like +things that are proper to religion, but also to the acts of all the +virtues which in so far as these are referred to God's service and +honor become acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes his whole +life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to religion, and +thus by reason of the religious life that they lead, those who are in +the state of perfection are called religious. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 184, AA. 4, 6) religion denotes the +state of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it does not +follow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already perfect, +but that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on Matt. +19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect," etc., says (Tract. viii in Matth.) +that "he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to become +perfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his +goods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will +begin to lead him to all the virtues." Thus all are not perfect in +religion, but some are beginners, some proficient. + +Reply Obj. 4: The religious state was instituted chiefly that we +might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the +obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the +obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut +off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs +to penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the +religious state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII, +qu. ii, cap. Admonere) a man who had killed his wife is counseled to +enter a monastery which is described as "better and lighter," rather +than to do public penance while remaining in the world. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 2] + +Whether Every Religious Is Bound to Keep All the Counsels? + +Objection 1: It would seem that every religious is bound to keep all +the counsels. For whoever professes a certain state of life is bound +to observe whatever belongs to that state. Now each religious +professes the state of perfection. Therefore every religious is bound +to keep all the counsels that pertain to the state of perfection. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that "he who +renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who +has gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness." Now it +belongs specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it +belongs to them also to do all the good they can. and so it would +seem that each of them is bound to fulfil all the counsels. + +Obj. 3: Further, if it is not requisite for the state of perfection +to fulfil all the counsels, it would seem enough to fulfil some of +them. But this is false, since some who lead a secular life fulfil +some of the counsels, for instance those who observe continence. +Therefore it would seem that every religious who is in the state of +perfection is bound to fulfil whatever pertains to perfection: and +such are the counsels. + +_On the contrary,_ one is not bound, unless one bind oneself, to do +works of supererogation. But every religious does not bind himself to +keep all the counsels, but to certain definite ones, some to some, +others to others. Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them. + +_I answer that,_ A thing pertains to perfection in three ways. First, +essentially, and thus, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 3) the perfect +observance of the precepts of charity belongs to perfection. +Secondly, a thing belongs to perfection consequently: such are those +things that result from the perfection of charity, for instance to +bless them that curse you (Luke 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like +kind, which though they be binding as regards the preparedness of the +mind, so that one has to fulfil them when necessity requires; yet are +sometimes fulfilled, without there being any necessity, through +superabundance of charity. Thirdly, a thing belongs to perfection +instrumentally and dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence, +and the like. + +Now it has been stated (A. 1) that the perfection of charity is the +end of the religious state. And the religious state is a school or +exercise for the attainment of perfection, which men strive to reach +by various practices, just as a physician may use various remedies in +order to heal. But it is evident that for him who works for an end it +is not necessary that he should already have attained the end, but it +is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. Hence he who +enters the religious state is not bound to have perfect charity, but +he is bound to tend to this, and use his endeavors to have perfect +charity. + +For the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those things that +result from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend +to fulfil them: against which intention he acts if he contemns them, +wherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them. + +In like manner he is not bound to observe all the practices whereby +perfection may be attained, but only those which are definitely +prescribed to him by the rule which he has professed. + +Reply Obj. 1: He who enters religion does not make profession to be +perfect, but he professes to endeavor to attain perfection; even as +he who enters the schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to +study in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine says (De +Civ. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to profess to be a wise +man, but acknowledged himself, "a lover of wisdom." Hence a religious +does not violate his profession if he be not perfect, but only if he +despises to tend to perfection. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as, though all are bound to love God with their +whole heart, yet there is a certain wholeness of perfection which +cannot be omitted without sin, and another wholeness which can be +omitted without sin (Q. 184, A. 2, ad 3), provided there be no +contempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious and +seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do whatever good they +can, for to all without exception it is said (Eccles. 9:10): +"Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly." Yet there is a +way of fulfilling this precept, so as to avoid sin, namely if one do +what one can as required by the conditions of one's state of life: +provided there be no contempt of doing better things, which contempt +sets the mind against spiritual progress. + +Reply Obj. 3: There are some counsels such that if they be omitted, +man's whole life would be taken up with secular business; for +instance if he have property of his own, or enter the married state, +or do something of the kind that regards the essential vows of +religion themselves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such +like counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about certain +particular better actions, which can be omitted without one's life +being taken up with secular actions; wherefore there is no need for +religious to be bound to fulfil all of them. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 3] + +Whether Poverty Is Required for Religious Perfection? + +Objection 1: It would seem that poverty is not required for religious +perfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently +belong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful +for a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor. +8:12) lays down the way in which the faithful are to give alms +saying: "If the will be forward, it is accepted according to that +which a man hath," i.e. "you should keep back what you need," and +afterwards he adds (2 Cor. 8:13): "For I mean not that others should +be eased, and you burthened," i.e. "with poverty," according to a +gloss. Moreover a gloss on 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to +be covered," says: "Though we brought nothing, and will carry nothing +away, we must not give up these temporal things altogether." +Therefore it seems that voluntary poverty is not requisite for +religious perfection. + +Obj. 2: Further, whosoever exposes himself to danger sins. But he who +renounces all he has and embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself +to danger--not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, "Lest perhaps +. . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the +name of my God," and Ecclus. 27:1, "Through poverty many have +sinned"--but also corporal, for it is written (Eccles. 7:13): "As +wisdom is a defense, so money is a defense," and the Philosopher says +(Ethic. iv, 1) that "the waste of property appears to be a sort of +ruining of one's self, since thereby man lives." Therefore it would +seem that voluntary poverty is not requisite for the perfection of +religious life. + +Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue observes the mean," as stated in _Ethic._ +ii, 6. But he who renounces all by voluntary poverty seems to go to +the extreme rather than to observe the mean. Therefore he does not +act virtuously: and so this does not pertain to the perfection of +life. + +Obj. 4: Further, the ultimate perfection of man consists in +happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; for it is written +(Ecclus. 31:8): "Blessed is the rich man that is found without +blemish," and the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that "riches +contribute instrumentally to happiness." Therefore voluntary poverty +is not requisite for religious perfection. + +Obj. 5: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the +religious state. But bishops may have property, as stated above (Q. +185, A. 6). Therefore religious may also. + +Obj. 6: Further, almsgiving is a work most acceptable to God, and as +Chrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep. ad Hebr.) "is a most effective remedy +in repentance." Now poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it would +seem that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. viii, 26): "There are some of +the righteous who bracing themselves up to lay hold of the very +height of perfection, while they aim at higher objects within, +abandon all things without." Now, as stated above, (AA. 1, 2), it +belongs properly to religious to brace themselves up in order to lay +hold of the very height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them +to abandon all outward things by voluntary poverty. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the religious state is an +exercise and a school for attaining to the perfection of charity. For +this it is necessary that a man wholly withdraw his affections from +worldly things; since Augustine says (Confess. x, 29), speaking to +God: "Too little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee, +which he loveth not for Thee." Wherefore he says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. +36) that "greater charity means less cupidity, perfect charity means +no cupidity." Now the possession of worldly things draws a man's mind +to the love of them: hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi ad Paulin. et +Theras.) that "we are more firmly attached to earthly things when we +have them than when we desire them: since why did that young man go +away sad, save because he had great wealth? For it is one thing not +to wish to lay hold of what one has not, and another to renounce what +one already has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter +are cut off as a limb." And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in Matth.) +that "the possession of wealth kindles a greater flame and the desire +for it becomes stronger." + +Hence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of charity the +first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby a man lives without +property of his own, according to the saying of our Lord (Matt. +19:21), "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou +hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me." + +Reply Obj. 1: As the gloss adds, "when the Apostle said this (namely +'not that you should be burthened,' i.e. with poverty)," he did not +mean that "it were better not to give: but he feared for the weak, +whom he admonished so to give as not to suffer privation." Hence in +like manner the other gloss means not that it is unlawful to renounce +all one's temporal goods, but that this is not required of necessity. +Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "Our Lord does not wish," +namely does not command us "to pour out our wealth all at once, but +to dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his oxen, +and fed the poor with that which was his own so that no household +care might hold him back." + +Reply Obj. 2: He who renounces all his possessions for Christ's sake +exposes himself to no danger, neither spiritual nor corporal. For +spiritual danger ensues from poverty when the latter is not +voluntary; because those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire +of money-getting, fall into many sins, according to 1 Tim. 6:9, "They +that will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the +devil." This attachment is put away by those who embrace voluntary +poverty, but it gathers strength in those who have wealth, as stated +above. Again bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on +following Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust +themselves to divine providence. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. +in Monte ii, 17): "Those who seek first the kingdom of God and His +justice are not weighed down by anxiety lest they lack what is +necessary." + +Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), the mean +of virtue is taken according to right reason, not according to the +quantity of a thing. Consequently whatever may be done in accordance +with right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the +quantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however, be against +right reason to throw away all one's possessions through +intemperance, or without any useful purpose; whereas it is in +accordance with right reason to renounce wealth in order to devote +oneself to the contemplation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are +said to have done this; for Jerome says (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin.): "The +famous Theban, Crates, once a very wealthy man, when he was going to +Athens to study philosophy, cast away a large amount of gold; for he +considered that he could not possess both gold and virtue at the same +time." Much more therefore is it according to right reason for a man +to renounce all he has, in order perfectly to follow Christ. +Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust. Monach.): "Poor thyself, +follow Christ poor." + +Reply Obj. 4: Happiness or felicity is twofold. One is perfect, to +which we look forward in the life to come; the other is imperfect, in +respect of which some are said to be happy in this life. The +happiness of this life is twofold, one is according to the active +life, the other according to the contemplative life, as the +Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 7, 8). Now wealth conduces +instrumentally to the happiness of the active life which consists in +external actions, because as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) "we +do many things by friends, by riches, by political influence, as it +were by instruments." On the other hand, it does not conduce to the +happiness of the contemplative life, rather is it an obstacle +thereto, inasmuch as the anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet of +the soul, which is most necessary to one who contemplates. Hence it +is that the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 8) that "for actions many +things are needed, but the contemplative man needs no such things," +namely external goods, "for his operation; in fact they are obstacles +to his contemplation." + +Man is directed to future happiness by charity; and since voluntary +poverty is an efficient exercise for the attaining of perfect +charity, it follows that it is of great avail in acquiring the +happiness of heaven. Wherefore our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "Go, sell +all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt +have treasure in heaven." Now riches once they are possessed are in +themselves of a nature to hinder the perfection of charity, +especially by enticing and distracting the mind. Hence it is written +(Matt. 13:22) that "the care of this world and the deceitfulness of +riches choketh up the word" of God, for as Gregory says (Hom. xv in +Ev.) by "preventing the good desire from entering into the heart, +they destroy life at its very outset." Consequently it is difficult +to safeguard charity amidst riches: wherefore our Lord said (Matt. +19:23) that "a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of +heaven," which we must understand as referring to one who actually +has wealth, since He says that this is impossible for him who places +his affection in riches, according to the explanation of Chrysostom +(Hom. lxiii in Matth.), for He adds (Matt. 19:24): "It is easier for +a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to +enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence it is not said simply that +the "rich man" is blessed, but "the rich man that is found without +blemish, and that hath not gone after gold," and this because he has +done a difficult thing, wherefore the text continues (Matt. 19:9): +"Who is he? and we will praise him; for he hath done wonderful things +in his life," namely by not loving riches though placed in the midst +of them. + +Reply Obj. 5: The episcopal state is not directed to the attainment +of perfection, but rather to the effect that, in virtue of the +perfection which he already has, a man may govern others, by +administering not only spiritual but also temporal things. This +belongs to the active life, wherein many things occur that may be +done by means of wealth as an instrument, as stated (ad 4). Wherefore +it is not required of bishops, who make profession of governing +Christ's flock, that they have nothing of their own, whereas it is +required of religious who make profession of learning to obtain +perfection. + +Reply Obj. 6: The renouncement of one's own wealth is compared to +almsgiving as the universal to the particular, and as the holocaust +to the sacrifice. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that those +who assist "the needy with the things they possess, by their good +deeds offer sacrifice, since they offer up something to God and keep +back something for themselves; whereas those who keep nothing for +themselves offer a holocaust which is greater than a sacrifice." +Wherefore Jerome also says (Contra Vigilant.): "When you declare that +those do better who retain the use of their possessions, and dole out +the fruits of their possessions to the poor, it is not I but the Lord +Who answers you; If thou wilt be perfect," etc., and afterwards he +goes on to say: "This man whom you praise belongs to the second and +third degree, and we too commend him: provided we acknowledge the +first as to be preferred to the second and third." For this reason in +order to exclude the error of Vigilantius it is said (De Eccl. Dogm. +xxxviii): "It is a good thing to give away one's goods by dispensing +them to the poor: it is better to give them away once for all with +the intention of following the Lord, and, free of solicitude, to be +poor with Christ." +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 4] + +Whether Perpetual Continence Is Required for Religious Perfection? + +Objection 1: It would seem that perpetual continence is not required +for religious perfection. For all perfection of the Christian life +began with Christ's apostles. Now the apostles do not appear to have +observed continence, as evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we +read Matt. 8:14. Therefore it would seem that perpetual continence is +not requisite for religious perfection. + +Obj. 2: Further, the first example of perfection is shown to us in +the person of Abraham, to whom the Lord said (Gen. 17:1): "Walk +before Me, and be perfect." Now the copy should not surpass the +example. Therefore perpetual continence is not requisite for +religious perfection. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is required for religious perfection is +to be found in every religious order. Now there are some religious +who lead a married life. Therefore religious perfection does not +require perpetual continence. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse +ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit, +perfecting sanctification in the fear of God." Now cleanness of flesh +and spirit is safeguarded by continence, for it is said (1 Cor. +7:34): "The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of +the Lord that she may be holy both in spirit and in body [Vulg.: +'both in body and in spirit']." Therefore religious perfection +requires continence. + +_I answer that,_ The religious state requires the removal of whatever +hinders man from devoting himself entirely to God's service. Now the +use of sexual union hinders the mind from giving itself wholly to the +service of God, and this for two reasons. First, on account of its +vehement delectation, which by frequent repetition increases +concupiscence, as also the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 12): and +hence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind from that +perfect intentness on tending to God. Augustine expresses this when +he says (Solil. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the +manly mind from its height as the fondling of women, and those bodily +contacts which belong to the married state." Secondly, because it +involves man in solicitude for the control of his wife, his children, +and his temporalities which serve for their upkeep. Hence the Apostle +says (1 Cor. 7:32, 33): "He that is without a wife is solicitous for +the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God: but he +that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he +may please his wife." + +Therefore perpetual continence, as well as voluntary poverty, is +requisite for religious perfection. Wherefore just as Vigilantius was +condemned for equaling riches to poverty, so was Jovinian condemned +for equaling marriage to virginity. + +Reply Obj. 1: The perfection not only of poverty but also of +continence was introduced by Christ Who said (Matt. 19:12): "There +are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs, for the kingdom of +heaven," and then added: "He that can take, let him take it." And +lest anyone should be deprived of the hope of attaining perfection, +he admitted to the state of perfection those even who were married. +Now the husbands could not without committing an injustice forsake +their wives, whereas men could without injustice renounce riches. +Wherefore Peter whom He found married, He severed not from his wife, +while "He withheld from marriage John who wished to marry" [*Prolog. +in Joan. among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxii), "the chastity +of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage, one of which +Abraham had in use, both of them in habit. For he lived chastely, and +he might have been chaste without marrying, but it was not requisite +then." Nevertheless if the patriarchs of old had perfection of mind +together with wealth and marriage, which is a mark of the greatness +of their virtue, this is no reason why any weaker person should +presume to have such great virtue that he can attain to perfection +though rich and married; as neither does a man unarmed presume to +attack his enemy, because Samson slew many foes with the jaw-bone of +an ass. For those fathers, had it been seasonable to observe +continence and poverty, would have been most careful to observe them. + +Reply Obj. 3: Such ways of living as admit of the use of marriage are +not the religious life simply and absolutely speaking, but in a +restricted sense, in so far as they have a certain share in those +things that belong to the religious state. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 5] + +Whether Obedience Belongs to Religious Perfection? + +Objection 1: It would seem that obedience does not belong to +religious perfection. For those things seemingly belong to religious +perfection, which are works of supererogation and are not binding +upon all. But all are bound to obey their superiors, according to the +saying of the Apostle (Heb. 13:17), "Obey your prelates, and be +subject to them." Therefore it would seem that obedience does not +belong to religious perfection. + +Obj. 2: Further, obedience would seem to belong properly to those who +have to be guided by the sense of others, and such persons are +lacking in discernment. Now the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong +meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses +exercised to the discerning of good and evil." Therefore it would +seem that obedience does not belong to the state of the perfect. + +Obj. 3: Further, if obedience were requisite for religious +perfection, it would follow that it is befitting to all religious. +But it is not becoming to all; since some religious lead a solitary +life, and have no superior whom they obey. Again religious superiors +apparently are not bound to obedience. Therefore obedience would seem +not to pertain to religious perfection. + +Obj. 4: Further, if the vow of obedience were requisite for religion, +it would follow that religious are bound to obey their superiors in +all things, just as they are bound to abstain from all venery by +their vow of continence. But they are not bound to obey them in all +things, as stated above (Q. 104, A. 5), when we were treating of the +virtue of obedience. Therefore the vow of obedience is not requisite +for religion. + +Obj. 5: Further, those services are most acceptable to God which are +done freely and not of necessity, according to 2 Cor. 9:7, "Not with +sadness or of necessity." Now that which is done out of obedience is +done of necessity of precept. Therefore those good works are more +deserving of praise which are done of one's own accord. Therefore the +vow of obedience is unbecoming to religion whereby men seek to attain +to that which is better. + +_On the contrary,_ Religious perfection consists chiefly in the +imitation of Christ, according to Matt. 19:21, "If thou wilt be +perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor, +and follow Me." Now in Christ obedience is commended above all +according to Phil. 2:8, "He became [Vulg.: 'becoming'] obedient unto +death." Therefore seemingly obedience belongs to religious perfection. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3) the religious state is a +school and exercise for tending to perfection. Now those who are +being instructed or exercised in order to attain a certain end must +needs follow the direction of someone under whose control they are +instructed or exercised so as to attain that end as disciples under a +master. Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction and +command of someone as regards things pertaining to the religious +life; wherefore it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The +monastic life denotes subjection and discipleship." Now one man is +subjected to another's command and instruction by obedience: and +consequently obedience is requisite for religious perfection. + +Reply Obj. 1: To obey one's superiors in matters that are essential +to virtue is not a work of supererogation, but is common to all: +whereas to obey in matters pertaining to the practice of perfection +belongs properly to religious. This latter obedience is compared to +the former as the universal to the particular. For those who live in +the world, keep something for themselves, and offer something to God; +and in the latter respect they are under obedience to their +superiors: whereas those who live in religion give themselves wholly +and their possessions to God, as stated above (AA. 1, 3). Hence their +obedience is universal. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1, 2), by +performing actions we contract certain habits, and when we have +acquired the habit we are best able to perform the actions. +Accordingly those who have not attained to perfection, acquire +perfection by obeying, while those who have already acquired +perfection are most ready to obey, not as though they need to be +directed to the acquisition of perfection, but as maintaining +themselves by this means in that which belongs to perfection. + +Reply Obj. 3: The subjection of religious is chiefly in reference to +bishops, who are compared to them as perfecters to perfected, as +Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi), where he also says that the +"monastic order is subjected to the perfecting virtues of the +bishops, and is taught by their godlike enlightenment." Hence neither +hermits nor religious superiors are exempt from obedience to bishops; +and if they be wholly or partly exempt from obedience to the bishop +of the diocese, they are nevertheless bound to obey the Sovereign +Pontiff, not only in matters affecting all in common, but also in +those which pertain specially to religious discipline. + +Reply Obj. 4: The vow of obedience taken by religious, extends to the +disposition of a man's whole life, and in this way it has a certain +universality, although it does not extend to all individual acts. For +some of these do not belong to religion, through not being of those +things that concern the love of God and of our neighbor, such as +rubbing one's beard, lifting a stick from the ground and so forth, +which do not come under a vow nor under obedience; and some are +contrary to religion. Nor is there any comparison with continence +whereby acts are excluded which are altogether contrary to religion. + +Reply Obj. 5: The necessity of coercion makes an act involuntary and +consequently deprives it of the character of praise or merit; whereas +the necessity which is consequent upon obedience is a necessity not +of coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is willing to obey, +although perhaps he would not be willing to do the thing commanded +considered in itself. Wherefore since by the vow of obedience a man +lays himself under the necessity of doing for God's sake certain +things that are not pleasing in themselves, for this very reason that +which he does is the more acceptable to God, though it be of less +account, because man can give nothing greater to God, than by +subjecting his will to another man's for God's sake. Hence in the +Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xviii, 7) it is stated that "the +Sarabaitae are the worst class of monks, because through providing +for their own needs without being subject to superiors, they are free +to do as they will; and yet day and night they are more busily +occupied in work than those who live in monasteries." +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 6] + +Whether It Is Requisite for Religious Perfection That Poverty, +Continence, and Obedience Should Come Under a Vow? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for religious +perfection that the three aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and +obedience, should come under a vow. For the school of perfection is +founded on the principles laid down by our Lord. Now our Lord in +formulating perfection (Matt. 19:21) said: "If thou wilt be perfect, +go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor," +without any mention of a vow. Therefore it would seem that a vow is +not necessary for the school of religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, a vow is a promise made to God, wherefore (Eccles. +5:3) the wise man after saying: "If thou hast vowed anything to God, +defer not to pay it," adds at once, "for an unfaithful and foolish +promise displeaseth Him." But when a thing is being actually given +there is no need for a promise. Therefore it suffices for religious +perfection that one keep poverty, continence, and obedience without. +vowing them. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Ad Pollent., de Adult. Conjug. i, +14): "The services we render are more pleasing when we might lawfully +not render them, yet do so out of love." Now it is lawful not to +render a service which we have not vowed, whereas it is unlawful if +we have vowed to render it. Therefore seemingly it is more pleasing +to God to keep poverty, continence, and obedience without a vow. +Therefore a vow is not requisite for religious perfection. + +_On the contrary,_ In the Old Law the Nazareans were consecrated by +vow according to Num. 6:2, "When a man or woman shall make a vow to +be sanctified and will consecrate themselves to the Lord," etc. Now +these were a figure of those "who attain the summit of perfection," +as a gloss [*Cf. Moral. ii] of Gregory states. Therefore a vow is +requisite for religious perfection. + +_I answer that,_ It belongs to religious to be in the state of +perfection, as shown above (Q. 174, A. 5). Now the state of +perfection requires an obligation to whatever belongs to perfection: +and this obligation consists in binding oneself to God by means of a +vow. But it is evident from what has been said (AA. 3, 4, 5) that +poverty, continence, and obedience belong to the perfection of the +Christian life. Consequently the religious state requires that one be +bound to these three by vow. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): +"When a man vows to God all his possessions, all his life, all his +knowledge, it is a holocaust"; and afterwards he says that this +refers to those who renounce the present world. + +Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord declared that it belongs to the perfection of +life that a man follow Him, not anyhow, but in such a way as not to +turn back. Wherefore He says again (Luke 9:62): "No man putting his +hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." +And though some of His disciples went back, yet when our Lord asked +(John 6:68, 69), "Will you also go away?" Peter answered for the +others: "Lord, to whom shall we go?" Hence Augustine says (De +Consensu Ev. ii, 17) that "as Matthew and Mark relate, Peter and +Andrew followed Him after drawing their boats on to the beach, not as +though they purposed to return, but as following Him at His command." +Now this unwavering following of Christ is made fast by a vow: +wherefore a vow is requisite for religious perfection. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Gregory says (Moral. ii) religious perfection +requires that a man give "his whole life" to God. But a man cannot +actually give God his whole life, because that life taken as a whole +is not simultaneous but successive. Hence a man cannot give his whole +life to God otherwise than by the obligation of a vow. + +Reply Obj. 3: Among other services that we can lawfully give, is our +liberty, which is dearer to man than aught else. Consequently when a +man of his own accord deprives himself by vow of the liberty of +abstaining from things pertaining to God's service, this is most +acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et +Arment.): "Repent not of thy vow; rejoice rather that thou canst no +longer do lawfully, what thou mightest have done lawfully but to thy +own cost. Happy the obligation that compels to better things." +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 7] + +Whether It Is Right to Say That Religious Perfection Consists in +These Three Vows? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not right to say that religious +perfection consists in these three vows. For the perfection of life +consists of inward rather than of outward acts, according to Rom. +14:17, "The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and +peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." Now the religious vow binds a man +to things belonging to perfection. Therefore vows of inward actions, +such as contemplation, love of God and our neighbor, and so forth, +should pertain to the religious state, rather than the vows of +poverty, continence, and obedience which refer to outward actions. + +Obj. 2: Further, the three aforesaid come under the religious vow, in +so far as they belong to the practice of tending to perfection. But +there are many other things that religious practice, such as +abstinence, watchings, and the like. Therefore it would seem that +these three vows are incorrectly described as pertaining to the state +of perfection. + +Obj. 3: Further, by the vow of obedience a man is bound to do +according to his superior's command whatever pertains to the practice +of perfection. Therefore the vow of obedience suffices without the +two other vows. + +Obj. 4: Further, external goods comprise not only riches but also +honors. Therefore, if religious, by the vow of poverty, renounce +earthly riches, there should be another vow whereby they may despise +worldly honors. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated (Extra, de Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad +monasterium) that "the keeping of chastity and the renouncing of +property are affixed to the monastic rule." + +_I answer that,_ The religious state may be considered in three ways. +First, as being a practice of tending to the perfection of charity: +secondly, as quieting the human mind from outward solicitude, +according to 1 Cor. 7:32: "I would have you to be without +solicitude": thirdly, as a holocaust whereby a man offers himself and +his possessions wholly to God; and in corresponding manner the +religious state is constituted by these three vows. + +First, as regards the practice of perfection a man is required to +remove from himself whatever may hinder his affections from tending +wholly to God, for it is in this that the perfection of charity +consists. Such hindrances are of three kinds. First, the attachment +to external goods, which is removed by the vow of poverty; secondly, +the concupiscence of sensible pleasures, chief among which are +venereal pleasures, and these are removed by the vow of continence; +thirdly, the inordinateness of the human will, and this is removed by +the vow of obedience. In like manner the disquiet of worldly +solicitude is aroused in man in reference especially to three things. +First, as regards the dispensing of external things, and this +solicitude is removed from man by the vow of poverty; secondly, as +regards the control of wife and children, which is cut away by the +vow of continence; thirdly, as regards the disposal of one's own +actions, which is eliminated by the vow of obedience, whereby a man +commits himself to the disposal of another. + +Again, "a holocaust is the offering to God of all that one has," +according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Now man has a threefold +good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 8). First, the good of +external things, which he wholly offers to God by the vow of +voluntary poverty: secondly, the good of his own body, and this good +he offers to God especially by the vow of continence, whereby he +renounces the greatest bodily pleasures. The third is the good of the +soul, which man wholly offers to God by the vow of obedience, whereby +he offers God his own will by which he makes use of all the powers +and habits of the soul. Therefore the religious state is fittingly +constituted by the three vows. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the end whereunto the religious +vow is directed is the perfection of charity, since all the interior +acts of virtue belong to charity as to their mother, according to 1 +Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Hence the interior +acts of virtue, for instance humility, patience, and so forth, do not +come under the religious vow, but this is directed to them as its end. + +Reply Obj. 2: All other religious observances are directed to the +three aforesaid principal vows; for if any of them are ordained for +the purpose of procuring a livelihood, such as labor, questing, and +so on, they are to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding of +which religious seek a livelihood by these means. Other observances +whereby the body is chastised, such as watching, fasting, and the +like, are directly ordained for the observance of the vow of +continence. And such religious observances as regard human actions +whereby a man is directed to the end of religion, namely the love of +God and his neighbor (such as reading, prayer, visiting the sick, and +the like), are comprised under the vow of obedience that applies to +the will, which directs its actions to the end according to the +ordering of another person. The distinction of habit belongs to all +three vows, as a sign of being bound by them: wherefore the religious +habit is given or blessed at the time of profession. + +Reply Obj. 3: By obedience a man offers to God his will, to which +though all human affairs are subject, yet some are subject to it +alone in a special manner, namely human actions, since passions +belong also to the sensitive appetite. Wherefore in order to restrain +the passions of carnal pleasures and of external objects of appetite, +which hinder the perfection of life, there was need for the vows of +continence and poverty; but for the ordering of one's own actions +accordingly as the state of perfection requires, there was need for +the vow of obedience. + +Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), strictly and +truly speaking honor is not due save to virtue. Since, however, +external goods serve instrumentally for certain acts of virtue, the +consequence is that a certain honor is given to their excellence +especially by the common people who acknowledge none but outward +excellence. Therefore since religious tend to the perfection of +virtue it becomes them not to renounce the honor which God and all +holy men accord to virtue, according to Ps. 138:17, "But to me Thy +friends, O God, are made exceedingly honorable." On the other hand, +they renounce the honor that is given to outward excellence, by the +very fact that they withdraw from a worldly life: hence no special +vow is needed for this. +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 8] + +Whether the Vow of Obedience Is the Chief of the Three Religious Vows? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the vow of obedience is not the chief +of the three religious vows. For the perfection of the religious life +was inaugurated by Christ. Now Christ gave a special counsel of +poverty; whereas He is not stated to have given a special counsel of +obedience. Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of +obedience. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 26:20) that "no price is +worthy of a continent soul." Now the vow of that which is more worthy +is itself more excellent. Therefore the vow of continence is more +excellent than the vow of obedience. + +Obj. 3: Further, the greater a vow the more indispensable it would +seem to be. Now the vows of poverty and continence "are so +inseparable from the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign +Pontiff can allow them to be broken," according to a Decretal (De +Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad monasterium): yet he can dispense a +religious from obeying his superior. Therefore it would seem that the +vow of obedience is less than the vow of poverty and continence. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxv, 14): "Obedience is +rightly placed before victims, since by victims another's flesh, but +by obedience one's own will, is sacrificed." Now the religious vows +are holocausts, as stated above (AA. 1, 3, ad 6). Therefore the vow +of obedience is the chief of all religious vows. + +_I answer that,_ The vow of obedience is the chief of the three +religious vows, and this for three reasons. + +First, because by the vow of obedience man offers God something +greater, namely his own will; for this is of more account than his +own body, which he offers God by continence, and than external +things, which he offers God by the vow of poverty. Wherefore that +which is done out of obedience is more acceptable to God than that +which is done of one's own will, according to the saying of Jerome +(Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): "My words are intended to teach you not +to rely on your own judgment": and a little further on he says: "You +may not do what you will; you must eat what you are bidden to eat, +you may possess as much as you receive, clothe yourself with what is +given to you." Hence fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done +of one's own will, according to Isa. 58:3, "Behold in the day of your +fast your own will is found." + +Secondly, because the vow of obedience includes the other vows, but +not vice versa: for a religious, though bound by vow to observe +continence and poverty, yet these also come under obedience, as well +as many other things besides the keeping of continence and poverty. + +Thirdly, because the vow of obedience extends properly to those acts +that are closely connected with the end of religion; and the more +closely a thing is connected with the end, the better it is. + +It follows from this that the vow of obedience is more essential to +the religious life. For if a man without taking a vow of obedience +were to observe, even by vow, voluntary poverty and continence, he +would not therefore belong to the religious state, which is to be +preferred to virginity observed even by vow; for Augustine says (De +Virgin. xlvi): "No one, methinks, would prefer virginity to the +monastic life." [*St. Augustine wrote not _monasterio_ but +_martyrio_--to "martyrdom"; and St. Thomas quotes the passage +correctly above, Q. 124, A. 3, and Q. 152, A. 5]. + +Reply Obj. 1: The counsel of obedience was included in the very +following of Christ, since to obey is to follow another's will. +Consequently it is more pertinent to perfection than the vow of +poverty, because as Jerome, commenting on Matt. 19:27, "Behold we +have left all things," observes, "Peter added that which is perfect +when he said: And have followed Thee." + +Reply Obj. 2: The words quoted mean that continence is to be +preferred, not to all other acts of virtue, but to conjugal chastity, +or to external riches of gold and silver which are measured by weight +[*_Pondere,_ referring to the Latin _ponderatio_ in the Vulgate, +which the Douay version renders "price."]. Or again continence is +taken in a general sense for abstinence from all evil, as stated +above (Q. 155, A. 4, ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: The Pope cannot dispense a religious from his vow of +obedience so as to release him from obedience to every superior in +matters relating to the perfection of life, for he cannot exempt him +from obedience to himself. He can, however, exempt him from +subjection to a lower superior, but this is not to dispense him from +his vow of obedience. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 9] + +Whether a Religious Sins Mortally Whenever He Transgresses the Things +Contained in His Rule? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a religious sins mortally whenever he +transgresses the things contained in his rule. For to break a vow is +a sin worthy of condemnation, as appears from 1 Tim. 5:11, 12, where +the Apostle says that widows who "will marry have [Vulg.: 'having'] +damnation, because they have made void their first faith." But +religious are bound to a rule by the vows of their profession. +Therefore they sin mortally by transgressing the things contained in +their rule. + +Obj. 2: Further, the rule is enjoined upon a religious in the same +way as a law. Now he who transgresses a precept of law sins mortally. +Therefore it would seem that a monk sins mortally if he transgresses +the things contained in his rule. + +Obj. 3: Further, contempt involves a mortal sin. Now whoever +repeatedly does what he ought not to do seems to sin from contempt. +Therefore it would seem that a religious sins mortally by frequently +transgressing the things contained in his rule. + +_On the contrary,_ The religious state is safer than the secular +state; wherefore Gregory at the beginning of his Morals [*Epist. +Missoria, ad Leand. Episc. i] compares the secular life to the stormy +sea, and the religious life to the calm port. But if every +transgression of the things contained in his rule were to involve a +religious in mortal sin, the religious life would be fraught with +danger of account of its multitude of observances. Therefore not +every transgression of the things contained in the rule is a mortal +sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 1, 2), a thing is +contained in the rule in two ways. First, as the end of the rule, for +instance things that pertain to the acts of the virtues; and the +transgression of these, as regards those which come under a common +precept, involves a mortal sin; but as regards those which are not +included in the common obligation of a precept, the transgression +thereof does not involve a mortal sin, except by reason of contempt, +because, as stated above (A. 2), a religious is not bound to be +perfect, but to tend to perfection, to which the contempt of +perfection is opposed. + +Secondly, a thing is contained in the rule through pertaining to the +outward practice, such as all external observances, to some of which +a religious is bound by the vow of his profession. Now the vow of +profession regards chiefly the three things aforesaid, namely +poverty, continence, and obedience, while all others are directed to +these. Consequently the transgression of these three involves a +mortal sin, while the transgression of the others does not involve a +mortal sin, except either by reason of contempt of the rule (since +this is directly contrary to the profession whereby a man vows to +live according to the rule), or by reason of a precept, whether given +orally by a superior, or expressed in the rule, since this would be +to act contrary to the vow of obedience. + +Reply Obj. 1: He who professes a rule does not vow to observe all the +things contained in the rule, but he vows the regular life which +consists essentially in the three aforesaid things. Hence in certain +religious orders precaution is taken to profess, not the rule, but to +live according to the rule, i.e. to tend to form one's conduct in +accordance with the rule as a kind of model; and this is set aside by +contempt. Yet greater precaution is observed in some religious orders +by professing obedience according to the rule, so that only that +which is contrary to a precept of the rule is contrary to the +profession, while the transgression or omission of other things binds +only under pain of venial sin, because, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2), +such things are dispositions to the chief vows. And venial sin is a +disposition to mortal, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 3), inasmuch +as it hinders those things whereby a man is disposed to keep the +chief precepts of Christ's law, namely the precepts of charity. + +There is also a religious order, that of the Friars Preachers, where +such like transgressions or omissions do not, by their very nature, +involve sin, either mortal or venial; but they bind one to suffer the +punishment affixed thereto, because it is in this way that they are +bound to observe such things. Nevertheless they may sin venially or +mortally through neglect, concupiscence, or contempt. + +Reply Obj. 2: Not all the contents of the law are set forth by way of +precept; for some are expressed under the form of ordinance or +statute binding under pain of a fixed punishment. Accordingly, just +as in the civil law the transgression of a legal statute does not +always render a man deserving of bodily death, so neither in the law +of the Church does every ordinance or statute bind under mortal sin; +and the same applies to the statutes of the rule. + +Reply Obj. 3: An action or transgression proceeds from contempt when +a man's will refuses to submit to the ordinance of the law or rule, +and from this he proceeds to act against the law or rule. On the +other hand, he does not sin from contempt, but from some other cause, +when he is led to do something against the ordinance of the law or +rule through some particular cause such as concupiscence or anger, +even though he often repeat the same kind of sin through the same or +some other cause. Thus Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that +"not all sins are committed through proud contempt." Nevertheless the +frequent repetition of a sin leads dispositively to contempt, +according to the words of Prov. 18:3, "The wicked man, when he is +come into the depth of sins, contemneth." +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 10] + +Whether a Religious Sins More Grievously Than a Secular by the Same +Kind of Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a religious does not sin more +grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin. For it is written +(2 Paralip. 30:18, 19): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all +them who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their +fathers, and will not impute it to them that they are not +sanctified." Now religious apparently follow the Lord the God of +their fathers with their whole heart rather than seculars, who partly +give themselves and their possessions to God and reserve part for +themselves, as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Therefore it would +seem that it is less imputed to them if they fall short somewhat of +their sanctification. + +Obj. 2: Further, God is less angered at a man's sins if he does some +good deeds, according to 2 Paralip. 19:2, 3, "Thou helpest the +ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the +Lord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord: +but good works are found in thee." Now religious do more good works +than seculars. Therefore if they commit any sins, God is less angry +with them. + +Obj. 3: Further, this present life is not carried through without +sin, according to James 3:2, "In many things we all offend." +Therefore if the sins of religious were more grievous than those of +seculars it would follow that religious are worse off than seculars: +and consequently it would not be a wholesome counsel to enter +religion. + +_On the contrary,_ The greater the evil the more it would seem to be +deplored. But seemingly the sins of those who are in the state of +holiness and perfection are the most deplorable, for it is written +(Jer. 23:9): "My heart is broken within me," and afterwards (Jer. +23:11): "For the prophet and the priest are defiled; and in My house +I have found their wickedness." Therefore religious and others who +are in the state of perfection, other things being equal, sin more +grievously. + +_I answer that,_ A sin committed by a religious may be in three ways +more grievous than a like sin committed by a secular. First, if it be +against his religious vow; for instance if he be guilty of +fornication or theft, because by fornication he acts against the vow +of continence, and by theft against the vow of poverty; and not +merely against a precept of the divine law. Secondly, if he sin out +of contempt, because thereby he would seem to be the more ungrateful +for the divine favors which have raised him to the state of +perfection. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 10:29) that the believer +"deserveth worse punishments" who through contempt tramples under +foot the Son of God. Hence the Lord complains (Jer. 11:15): "What is +the meaning that My beloved hath wrought much wickedness in My +house?" Thirdly, the sin of a religious may be greater on account of +scandal, because many take note of his manner of life: wherefore it +is written (Jer. 23:14): "I have seen the likeness of adulterers, and +the way of lying in the Prophets of Jerusalem; and they strengthened +the hands of the wicked, that no man should return from his evil +doings." + +On the other hand, if a religious, not out of contempt, but out of +weakness or ignorance, commit a sin that is not against the vow of +his profession, without giving scandal (for instance if he commit it +in secret) he sins less grievously in the same kind of sin than a +secular, because his sin if slight is absorbed as it were by his many +good works, and if it be mortal, he more easily recovers from it. +First, because he has a right intention towards God, and though it be +intercepted for the moment, it is easily restored to its former +object. Hence Origen commenting on Ps. 36:24, "When he shall fall he +shall not be bruised," says (Hom. iv in Ps. 36): "The wicked man, if +he sin, repents not, and fails to make amends for his sin. But the +just man knows how to make amends and recover himself; even as he who +had said: 'I know not the man,' shortly afterwards when the Lord had +looked on him, knew to shed most bitter tears, and he who from the +roof had seen a woman and desired her knew to say: 'I have sinned and +done evil before Thee.'" Secondly, he is assisted by his +fellow-religious to rise again, according to Eccles. 4:10, "If one +fall he shall be supported by the other: woe to him that is alone, +for when he falleth he hath none to lift him up." + +Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted refer to things done through weakness +or ignorance, but not to those that are done out of contempt. + +Reply Obj. 2: Josaphat also, to whom these words were addressed, +sinned not out of contempt, but out of a certain weakness of human +affection. + +Reply Obj. 3: The just sin not easily out of contempt; but sometimes +they fall into a sin through ignorance or weakness from which they +easily arise. If, however, they go so far as to sin out of contempt, +they become most wicked and incorrigible, according to the word of +Jer. 2:20: "Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and +thou hast said: 'I will not serve.' For on every high hill and under +every green tree thou didst prostitute thyself." Hence Augustine says +(Ep. lxxviii ad Pleb. Hippon.): "From the time I began to serve God, +even as I scarcely found better men than those who made progress in +monasteries, so have I not found worse than those who in the +monastery have fallen." +_______________________ + +QUESTION 187 + +OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE COMPETENT TO RELIGIOUS +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the things that are competent to religious; and +under this head there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is lawful for them to teach, preach, and do like +things? + +(2) Whether it is lawful for them to meddle in secular business? + +(3) Whether they are bound to manual labor? + +(4) Whether it is lawful for them to live on alms? + +(5) Whether it is lawful for them to quest? + +(6) Whether it is lawful for them to wear coarser clothes than other +persons? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 1] + +Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Teach, Preach, and the Like? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to teach, preach, +and the like. For it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam) in an +ordinance of a synod of Constantinople [*Pseudosynod held by Photius +in the year 879]: "The monastic life is one of subjection and +discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care." And +Jerome says (ad Ripar. et Desider. [*Contra Vigilant. xvi]): "A +monk's duty is not to teach but to lament." Again Pope Leo [*Leo I, +Ep. cxx ad Theodoret., 6, cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Adjicimus]: says "Let +none dare to preach save the priests of the Lord, be he monk or +layman, and no matter what knowledge he may boast of having." Now it +is not lawful to exceed the bounds of one's office or transgress the +ordinance of the Church. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for +religious to teach, preach, and the like. + +Obj. 2: Further, in an ordinance of the Council of Nicea (cf. XVI, +qu. i, can. Placuit) it is laid down as follows: "It is our absolute +and peremptory command addressed to all that monks shall not hear +confessions except of one another, as is right, that they shall not +bury the dead except those dwelling with them in the monastery, or if +by chance a brother happen to die while on a visit." But just as the +above belong to the duty of clerics, so also do preaching and +teaching. Therefore since "the business of a monk differs from that +of a cleric," as Jerome says (Ep. xiv ad Heliod.), it would seem +unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and the like. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Regist. v, Ep. 1): "No man can fulfil +ecclesiastical duties, and keep consistently to the monastic rule": +and this is quoted XVI, qu. i, can. Nemo potest. Now monks are bound +to keep consistently to the monastic rule. Therefore it would seem +that they cannot fulfil ecclesiastical duties, whereof teaching and +preaching are a part. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for them to +preach, teach, and do similar things. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory is quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Ex +auctoritate) as saying: "By authority of this decree framed in virtue +of our apostolic power and the duty of our office, be it lawful to +monk priests who are configured to the apostles, to preach, baptize, +give communion, pray for sinners, impose penance, and absolve from +sin." + +_I answer that,_ A thing is declared to be unlawful to a person in +two ways. First, because there is something in him contrary to that +which is declared unlawful to him: thus to no man is it lawful to +sin, because each man has in himself reason and an obligation to +God's law, to which things sin is contrary. And in this way it is +said to be unlawful for a person to preach, teach, or do like things, +because there is in him something incompatible with these things, +either by reason of a precept--thus those who are irregular by +ordinance of the Church may not be raised to the sacred orders--or by +reason of sin, according to Ps. 49:16, "But to the sinner God hath +said: Why dost thou declare My justice?" + +In this way it is not unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and do +like things, both because they are bound neither by vow nor by +precept of their rule to abstain from these things, and because they +are not rendered less apt for these things by any sin committed, but +on the contrary they are the more apt through having taken upon +themselves the practice of holiness. For it is foolish to say that a +man is rendered less fit for spiritual duties through advancing +himself in holiness; and consequently it is foolish to declare that +the religious state is an obstacle to the fulfilment of such like +duties. This error is rejected by Pope Boniface [*Boniface IV] for +the reasons given above. His words which are quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. +Sunt. nonnulli) are these: "There are some who without any dogmatic +proof, and with extreme daring, inspired with a zeal rather of +bitterness than of love, assert that monks though they be dead to the +world and live to God, are unworthy of the power of the priestly +office, and that they cannot confer penance, nor christen, nor +absolve in virtue of the power divinely bestowed on them in the +priestly office. But they are altogether wrong." He proves this first +because it is not contrary to the rule; thus he continues: "For +neither did the Blessed Benedict the saintly teacher of monks forbid +this in any way," nor is it forbidden in other rules. Secondly, he +refutes the above error from the usefulness of the monks, when he +adds at the end of the same chapter: "The more perfect a man is, the +more effective is he in these, namely in spiritual works." + +Secondly, a thing is said to be unlawful for a man, not on account of +there being in him something contrary thereto, but because he lacks +that which enables him to do it: thus it is unlawful for a deacon to +say mass, because he is not in priestly orders; and it is unlawful +for a priest to deliver judgment because he lacks the episcopal +authority. Here, however, a distinction must be made. Because those +things which are a matter of an order, cannot be deputed to one who +has not the order, whereas matters of jurisdiction can be deputed to +those who have not ordinary jurisdiction: thus the delivery of a +judgment is deputed by the bishop to a simple priest. In this sense +it is said to be unlawful for monks and other religious to preach, +teach, and so forth, because the religious state does not give them +the power to do these things. They can, however, do them if they +receive orders, or ordinary jurisdiction, or if matters of +jurisdiction be delegated to them. + +Reply Obj. 1: It results from the words quoted that the fact of their +being monks does not give monks the power to do these things, yet it +does not involve in them anything contrary to the performance of +these acts. + +Reply Obj. 2: Again, this ordinance of the Council of Nicea forbids +monks to claim the power of exercising those acts on the ground of +their being monks, but it does not forbid those acts being delegated +to them. + +Reply Obj. 3: These two things are incompatible, namely, the ordinary +cure of ecclesiastical duties, and the observance of the monastic +rule in a monastery. But this does not prevent monks and other +religious from being sometimes occupied with ecclesiastical duties +through being deputed thereto by superiors having ordinary cure; +especially members of religious orders that are especially instituted +for that purpose, as we shall say further on (Q. 188, A. 4). +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Occupy Themselves with Secular +Business? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to occupy +themselves with secular business. For in the decree quoted above (A. +1) of Pope Boniface it is said that the "Blessed Benedict bade them +to be altogether free from secular business; and this is most +explicitly prescribed by the apostolic doctrine and the teaching of +all the Fathers, not only to religious, but also to all the canonical +clergy," according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man being a soldier to God, +entangleth himself with secular business." Now it is the duty of all +religious to be soldiers of God. Therefore it is unlawful for them to +occupy themselves with secular business. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:11): "That you use your +endeavor to be quiet, and that you do your own business," which a +gloss explains thus--"by refraining from other people's affairs, so +as to be the better able to attend to the amendment of your own +life." Now religious devote themselves in a special way to the +amendment of their life. Therefore they should not occupy themselves +with secular business. + +Obj. 3: Further, Jerome, commenting on Matt. 11:8, "Behold they that +are clothed in soft garments are in the houses of kings," says: +"Hence we gather that an austere life and severe preaching should +avoid the palaces of kings and the mansions of the voluptuous." But +the needs of secular business induce men to frequent the palaces of +kings. Therefore it is unlawful for religious to occupy themselves +with secular business. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 16:1): "I commend to you +Phoebe our Sister," and further on (Rom. 16:2), "that you assist her +in whatsoever business she shall have need of you." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 186, AA. 1, 7, ad 1), the +religious state is directed to the attainment of the perfection of +charity, consisting principally in the love of God and secondarily in +the love of our neighbor. Consequently that which religious intend +chiefly and for its own sake is to give themselves to God. Yet if +their neighbor be in need, they should attend to his affairs out of +charity, according to Gal. 6:2, "Bear ye one another's burthens: and +so you shall fulfil the law of Christ," since through serving their +neighbor for God's sake, they are obedient to the divine love. Hence +it is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before God +and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their +tribulation," which means, according to a gloss, to assist the +helpless in their time of need. + +We must conclude therefore that it is unlawful for either monks or +clerics to carry on secular business from motives of avarice; but +from motives of charity, and with their superior's permission, they +may occupy themselves with due moderation in the administration and +direction of secular business. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals +(Dist. xxxviii, can. Decrevit): "The holy synod decrees that +henceforth no cleric shall buy property or occupy himself with +secular business, save with a view to the care of the fatherless, +orphans, or widows, or when the bishop of the city commands him to +take charge of the business connected with the Church." And the same +applies to religious as to clerics, because they are both debarred +from secular business on the same grounds, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 1: Monks are forbidden to occupy themselves with secular +business from motives of avarice, but not from motives of charity. + +Reply Obj. 2: To occupy oneself with secular business on account of +another's need is not officiousness but charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: To haunt the palaces of kings from motives of pleasure, +glory, or avarice is not becoming to religious, but there is nothing +unseemly in their visiting them from motives of piety. Hence it is +written (4 Kings 4:13): "Hast thou any business, and wilt thou that I +speak to the king or to the general of the army?" Likewise it becomes +religious to go to the palaces of kings to rebuke and guide them, +even as John the Baptist rebuked Herod, as related in Matt. 14:4. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 3] + +Whether Religious Are Bound to Manual Labor? + +Objection 1: It would seem that religious are bound to manual labor. +For religious are not exempt from the observance of precepts. Now +manual labor is a matter of precept according to 1 Thess. 4:11, "Work +with your own hands as we commanded you"; wherefore Augustine says +(De oper. Monach. xxx): "But who can allow these insolent men," +namely religious that do no work, of whom he is speaking there, "who +disregard the most salutary admonishment of the Apostle, not merely +to be borne with as being weaker than others, but even to preach as +though they were holier than others." Therefore it would seem that +religious are bound to manual labor. + +Obj. 2: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. xxi)] on +2 Thess. 3:10, "If any man will not work, neither let him eat," says: +"Some say that this command of the Apostle refers to spiritual works, +and not to the bodily labor of the farmer or craftsman"; and further +on: "But it is useless for them to try to hide from themselves and +from others the fact that they are unwilling not only to fulfil, but +even to understand the useful admonishments of charity"; and again: +"He wishes God's servants to make a living by working with their +bodies." Now religious especially are called servants of God, because +they give themselves entirely to the service of God, as Dionysius +asserts (Eccl. Hier. vi). Therefore it would seem that they are bound +to manual labor. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii): "I would +fain know how they would occupy themselves, who are unwilling to work +with their body. We occupy our time, say they, with prayers, psalms, +reading, and the word of God." Yet these things are no excuse, and he +proves this, as regards each in particular. For in the first place, +as to prayer, he says: "One prayer of the obedient man is sooner +granted than ten thousand prayers of the contemptuous": meaning that +those are contemptuous and unworthy to be heard who work not with +their hands. Secondly, as to the divine praises he adds: "Even while +working with their hands they can easily sing hymns to God." Thirdly, +with regard to reading, he goes on to say: "Those who say they are +occupied in reading, do they not find there what the Apostle +commanded? What sort of perverseness is this, to wish to read but not +to obey what one reads?" Fourthly, he adds in reference to preaching +[*Cap. xviii]: "If one has to speak, and is so busy that he cannot +spare time for manual work, can all in the monastery do this? And +since all cannot do this, why should all make this a pretext for +being exempt? And even if all were able, they should do so by turns, +not only so that the others may be occupied in other works, but also +because it suffices that one speak while many listen." Therefore it +would seem that religious should not desist from manual labor on +account of such like spiritual works to which they devote themselves. + +Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Luke 12:33, "Sell what you possess," +says: "Not only give your clothes to the poor, but sell what you +possess, that having once for all renounced all your possessions for +the Lord's sake, you may henceforth work with the labor of your +hands, so as to have wherewith to live or to give alms." Now it +belongs properly to religious to renounce all they have. Therefore it +would seem likewise to belong to them to live and give alms through +the labor of their hands. + +Obj. 5: Further, religious especially would seem to be bound to +imitate the life of the apostles, since they profess the state of +perfection. Now the apostles worked with their own hands, according +to 1 Cor. 4:12: "We labor, working with our own hands." Therefore it +would seem that religious are bound to manual labor. + +_On the contrary,_ Those precepts that are commonly enjoined upon all +are equally binding on religious and seculars. But the precept of +manual labor is enjoined upon all in common, as appears from 2 Thess. +3:6, "Withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly," +etc. (for by brother he signifies every Christian, according to 1 +Cor. 7:12, "If any brother have a wife that believeth not"). Now it +is written in the same passage (2 Thess. 3:10): "If any man will not +work, neither let him eat." Therefore religious are not bound to +manual labor any more than seculars are. + +_I answer that,_ Manual labor is directed to four things. First and +principally to obtain food; wherefore it was said to the first man +(Gen. 3:19): "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread," and it +is written (Ps. 127:2): "For thou shalt eat the labors of thy hands." +Secondly, it is directed to the removal of idleness whence arise many +evils; hence it is written (Ecclus. 33:28, 29): "Send" thy slave "to +work, that he be not idle, for idleness hath taught much evil." +Thirdly, it is directed to the curbing of concupiscence, inasmuch as +it is a means of afflicting the body; hence it is written (2 Cor. +6:5, 6): "In labors, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity." +Fourthly, it is directed to almsgiving, wherefore it is written (Eph. +4:28): "He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him +labor, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may +have something to give to him that suffereth need." Accordingly, in +so far as manual labor is directed to obtaining food, it comes under +a necessity of precept in so far as it is necessary for that end: +since that which is directed to an end derives its necessity from +that end, being, in effect, so far necessary as the end cannot be +obtained without it. Consequently he who has no other means of +livelihood is bound to work with his hands, whatever his condition +may be. This is signified by the words of the Apostle: "If any man +will not work, neither let him eat," as though to say: "The necessity +of manual labor is the necessity of meat." So that if one could live +without eating, one would not be bound to work with one's hands. The +same applies to those who have no other lawful means of livelihood: +since a man is understood to be unable to do what he cannot do +lawfully. Wherefore we find that the Apostle prescribed manual labor +merely as a remedy for the sin of those who gained their livelihood +by unlawful means. For the Apostle ordered manual labor first of all +in order to avoid theft, as appears from Eph. 4:28, "He that stole, +let him now steal no more; but rather let him labor, working with his +hands." Secondly, to avoid the coveting of others' property, +wherefore it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): "Work with your own hands, +as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly towards them that are +without." Thirdly, to avoid the discreditable pursuits whereby some +seek a livelihood. Hence he says (2 Thess. 3:10-12): "When we were +with you, this we declared to you: that if any man will not work, +neither let him eat. For we have heard that there are some among you +who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously meddling" +(namely, as a gloss explains it, "who make a living by meddling in +unlawful things). Now we charge them that are such, and beseech them +. . . that working with silence, they would eat their own bread." +Hence Jerome states (Super epist. ad Galat. [*Preface to Bk. ii of +Commentary]) that the Apostle said this "not so much in his capacity +of teacher as on account of the faults of the people." + +It must, however, be observed that under manual labor are comprised +all those human occupations whereby man can lawfully gain a +livelihood, whether by using his hands, his feet, or his tongue. For +watchmen, couriers, and such like who live by their labor, are +understood to live by their handiwork: because, since the hand is +"the organ of organs" [*De Anima iii, 8], handiwork denotes all kinds +of work, whereby a man may lawfully gain a livelihood. + +In so far as manual labor is directed to the removal of idleness, or +the affliction of the body, it does not come under a necessity of +precept if we consider it in itself, since there are many other means +besides manual labor of afflicting the body or of removing idleness: +for the flesh is afflicted by fastings and watchings, and idleness is +removed by meditation on the Holy Scriptures and by the divine +praises. Hence a gloss on Ps. 118:82, "My eyes have failed for Thy +word," says: "He is not idle who meditates only on God's word; nor is +he who works abroad any better than he who devotes himself to the +study of knowing the truth." Consequently for these reasons religious +are not bound to manual labor, as neither are seculars, except when +they are so bound by the statutes of their order. Thus Jerome says +(Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): "The Egyptian monasteries are wont to +admit none unless they work or labor, not so much for the necessities +of life, as for the welfare of the soul, lest it be led astray by +wicked thoughts." But in so far as manual labor is directed to +almsgiving, it does not come under the necessity of precept, save +perchance in some particular case, when a man is under an obligation +to give alms, and has no other means of having the wherewithal to +assist the poor: for in such a case religious would be bound as well +as seculars to do manual labor. + +Reply Obj. 1: This command of the Apostle is of natural law: +wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:6, "That you withdraw yourselves from +every brother walking disorderly," says, "otherwise than the natural +order requires," and he is speaking of those who abstained from +manual labor. Hence nature has provided man with hands instead of +arms and clothes, with which she has provided other animals, in order +that with his hands he may obtain these and all other necessaries. +Hence it is clear that this precept, even as all the precepts of the +natural law, is binding on both religious and seculars alike. Yet not +everyone sins that works not with his hands, because those precepts +of the natural law which regard the good of the many are not binding +on each individual, but it suffices that one person apply himself to +this business and another to that; for instance, that some be +craftsmen, others husbandmen, others judges, and others teachers, and +so forth, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), "If +the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing? If the whole +were the hearing, where would be the smelling?" + +Reply Obj. 2: This gloss is taken from Augustine's _De operibus +Monachorum,_ cap. 21, where he speaks against certain monks who +declared it to be unlawful for the servants of God to work with their +hands, on account of our Lord's saying (Matt. 6:25): "Be not +solicitous for your life, what you shall eat." Nevertheless his words +do not imply that religious are bound to work with their hands, if +they have other means of livelihood. This is clear from his adding: +"He wishes the servants of God to make a living by working with their +bodies." Now this does not apply to religious any more than to +seculars, which is evident for two reasons. First, on account of the +way in which the Apostle expresses himself, by saying: "That you +withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly." For he +calls all Christians brothers, since at that time religious orders +were not as yet founded. Secondly, because religious have no other +obligations than what seculars have, except as required by the rule +they profess: wherefore if their rule contain nothing about manual +labor, religious are not otherwise bound to manual labor than +seculars are. + +Reply Obj. 3: A man may devote himself in two ways to all the +spiritual works mentioned by Augustine in the passage quoted: in one +way with a view to the common good, in another with a view to his +private advantage. Accordingly those who devote themselves publicly +to the aforesaid spiritual works are thereby exempt from manual labor +for two reasons: first, because it behooves them to be occupied +exclusively with such like works; secondly, because those who devote +themselves to such works have a claim to be supported by those for +whose advantage they work. + +On the other hand, those who devote themselves to such works not +publicly but privately as it were, ought not on that account to be +exempt from manual labor, nor have they a claim to be supported by +the offerings of the faithful, and it is of these that Augustine is +speaking. For when he says: "They can sing hymns to God even while +working with their hands; like the craftsmen who give tongue to fable +telling without withdrawing their hands from their work," it is clear +that he cannot refer to those who sing the canonical hours in the +church, but to those who tell psalms or hymns as private prayers. +Likewise what he says of reading and prayer is to be referred to the +private prayer and reading which even lay people do at times, and not +to those who perform public prayers in the church, or give public +lectures in the schools. Hence he does not say: "Those who say they +are occupied in teaching and instructing," but: "Those who say they +are occupied in reading." Again he speaks of that preaching which is +addressed, not publicly to the people, but to one or a few in +particular by way of private admonishment. Hence he says expressly: +"If one has to speak." For according to a gloss on 1 Cor. 2:4, +"Speech is addressed privately, preaching to many." + +Reply Obj. 4: Those who despise all for God's sake are bound to work +with their hands, when they have no other means of livelihood, or of +almsgiving (should the case occur where almsgiving were a matter of +precept), but not otherwise, as stated in the Article. It is in this +sense that the gloss quoted is to be understood. + +Reply Obj. 5: That the apostles worked with their hands was sometimes +a matter of necessity, sometimes a work of supererogation. It was of +necessity when they failed to receive a livelihood from others. Hence +a gloss on 1 Cor. 4:12, "We labor, working with our own hands," adds, +"because no man giveth to us." It was supererogation, as appears from +1 Cor. 9:12, where the Apostle says that he did not use the power he +had of living by the Gospel. The Apostle had recourse to this +supererogation for three motives. First, in order to deprive the +false apostles of the pretext for preaching, for they preached merely +for a temporal advantage; hence he says (2 Cor. 11:12): "But what I +do, that I will do that I may cut off the occasion from them," etc. +Secondly, in order to avoid burdening those to whom he preached; +hence he says (2 Cor. 12:13): "What is there that you have had less +than the other churches, but that I myself was not burthensome to +you?" Thirdly, in order to give an example of work to the idle; hence +he says (2 Thess. 3:8, 9): "We worked night and day . . . that we +might give ourselves a pattern unto you, to imitate us." However, the +Apostle did not do this in places like Athens where he had facilities +for preaching daily, as Augustine observes (De oper. Monach. xviii). +Yet religious are not for this reason bound to imitate the Apostle in +this matter, since they are not bound to all works of supererogation: +wherefore neither did the other apostles work with their hands. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Live on Alms? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to live on alms. +For the Apostle (1 Tim. 5:16) forbids those widows who have other +means of livelihood to live on the alms of the Church, so that the +Church may have "sufficient for them that are widows indeed." And +Jerome says to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; +Can. Quoniam, cause xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv among the +supposititious works of St. Jerome] that "those who have sufficient +income from their parents and their own possessions, if they take +what belongs to the poor they commit and incur the guilt of +sacrilege, and by the abuse of such things they eat and drink +judgment to themselves." Now religious if they be able-bodied can +support themselves by the work of their hands. Therefore it would +seem that they sin if they consume the alms belonging to the poor. + +Obj. 2: Further, to live at the expense of the faithful is the +stipend appointed to those who preach the Gospel in payment of their +labor or work, according to Matt. 10:10: "The workman is worthy of +his meat." Now it belongs not to religious to preach the Gospel, but +chiefly to prelates who are pastors and teachers. Therefore religious +cannot lawfully live on the alms of the faithful. + +Obj. 3: Further, religious are in the state of perfection. But it is +more perfect to give than to receive alms; for it is written (Acts +20:35): "It is a more blessed thing to give, rather than to receive." +Therefore they should not live on alms, but rather should they give +alms of their handiwork. + +Obj. 4: Further, it belongs to religious to avoid obstacles to virtue +and occasions of sin. Now the receiving of alms offers an occasion of +sin, and hinders an act of virtue; hence a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:9, +"That we might give ourselves a pattern unto you," says: "He who +through idleness eats often at another's table, must needs flatter +the one who feeds him." It is also written (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt +thou take bribes which . . . blind the wise, and pervert the words of +the just," and (Prov. 22:7): "The borrower is servant to him that +lendeth." This is contrary to religion, wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. +3:9, "That we might give ourselves a pattern," etc., says, "our +religion calls men to liberty." Therefore it would seem that +religious should not live on alms. + +Obj. 5: Further, religious especially are bound to imitate the +perfection of the apostles; wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 3:15): +"Let us . . . as many as are perfect, be thus minded." But the +Apostle was unwilling to live at the expense of the faithful, either +in order to cut off the occasion from the false apostles as he +himself says (2 Cor. 11:12), or to avoid giving scandal to the weak, +as appears from 1 Cor. 9:12. It would seem therefore that religious +ought for the same reasons to refrain from living on alms. Hence +Augustine says (De oper. Monach. 28): "Cut off the occasion of +disgraceful marketing whereby you lower yourselves in the esteem of +others, and give scandal to the weak: and show men that you seek not +an easy livelihood in idleness, but the kingdom of God by the narrow +and strait way." + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): The Blessed Benedict +after leaving his home and parents dwelt for three years in a cave, +and while there lived on the food brought to him by a monk from Rome. +Nevertheless, although he was able-bodied, we do not read that he +sought to live by the labor of his hands. Therefore religious may +lawfully live on alms. + +_I answer that,_ A man may lawfully live on what is his or due to +him. Now that which is given out of liberality becomes the property +of the person to whom it is given. Wherefore religious and clerics +whose monasteries or churches have received from the munificence of +princes or of any of the faithful any endowment whatsoever for their +support, can lawfully live on such endowment without working with +their hands, and yet without doubt they live on alms. Wherefore in +like manner if religious receive movable goods from the faithful they +can lawfully live on them. For it is absurd to say that a person may +accept an alms of some great property but not bread or some small sum +of money. Nevertheless since these gifts would seem to be bestowed on +religious in order that they may have more leisure for religious +works, in which the donors of temporal goods wish to have a share, +the use of such gifts would become unlawful for them if they +abstained from religious works, because in that case, so far as they +are concerned, they would be thwarting the intention of those who +bestowed those gifts. + +A thing is due to a person in two ways. First, on account of +necessity, which makes all things common, as Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. +de Temp. lxiv, among the supposititious works of St. Ambrose] +asserts. Consequently if religious be in need they can lawfully live +on alms. Such necessity may occur in three ways. First, through +weakness of body, the result being that they are unable to make a +living by working with their hands. Secondly, because that which they +gain by their handiwork is insufficient for their livelihood: +wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii) that "the good works +of the faithful should not leave God's servants who work with their +hands without a supply of necessaries, that when the hour comes for +them to nourish their souls, so as to make it impossible for them to +do these corporal works, they be not oppressed by want." Thirdly, +because of the former mode of life of those who were unwont to work +with their hands: wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxi) +that "if they had in the world the wherewithal easily to support this +life without working, and gave it to the needy when they were +converted to God, we must credit their weakness and bear with it." +For those who have thus been delicately brought up are wont to be +unable to bear the toil of bodily labor. + +In another way a thing becomes due to a person through his affording +others something whether temporal or spiritual, according to 1 Cor. +9:11, "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great +matter if we reap your carnal things?" And in this sense religious +may live on alms as being due to them in four ways. First, if they +preach by the authority of the prelates. Secondly, if they be +ministers of the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13, 14, "They that +serve the altar partake with the altar. So also the lord ordained +that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel." Hence +Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxi): "If they be gospelers, I +allow, they have" (a claim to live at the charge of the faithful): +"if they be ministers of the altar and dispensers of the sacraments, +they need not insist on it, but it is theirs by perfect right." The +reason for this is because the sacrament of the altar wherever it be +offered is common to all the faithful. Thirdly, if they devote +themselves to the study of Holy Writ to the common profit of the +whole Church. Wherefore Jerome says (Contra Vigil. xiii): "It is +still the custom in Judea, not only among us but also among the +Hebrews, for those who meditate on the law of the Lord day and night, +and have no other share on earth but God alone, to be supported by +the subscriptions of the synagogues and of the whole world." +Fourthly, if they have endowed the monastery with the goods they +possessed, they may live on the alms given to the monastery. Hence +Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxv) that "those who renouncing or +distributing their means, whether ample or of any amount whatever, +have desired with pious and salutary humility to be numbered among +the poor of Christ, have a claim on the community and on brotherly +love to receive a livelihood in return. They are to be commended +indeed if they work with their hands, but if they be unwilling, who +will dare to force them? Nor does it matter, as he goes on to say, to +which monasteries, or in what place any one of them has bestowed his +goods on his needy brethren; for all Christians belong to one +commonwealth." + +On the other hand, in the default of any necessity, or of their +affording any profit to others, it is unlawful for religious to wish +to live in idleness on the alms given to the poor. Hence Augustine +says (De oper. Monach. xxii): "Sometimes those who enter the +profession of God's service come from a servile condition of life, +from tilling the soil or working at some trade or lowly occupation. +In their case it is not so clear whether they came with the purpose +of serving God, or of evading a life of want and toil with a view to +being fed and clothed in idleness, and furthermore to being honored +by those by whom they were wont to be despised and downtrodden. Such +persons surely cannot excuse themselves from work on the score of +bodily weakness, for their former mode of life is evidence against +them." And he adds further on (De oper. Monach. xxv): "If they be +unwilling to work, neither let them eat. For if the rich humble +themselves to piety, it is not that the poor may be exalted to pride; +since it is altogether unseemly that in a life wherein senators +become laborers, laborers should become idle, and that where the +lords of the manor have come after renouncing their ease, the serfs +should live in comfort." + +Reply Obj. 1: These authorities must be understood as referring to +cases of necessity, that is to say, when there is no other means of +succoring the poor: for then they would be bound not only to refrain +from accepting alms, but also to give what they have for the support +of the needy. + +Reply Obj. 2: Prelates are competent to preach in virtue of their +office, but religious may be competent to do so in virtue of +delegation; and thus when they work in the field of the Lord, they +may make their living thereby, according to 2 Tim. 2:6, "The +husbandman that laboreth must first partake of the fruits," which a +gloss explains thus, "that is to say, the preacher, who in the field +of the Church tills the hearts of his hearers with the plough of +God's word." Those also who minister to the preachers may live on +alms. Hence a gloss on Rom. 15:27, "If the Gentiles have been made +partakers of their spiritual things, they ought also in carnal things +to minister to them," says, "namely, to the Jews who sent preachers +from Jerusalem." There are moreover other reasons for which a person +has a claim to live at the charge of the faithful, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Other things being equal, it is more perfect to give +than to receive. Nevertheless to give or to give up all one's +possessions for Christ's sake, and to receive a little for one's +livelihood is better than to give to the poor part by part, as stated +above (Q. 186, A. 3, ad 6). + +Reply Obj. 4: To receive gifts so as to increase one's wealth, or to +accept a livelihood from another without having a claim to it, and +without profit to others or being in need oneself, affords an +occasion of sin. But this does not apply to religious, as stated +above. + +Reply Obj. 5: Whenever there is evident necessity for religious +living on alms without doing any manual work, as well as an evident +profit to be derived by others, it is not the weak who are +scandalized, but those who are full of malice like the Pharisees, +whose scandal our Lord teaches us to despise (Matt. 15:12-14). If, +however, these motives of necessity and profit be lacking, the weak +might possibly be scandalized thereby; and this should be avoided. +Yet the same scandal might be occasioned through those who live in +idleness on the common revenues. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 5] + +Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Beg? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to beg. For +Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxviii): "The most cunning foe has +scattered on all sides a great number of hypocrites wearing the +monastic habit, who go wandering about the country," and afterwards +he adds: "They all ask, they all demand to be supported in their +profitable penury, or to be paid for a pretended holiness." Therefore +it would seem that the life of mendicant religious is to be condemned. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): "That you . . . work +with your own hands as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly +towards them that are without: and that you want nothing of any +man's": and a gloss on this passage says: "You must work and not be +idle, because work is both honorable and a light to the unbeliever: +and you must not covet that which belongs to another and much less +beg or take anything." Again a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper. +Monach. iii)] on 2 Thess. 3:10, "If any man will not work," etc. +says: "He wishes the servants of God to work with the body, so as to +gain a livelihood, and not be compelled by want to ask for +necessaries." Now this is to beg. Therefore it would seem unlawful to +beg while omitting to work with one's hands. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is forbidden by law and contrary to +justice, is unbecoming to religious. Now begging is forbidden in the +divine law; for it is written (Deut. 15:4): "There shall be no poor +nor beggar among you," and (Ps. 36:25): "I have not seen the just +forsaken, nor his seed seeking bread." Moreover an able-bodied +mendicant is punished by civil law, according to the law (XI, xxvi, +de Valid. Mendicant.). Therefore it is unfitting for religious to beg. + +Obj. 4: Further, "Shame is about that which is disgraceful," as +Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Now Ambrose says (De Offic. i, +30) that "to be ashamed to beg is a sign of good birth." Therefore it +is disgraceful to beg: and consequently this is unbecoming to +religious. + +Obj. 5: Further, according to our Lord's command it is especially +becoming to preachers of the Gospel to live on alms, as stated above +(A. 4). Yet it is not becoming that they should beg, since a gloss on +2 Tim. 2:6, "The husbandman, that laboreth," etc. says: "The Apostle +wishes the gospeler to understand that to accept necessaries from +those among whom he labors is not mendicancy but a right." Therefore +it would seem unbecoming for religious to beg. + +_On the contrary,_ It becomes religious to live in imitation of +Christ. Now Christ was a mendicant, according to Ps. 39:18, "But I am +a beggar and poor"; where a gloss says: "Christ said this of Himself +as bearing the 'form of a servant,'" and further on: "A beggar is one +who entreats another, and a poor man is one who has not enough for +himself." Again it is written (Ps. 69:6): "I am needy and poor"; +where a gloss says: "'Needy,' that is a suppliant; 'and poor,' that +is, not having enough for myself, because I have no worldly wealth." +And Jerome says in a letter [*Reference unknown]: "Beware lest +whereas thy Lord," i.e. Christ, "begged, thou amass other people's +wealth." Therefore it becomes religious to beg. + +_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in reference to +mendicancy. The first is on the part of the act itself of begging, +which has a certain abasement attaching to it; since of all men those +would seem most abased who are not only poor, but are so needy that +they have to receive their meat from others. In this way some deserve +praise for begging out of humility, just as they abase themselves in +other ways, as being the most efficacious remedy against pride which +they desire to quench either in themselves or in others by their +example. For just as a disease that arises from excessive heat is +most efficaciously healed by things that excel in cold, so proneness +to pride is most efficaciously healed by those things which savor +most of abasement. Hence it is said in the Decretals (II, cap. Si +quis semel, de Paenitentia): "To condescend to the humblest duties, +and to devote oneself to the lowliest service is an exercise of +humility; for thus one is able to heal the disease of pride and human +glory." Hence Jerome praises Fabiola (Ep. lxxvii ad ocean.) for that +she desired "to receive alms, having poured forth all her wealth for +Christ's sake." The Blessed Alexis acted in like manner, for, having +renounced all his possessions for Christ's sake he rejoiced in +receiving alms even from his own servants. It is also related of the +Blessed Arsenius in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 6) that he gave +thanks because he was forced by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it +is enjoined to some people as a penance for grievous sins to go on a +pilgrimage begging. Since, however, humility like the other virtues +should not be without discretion, it behooves one to be discreet in +becoming a mendicant for the purpose of humiliation, lest a man +thereby incur the mark of covetousness or of anything else +unbecoming. Secondly, mendicancy may be considered on the part of +that which one gets by begging: and thus a man may be led to beg by a +twofold motive. First, by the desire to have wealth or meat without +working for it, and such like mendicancy is unlawful; secondly, by a +motive of necessity or usefulness. The motive is one of necessity if +a man has no other means of livelihood save begging; and it is a +motive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish something useful, and +is unable to do so without the alms of the faithful. Thus alms are +besought for the building of a bridge, or church, or for any other +work whatever that is conducive to the common good: thus scholars may +seek alms that they may devote themselves to the study of wisdom. In +this way mendicancy is lawful to religious no less than to seculars. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there explicitly of those who beg +from motives of covetousness. + +Reply Obj. 2: The first gloss speaks of begging from motives of +covetousness, as appears from the words of the Apostle; while the +second gloss speaks of those who without effecting any useful +purpose, beg their livelihood in order to live in idleness. On the +other hand, he lives not idly who in any way lives usefully. + +Reply Obj. 3: This precept of the divine law does not forbid anyone +to beg, but it forbids the rich to be so stingy that some are +compelled by necessity to beg. The civil law imposes a penalty on +able-bodied mendicants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of +necessity. + +Reply Obj. 4: Disgrace is twofold; one arises from lack of honesty +[*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1], the other from an external defect, thus it is +disgraceful for a man to be sick or poor. Such like uncomeliness of +mendicancy does not pertain to sin, but it may pertain to humility, +as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 5: Preachers have the right to be fed by those to whom +they preach: yet if they wish to seek this by begging so as to +receive it as a free gift and not as a right this will be a mark of +greater humility. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 6] + +Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Wear Coarser Clothes Than +Others? + +Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to wear coarser +clothes than others. For according to the Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22) we +ought to "refrain from all appearance of evil." Now coarseness of +clothes has an appearance of evil; for our Lord said (Matt. 7:15): +"Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep": +and a gloss on Apoc. 6:8, "Behold a pale horse," says: "The devil +finding that he cannot succeed, neither by outward afflictions nor by +manifest heresies, sends in advance false brethren, who under the +guise of religion assume the characteristics of the black and red +horses by corrupting the faith." Therefore it would seem that +religious should not wear coarse clothes. + +Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): "Avoid somber," +i.e. black, "equally with glittering apparel. Fine and coarse clothes +are equally to be shunned, for the one exhales pleasure, the other +vainglory." Therefore, since vainglory is a graver sin than the use +of pleasure, it would seem that religious who should aim at what is +more perfect ought to avoid coarse rather than fine clothes. + +Obj. 3: Further, religious should aim especially at doing works of +penance. Now in works of penance we should use, not outward signs of +sorrow, but rather signs of joy; for our Lord said (Matt. 6:16): +"When you fast, be not, as the hypocrites, sad," and afterwards He +added: "But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head and wash thy +face." Augustine commenting on these words (De Serm. Dom. in Monte +ii, 12): "In this chapter we must observe that not only the glare and +pomp of outward things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a +subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under +the guise of God's service." Therefore seemingly religious ought not +to wear coarse clothes. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:37): "They wandered +about in sheep-skins, in goat-skins," and a gloss adds--"as Elias and +others." Moreover it is said in the Decretal XXI, qu. iv, can. Omnis +jactantia: "If any persons be found to deride those who wear coarse +and religious apparel they must be reproved. For in the early times +all those who were consecrated to God went about in common and coarse +apparel." + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12), "in +all external things, it is not the use but the intention of the user +that is at fault." In order to judge of this it is necessary to +observe that coarse and homely apparel may be considered in two ways. +First, as being a sign of a man's disposition or condition, because +according to Ecclus. 19:27, "the attire . . . of the man" shows "what +he is." In this way coarseness of attire is sometimes a sign of +sorrow: wherefore those who are beset with sorrow are wont to wear +coarser clothes, just as on the other hand in times of festivity and +joy they wear finer clothes. Hence penitents make use of coarse +apparel, for example, the king (Jonah 3:6) who "was clothed with +sack-cloth," and Achab (3 Kings 21:27) who "put hair-cloth upon his +flesh." Sometimes, however, it is a sign of the contempt of riches +and worldly ostentation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustico +Monach.): "Let your somber attire indicate your purity of mind, your +coarse robe prove your contempt of the world, yet so that your mind +be not inflated withal, lest your speech belie your habit." In both +these ways it is becoming for religious to wear coarse attire, since +religion is a state of penance and of contempt of worldly glory. + +But that a person wish to signify this to others arises from three +motives. First, in order to humble himself: for just as a man's mind +is uplifted by fine clothes, so is it humbled by lowly apparel. Hence +speaking of Achab who "put hair-cloth on his flesh," the Lord said to +Elias: "Hast thou not seen Achab humbled before Me?" (3 Kings 21:29). +Secondly, in order to set an example to others; wherefore a gloss on +Matt. 3:4, "(John) had his garments of camel's hair," says: "He who +preaches penance is clothed in the habit of penance." Thirdly, on +account of vainglory; thus Augustine says (cf. Obj. 3) that "even the +weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation." + +Accordingly in the first two ways it is praiseworthy to wear humble +apparel, but in the third way it is sinful. + +Secondly, coarse and homely attire may be considered as the result of +covetousness or negligence, and thus also it is sinful. + +Reply Obj. 1: Coarseness of attire has not of itself the appearance +of evil, indeed it has more the appearance of good, namely of the +contempt of worldly glory. Hence it is that wicked persons hide their +wickedness under coarse clothing. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. +in Monte ii, 24) that "the sheep should not dislike their clothing +for the reason that the wolves sometimes hide themselves under it." + +Reply Obj. 2: Jerome is speaking there of the coarse attire that is +worn on account of human glory. + +Reply Obj. 3: According to our Lord's teaching men should do no deeds +of holiness for the sake of show: and this is especially the case +when one does something strange. Hence Chrysostom [*Hom. xiii in +Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John +Chrysostom] says: "While praying a man should do nothing strange, so +as to draw the gaze of others, either by shouting or striking his +breast, or casting up his hands," because the very strangeness draws +people's attention to him. Yet blame does not attach to all strange +behavior that draws people's attention, for it may be done well or +ill. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "in +the practice of the Christian religion when a man draws attention to +himself by unwonted squalor and shabbiness, since he acts thus +voluntarily and not of necessity, we can gather from his other deeds +whether his behavior is motivated by contempt of excessive dress or +by affectation." Religious, however, would especially seem not to act +thus from affectation, since they wear a coarse habit as a sign of +their profession whereby they profess contempt of the world. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 188 + +OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider the different kinds of religious life, and under +this head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there are different kinds of religious life or only one? + +(2) Whether a religious order can be established for the works of the +active life? + +(3) Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering? + +(4) Whether a religious order can be established for preaching and +the exercise of like works? + +(5) Whether a religious order can be established for the study of +science? + +(6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplative +life is more excellent than one that is directed to the active life? + +(7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing +something in common? + +(8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be preferred to +the religious life of those who live in community? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 1] + +Whether There Is Only One Religious Order? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one religious order. For +there can be no diversity in that which is possessed wholly and +perfectly; wherefore there can be only one sovereign good, as stated +in the First Part (Q. 6, AA. 2, 3, 4). Now as Gregory says (Hom. xx +in Ezech.), "when a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his +life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust," without which there is +no religious life. Therefore it would seem that there are not many +religious orders but only one. + +Obj. 2: Further, things which agree in essentials differ only +accidentally. Now there is no religious order without the three +essential vows of religion, as stated above (Q. 186, AA. 6, 7). +Therefore it would seem that religious orders differ not +specifically, but only accidentally. + +Obj. 3: Further, the state of perfection is competent both to +religious and to bishops, as stated above (Q. 185, AA. 5, 7). Now the +episcopate is not diversified specifically, but is one wherever it +may be; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxlvi ad Evan.): "Wherever a +bishop is, whether at Rome, or Gubbio, or Constantinople, or Reggio, +he has the same excellence, the same priesthood." Therefore in like +manner there is but one religious order. + +Obj. 4: Further, anything that may lead to confusion should be +removed from the Church. Now it would seem that a diversity of +religious orders might confuse the Christian people, as stated in the +Decretal de Statu Monach. et Canon. Reg. [*Cap. Ne Nimia, de Relig. +Dom.]. Therefore seemingly there ought not to be different religious +orders. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 44:10) that it pertains to the +adornment of the queen that she is "surrounded with variety." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 186, A, 7; Q. 187, A. 2), the +religious state is a training school wherein one aims by practice at +the perfection of charity. Now there are various works of charity to +which a man may devote himself; and there are also various kinds of +exercise. Wherefore religious orders may be differentiated in two +ways. First, according to the different things to which they may be +directed: thus one may be directed to the lodging of pilgrims, +another to visiting or ransoming captives. Secondly, there may be +various religious orders according to the diversity of practices; +thus in one religious order the body is chastised by abstinence in +food, in another by the practice of manual labor, scantiness of +clothes, or the like. + +Since, however, the end imports most in every matter, [*Arist., +_Topic._ vi 8] religious orders differ more especially according to +their various ends than according to their various practices. + +Reply Obj. 1: The obligation to devote oneself wholly to God's +service is common to every religious order; hence religious do not +differ in this respect, as though in one religious order a person +retained some one thing of his own, and in another order some other +thing. But the difference is in respect of the different things +wherein one may serve God, and whereby a man may dispose himself to +the service of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: The three essential vows of religion pertain to the +practice of religion as principles to which all other matters are +reduced, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 7). But there are various ways +of disposing oneself to the observance of each of them. For instance +one disposes oneself to observe the vow of continence, by solitude of +place, by abstinence, by mutual fellowship, and by many like means. +Accordingly it is evident that the community of the essential vows is +compatible with diversity of religious life, both on account of the +different dispositions and on account of the different ends, as +explained above. + +Reply Obj. 3: In matters relating to perfection, the bishop stands in +the position of agent, and the religious as passive, as stated above +(Q. 184, A. 7). Now the agent, even in natural things, the higher it +is, is so much the more one, whereas the things that are passive are +various. Hence with reason the episcopal state is one, while +religious orders are many. + +Reply Obj. 4: Confusion is opposed to distinction and order. +Accordingly the multitude of religious orders would lead to +confusion, if different religious orders were directed to the same +end and in the same way, without necessity or utility. Wherefore to +prevent this happening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish +a new religious order without the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 2] + +Whether a Religious Order Should Be Established for the Works of the +Active Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order should be +established for the works of the active life. For every religious +order belongs to the state of perfection, as stated above (Q. 184, A. +5; Q. 186, A. 1). Now the perfection of the religious state consists +in the contemplation of divine things. For Dionysius says (Eccl. +Hier. vi) that they are "called servants of God by reason of their +rendering pure service and subjection to God, and on account of the +indivisible and singular life which unites them by holy reflections," +i.e. contemplations, "on invisible things, to the Godlike unity and +the perfection beloved of God." Therefore seemingly no religious +order should be established for the works of the active life. + +Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the same judgment applies to canons +regular as to monks, according to Extra, De Postul., cap. Ex parte; +and De Statu Monach., cap. Quod Dei timorem: for it is stated that +"they are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of +monks": and the same would seem to apply to all other religious. Now +the monastic rule was established for the purpose of the +contemplative life; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. lviii ad Paulin.): "If +you wish to be what you are called, a monk," i.e. a solitary, "what +business have you in a city?" The same is found stated in Extra, De +Renuntiatione, cap. Nisi cum pridem; and De Regular., cap. Licet +quibusdam. Therefore it would seem that every religious order is +directed to the contemplative life, and none to the active life. + +Obj. 3: Further, the active life is concerned with the present world. +Now all religious are said to renounce the world; wherefore Gregory +says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): "He who renounces this world, and does all +the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers +sacrifice in the wilderness." Therefore it would seem that no +religious order can be directed to the active life. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and +undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless +and widows in their tribulation." Now this belongs to the active +life. Therefore religious life can be fittingly directed to the +active life. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the religious state is +directed to the perfection of charity, which extends to the love of +God and of our neighbor. Now the contemplative life which seeks to +devote itself to God alone belongs directly to the love of God, while +the active life, which ministers to our neighbor's needs, belongs +directly to the love of one's neighbor. And just as out of charity we +love our neighbor for God's sake, so the services we render our +neighbor redound to God, according to Matt. 25:40, "What you have +done [Vulg.: 'As long as you did it'] to one of these My least +brethren, you did it to Me." Consequently those services which we +render our neighbor, in so far as we refer them to God, are described +as sacrifices, according to Heb. 13:16, "Do not forget to do good and +to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained." And since +it belongs properly to religion to offer sacrifice to God, as stated +above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4, ad 1), it follows that certain +religious orders are fittingly directed to the works of the active +life. Wherefore in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4) the +Abbot Nesteros in distinguishing the various aims of religious orders +says: "Some direct their intention exclusively to the hidden life of +the desert and purity of heart; some are occupied with the +instruction of the brethren and the care of the monasteries; while +others delight in the service of the guesthouse," i.e. in hospitality. + +Reply Obj. 1: Service and subjection rendered to God are not +precluded by the works of the active life, whereby a man serves his +neighbor for God's sake, as stated in the Article. Nor do these works +preclude singularity of life; not that they involve man's living +apart from his fellow-men, but in the sense that each man +individually devotes himself to things pertaining to the service of +God; and since religious occupy themselves with the works of the +active life for God's sake, it follows that their action results from +their contemplation of divine things. Hence they are not entirely +deprived of the fruit of the contemplative life. + +Reply Obj. 2: The same judgment applies to monks and to all other +religious, as regards things common to all religious orders: for +instance as regards their devoting themselves wholly to the divine +service, their observance of the essential vows of religion, and +their refraining from worldly business. But it does not follow that +this likeness extends to other things that are proper to the monastic +profession, and are directed especially to the contemplative life. +Hence in the aforesaid Decretal, De Postulando, it is not simply +stated that "the same judgment applies to canons regular" as "to +monks," but that it applies "in matters already mentioned," namely +that "they are not to act as advocates in lawsuits." Again the +Decretal quoted, De Statu Monach., after the statement that "canons +regular are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of +monks," goes on to say: "Nevertheless they obey an easier rule." +Hence it is evident that they are not bound to all that monks are +bound. + +Reply Obj. 3: A man may be in the world in two ways: in one way by +his bodily presence, in another way by the bent of his mind. Hence +our Lord said to His disciples (John 15:19): "I have chosen you out +of the world," and yet speaking of them to His Father He said (John +17:11): "These are in the world, and I come to Thee." Although, then, +religious who are occupied with the works of the active life are in +the world as to the presence of the body, they are not in the world +as regards their bent of mind, because they are occupied with +external things, not as seeking anything of the world, but merely for +the sake of serving God: for "they . . . use this world, as if they +used it not," to quote 1 Cor. 7:31. Hence (James 1:27) after it is +stated that "religion clean and undefiled . . . is . . . to visit the +fatherless and widows in their tribulation," it is added, "and to +keep one's self unspotted from this world," namely to avoid being +attached to worldly things. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 3] + +Whether a Religious Order Can Be Directed to Soldiering? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order can be directed to +soldiering. For all religious orders belong to the state of +perfection. Now our Lord said with reference to the perfection of +Christian life (Matt. 5:39): "I say to you not to resist evil; but if +one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him also the other," +which is inconsistent with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no +religious order can be established for soldiering. + +Obj. 2: Further, the bodily encounter of the battlefield is more +grievous than the encounter in words that takes place between counsel +at law. Yet religious are forbidden to plead at law, as appears from +the Decretal De Postulando quoted above (A. 2, Obj. 2). Therefore it +is much less seemly for a religious order to be established for +soldiering. + +Obj. 3: Further, the religious state is a state of penance, as we +have said above (Q. 187, A. 6). Now according to the code of laws +soldiering is forbidden to penitents. For it is said in the Decretal +De Poenit., Dist. v, cap. 3: "It is altogether opposed to the rules +of the Church, to return to worldly soldiering after doing penance." +Therefore it is unfitting for any religious order to be established +for soldiering. + +Obj. 4: Further, no religious order may be established for an unjust +object. But as Isidore says (Etym. xviii, 1), "A just war is one that +is waged by order of the emperor." Since then religious are private +individuals, it would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and +consequently no religious order may be established for this purpose. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. clxxxix; ad Bonifac.), "Beware +of thinking that none of those can please God who handle war-like +weapons. Of such was holy David to whom the Lord gave great +testimony." Now religious orders are established in order that men +may please God. Therefore nothing hinders the establishing of a +religious order for the purpose of soldiering. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a religious order may be +established not only for the works of the contemplative life, but +also for the works of the active life, in so far as they are +concerned in helping our neighbor and in the service of God, but not +in so far as they are directed to a worldly object. Now the +occupation of soldiering may be directed to the assistance of our +neighbor, not only as regards private individuals, but also as +regards the defense of the whole commonwealth. Hence it is said of +Judas Machabeus (1 Macc. 3:2, 3) that "he [Vulg.: 'they'] fought with +cheerfulness the battle of Israel, and he got his people great +honor." It can also be directed to the upkeep of divine worship, +wherefore (1 Macc. 3:21) Judas is stated to have said: "We will fight +for our lives and our laws," and further on (1 Macc. 13:3) Simon +said: "You know what great battles I and my brethren, and the house +of my father, have fought for the laws and the sanctuary." + +Hence a religious order may be fittingly established for soldiering, +not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for the defense of divine +worship and public safety, or also of the poor and oppressed, +according to Ps. 81:4: "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of +the hand of the sinner." + +Reply Obj. 1: Not to resist evil may be understood in two ways. +First, in the sense of forgiving the wrong done to oneself, and thus +it may pertain to perfection, when it is expedient to act thus for +the spiritual welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating +patiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to +imperfection, or even to vice, if one be able to resist the wrongdoer +in a becoming manner. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 27): "The +courage whereby a man in battle defends his country against +barbarians, or protects the weak at home, or his friends against +robbers is full of justice": even so our Lord says in the passage +quoted [*Luke 6:30: "Of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not +again"; Cf. Matt. 5:40," . . . thy goods, ask them not again."] If, +however, a man were not to demand the return of that which belongs to +another, he would sin if it were his business to do so: for it is +praiseworthy to give away one's own, but not another's property. And +much less should the things of God be neglected, for as Chrysostom +[*Hom. v in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. +John Chrysostom] says, "it is most wicked to overlook the wrongs done +to God." + +Reply Obj. 2: It is inconsistent with any religious order to act as +counsel at law for a worldly object, but it is not inconsistent to do +so at the orders of one's superior and in favor of one's monastery, +as stated in the same Decretal, or for the defense of the poor and +widows. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii, cap. +1): "The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric is to buy +property or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view to +the care of the fatherless . . . and widows." Likewise to be a +soldier for the sake of some worldly object is contrary to all +religious life, but this does not apply to those who are soldiers for +the sake of God's service. + +Reply Obj. 3: Worldly soldiering is forbidden to penitents, but the +soldiering which is directed to the service of God is imposed as a +penance on some people, as in the case of those upon whom it is +enjoined to take arms in defense of the Holy Land. + +Reply Obj. 4: The establishment of a religious order for the purpose +of soldiering does not imply that the religious can wage war on their +own authority; but they can do so only on the authority of the +sovereign or of the Church. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 4] + +Whether a Religious Order Can Be Established for Preaching or Hearing +Confessions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order may be established +for preaching, or hearing confessions. For it is said (VII, qu. i +[*Cap. Hoc nequaquam; Cf. Q. 187, A. 1, Obj. 1]): "The monastic life +is one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or +pastoral care," and the same apparently applies to religious. Now +preaching and hearing confessions are the actions of a pastor and +teacher. Therefore a religious order should not be established for +this purpose. + +Obj. 2: Further, the purpose for which a religious order is +established would seem to be something most proper to the religious +life, as stated above (A. 1). Now the aforesaid actions are not +proper to religious but to bishops. Therefore a religious order +should not be established for the purpose of such actions. + +Obj. 3: Further, it seems unfitting that the authority to preach and +hear confessions should be committed to an unlimited number of men; +and there is no fixed number of those who are received into a +religious order. Therefore it is unfitting for a religious order to +be established for the purpose of the aforesaid actions. + +Obj. 4: Further, preachers have a right to receive their livelihood +from the faithful of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 9. If then the +office of preaching be committed to a religious order established for +that purpose, it follows that the faithful of Christ are bound to +support an unlimited number of persons, which would be a heavy burden +on them. Therefore a religious order should not be established for +the exercise of these actions. + +Obj. 5: Further, the organization of the Church should be in +accordance with Christ's institution. Now Christ sent first the +twelve apostles to preach, as related in Luke 9, and afterwards He +sent the seventy-two disciples, as stated in Luke 10. Moreover, +according to the gloss of Bede on "And after these things" (Luke +10:1), "the apostles are represented by the bishops, the seventy-two +disciples by the lesser priests," i.e. the parish priests. Therefore +in addition to bishops and parish priests, no religious order should +be established for the purpose of preaching and hearing confessions. + +_On the contrary,_ In the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4), +Abbot Nesteros, speaking of the various kinds of religious orders, +says: "Some choosing the care of the sick, others devoting themselves +to the relief of the afflicted and oppressed, or applying themselves +to teaching, or giving alms to the poor, have been most highly +esteemed on account of their devotion and piety." Therefore just as a +religious order may be established for the care of the sick, so also +may one be established for teaching the people by preaching and like +works. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it is fitting for a +religious order to be established for the works of the active life, +in so far as they are directed to the good of our neighbor, the +service of God, and the upkeep of divine worship. Now the good of our +neighbor is advanced by things pertaining to the spiritual welfare of +the soul rather than by things pertaining to the supplying of bodily +needs, in proportion to the excellence of spiritual over corporal +things. Hence it was stated above (Q. 32, A. 3) that spiritual works +of mercy surpass corporal works of mercy. Moreover this is more +pertinent to the service of God, to Whom no sacrifice is more +acceptable than zeal for souls, as Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.). +Furthermore, it is a greater thing to employ spiritual arms in +defending the faithful against the errors of heretics and the +temptations of the devil, than to protect the faithful by means of +bodily weapons. Therefore it is most fitting for a religious order to +be established for preaching and similar works pertaining to the +salvation of souls. + +Reply Obj. 1: He who works by virtue of another, acts as an +instrument. And a minister is like an "animated instrument," as the +Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2 [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 11]). Hence if a +man preach or do something similar by the authority of his superiors, +he does not rise above the degree of "discipleship" or "subjection," +which is competent to religious. + +Reply Obj. 2: Some religious orders are established for soldiering, +to wage war, not indeed on their own authority, but on that of the +sovereign or of the Church who are competent to wage war by virtue of +their office, as stated above (A. 3, ad 4). In the same way certain +religious orders are established for preaching and hearing +confessions, not indeed by their own authority, but by the authority +of the higher and lower superiors, to whom these things belong by +virtue of their office. Consequently to assist one's superiors in +such a ministry is proper to a religious order of this kind. + +Reply Obj. 3: Bishops do not allow these religious severally and +indiscriminately to preach or hear confessions, but according to the +discretion of the religious superiors, or according to their own +appointment. + +Reply Obj. 4: The faithful are not bound by law to contribute to the +support of other than their ordinary prelates, who receive the tithes +and offerings of the faithful for that purpose, as well as other +ecclesiastical revenues. But if some men are willing to minister to +the faithful by exercising the aforesaid acts gratuitously, and +without demanding payment as of right, the faithful are not burdened +thereby because their temporal contributions can be liberally repaid +by those men, nor are they bound by law to contribute, but by +charity, and yet not so that they be burdened thereby and others +eased, as stated in 2 Cor. 8:13. If, however, none be found to devote +themselves gratuitously to services of this kind, the ordinary +prelate is bound, if he cannot suffice by himself, to seek other +suitable persons and support them himself. + +Reply Obj. 5: The seventy-two disciples are represented not only by +the parish priests, but by all those of lower order who in any way +assist the bishops in their office. For we do not read that our Lord +appointed the seventy-two disciples to certain fixed parishes, but +that "He sent them two and two before His face into every city and +place whither He Himself was to come." It was fitting, however, that +in addition to the ordinary prelates others should be chosen for +these duties on account of the multitude of the faithful, and the +difficulty of finding a sufficient number of persons to be appointed +to each locality, just as it was necessary to establish religious +orders for military service, on account of the secular princes being +unable to cope with unbelievers in certain countries. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 5] + +Whether a Religious Order Should Be Established for the Purpose of +Study? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order should not be +established for the purpose of study. For it is written (Ps. 70:15, +16): "Because I have not known letters [Douay: 'learning'], I will +enter into the powers of the Lord," i.e. "Christian virtue," +according to a gloss. Now the perfection of Christian virtue, +seemingly, pertains especially to religious. Therefore it is not for +them to apply themselves to the study of letters. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is a source of dissent is unbecoming to +religious, who are gathered together in the unity of peace. Now study +leads to dissent: wherefore different schools of thought arose among +the philosophers. Hence Jerome (Super Epist. ad Tit. 1:5) says: +"Before a diabolical instinct brought study into religion, and people +said: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephas," etc. Therefore it +would seem that no religious order should be established for the +purpose of study. + +Obj. 3: Further, those who profess the Christian religion should +profess nothing in common with the Gentiles. Now among the Gentiles +were some who professed philosophy, and even now some secular persons +are known as professors of certain sciences. Therefore the study of +letters does not become religious. + +_On the contrary,_ Jerome (Ep. liii ad Paulin.) urges him to acquire +learning in the monastic state, saying: "Let us learn on earth those +things the knowledge of which will remain in heaven," and further on: +"Whatever you seek to know, I will endeavor to know with you." + +I answer that As stated above (A. 2), religion may be ordained to the +active and to the contemplative life. Now chief among the works of +the active life are those which are directly ordained to the +salvation of souls, such as preaching and the like. Accordingly the +study of letters is becoming to the religious life in three ways. +First, as regards that which is proper to the contemplative life, to +which the study of letters helps in a twofold manner. In one way by +helping directly to contemplate, namely by enlightening the +intellect. For the contemplative life of which we are now speaking is +directed chiefly to the consideration of divine things, as stated +above (Q. 180, A. 4), to which consideration man is directed by +study; for which reason it is said in praise of the righteous (Ps. +1:2) that "he shall meditate day and night" on the law of the Lord, +and (Ecclus. 39:1): "The wise man will seek out the wisdom of all the +ancients, and will be occupied in the prophets." In another way the +study of letters is a help to the contemplative life indirectly, by +removing the obstacles to contemplation, namely the errors which in +the contemplation of divine things frequently beset those who are +ignorant of the scriptures. Thus we read in the Conferences of the +Fathers (Coll. x, 3) that the Abbot Serapion through simplicity fell +into the error of the Anthropomorphites, who thought that God had a +human shape. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi) that "some through +seeking in contemplation more than they are able to grasp, fall away +into perverse doctrines, and by failing to be the humble disciples of +truth become the masters of error." Hence it is written (Eccles. +2:3): "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I +might turn my mind to wisdom and might avoid folly." + +Secondly, the study of letters is necessary in those religious orders +that are founded for preaching and other like works; wherefore the +Apostle (Titus 1:9), speaking of bishops to whose office these acts +belong, says: "Embracing that faithful word which is according to +doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to +convince the gainsayers." Nor does it matter that the apostles were +sent to preach without having studied letters, because, as Jerome +says (Ep. liii ad Paulin.), "whatever others acquire by exercise and +daily meditation in God's law, was taught them by the Holy Ghost." + +Thirdly, the study of letters is becoming to religious as regards +that which is common to all religious orders. For it helps us to +avoid the lusts of the flesh; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad +Rust. Monach.): "Love the science of the Scriptures and thou shalt +have no love for carnal vice." For it turns the mind away from +lustful thoughts, and tames the flesh on account of the toil that +study entails according to Ecclus. 31:1, "Watching for riches* +consumeth the flesh." [*_Vigilia honestatis._ St. Thomas would seem +to have taken _honestas_ in the sense of virtue]. It also helps to +remove the desire of riches, wherefore it is written (Wis. 7:8): +"I . . . esteemed riches nothing in comparison with her," and (1 +Macc. 12:9): "We needed none of these things," namely assistance from +without, "having for our comfort the holy books that are in our +hands." It also helps to teach obedience, wherefore Augustine says +(De oper. Monach. xvii): "What sort of perverseness is this, to wish +to read, but not to obey what one reads?" Hence it is clearly fitting +that a religious order be established for the study of letters. + +Reply Obj. 1: This commentary of the gloss is an exposition of the +Old Law of which the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): "The letter killeth." +Hence not to know letters is to disapprove of the circumcision of the +"letter" and other carnal observances. + +Reply Obj. 2: Study is directed to knowledge which, without charity, +"puffeth up," and consequently leads to dissent, according to Prov. +13:10, "Among the proud there are always dissensions": whereas, with +charity, it "edifieth and begets concord." Hence the Apostle after +saying (1 Cor. 1:5): "You are made rich . . . in all utterance and in +all knowledge," adds (1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the same +thing, and that there be no schisms among you." But Jerome is not +speaking here of the study of letters, but of the study of +dissensions which heretics and schismatics have brought into the +Christian religion. + +Reply Obj. 3: The philosophers professed the study of letters in the +matter of secular learning: whereas it becomes religious to devote +themselves chiefly to the study of letters in reference to the +doctrine that is "according to godliness" (Titus 1:1). It becomes not +religious, whose whole life is devoted to the service of God, to seek +for other learning, save in so far as it is referred to the sacred +doctrine. Hence Augustine says at the end of _De Musica_ vi, 17: +"Whilst we think that we should not overlook those whom heretics +delude by the deceitful assurance of reason and knowledge, we are +slow to advance in the consideration of their methods. Yet we should +not be praised for doing this, were it not that many holy sons of +their most loving mother the Catholic Church had done the same under +the necessity of confounding heretics." +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 6] + +Whether a Religious Order That Is Devoted to the Contemplative Life +Is More Excellent Than on That Is Given to the Active Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order which is devoted to +the contemplative life is not more excellent than one which is given +to the active life. For it is said (Extra, de Regular. et Transeunt. +ad Relig., cap. Licet), quoting the words of Innocent III: "Even as a +greater good is preferred to a lesser, so the common profit takes +precedence of private profit: and in this case teaching is rightly +preferred to silence, responsibility to contemplation, work to rest." +Now the religious order which is directed to the greater good is +better. Therefore it would seem that those religious orders that are +directed to the active life are more excellent than those which are +directed to the contemplative life. + +Obj. 2: Further, every religious order is directed to the perfection +of charity, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Now a gloss on Heb. 12:4, +"For you have not yet resisted unto blood," says: "In this life there +is no more perfect love than that to which the holy martyrs attained, +who fought against sin unto blood." Now to fight unto blood is +becoming those religious who are directed to military service, and +yet this pertains to the active life. Therefore it would seem that +religious orders of this kind are the most excellent. + +Obj. 3: Further, seemingly the stricter a religious order is, the +more excellent it is. But there is no reason why certain religious +orders directed to the active life should not be of stricter +observance than those directed to the contemplative life. Therefore +they are more excellent. + +_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Luke 10:42) that the "best part" +was Mary's, by whom the contemplative life is signified. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the difference between one +religious order and another depends chiefly on the end, and +secondarily on the exercise. And since one thing cannot be said to be +more excellent than another save in respect of that in which it +differs therefrom, it follows that the excellence of one religious +order over another depends chiefly on their ends, and secondarily on +their respective exercises. Nevertheless each of these comparisons is +considered in a different way. For the comparison with respect to the +end is absolute, since the end is sought for its own sake; whereas +the comparison with respect to exercise is relative, since exercise +is sought not for its own sake, but for the sake of the end. Hence a +religious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to an end +that is absolutely more excellent either because it is a greater good +or because it is directed to more goods. If, however, the end be the +same, the excellence of one religious order over another depends +secondarily, not on the amount of exercise, but on the proportion of +the exercise to the end in view. Wherefore in the Conferences of the +Fathers (Coll. ii, 2) Blessed Antony is quoted, as preferring +discretion whereby a man moderates all his actions, to fastings, +watchings, and all such observances. + +Accordingly we must say that the work of the active life is twofold. +one proceeds from the fulness of contemplation, such as teaching and +preaching. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the words +of Ps. 144:7, "They shall publish the memory of . . . Thy sweetness," +refer "to perfect men returning from their contemplation." And this +work is more excellent than simple contemplation. For even as it is +better to enlighten than merely to shine, so is it better to give to +others the fruits of one's contemplation than merely to contemplate. +The other work of the active life consists entirely in outward +occupation, for instance almsgiving, receiving guests, and the like, +which are less excellent than the works of contemplation, except in +cases of necessity, as stated above (Q. 182, A. 1). Accordingly the +highest place in religious orders is held by those which are directed +to teaching and preaching, which, moreover, are nearest to the +episcopal perfection, even as in other things "the end of that which +is first is in conjunction with the beginning of that which is +second," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. vii). The second place +belongs to those which are directed to contemplation, and the third +to those which are occupied with external actions. + +Moreover, in each of these degrees it may be noted that one religious +order excels another through being directed to higher action in the +same genus; thus among the works of the active life it is better to +ransom captives than to receive guests, and among the works of the +contemplative life prayer is better than study. Again one will excel +another if it be directed to more of these actions than another, or +if it have statutes more adapted to the attainment of the end in view. + +Reply Obj. 1: This Decretal refers to the active life as directed to +the salvation of souls. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those religious orders that are established for the +purpose of military service aim more directly at shedding the enemy's +blood than at the shedding of their own, which latter is more +properly competent to martyrs. Yet there is no reason why religious +of this description should not acquire the merit of martyrdom in +certain cases, and in this respect stand higher than other religious; +even as in some cases the works of the active life take precedence of +contemplation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Strictness of observances, as the Blessed Antony +remarks (Conferences of the Fathers; Coll. ii, 2), is not the chief +object of commendation in a religious order; and it is written (Isa. +58:5): "Is this such a fast as I have chosen, for a man to afflict +his soul for a day?" Nevertheless it is adopted in religious life as +being necessary for taming the flesh, "which if done without +discretion, is liable to make us fail altogether," as the Blessed +Antony observes. Wherefore a religious order is not more excellent +through having stricter observances, but because its observances are +directed by greater discretion to the end of religion. Thus the +taming of the flesh is more efficaciously directed to continence by +means of abstinence in meat and drink, which pertain to hunger and +thirst, than by the privation of clothing, which pertains to cold and +nakedness, or by bodily labor. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 7] + +Whether Religious Perfection Is Diminished by Possessing Something in +Common? + +Objection 1: It would seem that religious perfection is diminished by +possessing something in common. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If +thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast and give +to the poor." Hence it is clear that to lack worldly wealth belongs +to the perfection of Christian life. Now those who possess something +in common do not lack worldly wealth. Therefore it would seem that +they do not quite reach to the perfection of Christian life. + +Obj. 2: Further, the perfection of the counsels requires that one +should be without worldly solicitude; wherefore the Apostle in giving +the counsel of virginity said (1 Cor. 7:32): "I would have you to be +without solicitude." Now it belongs to the solicitude of the present +life that certain people keep something to themselves for the morrow; +and this solicitude was forbidden His disciples by our Lord (Matt. +6:34) saying: "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow." Therefore it +would seem that the perfection of Christian life is diminished by +having something in common. + +Obj. 3: Further, possessions held in common belong in some way to +each member of the community; wherefore Jerome (Ep. lx ad Heliod. +Episc.) says in reference to certain people: "They are richer in the +monastery than they had been in the world; though serving the poor +Christ they have wealth which they had not while serving the rich +devil; the Church rejects them now that they are rich, who in the +world were beggars." But it is derogatory to religious perfection +that one should possess wealth of one's own. Therefore it is also +derogatory to religious perfection to possess anything in common. + +Obj. 4: Further, Gregory (Dial. iii, 14) relates of a very holy man +named Isaac, that "when his disciples humbly signified that he should +accept the possessions offered to him for the use of the monastery, +he being solicitous for the safeguarding of his poverty, held firmly +to his opinion, saying: A monk who seeks earthly possessions is no +monk at all": and this refers to possessions held in common, and +which were offered him for the common use of the monastery. Therefore +it would seem destructive of religious perfection to possess anything +in common. + +Obj. 5: Further, our Lord in prescribing religious perfection to His +disciples, said (Matt. 10:9, 10): "Do not possess gold, nor silver, +nor money in your purses, nor script for your journey." By these +words, as Jerome says in his commentary, "He reproves those +philosophers who are commonly called Bactroperatae [*i.e. staff and +scrip bearers], who as despising the world and valuing all things at +naught carried their pantry about with them." Therefore it would seem +derogatory to religious perfection that one should keep something +whether for oneself or for the common use. + +_On the contrary,_ Prosper [*Julianus Pomerius, among the works of +Prosper] says (De Vita Contempl. ix) and his words are quoted (XII, +qu. 1, can. Expedit): "It is sufficiently clear both that for the +sake of perfection one should renounce having anything of one's own, +and that the possession of revenues, which are of course common +property, is no hindrance to the perfection of the Church." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 185, A. 6, +ad 1), perfection consists, essentially, not in poverty, but in +following Christ, according to the saying of Jerome (Super Matth. +xix, 27): "Since it is not enough to leave all, Peter adds that which +is perfect, namely, 'We have followed Thee,'" while poverty is like +an instrument or exercise for the attainment of perfection. Hence in +the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the abbot Moses says: +"Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, poverty, and +privation of all one's possessions are not perfection, but means of +perfection." + +Now the privation of one's possessions, or poverty, is a means of +perfection, inasmuch as by doing away with riches we remove certain +obstacles to charity; and these are chiefly three. The first is the +cares which riches bring with them; wherefore our Lord said (Matt. +13:22): "That which was sown [Vulg.: 'He that received the seed'] +among thorns, is he that heareth the word, and the care of this +world, and the deceitfulness of riches, choketh up the word." The +second is the love of riches, which increases with the possession of +wealth; wherefore Jerome says (Super Matth. xix, 23) that "since it +is difficult to despise riches when we have them, our Lord did not +say: 'It is impossible for a rich man to enter the kingdom of +heaven,' but: 'It is difficult.'" The third is vainglory or elation +which results from riches, according to Ps. 48:7, "They that trust in +their own strength, and glory in the multitude of their riches." + +Accordingly the first of these three cannot be altogether separated +from riches whether great or small. For man must needs take a certain +amount of care in acquiring or keeping external things. But so long +as external things are sought or possessed only in a small quantity, +and as much as is required for a mere livelihood, such like care does +not hinder one much; and consequently is not inconsistent with the +perfection of Christian life. For our Lord did not forbid all care, +but only such as is excessive and hurtful; wherefore Augustine, +commenting on Matt. 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your life, what you +shall eat," says (De Serm. in Monte [*The words quoted are from De +Operibus Monach. xxvi]): "In saying this He does not forbid them to +procure these things in so far as they needed them, but to be intent +on them, and for their sake to do whatever they are bidden to do in +preaching the Gospel." Yet the possession of much wealth increases +the weight of care, which is a great distraction to man's mind and +hinders him from giving himself wholly to God's service. The other +two, however, namely the love of riches and taking pride or glorying +in riches, result only from an abundance of wealth. + +Nevertheless it makes a difference in this matter if riches, whether +abundant or moderate, be possessed in private or in common. For the +care that one takes of one's own wealth, pertains to love of self, +whereby a man loves himself in temporal matters; whereas the care +that is given to things held in common pertains to the love of +charity which "seeketh not her own," but looks to the common good. +And since religion is directed to the perfection of charity, and +charity is perfected in "the love of God extending to contempt of +self" [*Augustine, De Civ. Dei xiv, 28,] it is contrary to religious +perfection to possess anything in private. But the care that is given +to common goods may pertain to charity, although it may prove an +obstacle to some higher act of charity, such as divine contemplation +or the instructing of one's neighbor. Hence it is evident that to +have excessive riches in common, whether in movable or in immovable +property, is an obstacle to perfection, though not absolutely +incompatible with it; while it is not an obstacle to religious +perfection to have enough external things, whether movables or +immovables, as suffice for a livelihood, if we consider poverty in +relation to the common end of religious orders, which is to devote +oneself to the service of God. But if we consider poverty in relation +to the special end of any religious order, then this end being +presupposed, a greater or lesser degree of poverty is adapted to that +religious order; and each religious order will be the more perfect in +respect of poverty, according as it professes a poverty more adapted +to its end. For it is evident that for the purpose of the outward and +bodily works of the active life a man needs the assistance of outward +things, whereas few are required for contemplation. Hence the +Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "many things are needed for +action, and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions are. But +the contemplative man requires no such things for the exercise of his +act: he needs only the necessaries; other things are an obstacle to +his contemplation." Accordingly it is clear that a religious order +directed to the bodily actions of the active life, such as soldiering +or the lodging of guests, would be imperfect if it lacked common +riches; whereas those religious orders which are directed to the +contemplative life are the more perfect, according as the poverty +they profess burdens them with less care for temporal things. And the +care of temporal things is so much a greater obstacle to religious +life as the religious life requires a greater care of spiritual +things. + +Now it is manifest that a religious order established for the purpose +of contemplating and of giving to others the fruits of one's +contemplation by teaching and preaching, requires greater care of +spiritual things than one that is established for contemplation only. +Wherefore it becomes a religious order of this kind to embrace a +poverty that burdens one with the least amount of care. Again it is +clear that to keep what one has acquired at a fitting time for one's +necessary use involves the least burden of care. Wherefore a +threefold degree of poverty corresponds to the three aforesaid +degrees of religious life. For it is fitting that a religious order +which is directed to the bodily actions of the active life should +have an abundance of riches in common; that the common possession of +a religious order directed to contemplation should be more moderate, +unless the said religious be bound, either themselves or through +others, to give hospitality or to assist the poor; and that those who +aim at giving the fruits of their contemplation to others should have +their life most exempt from external cares; this being accomplished +by their laying up the necessaries of life procured at a fitting +time. This, our Lord, the Founder of poverty, taught by His example. +For He had a purse which He entrusted to Judas, and in which were +kept the things that were offered to Him, as related in John 12:6. + +Nor should it be argued that Jerome (Super Matth. xvii, 26) says: "If +anyone object that Judas carried money in the purse, we answer that +He deemed it unlawful to spend the property of the poor on His own +uses," namely by paying the tax--because among those poor His +disciples held a foremost place, and the money in Christ's purse was +spent chiefly on their needs. For it is stated (John 4:8) that "His +disciples were gone into the city to buy meats," and (John 13:29) +that the disciples "thought, because Judas had the purse, that Jesus +had said to him: But those things which we have need of for the +festival day, or that he should give something to the poor." From +this it is evident that to keep money by, or any other common +property for the support of religious of the same order, or of any +other poor, is in accordance with the perfection which Christ taught +by His example. Moreover, after the resurrection, the disciples from +whom all religious orders took their origin kept the price of the +lands, and distributed it according as each one had need (Acts 4:34, +35). + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1), this saying of +our Lord does not mean that poverty itself is perfection, but that it +is the means of perfection. Indeed, as shown above (Q. 186, A. 8), it +is the least of the three chief means of perfection; since the vow of +continence excels the vow of poverty, and the vow of obedience excels +them both. Since, however, the means are sought not for their own +sake, but for the sake of the end, a thing is better, not for being a +greater instrument, but for being more adapted to the end. Thus a +physician does not heal the more the more medicine he gives, but the +more the medicine is adapted to the disease. Accordingly it does not +follow that a religious order is the more perfect, according as the +poverty it professes is more perfect, but according as its poverty is +more adapted to the end both common and special. Granted even that +the religious order which exceeds others in poverty be more perfect +in so far as it is poorer, this would not make it more perfect +simply. For possibly some other religious order might surpass it in +matters relating to continence, or obedience, and thus be more +perfect simply, since to excel in better things is to be better +simply. + +Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord's words (Matt. 6:34), "Be not solicitous for +tomorrow," do not mean that we are to keep nothing for the morrow; +for the Blessed Antony shows the danger of so doing, in the +Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. ii, 2), where he says: "It has been +our experience that those who have attempted to practice the +privation of all means of livelihood, so as not to have the +wherewithal to procure themselves food for one day, have been +deceived so unawares that they were unable to finish properly the +work they had undertaken." And, as Augustine says (De oper. Monach. +xxiii), "if this saying of our Lord, 'Be not solicitous for +tomorrow,' means that we are to lay nothing by for the morrow, those +who shut themselves up for many days from the sight of men, and apply +their whole mind to a life of prayer, will be unable to provide +themselves with these things." Again he adds afterwards: "Are we to +suppose that the more holy they are, the less do they resemble the +birds?" And further on (De oper. Monach. xxiv): "For if it be argued +from the Gospel that they should lay nothing by, they answer rightly: +Why then did our Lord have a purse, wherein He kept the money that +was collected? Why, in days long gone by, when famine was imminent, +was grain sent to the holy fathers? Why did the apostles thus provide +for the needs of the saints?" + +Accordingly the saying: "Be not solicitous for tomorrow," according +to Jerome (Super Matth.) is to be rendered thus: "It is enough that +we think of the present; the future being uncertain, let us leave it +to God": according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvi in the Opus Imperfectum, +falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "It is enough to endure the +toil for necessary things, labor not in excess for unnecessary +things": according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17): +"When we do any good action, we should bear in mind not temporal +things which are denoted by the morrow, but eternal things." + +Reply Obj. 3: The saying of Jerome applies where there are excessive +riches, possessed in private as it were, or by the abuse of which +even the individual members of a community wax proud and wanton. But +they do not apply to moderate wealth, set by for the common use, +merely as a means of livelihood of which each one stands in need. For +it amounts to the same that each one makes use of things pertaining +to the necessaries of life, and that these things be set by for the +common use. + +Reply Obj. 4: Isaac refused to accept the offer of possessions, +because he feared lest this should lead him to have excessive wealth, +the abuse of which would be an obstacle to religious perfection. +Hence Gregory adds (Dial. iii, 14): "He was as afraid of forfeiting +the security of his poverty, as the rich miser is careful of his +perishable wealth." It is not, however, related that he refused to +accept such things as are commonly necessary for the upkeep of life. + +Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5, 6) that bread, wine, +and the like are natural riches, while money is artificial riches. +Hence it is that certain philosophers declined to make use of money, +and employed other things, living according to nature. Wherefore +Jerome shows by the words of our Lord, Who equally forbade both, that +it comes to the same to have money and to possess other things +necessary for life. And though our Lord commanded those who were sent +to preach not to carry these things on the way, He did not forbid +them to be possessed in common. How these words of our Lord should be +understood has been shown above (Q. 185, A. 6 ad 2; I-II, Q. 108, A. +2, ad 3). +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 8] + +Whether the Religious Life of Those Who Live in Community Is More +Perfect Than That of Those Who Lead a Solitary Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the religious life of those who live +in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary +life. For it is written (Eccles. 4:9): "It is better . . . that two +should be together, than one; for they have the advantage of their +society." Therefore the religious life of those who live in community +would seem to be more perfect. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Matt. 18:20): "Where there are two or +three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them." +But nothing can be better than the fellowship of Christ. Therefore it +would seem better to live in community than in solitude. + +Obj. 3: Further, the vow of obedience is more excellent than the +other religious vows; and humility is most acceptable to God. Now +obedience and humility are better observed in company than in +solitude; for Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic. Monach.): "In solitude +pride quickly takes man unawares, he sleeps as much as he will, he +does what he likes"; whereas when instructing one who lives in +community, he says: "You may not do what you will, you must eat what +you are bidden to eat, you may possess so much as you receive, you +must obey one you prefer not to obey, you must be a servant to your +brethren, you must fear the superior of the monastery as God, love +him as a father." Therefore it would seem that the religious life of +those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who +lead a solitary life. + +Obj. 4: Further, our Lord said (Luke 11:33): "No man lighteth a +candle and putteth it in a hidden place, nor under a bushel." Now +those who lead a solitary life are seemingly in a hidden place, and +to be doing no good to any man. Therefore it would seem that their +religious life is not more perfect. + +Obj. 5: Further, that which is in accord with man's nature is +apparently more pertinent to the perfection of virtue. But man is +naturally a social animal, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1). +Therefore it would seem that to lead a solitary life is not more +perfect than to lead a community life. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii) that +"those are holier who keep themselves aloof from the approach of all, +and give their whole mind to a life of prayer." + +_I answer that,_ Solitude, like poverty, is not the essence of +perfection, but a means thereto. Hence in the Conferences of the +Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the Abbot Moses says that "solitude," even as +fasting and other like things, is "a sure means of acquiring purity +of heart." Now it is evident that solitude is a means adapted not to +action but to contemplation, according to Osee 2:14, "I . . . will +lead her into solitude [Douay: 'the wilderness']; and I will speak to +her heart." Wherefore it is not suitable to those religious orders +that are directed to the works whether corporal or spiritual of the +active life; except perhaps for a time, after the example of Christ, +Who as Luke relates (6:12), "went out into a mountain to pray; and He +passed the whole night in the prayer of God." On the other hand, it +is suitable to those religious orders that are directed to +contemplation. + +It must, however, be observed that what is solitary should be +self-sufficing by itself. Now such a thing is one "that lacks +nothing," and this belongs to the idea of a perfect thing +[*Aristotle, _Phys._ iii, 6]. Wherefore solitude befits the +contemplative who has already attained to perfection. This happens in +two ways: in one way by the gift only of God, as in the case of John +the Baptist, who was "filled with the Holy Ghost even from his +mother's womb" (Luke 1:11), so that he was in the desert even as a +boy; in another way by the practice of virtuous action, according to +Heb. 5:14: "Strong meat is for the perfect; for them who by custom +have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil." + +Now man is assisted in this practice by the fellowship of others in +two ways. First, as regards his intellect, to the effect of his being +instructed in that which he has to contemplate; wherefore Jerome says +(ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "It pleases me that you have the +fellowship of holy men, and teach not yourself." Secondly, as regards +the affections, seeing that man's noisome affections are restrained +by the example and reproof which he receives from others; for as +Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 23), commenting on the words, "To whom I +have given a house in the wilderness" (Job 39:6), "What profits +solitude of the body, if solitude of the heart be lacking?" Hence a +social life is necessary for the practice of perfection. Now solitude +befits those who are already perfect; wherefore Jerome says (ad +Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "Far from condemning the solitary life, +we have often commended it. But we wish the soldiers who pass from +the monastic school to be such as not to be deterred by the hard +noviciate of the desert, and such as have given proof of their +conduct for a considerable time." + +Accordingly, just as that which is already perfect surpasses that +which is being schooled in perfection, so the life of the solitaries, +if duly practiced, surpasses the community life. But if it be +undertaken without the aforesaid practice, it is fraught with very +great danger, unless the grace of God supply that which others +acquire by practice, as in the case of the Blessed Antony and the +Blessed Benedict. + +Reply Obj. 1: Solomon shows that two are better than one, on account +of the help which one affords the other either by "lifting him" up, +or by "warming him," i.e. giving him spiritual heat (Eccles. 4:10, +11). But those who have already attained to perfection do not require +this help. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to 1 John 4:16, "He that abideth in charity +abideth in God and God in him." Wherefore just as Christ is in the +midst of those who are united together in the fellowship of brotherly +love, so does He dwell in the heart of the man who devotes himself to +divine contemplation through love of God. + +Reply Obj. 3: Actual obedience is required of those who need to be +schooled according to the direction of others in the attainment of +perfection; but those who are already perfect are sufficiently "led +by the spirit of God" so that they need not to obey others actually. +Nevertheless they have obedience in the preparedness of the mind. + +Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), "no one is +forbidden to seek the knowledge of truth, for this pertains to a +praiseworthy leisure." That a man be placed "on a candlestick," does +not concern him but his superiors, and "if this burden is not placed +on us," as Augustine goes on to say (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), "we must +devote ourselves to the contemplation of truth," for which purpose +solitude is most helpful. Nevertheless, those who lead a solitary +life are most useful to mankind. Hence, referring to them, Augustine +says (De Morib. Eccl. xxxi): "They dwell in the most lonely places, +content to live on water and the bread that is brought to them from +time to time, enjoying colloquy with God to whom they have adhered +with a pure mind. To some they seem to have renounced human +intercourse more than is right: but these understand not how much +such men profit us by the spirit of their prayers, what an example to +us is the life of those whom we are forbidden to see in the body." + +Reply Obj. 5: A man may lead a solitary life for two motives. One is +because he is unable, as it were, to bear with human fellowship on +account of his uncouthness of mind; and this is beast-like. The other +is with a view to adhering wholly to divine things; and this is +superhuman. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "he who +associates not with others is either a beast or a god," i.e. a godly +man. +_______________________ + +QUESTION 189 + +OF THE ENTRANCE INTO RELIGIOUS LIFE +(In Ten Articles) + +We must now consider the entrance into religious life. Under this +head there are ten points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether those who are not practiced in the observance of the +commandments should enter religion? + +(2) Whether it is lawful for a person to be bound by vow to enter +religion? + +(3) Whether those who are bound by vow to enter religion are bound to +fulfil their vow? + +(4) Whether those who vow to enter religion are bound to remain there +in perpetuity? + +(5) Whether children should be received into religion? + +(6) Whether one should be withheld from entering religion through +deference to one's parents? + +(7) Whether parish priests or archdeacons may enter religion? + +(8) Whether one may pass from one religious order to another? + +(9) Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion? + +(10) Whether serious deliberation with one's relations and friends +is requisite for entrance into religion? +_______________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 1] + +Whether Those Who Are Not Practiced in Keeping the Commandments +Should Enter Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that none should enter religion but those +who are practiced in the observance of the commandments. For our Lord +gave the counsel of perfection to the young man who said that he had +kept the commandments "from his youth." Now all religious orders +originate from Christ. Therefore it would seem that none should be +allowed to enter religion but those who are practiced in the +observance of the commandments. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ezech., and Moral. xxii): +"No one comes suddenly to the summit; but he must make a beginning of +a good life in the smallest matters, so as to accomplish great +things." Now the great things are the counsels which pertain to the +perfection of life, while the lesser things are the commandments +which belong to common righteousness. Therefore it would seem that +one ought not to enter religion for the purpose of keeping the +counsels, unless one be already practiced in the observance of the +precepts. + +Obj. 3: Further, the religious state, like the holy orders, has a +place of eminence in the Church. Now, as Gregory writes to the bishop +Siagrius [*Regist. ix, Ep. 106], "order should be observed in +ascending to orders. For he seeks a fall who aspires to mount to the +summit by overpassing the steps." [*The rest of the quotation is from +Regist. v, Ep. 53, ad Virgil. Episc.]. "For we are well aware that +walls when built receive not the weight of the beams until the new +fabric is rid of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with +weight before they are seasoned they bring down the whole building" +(Dist. xlviii, can. Sicut neophytus). Therefore it would seem that +one should not enter religion unless one be practiced in the +observance of the precepts. + +Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, "As a child that is weaned is +towards his mother," says: "First we are conceived in the womb of +Mother Church, by being taught the rudiments of faith. Then we are +nourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same +elements. Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being +regenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in her +hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in +good works and are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while +we progress; until having grown out of infancy we leave our mother's +milk for a father's control, that is to say, we pass from simple +doctrine, by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word +that was in the beginning with God." Afterwards it goes on to say: +"For those who are just baptized on Holy Saturday are borne in the +hands of the Church as it were and fed with milk until Pentecost, +during which time nothing arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising +at midnight. Afterwards they are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit, +and being weaned so to speak, begin to fast and keep other difficult +observances. Many, like the heretics and schismatics, have perverted +this order by being weaned before the time. Hence they have come to +naught." Now this order is apparently perverted by those who enter +religion, or induce others to enter religion, before they are +practiced in the easier observance of the commandments. Therefore +they would seem to be heretics or schismatics. + +Obj. 5: Further, one should proceed from that which precedes to that +which follows after. Now the commandments precede the counsels, +because they are more universal, for "the implication of the one by +the other is not convertible" [*Categor. ix], since whoever keeps the +counsels keeps the commandments, but the converse does not hold. +Seeing then that the right order requires one to pass from that which +comes first to that which comes after, it follows that one ought not +to pass to the observance of the counsels in religion, without being +first of all practiced in the observance of the commandments. + +_On the contrary,_ Matthew the publican who was not practiced in the +observance of the commandments was called by our Lord to the +observance of the counsels. For it is stated (Luke 5:28) that +"leaving all things he . . . followed Him." Therefore it is not +necessary for a person to be practiced in the observance of the +commandments before passing to the perfection of the counsels. + +_I answer that,_ As shown above (Q. 188, A. 1), the religious state +is a spiritual schooling for the attainment of the perfection of +charity. This is accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to +perfect charity by religious observances; and these obstacles are +those things which attach man's affections to earthly things. Now the +attachment of man's affections to earthly things is not only an +obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to the +loss of charity, when through turning inordinately to temporal goods +man turns away from the immutable good by sinning mortally. Hence it +is evident that the observances of the religious state, while +removing the obstacles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions +of sin: for instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience, +and the like withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust and all +other manner of sins. + +Consequently it is right that not only those who are practiced in the +observance of the commandments should enter religion in order to +attain to yet greater perfection, but also those who are not +practiced, in order the more easily to avoid sin and attain to +perfection. + +Reply Obj. 1: Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 20) says: "The young man lies +when he says: 'All these have I kept from my youth.' For if he had +fulfilled this commandment, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as +thyself,' why did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all thou +hast and give to the poor?" But this means that he lied as to the +perfect observance of this commandment. Hence Origen says (Tract. +viii super Matth.) that "it is written in the Gospel according to the +Hebrews that when our Lord had said to him: 'Go, sell all thou hast,' +the rich man began to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to +him: How sayest thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets, +seeing that it is written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as +thyself? Behold many of thy brethren, children of Abraham, are +clothed in filth, and die of hunger, whilst thy house is full of all +manner of good things, and nothing whatever hath passed thence to +them. And thus our Lord reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect, +go, etc. For it is impossible to fulfil the commandment which says, +Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, and to be rich, especially +to have such great wealth." This also refers to the perfect +fulfilment of this precept. On the other hand, it is true that he +kept the commandments imperfectly and in a general way. For +perfection consists chiefly in the observance of the precepts of +charity, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 3). Wherefore in order to show +that the perfection of the counsels is useful both to the innocent +and to sinners, our Lord called not only the innocent youth but also +the sinner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His call, and the youth obeyed +not, because sinners are converted to the religious life more easily +than those who presume on their innocency. It is to the former that +our Lord says (Matt. 21:31): "The publicans and the harlots shall go +into the kingdom of God before you." + +Reply Obj. 2: The highest and the lowest place can be taken in three +ways. First, in reference to the same state and the same man; and +thus it is evident that no one comes to the summit suddenly, since +every man that lives aright, progresses during the whole course of +his life, so as to arrive at the summit. Secondly, in comparison with +various states; and thus he who desires to reach to a higher state +need not begin from a lower state: for instance, if a man wish to be +a cleric he need not first of all be practiced in the life of a +layman. Thirdly, in comparison with different persons; and in this +way it is clear that one man begins straightway not only from a +higher state, but even from a higher degree of holiness, than the +highest degree to which another man attains throughout his whole +life. Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): "All are agreed that the boy +Benedict began at a high degree of grace and perfection in his daily +life." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 6) the holy orders +prerequire holiness, whereas the religious state is a school for the +attainment of holiness. Hence the burden of orders should be laid on +the walls when these are already seasoned with holiness, whereas the +burden of religion seasons the walls, i.e. men, by drawing out the +damp of vice. + +Reply Obj. 4: It is manifest from the words of this gloss that it is +chiefly a question of the order of doctrine, in so far as one has to +pass from easy matter to that which is more difficult. Hence it is +clear from what follows that the statement that certain "heretics" +and "schismatics have perverted this order" refers to the order of +doctrine. For it continues thus: "But he says that he has kept these +things, namely the aforesaid order, binding himself by an oath +[*Referring to the last words of the verse, and taking _retributio,_ +which Douay renders _reward,_ as meaning 'punishment']. Thus I was +humble not only in other things but also in knowledge, for 'I was +humbly minded'; because I was first of all fed with milk, which is +the Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake of the bread of +angels, namely the Word that is in the beginning with God." The +example which is given in proof, of the newly baptized not being +commanded to fast until Pentecost, shows that no difficult things are +to be laid on them as an obligation before the Holy Ghost inspires +them inwardly to take upon themselves difficult things of their own +choice. Hence after Pentecost and the receiving of the Holy Ghost the +Church observes a fast. Now the Holy Ghost, according to Ambrose +(Super Luc. 1:15), "is not confined to any particular age; He ceases +not when men die, He is not excluded from the maternal womb." Gregory +also in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.) says: "He fills the boy +harpist and makes him a psalmist: He fills the boy abstainer and +makes him a wise judge [*Dan. 1:8-17]," and afterwards he adds: "No +time is needed to learn whatsoever He will, for He teaches the mind +by the merest touch." Again it is written (Eccles. 8:8), "It is not +in man's power to stop the Spirit," and the Apostle admonishes us (1 +Thess. 5:19): "Extinguish not the Spirit," and (Acts 7:51) it is said +against certain persons: "You always resist the Holy Ghost." + +Reply Obj. 5: There are certain chief precepts which are the ends, so +to say, of the commandments and counsels. These are the precepts of +charity, and the counsels are directed to them, not that these +precepts cannot be observed without keeping the counsels, but that +the keeping of the counsels conduces to the better observance of the +precepts. The other precepts are secondary and are directed to the +precepts of charity; in such a way that unless one observe them it is +altogether impossible to keep the precepts of charity. Accordingly in +the intention the perfect observance of the precepts of charity +precedes the counsels, and yet sometimes it follows them in point of +time. For such is the order of the end in relation to things directed +to the end. But the observance in a general way of the precepts of +charity together with the other precepts, is compared to the counsels +as the common to the proper, because one can observe the precepts +without observing the counsels, but not vice versa. Hence the common +observance of the precepts precedes the counsels in the order of +nature; but it does not follow that it precedes them in point of +time, for a thing is not in the genus before being in one of the +species. But the observance of the precepts apart from the counsels +is directed to the observance of the precepts together with the +counsels; as an imperfect to a perfect species, even as the +irrational to the rational animal. Now the perfect is naturally prior +to the imperfect, since "nature," as Boethius says (De Consol. iii, +10), "begins with perfect things." And yet it is not necessary for +the precepts first of all to be observed without the counsels, and +afterwards with the counsels, just as it is not necessary for one to +be an ass before being a man, or married before being a virgin. In +like manner it is not necessary for a person first of all to keep the +commandments in the world before entering religion; especially as the +worldly life does not dispose one to religious perfection, but is +more an obstacle thereto. +_______________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 2] + +Whether One Ought to Be Bound by Vow to Enter Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to +enter religion. For in making his profession a man is bound by the +religious vow. Now before profession a year of probation is allowed, +according to the rule of the Blessed Benedict (lviii) and according +to the decree of Innocent IV [*Sext. Decret., cap. Non solum., de +Regular. et Transeunt, ad Relig.] who moreover forbade anyone to be +bound to the religious life by profession before completing the year +of probation. Therefore it would seem that much less ought anyone +while yet in the world to be bound by vow to enter religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 15): Jews "should be +persuaded to be converted, not by compulsion but of their own free +will" (Dist. xlv, can. De Judaeis). Now one is compelled to fulfil +what one has vowed. Therefore no one should be bound by vow to enter +religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one should give another an occasion of falling; +wherefore it is written (Ex. 21:33, 34): "If a man open a pit . . . +and an ox or an ass fall into it, the owner of the pit shall pay the +price of the beasts." Now through being bound by vow to enter +religion it often happens that people fall into despair and various +sins. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow +to enter religion. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written, (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye, and pay to +the Lord your God"; and a gloss of Augustine says that "some vows +concern the individual, such as vows of chastity, virginity, and the +like." Consequently Holy Scripture invites us to vow these things. +But Holy Scripture invites us only to that which is better. Therefore +it is better to bind oneself by vow to enter religion. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 6), when we were treating +of vows, one and the same work done in fulfilment of a vow is more +praiseworthy than if it be done apart from a vow, both because to vow +is an act of religion, which has a certain pre-eminence among the +virtues, and because a vow strengthens a man's will to do good; and +just as a sin is more grievous through proceeding from a will +obstinate in evil, so a good work is the more praiseworthy through +proceeding from a will confirmed in good by means of a vow. Therefore +it is in itself praiseworthy to bind oneself by vow to enter religion. + +Reply Obj. 1: The religious vow is twofold. One is the solemn vow +which makes a man a monk or a brother in some other religious order. +This is called the profession, and such a vow should be preceded by a +year's probation, as the objection proves. The other is the simple +vow which does not make a man a monk or a religious, but only binds +him to enter religion, and such a vow need not be preceded by a +year's probation. + +Reply Obj. 2: The words quoted from Gregory must be understood as +referring to absolute violence. But the compulsion arising from the +obligation of a vow is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of +end, because after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of +salvation unless one fulfil that vow. Such a necessity is not to be +avoided; indeed, as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Armentar. et +Paulin.), "happy is the necessity that compels us to better things." + +Reply Obj. 3: The vow to enter religion is a strengthening of the +will for better things, and consequently, considered in itself, +instead of giving a man an occasion of falling, withdraws him from +it. But if one who breaks a vow falls more grievously, this does not +derogate from the goodness of the vow, as neither does it derogate +from the goodness of Baptism that some sin more grievously after +being baptized. +_______________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 3] + +Whether One Who Is Bound by a Vow to Enter Religion Is Under an +Obligation of Entering Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one who is bound by the vow to enter +religion is not under an obligation of entering religion. For it is +said in the Decretals (XVII, qu. ii, can. Consaldus): "Consaldus, a +priest under pressure of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to +become a monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery or +abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but he renounced his +benefice in the hands of a notary; and when he was restored to health +he refused to become a monk." And afterwards it is added: "We adjudge +and by apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest be +admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he be allowed to +retain them in peace." Now this would not be if he were bound to +enter religion. Therefore it would seem that one is not bound to keep +one's vow of entering religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is not in his power. Now +it is not in a person's power to enter religion, since this depends +on the consent of those whom he wishes to join. Therefore it would +seem that a man is not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound +himself to enter religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a more useful one. +Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter religion might hinder the +fulfilment of a vow to take up the cross in defense of the Holy Land; +and the latter apparently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man +obtains the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that the +vow by which a man has bound himself to enter religion is not +necessarily to be fulfilled. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed +anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish +promise displeaseth him"; and a gloss on Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye, and pay +to the Lord your God," says: "To vow depends on the will: but after +the vow has been taken the fulfilment is of obligation." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 1), when we were treating +of vows, a vow is a promise made to God in matters concerning God. +Now, as Gregory says in a letter to Boniface [*Innoc. I, Epist. ii, +Victricio Epo. Rotomag., cap. 14; Cf. can. Viduas: cause. xxvii, qu. +1]: "If among men of good faith contracts are wont to be absolutely +irrevocable, how much more shall the breaking of this promise given +to God be deserving of punishment!" Therefore a man is under an +obligation to fulfil what he has vowed, provided this be something +pertaining to God. + +Now it is evident that entrance into religion pertains very much to +God, since thereby man devotes himself entirely to the divine +service, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1). Hence it follows that he who +binds himself to enter religion is under an obligation to enter +religion according as he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that +if he intend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as +soon as he can, through the cessation of a lawful impediment; whereas +if he intend to bind himself to a certain fixed time, or under a +certain fixed condition, he is bound to enter religion when the time +comes or the condition is fulfilled. + +Reply Obj. 1: This priest had made, not a solemn, but a simple vow. +Hence he was not a monk in effect, so as to be bound by law to dwell +in a monastery and renounce his cure. However, in the court of +conscience one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter +religion. Hence (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Per tuas) +the Bishop of Grenoble, who had accepted the episcopate after vowing +to enter religion, without having fulfilled his vow, is counseled +that if "he wish to heal his conscience he should renounce the +government of his see and pay his vows to the Most High." + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 88, A. 3, ad 2), when we were +treating of vows, he who has bound himself by vow to enter a certain +religious order is bound to do what is in his power in order to be +received in that order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to +enter the religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound +to go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only to one +particular order, he is bound only according to the measure of the +obligation to which he has engaged himself. + +Reply Obj. 3: The vow to enter religion being perpetual is greater +than the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, which is a temporal vow; +and as Alexander III says (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. +Scripturae), "he who exchanges a temporary service for the perpetual +service of religion is in no way guilty of breaking his vow." + +Moreover it may be reasonably stated that also by entrance into +religion a man obtains remission of all his sins. For if by giving +alms a man may forthwith satisfy for his sins, according to Dan. +4:24, "Redeem thou thy sins with alms," much more does it suffice to +satisfy for all his sins that a man devote himself wholly to the +divine service by entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of +satisfaction, even that of public penance, according to the Decretals +(XXXIII, qu. i, cap. Admonere) just as a holocaust exceeds a +sacrifice, as Gregory declares (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence we read in +the Lives of the Fathers (vi, 1) that by entering religion one +receives the same grace as by being baptized. And yet even if one +were not thereby absolved from all debt of punishment, nevertheless +the entrance into religion is more profitable than a pilgrimage to +the Holy Land, as regards the advancement in good, which is +preferable to absolution from punishment. +_______________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 4] + +Whether He Who Has Vowed to Enter Religion Is Bound to Remain in +Religion in Perpetuity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that he who has vowed to enter religion, +is bound in perpetuity to remain in religion. For it is better not to +enter religion than to leave after entering, according to 2 Pet. +2:21, "It had been better for them not to have known the way of +justice, than after they have known it to turn back," and Luke 9:62, +"No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for +the kingdom of God." But he who bound himself by the vow to enter +religion, is under the obligation to enter, as stated above (A. 3). +Therefore he is also bound to remain for always. + +Obj. 2: Further, everyone is bound to avoid that which gives rise to +scandal, and is a bad example to others. Now by leaving after +entering religion a man gives a bad example and is an occasion of +scandal to others, who are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited +to leave. Therefore it seems that he who enters religion in order to +fulfil a vow which he had previously taken, is bound to remain +evermore. + +Obj. 3: Further, the vow to enter religion is accounted a perpetual +vow: wherefore it is preferred to temporal vows, as stated above (A. +3, ad 3; Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1). But this would not be so if a person +after vowing to enter religion were to enter with the intention of +leaving. It seems, therefore, that he who vows to enter religion is +bound also to remain in perpetuity. + +_On the contrary,_ The vow of religious profession, for the reason +that it binds a man to remain in religion for evermore, has to be +preceded by a year of probation; whereas this is not required before +the simple vow whereby a man binds himself to enter religion. +Therefore it seems that he who vows to enter religion is not for that +reason bound to remain there in perpetuity. + +_I answer that,_ The obligation of a vow proceeds from the will: +because "to vow is an act of the will" according to Augustine [*Gloss +of Peter Lombard on Ps. 75:12]. Consequently the obligation of a vow +extends as far as the will and intention of the person who takes the +vow. Accordingly if in vowing he intend to bind himself not only to +enter religion, but also to remain there evermore, he is bound to +remain in perpetuity. If, on the other hand, he intend to bind +himself to enter religion for the purpose of trial, while retaining +the freedom to remain or not remain, it is clear that he is not bound +to remain. If, however, in vowing he thought merely of entering +religion, without thinking of being free to leave, or of remaining in +perpetuity, it would seem that he is bound to enter religion +according to the form prescribed by common law, which is that those +who enter should be given a year's probation. Wherefore he is not +bound to remain for ever. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is better to enter religion with the purpose of +making a trial than not to enter at all, because by so doing one +disposes oneself to remain always. Nor is a person accounted to turn +or to look back, save when he omits to do that which he engaged to +do: else whoever does a good work for a time, would be unfit for the +kingdom of God, unless he did it always, which is evidently false. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man who has entered religion gives neither scandal +nor bad example by leaving, especially if he do so for a reasonable +motive; and if others are scandalized, it will be passive scandal on +their part, and not active scandal on the part of the person leaving, +since in doing so, he has done what was lawful, and expedient on +account of some reasonable motive, such as sickness, weakness, and +the like. + +Reply Obj. 3: He who enters with the purpose of leaving forthwith, +does not seem to fulfil his vow, since this was not his intention in +vowing. Hence he must change that purpose, at least so as to wish to +try whether it is good for him to remain in religion, but he is not +bound to remain for evermore. +_______________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 5] + +Whether Children Should Be Received in Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that children ought not to be received in +religion. Because it is said (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad +Relig., cap. Nullus): "No one should be tonsured unless he be of +legal age and willing." But children, seemingly, are not of legal +age; nor have they a will of their own, not having perfect use of +reason. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in +religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, the state of religion would seem to be a state of +repentance; wherefore religion is derived [*Cf. Q. 81, A. 1] from +_religare_ (to bind) or from _re-eligere_ (to choose again), as +Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 3 [*Cf. De Vera Relig. lv]). But +repentance does not become children. Therefore it seems that they +should not enter religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is like that of an oath. But +children under the age of fourteen ought not to be bound by oath +(Decret. XXII, qu. v, cap. Pueri and cap. Honestum.). Therefore it +would seem that neither should they be bound by vow. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is seemingly unlawful to bind a person to an +obligation that can be justly canceled. Now if any persons of unripe +age bind themselves to religion, they can be withdrawn by their +parents or guardians. For it is written in the Decretals (XX, qu. ii, +can. Puella) that "if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the +sacred veil of her own accord, her parents or guardians, if they +choose, can at once declare the deed null and void." It is therefore +unlawful for children, especially of unripe age, to be admitted or +bound to religion. + +_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Matt. 19:14): "Suffer the little +children, and forbid them not to come to Me." Expounding these words +Origen says (Tract. vii in Matth.) that "the disciples of Jesus +before they have been taught the conditions of righteousness [*Cf. +Matt. 19:16-30], rebuke those who offer children and babes to Christ: +but our Lord urges His disciples to stoop to the service of children. +We must therefore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel +in wisdom we despise the Church's little ones, as though we were +great, and forbid the children to come to Jesus." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 1), the religious vow is +twofold. One is the simple vow consisting in a mere promise made to +God, and proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind. Such +a vow derives its efficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may +encounter a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as +in the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding [*Extra, De +Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Sicut tenor]. The same applies +to children who have not reached the required use of reason, so as to +be capable of guile, which use boys attain, as a rule, at about the +age of fourteen, and girls at the age of twelve, this being what is +called "the age of puberty," although in some it comes earlier and in +others it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of +nature. Secondly, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters an +obstacle, if the person who makes a vow to God is not his own master; +for instance, if a slave, though having the use of reason, vows to +enter religion, or even is ordained, without the knowledge of his +master: for his master can annul this, as stated in the Decretals +(Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). And since boys and girls under the age +of puberty are naturally in their father's power as regards the +disposal of their manner of life, their father may either cancel or +approve their vow, if it please him to do so, as it is expressly said +with regard to a woman (Num. 30:4). + +Accordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a child makes a +simple vow, not yet having full use of reason, he is not bound in +virtue of the vow; but if he has the use of reason before reaching +the age of puberty, he is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his +vow; yet this obligation may be removed by his father's authority, +under whose control he still remains, because the ordinance of the +law whereby one man is subject to another considers what happens in +the majority of cases. If, however, the child has passed the age of +puberty, his vow cannot be annulled by the authority of his parents; +though if he has not the full use of reason, he would not be bound in +the sight of God. + +The other is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a religious. +Such a vow is subject to the ordinance of the Church, on account of +the solemnity attached to it. And since the Church considers what +happens in the majority of cases, a profession made before the age of +puberty, however much the person who makes profession may have the +use of reason, or be capable of guile, does not take effect so as to +make him a religious (Extra, De Regular., etc. cap. Significatum +est.). + +Nevertheless, although they cannot be professed before the age of +puberty, they can, with the consent of their parents, be received +into religion to be educated there: thus it is related of John the +Baptist (Luke 1:80) that "the child grew and was strengthened in +spirit, and was in the deserts." Hence, as Gregory states (Dial. ii, +3), "the Roman nobles began to give their sons to the blessed +Benedict to be nurtured for Almighty God"; and this is most fitting, +according to Lam. 3:27, "It is good for a man when he has borne the +yoke from his youth." It is for this reason that by common custom +children are made to apply themselves to those duties or arts with +which they are to pass their lives. + +Reply Obj. 1: The legal age for receiving the tonsure and taking the +solemn vow of religion is the age of puberty, when a man is able to +make use of his own will; but before the age of puberty it is +possible to have reached the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be +educated in a religious house. + +Reply Obj. 2: The religious state is chiefly directed to the +atta[in]ment of perfection, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1, ad 4); and +accordingly it is becoming to children, who are easily drawn to it. +But as a consequence it is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as +occasions of sin are removed by religious observances, as stated +above (Q. 186, A. 1, ad 4). + +Reply Obj. 3: Even as children are not bound to take oaths (as the +canon states), so are they not bound to take vows. If, however, they +bind themselves by vow or oath to do something, they are bound in +God's sight, if they have the use of reason, but they are not bound +in the sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen. + +Reply Obj. 4: A woman who has not reached the age of puberty is not +rebuked (Num. 30:4) for taking a vow without her parents' consent: +but the vow can be made void by her parents. Hence it is evident that +she does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand that she +binds herself by vow, so far as she may, without prejudice to her +parents' authority. +_______________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 6] + +Whether One Ought to Be Withdrawn from Entering Religion Through +Deference to One's Parents? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one ought to be withdrawn from +entering religion through deference to one's parents. For it is not +lawful to omit that which is of obligation in order to do that which +is optional. Now deference to one's parents comes under an obligation +of the precept concerning the honoring of our parents (Ex. 20:12); +wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:4): "If any widow have children +or grandchildren, let her learn first to govern her own house, and to +make a return of duty to her parents." But the entrance to religion +is optional. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to omit +deference to one's parents for the sake of entering religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the subjection of a son to his father is +greater than that of a slave to his master, since sonship is natural, +while slavery results from the curse of sin, as appears from Gen. +9:25. Now a slave cannot set aside the service of his master in order +to enter religion or take holy orders, as stated in the Decretals +(Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). Much less therefore can a son set aside +the deference due to his father in order to enter religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, a man is more indebted to his parents than to those +to whom he owes money. Now persons who owe money to anyone cannot +enter religion. For Gregory says (Regist. viii, Ep. 5) that "those +who are engaged in trade must by no means be admitted into a +monastery, when they seek admittance, unless first of all they +withdraw from public business" (Dist. liii, can. Legem.). Therefore +seemingly much less may children enter religion in despite of their +duty to their parents. + +_On the contrary,_ It is related (Matt. 4:22) that James and John +"left their nets and father, and followed our Lord." By this, says +Hilary (Can. iii in Matth.), "we learn that we who intend to follow +Christ are not bound by the cares of the secular life, and by the +ties of home." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 101, A. 2, ad 2) when we were +treating of piety, parents as such have the character of a principle, +wherefore it is competent to them as such to have the care of their +children. Hence it is unlawful for a person having children to enter +religion so as altogether to set aside the care for their children, +namely without providing for their education. For it is written (1 +Tim. 5:8) that "if any man have not care of his own . . . he hath +denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." + +Nevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to be assisted +by their children, in so far, to wit, as they are placed in a +condition of necessity. Consequently we must say that when their +parents are in such need that they cannot fittingly be supported +otherwise than by the help of their children, these latter may not +lawfully enter religion in despite of their duty to their parents. +If, however, the parents' necessity be not such as to stand in great +need of their children's assistance, the latter may, in despite of +the duty they owe their parents, enter religion even against their +parents' command, because after the age of puberty every freeman +enjoys freedom in things concerning the ordering of his state of +life, especially in such as belong to the service of God, and "we +should more obey the Father of spirits that we may live [*'Shall we +not much more obey the Father of Spirits, and live?']," as says the +Apostle (Heb. 12:9), than obey our parents. Hence as we read (Matt. +8:22; Luke 9:62) our Lord rebuked the disciple who was unwilling to +follow him forthwith on account of his father's burial: for there +were others who could see to this, as Chrysostom remarks [*Hom. xxvii +in Matth.]. + +Reply Obj. 1: The commandment of honoring our parents extends not +only to bodily but also to spiritual service, and to the paying of +deference. Hence even those who are in religion can fulfil the +commandment of honoring their parents, by praying for them and by +revering and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even those +who live in the world honor their parents in different ways as befits +their condition. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since slavery was imposed in punishment of sin, it +follows that by slavery man forfeits something which otherwise he +would be competent to have, namely the free disposal of his person, +for "a slave belongs wholly to his master" [*Aristotle, Polit. i, 2]. +On the other hand, the son, through being subject to his father, is +not hindered from freely disposing of his person by transferring +himself to the service of God; which is most conducive to man's good. + +Reply Obj. 3: He who is under a certain fixed obligation cannot +lawfully set it aside so long as he is able to fulfil it. Wherefore +if a person is under an obligation to give an account to someone or +to pay a certain fixed debt, he cannot lawfully evade this obligation +in order to enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of money, and +has not wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he can, namely +by surrendering his goods to his creditor. According to civil law +[*Cod. IV, x, de Oblig. et Action, 12] money lays an obligation not +on the person of a freeman, but on his property, because the person +of a freeman "is above all pecuniary consideration" [*Dig. L, xvii, +de div. reg. Jur. ant. 106, 176]. Hence, after surrendering his +property, he may lawfully enter religion, nor is he bound to remain +in the world in order to earn the means of paying the debt. + +On the other hand, he does not owe his father a special debt, except +as may arise in a case of necessity, as stated above. +_______________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 7] + +Whether Parish Priests May Lawfully Enter Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that parish priests cannot lawfully enter +religion. For Gregory says (Past. iii, 4) that "he who undertakes the +cure of souls, receives an awful warning in the words: 'My son, if +thou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a +stranger'" (Prov. 6:1); and he goes on to say, "because to be surety +for a friend is to take charge of the soul of another on the surety +of one's own behavior." Now he who is under an obligation to a man +for a debt, cannot enter religion, unless he pay what he owes, if he +can. Since then a priest is able to fulfil the cure of souls, to +which obligation he has pledged his soul, it would seem unlawful for +him to lay aside the cure of souls in order to enter religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, what is lawful to one is likewise lawful to all. But +if all priests having cure of souls were to enter religion, the +people would be left without a pastor's care, which would be +unfitting. Therefore it seems that parish priests cannot lawfully +enter religion. + +Obj. 3: Further, chief among the acts to which religious orders are +directed are those whereby a man gives to others the fruit of his +contemplation. Now such acts are competent to parish priests and +archdeacons, whom it becomes by virtue of their office to preach and +hear confessions. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a parish +priest or archdeacon to pass over to religion. + +_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu. ii, cap. +Duce sunt leges.): "If a man, while governing the people in his +church under the bishop and leading a secular life, is inspired by +the Holy Ghost to desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or +under some canonical rule, even though his bishop withstand him, we +authorize him to go freely." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 3; Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1), +the obligation of a perpetual vow stands before every other +obligation. Now it belongs properly to bishops and religious to be +bound by perpetual vow to devote themselves to the divine service +[*Cf. Q. 184, A. 5], while parish priests and archdeacons are not, as +bishops are, bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to retain the cure +of souls. Wherefore bishops "cannot lay aside their bishopric for any +pretext whatever, without the authority of the Roman Pontiff" (Extra, +De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet.): whereas +archdeacons and parish priests are free to renounce in the hands of +the bishop the cure entrusted to them, without the Pope's special +permission, who alone can dispense from perpetual vows. Therefore it +is evident that archdeacons and parish priests may lawfully enter +religion. + +Reply Obj. 1: Parish priests and archdeacons have bound themselves to +the care of their subjects, as long as they retain their archdeaconry +or parish, but they did not bind themselves to retain their +archdeaconry or parish for ever. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Jerome says (Contra Vigil.): "Although they," namely +religious, "are sorely smitten by thy poisonous tongue, about whom +you argue, saying; 'If all shut themselves up and live in solitude, +who will go to church? who will convert worldlings? who will be able +to urge sinners to virtue?' If this holds true, if all are fools with +thee, who can be wise? Nor will virginity be commendable, for if all +be virgins, and none marry, the human race will perish. Virtue is +rare, and is not desired by many." It is therefore evident that this +is a foolish alarm; thus might a man fear to draw water lest the +river run dry. [*St. Thomas gives no reply to the third objection, +which is sufficiently solved in the body of the article.] +_______________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 8] + +Whether It Is Lawful to Pass from One Religious Order to Another? + +Objection 1: It seems unlawful to pass from one religious order to +another, even a stricter one. For the Apostle says (Heb. 10:25): "Not +forsaking our assembly, as some are accustomed"; and a gloss +observes: "Those namely who yield through fear of persecution, or who +presuming on themselves withdraw from the company of sinners or of +the imperfect, that they may appear to be righteous." Now those who +pass from one religious order to another more perfect one would seem +to do this. Therefore this is seemingly unlawful. + +Obj. 2: Further, the profession of monks is stricter than that of +canons regular (Extra, De Statu Monach. et Canonic. Reg., cap. Quod +Dei timorem). But it is unlawful for anyone to pass from the state of +canon regular to the monastic state. For it is said in the Decretals +(XIX, qu. iii, can. Mandamus): "We ordain and without any exception +forbid any professed canon regular to become a monk, unless (which +God forbid) he have fallen into public sin." Therefore it would seem +unlawful for anyone to pass from one religious order to another of +higher rank. + +Obj. 3: Further, a person is bound to fulfil what he has vowed, as +long as he is able lawfully to do so; thus if a man has vowed to +observe continence, he is bound, even after contracting marriage by +words in the present tense, to fulfil his vow so long as the marriage +is not consummated, because he can fulfil the vow by entering +religion. Therefore if a person may lawfully pass from one religious +order to another, he will be bound to do so if he vowed it previously +while in the world. But this would seem objectionable, since in many +cases it might give rise to scandal. Therefore a religious may not +pass from one religious order to another stricter one. + +_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (XX, qu. iv, can. +Virgines): "If sacred virgins design for the good of their soul to +pass to another monastery on account of a stricter life, and decide +to remain there, the holy synod allows them to do so": and the same +would seem to apply to any religious. Therefore one may lawfully pass +from one religious order to another. + +_I answer that,_ It is not commendable to pass from one religious +order to another: both because this frequently gives scandal to those +who remain; and because, other things being equal, it is easier to +make progress in a religious order to which one is accustomed than in +one to which one is not habituated. Hence in the Conferences of the +Fathers (Coll. xiv, 5) Abbot Nesteros says: "It is best for each one +that he should, according to the resolve he has made, hasten with the +greatest zeal and care to reach the perfection of the work he has +undertaken, and nowise forsake the profession he has chosen." And +further on he adds (cap. 6) by way of reason: "For it is impossible +that one and the same man should excel in all the virtues at once, +since if he endeavor to practice them equally, he will of necessity, +while trying to attain them all, end in acquiring none of them +perfectly": because the various religious orders excel in respect of +various works of virtue. + +Nevertheless one may commendably pass from one religious order to +another for three reasons. First, through zeal for a more perfect +religious life, which excellence depends, as stated above (Q. 188, A. +6), not merely on severity, but chiefly on the end to which a +religious order is directed, and secondarily on the discretion +whereby the observances are proportionate to the due end. Secondly, +on account of a religious order falling away from the perfection it +ought to have: for instance, if in a more severe religious order, the +religious begin to live less strictly, it is commendable for one to +pass even to a less severe religious order if the observance is +better. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xix, 3, 5, 6) +Abbot John says of himself that he had passed from the solitary life, +in which he was professed, to a less severe life, namely of those who +lived in community, because the hermetical life had fallen into +decline and laxity. Thirdly, on account of sickness or weakness, the +result of which sometimes is that one is unable to keep the +ordinances of a more severe religious order, though able to observe +those of a less strict religion. + +There is, however, a difference in these three cases. For in the +first case one ought, on account of humility, to seek permission: yet +this cannot be denied, provided it be certain that this other +religion is more severe. "And if there be a probable doubt about +this, one should ask one's superior to decide" (Extra, De Regular. et +Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet.). In like manner the superior's +decision should be sought in the second case. In the third case it is +also necessary to have a dispensation. + +Reply Obj. 1: Those who pass to a stricter religious order, do so not +out of presumption that they may appear righteous, but out of +devotion, that they may become more righteous. + +Reply Obj. 2: Religious orders whether of monks or of canons regular +are destined to the works of the contemplative life. Chief among +these are those which are performed in the divine mysteries, and +these are the direct object of the orders of canons regular, the +members of which are essentially religious clerics. On the other +hand, monastic religious are not essentially clerics, according to +the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, cap. Alia causa). Hence although monastic +orders are more severe, it would be lawful, supposing the members to +be lay monks, to pass from the monastic order to an order of canons +regular, according to the statement of Jerome (Ep. cxxv, ad Rustic. +Monach.): "So live in the monastery as to deserve to become a +cleric"; but not conversely, as expressed in the Decretal quoted +(XIX, qu. iii). If, however, the monks be clerics devoting themselves +to the sacred ministry, they have this in common with canons regular +coupled with greater severity, and consequently it will be lawful to +pass from an order of canons regular to a monastic order, provided +withal that one seek the superior's permission (XIX, qu. iii; cap. +Statuimus). + +Reply Obj. 3: The solemn vow whereby a person is bound to a less +strict order, is more binding than the simple vow whereby a person is +bound to a stricter order. For if after taking a simple vow a person +were to be married, his marriage would not be invalid, as it would be +after his taking a solemn vow. Consequently a person who is professed +in a less severe order is not bound to fulfil a simple vow he has +taken on entering a more severe order. +_______________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 9] + +Whether One Ought to Induce Others to Enter Religion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no one ought to induce others to +enter religion. For the blessed Benedict prescribes in his Rule +(lviii) that "those who seek to enter religion must not easily be +admitted, but spirits must be tested whether they be of God"; and +Cassian has the same instruction (De Inst. Caenob. iv, 3). Much less +therefore is it lawful to induce anyone to enter religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, our Lord said (Matt. 23:15): "Woe to you . . . +because you go round about the sea and the land to make one +proselyte, and when he is made you make him the child of hell twofold +more than yourselves." Now thus would seem to do those who induce +persons to enter religion. Therefore this would seem blameworthy. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one should induce another to do what is to his +prejudice. But those who are induced to enter religion, sometimes +take harm therefrom, for sometimes they are under obligation to enter +a stricter religion. Therefore it would not seem praiseworthy to +induce others to enter religion. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 26:3, seqq. [*St. Thomas quotes +the sense, not the words]): "Let one curtain draw the other." +Therefore one man should draw another to God's service. + +_I answer that,_ Those who induce others to enter religion not only +do not sin, but merit a great reward. For it is written (James 5:20): +"He who causeth a sinner to be converted from the error of his way, +shall save his soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins"; +and (Dan. 12:3): "They that instruct many to justice shall be as +stars for all eternity." + +Nevertheless such inducement may be affected by a threefold +inordinateness. First, if one person force another by violence to +enter religion: and this is forbidden in the Decretals (XX, qu. iii, +cap. Praesens). Secondly, if one person persuade another simoniacally +to enter religion, by giving him presents: and this is forbidden in +the Decretal (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). But this does not apply to +the case where one provides a poor person with necessaries by +educating him in the world for the religious life; or when without +any compact one gives a person little presents for the sake of good +fellowship. Thirdly, if one person entices another by lies: for it is +to be feared that the person thus enticed may turn back on finding +himself deceived, and thus "the last state of that man" may become +"worse than the first" (Luke 11:26). + +Reply Obj. 1: Those who are induced to enter religion have still a +time of probation wherein they make a trial of the hardships of +religion, so that they are not easily admitted to the religious life. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to Hilary (Can. xxiv in Matth.) this saying +of our Lord was a forecast of the wicked endeavors of the Jews, after +the preaching of Christ, to draw Gentiles or even Christians to +observe the Jewish ritual, thereby making them doubly children of +hell, because, to wit, they were not forgiven the former sins which +they committed while adherents of Judaism, and furthermore they +incurred the guilt of Jewish perfidy; and thus interpreted these +words have nothing to do with the case in point. + +According to Jerome, however, in his commentary on this passage of +Matthew, the reference is to the Jews even at the time when it was +yet lawful to keep the legal observances, in so far as he whom they +converted to Judaism "from paganism, was merely misled; but when he +saw the wickedness of his teachers, he returned to his vomit, and +becoming a pagan deserved greater punishment for his treachery." +Hence it is manifest that it is not blameworthy to draw others to the +service of God or to the religious life, but only when one gives a +bad example to the person converted, whence he becomes worse. + +Reply Obj. 3: The lesser is included in the greater. Wherefore a +person who is bound by vow or oath to enter a lesser order, may be +lawfully induced to enter a greater one, unless there be some special +obstacle, such as ill-health, or the hope of making greater progress +in the lesser order. On the other hand, one who is bound by vow or +oath to enter a greater order, cannot be lawfully induced to enter a +lesser order, except for some special and evident motive, and then +with the superior's dispensation. +_______________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 10] + +Whether It Is Praiseworthy to Enter Religion Without Taking Counsel +of Many, and Previously Deliberating for a Long Time? + +Objection 1: It would not seem praiseworthy to enter religion without +taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time. +For it is written (1 John 4:1): "Believe not every spirit, but try +the spirits if they be of God." Now sometimes a man's purpose of +entering religion is not of God, since it often comes to naught +through his leaving the religious life; for it is written (Acts 5:38, +39): "If this counsel or this work be of God, you cannot overthrow +it." Therefore it would seem that one ought to make a searching +inquiry before entering religion. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 25:9): "Treat thy cause with +thy friend." Now a man's cause would seem to be especially one that +concerns a change in his state of life. Therefore seemingly one ought +not to enter religion without discussing the matter with one's +friends. + +Obj. 3: Further, our Lord (Luke 14:28) in making a comparison with a +man who has a mind to build a tower, says that he doth "first sit +down and reckon the charges that are necessary, whether he have +wherewithal to finish it," lest he become an object of mockery, for +that "this man began to build and was not able to finish." Now the +wherewithal to build the tower, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Laetum +ccxliii), is nothing less than that "each one should renounce all his +possessions." Yet it happens sometimes that many cannot do this, nor +keep other religious observances; and in signification of this it is +stated (1 Kings 17:39) that David could not walk in Saul's armor, for +he was not used to it. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to +enter religion without long deliberation beforehand and taking +counsel of many. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated (Matt. 4:20) that upon our Lord's +calling them, Peter and Andrew "immediately leaving their nets, +followed Him." Here Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.): "Such +obedience as this does Christ require of us, that we delay not even +for a moment." + +_I answer that,_ Long deliberation and the advice of many are +required in great matters of doubt, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. +iii, 3); while advice is unnecessary in matters that are certain and +fixed. Now with regard to entering religion three points may be +considered. First, the entrance itself into religion, considered by +itself; and thus it is certain that entrance into religion is a +greater good, and to doubt about this is to disparage Christ Who gave +this counsel. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. c, 2): "The +East," that is Christ, "calleth thee, and thou turnest to the West," +namely mortal and fallible man. Secondly, the entrance into religion +may be considered in relation to the strength of the person who +intends to enter. And here again there is no room for doubt about the +entrance to religion, since those who enter religion trust not to be +able to stay by their own power, but by the assistance of the divine +power, according to Isa. 40:31, "They that hope in the Lord shall +renew their strength, they shall take wings as eagles, they shall run +and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint." Yet if there be +some special obstacle (such as bodily weakness, a burden of debts, or +the like) in such cases a man must deliberate and take counsel with +such as are likely to help and not hinder him. Hence it is written +(Ecclus. 37:12): "Treat with a man without religion concerning +holiness [*The Douay version supplies the negative: 'Treat not . . . +nor with . . .'], with an unjust man concerning justice," meaning +that one should not do so, wherefore the text goes on (Ecclus. 37:14, +15), "Give no heed to these in any matter of counsel, but be +continually with a holy man." In these matters, however, one should +not take long deliberation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. and Paulin. +liii): "Hasten, I pray thee, cut off rather than loosen the rope that +holds the boat to the shore." Thirdly, we may consider the way of +entering religion, and which order one ought to enter, and about such +matters also one may take counsel of those who will not stand in +one's way. + +Reply Obj. 1: The saying: "Try the spirits, if they be of God," +applies to matters admitting of doubt whether the spirits be of God; +thus those who are already in religion may doubt whether he who +offers himself to religion be led by the spirit of God, or be moved +by hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether he be +moved by the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to enter religion +there can be no doubt but that the purpose of entering religion to +which his heart has given birth is from the spirit of God, for it is +His spirit "that leads" man "into the land of uprightness" (Ps. +142:10). + +Nor does this prove that it is not of God that some turn back; since +not all that is of God is incorruptible: else corruptible creatures +would not be of God, as the Manicheans hold, nor could some who have +grace from God lose it, which is also heretical. But God's "counsel" +whereby He makes even things corruptible and changeable, is +imperishable according to Isa. 46:10, "My counsel shall stand and all +My will shall be done." Hence the purpose of entering religion needs +not to be tried whether it be of God, because "it requires no further +demonstration," as a gloss says on 1 Thess. 5:21, "Prove all things." + +Reply Obj. 2: Even as "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal. +5:17), so too carnal friends often thwart our spiritual progress, +according to Mic. 7:6, "A man's enemies are they of his own +household." Wherefore Cyril expounding Luke 9:61, "Let me first take +my leave of them that are at my house," says [*Cf. St. Thomas's +Catena Aurea]: "By asking first to take his leave of them that were +at his house, he shows he was somewhat of two minds. For to +communicate with his neighbors, and consult those who are unwilling +to relish righteousness, is an indication of weakness and turning +back. Hence he hears our Lord say: 'No man putting his hand to the +plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God,' because he +looks back who seeks delay in order to go home and confer with his +kinsfolk." + +Reply Obj. 3: The building of the tower signifies the perfection of +Christian life; and the renunciation of one's possessions is the +wherewithal to build this tower. Now no one doubts or deliberates +about wishing to have the wherewithal, or whether he is able to build +the tower if he have the wherewithal, but what does come under +deliberation is whether one has the wherewithal. Again it need not be +a matter of deliberation whether one ought to renounce all that one +has, or whether by so doing one may be able to attain to perfection; +whereas it is a matter of deliberation whether that which one is +doing amounts to the renunciation of all that he has, since unless he +does renounce (which is to have the wherewithal) he cannot, as the +text goes on to state, be Christ's disciple, and this is to build the +tower. + +The misgiving of those who hesitate as to whether they may be able to +attain to perfection by entering religion is shown by many examples +to be unreasonable. Hence Augustine says (Confess. viii, 11): "On +that side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go, +there appeared to me the chaste dignity of continency . . . honestly +alluring me to come and doubt not, and stretching forth to receive +and embrace me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples. +There were so many young men and maidens here, a multitude of youth +and every age, grave widows and aged virgins . . . And she smiled at +me with a persuasive mockery as though to say: Canst not thou what +these youths and these maidens can? Or can they either in themselves, +and not rather in the Lord their God? . . . Why standest thou in +thyself, and so standest not? Cast thyself upon Him; fear not, He +will not withdraw Himself that thou shouldst fall. Cast thyself +fearlessly upon Him: He will receive and will heal thee." + +The example quoted of David is not to the point, because "the arms of +Saul," as a gloss on the passage observes, "are the sacraments of the +Law, as being burdensome": whereas religion is the sweet yoke of +Christ, for as Gregory says (Moral. iv, 33), "what burden does He lay +on the shoulders of the mind, Who commands us to shun all troublesome +desires, Who warns us to turn aside from the rough paths of this +world?" + +To those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon themselves He promises +the refreshment of the divine fruition and the eternal rest of their +souls. + +To which may He Who made this promise bring us, Jesus Christ our +Lord, "Who is over all things God blessed for ever. Amen." + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda +Secundae), by Thomas Aquinas + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SUMMA THEOLOGICA, PART II-II *** + +***** This file should be named 18755.txt or 18755.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/8/7/5/18755/ + +Produced by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and +supplementation by David McClamrock + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |