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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda
+Secundae), by Thomas Aquinas
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae)
+
+Author: Thomas Aquinas
+
+Translator: Fathers of the English Dominican Province
+
+Release Date: July 4, 2006 [EBook #18755]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SUMMA THEOLOGICA, PART II-II ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and
+supplementation by David McClamrock
+
+
+
+
+
+
+SUMMA THEOLOGICA
+
+PART II-II ("Secunda Secundae")
+
+Translated by
+Fathers of the English Dominican Province
+
+BENZIGER BROTHERS
+NEW YORK
+________________________
+
+DEDICATION
+
+To the Blessed Virgin
+Mary Immaculate
+Seat of Wisdom
+________________________
+
+NOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION
+
+The text of this electronic edition was originally produced by Sandra
+K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian
+Classics Ethereal Library <http://www.ccel.org>. I have eliminated
+unnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in
+transcription, and added the dedication, tables of contents,
+Prologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they
+appeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers.
+Each article is now designated by part, question number, and article
+number in brackets, like this:
+
+> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]
+
+> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?
+
+In a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger
+Brothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text
+of the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in
+brackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first
+sentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: "Not only is it
+impossible that anything should be created by God...." By reference
+to the Latin, "non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari"
+(emphasis added), this has been corrected to "Not only is it [not]
+impossible that anything should be created by God...."
+
+This electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers
+edition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the
+original page numbers and headers):
+
+* The repetitive expression "We proceed thus to the [next] Article"
+does not appear directly below the title of each article.
+
+* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end,
+_like this._ Quotations and other "quotable" matter, however, are
+ordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this
+edition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they
+were set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers
+edition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear
+in the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in
+parentheses.
+
+* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated
+by colons, like this: "Dan. 7:10"--not like this: "Dan. vii. 10."
+Small roman numerals have been retained where they appear in
+citations to books other than the Bible.
+
+* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers
+edition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the
+footnote mark appeared.
+
+* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration.
+
+* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines.
+
+* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and
+at certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line
+for each topic.
+
+* Titles of questions are in all caps.
+
+Anything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to
+the content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a
+defect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock).
+
+________________________
+
+CONTENTS
+
+SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (QQ. 1-189)
+
+Question
+
+1.   Of Faith
+2.   Of the Act of Faith
+3.   Of the Outward Act of Faith
+4.   Of the Virtue Itself of Faith
+5.   Of Those Who Have Faith
+6.   Of the Cause of Faith
+7.   Of the Effects of Faith
+8.   Of the Gift of Understanding
+9.   Of the Gift of Knowledge
+10.  Of Unbelief in General
+11.  Of Heresy
+12.  Of Apostasy
+13.  Of the Sin of Blasphemy, in General
+14.  Of Blasphemy Against the Holy Ghost
+15.  Of the Vices Opposed to Knowledge and Understanding
+16.  Of the Precepts of Faith, Knowledge, and Understanding
+17.  Of Hope, Considered in Itself
+18.  Of the Subject of Hope
+19.  Of the Gift of Fear
+20.  Of Despair
+21.  Of Presumption
+22.  Of the Precepts Relating to Hope and Fear
+23.  Of Charity, Considered in Itself
+24.  Of the Subject of Charity
+25.  Of the Object of Charity
+26.  Of the Order of Charity
+27.  Of the Principal Act of Charity, Which Is to Love
+28.  Of Joy
+29.  Of Peace
+30.  Of Mercy
+31.  Of Beneficence
+32.  Of Almsdeeds
+33.  Of Fraternal Correction
+34.  Of Hatred
+35.  Of Sloth
+36.  Of Envy
+37.  Of Discord, Which Is Contrary to Peace
+38.  Of Contention
+39.  Of Schism
+40.  Of War
+41.  Of Strife
+42.  Of Sedition
+43.  Of Scandal
+44.  Of the Precepts of Charity
+45.  Of the Gift of Wisdom
+46.  Of Folly Which Is Opposed to Wisdom
+
+TREATISE ON PRUDENCE AND JUSTICE
+
+47.  Of Prudence Considered in Itself
+48.  Of the Parts of Prudence
+49.  Of Each Quasi-integral Part of Prudence
+50.  Of the Subjective Parts of Prudence
+51.  Of the Virtues Which Are Connected with Prudence
+52.  Of the Gift of Counsel
+53.  Of Imprudence
+54.  Of Negligence
+55.  Of Vices Opposed to Prudence by Way of Resemblance
+56.  Of the Precepts Relating to Prudence
+57.  Of Right
+58.  Of Justice
+59.  Of Injustice
+60.  Of Judgment
+61.  Of the Parts of Justice
+62.  Of Restitution
+63.  Of Respect of Persons
+64.  Of Murder
+65.  Of Injuries Committed on the Person
+66.  Of Theft and Robbery
+67.  Of the Injustice of a Judge, in Judging
+68.  Of Matters Concerning Unjust Accusation
+69.  Of Sins Committed Against Justice on the Part of the Defendant
+70.  Of Injustice with Regard to the Person of the Witness
+71.  Of Injustice in Judgment on the Part of Counsel
+72.  Of Reviling
+73.  Of Backbiting
+74.  Of Tale-Bearing
+75.  Of Derision
+76.  Of Cursing
+77.  Of Cheating, Which Is Committed in Buying and Selling
+78.  Of the Sin of Usury
+79.  Of the Quasi-integral Parts of Justice
+80.  Of the Potential Parts of Justice
+81.  Of Religion
+82.  Of Devotion
+83.  Of Prayer
+84.  Of Adoration
+85.  Of Sacrifice
+86.  Of Oblations and First-fruits
+87.  Of Tithes
+88.  Of Vows
+89.  Of Oaths
+90.  Of the Taking of God's Name by Way of Adjuration
+91.  Of Taking the Divine Name for the Purpose of Invoking It by
+       Means of Praise
+92.  Of Superstition
+93.  Of Superstition Consisting in Undue Worship of the True God
+94.  Of Idolatry
+95.  Of Superstition in Divinations
+96.  Of Superstition in Observances
+97.  Of the Temptation of God
+98.  Of Perjury
+99.  Of Sacrilege
+100. On Simony
+101. Of Piety
+102. Of Observance, Considered in Itself, and of Its Parts
+103. Of Dulia
+104. Of Obedience
+105. Of Disobedience
+106. Of Thankfulness or Gratitude
+107. Of Ingratitude
+108. Of Vengeance
+109. Of Truth
+110. Of the Vices Opposed to Truth, and First of Lying
+111. Of Dissimulation and Hypocrisy
+112. Of Boasting
+113. Of Irony
+114. Of the Friendliness Which Is Called Affability
+115. Of Flattery
+116. Of Quarreling
+117. Of Liberality
+118. Of the Vices Opposed to Liberality, and in the First Place,
+     of Covetousness
+119. Of Prodigality
+120. Of "Epikeia" or Equity
+121. Of Piety
+122. Of the Precepts of Justice
+
+TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE
+
+123. Of Fortitude
+124. Of Martyrdom
+125. Of Fear
+126. Of Fearlessness
+127. Of Daring
+128. Of the Parts of Fortitude
+129. Of Magnanimity
+130. Of Presumption
+131. Of Ambition
+132. Of Vainglory
+133. Of Pusillanimity
+134. Of Magnificence
+135. Of Meanness
+136. Of Patience
+137. Of Perseverance
+138. Of the Vices Opposed to Perseverance
+139. Of the Gift of Fortitude
+140. Of the Precepts of Fortitude
+141. Of Temperance
+142. Of the Vices Opposed to Temperance
+143. Of the Parts of Temperance, in General
+144. Of Shamefacedness
+145. Of Honesty
+146. Of Abstinence
+147. Of Fasting
+148. Of Gluttony
+149. Of Sobriety
+150. Of Drunkenness
+151. Of Chastity
+152. Of Virginity
+153. Of Lust
+154. Of the Parts of Lust
+155. Of Continence
+156. Of Incontinence
+157. Of Clemency and Meekness
+158. Of Anger
+159. Of Cruelty
+160. Of Modesty
+161. Of Humility
+162. Of Pride
+163. Of the First Man's Sin
+164. Of the Punishments of the First Man's Sin
+165. Of Our First Parents' Temptation
+166. Of Studiousness
+167. Of Curiosity
+168. Of Modesty as Consisting in the Outward Movements of the Body
+169. Of Modesty in the Outward Apparel
+170. Of the Precepts of Temperance
+
+TREATISE ON ACTS WHICH PERTAIN ESPECIALLY TO CERTAIN MEN
+
+171. Of Prophecy
+172. Of the Cause of Prophecy
+173. Of the Manner in Which Prophetic Knowledge Is Conveyed
+174. Of the Division of Prophecy
+175. Of Rapture
+176. Of the Grace of Tongues
+177. Of the Gratuitous Grace Consisting in Words
+178. Of the Grace of Miracles
+179. Of the Division of Life into Active and Contemplative
+180. Of the Contemplative Life
+181. Of the Active Life
+182. Of the Active Life in Comparison with the Contemplative Life
+183. Of Man's Various Duties and States in General
+184. Of the State of Perfection in General
+185. Of Things Pertaining to the Episcopal State
+186. Of Those Things in Which the Religious State Properly Consists
+187. Of Those Things That Are Competent to Religious
+188. Of the Different Kinds of Religious Life
+189. Of the Entrance into Religious Life
+_______________________
+
+SUMMA THEOLOGICA
+
+SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART
+["II-II," "Secunda Secundae"]
+_______________________
+
+TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ. 1-46)
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 1
+
+OF FAITH (In Ten Articles)
+
+Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with
+Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.
+
+The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of
+the corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the
+opposite vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.
+
+About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act;
+(3) the habit of faith.
+
+Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
+
+(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex,
+i.e. whether it is a thing or a proposition?
+
+(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?
+
+(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?
+
+(5) Whether it can be anything known?
+
+(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a
+certain number of articles?
+
+(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?
+
+(8) Of the number of articles;
+
+(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;
+
+(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Object of Faith Is the First Truth?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First
+Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is
+proposed to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the
+Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but
+also things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of
+the Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of
+faith is not only the First Truth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they
+are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things
+contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is
+considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things
+contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning
+man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only
+the First Truth, but also created truth.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the
+sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith
+is not only the First Truth.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is
+about the simple and everlasting truth." Now this is the First Truth.
+Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.
+
+_I answer that,_ The object of every cognitive habit includes two
+things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material
+object, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is
+the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the
+conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of
+the science is the mean of demonstration, through which the
+conclusions are known.
+
+Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the
+object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of
+which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it
+is revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the
+Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which
+faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things,
+which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as
+bearing some relation to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain
+effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards
+the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the
+object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing
+comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of
+the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation
+to health.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the
+sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under
+faith, in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much
+as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
+
+The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all
+things contained in Holy Writ.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so
+that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further
+on (Q. 25, A. 1).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Object of Faith Is Something Complex, by Way of a
+Proposition?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something
+complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First
+Truth, as stated above (A. 1). Now the First Truth is something
+simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol.
+Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is
+not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God . . .
+almighty." Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a
+thing.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor.
+13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to
+face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known."
+But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is
+the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now
+the mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science
+and opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise
+about propositions; so that its object is something complex.
+
+_I answer that,_ The thing known is in the knower according to the
+mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to
+know the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the First Part
+(Q. 85, A. 5). Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known
+by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the
+other hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity,
+things that are complex in themselves.
+
+Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First,
+as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of
+faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we
+have faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this
+respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a
+proposition.
+
+Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount
+of truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the object of faith on the part
+of the thing believed.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in
+so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is
+evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the
+believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as
+in science we do not form propositions, except in order to have
+knowledge about things through their means, so is it in faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the First
+Truth seen in itself, according to 1 John 3:2: "We know that when He
+shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He
+is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way
+of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not
+apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison
+fails.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Anything False Can Come Under Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith.
+For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can
+come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not
+obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as
+being good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false
+can be the object of faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born,
+according to John 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might
+see My day: he saw it, and was glad." But after the time of Abraham,
+God might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed
+that He did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have
+been false. Therefore the object of faith can be something false.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ,
+and many continued so to believe, until they heard the preaching of
+the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He began to
+preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore
+something false can come under faith.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe
+that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the
+altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly
+consecrated, and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but
+only bread. Therefore something false can come under faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ No virtue that perfects the intellect is related
+to the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the
+Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that
+perfects the intellect, as we shall show further on (Q. 4, AA. 2, 5).
+Therefore nothing false can come under it.
+
+_I answer that,_ Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by
+means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
+except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save
+through the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated (A. 1)
+that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so
+that nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under
+the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can
+non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows
+therefore that nothing false can come under faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of
+the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect the
+intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the
+nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other
+hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not
+entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance
+with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what
+one is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas
+hope and charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between
+them fails.
+
+Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man
+hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would
+be an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he
+perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.
+
+In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be;
+so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual
+whom we love for God's sake.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in itself
+was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it stands in
+God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as
+explained in the First Part (Q. 14, AA. 13, 15): and it is thus that
+it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it
+cannot be false.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to believe
+in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time,
+wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human
+conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion
+through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false
+opinion to be the outcome of faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such and
+such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ
+is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly
+consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not
+follow that anything false comes under faith.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Object of Faith Can Be Something Seen?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something
+seen. For Our Lord said to Thomas (John 20:29): "Because thou hast
+seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed." Therefore vision and faith
+regard the same object.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of
+faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark
+manner." Therefore what is believed is seen.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen
+under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine
+states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard,
+according to Rom. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing." Therefore
+faith is of things seen.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
+evidence of things that appear not."
+
+_I answer that,_ Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which
+is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
+through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known
+either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held
+by the habit of understanding), or through something else already
+known (as in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of
+science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through
+being sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but
+through an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side
+rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear
+of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be
+certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith.
+
+Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the
+intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident
+that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the
+senses or by the intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another" [*St.
+Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to
+be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my God."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those things which come under faith can be considered
+in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and
+believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that
+is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are
+seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the
+evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to
+be believed.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For
+just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is
+becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith,
+the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming
+to a right faith, and not to assent to others.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but
+not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not
+follow that these things are seen.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Those Things That Are of Faith Can Be an Object of Science
+[*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through
+its demonstration]?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be
+an object of science. For where science is lacking there is
+ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not
+in ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of
+such things savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it
+ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore things that are of faith can be an
+object of science.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers
+employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore such
+things can be an object of science.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of
+science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces
+science." Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the
+philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth.
+Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since
+faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and
+science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster.
+i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a
+thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of
+perception." Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of
+perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of
+perception. Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an
+object of science.
+
+_I answer that,_ All science is derived from self-evident and
+therefore "seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must
+needs be, in a fashion, seen.
+
+Now as stated above (A. 4), it is impossible that one and the same
+thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is
+equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of
+science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however,
+that a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is
+believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now
+believe about the Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now
+through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face": which
+vision the angels possess already; so that what we believe, they see.
+In like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or
+scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer,
+is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it
+by demonstration.
+
+Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is
+equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things
+which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not
+about the same things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of
+faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do
+they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know
+them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes
+them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A. 4, ad
+2, 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that
+are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive
+arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not
+impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of
+faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares
+(Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well
+proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from
+self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology
+is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work (P. I, Q. 1, A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are
+reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed
+simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to
+matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by
+demonstration must know them first of all by faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and
+opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as
+we have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for
+one and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing
+relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same
+respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the
+same object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like
+manner, one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and,
+by faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man,
+about the same object, and in the same respect, science is
+incompatible with either opinion or faith, yet for different reasons.
+Because science is incompatible with opinion about the same object
+simply, for the reason that science demands that its object should be
+deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to
+opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be otherwise.
+Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of
+faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why
+science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same
+respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas
+the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Those Things That Are of Faith Should Be Divided into Certain
+Articles?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should
+not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in
+Holy Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their
+multitude, cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems
+superfluous to distinguish certain articles of faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely,
+and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal
+aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated above
+(A. 1), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be
+distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice
+should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into
+articles.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of Auxerre,
+Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth concerning God,
+exacting [arctans] our belief." Now belief is a voluntary act, since,
+as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), "no man believes against
+his will." Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be
+divided into articles.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine
+truth, tending thereto." Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth
+by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in
+our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into
+articles.
+
+_I answer that,_ the word "article" is apparently derived from the
+Greek; for the Greek _arthron_ [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea]
+which the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of
+distinct parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit
+together are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the
+Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which are affixed to
+words to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric,
+articles are parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says
+(Rhet. iv) that an article is composed of words each pronounced
+singly and separately, thus: "Your passion, your voice, your look,
+have struck terror into your foes."
+
+Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct
+articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together.
+Now the object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as
+stated above (A. 4). Consequently any matter that, for a special
+reason, is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters
+are known or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to
+distinguish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in
+seeing that God suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again
+from the dead, wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct
+from the article of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was
+buried, present the same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is
+not difficult to accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one
+article.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in
+themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but
+only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions
+are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in
+order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith
+consists in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb.
+11:2: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows
+that those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly
+to eternal life. Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God
+[*The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of
+God, etc.], the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and
+these are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand certain
+things in Holy Writ are proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their
+own account, but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for
+instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again at
+the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like, which are related in Holy
+Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or the
+Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct
+articles.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken
+in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there
+is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth:
+and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles.
+Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered
+from our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of
+faith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of view
+there are various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This definition of an article is taken from an
+etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in
+accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it
+does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that
+although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since
+belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of
+end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and
+"without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle
+declares (Heb. 11:6).
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Articles of Faith Have Increased in Course of Time?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not
+increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb.
+11:1), "faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Now the
+same things are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all
+times, the same things are to be believed.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised
+by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered
+them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of
+faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as
+stated in Eph. 2:8: "It is the gift of God." Since then there can be
+no lack of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of
+faith was perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time
+went on.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion
+no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a
+beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii).
+Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with
+perfect things, so that those who were the first to deliver the
+faith, knew it most perfectly.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us
+through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of
+faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later,
+according to Deut. 32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to
+thee." Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the
+mysteries, for "they received them more fully than others, even as
+they received them earlier," as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23: "Ourselves
+also who have the first fruits of the Spirit." Therefore it seems
+that knowledge of matters of faith has not increased as time went on.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that "the
+knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the
+nearer they were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they
+receive the mysteries of salvation."
+
+_I answer that,_ The articles of faith stand in the same relation to
+the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based
+on natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order,
+so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles
+are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same
+thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," as the
+Philosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the
+articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of
+faith, such as God's existence, and His providence over the salvation
+of man, according to Heb. 11: "He that cometh to God, must believe
+that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." For the
+existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God
+eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His
+providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for
+man's salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: and in this
+way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are
+contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes
+belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth.
+
+Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the
+articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went
+on: since whatever those who lived later have believed, was
+contained, albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who
+preceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articles
+believed explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some
+were known explicitly which were not known explicitly by those who
+lived before them. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2, 3): "I am
+the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg.: 'I am
+the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob'] . . . and
+My name Adonai I did not show them": David also said (Ps. 118:100):
+"I have had understanding above ancients": and the Apostle says (Eph.
+3:5) that the mystery of Christ, "in other generations was not known,
+as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped for
+from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through
+Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time,
+the further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the
+Apostle says (Heb. 11:13): "All these died according to faith, not
+having received the promises, but beholding them afar off." Now the
+further off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore
+those who were nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge
+of the good things to be hoped for.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the
+part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in
+knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that
+takes place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the
+learner; thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does
+not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for
+he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the
+disciple's capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this
+way that men made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on.
+Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament
+to childhood.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation can
+take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the active
+cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature
+makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not
+brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in
+existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the
+imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the
+imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is
+the active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while
+man is likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action.
+Hence, among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from
+imperfection to perfection; and, although some men have been after
+the manner of active causes, through being doctors of faith,
+nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for
+the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of
+faith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith,
+so far as was necessary at the time for the instruction of the
+people, either openly or in figures.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by
+Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of
+fulness [*Vulg.: 'fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were
+nearest to Christ, whether before, like John the Baptist, or after,
+like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith;
+for even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of
+manhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more
+perfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his
+youth.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Articles of Faith Are Suitably Formulated?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably
+formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do
+not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above
+(A. 5). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God;
+hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many
+other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there
+is one God" should not be set down as an article of faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should
+believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to
+be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points
+some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention
+should have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His
+omnipotence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know
+the Son, according to John 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father
+also." Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father
+and Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the
+Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several
+articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the
+Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about
+the Person of the Father.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of
+the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too
+is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His
+Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work
+appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work
+appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets."
+Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated
+to the Son in respect of His Godhead.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special
+difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should
+have been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems
+that there is not a sufficient number of articles.
+
+On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the
+articles thus.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 4, 6), to faith those things in
+themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life,
+and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are
+proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the
+Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of
+Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the
+sons of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written (John 17:3):
+"This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God,
+and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Wherefore the first
+distinction in matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of
+the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of Christ's human
+nature, which is the "mystery of godliness" (1 Tim. 3:16).
+
+Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are
+proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the
+first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which
+three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and
+thirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers
+to the order of nature, in relation to which the article about the
+creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace,
+in relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man
+are included in one article; while the third refers to the order of
+glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us
+concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus
+there are seven articles referring to the Godhead.
+
+In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven
+articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or
+conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His
+Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the
+fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh,
+to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen
+articles.
+
+Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the
+Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the
+three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the
+three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of
+glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the
+glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity
+into one article.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the
+philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance
+His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped,
+all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching
+over things, as stated in the First Part (Q. 13, A. 8). Now in beings
+having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and
+knowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal
+knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills
+in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His
+providence over them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and Holy
+Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article
+refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the
+relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way,
+include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not
+a Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of
+view, there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one
+article to the three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each
+Person, certain points have to be observed, about which some happen
+to fall into error, looking at it in this way, we may distinguish
+three articles about the three Persons. For Arius believed in the
+omnipotence and eternity of the Father, but did not believe the Son
+to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for
+an article about the Person of the Son in order to settle this point.
+In like manner it was necessary to appoint a third article about the
+Person of the Holy Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way
+Christ's conception and birth, just as the resurrection and life
+everlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one
+article, in so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from
+another point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as
+each one separately presents a special difficulty.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent to
+sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be
+believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons
+of the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is
+never sent, as we stated in the First Part (Q. 43, A. 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its
+consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which
+is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which
+is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by
+appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to
+the Holy Ghost.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of the
+Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this
+respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other
+is that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it
+is included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which
+are ascribed to God's almighty power.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 9]
+
+Whether It Is Suitable for the Articles of Faith to Be Embodied in a
+Symbol?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of
+faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of
+faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made,
+since it is written (Deut. 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that
+I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it
+was unlawful to make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy
+Writ had once been published.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but
+"one faith." Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it
+is not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in the
+symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all
+competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith.
+Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed
+in the words: "I believe in one God."
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of
+faith, as stated above (A. 8). But the descent into hell is not
+mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is
+expressed inadequately.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the
+passage, "You believe in God, believe also in Me" (John 14:1) says:
+"We believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God."
+Since then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems
+unfitting to say: "In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church."
+
+Obj. 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of faith.
+Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly.
+Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be
+sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of
+faith in a symbol.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The universal Church cannot err, since she is
+governed by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was
+Our Lord's promise to His disciples (John 16:13): "When He, the
+Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth." Now the
+symbol is published by the authority of the universal Church.
+Therefore it contains nothing defective.
+
+_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), "he that cometh to
+God, must believe that He is." Now a man cannot believe, unless the
+truth be proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for
+the truth of faith to be collected together, so that it might the more
+easily be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth
+through ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of
+maxims of faith that the symbol [*The Greek _symballein_] takes its
+name.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ,
+diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes
+obscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy
+Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by
+all those who require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have
+no time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was
+necessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings of
+Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This indeed was no
+addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the
+symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about
+the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of
+simple-minded persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave
+rise to the necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise
+differ from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy of
+heretics, one contains more explicitly what another contains
+implicitly.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol in the
+person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united together by
+faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since such is
+the faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not only
+outwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is
+expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living
+faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they
+should endeavor to acquire it.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: No error about the descent into hell had arisen among
+heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that
+point. For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the
+Fathers, but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the
+Apostles. For a subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one;
+rather does it expound it, as stated above (ad 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 5: If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this must
+be taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the Holy
+Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe in
+the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church." But it is better and more in
+keeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the
+holy Catholic Church," as Pope Leo [*Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.]
+observes.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of
+the symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was
+already spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it
+is sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the
+Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the
+faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as
+though it were against the darkness of past and future errors.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 10]
+
+Whether It Belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to Draw Up a Symbol of
+Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign
+Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol
+becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as
+stated above (A. 9). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith
+were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth
+of faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as
+stated above (A. 7). Since then this reason ceased with the advent of
+the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more
+and more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the
+authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the
+symbol.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden under
+pain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden under
+pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of
+the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first* council of
+Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council
+had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to
+utter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined
+by the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and
+this under pain of anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by
+Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as
+the "Latrocinium" and condemned by the Pope.] The same was repeated
+in the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it
+seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new
+edition of the symbol.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but
+patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung
+in the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign
+Pontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of
+the symbol.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The symbol was drawn up by a general council. Now
+such a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of
+the Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can.
+4, 5]. Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff
+to draw up a symbol.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Obj. 1), a new edition of the
+symbol becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may
+arise. Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to
+that authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally,
+so that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs
+to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more
+important and more difficult questions that arise in the Church are
+referred," as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence
+our Lord said to Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff (Luke 22:32):
+"I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not, and thou,
+being once converted, confirm thy brethren." The reason of this is
+that there should be but one faith of the whole Church, according to
+1 Cor. 1:10: "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no
+schisms among you": and this could not be secured unless any question
+of faith that may arise be decided by him who presides over the whole
+Church, so that the whole Church may hold firmly to his decision.
+Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign
+Pontiff to publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other
+matters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke a general
+council and so forth.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the
+teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Pet.
+3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic
+teaching and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction,
+it was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly
+against the errors which arose.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This prohibition and sentence of the council was
+intended for private individuals, who have no business to decide
+matters of faith: for this decision of the general council did not
+take away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new
+edition of the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the
+same faith with greater explicitness. For every council has taken
+into account that a subsequent council would expound matters more
+fully than the preceding council, if this became necessary through
+some heresy arising. Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign
+Pontiff, by whose authority the council is convoked, and its
+decision confirmed.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not under
+the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine,
+as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly
+the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the
+Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith. Since
+it contained briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the
+authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule
+of faith.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 2
+
+OF THE ACT OF FAITH
+(In Ten Articles)
+
+We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act;
+(2) the external act.
+
+Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is "to believe," which is the internal act of faith?
+
+(2) In how many ways is it expressed?
+
+(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything
+above natural reason?
+
+(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are
+attainable by natural reason?
+
+(5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things
+explicitly?
+
+(6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith?
+
+(7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for
+salvation?
+
+(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity
+explicitly?
+
+(9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious?
+
+(10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 1]
+
+Whether to Believe Is to Think with Assent?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not to think with
+assent. Because the Latin word "cogitatio" [thought] implies a
+research, for "cogitare" [to think] seems to be equivalent to
+"coagitare," i.e. "to discuss together." Now Damascene says (De Fide
+Orth. iv) that faith is "an assent without research." Therefore
+thinking has no place in the act of faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show
+further on (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to think is an act of the cogitative
+power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the
+First Part (Q. 78, A. 4). Therefore thought has nothing to do with
+faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its
+object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect,
+but of the will, even as consent is, as stated above (I-II, Q. 15, A.
+1, ad 3). Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.
+
+_On the contrary,_ This is how "to believe" is defined by Augustine
+(De Praedest. Sanct. ii).
+
+_I answer that,_ "To think" can be taken in three ways. First, in a
+general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as
+Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): "By understanding I mean now
+the faculty whereby we understand when thinking." Secondly, "to
+think" is more strictly taken for that consideration of the
+intellect, which is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which
+precedes the intellect's arrival at the stage of perfection that
+comes with the certitude of sight. In this sense Augustine says (De
+Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of God is not called the Thought, but the
+Word of God. When our thought realizes what we know and takes form
+therefrom, it becomes our word. Hence the Word of God must be
+understood without any thinking on the part of God, for there is
+nothing there that can take form, or be unformed." In this way
+thought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while yet
+deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth.
+Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one of
+deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the
+intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to
+the sensitive part, hence it is that "to think" is taken secondly for
+an act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the
+cogitative power.
+
+Accordingly, if "to think" be understood broadly according to the
+first sense, then "to think with assent," does not express completely
+what is meant by "to believe": since, in this way, a man thinks with
+assent even when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is
+certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
+demonstration.], or understands. If, on the other hand, "to think" be
+understood in the second way, then this expresses completely the
+nature of the act of believing. For among the acts belonging to the
+intellect, some have a firm assent without any such kind of thinking,
+as when a man considers the things that he knows by science, or
+understands, for this consideration is already formed. But some acts
+of the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent,
+whether they incline to neither side, as in one who "doubts"; or
+incline to one side rather than the other, but on account of some
+slight motive, as in one who "suspects"; or incline to one side yet
+with fear of the other, as in one who "opines." But this act "to
+believe," cleaves firmly to one side, in which respect belief has
+something in common with science and understanding; yet its knowledge
+does not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with
+doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence it is proper to the believer to
+think with assent: so that the act of believing is distinguished from
+all the other acts of the intellect, which are about the true or the
+false.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason which
+demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things
+whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance that such things
+have been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: "To think" is not taken here for the act of the
+cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The intellect of the believer is determined to one
+object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken
+here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the
+will.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Act of Faith Is Suitably Distinguished As Believing God,
+Believing in a God and Believing in God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably
+distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in
+God. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is
+one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three
+acts of faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should not
+be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now "to believe
+God" is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the
+First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from
+certain other acts of faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be
+called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a
+God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose
+object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the
+will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe in God," which
+implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species
+of that act.
+
+_On the contrary_ is the authority of Augustine who makes this
+distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi--Tract. xxix in Joan.).
+
+_I answer that,_ The act of any power or habit depends on the relation
+of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be
+considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the
+intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above
+(A. 1, ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part
+of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.
+
+If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can
+be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). One
+of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of
+faith is "to believe in a God"; because, as stated above (ibid.)
+nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is
+referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it
+is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point
+of faith; and thus an act of faith is "to believe God," since, as
+stated above (ibid.) the formal object of faith is the First Truth,
+to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent for Its sake to
+whatever he believes.
+
+Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the
+intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in
+God." For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the
+aspect of an end.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These three do not denote different acts of faith, but
+one and the same act having different relations to the object of
+faith.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Unbelievers cannot be said "to believe in a God" as
+we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not
+believe that God exists under the conditions that faith determines;
+hence they do not truly imply believe in a God, since, as the
+Philosopher observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know simple things
+defectively is not to know them at all."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As stated above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 1) the will moves the
+intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in this
+respect an act of faith is "to believe in God."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 3]
+
+Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Anything Above the
+Natural Reason?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe
+anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of
+a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now
+matters of faith, surpass man's natural reason, since they are things
+unseen as stated above (Q. 1, A. 4). Therefore to believe seems
+unnecessary for salvation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters,
+wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true
+or false, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words?"
+Now a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith,
+since he cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our
+judgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such
+matters. Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to Ps.
+36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord." Now "the
+invisible things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood by the
+things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according
+to Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the
+understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not
+necessary for man's salvation, that he should believe certain things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is
+impossible to please God."
+
+_I answer that,_ Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we
+find that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower
+nature, one of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement,
+while the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature.
+Thus water by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the
+earth), while according to the movement of the moon, it moves round
+the centre by ebb and flow. In like manner the planets have their
+proper movements from west to east, while in accordance with the
+movement of the first heaven, they have a movement from east to west.
+Now the created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to
+God, since other creatures do not attain to the universal, but only
+to something particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness
+either in _being_ only, as inanimate things, or also in _living,_ and
+in _knowing singulars,_ as plants and animals; whereas the rational
+nature, in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and
+being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being.
+
+Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not
+only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that
+which it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine
+goodness. Hence it was said above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8) that man's
+ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which
+vision man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to
+John 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned
+cometh to Me." Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed
+all at once, but by little and little, according to the mode of his
+nature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in order
+that he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the
+Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it behooves a
+learner to believe."
+
+Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly
+happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes
+the master who is teaching him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher nature,
+natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some
+supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural
+light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of
+virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this
+way, by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to
+matters of faith and not to those which are against faith.
+Consequently "there is no" danger or "condemnation to them that are
+in Christ Jesus," and whom He has enlightened by faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things
+of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to God
+from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): "Many things
+are shown to thee above the understandings of man."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Necessary to Believe Those Things Which Can Be Proved
+by Natural Reason?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which
+can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's
+works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is
+superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices.
+Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that
+can be known by natural reason.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the object
+of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as
+stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Since therefore all things that can be
+known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there
+is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is
+certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
+demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of
+them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the
+others should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is
+not necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural
+reason.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is necessary to believe that God is one and
+incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only
+things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by
+reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may
+arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the
+science to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God,
+is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it
+presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by until late
+in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of God. The second
+reason is, in order that the knowledge of God may be more general.
+For many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either
+through dullness of mind, or through having a number of occupations,
+and temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom
+would be altogether deprived of the knowledge of God, unless Divine
+things were brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The
+third reason is for the sake of certitude. For human reason is very
+deficient in things concerning God. A sign of this is that
+philosophers in their researches, by natural investigation, into
+human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among
+themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge
+of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine
+matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them,
+as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind
+for the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved
+by reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and
+about the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can
+be an object of faith for another, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 5).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although all things that can be known by science are
+of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to
+beatitude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Man Is Bound to Believe Anything Explicitly?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything
+explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it
+is not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written
+(Rom. 10:14, 15): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not
+heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they
+preach unless they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe
+anything explicitly.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we
+by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity, and
+it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the
+precept of Our Lord (Matt. 5:39): "If one strike thee on one [Vulg.:
+'thy right'] cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others of the
+same kind, according to Augustine's exposition (De Serm. Dom. in
+Monte xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything
+explicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God
+proposes to be believed.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according
+to Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Now the
+virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed
+precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according
+to Ps. 118:60: "I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy
+commandments." Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man
+should be ready to believe whatever God may propose, without his
+believing anything explicitly.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God,
+must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him."
+
+_I answer that,_ The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to
+fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining
+salvation. Now an act of virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5)
+depends on the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things
+may be considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is
+the proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is
+accidental and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it
+belongs properly and directly to the object of fortitude, to face the
+dangers of death, and to charge at the foe with danger to oneself,
+for the sake of the common good: yet that, in a just war, a man be
+armed, or strike another with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to
+the object of fortitude, but indirectly.
+
+Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of
+a precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate
+in its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the
+fulfilment of the precept does not require that a virtuous act should
+terminate in those things which have an accidental or secondary
+relation to the proper and direct object of that virtue, except in
+certain places and at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the
+direct object of faith is that whereby man is made one of the
+Blessed, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8): while the indirect and
+secondary object comprises all things delivered by God to us in Holy
+Writ, for instance that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son
+of Jesse, and so forth.
+
+Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is
+bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to
+other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly,
+but only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he
+is prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine
+Scriptures. Then alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly,
+when it is clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of
+faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a man's
+power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound
+to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing
+grace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe
+the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for
+this help "to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully
+given; and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a
+punishment of a previous, or at least of original, sin," as Augustine
+states (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi [*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct.
+viii.]).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable things
+which are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely, God
+and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity
+which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly speaking,
+in the will; hence promptness of the will subject to authority,
+suffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper and
+direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental
+or consequent to that proper and direct object.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 6]
+
+Whether All Are Equally Bound to Have Explicit Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all are equally bound to have
+explicit faith. For all are bound to those things which are necessary
+for salvation, as is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is
+necessary for salvation that certain things should be believed
+explicitly. Therefore all are equally bound to have explicit faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he is
+not bound to believe. But simple persons are sometimes tested in
+reference to the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are
+bound to believe everything explicitly.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but
+only implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the faith
+of the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the
+learned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have
+explicit faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have
+explicit faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 1:14): "The oxen were
+ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them," because, as Gregory
+expounds this passage (Moral. ii, 17), the simple, who are signified
+by the asses, ought, in matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who
+are denoted by the oxen.
+
+_I answer that,_ The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of
+Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural reason. Now
+Divine revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are
+over them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the
+angels, and to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius
+explains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding
+of faith must needs reach men of lower degree through those of higher
+degree. Consequently, just as the higher angels, who enlighten those
+who are below them, have a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the
+lower angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of
+higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under
+obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to
+believe them more explicitly.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The unfolding of the articles of faith is not equally
+necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher degree,
+whose duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe explicitly
+more things than others are.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Simple persons should not be put to the test about
+subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been
+corrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple
+people in such questions. If, however, it is found that they are free
+from obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to
+their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The simple have no faith implied in that of the
+learned, except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine
+teaching. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of
+me, as I also am of Christ." Hence it is not human knowledge, but the
+Divine truth that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned
+stray from this rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple ones,
+who think that the learned believe aright; unless the simple hold
+obstinately to their individual errors, against the faith of the
+universal Church, which cannot err, since Our Lord said (Luke 22:32):
+"I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not."
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 7]
+
+Whether It Is Necessary for the Salvation of All, That They Should
+Believe Explicitly in the Mystery of Christ?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for the salvation
+of all that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.
+For man is not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are
+ignorant about: since the unfolding of faith is the result of Divine
+revelation, which reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above
+(A. 6; I, Q. 111, A. 1). Now even the angels were in ignorance of the
+mystery of the Incarnation: hence, according to the commentary of
+Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they who ask (Ps. 23:8): "Who is
+this king of glory?" and (Isa. 63:1): "Who is this that cometh from
+Edom?" Therefore men were not bound to believe explicitly in the
+mystery of Christ's Incarnation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is evident that John the Baptist was one of the
+teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him (Matt. 11:11) that
+"there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater
+than" he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to have known the
+mystery of Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (Matt. 11:3):
+"Art Thou He that art to come, or look we for another?" Therefore
+even the teachers were not bound to explicit faith in Christ.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the
+ministry of the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it
+would seem that the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith
+in Christ, since they received no revelation. Therefore it seems that
+it was not necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly
+in the mystery of Christ.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vii; Ep. cxc):
+"Our faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young is
+delivered from the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except
+by the one Mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5; Q. 1, A. 8), the object of
+faith includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man
+obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and
+Passion is the way by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written
+(Acts 4:12): "There is no other name under heaven given to men,
+whereby we must be saved." Therefore belief of some kind in the
+mystery of Christ's Incarnation was necessary at all times and for
+all persons, but this belief differed according to differences of
+times and persons. The reason of this is that before the state of
+sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ's Incarnation, in so far as
+it was intended for the consummation of glory, but not as it was
+intended to deliver man from sin by the Passion and Resurrection,
+since man had no foreknowledge of his future sin. He does, however,
+seem to have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from the
+fact that he said (Gen. 2:24): "Wherefore a man shall leave father
+and mother, and shall cleave to his wife," of which the Apostle says
+(Eph. 5:32) that "this is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the
+Church," and it is incredible that the first man was ignorant about
+this sacrament.
+
+But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the
+Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the
+human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else,
+have foreshadowed Christ's Passion by certain sacrifices both before
+and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the
+learned explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those
+sacrifices, believed them to be ordained by God in reference to
+Christ's coming, and thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so
+to speak. And, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7), the nearer they were to
+Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ's mysteries.
+
+After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound
+to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards
+those which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly
+proclaimed, such as the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of
+which we have spoken above (Q. 1, A. 8). As to other minute points in
+reference to the articles of the Incarnation, men have been bound to
+believe them more or less explicitly according to each one's state
+and office.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not entirely
+hidden from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v, 19),
+yet certain aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ
+revealed them to them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It was not through ignorance that John the Baptist
+inquired of Christ's advent in the flesh, since he had clearly
+professed his belief therein, saying: "I saw, and I gave testimony,
+that this is the Son of God" (John 1:34). Hence he did not say: "Art
+Thou He that hast come?" but "Art Thou He that art to come?" thus
+saying about the future, not about the past. Likewise it is not to be
+believed that he was ignorant of Christ's future Passion, for he had
+already said (John 1:39): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who
+taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world," thus foretelling
+His future immolation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as
+may be seen especially in Isaias 53. We may therefore say with
+Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked this question, being in
+ignorance as to whether Christ would descend into hell in His own
+Person. But he did not ignore the fact that the power of Christ's
+Passion would be extended to those who were detained in Limbo,
+according to Zech. 9:11: "Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament
+hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no
+water"; nor was he bound to believe explicitly, before its
+fulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither Himself.
+
+It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on
+Luke 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from
+devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he
+inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his
+disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the
+latter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing
+to the signs of His works.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Many of the gentiles received revelations of Christ, as
+is clear from their predictions. Thus we read (Job 19:25): "I know
+that my Redeemer liveth." The Sibyl too foretold certain things about
+Christ, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we
+read in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine
+Augustus and his mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a
+man on whose breast was a golden plate with the inscription: "Christ
+shall be born of a virgin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the
+lifetime of Irene and Constantine, thou shalt see me again" [*Cf.
+Baron, Annal., A.D. 780]. If, however, some were saved without
+receiving any revelation, they were not saved without faith in a
+Mediator, for, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they
+did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in Divine
+providence, since they believed that God would deliver mankind in
+whatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the revelation of
+the Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: "Who
+teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth."
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 8]
+
+Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Explicitly in the
+Trinity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to
+believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6):
+"He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to
+them that seek Him." Now one can believe this without believing in the
+Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the
+Trinity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further our Lord said (John 17:5, 6): "Father, I have
+manifested Thy name to men," which words Augustine expounds (Tract.
+cvi) as follows: "Not the name by which Thou art called God, but the
+name whereby Thou art called My Father," and further on he adds: "In
+that He made this world, God is known to all nations; in that He is
+not to be worshipped together with false gods, 'God is known in
+Judea'; but, in that He is the Father of this Christ, through Whom He
+takes away the sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name
+of His, which hitherto they knew not." Therefore before the coming of
+Christ it was not known that Paternity and Filiation were in the
+Godhead: and so the Trinity was not believed explicitly.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of God
+is the object of heavenly happiness. Now the object of heavenly
+happiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in
+God, without any distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not
+necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is
+expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is
+written in manifestation of the Trinity: "Let us make man to Our image
+and likeness" (Gen. 1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was
+necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is impossible to believe explicitly in the
+mystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of
+Christ includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the
+world through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He was
+conceived by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the
+mystery of Christ was believed explicitly by the learned, but
+implicitly and under a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too was
+it with the mystery of the Trinity. And consequently, when once grace
+had been revealed, all were bound to explicit faith in the mystery of
+the Trinity: and all who are born again in Christ, have this bestowed
+on them by the invocation of the Trinity, according to Matt. 28:19:
+"Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of
+the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Explicit faith in those two things was necessary at all
+times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times and
+for all people.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Before Christ's coming, faith in the Trinity lay hidden
+in the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles it
+was shown to the world.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God's sovereign goodness as we understand it now
+through its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of
+Persons: but as understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it
+cannot be understood without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the
+mission of the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 9]
+
+Whether to Believe Is Meritorious?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not meritorious. For
+the principle of all merit is charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 114,
+A. 4). Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore,
+just as an act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by
+our natural gifts, so neither is an act of faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific
+knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known
+[*Science is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through
+its demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not
+meritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is
+not meritorious.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a
+sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a
+sufficient motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any
+merit on his part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to
+believe: whereas if he has not a sufficient motive for believing,
+this is a mark of levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: "He that is
+hasty to give credit, is light of heart," so that, seemingly, he
+gains no merit thereby. Therefore to believe is by no means
+meritorious.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the saints "by
+faith . . . obtained promises," which would not be the case if they
+did not merit by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, AA. 3, 4), our
+actions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will
+moved with grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from
+the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the
+act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine
+truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that
+it is subject to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently
+the act of faith can be meritorious.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Nature is compared to charity which is the principle of
+merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to charity as the
+disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that
+the subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the form, nor
+can a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but after
+the advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding
+disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the chief principle
+of action, even as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial
+form of fire. Accordingly neither nature nor faith can, without
+charity, produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity,
+the act of faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of
+nature, and a natural act of the free-will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Two things may be considered in science: namely the
+scientist's assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of that
+fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will, because
+the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration,
+wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual
+consideration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to his
+free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to consider.
+Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred
+to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the good of our
+neighbor. On the other hand, in the case of faith, both these things
+are subject to the free-will so that in both respects the act of
+faith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion, there is no
+firm assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes
+(Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a perfect
+act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the assent, it does
+not appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards the
+actual consideration.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for
+he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by
+miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine
+invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however,
+sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose
+the merit.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 10]
+
+Whether Reasons in Support of What We Believe Lessen the Merit of
+Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe
+lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.)
+that "there is no merit in believing what is shown by reason." If,
+therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith
+is altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human
+reasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes the merit of
+believing.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens
+the amount of merit, since "happiness is the reward of virtue," as
+the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to
+diminish the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential
+to faith to be about the unseen, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5).
+Now the more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it unseen.
+Therefore human reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the
+merit of faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an
+inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether
+it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a
+man to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so.
+Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 3:15): "Being ready always to
+satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg.: 'Of
+that hope which is in you.' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken
+from Bede.] and hope which is in you." Now the Apostle would not give
+this advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith.
+Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9), the act of faith can be
+meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to
+the use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of
+what we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the
+believer. First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance,
+when a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe,
+unless he be moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason
+diminishes the merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above
+(I-II, Q. 24, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 77, A. 6, ad 2) that, in moral virtues,
+a passion which precedes choice makes the virtuous act less
+praiseworthy. For just as a man ought to perform acts of moral
+virtue, on account of the judgment of his reason, and not on account
+of a passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not on account
+of human reason, but on account of the Divine authority. Secondly,
+human reasons may be consequent to the will of the believer. For when
+a man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he
+thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support
+thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude the merit of
+faith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again, in moral virtues a
+consequent passion is the sign of a more prompt will, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 24, A. 3, ad 1). We have an indication of this in the words
+of the Samaritans to the woman, who is a type of human reason: "We
+now believe, not for thy saying" (John 4:42).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has no
+will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons.
+But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the
+authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration
+of some of them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith
+is not, for that reason, lost or diminished.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support of
+the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring
+intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not
+cease to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing
+that what faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do
+not diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand,
+though demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith
+[*The Leonine Edition reads: 'in support of matters of faith which
+are however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,' etc.],
+but not of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith,
+since they make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not
+diminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready to
+believe them, even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit
+is not diminished.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it consist
+in a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the merit
+of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and firm
+in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through not
+renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise have
+greater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on account
+of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in
+opposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to
+faith, do not always diminish the promptness of the will to believe,
+and therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 3
+
+OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith:
+under which head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?
+
+(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 3, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Confession Is an Act of Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith.
+For the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession
+belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act
+of faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of
+confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph.
+6:19) asks for prayers that it may be granted him "with confidence,
+to make known the mystery of the gospel." Now it belongs to
+fortitude, which moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from
+doing good on account of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that
+confession is not an act of faith, but rather of fortitude or
+constancy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess one's
+faith outwardly, so does it make one do other external good works,
+for it is written (Gal. 5:6) that "faith . . . worketh by charity."
+But other external works are not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore
+neither is confession an act of faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss explains the words of 2 Thess. 1:11, "and
+the work of faith in power" as referring to "confession which is a
+work proper to faith."
+
+_I answer that,_ Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to
+whose end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred
+specifically to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh,
+and consequently it is an act of abstinence.
+
+Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred
+specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according
+to 2 Cor. 4:13: "Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe,
+and therefore we speak also." For the outward utterance is intended
+to signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought
+of matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the
+outward confession of them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A threefold confession is commended by the Scriptures.
+One is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a proper act
+of faith, since it is referred to the end of faith as stated above.
+Another is the confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is an
+act of "latria," for its purpose is to give outward honor to God,
+which is the end of "latria." The third is the confession of sins,
+which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is the end of
+penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct, but an
+indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4). Hence
+fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith, viz.
+fear or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession, but
+an indirect cause so to speak.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all
+outward acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding,
+but not eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession
+as its proper act, without the help of any other virtue.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 3, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Confession of Faith Is Necessary for Salvation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary
+for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if
+it is a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of
+faith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can
+be realized without any outward confession. Therefore confession of
+faith is not necessary for salvation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his
+faith to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have
+to instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple
+folk are not bound to confess the faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb others,
+is not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:32):
+"Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church
+of God." Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance among
+unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 10:10): "With the heart we
+believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto
+salvation."
+
+_I answer that,_ Things that are necessary for salvation come under
+the precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is
+something affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept.
+Hence its necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an
+affirmative precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 5, ad 3; I-II, Q. 88, A. 1, ad 2) do
+not bind for always, although they are always binding; but they bind
+as to place and time according to other due circumstances, in respect
+of which human acts have to be regulated in order to be acts of
+virtue.
+
+Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at
+all times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain
+times, when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of
+due honor, or our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him:
+for instance, if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to
+remain silent, so as to make people believe either that he is without
+faith, or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others away from
+the faith; for in such cases as these, confession of faith is
+necessary for salvation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The end of faith, even as of the other virtues, must
+be referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and our
+neighbor. Consequently when God's honor and our neighbor's good
+demand, man should not be contented with being united by faith to
+God's truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In cases of necessity where faith is in danger, every
+one is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good
+example and encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check
+the attacks of unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty
+of all the faithful to instruct others in the faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is nothing commendable in making a public
+confession of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among
+unbelievers, without any profit either to the faith or to the
+faithful. Hence Our Lord said (Matt. 7:6): "Give not that which is
+holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine . . . lest
+turning upon you, they tear you." Yet, if there is hope of profit to
+the faith, or if there be urgency, a man should disregard the
+disturbance of unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it
+is written (Matt. 15:12) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord
+that "the Pharisee, when they heard this word, were scandalized," He
+answered: "Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 4
+
+OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first
+place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the
+cause of faith; fourthly, its effects.
+
+Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is faith?
+
+(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?
+
+(3) Whether its form is charity?
+
+(4) Whether living (_formata_) faith and lifeless (_informis_) faith
+are one identically?
+
+(5) Whether faith is a virtue?
+
+(6) Whether it is one virtue?
+
+(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;
+
+(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the
+intellectual virtues.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 1]
+
+Whether This Is a Fitting Definition of Faith: "Faith Is the
+Substance of Things to Be Hoped For, the Evidence of Things That
+Appear Not?"
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting
+definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance
+of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not."
+For no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it
+is a theological virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3).
+Therefore it is not a substance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things
+to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should not be
+included in a definition of faith, as though they were its object.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope,
+since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on (A.
+3). Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing
+to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different
+genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and
+neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to
+state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence."
+
+Obj. 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which
+it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is
+already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to
+speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is
+unfittingly defined.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The authority of the Apostle suffices.
+
+_I answer that,_ Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are
+not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this
+definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith
+can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the
+form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles
+of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.
+
+In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are
+known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit,
+should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object.
+Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 2, 3),
+which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the
+will's command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object
+of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the
+intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a
+theological virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 2), has one same
+thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity, be
+in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Q. 1,
+AA. 1, 4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and
+whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under
+the aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the
+act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to
+the Apostle (Rom. 8:25): "We hope for that which we see not": because
+to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has
+already, but for what one has not, as stated above (I-II, Q. 67, A.
+4). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is
+the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the
+substance of things to be hoped for." For we are wont to call by the
+name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when
+the whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first
+beginning; for instance, we might say that the first self-evident
+principles are the substance of science, because, to wit, these
+principles are in us the first beginnings of science, the whole of
+which is itself contained in them virtually. In this way then faith
+is said to be the "substance of things to be hoped for," for the
+reason that in us the first beginning of things to be hoped for is
+brought about by the assent of faith, which contains virtually all
+things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through
+seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made
+evident when we were speaking of happiness (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8; I-II,
+Q. 4, A. 3).
+
+The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect,
+considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words,
+"evidence of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for
+the result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere
+to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the
+non-apparent truth of faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another
+reading has "conviction," because to wit, the intellect of the
+believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it
+sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to
+the form of a definition, he may say that "faith is a habit of the
+mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect
+assent to what is non-apparent."
+
+In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to
+the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish
+it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect
+adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that
+appear not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the
+object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the
+substance of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of
+faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the
+beatitude we hope for.
+
+Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of
+this one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in
+Joan.: QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we
+believe what we do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
+iv, 11) that "faith is an assent without research," and when others
+say that "faith is that certainty of the mind about absent things
+which surpasses opinion but falls short of science," these all amount
+to the same as the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear
+not"; and when Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid
+foundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing
+forth the truth in him," comes to the same as "substance of things to
+be hoped for."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme genus
+condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance
+which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus
+contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by
+the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of
+those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope, as we
+shall prove further on (Q. 18, A. 1). For this reason the definition
+of faith includes the object of hope.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the
+present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so
+adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of
+the absent and the unseen.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the
+definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor
+different acts, but different relationships of one act to different
+objects, as is clear from what has been said.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing,
+make[s] it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority
+does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence
+referred to in the definition of faith.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Faith Resides in the Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the
+intellect. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith
+resides in the believer's will." Now the will is a power distinct
+from the intellect. Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds
+from the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its
+praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is
+in the will, and not in the intellect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical.
+Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not
+concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in _De
+Anima_ iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas
+"faith . . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is
+it in the practical intellect, the object of which is some true,
+contingent thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith
+is the Eternal Truth, as was shown above (Q. 1, A. 1). Therefore
+faith does not reside in the intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision,
+according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark
+manner; but then face to face." Now vision is in the intellect.
+Therefore faith is likewise.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be
+perfect. Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active
+principles, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not
+possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the
+art, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the
+soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to act well
+is a habit, as stated above (I-II, Q. 49, A. 4, ad 1, 2, 3).
+Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected
+by a habit residing in each of them. Again, it has been stated above
+(Q. 2, AA. 1, 2) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch
+as the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will
+and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be
+perfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be
+perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the
+intellect: even as there needs to be the habit of prudence in the
+reason, besides the habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty,
+in order that the act of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is
+immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of that act
+is "the true," which pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently
+faith, which is the proper principle of that act, must needs reside
+in the intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which is
+described as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his
+intellect assents to matters of faith at the command of the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey but
+also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command of
+the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed
+in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be a
+habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the
+assenting intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as
+evidenced by its object. But since this object, which is the First
+Truth, is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves
+(De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just as
+"the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension" (De Anima
+iii, 10).
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Charity Is the Form of Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith.
+For each thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two
+things are opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of
+the other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of
+a division, as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore
+charity is not the form of faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are in
+one subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in the
+intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not the
+form of faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now
+obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of
+believing, on the part of the will, according to Rom. 1:5: "For
+obedience to the faith in all nations." Therefore obedience rather
+than charity, is the form of faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Each thing works through its form. Now faith works
+through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.
+
+_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (I-II, Q.
+1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 6), voluntary acts take their species from
+their end which is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing
+its species, is after the manner of a form in natural things.
+Wherefore the form of any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to
+which that act is directed, both because it takes its species
+therefrom, and because the mode of an action should correspond
+proportionately to the end. Now it is evident from what has been said
+(A. 1), that the act of faith is directed to the object of the will,
+i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which is the end of
+faith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper object of charity.
+Therefore charity is called the form of faith in so far as the act
+of faith is perfected and formed by charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens
+the act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being quickened by
+different habits, so as to be reduced to various species in a certain
+order, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2)
+when we were treating of human acts in general.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But it is
+not thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that it
+quickens the act of faith, as explained above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other
+virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity, as
+we shall show further on (Q. 23, A. 8), and consequently charity is
+spoken of as the form of faith.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Lifeless Faith Can Become Living, or Living Faith, Lifeless?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become
+living, or living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10,
+"when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be
+done away." Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living
+faith. Therefore when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done
+away, so that they are not one identical habit.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now
+lifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: "Faith without works
+is dead." Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God's grace, by its advent, has no less effect in a
+believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it
+causes the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who
+hitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of
+faith in him.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), "accidents
+cannot be altered." Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same
+faith cannot be at one time living, and at another, lifeless.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words, "Faith without works is dead"
+(James 2:20) adds, "by which it lives once more." Therefore faith
+which was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and
+living.
+
+_I answer that,_ There have been various opinions on this question.
+For some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that
+living and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living
+faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner,
+when a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of
+lifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting
+that grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and
+that a gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal
+sin.
+
+Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have
+said that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but
+that, all the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless
+faith is not taken away, and that it remains together with the habit
+of living faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable
+that the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person
+having living faith.
+
+We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are
+one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated
+by that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a
+perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which
+pertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not
+pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit
+of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in
+respect of something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in
+respect of something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and
+lifeless faith are not distinct habits.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those imperfect
+things from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when the
+perfect comes the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the
+advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially
+"of the things that appear not." When, however, imperfection is not
+inseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical thing which
+was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man
+and consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes
+a man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental
+thereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes
+living.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an
+animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul:
+consequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living
+and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which
+gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith.
+Hence there is no comparison.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to
+be in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said
+above (I, Q. 104, A. 1; I-II, Q. 109, A. 9) that God is always
+working man's justification, even as the sun is always lighting up
+the air. Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a
+believer than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith
+in both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter
+by creating it anew.
+
+We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the
+disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one
+who has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin
+does not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a
+previous mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not
+changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith
+without charity, and at another time, with charity.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Faith Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue
+is directed to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject
+good," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is
+directed to the true. Therefore faith is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue.
+Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among the
+acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi,
+3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species, as
+stated above (A. 4). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since it is
+not connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living
+faith a virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct
+from the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces
+(1 Cor. 12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore
+faith is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Man is justified by the virtues, since "justice
+is all virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is
+justified by faith according to Rom. 5:1: "Being justified therefore
+by faith let us have peace," etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As shown above, it is by human virtue that human
+acts are rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle
+of a good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living
+faith. For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to
+the truth at the command of the will, two things are required that
+this act may be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should
+infallibly tend to its object, which is the true; while the other is
+that the will should be infallibly directed to the last end, on
+account of which it assents to the true: and both of these are to be
+found in the act of living faith. For it belongs to the very essence
+of faith that the intellect should ever tend to the true, since
+nothing false can be the object of faith, as proved above (Q. 1, A.
+3): while the effect of charity, which is the form of faith, is that
+the soul ever has its will directed to a good end. Therefore living
+faith is a virtue.
+
+On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though
+the act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the
+intellect, it has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as
+if temperance be in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the
+rational part, temperance is not a virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q.
+65, A. 1), because the act of temperance requires both an act of
+reason, and an act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of
+faith requires an act of the will, and an act of the intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it
+is its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to some good
+in so far as it directs the intellect to the true. Furthermore, it
+has a relation to the good considered as the object of the will,
+inasmuch as it is formed by charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on
+human reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of necessity,
+from its premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence such like
+faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are
+speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and
+consequently its object cannot be anything false; so that faith of
+this kind can be a virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically,
+as though they belonged to different species. But they differ as
+perfect and imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless faith,
+being imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue,
+for "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 18).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the
+gratuitous graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason,
+since the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are
+not common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle
+says: "There are diversities of graces," and again, "To one is given"
+this grace and "to another" that. Now lifeless faith is common to all
+members of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part of its
+substance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must,
+therefore, say that in that passage, faith denotes a certain
+excellency of faith, for instance, "constancy in faith," according
+to a gloss, or the "word of faith."
+
+Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain
+pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss
+on the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are
+enumerated, explains faith as being "certainty about the unseen."
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Faith Is One Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith
+is a gift of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge
+are numbered among God's gifts according to Isa. 11:2. Now wisdom and
+knowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and
+knowledge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii,
+14, 15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and also about
+some temporal things, it seems that faith is not one virtue, but
+divided into several parts.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q.
+3, A. 1). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for all:
+since what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet
+to come, as appears from Isa. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive."
+Therefore faith is not one.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But one
+accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one
+faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): "One Lord, one faith."
+
+_I answer that,_ If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in
+two ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one
+faith. Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by
+adhering to which we believe whatever is contained in the faith.
+Secondly, on the part of the subject, and thus faith is
+differentiated according as it is in various subjects. Now it is
+evident that faith, just as any other habit, takes its species from
+the formal aspect of its object, but is individualized by its
+subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit whereby we believe, it
+is one specifically, but differs numerically according to its various
+subjects.
+
+If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed,
+then, again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one
+same thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in
+believing, be diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to
+one.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do
+not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to something
+eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). Hence
+there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is
+different with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and
+eternal matters under their respective aspects.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This difference of past and future arises, not from
+any difference in the thing believed, but from the different
+relationships of believers to the one thing believed, as also we
+have mentioned above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 4; I-II, Q. 107, A. 1, ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of faith.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Faith Is the First of the Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues.
+For a gloss on Luke 12:4, "I say to you My friends," says that
+fortitude is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that
+which is founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the
+virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, "Be not emulous," says that hope
+"leads on to faith." Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state further
+on (Q. 17, A. 1). Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it was stated above (A. 2) that the intellect of the
+believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent to matters of
+faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is not the
+first virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation, as
+a gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.].
+Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it
+is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is
+the foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the
+first part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of acts.
+Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected by
+charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by
+faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity
+precedes faith. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
+substance of things to be hoped for." Now the substance of a thing is
+that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by
+its very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature,
+precedes all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in
+matters of action, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 3; I-II, Q. 34,
+A. 4, ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last
+end, must needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of
+necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the
+will, since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far
+as it is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is
+present in the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by
+faith, the first of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith,
+because natural knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly
+bliss, which is the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards
+Him.
+
+On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For
+an accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which
+removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the
+Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be
+said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove
+obstacles to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that
+hinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to
+submit himself to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some
+other virtues, although there are no real virtues, unless faith be
+presupposed, as Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3).
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one cannot
+hope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this possible,
+since hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above (I-II, Q.
+40, A. 1). It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to
+persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this
+sense that hope is said to lead to faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes the
+inclination of the will to fulfil God's commandments. In this way it
+is not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue;
+since all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law,
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 2); and thus it is requisite for
+faith. In another way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the
+commandments considered as a duty. In this way it is a special
+virtue, and a part of justice: for a man does his duty by his
+superior when he obeys him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby
+man knows that God is his superior, Whom he must obey.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come
+first, but also to be connected with the other parts of the building:
+since the building would not be founded on it unless the other parts
+adhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is
+charity, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things have charity
+which is the bond of perfection." Consequently faith without charity
+cannot be the foundation: and yet it does not follow that charity
+precedes faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Some act of the will is required before faith, but not
+an act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes
+faith, because the will cannot tend to God with perfect love, unless
+the intellect possesses right faith about Him.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Faith Is More Certain Than Science and the Other Intellectual
+Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than
+science and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to
+certitude, wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain,
+through being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less
+it has of an admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also
+wisdom are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the
+believer may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about
+matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the
+intellectual virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But "faith is
+through hearing" according to Rom. 10:17; whereas understanding,
+science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore
+science and understanding are more certain than faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more
+perfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than
+faith, since faith is the way to understanding, according to another
+version [*The Septuagint] of Isa. 7:9: "If you will not believe, you
+shall not understand [Vulg.: 'continue']": and Augustine says (De
+Trin. xiv, 1) that "faith is strengthened by science." Therefore it
+seems that science or understanding is more certain than faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): "When you had
+received of us the word of the hearing," i.e. by faith . . . "you
+received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word
+of God." Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore
+science is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4, ad 2) two of the
+intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and
+art; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of
+its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change,
+whereas the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science
+[*In English the corresponding 'gift' is called knowledge] and
+understanding, are about necessary things, as stated above (I-II, Q.
+57, A. 5, ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and
+understanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual
+virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2, 3); secondly,
+for the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first
+way, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First,
+on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain
+cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than
+those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth,
+whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason.
+Secondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and
+thus the more a man's intellect lays hold of a thing, the more
+certain it is. In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of
+faith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the
+aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged
+simply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with respect to a
+disposition on the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more
+certain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e.
+for us. Likewise if these three be taken as gifts received in this
+present life, they are related to faith as to their principle which
+they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith is more certain.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith,
+but on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith
+with our intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain than
+hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear
+greatly surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain
+than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what
+he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is
+apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man
+certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than
+about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more
+perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater
+clearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the
+whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises
+from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge
+of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But in so far
+as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they
+are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the
+certitude of God's word, on which faith is founded.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 5
+
+OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are
+four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their
+original state?
+
+(2) Whether the demons have faith?
+
+(3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in
+others?
+
+(4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Was Faith in the Angels, or in Man, in Their Original
+State?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there was no faith, either in the
+angels, or in man, in their original state. For Hugh of S. Victor
+says in his Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that "man cannot see God or
+things that are in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation."
+Now the angels, in their original state, before they were either
+confirmed in grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes opened to
+contemplation, since "they saw things in the Word," according to
+Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Likewise the first man, while in the
+state of innocence, seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for
+Hugh St. Victor says (De Sacram. i, 6) that "in his original state
+man knew his Creator, not by the mere outward perception of hearing,
+but by inward inspiration, not as now believers seek an absent God by
+faith, but by seeing Him clearly present to their contemplation."
+Therefore there was no faith in the angels and man in their original
+state.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure,
+according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "We see now through a glass in a dark
+manner." Now in their original state there was not obscurity either
+in the angels or in man, because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore
+there could be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original
+state.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 10:17) that "faith . . .
+cometh by hearing." Now this could not apply to angels and man in
+their original state; for then they could not hear anything from
+another. Therefore, in that state, there was no faith either in man
+or in the angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God,
+must believe." Now the original state of angels and man was one of
+approach to God. Therefore they had need of faith.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some say that there was no faith in the angels before
+they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he
+sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of
+Divine things. Since, however, "faith is the evidence of things that
+appear not," according to the Apostle (Heb. 11:2), and since "by faith
+we believe what we see not," according to Augustine (Tract. xl in
+Joan.; QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes
+faith, which renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith.
+Now the principal object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of
+which gives the happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith.
+Consequently, as the angels before their confirmation in grace, and
+man before sin, did not possess the happiness whereby God is seen in
+His Essence, it is evident that the knowledge they possessed was not
+such as to exclude faith.
+
+It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be
+explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith.
+And if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as
+some [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29] hold, perhaps one might hold
+that there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in
+grace, or in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses
+not only a man's but even an angel's natural knowledge about God.
+
+Since, however, we stated in the First Part (Q. 62, A. 3; Q. 95, A.
+1) that man and the angels were created with the gift of grace, we
+must needs say that there was in them a certain beginning of
+hoped-for happiness, by reason of grace received but not yet
+consummated, which happiness was begun in their will by hope and
+charity, and in the intellect by faith, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 7).
+Consequently we must hold that the angels had faith before they were
+confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we must observe
+that in the object of faith, there is something formal, as it were,
+namely the First Truth surpassing all the natural knowledge of a
+creature, and something material, namely, the thing to which we
+assent while adhering to the First Truth. With regard to the former,
+before obtaining the happiness to come, faith is common to all who
+have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: whereas with
+regard to the things which are proposed as the material object of
+faith, some are believed by one, and known manifestly by another,
+even in the present state, as we have shown above (Q. 1, A. 5; Q. 2,
+A. 4, ad 2). In this respect, too, it may be said that the angels
+before being confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest
+knowledge about certain points in the Divine mysteries, which now we
+cannot know except by believing them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the words of Hugh of S. Victor are those of a
+master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be said that
+the contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly
+contemplation, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence.
+Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before they were
+confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet their contemplation was
+of a higher order than ours, for by its means they approached nearer
+to God, and had manifest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and
+mysteries than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them
+so that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: since by the light
+of wisdom He was more present to them than He is to us, although He
+was not so present to them as He is to the Blessed by the light of
+glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the
+original state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural
+obscurity in the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every
+creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine
+light: and this obscurity suffices for faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the original state there was no hearing anything
+from man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring
+inwardly: thus the prophets heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9:
+"I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 2]
+
+Whether in the Demons There Is Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the demons have no faith. For
+Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith depends on the
+believer's will": and this is a good will, since by it man wishes to
+believe in God. Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good,
+as stated above (I, Q. 64, A. 2, ad 5), it seems that in the demons
+there is no faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to Eph.
+2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the gift
+of God." Now, according to a gloss on Osee 3:1, "They look to strange
+gods, and love the husks of the grapes," the demons lost their gifts
+of grace by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons
+after they sinned.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins, as
+Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on John 15:22, "If I had
+not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they
+have no excuse for their sin." Now the sin of unbelief is in some
+men. Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty
+of a sin graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable.
+Therefore in the demons there is no faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . .
+believe and tremble."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 4; Q. 2, A. 1), the
+believer's intellect assents to that which he believes, not because
+he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident
+principles, but because his will commands his intellect to assent.
+Now, that the will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two
+causes. First, through the will being directed to the good, and in
+this way, to believe is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, because the
+intellect is convinced that it ought to believe what is said, though
+that conviction is not based on objective evidence. Thus if a
+prophet, while preaching the word of God, were to foretell something,
+and were to give a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the
+intellect of a witness would be convinced so as to recognize clearly
+that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the thing itself
+foretold would not be evident in itself, and consequently the essence
+of faith would not be removed.
+
+Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in
+the faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not in the demons,
+but only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby
+they recognize that the teaching of the Church is from God, although
+they do not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for
+instance that there are three Persons in God, and so forth.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe, by the
+evidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for their
+belief.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to
+believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when
+that faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have,
+is not a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through
+their natural intellectual acumen.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident,
+that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so
+that their malice is by no means diminished by their belief.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 3]
+
+Whether a Man Who Disbelieves One Article of Faith, Can Have Lifeless
+Faith in the Other Articles?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article
+of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the
+natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a
+catholic. Now a catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift of
+faith in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it
+seems that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the
+gift of lifeless faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one
+science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may
+possess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions,
+and yet be ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe
+some articles of faith without believing the others.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of
+faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a
+man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can
+believe some articles, and disbelieve others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is
+disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does
+not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does
+faith, after a man disbelieves one article.
+
+ _I answer that,_ Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a
+heretic who disbelieves one article of faith.
+
+The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the
+formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit
+cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as
+manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds
+from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an
+infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which
+proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the
+habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by
+faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion
+without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but
+merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to
+the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to
+whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by
+the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he
+chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church
+as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident
+that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is
+not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but
+if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error.
+Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article
+has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in
+accordance with his own will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith,
+about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful
+does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order
+to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds
+the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The various conclusions of a science have their
+respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without
+another, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without
+knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the
+articles of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First
+Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the
+Church who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever
+abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The various precepts of the Law may be referred either
+to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept
+without another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect
+obedience to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one
+commandment, according to James 2:10: "Whosoever shall . . . offend
+in one point is become guilty of all."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Faith Can Be Greater in One Man Than in Another?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man
+than in another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its
+object. Now whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith,
+since by failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as
+stated above (A. 3). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater
+in one than in another.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, those things which consist in something supreme
+cannot be "more" or "less." Now faith consists in something supreme,
+because it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above
+all things. Therefore faith cannot be "more" or "less."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding
+of principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of faith
+are the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above
+(Q. 1, A. 7). Now the understanding of principles is possessed in
+equal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree
+by all the faithful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Wherever we find great and little, there we find
+more or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little,
+for Our Lord said to Peter (Matt. 14:31): "O thou of little faith,
+why didst thou doubt?" And to the woman he said (Matt. 15: 28): "O
+woman, great is thy faith!" Therefore faith can be greater in one
+than in another.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 52, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 112,
+A. 4), the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of
+view: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of its
+participation by the subject.
+
+Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in
+respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material
+object which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of
+faith is one and simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above (Q.
+1, A. 1). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among
+believers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above (Q. 4,
+A. 6). But the things which are proposed as the matter of our belief
+are many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in this
+respect one man can believe explicitly more things than another, so
+that faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more
+explicit.
+
+If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of
+its participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the
+act of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as
+stated above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2; Q. 4, A. 2). Consequently a man's faith
+may be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his
+intellect, on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in
+another way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater
+promptitude, devotion, or confidence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of
+faith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly
+believe all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. In
+this respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the part of
+the object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is essential to faith that one should give the first
+place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit to
+it with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way
+faith is greater in one than in another.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The understanding of principles results from man's very
+nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from
+the gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above
+(I-II, Q. 112, A. 4). Hence the comparison fails.
+
+Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to
+another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 6
+
+OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are
+two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether faith is infused into man by God?
+
+(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Faith Is Infused into Man by God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God.
+For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us,
+and nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which
+science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused.
+Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing,
+seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by
+seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is
+written (John 4:53): "The father . . . knew that it was at the same
+hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed,
+and his whole house"; and (Rom. 10:17) it is said that "faith is
+through hearing." Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which depends on a man's will can be acquired
+by him. But "faith depends on the believer's will," according to
+Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired
+by man.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 2:8, 9): "By grace you are
+saved through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man
+may glory . . . for it is the gift of God."
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the
+things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is
+necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second
+thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things
+which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of
+these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are
+of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man's
+knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed
+by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the
+apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in
+sending preachers of the faith, according to Rom. 10:15: "How shall
+they preach, unless they be sent?"
+
+As regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of
+faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement,
+such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace
+the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who
+see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and
+some do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves
+man inwardly to assent to matters of faith.
+
+The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's
+free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is
+from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready
+to assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of
+faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe.
+But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith,
+is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some
+supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God.
+Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of
+faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of
+external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper
+cause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument again refers to the cause that
+proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to
+believe by words or deeds.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the
+believer: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in
+order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as
+stated above (Q. 2, A. 3).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Lifeless Faith Is a Gift of God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God.
+For it is written (Deut. 32:4) that "the works of God are perfect." Now
+lifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of
+God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through
+lacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless (_informis_)
+when it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not
+from God, as stated above (I-II, Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore
+neither is lifeless faith from God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is
+written (John 7:23): "If a man receive circumcision on the
+sabbath-day, that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry
+at Me because I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?" Now
+faith heals man from unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God
+the gift of faith, is at the same time healed from all his sins. But
+this is not done except by living faith. Therefore living faith alone
+is a gift of God: and consequently lifeless faith is not from God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on 1 Cor. 13:2 says that "the faith which
+lacks charity is a gift of God." Now this is lifeless faith.
+Therefore lifeless faith is a gift of God.
+
+_I answer that,_ Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted
+that privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas
+sometimes it is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of
+its proper species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the
+humors is essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not
+essential to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since,
+therefore, when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign
+the cause of that thing as existing in its proper species, it follows
+that what is not the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the
+cause of the thing to which that privation belongs as being essential
+to its species. For we cannot assign as the cause of a sickness,
+something which is not the cause of a disturbance in the humors:
+though we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something which
+is not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the
+diaphanous body.
+
+Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of
+faith, since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic
+form, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 4). Consequently the cause of lifeless
+faith is that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this
+is God, as stated above (A. 1). It follows, therefore, that
+lifeless faith is a gift of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with
+the perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a
+perfection that suffices for the essential notion of faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The deformity of an act is essential to the act's
+species, considered as a moral act, as stated above (I, Q. 48, A. 1,
+ad 2; I-II, Q. 18, A. 5): for an act is said to be deformed through
+being deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of
+the act's circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of
+a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though He
+is the cause of the act as such.
+
+We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a
+due form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is
+compared to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the
+deformed act is not from God, so neither is a false faith; and as
+lifeless faith is from God, so too, acts that are good generically,
+though not quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in
+sinners, are from God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He who receives faith from God without charity, is
+healed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous
+unbelief is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing
+from committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that
+a man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to
+desist, without desisting from another act of sin, through the
+instigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is
+granted by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the
+gift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like, is given
+to some without charity.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 7
+
+OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there
+are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?
+
+(2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 7, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Fear Is an Effect of Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith. For
+an effect does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for it
+is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him."
+Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. Now
+fear and hope are contraries, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2):
+and faith begets hope, as a gloss observes on Matt. 1:2. Therefore
+fear is not an effect of faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one contrary does not cause another. Now the object
+of faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object of
+fear is an evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 1). Again, acts
+take their species from the object, according to what was stated
+above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . .
+believe and tremble."
+
+_I answer that,_ Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 41, A. 1). Now the principle of all appetitive
+movements is the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the
+principle of fear and of every appetitive movement must be an
+apprehension. Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension
+of certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with the
+Divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of the fear
+whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and this is servile fear.
+
+It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be
+separated from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself to
+Him, and holds Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate
+God as an unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the
+greatest evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of
+the first fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith is the cause, while
+living faith is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it
+makes man adhere to God and to be subject to Him by charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith, because if
+we knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and
+punishments, concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear
+Him. If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain
+articles of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then
+reverential fear follows, the result of which is that man submits his
+intellect to God, so as to believe in all the Divine promises. Hence
+the text quoted continues: "And your reward shall not be made void."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The same thing in respect of contraries can be the
+cause of contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith begets
+hope, in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which God
+awards to the just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it
+makes us appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on
+sinners.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The primary and formal object of faith is the good
+which is the First Truth; but the material object of faith includes
+also certain evils; for instance, that it is an evil either not to
+submit to God, or to be separated from Him, and that sinners will
+suffer penal evils from God: in this way faith can be the cause of
+fear.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 7, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Faith Has the Effect of Purifying the Heart?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For
+purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith
+is in the intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying
+the heart.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible with
+impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may be
+seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not
+purify the heart.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any way,
+it would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not purify
+the intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge.
+Therefore faith nowise purifies the heart.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Peter said (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their hearts by
+faith."
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing is impure through being mixed with baser
+things: for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which
+betters it, but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that
+the rational creature is more excellent than all transient and
+corporeal creatures; so that it becomes impure through subjecting
+itself to transient things by loving them. From this impurity the
+rational creature is purified by means of a contrary movement,
+namely, by tending to that which is above it, viz. God. The first
+beginning of this movement is faith: since "he that cometh to God
+must believe that He is," according to Heb. 11:6. Hence the first
+beginning of the heart's purifying is faith; and if this be perfected
+through being quickened by charity, the heart will be perfectly
+purified thereby.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Things that are in the intellect are the principles of
+those which are in the appetite, in so far as the apprehended good
+moves the appetite.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity which
+is contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the
+human intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself,
+through wishing to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible
+objects. But when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible
+with any kind of impurity, because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov.
+10:12).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity
+of sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect,
+according to the present state of life.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 8
+
+OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider the gifts of understanding and knowledge, which
+respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of
+understanding there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
+
+(2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person?
+
+(3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is
+only speculative, or practical also?
+
+(4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of
+understanding?
+
+(5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace?
+
+(6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other
+gifts.
+
+(7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift?
+
+(8) Which of the fruits?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Understanding Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the
+Holy Ghost. For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of
+nature, since they are given in addition to the latter. Now
+understanding is a natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident
+principles are known, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 6. Therefore it should
+not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures according
+to their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now
+the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a
+sign of understanding), but discursively (which is a sign of reason),
+as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine knowledge
+which is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason rather
+than a gift of understanding.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is
+condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9, 10). Now no gift of the Holy
+Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost
+should receive the name of understanding.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
+shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding."
+
+_I answer that,_ Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for
+"intelligere" [to understand] is the same as "intus legere" [to read
+inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference
+between intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned
+with external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge
+penetrates into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the
+intellect is "what a thing is," as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 6.
+
+Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find
+which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under
+the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under
+words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the
+truth they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is
+enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is
+perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and
+vice versa. Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all
+these things.
+
+Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things
+as it were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the
+understanding, the further can it penetrate into the heart of things.
+Now the natural light of our understanding is of finite power;
+wherefore it can reach to a certain fixed point. Consequently man
+needs a supernatural light in order to penetrate further still so
+as to know what it cannot know by its natural light: and this
+supernatural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift of
+understanding.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The natural light instilled within us, manifests only
+certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since man
+is ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q. 2, A. 3;
+I-II, Q. 3, A. 8), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for
+which he requires the gift of understanding.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an
+understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by
+proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of
+reason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we
+ignored. Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something
+previously understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the
+light of nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore
+this addition is not called "reason" but "understanding," since the
+additional light is in comparison with what we know supernaturally,
+what the natural light is in regard to those things which we know
+from the first.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: "Will" denotes simply a movement of the appetite
+without indicating any excellence; whereas "understanding" denotes a
+certain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of
+things. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding
+rather than after the will.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Compatible with Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is
+incompatible with faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15)
+that "the thing which is understood is bounded by the comprehension
+of him who understands it." But the thing which is believed is not
+comprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippians
+3:12: "Not as though I had already comprehended [Douay: 'attained'],
+or were already perfect." Therefore it seems that faith and
+understanding are incompatible in the same subject.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is understood is seen by the understanding.
+But faith is of things that appear not, as stated above (Q. 1, A.
+4; Q. 4, A. 1). Therefore faith is incompatible with understanding
+in the same subject.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, understanding is more certain than science. But
+science and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated
+above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Much less, therefore, can understanding
+and faith be in the same subject.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding
+enlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard." Now one who
+has faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard;
+thus it is written (Luke 24:27, 32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures
+to His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore
+understanding is compatible with faith.
+
+_I answer that,_ We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on
+the side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.
+
+On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain
+things, of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery
+to three Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son;
+whereas other things come under faith, through being subordinate, in
+one way or another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that
+is contained in the Divine Scriptures.
+
+On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that
+there are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way,
+we understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the
+essence of the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in
+itself of the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the
+state of faith lasts, we cannot understand those things which are the
+direct object of faith: although certain other things that are
+subordinate to faith can be understood even in this way.
+
+In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of
+a thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity
+or mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward
+appearances, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we
+understand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the
+sake of things that appear externally. In this way, even during the
+state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those
+things which are the direct object of faith.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three
+argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to
+the understanding of matters subordinate to faith.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Merely Speculative or Also
+Practical?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of
+the Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according
+to Gregory (Moral. i, 32), "understanding penetrates certain more
+exalted things." But the practical intellect is occupied, not with
+exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions
+are concerned. Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not
+practical.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the gift of understanding is something more
+excellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the
+intellectual virtue of understanding is concerned with none but
+necessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much
+more, therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but
+necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about necessary
+things, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and
+which may result from man's activity. Therefore the gift of
+understanding is not practical.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in
+matters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with
+which the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural
+reason, which is the directing principle in matters of action, as was
+made clear above (I-II, Q. 58, A. 2; I-II, Q. 71, A. 6). Therefore
+the gift of understanding is not practical.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 110:10): "A good understanding
+to all that do it."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the gift of understanding is
+not only about those things which come under faith first and
+principally, but also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good
+actions have a certain relationship to faith: since "faith worketh
+through charity," according to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift
+of understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though these
+were its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our actions
+is the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by
+the gift of understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting
+it, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The things with which human actions are concerned are
+not surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred
+to the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness,
+they are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The excellence of the gift of understanding consists
+precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not only
+as they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is
+the more excellent, according to the greater extent of its object.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The rule of human actions is the human reason and the
+eternal law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6). Now the eternal law
+surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as
+ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and requires
+the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Gift of Understanding Is in All Who Are in a State of
+Grace?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in
+all who are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49)
+that "the gift of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness
+of mind." Now many who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of
+mind. Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a
+state of grace.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, of all the things that are connected with knowledge,
+faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by faith
+Christ dwells in our hearts, according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift of
+understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who
+have faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says
+(De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not
+necessary for salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in
+a state of grace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, those things which are common to all who are in a
+state of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of
+understanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself
+profitably, for, at times, "when the mind is puffed up with
+understanding sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base
+and vile things," as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the
+gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 81:5): "They have not known or
+understood, they walk on in darkness." But no one who is in a state
+of grace walks in darkness, according to John 8:12: "He that
+followeth Me, walketh not in darkness." Therefore no one who is in a
+state of grace is without the gift of understanding.
+
+_I answer that,_ In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs
+be rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man's will for good,
+according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will
+cannot be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some
+knowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good
+understood, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy
+Ghost directs man's will by the gift of charity, so as to move it
+directly to some supernatural good; so also, by the gift of
+understanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that it knows some
+supernatural truth, to which the right will needs to tend.
+
+Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have
+sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer dulness of
+mind with regard to things that are not necessary for salvation; but
+with regard to those that are necessary for salvation, they are
+sufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 John 2:27:
+"His unction teacheth you of all things."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although not all who have faith understand fully the
+things that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that
+they ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate
+from them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift
+of understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in order
+that they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes
+with regard to other things, so that their mind is unable to
+penetrate all things clearly.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Found Also in Those Who Have Not
+Sanctifying Grace?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is found
+also in those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in
+expounding the words of Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for
+Thy justifications," says: "Understanding flies ahead, and man's will
+is weak and slow to follow." But in all who have sanctifying grace,
+the will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of
+understanding can be in those who have not sanctifying grace.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of
+understanding in a" prophetic "vision," so that, seemingly, there is
+no prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be
+prophecy without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Matt. 7:22, where
+those who say: "We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg.: 'Have we not
+prophesied in Thy name?']," are answered with the words: "I never knew
+you." Therefore the gift of understanding can be without sanctifying
+grace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue
+of faith, according to Isa. 7:9, following another reading [*The
+Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand."
+Now faith can be without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of
+understanding can be without it.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 6:45): "Every one that hath
+heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now it is by
+the intellect, as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn
+or understand what we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of
+understanding, cometh to Christ, which is impossible without
+sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be
+without sanctifying grace.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2) the gifts of
+the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the
+motion of the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of
+grace is called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's
+understanding is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of
+which movement depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore
+unless the human intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to
+have a right estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of
+understanding, however much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in
+regard to other truths that are preambles to the faith.
+
+Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in
+error about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest
+good: and no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in
+moral matters a man has a right estimate about the end through a habit
+of virtue. Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without
+sanctifying grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: By understanding Augustine means any kind of
+intellectual light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions
+of a gift, unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a
+right estimate about the end.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The understanding that is requisite for prophecy, is a
+kind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things revealed
+to the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind with
+regard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs to the
+gift of understanding.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed but
+understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which
+perception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard
+the end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between
+understanding and faith.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Distinct from the Other Gifts?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not
+distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between
+things whose opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to
+folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to
+rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states
+(Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference between
+folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does
+understanding differ from the other gifts.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs
+from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be
+about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not
+about any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first
+principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally
+self-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as
+are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first
+principles in supernatural knowledge, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7).
+Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other
+intellectual gifts.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or
+practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as
+stated above (A. 3). Therefore it is not distinct from the other
+intellectual gifts, but comprises them all.
+
+_On the contrary,_ When several things are enumerated together they
+must be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction
+is the origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated
+together with the other gifts, as appears from Isa. 11:2. Therefore
+the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts.
+
+_I answer that,_ The difference between the gift of understanding and
+three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident,
+since the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while
+the three belong to the appetitive power.
+
+But the difference between this gift of understanding and the
+remaining three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also
+belong to the cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William
+of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of
+understanding differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in
+that these two belong to practical knowledge, while the gift of
+understanding belongs to speculative knowledge; and that it differs
+from the gift of wisdom, which also belongs to speculative knowledge,
+in that wisdom is concerned with judgment, while understanding
+renders the mind apt to grasp the things that are proposed, and to
+penetrate into their very heart. And in this sense we have assigned
+the number of the gifts, above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4).
+
+But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is
+concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters,
+as stated above (A. 3), and likewise, the gift of knowledge regards
+both matters, as we shall show further on (Q. 9, A. 3), and
+consequently, we must take their distinction in some other way. For
+all these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which,
+in us, takes its foundation from faith. Now "faith is through
+hearing" (Rom. 10:17). Hence some things must be proposed to be
+believed by man, not as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by
+faith. But faith, first and principally, is about the First Truth,
+secondarily, about certain considerations concerning creatures, and
+furthermore extends to the direction of human actions, in so far as
+it works through charity, as appears from what has been said above
+(Q. 4, A. 2, ad 3).
+
+Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief,
+two things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated
+or grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of
+understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these
+things aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these
+things, and to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with
+regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard
+to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its
+application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The foregoing difference between those four gifts is
+clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which
+Gregory assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to
+sharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp,
+when it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are
+proposed to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind
+unable to pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a
+fool if he judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore
+folly is properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright
+about the universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind,
+even about any particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to
+knowledge, which gives man a right judgment about particular causes,
+viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to counsel, whereby
+man does not proceed to action before deliberating with his reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The gift of understanding is about the first principles
+of that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise than
+faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it
+belongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the
+things that are said.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of
+knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment,
+but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Sixth Beatitude, "Blessed Are the Clean of Heart," etc.,
+Responds to the Gift of Understanding?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the
+clean of heart, for they shall see God," does not respond to the gift
+of understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly
+to the appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the
+appetite, but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the
+aforesaid beatitude does not respond to the gift of understanding.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their
+hearts by faith." Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart
+being purified. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is related to
+the virtue of faith rather than to the gift of understanding.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the
+present state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the
+present life, since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed,
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8). Therefore the sixth beatitude
+which comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of
+understanding.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
+sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to
+the clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye
+hath not seen."
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as
+also in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the
+other by way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 69, AA. 2, 4), and each of these, in some way, responds
+to the gift of understanding.
+
+For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to
+seeing God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of inordinate
+affections: and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and
+gifts belonging to the appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart
+is a kind of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of
+the mind that is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the
+truths which are proposed to it about God, no longer by way of
+corporeal phantasms, nor infected with heretical misrepresentations:
+and this cleanness is the result of the gift of understanding.
+
+Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God's
+Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though we see not
+what God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more
+perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He
+surpasses all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God
+belongs to the gift of understanding; the first, to the gift of
+understanding in its state of perfection, as possessed in heaven; the
+second, to the gift of understanding in its state of inchoation, as
+possessed by wayfarers.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two
+arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while the third refers
+to the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in
+this life by way of inchoation, and will be fulfilled, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 69, A. 2).
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Faith, Among the Fruits, Responds to the Gift of
+Understanding?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not
+respond to the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit
+of faith, since it is written (Isa. 7:9) according to another reading
+[*The Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not
+understand," where our version has: "If you will not believe, you
+shall not continue." Therefore fruit is not the fruit of
+understanding.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what
+follows. But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the
+foundation of the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above (Q. 4,
+AA. 1, 7). Therefore faith is not the fruit of understanding.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the
+appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect;
+namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite.
+Therefore faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more
+than to wisdom, knowledge or counsel.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of
+understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith,
+which certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says
+that the "faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen."
+Therefore faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of
+understanding.
+
+_I answer that,_ The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above (I-II, Q.
+70, A. 1), when we were discussing them, are so called because they
+are something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of
+the Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an
+end, which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that
+which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be,
+after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to
+the other powers.
+
+Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a
+power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same
+power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will.
+In this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to
+the gift of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while
+the fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the
+will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a virtue.
+But we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind of
+certitude of faith, to which man attains by the gift of understanding.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it
+would be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to be
+believed, without understanding it in some way. However, the
+perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith: which
+perfection of understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty
+of faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist in that
+very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for its own
+sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand,
+speculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is
+the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which
+belongs only to practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of
+its own: while the gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge,
+which can belongs also to speculative knowledge, have but one
+corresponding fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith.
+The reason why there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive
+faculty, is because, as already stated, the character of end, which
+the word fruit implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the
+intellective part.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 9
+
+OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are
+four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether knowledge is a gift?
+
+(2) Whether it is about Divine things?
+
+(3) Whether it is speculative or practical?
+
+(4) Which beatitude responds to it?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Knowledge Is a Gift?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the
+gifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge
+implies an effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says
+(Poster. i, 2) that a "demonstration is a syllogism which produces
+knowledge." Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy
+persons, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 4; I-II, Q. 68, A. 5). Now
+Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful lack
+knowledge though they have faith." Therefore knowledge is not a gift.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Therefore one gift suffices for
+the perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds
+to the virtue of faith, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 2). Therefore the
+gift of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear
+to which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are
+perfections of virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2), it
+seems that knowledge is not a gift.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Isa.
+11:2).
+
+_I answer that,_ Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore,
+does not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature.
+Now, when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to
+some truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth:
+first, because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure
+judgment on it.
+
+Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human
+intellect may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of
+these is that he should have a sound grasp of the things that are
+proposed to be believed, and this pertains to the gift of
+understanding, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 6): while the other is that
+he should have a sure and right judgment on them, so as to discern
+what is to be believed, from what is not to be believed, and for this
+the gift of knowledge is required.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures,
+according to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms
+a sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his
+reason: and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative
+reasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of
+truth, without any discursive process, by simple intuition, as was
+stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 7); wherefore God's knowledge is
+not discursive, or argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which
+that knowledge is likened which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it
+is a participated likeness thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief.
+One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning
+things to be believed from things not to be believed: in this way
+knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a
+knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what
+one ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to
+induce others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This
+knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not
+given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted,
+adds: "It is one thing for a man merely to know what he ought to
+believe, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to the
+godly, and to defend it against the ungodly."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and
+intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the
+theological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the
+perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is
+not unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological
+virtue.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is About Divine Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine
+things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets,
+nourishes and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things,
+because its object is the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1).
+Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than
+acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine
+things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore
+is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Rom. 1:20, "the invisible things of God
+. . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
+made." If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems
+that there is also knowledge of Divine things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge
+of Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of
+human affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge."
+
+_I answer that,_ A sure judgment about a thing is formed chiefly from
+its cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the
+order of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the
+second, so ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed
+through the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first
+cause through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed
+through the first cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.
+
+Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common
+name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short
+of the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most
+perfect thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of
+convertible terms, that which signifies "what a thing is," is given
+the special name of "definition," but the convertible terms which
+fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called "proper"
+terms.
+
+Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment
+as stated above (A. 1), if this certitude of the judgment is derived
+from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is
+wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows
+the highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of
+all matters by that cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who
+knows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the
+knowledge of Divine things is called "wisdom," while the knowledge
+of human things is called "knowledge," this being the common name
+denoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment
+which is formed through second causes. Accordingly, if we take
+knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom,
+so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or created things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet
+faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence
+to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge,
+but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of
+union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of
+wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic
+acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special
+gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through
+created things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), every cognitive habit
+regards formally the mean through which things are known, and
+materially, the things that are known through the mean. And since
+that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those
+sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from
+mathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical
+sciences, though, as to their matter they have more in common with
+physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated in _Phys._  ii, 2
+that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man knows God
+through His creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to which
+it belongs formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs
+materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to
+Divine things, this pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is Practical Knowledge?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered
+among the gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin.
+xii, 14) that "knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we
+make use of external things." But the knowledge which is concerned
+about actions is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is
+practical.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought if
+it hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it
+lacks the discernment of knowledge." Now it follows from this
+authority that knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a
+speculative science. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not
+speculative but practical.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the
+righteous, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 5). But speculative knowledge
+can be also in the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: "To
+him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a
+sin." Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but
+practical.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge on her own
+day prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in
+the mind." Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds
+of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of
+knowledge is both speculative and practical.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 9, A. 8), the gift of knowledge,
+like the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of
+faith. Now faith consists primarily and principally in speculation,
+in as much as it is founded on the First Truth. But since the First
+Truth is also the last end for the sake of which our works are done,
+hence it is that faith extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6:
+"Faith . . . worketh by charity."
+
+The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and
+principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what
+he ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works,
+since we are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of
+faith, and of conclusions drawn therefrom.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge, in so
+far as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge, yet
+not action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.
+
+Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As we have already stated (Q. 8, A. 5) about the gift
+of understanding, not everyone who understands, has the gift of
+understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of grace:
+and so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that
+they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about matters
+of faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as never
+to wander from the straight path of justice. This is the knowledge of
+holy things, according to Wis. 10:10: "She conducted the just . . .
+through the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of holy
+things."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Third Beatitude, "Blessed Are They That Mourn," etc.
+Corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the third beatitude, "Blessed are they
+that mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even
+as evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy.
+Now knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter
+is known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and
+the crooked line" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude
+does not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now
+there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there
+joy, since it is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no
+bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness."
+Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with
+the gift of knowledge.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation,
+before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation,
+sorrow does not correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is
+not concerned about things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii,
+9). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to
+correspond with the gift of knowledge.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv):
+"Knowledge befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been
+mastered by the evil which he coveted as though it were good."
+
+_I answer that,_ Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to
+knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God
+is occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: "Creatures . . . are turned
+to an abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of
+those, namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they
+deem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing
+their last end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a
+right judgment of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of
+which they may be the occasion), which judgment he exercises through
+the gift of knowledge.
+
+Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of
+knowledge.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in
+so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper
+cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy
+correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of
+knowledge there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past
+errors, and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right
+judgment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this reason
+sorrow is set forth in this beatitude, as the merit, and the
+resulting consolation, as the reward; which is begun in this life,
+and is perfected in the life to come.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he
+may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers:
+it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it
+consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in
+considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude
+does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in
+well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the
+beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is
+not ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are
+about Divine things.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 10
+
+OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL
+(In Twelve Articles)
+
+In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief,
+which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to
+confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which
+are contrary to knowledge and understanding.
+
+As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general;
+(2) heresy; (3) apostasy from the faith.
+
+Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?
+
+(2) What is its subject?
+
+(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
+
+(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?
+
+(5) Of the species of unbelief;
+
+(6) Of their comparison, one with another;
+
+(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?
+
+(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?
+
+(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?
+
+(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?
+
+(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?
+
+(12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against
+their parents' will?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Unbelief Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin
+is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now
+unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De
+Praedest. Sanct. v) that "to be capable to having faith, just as to be
+capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have
+faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful."
+Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a
+sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every
+sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid unbelief,
+for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says
+(Rom. 10:14): "How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not
+heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?" Therefore
+unbelief does not seem to be a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), there are seven
+capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not
+seem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a
+sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue,
+and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of
+pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because
+he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of
+opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the
+faith, or despises it, according to Isa. 53:1: "Who hath believed our
+report?" It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is
+in this sense that unbelief is a sin.
+
+If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in
+those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character,
+not of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine
+things is a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like
+unbelievers are damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot
+be taken away without faith, but not on account of their sin of
+unbelief. Hence Our Lord said (John 15:22) "If I had not come, and
+spoken to them, they would not have sin"; which Augustine expounds
+(Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as "referring to the sin whereby they
+believed not in Christ."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it
+is part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his inner
+instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way,
+unbelief is contrary to nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure
+negation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride,
+through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules
+of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence
+Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumptuous innovations arise
+from vainglory."
+
+It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not
+reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices
+opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital
+vices.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Unbelief Is in the Intellect As Its Subject?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as
+its subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De
+Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above (A. 1).
+Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching
+of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore unbelief
+is in the will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Cor.
+11:14 "Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light," says
+that if "a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for
+a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does
+or says what is becoming to a good angel." This seems to be because
+of the rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel,
+since his intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin
+of unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and,
+consequently, it does not reside in the intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Things which are contrary to one another are in
+the same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in
+the intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2), sin is said
+to be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a
+sinful act may have two principles: one is its first and universal
+principle, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will,
+because every sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act
+is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act:
+thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and lust,
+wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now
+dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the
+intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as assent is.
+
+Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate
+subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which
+way every sin is said to be in the will.
+
+Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The will's contempt causes the intellect's dissent,
+which completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of unbelief
+is in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one, does
+not dissent from a matter of faith, because "his bodily senses are
+deceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and right
+judgment" as the gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But,
+according to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to
+invite one to his abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is not without
+sin.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Unbelief Is the Greatest of Sins?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
+For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): "I should hesitate
+to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a
+heretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact
+that he is a heretic." But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we
+ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not,
+seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes
+sin: for the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12, 13): "I . . . before was a
+blasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . .
+mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore
+unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment,
+according to Deut. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall
+the measure also of the stripes be." Now a greater punishment is due
+to believers than to unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much
+more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden
+under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the
+testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?" Therefore unbelief is
+not the greatest of sins.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine, commenting on John 15:22, "If I had not
+come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin," says (Tract.
+lxxxix in Joan.): "Under the general name, He refers to a singularly
+great sin. For this," viz. infidelity, "is the sin to which all others
+may be traced." Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.
+
+_I answer that,_ Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3). Hence the more a
+sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever
+separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true
+knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not
+approach Him, but is severed from Him.
+
+Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know
+Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God.
+Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any
+sin that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to
+the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall
+state further on (Q. 20, A. 3; Q. 34, A. 2, ad 2; Q. 39, A. 2, ad 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus
+from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence
+Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic
+not sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more
+grave generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and
+conversely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be
+aggravated.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory
+thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter
+respect it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this
+ignorance, it has a certain reason for excuse, especially when a
+man sins not from malice, as was the case with the Apostle.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of
+unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider
+the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery,
+committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other
+things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on
+account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account
+of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and
+which he insults by committing sin.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Every Act of an Unbeliever Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin.
+Because a gloss on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin,"
+says: "The whole life of unbelievers is a sin." Now the life of
+unbelievers consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an
+unbeliever is a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no
+good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among
+unbelievers, no action can be good.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which
+follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of
+all the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in
+unbelievers, they can do no good work, but sin in every action of
+theirs.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever
+(Acts 10:4, 31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not
+every action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are
+good.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 85, AA. 2, 4) mortal sin
+takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of
+nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are
+without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them.
+Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works
+which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a
+certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature
+suffices.
+
+Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but
+whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For
+even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or
+even mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an
+unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to
+the end of his unbelief.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the
+life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is
+taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence
+the same authority adds: "Because every one that lives or acts
+according to his unbelief, sins grievously."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the
+supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can
+direct the intention in respect of a connatural good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in
+unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them,
+whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With
+regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not
+an unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God,
+whom none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the
+truth of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent
+to him to give him fuller instruction in the faith.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 5]
+
+Whether There Are Several Species of Unbelief?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of
+unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another,
+they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is
+the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter
+contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also
+is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves
+are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends
+not on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not
+several species of unbelief, according to the various points which
+the unbeliever disbelieves.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in
+an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of
+unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to
+follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and
+consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of
+our consideration.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different species.
+Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different points
+of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of
+species of unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Several species of vice are opposed to each
+virtue, because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways,"
+according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii,
+6). Now faith is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are
+opposed to it.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4; I-II, Q. 64, A.
+1), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge
+or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter,
+whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices
+are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are
+opposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with
+regard to their different relations to the virtue: and in this way
+there are determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to
+a moral virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and
+another, by falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of
+vices opposed to one virtue may be considered in respect of the
+corruption of the various conditions required for that virtue. In
+this way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g.
+temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in
+which the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that
+the rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans
+held evil to be infinite.
+
+Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison
+to faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in
+number. For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the
+faith, this may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted
+before it has been accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or
+heathens; or the Christian faith is resisted after it has been
+accepted, and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of
+the Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and such is the
+unbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way, reckon these
+three as species of unbelief.
+
+If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to
+the various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not
+determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied
+indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two
+ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case
+the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin,
+and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be
+considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is
+the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its
+species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must
+therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth
+considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect,
+considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that
+it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives
+its various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it
+adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of
+vice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by
+turning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various
+inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through
+adhering to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of
+unbelief, because unbelievers follow many false opinions.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the various species of unbelief
+according to various points in which errors occur.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many things
+in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things,
+be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing
+hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as
+one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily
+diseases.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Unbelief of Pagans or Heathens Is Graver Than Other Kinds?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is
+graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver
+according as it endangers the health of a more important member of
+the body, so does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed
+to that which holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which
+is most important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which
+the heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their
+unbelief is the gravest of all.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which
+contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important
+points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more
+detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ
+from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in
+more numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since
+they do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the
+gravest.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good
+in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from
+God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New
+Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who
+receive neither Testament.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 2:21): "It had been better
+for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have
+known it, to turn back." Now the heathens have not known the way of
+justice, whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing
+it in some way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), two things may be considered
+in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this
+point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more
+grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having
+accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised,
+sins more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way
+the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and
+resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that
+of the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since,
+however, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which
+they corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more
+grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not
+accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.
+
+The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of
+matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points
+than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of
+heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of
+the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of
+the Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens
+do.
+
+Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point
+of view of guilt; since, as stated above (A. 1) unbelief has the
+character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the
+mere absence of faith, for the latter as was stated (A. 1) seems
+rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking
+absolutely, the unbelief of heretics is the worst.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 7]
+
+Whether One Ought to Dispute with Unbelievers in Public?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with
+unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend
+not in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the
+hearers." But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly
+without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute
+publicly with unbelievers.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the
+canons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus:
+"It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if
+anyone ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which
+have once been judged and disposed of." Now all matters of faith have
+been decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the
+councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public
+about matters of faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments.
+But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter:
+whereas things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be
+a matter of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about
+matters of faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 9:22, 29) that "Saul
+increased much more in strength, and confounded the Jews," and that
+"he spoke . . . to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks."
+
+_I answer that,_ In disputing about the faith, two things must be
+observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of
+his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his
+intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about
+the faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as
+though he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would
+sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other
+hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to
+confute errors, or for practice.
+
+On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear
+the disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and
+wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith,
+there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their
+presence. But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction;
+because either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for
+instance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith
+in them, or else they are not subject to provocation in this matter,
+as in those countries where there are no unbelievers. In the first
+case it is necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided
+there be those who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting
+errors; since in this way simple people are strengthened in the
+faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to deceive,
+while if those who ought to withstand the perverters of the truth of
+faith were silent, this would tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory
+says (Pastor. ii, 4): "Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to
+error, so does an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might
+have been instructed." On the other hand, in the second case it is
+dangerous to dispute in public about the faith, in the presence of
+simple people, whose faith for this very reason is more firm, that
+they have never heard anything differing from what they believe.
+Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have to
+say against the faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but
+such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than
+of sound speeches.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That law forbade those public disputations about the
+faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are
+for the safeguarding thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as
+though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known,
+and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is
+necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by
+defending the faith, according to 1 Pet. 3:15: "Being ready always
+to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith
+which is in you [*Vulg.: 'Of that hope which is in you'; St. Thomas'
+reading is apparently taken from Bede]." Sometimes again, it is
+necessary, in order to convince those who are in error, according to
+Titus 1:9: "That he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to
+convince the gainsayers."
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Unbelievers Ought to Be Compelled to the Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be
+compelled to the faith. For it is written (Matt. 13:28) that the
+servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown,
+asked him: "Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?" and that he
+answered: "No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the
+wheat also together with it": on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom.
+xlvi in Matth.): "Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of
+men. For it is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will
+necessarily slay many innocent persons." Therefore it seems that for
+the same reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De
+Judaeis): "The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that
+for the future, none are to be compelled to believe." Therefore, in
+like manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that "it is
+possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot
+believe unless he is willing." Therefore it seems that unbelievers
+ought not to be compelled to the faith.
+
+Obj. 4: It is said in God's person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]): "I
+desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: 'of him that dieth']." Now
+we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 19, AA. 9, 10). Therefore we should not even wish
+unbelievers to be put to death.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 14:23): "Go out into the
+highways and hedges; and compel them to come in." Now men enter into
+the house of God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some
+ought to be compelled to the faith.
+
+_I answer that,_ Among unbelievers there are some who have never
+received the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are
+by no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may
+believe, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they
+should be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so
+that they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their
+evil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this
+reason that Christ's faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not
+indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even if
+they were to conquer them, and take them prisoners, they should still
+leave them free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent
+them from hindering the faith of Christ.
+
+On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have
+accepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all
+apostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that
+they may fulfil what they have promised, and hold what they, at one
+time, received.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid,
+not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from
+the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii)
+of himself: "It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to
+union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with
+arguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of
+contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law
+was so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has
+broken our chains asunder." Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's
+words, "Suffer both to grow until the harvest," must be gathered from
+those which precede, "lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root
+the wheat also together with it." For, Augustine says (Contra Ep.
+Parmen. iii, 2) "these words show that when this is not to be feared,
+that is to say, when a man's crime is so publicly known, and so
+hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as might cause
+a schism, the severity of discipline should not slacken."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought
+not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have
+received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in
+the same chapter.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a
+vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter
+of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received
+it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled
+to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep.
+clxxxv): "What do these people mean by crying out continually: 'We
+may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ
+compel?' They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and
+afterwards taught Him."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, "none of us
+wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve
+to have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war
+which he had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church
+gathers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the
+sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations."
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 9]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Communicate with Unbelievers?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with
+unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:27): "If any of them that
+believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything
+that is set before you." And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad
+Heb.): "If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without
+any reservation." Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate
+with him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do
+to judge them that are without?" Now unbelievers are without. When,
+therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with
+certain people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to
+communicate with unbelievers.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he
+communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his
+servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews,
+or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully
+communicate with them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 7:2, 3): "Thou shalt make no
+league with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make
+marriages with them": and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, "The woman who at
+the return of the month," etc. says: "It is so necessary to shun
+idolatry, that we should not come in touch with idolaters or their
+disciples, nor have any dealings with them."
+
+_I answer that,_ Communication with a particular person is forbidden to
+the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with
+whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of
+those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can
+be gathered from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had
+pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know
+you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump?" and afterwards
+he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the
+sentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge
+them that are within?"
+
+Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful
+to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the
+Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the
+right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal
+judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are
+guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some
+temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a
+punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those
+unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by
+corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the
+faith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of
+excommunication on both.
+
+With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish
+according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and
+time. For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that
+their communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of
+the latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith.
+These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have
+not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be
+some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people
+and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared
+as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with
+unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or
+to communicate with them without necessity.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against
+unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them:
+but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of
+temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church,
+for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication
+with certain unbelievers.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is more probability that a servant who is ruled
+by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his
+master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so
+the faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If,
+however, the master were in danger, through communicating with such
+a servant, he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command
+(Matt. 18:8): "If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and
+cast it from thee."
+
+With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition
+gives this solution before the Reply Obj. 2] sense the reply is that
+the Lord gave this command in reference to those nations into whose
+territory the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined
+to idolatry, so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent
+dealings with those nations, they should be estranged from the faith:
+hence the text goes on (Deut. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son
+from following Me."
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 10]
+
+Whether Unbelievers May Have Authority or Dominion Over the Faithful?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or
+dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1):
+"Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters
+worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of
+unbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing
+masters, let them not despise them." Moreover it is written (1 Pet.
+2:18): "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to
+the good and gentle, but also to the froward." Now this command would
+not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could
+have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers
+can have authority over the faithful.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his
+subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving
+princes' households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians
+(4:22): "All the saints salute you, especially they that are of
+Caesar's household," referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever.
+Therefore unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a slave
+is his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life, even
+as a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning the
+working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject
+to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore
+unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment
+on those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce
+judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): "Dare any
+of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the
+unjust," i.e. unbelievers, "and not before the saints?" Therefore it
+seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.
+
+_I answer that,_ That this question may be considered in two ways.
+First, we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the
+faithful as of a thing to be established for the first time. This
+ought by no means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and
+endanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their
+superiors to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of
+great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they
+see the faithful fall away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to
+go to law before an unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether
+forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over believers, or to have
+authority over them in any capacity whatever.
+
+Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force:
+and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions
+of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers
+arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of
+grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural
+reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers,
+considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of
+unbelievers over the faithful.
+
+Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done
+away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the
+authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief
+deserve to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted
+into children of God.
+
+This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those
+unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church
+and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew
+became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without
+paying any price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i.e. born in
+slavery; and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought
+for his service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he
+should be offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church
+harm them in this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to
+the Church, she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular
+princes have enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in
+favor of liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the
+above law to those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her
+members, in temporal matters, although she has the right to do so:
+and this, in order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Matt.
+17:25, 26) that He could be excused from paying the tribute, because
+"the children are free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in
+order to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that
+servants should honor their masters, adds, "lest the name of the
+Lord and His doctrine be blasphemed."
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction of
+faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the
+conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that
+there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor's household,
+that they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed
+Sebastian encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and,
+the while, remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace
+of Diocletian.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their whole
+lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything: whereas
+the craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special works.
+Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have dominion or
+authority over the faithful, than that they should be allowed to
+employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits Christians to
+work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail their living
+together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send
+master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6. Yet, if
+there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by such
+communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 11]
+
+Whether the Rites of Unbelievers Ought to Be Tolerated?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be
+tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their
+rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent
+therein, as a gloss observes on Rom. 1:32: "Not only they that do
+them, but they also that consent to them that do them." Therefore it
+is a sin to tolerate their rites.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry,
+because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, "Be not held again under the yoke of
+bondage," says: "The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of
+idolatry." But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the
+rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the
+temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as
+Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that
+even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above
+(A. 3). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not
+tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the
+rites of unbelievers to be tolerated.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist.
+xlv, can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be
+allowed to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their
+fathers have for ages observed them."
+
+_I answer that,_ Human government is derived from the Divine
+government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful
+and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take
+place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them,
+greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly
+in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly
+tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain
+greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): "If
+you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust."
+Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated,
+either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of
+some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their
+rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we
+hold, there follows this good--that our very enemies bear witness to
+our faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to
+speak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their
+rites.
+
+On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither
+truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except
+perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance
+that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if
+they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For
+this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of
+heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 12]
+
+Whether the Children of Jews and Other Unbelievers Ought to Be
+Baptized Against Their Parents' Will?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other
+unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the
+bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority
+over children, since the right of parental authority can be made to
+cease, when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot
+be severed by man, according to Matt. 19:6: "What . . . God hath
+joined together let no man put asunder." And yet the marriage bond is
+broken on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15):
+"If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is
+not under servitude in such cases": and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima,
+and Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if the unbelieving partner is
+unwilling to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator,
+then the other partner is not bound to cohabitation." Much more,
+therefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents'
+authority over their children: and consequently their children may be
+baptized against their parents' will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger
+of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death.
+Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death
+and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and
+other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they be
+left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it
+seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and
+instructed in the faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen,
+and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings
+and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings
+and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children.
+Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against
+their parents' wishes.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his
+soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore
+it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents,
+and consecrated to God in Baptism.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching
+does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt
+of punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue
+through not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach,
+according to the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who "sees the
+sword coming and sounds not the trumpet." Much more therefore, if
+Jewish children are lost through not being baptized are they
+accounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would
+be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against
+their will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority
+over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these
+should not be baptized against their parents' will.
+
+_I answer that,_ The custom of the Church has very great authority
+and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very
+doctrine of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church.
+Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by
+that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it
+was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of the
+Jews against the will of their parents, although at times past there
+have been many very powerful catholic princes like Constantine and
+Theodosius, with whom most holy bishops have been on most friendly
+terms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius,
+who would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from them if
+it had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat
+this assertion, that the children of Jews should be baptized against
+their parents' wishes, in contradiction to the Church's custom
+observed hitherto.
+
+There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger
+to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of
+reason, afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be
+persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly
+embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith.
+
+The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child
+is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct
+from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its
+mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of
+its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is
+like a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason,
+he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a
+horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use
+them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the
+natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his
+father's care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a
+child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from
+its parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents'
+wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its
+free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after
+itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then
+it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace
+the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even
+against its parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of
+reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that
+they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given
+to understand that it is the parents' duty to look after the
+salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use
+of reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the
+use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the
+other's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes
+to the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child
+has come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: No one should be snatched from natural death against
+the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the
+judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence:
+hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a
+child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from
+the danger of everlasting death.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which
+does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can
+know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the
+natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason,
+under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose
+of the child in all matters relating to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching,
+threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching.
+Hence it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made thee a
+watchman to the children [Vulg.: 'house'] of Israel." On the other
+hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of
+unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the
+danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their
+children fail to obtain salvation.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 11
+
+OF HERESY
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?
+
+(2) Of the matter about which it is;
+
+(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?
+
+(4) Whether converts should be received?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Heresy Is a Species of Unbelief?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief.
+For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 2).
+Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather
+to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf.
+Decretals xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] "The works of the flesh are
+manifest: Heresy is derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby
+a man makes choice of that school which he deems best." But choice is
+an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1).
+Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end; hence
+the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery that
+he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer." Now the end of
+heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which
+belong to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De
+Util. Credendi i) that "a heretic is one who either devises or
+follows false and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit,
+especially that he may lord and be honored above others." Therefore
+heresy is a species of pride rather than of unbelief.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would
+seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of
+the flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh
+are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness," and among the
+others, he adds, "dissensions, sects," which are the same as
+heresies. Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is
+one who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is
+opposed to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it
+is a species of unbelief.
+
+_I answer that,_ The word heresy as stated in the first objection
+denotes a choosing. Now choice as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 3) is
+about things directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in
+matters of faith, the will assents to some truth, as to its proper
+good, as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 3): wherefore that which is the
+chief truth, has the character of last end, while those which are
+secondary truths, have the character of being directed to the end.
+
+Now, whoever believes, assents to someone's words; so that, in every
+form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to
+hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by
+holding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place.
+Consequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his
+will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong to His doctrine.
+
+Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the
+rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to
+assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in
+respect of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in
+pagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to
+Christ, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents
+to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the
+suggestions of his own mind.
+
+Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who
+profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the will
+regards faith, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Vices take their species from their proximate end,
+while, from their remote end, they take their genus and cause. Thus
+in the case of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is the
+species of adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the
+ultimate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result of the
+theft, and is included under it, as an effect under its cause, or a
+species under its genus, as appears from what we have said about acts
+in general (I-II, Q. 18, A. 7). Wherefore, as to the case in point
+also, the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one's own false
+opinion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote end
+reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or covetousness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as heresy is so called from its being a choosing
+[*From the Greek _hairein_, to cut off], so does sect derive its name
+from its being a cutting off (_secando_), as Isidore states (Etym.
+viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing, and each
+belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the act
+itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by reason
+of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in which way
+it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second
+objection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to
+error, as the Philosopher states in _Metaph._ iv; _Ed. Did._ iii, 5),
+for this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, in as much
+as its act is independent on a bodily organ.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Heresy Is Properly About Matters of Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters
+of faith. For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians,
+so were there among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes
+(Etym. viii, 3, 4, 5). Now their dissensions were not about matters
+of faith. Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though
+they were its proper matter.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now
+heresy is not only about things, but also about works, and about
+interpretations of Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that
+"whoever expounds the Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy
+Ghost by Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though he
+may not have left the Church": and elsewhere he says that "heresies
+spring up from words spoken amiss." [*St. Thomas quotes this saying
+elsewhere, in Sent. iv, D, 13, and III, Q. 16, A. 8, but it is
+not to be found in St. Jerome's works.] Therefore heresy is not
+properly about the matter of faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about
+matters pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on
+the question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet
+this was without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not
+properly about the matter of faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ.
+Dei xviii, 51]: "In Christ's Church, those are heretics, who hold
+mischievous and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may
+think soundly and rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing
+to mend their pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending
+them." Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which
+are contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby "the just man liveth"
+(Rom. 1:17). Therefore heresy is about matters of faith, as about its
+proper matter.
+
+_I answer that,_ We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a
+corruption of the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption
+of the Christian faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that
+are not of faith, for instance, in questions of geometry and so
+forth, which cannot belong to the faith by any means; but only when a
+person has a false opinion about things belonging to the faith.
+
+Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above (I, Q.
+32, A. 4; I-II, Q. 1, A. 6, ad 1; I-II, Q. 2, A. 5), in one way,
+directly and principally, e.g. the articles of faith; in another way,
+indirectly and secondarily, e.g. those matters, the denial of which
+leads to the corruption of some article of faith; and there may be
+heresy in either way, even as there can be faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees were
+about opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies
+among Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another sense
+than that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the meaning
+of Holy Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has
+revealed. Hence it is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets:
+"They have persisted to confirm what they have said," viz. by false
+interpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by
+the words that he utters, since confession is an act of faith, as
+stated above (Q. 3, A. 1). Wherefore inordinate words about matters
+of faith may lead to corruption of the faith; and hence it is that
+Pope Leo says in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: "The
+enemies of Christ's cross lie in wait for our every deed and word, so
+that, if we but give them the slightest pretext, they may accuse us
+mendaciously of agreeing with Nestorius."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it stated
+in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): "By no means
+should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse
+their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek
+the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when
+they have found the truth," because, to wit, they do not make a
+choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly,
+certain doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding
+of which in this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is
+concerned, or even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined
+by the Church; although if anyone were obstinately to deny them after
+they had been defined by the authority of the universal Church, he
+would be deemed a heretic. This authority resides chiefly in the
+Sovereign Pontiff. For we read [*Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]:
+"Whenever a question of faith is in dispute, I think, that all our
+brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the matter to none other
+than Peter, as being the source of their name and honor, against
+whose authority neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of the holy
+doctors defended their opinion." Hence Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol
+[*Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]): "This, most blessed
+Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in the Catholic Church.
+If anything therein has been incorrectly or carelessly expressed, we
+beg that it may be set aright by you who hold the faith and see of
+Peter. If however this, our profession, be approved by the judgment
+of your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that he himself
+is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic but a heretic."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Heretics Ought to Be Tolerated?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the
+Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:24, 25): "The servant of the Lord must not
+wrangle . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if
+peradventure God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they
+may recover themselves from the snares of the devil." Now if heretics
+are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of
+repentance. Therefore it seems contrary to the Apostle's command.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be
+tolerated. Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle
+says (1 Cor. 11:19): "There must be . . . heresies, that they . . .
+who are reproved, may be manifest among you." Therefore it seems that
+heretics should be tolerated.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Master commanded his servants (Matt. 13:30) to
+suffer the cockle "to grow until the harvest," i.e. the end of the
+world, as a gloss explains it. Now holy men explain that the cockle
+denotes heretics. Therefore heretics should be tolerated.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Titus 3:10, 11): "A man that is a
+heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that
+he, that is such an one, is subverted."
+
+_I answer that,_ With regard to heretics two points must be observed:
+one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On
+their own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be
+separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed
+from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt
+the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which
+supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other
+evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority,
+much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted
+of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death.
+
+On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the
+conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but
+"after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs:
+after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for
+his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating
+him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him
+to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by
+death. For Jerome commenting on Gal. 5:9, "A little leaven," says:
+"Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest
+the whole house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock,
+burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as
+that spark was not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by
+its flame."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This very modesty demands that the heretic should be
+admonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to
+retract, he must be reckoned as already "subverted," as we may gather
+from the words of the Apostle quoted above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the
+intention of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the
+faithful being put to the test, and "makes us shake off our
+sluggishness, and search the Scriptures more carefully," as Augustine
+states (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the
+corruption of the faith, which is to inflict very great harm indeed.
+Consequently we should consider what they directly intend, and expel
+them, rather than what is beside their intention, and so, tolerate
+them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can. Notandum),
+"to be excommunicated is not to be uprooted." A man is
+excommunicated, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his "spirit may
+be saved in the day of Our Lord." Yet if heretics be altogether
+uprooted by death, this is not contrary to Our Lord's command, which
+is to be understood as referring to the case when the cockle cannot
+be plucked up without plucking up the wheat, as we explained above
+(Q. 10, A. 8, ad 1), when treating of unbelievers in general.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Church Should Receive Those Who Return from Heresy?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to
+receive those who return from heresy. For it is written (Jer. 3:1) in
+the person of the Lord: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers;
+nevertheless return to Me saith the Lord." Now the sentence of the
+Church is God's sentence, according to Deut. 1:17: "You shall hear the
+little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man's
+person, because it is the judgment of God." Therefore even those who
+are guilty of the prostitution of unbelief which is spiritual
+prostitution, should be received all the same.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Our Lord commanded Peter (Matt. 18:22) to forgive
+his offending brother "not" only "till seven times, but till seventy
+times seven times," which Jerome expounds as meaning that "a man
+should be forgiven, as often as he has sinned." Therefore he ought to
+be received by the Church as often as he has sinned by falling back
+into heresy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other unbelievers
+who wish to be converted are received by the Church. Therefore
+heretics also should be received.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix)
+says that "those who are found to have relapsed into the error which
+they had already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal."
+Therefore they should not be received by the Church.
+
+_I answer that,_ In obedience to Our Lord's institution, the Church
+extends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who
+persecute her, according to Matt. 5:44: "Love your enemies; do good
+to them that hate you." Now it is part of charity that we should both
+wish and work our neighbor's good. Again, good is twofold: one is
+spiritual, namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the
+object of charity, since it is this chiefly that we should wish for
+one another. Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who
+return after falling no matter how often, are admitted by the Church
+to Penance whereby the way of salvation is opened to them.
+
+The other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz.
+temporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions, good
+repute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by
+charity to wish others this good, except in relation to the eternal
+salvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of
+these goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eternal
+salvation in many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a
+good to that person, rather should we desire him to be without it,
+both because eternal salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and
+because the good of the many is to be preferred to the good of one.
+Now if heretics were always received on their return, in order to
+save their lives and other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial
+to the salvation of others, both because they would infect others if
+they relapsed again, and because, if they escaped without punishment,
+others would feel more assured in lapsing into heresy. For it is
+written (Eccles. 8:11): "For because sentence is not speedily
+pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without
+any fear."
+
+For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who
+return from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their
+lives, and sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the
+ecclesiastical dignities which they may have had before, should their
+conversion appear to be sincere: we read of this as having frequently
+been done for the good of peace. But when they fall again, after
+having been received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in
+faith, wherefore when they return again, they are admitted to
+Penance, but are not delivered from the pain of death.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In God's tribunal, those who return are always
+received, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who
+return in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for
+she presumes that those who relapse after being once received, are
+not sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the
+way of salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence
+of death.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed
+against oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and
+spare our brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied
+to sins committed against one's neighbor or against God, for it is
+not left to our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says
+on Matt. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend against thee." Yet even
+in this matter the law prescribes limits according as God's honor or
+our neighbor's good demands.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When other unbelievers, who have never received the
+faith are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy
+in faith, as relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 12
+
+OF APOSTASY
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
+
+(2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are
+absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 12, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Apostasy Pertains to Unbelief?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to
+unbelief. For that which is the origin of all sins, does not,
+seemingly, pertain to unbelief, since many sins there are without
+unbelief. Now apostasy seems to be the origin of every sin, for it
+is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of man is
+apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God," and further on, (Ecclus.
+10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." Therefore apostasy
+does not pertain to unbelief.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas
+apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance,
+or even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (Prov.
+6:12-14): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh
+with a perverse mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the
+foot, speaketh with the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil,
+and at all times he soweth discord." Moreover if anyone were to have
+himself circumcised, or to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would
+be deemed an apostate. Therefore apostasy does not pertain to
+unbelief.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a
+determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to
+unbelief, it would follow that it is a determinate species of
+unbelief, which does not seem to agree with what has been said
+(Q. 10, A. 5). Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 6:67): "Many of his disciples
+went back," i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously
+(John 6:65): "There are some of you that believe not." Therefore
+apostasy pertains to unbelief.
+
+_I answer that,_ Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may
+happen in various ways according to the different kinds of union
+between man and God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by
+faith; secondly, by having his will duly submissive in obeying His
+commandments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to
+supererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or
+Holy Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that which
+precedes, remains, but the converse does not hold. Accordingly a man
+may apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the religious life to
+which he was bound by profession, or from the Holy Order which he
+had received: and this is called "apostasy from religious life" or
+"Orders." A man may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in his
+mind against the Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize
+in both the above ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.
+
+But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God
+altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that
+whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called "apostasy of
+perfidy." In this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to
+unbelief.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the second kind of apostasy,
+which denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's
+commandments, an act that is to be found in every mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to faith not only that the heart should
+believe, but also that external words and deeds should bear witness
+to the inward faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this way
+too, certain external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far
+as they are signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said
+itself to be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be
+understood as referring to every kind of apostate, yet it applies
+most truly to an apostate from the faith. For since faith is the
+first foundation of things to be hoped for, and since, without faith
+it is "impossible to please God"; when once faith is removed, man
+retains nothing that may be useful for the obtaining of eternal
+salvation, for which reason it is written (Prov. 6:12): "A man that
+is an apostate, an unprofitable man": because faith is the life of
+the soul, according to Rom. 1:17: "The just man liveth by faith."
+Therefore, just as when the life of the body is taken away, man's
+every member and part loses its due disposition, so when the life of
+justice, which is by faith, is done away, disorder appears in all
+his members. First, in his mouth, whereby chiefly his mind stands
+revealed; secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of
+movement; fourthly, in his will, which tends to evil. The result is
+that "he sows discord," endeavoring to sever others from the faith
+even as he severed himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The species of a quality or form are not diversified by
+the fact of its being the term _wherefrom_ or _whereto_ of movement:
+on the contrary, it is the movement that takes its species from the
+terms. Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term _whereto_ of the
+movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not
+imply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance
+thereof, according to 2 Pet. 2:21: "It had been better for them not
+to know the truth [Vulg.: 'the way of justice'], than after they had
+known it, to turn back."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 12, Art. 2]
+
+Whether a Prince Forfeits His Dominion Over His Subjects, on Account
+of Apostasy from the Faith, So That They No Longer Owe Him Allegiance?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his
+dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith,
+that they no longer owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine,
+Super Ps. 124:3] says that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate,
+nevertheless had under him Christian soldiers, who when he said to
+them, "Fall into line for the defense of the republic," were bound to
+obey. Therefore subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to
+their prince on account of his apostasy.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now we
+find that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph
+served Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served
+Assuerus. Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects
+from allegiance to their sovereign.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns away
+from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of apostasy
+from the faith, princes were to lose their right to command those of
+their subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it on
+account of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we
+ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his
+apostatizing from the faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): "Holding to
+the institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic
+authority, absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or
+through the sacred bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated
+persons: and we absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance
+to such persons, until these shall have made amends." Now apostates
+from the faith, like heretics, are excommunicated, according to the
+Decretal [*Extra, De Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam]. Therefore
+princes should not be obeyed when they have apostatized from the
+faith.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 10, A. 10), unbelief, in itself,
+is not inconsistent with dominion, since dominion is a device of the
+law of nations which is a human law: whereas the distinction between
+believers and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not annul
+human right. Nevertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced
+to the loss of his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on account
+of other sins.
+
+Now it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief
+in those who have never received the faith, according to the saying
+of the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do to judge them that
+are without?" She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the
+unbelief of those who have received the faith: and it is fitting that
+they should be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their
+subjects: for this same allegiance might conduce to great corruption
+of the faith, since, as was stated above (A. 1, Obj. 2), "a man that
+is an apostate . . . with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and . . .
+soweth discord," in order to sever others from the faith.
+Consequently, as soon as sentence of excommunication is passed on a
+man on account of apostasy from the faith, his subjects are "ipso
+facto" absolved from his authority and from the oath of allegiance
+whereby they were bound to him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: At that time the Church was but recently instituted,
+and had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes; and so she
+allowed the faithful to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that
+were not contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet
+greater danger.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated in the article, it is not a question of those
+unbelievers who have never received the faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether,
+as stated above (A. 1), which is not the case in any other sin.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 13
+
+OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the
+confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy
+which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?
+
+(2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?
+
+(3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin?
+
+(4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Blasphemy Is Opposed to the Confession of Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the
+confession of faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or
+insult against the Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God
+rather than to unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the
+confession of faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, on Eph. 4:31, "Let blasphemy . . . be put away from
+you," a gloss says, "that which is committed against God or the
+saints." But confession of faith, seemingly, is not about other
+things than those pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith.
+Therefore blasphemy is not always opposed to the confession of faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to some, there are three kinds of
+blasphemy. The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed
+of God; the second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and
+the third, when something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, so
+that, seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His
+creatures. Now the object of faith is God. Therefore blasphemy is not
+opposed to confession of faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12, 13): "I . . .
+before was a blasphemer and a persecutor," and afterwards, "I did it
+ignorantly in" my "unbelief." Hence it seems that blasphemy pertains
+to unbelief.
+
+_I answer that,_ The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement
+of some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness.
+Hence whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does
+not befit Him, is far removed from the perfection of goodness which is
+His Essence. Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting
+God, or affirms anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine
+goodness.
+
+Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it may happen
+merely in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the second way
+this opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections,
+even as, on the other hand, faith in God is perfected by love of Him.
+Accordingly this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in
+the intellect alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought
+only, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself
+outwardly in speech it is blasphemy of the tongue. It is in this
+sense that blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: He that speaks against God, with the intention of
+reviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of
+the falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness
+of his will, whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due
+to God, and this is perfect blasphemy.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as
+praise is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does
+blasphemy against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in this
+way divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things, or
+to deny fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and
+negation. For this diversity does not cause distinct species of
+habits, since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made
+known by the same knowledge, and it is the same ignorance which errs
+in either way, since negatives are proved by affirmatives, according
+to Poster. i, 25. Again to ascribe to creatures things that are
+proper to God, seems to amount to the same as affirming something
+unfitting of Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and
+to ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God, is to assert
+that God is the same as a creature.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Blasphemy Is Always a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin.
+Because a gloss on the words, "Now lay you also all away," etc. (Col.
+3:8) says: "After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins":
+and yet among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy
+is comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts
+of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to any of
+them. Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not mortal:
+hence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede the
+deliberation of the reason, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 3,
+10). Now blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the
+reason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 24:16): "He that blasphemeth
+the name of the Lord, dying let him die." Now the death punishment
+is not inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a
+mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 5), a mortal sin
+is one whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual
+life, which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever
+things are contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their
+genus. Now blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity,
+because, as stated above (A. 1), it disparages the Divine goodness,
+which is the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal
+sin, by reason of its genus.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all
+the sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those
+mentioned previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned
+afterwards are less grievous; and yet among the latter some more
+grievous sins are included.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since, as stated above (A. 1), blasphemy is contrary
+to the confession of faith, its prohibition is comprised under the
+prohibition of unbelief, expressed by the words: "I am the Lord thy
+God," etc. (Ex. 20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: "Thou
+shalt not take the name of . . . God in vain" (Ex. 20:7). Because he
+who asserts something false about God, takes His name in vain even
+more than he who uses the name of God in confirmation of a falsehood.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There are two ways in which blasphemy may occur
+unawares and without deliberation. In the first way, by a man failing
+to advert to the blasphemous nature of his words, and this may happen
+through his being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out into
+words suggested by his imagination, without heeding to the meaning of
+those words: this is a venial sin, and is not a blasphemy properly so
+called. In the second way, by adverting to the meaning of his words,
+and to their blasphemous nature: in which case he is not excused from
+mortal sin, even as neither is he who, in a sudden movement of anger,
+kills one who is sitting beside him.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Sin of Blasphemy Is the Greatest Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of blasphemy is not the
+greatest sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing
+is said to be evil because it does harm. Now the sin of murder, since
+it destroys a man's life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy,
+which can do no harm to God. Therefore the sin of murder is more
+grievous than that of blasphemy.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a perjurer calls upon God to witness to a falsehood,
+and thus seems to assert that God is false. But not every blasphemer
+goes so far as to say that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more
+grievous sin than blasphemy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, on Ps. 74:6, "Lift not up your horn on high," a
+gloss says: "To excuse oneself for sin is the greatest sin of all."
+Therefore blasphemy is not the greatest sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ On Isa. 18:2, "To a terrible people," etc. a gloss
+says: "In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), blasphemy is opposed to the
+confession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief:
+while the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added
+thereto, and yet more, if it breaks out into words, even as love
+and confession add to the praise of faith.
+
+Therefore, since, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 3), unbelief is the
+greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy
+also is a very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as
+unbelief and being an aggravated form of that sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the
+objects of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin
+committed directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a
+sin against one's neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them in
+respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for
+murder does more harm to one's neighbor, than blasphemy does to God.
+Since, however, the gravity of a sin depends on the intention of the
+evil will, rather than on the effect of the deed, as was shown above
+(I-II, Q. 73, A. 8), it follows that, as the blasphemer intends to do
+harm to God's honor, absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously
+that the murderer. Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to
+punishment, among sins committed against our neighbor.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A gloss on the words, "Let . . . blasphemy be put away
+from you" (Eph. 4:31) says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury." The
+reason is that the perjurer does not say or think something false
+about God, as the blasphemer does: but he calls God to witness to a
+falsehood, not that he deems God a false witness, but in the hope, as
+it were, that God will not testify to the matter by some evident sign.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that
+aggravates every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the
+most grievous sin, for as much as it makes every sin more grievous.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Damned Blaspheme?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not blaspheme. Because
+some wicked men are deterred from blaspheming now, on account of the
+fear of future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these
+punishments, so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more
+are they restrained from blaspheming.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, since blasphemy is a most grievous sin, it is most
+demeritorious. Now in the life to come there is no state of meriting
+or demeriting. Therefore there will be no place for blasphemy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Eccles. 11:3) that "the tree . . . in
+what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be": whence it
+clearly follows that, after this life, man acquires neither merit nor
+sin, which he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be
+damned who were not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore,
+will they blaspheme in the life to come.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Apoc. 16:9): "The men were scorched
+with great heat, and they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power
+over these plagues," and a gloss on these words says that "those who
+are in hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will
+nevertheless complain that God is so powerful as to torture them
+thus." Now this would be blasphemy in their present state: and
+consequently it will also be in their future state.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3), detestation of the Divine
+goodness is a necessary condition of blasphemy. Now those who are in
+hell retain their wicked will which is turned away from God's
+justice, since they love the things for which they are punished,
+would wish to use them if they could, and hate the punishments
+inflicted on them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins
+which they have committed, not because they hate them, but because
+they are punished for them. Accordingly this detestation of the
+Divine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy of the heart: and
+it is credible that after the resurrection they will blaspheme God
+with the tongue, even as the saints will praise Him with their voices.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy
+through fear of punishment which they think they can escape: whereas,
+in hell, the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they
+are borne towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Merit and demerit belong to the state of a wayfarer,
+wherefore good is meritorious in them, while evil is demeritorious.
+In the blessed, on the other hand, good is not meritorious, but is
+part of their blissful reward, and, in like manner, in the damned,
+evil is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will that
+detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in
+this respect there can be blasphemy in him.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 14
+
+OF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost:
+under which head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same
+as the sin committed through certain malice?
+
+(2) Of the species of this sin;
+
+(3) Whether it can be forgiven?
+
+(4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost
+before committing other sins?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Is the Same As the Sin
+Committed Through Certain Malice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not
+the same as the sin committed through certain malice. Because the sin
+against the Holy Ghost is the sin of blasphemy, according to Matt.
+12:32. But not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of
+blasphemy: since many other kinds of sin may be committed through
+certain malice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the
+same as the sin committed through certain malice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the sin committed through certain malice is
+condivided with sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed
+through weakness: whereas the sin against the Holy Ghost is
+condivided with the sin against the Son of Man (Matt. 12:32).
+Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin
+committed through certain malice, since things whose opposites
+differ, are themselves different.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is itself a generic
+sin, having its own determinate species: whereas sin committed
+through certain malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition
+or general circumstance of sin, which can affect any kind of sin at
+all. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the
+sin committed through certain malice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43) that "to sin
+against the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in the malice of sin for
+its own sake." Now this is to sin through certain malice. Therefore
+it seems that the sin committed through certain malice is the same
+as the sin against the Holy Ghost.
+
+_I answer that,_ Three meanings have been given to the sin against
+the Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz. Athanasius (Super
+Matth. xii, 32), Hilary (Can. xii in Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc.
+xii, 10), Jerome (Super Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in
+Matth.), say that the sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to
+utter a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit we
+understand the essential name applicable to the whole Trinity, each
+Person of which is a Spirit and is holy, or the personal name of one
+of the Persons of the Trinity, in which sense blasphemy against the
+Holy Ghost is distinct from the blasphemy against the Son of Man
+(Matt. 12:32), for Christ did certain things in respect of His human
+nature, by eating, drinking, and such like actions, while He did
+others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out devils, raising the
+dead, and the like: which things He did both by the power of His own
+Godhead and by the operation of the Holy Ghost, of Whom He was full,
+according to his human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking
+blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Matt. 11:19) that
+He was "a glutton . . . a wine drinker," and a "friend of publicans":
+but afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, when they
+ascribed to the prince of devils those works which Christ did by the
+power of His own Divine Nature and by the operation of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Augustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi), says that blasphemy
+or the sin against the Holy Ghost, is final impenitence when, namely,
+a man perseveres in mortal sin until death, and that it is not
+confined to utterance by word of mouth, but extends to words in
+thought and deed, not to one word only, but to many. Now this word,
+in this sense, is said to be uttered against the Holy Ghost, because
+it is contrary to the remission of sins, which is the work of the
+Holy Ghost, Who is the charity both of the Father and of the Son. Nor
+did Our Lord say this to the Jews, as though they had sinned against
+the Holy Ghost, since they were not yet guilty of final impenitence,
+but He warned them, lest by similar utterances they should come to
+sin against the Holy Ghost: and it is in this sense that we are to
+understand Mark 3:29, 30, where after Our Lord had said: "But he that
+shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost," etc. the Evangelist adds,
+"because they said: He hath an unclean spirit."
+
+But others understand it differently, and say that the sin of
+blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is a sin committed against that
+good which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost: because goodness is
+appropriated to the Holy Ghost, just a power is appropriated to the
+Father, and wisdom to the Son. Hence they say that when a man sins
+through weakness, it is a sin "against the Father"; that when he sins
+through ignorance, it is a sin "against the Son"; and that when he
+sins through certain malice, i.e. through the very choosing of evil,
+as explained above (I-II, Q. 78, AA. 1, 3), it is a sin "against the
+Holy Ghost."
+
+Now this may happen in two ways. First by reason of the very
+inclination of a vicious habit which we call malice, and, in this
+way, to sin through malice is not the same as to sin against the Holy
+Ghost. In another way it happens that by reason of contempt, that
+which might have prevented the choosing of evil, is rejected or
+removed; thus hope is removed by despair, and fear by presumption,
+and so on, as we shall explain further on (QQ. 20, 21). Now all these
+things which prevent the choosing of sin are effects of the Holy
+Ghost in us; so that, in this sense, to sin through malice is to sin
+against the Holy Ghost.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as the confession of faith consists in a
+protestation not only of words but also of deeds, so blasphemy
+against the Holy Ghost can be uttered in word, thought and deed.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the third interpretation, blasphemy
+against the Holy Ghost is condivided with blasphemy against the Son
+of Man, forasmuch as He is also the Son of God, i.e. the "power of
+God and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). Wherefore, in this sense,
+the sin against the Son of Man will be that which is committed
+through ignorance, or through weakness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Sin committed through certain malice, in so far as it
+results from the inclination of a habit, is not a special sin, but a
+general condition of sin: whereas, in so far as it results from a
+special contempt of an effect of the Holy Ghost in us, it has the
+character of a special sin. According to this interpretation the sin
+against the Holy Ghost is a special kind of sin, as also according to
+the first interpretation: whereas according to the second, it is not
+a species of sin, because final impenitence may be a circumstance of
+any kind of sin.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Fitting to Distinguish Six Kinds of Sin Against the
+Holy Ghost?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish six kinds of sin
+against the Holy Ghost, viz. despair, presumption, impenitence,
+obstinacy, resisting the known truth, envy of our brother's spiritual
+good, which are assigned by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to deny
+God's justice or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a man
+rejects God's mercy, and by presumption, His justice. Therefore each
+of these is a kind of unbelief rather than of the sin against the
+Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, impenitence, seemingly, regards past sins, while
+obstinacy regards future sins. Now past and future time do not
+diversify the species of virtues or vices, since it is the same faith
+whereby we believe that Christ was born, and those of old believed
+that He would be born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not
+be reckoned as two species of sin against the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (John 1:17).
+Therefore it seem that resistance of the known truth, and envy of a
+brother's spiritual good, belong to blasphemy against the Son rather
+than against the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et Praecept. xi) that "to
+refuse to obey is to resist the Holy Ghost." Moreover a gloss on Lev.
+10:16, says that "a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the
+Holy Ghost." Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to the
+Holy Ghost by Whom the Church is united together. Therefore it seems
+that the species of sins against the Holy Ghost are insufficiently
+enumerated.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] (De Fide ad Petrum iii)
+says that "those who despair of pardon for their sins, or who without
+merits presume on God's mercy, sin against the Holy Ghost," and
+(Enchiridion lxxxiii) that "he who dies in a state of obstinacy is
+guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost," and (De Verb. Dom., Serm.
+lxxi) that "impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost," and (De
+Serm. Dom. in Monte xxii), that "to resist fraternal goodness with
+the brands of envy is to sin against the Holy Ghost," and in his book
+De unico Baptismo (De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 35) he says that "a man
+who spurns the truth, is either envious of his brethren to whom the
+truth is revealed, or ungrateful to God, by Whose inspiration the
+Church is taught," and therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy
+Ghost.
+
+_I answer that,_ The above species are fittingly assigned to the sin
+against the Holy Ghost taken in the third sense, because they are
+distinguished in respect of the removal or contempt of those things
+whereby a man can be prevented from sinning through choice. These
+things are either on the part of God's judgment, or on the part of
+His gifts, or on the part of sin. For, by consideration of the Divine
+judgment, wherein justice is accompanied with mercy, man is hindered
+from sinning through choice, both by hope, arising from the
+consideration of the mercy that pardons sins and rewards good deeds,
+which hope is removed by "despair"; and by fear, arising from the
+consideration of the Divine justice that punishes sins, which fear is
+removed by "presumption," when, namely, a man presumes that he can
+obtain glory without merits, or pardon without repentance.
+
+God's gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are two: one is the
+acknowledgment of the truth, against which there is the "resistance of
+the known truth," when, namely, a man resists the truth which he has
+acknowledged, in order to sin more freely: while the other is the
+assistance of inward grace, against which there is "envy of a
+brother's spiritual good," when, namely, a man is envious not only of
+his brother's person, but also of the increase of Divine grace in the
+world.
+
+On the part of sin, there are two things which may withdraw man
+therefrom: one is the inordinateness and shamefulness of the act, the
+consideration of which is wont to arouse man to repentance for the
+sin he has committed, and against this there is "impenitence," not as
+denoting permanence in sin until death, in which sense it was taken
+above (for thus it would not be a special sin, but a circumstance of
+sin), but as denoting the purpose of not repenting. The other thing
+is the smallness or brevity of the good which is sought in sin,
+according to Rom. 6:21: "What fruit had you therefore then in those
+things, of which you are now ashamed?" The consideration of this is
+wont to prevent man's will from being hardened in sin, and this is
+removed by "obstinacy," whereby man hardens his purpose by clinging
+to sin. Of these two it is written (Jer. 8:6): "There is none that
+doth penance for his sin, saying: What have I done?" as regards the
+first; and, "They are all turned to their own course, as a horse
+rushing to the battle," as regards the second.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The sins of despair and presumption consist, not in
+disbelieving in God's justice and mercy, but in contemning them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only in respect of
+past and future time, but also in respect of certain formal aspects
+by reason of the diverse consideration of those things which may be
+considered in sin, as explained above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Grace and truth were the work of Christ through the
+gifts of the Holy Ghost which He gave to men.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: To refuse to obey belongs to obstinacy, while a feigned
+repentance belongs to impenitence, and schism to the envy of a
+brother's spiritual good, whereby the members of the Church are
+united together.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Can Be Forgiven?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost can be
+forgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi): "We should
+despair of no man, so long as Our Lord's patience brings him back to
+repentance." But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would be possible
+to despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost
+can be forgiven.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no sin is forgiven, except through the soul being
+healed by God. But "no disease is incurable to an all-powerful
+physician," as a gloss says on Ps. 102:3, "Who healeth all thy
+diseases." Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the free-will is indifferent to either good or evil.
+Now, so long as man is a wayfarer, he can fall away from any virtue,
+since even an angel fell from heaven, wherefore it is written (Job
+4:18, 19): "In His angels He found wickedness: how much more shall
+they that dwell in houses of clay?" Therefore, in like manner, a man
+can return from any sin to the state of justice. Therefore the sin
+against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 12:32): "He that shall speak
+against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this
+world, nor in the world to come": and Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
+Monte i, 22) that "so great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot
+submit to the humiliation of asking for pardon."
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the various interpretations of the sin
+against the Holy Ghost, there are various ways in which it may be said
+that it cannot be forgiven. For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost
+we understand final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable, since
+in no way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a man
+perseveres until death will not be forgiven in the life to come, since
+it was not remitted by repentance in this life.
+
+According to the other two interpretations, it is said to be
+unpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven, but because,
+considered in itself, it deserves not to be pardoned: and this in two
+ways. First, as regards the punishment, since he that sins through
+ignorance or weakness, deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins
+through certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his
+punishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the Son of Man
+before His Godhead was revealed, could have some excuse, on account
+of the weakness of the flesh which they perceived in Him, and hence,
+they deserved less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against
+His very Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works of the Holy
+Ghost, had no excuse in diminution of their punishment. Wherefore,
+according to Chrysostom's commentary (Hom. xlii in Matth.), the Jews
+are said not to be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in
+the world to come, because they were punished for it, both in the
+present life, through the Romans, and in the life to come, in the
+pains of hell. Thus also Athanasius adduces the example of their
+forefathers who, first of all, wrangled with Moses on account of the
+shortage of water and bread; and this the Lord bore with patience,
+because they were to be excused on account of the weakness of the
+flesh: but afterwards they sinned more grievously when, by ascribing
+to an idol the favors bestowed by God Who had brought them out of
+Egypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against the Holy Ghost, saying
+(Ex. 32:4): "These are thy gods, O Israel, that have brought thee out
+of the land of Egypt." Therefore the Lord both inflicted temporal
+punishment on them, since "there were slain on that day about three
+and twenty thousand men" (Ex. 32:28), and threatened them with
+punishment in the life to come, saying, (Ex. 32:34): "I, in the day
+of revenge, will visit this sin . . . of theirs."
+
+Secondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt: thus a disease
+is said to be incurable in respect of the nature of the disease, which
+removes whatever might be a means of cure, as when it takes away the
+power of nature, or causes loathing for food and medicine, although
+God is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the Holy
+Ghost is said to be unpardonable, by reason of its nature, in so far
+as it removes those things which are a means towards the pardon of
+sins. This does not, however, close the way of forgiveness and healing
+to an all-powerful and merciful God, Who, sometimes, by a miracle, so
+to speak, restores spiritual health to such men.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We should despair of no man in this life, considering
+God's omnipotence and mercy. But if we consider the circumstances of
+sin, some are called (Eph. 2:2) "children of despair" [*_Filios
+diffidentiae,_ which the Douay version renders "children of
+unbelief."].
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the question on the part of
+God's omnipotence, not on that of the circumstances of sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In this life the free-will does indeed ever remain
+subject to change: yet sometimes it rejects that whereby, so far as
+it is concerned, it can be turned to good. Hence considered in itself
+this sin is unpardonable, although God can pardon it.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 4]
+
+Whether a Man Can Sin First of All Against the Holy Ghost?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot sin first of all against
+the Holy Ghost, without having previously committed other sins. For
+the natural order requires that one should be moved to perfection from
+imperfection. This is evident as regards good things, according to
+Prov. 4:18: "The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards
+and increases even to perfect day." Now, in evil things, the perfect
+is the greatest evil, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. v, text. 21).
+Since then the sin against the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it
+seems that man comes to commit this sin through committing lesser
+sins.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through
+certain malice, or through choice. Now man cannot do this until he has
+sinned many times; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6, 9) that
+"although a man is able to do unjust deeds, yet he cannot all at once
+do them as an unjust man does," viz. from choice. Therefore it seems
+that the sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be committed except after
+other sins.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, repentance and impenitence are about the same
+object. But there is no repentance, except about past sins. Therefore
+the same applies to impenitence which is a species of the sin against
+the Holy Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost presupposes
+other sins.
+
+_On the contrary,_ "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to
+make a poor man rich" (Ecclus. 11:23). Therefore, conversely, it is
+possible for a man, according to the malice of the devil who tempts
+him, to be led to commit the most grievous of sins which is that
+against the Holy Ghost.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), in one way, to sin against
+the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice. Now one may sin
+through certain malice in two ways, as stated in the same place:
+first, through the inclination of a habit; but this is not, properly
+speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to
+commit this sin all at once, in as much as sinful acts must precede
+so as to cause the habit that induces to sin. Secondly, one may sin
+through certain malice, by contemptuously rejecting the things
+whereby a man is withdrawn from sin. This is, properly speaking, to
+sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (A. 1); and this also,
+for the most part, presupposes other sins, for it is written (Prov.
+18:3) that "the wicked man, when he is come into the depth of sins,
+contemneth."
+
+Nevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sinful act, to
+sin against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both on account of his
+free-will, and on account of the many previous dispositions, or
+again, through being vehemently moved to evil, while but feebly
+attached to good. Hence never or scarcely ever does it happen that
+the perfect sin all at once against the Holy Ghost: wherefore Origen
+says (Peri Archon. i, 3): "I do not think that anyone who stands on
+the highest step of perfection, can fail or fall suddenly; this can
+only happen by degrees and bit by bit."
+
+The same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be taken literally
+for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For such blasphemy as Our Lord
+speaks of, always proceeds from contemptuous malice.
+
+If, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) we understand
+the sin against the Holy Ghost to denote final impenitence, it does
+not regard the question in point, because this sin against the Holy
+Ghost requires persistence in sin until the end of life.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Movement both in good and in evil is made, for the most
+part, from imperfect to perfect, according as man progresses in good
+or evil: and yet in both cases, one man can begin from a greater
+(good or evil) than another man does. Consequently, that from which a
+man begins can be perfect in good or evil according to its genus,
+although it may be imperfect as regards the series of good or evil
+actions whereby a man progresses in good or evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the sin which is committed
+through certain malice, when it proceeds from the inclination of a
+habit.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If by impenitence we understand with Augustine (De
+Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) persistence in sin until the end, it is clear
+that it presupposes sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we
+take it for habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a sin against
+the Holy Ghost, it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is
+possible for a man who has never sinned to have the purpose either
+of repenting or of not repenting, if he should happen to sin.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 15
+
+OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and
+understanding. Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which
+is opposed to knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins
+(I-II, Q. 76), we must now inquire about blindness of mind and
+dulness of sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding;
+and under this head there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of
+mind?
+
+(3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Blindness of Mind Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind is not a sin.
+Because, seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin.
+Now blindness of mind excuses from sin; for it is written (John
+9:41): "If you were blind, you should not have sin." Therefore
+blindness of mind is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, punishment differs from guilt. But blindness of mind
+is a punishment as appears from Isa. 6:10, "Blind the heart of this
+people," for, since it is an evil, it could not be from God, were it
+not a punishment. Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De
+Vera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary, since, as
+Augustine says (Confess. x), "all love to know the resplendent
+truth," and as we read in Eccles. 11:7, "the light is sweet and it is
+delightful for the eyes to see the sun." Therefore blindness of mind
+is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons blindness of
+mind among the vices arising from lust.
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as bodily blindness is the privation of the
+principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the privation of
+the principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has a
+threefold principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light,
+since it pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never
+forfeit from the soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented from
+exercising its proper act, through being hindered by the lower powers
+which the human intellect needs in order to understand, for instance
+in the case of imbeciles and madmen, as stated in the First Part (Q.
+84, AA. 7, 8).
+
+Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual light
+superadded to the natural light of reason, which light is sometimes
+forfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a
+punishment, in so far as the privation of the light of grace is a
+punishment. Hence it is written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): "Their
+own malice blinded them."
+
+A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible principle,
+through which a man understands other things; to which principle a
+man may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens
+in two ways. Sometimes it is due to the fact that a man's will is
+deliberately turned away from the consideration of that principle,
+according to Ps. 35:4, "He would not understand, that he might do
+well": whereas sometimes it is due to the mind being more busy about
+things which it loves more, so as to be hindered thereby from
+considering this principle, according to Ps. 57:9, "Fire," i.e. of
+concupiscence, "hath fallen on them and they shall not see the sun."
+In either of these ways blindness of mind is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The blindness that excuses from sin is that which
+arises from the natural defect of one who cannot see.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the second kind of blindness
+which is a punishment.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by all;
+and yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a
+man is hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Dulness of Sense Is a Sin Distinct from Blindness of Mind?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin
+from blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now
+dulness is opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory
+(Moral. ii, 49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding
+denotes a principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same
+as blindness of mind.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking of dulness
+describes it as "dulness of sense in respect of understanding." Now
+dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as
+a defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind.
+Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be chiefly in the
+fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated above (A. 1),
+while dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural defect is
+not a sin: so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would not be a sin,
+which is contrary to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he
+reckons it among the sins arising from gluttony.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Different causes produce different effects. Now
+Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from
+gluttony, and that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these
+others are different vices. Therefore those are different vices also.
+
+_I answer that,_ Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be
+sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through
+being obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of
+metaphor, is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its
+object from a distance or is able by penetration as it were to
+perceive the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence
+in corporeal things the senses are said to be acute when they can
+perceive a sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing, or scent,
+while on the other hand they are said to be dull, through being
+unable to perceive, except sensible objects that are near at hand, or
+of great power.
+
+Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in
+connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect of
+certain primals and extremes, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, even as the
+senses are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of
+knowledge. Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does
+not perceive its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but
+through certain other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a
+thing's essence through a property thereof, and the cause through its
+effect. Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in
+connection with his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a
+property or effect of a thing, he understands the nature or the thing
+itself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its slightest details:
+whereas a man is said to have a dull sense in connection with his
+understanding, if he cannot arrive at knowing the truth about a
+thing, without many explanations; in which case, moreover, he is
+unable to obtain a perfect perception of everything pertaining to the
+nature of that thing.
+
+Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes
+a certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual
+goods; while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the
+knowledge of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of
+understanding, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehending
+them, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost nature. This
+dulness has the character of sin, just as blindness of mind has, that
+is, in so far as it is voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to
+his affection for carnal things, dislikes or neglects the careful
+consideration of spiritual things.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Blindness of Mind and Dulness of Sense Arise from Sins of the
+Flesh?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind and dulness of
+sense do not arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine (Retract. i,
+4) retracts what he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, "God Who didst
+wish none but the clean to know the truth," and says that one might
+reply that "many, even those who are unclean, know many truths." Now
+men become unclean chiefly by sins of the flesh. Therefore blindness
+of mind and dulness of sense are not caused by sins of the flesh.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, blindness of mind and dulness of sense are defects
+in connection with the intellective part of the soul: whereas carnal
+sins pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does not
+act on the soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the
+flesh do not cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all things are more passive to what is near them
+than to what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer the mind than
+carnal vices are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense
+are caused by spiritual rather than by carnal vices.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of
+sense arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust.
+
+_I answer that,_ The perfect intellectual operation in man consists in
+an abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the more a man's
+intellect is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly will it
+be able to consider things intelligible, and to set in order all
+things sensible. Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to
+be "detached" in order to command, and that the agent must have power
+over matter, in order to be able to move it. Now it is evident that
+pleasure fixes a man's attention on that which he takes pleasure in:
+wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4, 5) that we all do best
+that which we take pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do
+them either not at all, or in a faint-hearted fashion.
+
+Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with
+pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most
+impetuous of all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices
+cause man's attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so
+that in consequence man's operation in regard to intelligible things
+is weakened, more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as
+sexual pleasures are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore
+lust gives rise to blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely
+the knowledge of spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from
+gluttony, which makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible
+things. On the other hand, the contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and
+chastity, dispose man very much to the perfection of intellectual
+operation. Hence it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to these children" on
+account of their abstinence and continency, "God gave knowledge and
+understanding in every book, and wisdom."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although some who are the slaves of carnal vices are at
+times capable of subtle considerations about intelligible things, on
+account of the perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit
+superadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the pleasures of the
+body, it must needs happen that their attention is frequently
+withdrawn from this subtle contemplation: wherefore the unclean can
+know some truths, but their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not by
+altering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid
+manner.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are
+further removed from the mind, that they distract the mind's
+attention to more remote things, so that they hinder the mind's
+contemplation all the more.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 16
+
+OF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and
+under this head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) The precepts concerning faith;
+
+(2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 16, Art. 1]
+
+Whether in the Old Law There Should Have Been Given Precepts of Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that, in the Old Law, there should have
+been given precepts of faith. Because a precept is about something due
+and necessary. Now it is most necessary for man that he should
+believe, according to Heb. 11:6, "Without faith it is impossible to
+please God." Therefore there was very great need for precepts of faith
+to be given.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the New Testament is contained in the Old, as the
+reality in the figure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 107, A. 3). Now the
+New Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance John
+14:1: "You believe in God; believe also in Me." Therefore it seems
+that some precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law
+also.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the same
+as to forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many
+precepts forbidding unbelief: thus (Ex. 20:3): "Thou shalt not have
+strange gods before Me," and (Deut. 13:1-3) they were forbidden to
+hear the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them
+away from their faith in God. Therefore precepts of faith should have
+been given in the Old Law also.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above
+(Q. 3, A. 1). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the confession
+and the promulgation of faith: for they were commanded (Ex. 12:27)
+that, when their children should ask them, they should tell them the
+meaning of the paschal observance, and (Deut. 13:9) they were
+commanded to slay anyone who disseminated doctrine contrary to faith.
+Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained in
+the Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said (John 15:25) that it was written
+in the Law: "They have hated Me without cause," although this is
+found written in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye
+that fear the Lord, believe Him." Therefore the Old Law should have
+contained precepts of faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (Rom. 3:27) calls the Old Law the "law
+of works" which he contrasts with the "law of faith." Therefore the
+Old Law ought not to have contained precepts of faith.
+
+_I answer that,_ A master does not impose laws on others than his
+subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone
+who receives the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the
+primary subjection of man to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6:
+"He that cometh to God, must believe that He is." Hence faith is
+presupposed to the precepts of the Law: for which reason (Ex. 20:2)
+that which is of faith, is set down before the legal precepts, in the
+words, "I am the Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of
+Egypt," and, likewise (Deut. 6:4), the words, "Hear, O Israel, the
+Lord thy [Vulg.: 'our'] God is one," precede the recording of the
+precepts.
+
+Since, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith
+whereby we believe that God is, which is the first and chief of all
+articles of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 1, 7), it follows that,
+if we presuppose faith in God, whereby man's mind is subjected to
+Him, it is possible for precepts to be given about other articles of
+faith. Thus Augustine expounding the words: "This is My commandment"
+(John 15:12) says (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.) that we have received
+many precepts of faith. In the Old Law, however, the secret things of
+faith were not to be set before the people, wherefore, presupposing
+their faith in one God, no other precepts of faith were given in the
+Old Law.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Faith is necessary as being the principle of spiritual
+life, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the Law.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of faith,
+namely belief in one God, when He said: "You believe in God," and
+commanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one
+Person is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs to the faith
+of the New Testament, wherefore He added: "Believe also in Me."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which corrupt
+virtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 4, ad 3; I-II, Q. 19, A. 6, ad 1, A. 7, ad 3).
+Therefore faith in one God being presupposed, prohibitive precepts
+had to be given in the Old Law, so that men might be warned off those
+particular defects whereby their faith might be corrupted.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also
+presuppose man's submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law
+could contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of
+faith, rather than to faith itself.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: In this passage again that faith is presupposed whereby
+we believe that God is; hence it begins, "Ye that fear the Lord,"
+which is not possible without faith. The words which follow--"believe
+Him"--must be referred to certain special articles of faith, chiefly
+to those things which God promises to them that obey Him, wherefore
+the passage concludes--"and your reward shall not be made void."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 16, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Precepts Referring to Knowledge and Understanding Were
+Fittingly Set Down in the Old Law?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts referring to knowledge
+and understanding were unfittingly set down in the Old Law. For
+knowledge and understanding pertain to cognition. Now cognition
+precedes and directs action. Therefore the precepts referring to
+knowledge and understanding should precede the precepts of the Law
+referring to action. Since, then, the first precepts of the Law are
+those of the decalogue, it seems that precepts of knowledge and
+understanding should have been given a place among the precepts of
+the decalogue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, learning precedes teaching, for a man must learn
+from another before he teaches another. Now the Old Law contains
+precepts about teaching--both affirmative precepts as, for example,
+(Deut. 4:9), "Thou shalt teach them to thy sons"--and prohibitive
+precepts, as, for instance, (Deut. 4:2), "You shall not add to the
+word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it."
+Therefore it seems that man ought to have been given also some
+precepts directing him to learn.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, knowledge and understanding seem more necessary to a
+priest than to a king, wherefore it is written (Malachi 2:7): "The
+lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law
+at his mouth," and (Osee 4:6): "Because thou hast rejected knowledge,
+I will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood
+to Me." Now the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law
+(Deut. 17:18, 19). Much more therefore should the Law have commanded
+the priests to learn the Law.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is not possible while asleep to meditate on
+things pertaining to knowledge and understanding: moreover it is
+hindered by extraneous occupations. Therefore it is unfittingly
+commanded (Deut. 6:7): "Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy
+house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising." Therefore
+the precepts relating to knowledge and understanding are unfittingly
+set down in the Law.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:6): "That, hearing all
+these precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and understanding people."
+
+_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in relation to
+knowledge and understanding: first, the reception thereof; secondly,
+the use; and thirdly, their preservation. Now the reception of
+knowledge or understanding, is by means of teaching and learning, and
+both are prescribed in the Law. For it is written (Deut. 6:6): "These
+words which I command thee . . . shall be in thy heart." This refers
+to learning, since it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind to
+what is said, while the words that follow--"and thou shalt tell them
+to thy children"--refer to teaching.
+
+The use of knowledge and understanding is the meditation on those
+things which one knows or understands. In reference to this, the text
+goes on: "thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house," etc.
+
+Their preservation is effected by the memory, and, as regards this,
+the text continues--"and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand,
+and they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt
+write them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house." Thus the
+continual remembrance of God's commandments is signified, since it
+is impossible for us to forget those things which are continually
+attracting the notice of our senses, whether by touch, as those
+things we hold in our hands, or by sight, as those things which are
+ever before our eyes, or to which we are continually returning, for
+instance, to the house door. Moreover it is clearly stated (Deut.
+4:9): "Forget not the words that thy eyes have seen and let them
+not go out of thy heart all the days of thy life."
+
+We read of these things also being commanded more notably in the New
+Testament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in that of the
+apostles.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Deut. 4:6, "this is your wisdom and
+understanding in the sight of the nations." By this we are given to
+understand that the wisdom and understanding of those who believe in
+God consist in the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the
+Law had to be given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know
+and understand them, and so it was not fitting that the aforesaid
+precepts should be placed among the precepts of the decalogue which
+take the first place.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There are also in the Law precepts relating to
+learning, as stated above. Nevertheless teaching was commanded more
+expressly than learning, because it concerned the learned, who were
+not under any other authority, but were immediately under the law,
+and to them the precepts of the Law were given. On the other hand
+learning concerned the people of lower degree, and these the
+precepts of the Law have to reach through the learned.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge of the Law is so closely bound up with the
+priestly office that being charged with the office implies being
+charged to know the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts
+to be given about the training of the priests. On the other hand, the
+doctrine of God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office,
+because a king is placed over his people in temporal matters: hence
+it is especially commanded that the king should be instructed by the
+priests about things pertaining to the law of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: That precept of the Law does not mean that man should
+meditate on God's law by sleeping, but during sleep, i.e. that he
+should meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep,
+because this leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so
+far as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of
+sleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). In like manner we
+are commanded to meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not
+that we are bound to be always actually thinking about the Law, but
+that we should regulate all our actions according to it.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 17
+
+OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself;
+(2) the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding
+precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold
+consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.
+
+Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether hope is a virtue?
+
+(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?
+
+(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's
+happiness?
+
+(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?
+
+(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?
+
+(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?
+
+(7) Of its relation to faith;
+
+(8) Of its relation to charity.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Hope Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man
+makes ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii,
+18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope,
+like the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore
+hope is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works
+virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.
+xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the
+Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing"
+(Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But hope is the disposition of an
+imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have.
+Therefore hope is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three
+daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and
+charity. Therefore hope is a virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the
+virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work
+good likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it
+must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and
+ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say
+that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its
+proper measurement. But, as we stated above (Q. 8, A. 3, ad 3) human
+acts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz.
+the reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God:
+wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or God
+Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For,
+as we have already stated (I-II, Q. 40, A. 1), when we were treating
+of the passion of hope, the object of hope is a future good,
+difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in
+two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as
+stated in _Ethic._ iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything
+as being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our hope
+attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident
+that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to
+attain its due rule.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right
+reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue.
+Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's
+attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot
+make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill
+use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus
+is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we
+speak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show
+further on (A. 5; Q. 18, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing
+hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace
+and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of
+hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our
+merits, but from grace alone.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that
+which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in
+so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help
+he leans.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Eternal Happiness Is the Proper Object of Hope?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper
+object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses
+every movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the
+soul. Now eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human
+soul, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not "entered
+into the heart of man." Therefore happiness is not the proper object
+of hope.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written
+(Ps. 36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He
+will do it." Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for
+eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and
+spiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's
+Prayer, to be delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal
+happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of
+hope.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many
+things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore
+eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope
+"which entereth in," i.e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil,"
+i.e. into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of
+a gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal
+happiness.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the hope of which we speak
+now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped
+for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore
+the good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is
+the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine
+helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an
+infinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the
+enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing
+less than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things
+to His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper
+and principal object of hope is eternal happiness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man
+perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its
+nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect
+good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in
+this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the
+Apostle says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within
+the veil," because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to
+speak.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in
+reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness
+chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards
+secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith
+regards God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are
+referred to God, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser
+things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness,
+nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although,
+as compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things
+besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such
+things in reference to its principal object.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 3]
+
+Whether One Man May Hope for Another's Eternal Happiness?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal
+happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this
+very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect
+it unto the day of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will
+be eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's
+eternal happiness.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him.
+But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to
+James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore
+we can hope for another's eternal happiness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it
+is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine
+would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we
+should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can
+also hope for another's eternal salvation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is
+only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for
+them."
+
+_I answer that,_ We can hope for something in two ways: first,
+absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous
+and pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for
+something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way
+its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to
+explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that
+love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a
+movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous
+good. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can
+directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love,
+looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always
+towards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved.
+Therefore hope regards directly one's own good, and not that which
+pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with
+another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as
+for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another's eternal
+life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the
+same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his
+neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes
+for himself and for another.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 4]
+
+Whether a Man Can Lawfully Hope in Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the
+object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain
+eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says
+(Dial. i, 8) that "predestination is furthered by the saints'
+prayers." Therefore one may hope in man.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not
+to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in
+him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4:
+"Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in
+any brother of his." Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above
+(A. 2, Obj. 2). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something.
+Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that
+trusteth in man."
+
+_I answer that,_ Hope, as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7),
+regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the
+help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes
+to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which
+one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient
+cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a
+secondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the
+secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the
+principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary
+efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope
+regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance
+as the first cause leading to happiness.
+
+Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save
+happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final
+happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any
+creature, as though it were the first cause of movement towards
+happiness. It is, however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as
+being the secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is helped
+to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way
+that we turn to the saints, and that we ask men also for certain
+things; and for this reason some are blamed in that they cannot be
+trusted to give help.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Hope Is a Theological Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For
+a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has
+for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to
+obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two
+vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 4). But hope is a mean
+between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological
+virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a
+species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it
+seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it
+belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the
+arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith
+and charity, which are theological virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since specific differences, by their very nature,
+divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place
+hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
+
+Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that hope has the character of
+virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human
+actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as
+much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in
+as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is
+evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a
+virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one
+that has God for its object, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 1), it
+is evident that hope is a theological virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it
+in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause,
+as stated above (A. 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the
+measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
+excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the
+rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.
+Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and
+these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to
+follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a
+theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by
+another rule, and that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not
+proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to
+follow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with
+regard to something that is referred to its principal object. Thus
+faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the
+First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on
+the part of the things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for
+instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has
+no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is
+impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may
+have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to
+obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or
+despairs of things of which he is capable.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of
+hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to
+longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether
+that which we hope for be delayed or not.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of
+obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper
+object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a
+theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
+another's help, as stated above (A. 1).
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Hope Is Distinct from the Other Theological Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other
+theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects,
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the object of hope is the
+same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not
+distinct from the other theological virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession
+of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life
+of the world to come." Now expectation of future happiness belongs to
+hope, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore hope is not distinct from
+faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly
+to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ There cannot be number without distinction. Now
+hope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says
+(Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity.
+Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ A virtue is said to be theological from having God
+for the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in
+two ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else
+is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for
+His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
+
+On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a
+principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from
+God both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
+Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
+derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells
+us is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence
+we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to
+the Divine assistance for obtaining happiness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God is the object of these virtues under different
+aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the object
+suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54,
+A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as
+though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope
+presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on (A. 7).
+Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained
+finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity,
+properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to
+Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Hope Precedes Faith?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss
+on Ps. 36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the
+entrance to faith and the beginning of salvation." But salvation is
+by faith whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should
+precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in
+the definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of
+things to be hoped for." Therefore hope precedes faith.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle
+says (1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to
+receive fruit." But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope
+precedes faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac,"
+i.e. "Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.
+
+_I answer that,_ Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the
+object of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In
+order, therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of
+hope to be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in
+one way, eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine
+assistance, as explained above (A. 2; A. 6, ad 3): and both of these
+are proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able
+to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine
+assistance is ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh
+to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek
+Him." Therefore it is evident that faith precedes hope.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is called
+"the entrance" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope
+we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called
+the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be established
+and perfected in faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition
+of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not
+apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a
+circumlocution by something resulting from faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it
+suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Charity Precedes Hope?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose
+says on Luke 27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard
+seed," etc.: "Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity." But
+faith precedes charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good
+emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity." Now to
+hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul.
+Therefore it flows from charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope
+proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but
+also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by
+charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
+commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience,"
+i.e. "from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes
+charity.
+
+_I answer that,_ Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and
+of matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect:
+the other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which
+the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first
+order hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that
+hope and all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 4; I-II, Q. 28, A. 6, ad 2; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7)
+in the treatise on the passions.
+
+Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that
+whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person
+some good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect
+love is that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but
+that he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he
+desires. The first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to
+God for His own sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since
+he that hopes, intends to obtain possession of something for himself.
+
+Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as
+a man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for
+his sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so
+too, hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be
+rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments.
+On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally
+precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made
+more perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this
+sense that Ambrose states (Obj. 1) that charity flows from hope: so
+that this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from
+some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every
+kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living
+hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a
+friend.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is
+naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 18
+
+OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are
+four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?
+
+(2) Whether it is in the blessed?
+
+(3) Whether it is in the damned?
+
+(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Hope Is in the Will As Its Subject?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its
+subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above
+(Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1). Now the arduous is the object, not
+of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will
+but in the irascible.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another.
+Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the
+most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the
+same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things
+simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act
+of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the
+will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power:
+so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The soul is not apprehensive of God save as
+regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine
+declares (De Trin. xiv, 3, 6). Now hope is a theological virtue
+having God for its object. Since therefore it is neither in the
+memory, nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty,
+it follows that it is in the will as its subject.
+
+_I answer that,_ As shown above (I, Q. 87, A. 2), habits are known by
+their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive
+faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold
+appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into
+irascible and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called
+the will, as stated in the First Part (Q. 82, A. 5), those movements
+which occur in the lower appetite, are with passion, while those in
+the higher appetite are without passion, as shown above (I, Q. 87, A.
+2, ad 1; I-II, Q. 22, A. 3, ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope
+cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the
+principal object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good.
+Therefore hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and
+not in the lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible:
+whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible,
+or rather superintelligible.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to
+one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required
+in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of
+hoping.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity are
+mutually related, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8). Hence there is no
+reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the
+same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the
+same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the First
+Part (Q. 85, A. 4).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 2]
+
+Whether in the Blessed There Is Hope?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For
+Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His
+conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words
+of Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person.
+Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous
+good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men
+hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can
+hope to continue in its possession.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness,
+not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above (Q. 17, A.
+3). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of
+others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there can be
+hope in them.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory
+of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the saints
+in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10;
+Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can
+be hope.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth,
+why doth he hope for?" Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God.
+Therefore hope has no place in them.
+
+_I answer that,_ If what gives a thing its species be removed, the
+species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as
+when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same
+specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object,
+even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q. 17, AA. 5, 6;
+I-II, Q. 54, A. 2): and its principal object is eternal happiness as
+being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above
+(Q. 17, A. 2).
+
+Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope
+except in so far as it is something future, it follows that when
+happiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with
+the virtue of hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in
+heaven, and neither of them can be in the blessed.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore
+blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same
+time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He
+was still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the
+glory of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to have the
+virtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the
+body but the enjoyment of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal life,
+because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were, of
+God's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of
+happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future.
+Hence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness
+(for as regards this there is no future), but are in actual
+possession thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same
+hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of others.
+But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their
+own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not
+by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he
+that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor,
+without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having God for its
+object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which consists
+in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Moreover,
+although the glory of the body is something arduous in comparison
+with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the glory of the
+soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small thing as
+compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has the
+glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of
+the body.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Hope Is in the Damned?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the
+devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Matt. 25:41:
+"Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared
+for the devil and his angels." But the devil has hope, according to
+Job 40:28, "Behold his hope shall fail him." Therefore it seems that
+the damned have hope.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope.
+But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according to
+James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and tremble." Therefore it
+seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit
+that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, "If the tree fall
+to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall,
+there shall it be." Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and
+never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12,
+"Rejoicing in hope." Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and
+grief, according to Isa. 65:14, "My servants shall praise for
+joyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall
+howl for grief of spirit." Therefore no hope is in the damned.
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will
+should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that
+what is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that
+which is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will:
+wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could
+not be perfectly happy in their first state before their
+confirmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no
+foreknowledge of what would happen to them. For perfect and true
+happiness requires that one should be certain of being happy for
+ever, else the will would not rest.
+
+In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary
+condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly
+penal unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible
+if they were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation.
+Hence it belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should
+know that they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain
+happiness. Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): "He believeth not
+that he may return from darkness to light." It is, therefore, evident
+that they cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither
+can the blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is
+no hope either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand,
+hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory,
+because in either case they apprehend happiness as a future possible
+thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said of the
+devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it
+be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby
+he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just before
+(Job 40:18): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth":
+this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is about
+things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or
+another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and
+concerning oneself." Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in
+the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them
+future possible things, but far removed from them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their
+demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase
+their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their
+respective states.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 4]
+
+Whether There Is Certainty in the Hope of a Wayfarer?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of
+a wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not
+to the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in
+hope.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated above
+(Q. 17, A. 1). Now it is impossible in this life to know for certain
+that we are in a state of grace, as stated above (I-II, Q. 112, A.
+5). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may fail.
+Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore
+wayfarer's hope has no certainty.
+
+_On the contrary,_ "Hope is the certain expectation of future
+happiness," as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be
+gathered from 2 Tim. 1:12, "I know Whom I have believed, and I am
+certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed to Him."
+
+_I answer that,_ Certainty is found in a thing in two ways,
+essentially and by participation. It is found essentially in the
+cognitive power; by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to
+its end by the cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works
+with certainty, since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves
+everything with certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral
+virtues are said to work with greater certainty than art, in as much
+as, like a second nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason:
+and thus too, hope tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing
+in the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive faculty.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received,
+but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not
+grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has
+faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is
+due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but
+not to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places
+its trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 19
+
+OF THE GIFT OF FEAR
+(In Twelve Articles)
+
+We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether God is to be feared?
+
+(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;
+
+(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?
+
+(4) Whether servile fear is good?
+
+(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?
+
+(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?
+
+(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
+
+(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
+
+(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
+
+(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?
+
+(11) Whether it remains in heaven?
+
+(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 1]
+
+Whether God Can Be Feared?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object
+of fear is a future evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 41, AA. 2, 3).
+But God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore
+God cannot be feared.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God.
+Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear
+those things whence evil comes to us." But evil comes to us, not from
+God, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy
+own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me." Therefore God is not to be
+feared.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 10:7): "Who shall not fear
+Thee, O King of nations?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where
+is My fear?"
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the
+future good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is
+someone's help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes
+for, so, too, fear may have two objects, one of which is the very
+evil which a man shrinks from, while the other is that from which the
+evil may come. Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness
+itself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can be an object of fear
+in the second way, in so far as there may come to us some evil either
+from Him or in relation to Him.
+
+From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not
+absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good.
+Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an
+end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the
+order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of
+fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in
+so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely
+speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.
+
+In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be
+separated from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This objection considers the object of fear as being
+the evil which a man shuns.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in respect of
+which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which
+He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to
+fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that,
+accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under
+different aspects.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author but
+from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment
+is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good,
+since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly;
+although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is
+written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked
+with works and words have called it to them."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Fear Is Fittingly Divided into Filial, Initial, Servile and
+Worldly Fear?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into
+filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De
+Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness,
+shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above (I-II, Q. 41, A.
+4), and which are not mentioned in the division in question.
+Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But
+there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good,
+since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . .
+believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to
+Mk. 14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy." Therefore the
+aforesaid division of fear is insufficient.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of
+wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now
+filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father,
+is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in
+comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be
+that of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be
+distinguished from all these other fears.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial
+and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between
+them.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear
+about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the desire
+for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the
+flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore
+"worldly fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct
+from "human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person.
+
+On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).
+
+_I answer that,_ We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes
+us turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object
+of fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man
+withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes,
+on account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him.
+This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of
+fault.
+
+Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of
+punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear
+of committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child
+to fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both,
+it will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to
+whether it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has
+been treated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 3) when we were considering the
+passion of fear.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul:
+whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as
+explained above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while
+moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all
+the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now
+natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not
+numbered among these kinds of fear.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the power
+which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the
+contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her
+husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he
+submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to
+whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste
+fear amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes
+our Father, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of
+adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)"; and by this same
+charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have
+espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste
+virgin to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these,
+since it does not include charity in its definition.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: These three fears regard punishment but in different
+ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which turns man
+away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or threaten:
+whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby men are
+drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God. Servile
+fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it
+secondarily.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away from God
+through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of
+forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to
+the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although
+they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of
+different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins,
+all of which alike however lead man away from God.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Worldly Fear Is Always Evil?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil.
+Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are
+blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge
+of whom we read (Luke 18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded
+man." Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the
+punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments
+incite us to good actions, according to Rom. 13:3, "Wilt thou not be
+afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have
+praise from the same." Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not evil,
+since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to
+fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby
+the present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear
+is not always evil.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them
+that kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but
+what is evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.
+
+_I answer that,_ As shown above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 1;
+I-II, Q. 54, A. 2) moral acts and habits take their name and species
+from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's movement
+is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement
+is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone were
+to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on account
+of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the
+covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he
+seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the
+desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly
+love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the
+world as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is
+born of love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine
+states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises
+from worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear
+is always evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in so
+far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of
+grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in
+this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one
+may have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is
+praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias
+or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in order to
+withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister, according to
+Rom. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath
+upon him that doth evil." To fear the secular power in this way is
+part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his
+own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that
+account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds,
+which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse
+than to suffer any punishment whatever.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Servile Fear Is Good?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the
+use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of
+servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "if a man
+do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well
+done." Therefore servile fear is not good.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile fear
+grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11, "Why
+did I not die in the womb?" Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a man
+dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer
+loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of
+pride, not of humility." Therefore servile fear is evil.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of
+charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But
+mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear
+is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "You have not
+received the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit
+that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear." Therefore
+servile fear is not evil.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be
+evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free
+is cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as
+cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever
+does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it
+is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is
+contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from
+love. Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so
+that if servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil
+simply, even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it
+contrary to charity belongs to its very species.
+
+This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile
+fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless
+faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the
+object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by
+accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary,
+is loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is
+feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid
+of charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and
+that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is
+the case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not
+destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end.
+Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is
+evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who
+does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not
+justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride,
+but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to
+subject his affections to the yoke of justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the
+sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity,
+so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its
+substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be
+feared as the principal evil.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Servile Fear Is Substantially the Same As Filial Fear?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the
+same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same
+apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is
+accompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and
+lifeless faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and
+filial fear are substantially the same.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the
+same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they
+both fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially
+the same.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain favors
+from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be punished
+by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to
+receive other favors from Him, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 2, ad 2).
+Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the
+same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says
+that there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.
+
+_I answer that,_ The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts
+and habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, Q.
+54, A. 2), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear
+correspond to different kinds of evil.
+
+Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs
+specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown
+above (A. 2). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear are
+not the same substantially but differ specifically.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards the
+object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but in
+respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of
+charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand,
+servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the
+comparison fails.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God
+in the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the
+infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as
+the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks
+to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz.
+God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural
+movements differ specifically according to their different
+relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not
+specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of
+the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This
+cannot be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Servile Fear Remains with Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with
+charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that
+"when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had
+prepared a place for it."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts,
+by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Now "where the
+Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then
+freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away
+when charity comes.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as
+punishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of God drives away
+self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine
+testifies (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "the love of God unto the
+contempt of self builds up the city of God." Therefore it seems that
+servile fear is driven out when charity comes.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as
+stated above (A. 4). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not
+forfeited through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost
+dwells in us. Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity
+comes.
+
+_I answer that,_ Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is
+fear of punishment which is detrimental to one's own good. Hence the
+fear of punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as
+self-love is: because it comes to the same that a man love his own
+good and that he fear to be deprived of it.
+
+Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In
+one way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the
+love of his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when
+a man loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way,
+it is indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as
+when a man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet
+not so as to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have
+another special love for one's neighbor, besides the love of charity
+which is founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness,
+consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is
+referable to charity.
+
+Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity,
+because separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns
+exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it
+is contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that
+is opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in
+opposition to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear
+of punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of
+punishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when,
+to wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from
+God, but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not
+place his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil
+as being the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent
+with charity; but it is not called servile, except when punishment is
+dreaded as a principal evil, as explained above (AA. 2, 4). Hence
+fear considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the
+substance of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love
+can remain with charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as servile:
+and such is the sense of the two other objections.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Fear Is the Beginning of Wisdom?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
+For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a
+part of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while
+wisdom is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the
+beginning of wisdom.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of the
+Lord, that is wisdom," according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems
+that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something is
+prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that
+fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Ps. 110:10: "The fear of the
+Lord is the beginning of wisdom."
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two
+ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to
+its essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of
+an art as to its essence consists in the principles from which that
+art proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that
+wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the
+beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is
+where the builder begins his work.
+
+Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall
+state further on (Q. 45, A. 1), it is considered by us in one way,
+and in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is
+ordained to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according
+to a participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through
+grace, wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being
+cognizant of God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as
+directing human conduct; since this is directed not only by the human
+law, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii,
+14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists
+in the first principles of wisdom, i.e. the articles of faith, and in
+this sense faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as
+regards the effect, the beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom
+begins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet
+servile fear in one way, and filial fear, in another. For servile
+fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in
+so far as he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is
+thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom, according to Ecclus. 1:27,
+"The fear of the Lord driveth out sin." On the other hand, chaste or
+filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of
+wisdom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the Divine law
+belongs to wisdom, in order to make a beginning, man must first of
+all fear God and submit himself to Him: for the result will be that
+in all things he will be ruled by God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that fear is not the beginning of
+wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life that
+is ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is
+written (Ecclus. 1:25): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for
+[Vulg.: 'and'] the branches thereof are longlived." Consequently, as
+the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said
+to be wisdom.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of
+wisdom in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus.
+25:16): "The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning
+of faith is to be fast joined to it."
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Initial Fear Differs Substantially from Filial Fear?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially
+from filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear
+is the beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, "The fear of
+God is the beginning of love." Therefore initial fear is distinct
+from filial fear.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the object
+of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to be
+the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore
+initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the
+extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial
+fear. Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the
+substance of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect
+of perfection and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In
+prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ
+substantially from filial fear.
+
+_I answer that,_ Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning
+(_initium_). Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in
+some way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way,
+initial.
+
+It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial
+fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in
+the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in
+whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning
+of charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial
+fear, because they have not yet attained to the perfection of
+charity. Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to
+filial fear as imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and
+imperfect charity differ, not as to essence but as to state.
+Therefore we must conclude that initial fear, as we understand it
+here, does not differ essentially from filial fear.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile fear,
+which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces the
+thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if
+it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of
+love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its proper
+object, but as having something of servile fear connected with it:
+for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with
+charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with
+imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not
+only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment,
+though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which
+"casteth out fear," according to 1 John 4:18.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear,
+not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect is
+a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in
+_Metaph._ ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being,
+while it differs altogether from non-being.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 9]
+
+Whether Fear Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
+For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also
+from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to
+Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore
+fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God for
+its object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is
+feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a
+theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue,
+being connected with the same matter, as it were.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is bestowed
+as a remedy against pride." But the virtue of humility is opposed to
+pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since
+they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says (Moral.
+ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good,
+while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should not
+be said that fear is a gift.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven
+gifts of the Holy Ghost (Isa. 11:3).
+
+_I answer that,_ Fear is of several kinds, as stated above (A. 2).
+Now it is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib.
+Arb. xviii), "that is a gift of God"--for it was by this fear that
+Peter denied Christ--but that fear of which it was said (Matt.
+10:28): "Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell."
+
+Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
+Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De
+Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas
+the gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as
+they are inseparable from charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A.
+5).
+
+It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among
+the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it
+was stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 3) that the gifts of the Holy
+Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby
+these are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as,
+by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to
+the motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of
+a certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a
+non-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the
+movable subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what
+filial or chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid
+separating ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De
+Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it
+were, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and
+the last place, in the descending order.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope: since
+thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain by
+God's help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore
+filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The proper and principal object of fear is the evil
+shunned, and in this way, as stated above (A. 1), God cannot be an
+object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and the
+other theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust in
+God's help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to
+obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies
+to the other theological virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it does
+not follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from charity
+which is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the
+emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of
+different emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is,
+because love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed by
+reason of its own nature, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4);
+for which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear
+principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes,
+wherefore it is something less than a theological virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride
+of man is to fall off from God," that is to refuse submission to God,
+and this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear cuts
+off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a remedy
+against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the
+virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the
+Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4), while the theological virtues are
+the origin of the gifts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 69, A. 4, ad 3).
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 10]
+
+Whether Fear Decreases When Charity Increases?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For
+Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): "The more charity
+increases, the more fear decreases."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity
+increases when hope increases, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 8).
+Therefore fear decreases when charity increases.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies separation.
+Now separation decreases when union increases. Therefore fear
+decreases when the love of charity increases.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "the
+fear of God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love
+God above all things, and our neighbor as ourselves."
+
+_I answer that,_ Fear is twofold, as stated above (AA. 2, 4); one is
+filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be
+separated from him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears
+punishment.
+
+Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as
+an effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one
+loves a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated
+from him.
+
+On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely
+cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains
+as to its substance, as stated above (A. 6). This fear decreases as
+charity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man
+loves God, the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks
+less of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly,
+because, the faster he clings, the more confident he is of the
+reward, and, consequently the less fearful of punishment.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope
+increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases,
+because the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by
+another's help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated
+from him.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Filial fear does not imply separation from God, but
+submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet, in
+a way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal
+oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be
+observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than
+himself and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of
+charity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of
+fear.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 11]
+
+Whether Fear Remains in Heaven?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For
+it is written (Prov. 1:33): "He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without
+fear of evils," which is to be understood as referring to those who
+already enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is
+about some evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above
+(AA. 2, 5; I-II, Q. 42, A. 1). Therefore there will be no fear in
+heaven.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according to
+1 John 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." But God
+fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards
+good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore
+neither will there be fear in heaven.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The fear of the Lord
+is holy, enduring for ever and ever."
+
+_I answer that,_ Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no
+means be in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security
+which is essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above (I-II,
+Q. 5, A. 4).
+
+But with regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of
+charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in
+heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.
+
+In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object
+of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a
+possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of
+avoidance, fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for
+little evils inspire no fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its
+staying in its own order, so a thing's evil consists in forsaking its
+order. Again, the order of a rational creature is that it should be
+under God and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for
+a rational creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too
+is it an evil for it, if it submit not to God, but presumptuously
+revolt against Him or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a
+rational creature considered as to its nature on account of the
+natural flexibility of the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it
+becomes impossible, by reason of the perfection of glory. Therefore
+the avoidance of this evil that consists in non-subjection to God,
+and is possible to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss, will
+be in heaven; while in this life there is avoidance of this evil as
+of something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, expounding the words
+of Job (26:11), "The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His
+beck," says (Moral. xvii, 29): "The heavenly powers that gaze on Him
+without ceasing, tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it
+should be of a penal nature, is one not of fear but of wonder,"
+because, to wit, they wonder at God's supereminence and
+incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) in this
+sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the question
+doubtful. "If," he says, "this chaste fear that endureth for ever and
+ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that is
+afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds
+fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which
+we have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is
+allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because
+chaste fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we
+avoid sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and
+possess ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no
+kind of fear is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for
+ever and ever, because that which fear will lead us to, will be
+everlasting."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the fear
+that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear
+which is accompanied by security.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) "the same things are
+both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable
+imitation of the Inimitable"--that is, because, so far as they can,
+they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly--"they are unlike
+because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short
+infinitely and immeasurably." Hence, if there be no fear in God
+(since there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not
+follow that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in
+perfect subjection to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Hope implies a certain defect, namely the futurity of
+happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas fear
+implies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is infinitely
+distant from God, and this defect will remain even in heaven. Hence
+fear will not be cast out altogether.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 12]
+
+Whether Poverty of Spirit Is the Beatitude Corresponding to the Gift
+of Fear?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the
+beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the
+beginning of the spiritual life, as explained above (A. 7): whereas
+poverty belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to
+Matt. 19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and
+give to the poor." Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to
+the gift of fear.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120): "Pierce Thou my flesh
+with Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear to
+restrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong
+rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of
+mourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude
+of poverty.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of hope,
+as stated above (A. 9, ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is,
+"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children
+of God," seems above all to correspond to hope, because according to
+Rom. 5:2, "we . . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of
+God." Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear,
+rather than poverty of spirit.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it was stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 2) that the
+fruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits
+correspond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the
+beatitudes.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
+fear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed
+are the poor in spirit."
+
+_I answer that,_ Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear.
+Because, since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and
+submission to God, whatever results from this submission belongs to
+the gift of fear. Now from the very fact that a man submits to God,
+it follows that he ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in
+another but seeks it only in God. For that would be inconsistent with
+perfect subjection to God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8): "Some
+trust in chariots and some in horses; but we will call upon the name
+of . . . our God." It follows that if a man fear God perfectly, he
+does not, by pride, seek greatness either in himself or in external
+goods, viz. honors and riches. In either case, this proceeds from
+poverty of spirit, in so far as the latter denotes either the voiding
+of a puffed up and proud spirit, according to Augustine's
+interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the renunciation of
+worldly goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one's own will,
+through the instigation of the Holy Spirit, according to the
+expounding of Ambrose on Luke 6:20 and Jerome on Matt. 5:3.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue, all the
+beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this
+perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a
+perfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly
+goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts.
+Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of
+temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial
+fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent
+with the perfection of wisdom, as stated above (AA. 7, 10).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The undue exaltation of man either in himself or in
+another is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is
+the result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in
+consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject
+to Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless,
+pleasure is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous
+character of a thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of
+poverty corresponds to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning,
+consequently.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of
+tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation
+of withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the
+term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of
+ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal
+from external things which hinder submission to God, fittingly
+corresponds to fear.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As regards the fruits, it seems that those things
+correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of
+temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty,
+continency and chastity.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 20
+
+OF DESPAIR
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption.
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether despair is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it can be without unbelief?
+
+(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
+
+(4) Whether it arises from sloth?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Despair Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin
+includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from
+the immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But
+despair includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not
+a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no
+sin, because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Matt.
+7:18). Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God,
+or from horror at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore despair
+is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for
+the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault
+but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to
+wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be
+a sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the
+Apostle says of certain men (Eph. 4:19): "Who, despairing, have given
+themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness
+and [Vulg.: 'unto'] covetousness." Therefore despair is not only a
+sin but also the origin of other sins.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2)
+affirmation and negation in the intellect correspond to search and
+avoidance in the appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect
+correspond to good and evil in the appetite. Consequently every
+appetitive movement which is conformed to a true intellect, is good
+in itself, while every appetitive movement which is conformed to a
+false intellect is evil in itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of
+the intellect about God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind,
+and pardon to sinners, according to Ezech. 18:23, "I desire not the
+death of the sinner, but that he should be converted, and live"
+[*Vulg.: 'Is it My will that a sinner should die . . . and not that
+he should be converted and live?' Cf. Ezech. 33:11]: while it is a
+false opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that
+He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace. Therefore,
+just as the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true
+opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the contrary movement of
+despair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is
+vicious and sinful.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In every mortal sin there is, in some way, aversion
+from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but not
+always in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have
+God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as
+hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion
+from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to
+a mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God,
+must necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist
+principally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in
+aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not
+to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which
+is that he departs from God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two ways:
+first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an act
+proceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a
+virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii,
+18, 19) that "no man makes evil use of virtue." Secondly, a thing
+proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and
+in this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus
+sometimes men pride themselves of their virtues, according to
+Augustine (Ep. ccxi): "Pride lies in wait for good works that they
+may die." In this way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may
+lead to despair, in so far as man makes evil use of those good
+things, by allowing them to be an occasion of despair.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The damned are outside the pale of hope on account of
+the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not imputed
+to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their damnation. Even
+so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of obtaining that
+which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which was not due
+to be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to despair
+of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever
+becoming rich.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Can Be Despair Without Unbelief?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no despair without
+unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so
+long as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a
+man cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his
+faith be removed.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to prefer one's own guilt to God's mercy and
+goodness, is to deny the infinity of God's goodness and mercy, and so
+savors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to
+the Divine mercy and goodness, according to Gen. 4:13: "My iniquity
+is greater than that I may deserve pardon." Therefore whoever
+despairs, is an unbeliever.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an
+unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned
+heresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon
+for sins after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is
+an unbeliever.
+
+_On the contrary,_ If we remove that which follows, that which
+precedes remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above (Q. 17, A.
+7). Therefore when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not
+everyone who despairs, is an unbeliever.
+
+_I answer that,_ Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to
+the appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the
+appetite is moved in connection with particulars, since the
+appetitive movement is from the soul towards things, which, in
+themselves, are particular. Now it may happen that a man, while
+having a right opinion in the universal, is not rightly disposed as
+to his appetitive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a
+particular matter, because, in order to pass from the universal
+opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is necessary to
+have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just as it is
+impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal
+proposition, except through the holding of a particular proposition.
+Hence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal,
+fails in an appetitive movement, in regard to some particular, his
+particular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as
+the fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this
+particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular matter,
+although he retains the true universal estimate according to faith,
+viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In the same way, a man while
+retaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, viz. that
+there is in the Church the power of forgiving sins, may suffer a
+movement of despair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state,
+there is no hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a
+particular matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there
+can be other mortal sins, without belief.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The effect is done away, not only when the first cause
+is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence the
+movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the
+universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of
+the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular
+estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God's mercy
+is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs
+judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some
+particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.
+
+The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians
+denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Despair Is the Greatest of Sins?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins.
+For there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above (A. 2).
+But unbelief is the greatest of sins because it overthrows the
+foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair is not the
+greatest of sins.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as the
+Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than
+hope, according to 1 Cor. 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater
+sin than despair.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but
+inordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only
+inordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion.
+Therefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than other
+sins.
+
+_On the contrary,_ An incurable sin seems to be most grievous,
+according to Jer. 30:12: "Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very
+grievous." Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jer.
+15:18: "My wound is desperate so as to refuse to be healed." [*Vulg.:
+"Why is my wound," etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Those sins which are contrary to the theological
+virtues are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since
+the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are
+opposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now
+every mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact
+of its turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a
+mutable good, even inordinately, without turning away from God, it
+would not be a mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its
+very nature, includes aversion from God, is most grievous among
+mortal sins.
+
+Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the
+theological virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God and
+unbelief to despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in
+respect of their proper species, they are more grievous. For unbelief
+is due to a man not believing God's own truth; while the hatred of
+God arises from man's will being opposed to God's goodness itself;
+whereas despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share of
+God's goodness. Hence it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are
+against God as He is in Himself, while despair is against Him,
+according as His good is partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly
+speaking it is a more grievous sin to disbelieve God's truth, or to
+hate God, than not to hope to receive glory from Him.
+
+If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point
+of view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope withdraws us from
+evils and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is
+given up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good
+works. Wherefore a gloss on Prov. 24:10, "If thou lose hope being
+weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished,"
+says: "Nothing is more hateful than despair, for the man that has it
+loses his constancy both in the every day toils of this life, and,
+what is worse, in the battle of faith." And Isidore says (De Sum.
+Bono ii, 14): "To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair
+is to fall into hell."
+
+[And from this the response to the objections is evident.]
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Despair Arises from Sloth?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that despair does not arise from sloth.
+Because different causes do not give rise to one same effect. Now
+despair of the future life arises from lust, according to Gregory
+(Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it does not arise from sloth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as despair is contrary to hope, so is sloth
+contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy arises from hope,
+according to Rom. 12:12, "rejoicing in hope." Therefore sloth arises
+from despair, and not vice versa.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, contrary effects have contrary causes. Now hope, the
+contrary of which is despair, seems to proceed from the consideration
+of Divine favors, especially the Incarnation, for Augustine says (De
+Trin. xiii, 10): "Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope, than
+that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now what greater proof
+could we have of this than that God's Son should deign to unite
+Himself to our nature?" Therefore despair arises rather from the
+neglect of the above consideration than from sloth.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons despair among
+the effects of sloth.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1),
+the object of hope is a good, difficult but possible to obtain by
+oneself or by another. Consequently the hope of obtaining happiness
+may be lacking in a person in two ways: first, through his not
+deeming it an arduous good; secondly, through his deeming it
+impossible to obtain either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact
+that spiritual goods taste good to us no more, or seem to be goods of
+no great account, is chiefly due to our affections being infected
+with the love of bodily pleasures, among which, sexual pleasures hold
+the first place: for the love of those pleasures leads man to have a
+distaste for spiritual things, and not to hope for them as arduous
+goods. In this way despair is caused by lust.
+
+On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good
+impossible to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due to his
+being over downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his
+affections, it seems to him that he will never be able to rise to any
+good. And since sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in
+this way despair is born of sloth.
+
+Now this is the proper object of hope--that the thing is possible,
+because the good and the arduous regard other passions also. Hence
+despair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise
+from lust, for the reason given above.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11), just as
+hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater hope:
+and, accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily into
+despair, according to 2 Cor. 2:7: "Lest . . . such an one be
+swallowed up by overmuch sorrow." Yet, since the object of hope is
+good, to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, not
+naturally but only on account of some supervening obstacle, it
+follows that, more directly, hope gives birth to joy, while on the
+contrary despair is born of sorrow.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This very neglect to consider the Divine favors arises
+from sloth. For when a man is influenced by a certain passion he
+considers chiefly the things which pertain to that passion: so that a
+man who is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful
+things, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he turn his
+thoughts away from sadness.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 21
+
+OF PRESUMPTION
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is the object in which presumption trusts?
+
+(2) Whether presumption is a sin?
+
+(3) To what is it opposed?
+
+(4) From what vice does it arise?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Presumption Trusts in God or in Our Own Power?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that presumption, which is a sin against
+the Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but in our own power. For the
+lesser the power, the more grievously does he sin who trusts in it
+too much. But man's power is less than God's. Therefore it is a more
+grievous sin to presume on human power than to presume on the power
+of God. Now the sin against the Holy Ghost is most grievous.
+Therefore presumption, which is reckoned a species of sin against the
+Holy Ghost, trusts to human rather than to Divine power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, other sins arise from the sin against the Holy
+Ghost, for this sin is called malice which is a source from which
+sins arise. Now other sins seem to arise from the presumption whereby
+man presumes on himself rather than from the presumption whereby he
+presumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, according to
+Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it seems that presumption
+which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, relies chiefly on human power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sin arises from the inordinate conversion to a
+mutable good. Now presumption is a sin. Therefore it arises from
+turning to human power, which is a mutable good, rather than from
+turning to the power of God, which is an immutable good.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Just as, through despair, a man despises the
+Divine mercy, on which hope relies, so, through presumption, he
+despises the Divine justice, which punishes the sinner. Now justice
+is in God even as mercy is. Therefore, just as despair consists in
+aversion from God, so presumption consists in inordinate conversion
+to Him.
+
+_I answer that,_ Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. Now the
+object of hope is an arduous possible good: and a thing is possible
+to a man in two ways: first by his own power; secondly, by the power
+of God alone. With regard to either hope there may be presumption
+owing to lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man relies on
+his own power, there is presumption if he tends to a good as though
+it were possible to him, whereas it surpasses his powers, according
+to Judith 6:15: "Thou humblest them that presume of themselves." This
+presumption is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to
+the mean in this kind of hope.
+
+But as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there
+may be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that a man tends
+to some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of
+God, whereas it is not possible, for instance, if a man hope to
+obtain pardon without repenting, or glory without merits. This
+presumption is, properly, the sin against the Holy Ghost, because, to
+wit, by presuming thus a man removes or despises the assistance of
+the Holy Spirit, whereby he is withdrawn from sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 20, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3) a sin
+which is against God is, in its genus, graver than other sins. Hence
+presumption whereby a man relies on God inordinately, is a more
+grievous sin than the presumption of trusting in one's own power,
+since to rely on the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to
+God, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident that it is
+a graver sin to detract from the Divine power than to exaggerate
+one's own.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The presumption whereby a man presumes inordinately on
+God, includes self-love, whereby he loves his own good inordinately.
+For when we desire a thing very much, we think we can easily procure
+it through others, even though we cannot.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Presumption on God's mercy implies both
+conversion to a mutable good, in so far as it arises from an
+inordinate desire of one's own good, and aversion from the immutable
+good, in as much as it ascribes to the Divine power that which is
+unbecoming to it, for thus man turns away from God's power.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Presumption Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is not a sin. For no sin
+is a reason why man should be heard by God. Yet, through presumption
+some are heard by God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): "Hear me a
+poor wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy."
+Therefore presumption on God's mercy is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, presumption denotes excessive hope. But there cannot
+be excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and mercy are
+infinite. Therefore it seems that presumption is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which is a sin does not excuse from sin: for
+the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) that "Adam sinned less, because he
+sinned in the hope of pardon," which seems to indicate presumption.
+Therefore presumption is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy
+Ghost.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 20, A. 1) with regard to
+despair, every appetitive movement that is conformed to a false
+intellect, is evil in itself and sinful. Now presumption is an
+appetitive movement, since it denotes an inordinate hope. Moreover it
+is conformed to a false intellect, just as despair is: for just as it
+is false that God does not pardon the repentant, or that He does not
+turn sinners to repentance, so is it false that He grants forgiveness
+to those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory to
+those who cease from good works: and it is to this estimate that the
+movement of presumption is conformed.
+
+Consequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than despair,
+since, on account of His infinite goodness, it is more proper to God
+to have mercy and to spare, than to punish: for the former becomes
+God in Himself, the latter becomes Him by reason of our sins.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Presumption sometimes stands for hope, because even the
+right hope which we have in God seems to be presumption, if it be
+measured according to man's estate: yet it is not, if we look at the
+immensity of the goodness of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as though
+man hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from God
+something unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too little
+in Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power; as stated above
+(A. 1, ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To sin with the intention of persevering in sin and
+through the hope of being pardoned, is presumptuous, and this does
+not diminish, but increases sin. To sin, however, with the hope of
+obtaining pardon some time, and with the intention of refraining from
+sin and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes sin,
+because this seems to indicate a will less hardened in sin.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Presumption Is More Opposed to Fear Than to Hope?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear
+than to hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now
+presumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written
+(Wis. 17:10): "A troubled conscience always presumes [Douay:
+'forecasteth'] grievous things," and (Wis. 17:11) that "fear is a
+help to presumption [*Vulg.: 'Fear is nothing else but a yielding up
+of the succours from thought.']." Therefore presumption is opposed to
+fear rather than to hope.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now
+presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because
+presumption implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas
+fear denotes movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is contrary
+to fear rather than to hope.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it
+does not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope.
+Since therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that
+presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.
+
+_On the contrary,_ When two vices are opposed to one another they are
+contrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to
+fortitude. Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of
+despair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that
+presumption also is more directly opposed to hope.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "every
+virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as
+temerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice,
+alike, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning
+is opposed to prudence." This agrees with the Philosopher who says
+(Ethic. ii, 8) that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of
+the contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with
+insensibility, and fortitude with audacity.
+
+Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear,
+especially servile fear, which looks at the punishment arising from
+God's justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a
+kind of false likeness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes
+an inordinate hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed
+when they belong to the same genus, than when they belong to
+different genera, it follows that presumption is more directly
+opposed to hope than to fear. For they both regard and rely on the
+same object, hope inordinately, presumption inordinately.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and
+properly applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in
+this way that inordinate fear is called presumption.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Contraries are things that are most distant from one
+another within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a
+movement of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or
+inordinate. Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than
+to fear, since it is opposed to hope in respect of its specific
+difference, as an inordinate thing to an ordinate one, whereas it is
+opposed to fear, in respect of its generic difference, which is the
+movement of hope.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic
+contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety.
+Hence presumption excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas
+it does not exclude hope except by reason of its difference, by
+excluding its ordinateness.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Presumption Arises from Vainglory?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that presumption does not arise from
+vainglory. For presumption seems to rely most of all on the Divine
+mercy. Now mercy (_misericordia_) regards unhappiness (_miseriam_)
+which is contrary to glory. Therefore presumption does not arise from
+vainglory.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, presumption is opposed to despair. Now despair
+arises from sorrow, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 4, ad 2). Since
+therefore opposites have opposite causes, presumption would seem to
+arise from pleasure, and consequently from sins of the flesh, which
+give the most absorbing pleasure.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the vice of presumption consists in tending to some
+impossible good, as though it were possible. Now it is owing to
+ignorance that one deems an impossible thing to be possible.
+Therefore presumption arises from ignorance rather than from
+vainglory.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumption
+of novelties is a daughter of vainglory."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), presumption is twofold; one
+whereby a man relies on his own power, when he attempts something
+beyond his power, as though it were possible to him. Such like
+presumption clearly arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great
+desire for glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power, and
+especially novelties which call for greater admiration. Hence Gregory
+states explicitly that presumption of novelties is a daughter of
+vainglory.
+
+The other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Divine mercy or
+power, consisting in the hope of obtaining glory without merits, or
+pardon without repentance. Such like presumption seems to arise
+directly from pride, as though man thought so much of himself as to
+esteem that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory,
+however much he might be a sinner.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 22
+
+OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under
+which head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) The precepts relating to hope;
+
+(2) The precepts relating to fear.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 22, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Should Be a Precept of Hope?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given relating
+to the virtue of hope. For when an effect is sufficiently procured by
+one cause, there is no need to induce it by another. Now man is
+sufficiently induced by his natural inclination to hope for good.
+Therefore there is no need of a precept of the Law to induce him to
+do this.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, since precepts are given about acts of virtue, the
+chief precepts are about the acts of the chief virtues. Now the chief
+of all the virtues are the three theological virtues, viz. hope,
+faith and charity. Consequently, as the chief precepts of the Law are
+those of the decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3), it seems that if any precept of hope were
+given, it should be found among the precepts of the decalogue. But it
+is not to be found there. Therefore it seems that the Law should
+contain no precept of hope.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is equivalent to a
+prohibition of the act of the opposite vice. Now no precept is to be
+found forbidding despair which is contrary to hope. Therefore it
+seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says on John 15:12, "This is My
+commandment, that you love one another" (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.):
+"How many things are commanded us about faith! How many relating to
+hope!" Therefore it is fitting that some precepts should be given
+about hope.
+
+_I answer that,_ Among the precepts contained in Holy Writ, some
+belong to the substance of the Law, others are preambles to the Law.
+The preambles to the Law are those without which no law is possible:
+such are the precepts relating to the act of faith and the act of
+hope, because the act of faith inclines man's mind so that he
+believes the Author of the Law to be One to Whom he owes submission,
+while, by the hope of a reward, he is induced to observe the
+precepts. The precepts that belong to the substance of the Law are
+those which relate to right conduct and are imposed on man already
+subject and ready to obey: wherefore when the Law was given these
+precepts were set forth from the very outset under the form of a
+command.
+
+Yet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given under the
+form of a command, since, unless man already believed and hoped, it
+would be useless to give him the Law: but, just as the precept of
+faith had to be given under the form of an announcement or reminder,
+as stated above (Q. 16, A. 1), so too, the precept of hope, in the
+first promulgation of the Law, had to be given under the form of a
+promise. For he who promises rewards to them that obey him, by that
+very fact, urges them to hope: hence all the promises contained in
+the Law are incitements to hope.
+
+Since, however, when once the Law has been given, it is for a wise
+man to induce men not only to observe the precepts, but also, and
+much more, to safeguard the foundation of the Law, therefore, after
+the first promulgation of the Law, Holy Writ holds out to man many
+inducements to hope, even by way of warning or command, and not
+merely by way of promise, as in the Law; for instance, in the Ps.
+61:9: "Hope [Douay: 'Trust'] in Him all ye congregation of the
+people," and in many other passages of the Scriptures.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Nature inclines us to hope for the good which is
+proportionate to human nature; but for man to hope for a supernatural
+good he had to be induced by the authority of the Divine law, partly
+by promises, partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless there
+was need for precepts of the Divine law to be given even for those
+things to which natural reason inclines us, such as the acts of the
+moral virtues, for sake of insuring a greater stability, especially
+since the natural reason of man was clouded by the lusts of sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The precepts of the law of the decalogue belong to the
+first promulgation of the Law: hence there was no need for a precept
+of hope among the precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough to
+induce men to hope by the inclusion of certain promises, as in the
+case of the first and fourth commandments.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In those observances to which man is bound as under a
+duty, it is enough that he receive an affirmative precept as to what
+he has to do, wherein is implied the prohibition of what he must
+avoid doing: thus he is given a precept concerning the honor due to
+parents, but not a prohibition against dishonoring them, except by
+the law inflicting punishment on those who dishonor their parents.
+And since in order to be saved it is man's duty to hope in God, he
+had to be induced to do so by one of the above ways, affirmatively,
+so to speak, wherein is implied the prohibition of the opposite.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 22, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Should Have Been Given a Precept of Fear?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that, in the Law, there should not have
+been given a precept of fear. For the fear of God is about things
+which are a preamble to the Law, since it is the "beginning of
+wisdom." Now things which are a preamble to the Law do not come under
+a precept of the Law. Therefore no precept of fear should be given in
+the Law.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect is also given. Now love
+is the cause of fear, since "every fear proceeds from some kind of
+love," as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Therefore given the
+precept of love, it would have been superfluous to command fear.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, presumption, in a way, is opposed to fear. But the
+Law contains no prohibition against presumption. Therefore it seems
+that neither should any precept of fear have been given.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 10:12): "And now, Israel,
+what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the
+Lord thy God?" But He requires of us that which He commands us to do.
+Therefore it is a matter of precept that man should fear God.
+
+_I answer that,_ Fear is twofold, servile and filial. Now just as man
+is induced, by the hope of rewards, to observe precepts of law, so
+too is he induced thereto by the fear of punishment, which fear is
+servile.
+
+And just as according to what has been said (A. 1), in the
+promulgation of the Law there was no need for a precept of the act of
+hope, and men were to be induced thereto by promises, so neither was
+there need for a precept, under form of command, of fear which
+regards punishment, and men were to be induced thereto by the threat
+of punishment: and this was realized both in the precepts of the
+decalogue, and afterwards, in due sequence, in the secondary precepts
+of the Law.
+
+Yet, just as wise men and the prophets who, consequently, strove to
+strengthen man in the observance of the Law, delivered their teaching
+about hope under the form of admonition or command, so too did they
+in the matter of fear.
+
+On the other hand filial fear which shows reverence to God, is a sort
+of genus in respect of the love of God, and a kind of principle of
+all observances connected with reverence for God. Hence precepts of
+filial fear are given in the Law, even as precepts of love, because
+each is a preamble to the external acts prescribed by the Law and to
+which the precepts of the decalogue refer. Hence in the passage
+quoted in the argument _On the contrary,_ man is required "to have
+fear, to walk in God's ways," by worshipping Him, and "to love Him."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Filial fear is a preamble to the Law, not as though it
+were extrinsic thereto, but as being the beginning of the Law, just
+as love is. Hence precepts are given of both, since they are like
+general principles of the whole Law.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: From love proceeds filial fear as also other good works
+that are done from charity. Hence, just as after the precept of
+charity, precepts are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the
+same time precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity, just
+as, in demonstrative sciences, it is not enough to lay down the first
+principles, unless the conclusions also are given which follow from
+them proximately or remotely.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Inducement to fear suffices to exclude presumption,
+even as inducement to hope suffices to exclude despair, as stated
+above (A. 1, ad 3).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 23
+
+OF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+In proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself;
+(2) the corresponding gift of wisdom. The first consideration will be
+fivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its
+acts; (4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating thereto.
+
+The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity,
+considered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in its relation
+to its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether charity is friendship?
+
+(2) Whether it is something created in the soul?
+
+(3) Whether it is a virtue?
+
+(4) Whether it is a special virtue?
+
+(5) Whether it is one virtue?
+
+(6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?
+
+(7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it?
+
+(8) Whether it is the form of the virtues?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Charity Is Friendship?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not friendship. For
+nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's
+friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is
+of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay:
+'conversation'] is not with men" (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is
+not friendship.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there is no friendship without return of love
+(Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies,
+according to Matt. 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is
+not friendship.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there
+are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the
+delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the
+friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his
+letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the
+Bible: "True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn
+together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence,
+not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the
+study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it friendship for the
+virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship
+based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii).
+Therefore charity is not friendship.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 15:15): "I will not now call
+you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by
+reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2, 3) not
+every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is
+together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to
+wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love,
+but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a
+horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of
+concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship
+for wine or for a horse.
+
+Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain
+mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and
+friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of
+communication.
+
+Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God,
+inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of
+friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which
+it is written (1 Cor. 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called
+unto the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this
+communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is
+the friendship of man for God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in
+respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to
+this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God
+or the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect of his
+mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and
+both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of
+life, wherefore it is written (Phil. 3:20): "Our conversation is in
+heaven." But this "conversation" will be perfected in heaven, when
+"His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face" (Apoc.
+22:3, 4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected
+in heaven.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in
+respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to
+one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another,
+as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he
+loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected
+with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for
+their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate
+us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to
+our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom
+the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The friendship that is based on the virtuous is
+directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for
+his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not
+virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on
+the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for
+God's sake.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Charity Is Something Created in the Soul?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not something created in
+the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his
+neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is love.
+Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he
+says (De Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: God is Charity, even as it was
+said: God is a Spirit." Therefore charity is not something created in
+the soul, but is God Himself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the
+soul is the life of the body, according to Deut. 30:20: "He is thy
+life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God
+quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity,
+according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that we have passed from death to
+life, because we love the brethren." Therefore God is charity itself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the
+contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed
+it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings
+the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not
+something created in the soul.
+
+On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By
+charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God
+for His own sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in
+the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.
+
+_I answer that,_ The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q.
+17 of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something
+created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the
+mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we
+love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from
+the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous
+acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues,
+for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and
+this he said on account of the excellence of charity.
+
+But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary,
+detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind
+the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a
+way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle
+of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive
+power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose
+principle needs to be in itself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 6, A. 1):
+so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which
+involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an
+act of the will.
+
+Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will
+in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an
+instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action,
+nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again
+the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has
+been stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4) that the love of charity is
+the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy
+Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should
+be the efficient cause of that act.
+
+Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be
+connatural to that power by reason of some form which is the
+principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to
+their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is
+inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He
+"ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the
+act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so
+that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power,
+inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect
+than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it
+be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue,
+since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity
+has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure.
+Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of
+charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the
+natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and
+causing it to act with ease and pleasure.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is
+wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with
+the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God
+(since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation
+of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a
+share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love
+our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of
+speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines
+Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to
+some an occasion of error.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God is effectively the life both of the soul by
+charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the
+life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body.
+Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is
+immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form
+depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore
+it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an
+infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God,
+this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of
+charity.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Charity Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity
+is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a
+virtue, as may be gathered from _Ethic._ viii, 1; nor is it numbered
+among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore,
+is charity a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo et
+Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies
+rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a
+virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is
+not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the
+soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject.
+Therefore charity is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is
+a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us
+to God, for by it we love Him."
+
+_I answer that,_ Human acts are good according as they are regulated
+by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the
+principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of
+human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), viz.
+human reason and God.
+
+Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with
+right reason," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, so too, the nature of
+virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to
+faith, (Q. 4, A. 5) and hope (Q. 17, A. 1). Wherefore, it follows
+that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites
+us to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that
+friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a virtue or
+with a virtue." For we might say that it is a moral virtue about
+works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect
+from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another
+person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship
+considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of
+a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13).
+Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of
+itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and
+virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit,
+as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident
+from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous,
+as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore
+friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather
+than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it
+is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the
+goodness of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to
+rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 25, A. 2) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love
+is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love.
+And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean
+that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of
+excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider
+its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has
+its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident
+which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its
+subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an
+accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is
+superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher
+nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way
+charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation
+of the Holy Ghost.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Charity Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For
+Jerome says: "Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby
+we love God" [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and
+Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that
+"virtue is the order of love." Now no special virtue is included in
+the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a
+special virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be
+a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue,
+according to 1 Cor. 13:4: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed
+it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: "Let all
+your things be done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special
+virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now
+Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, "Thou shalt love"
+is "a general commandment," and "Thou shalt not covet," "a general
+prohibition." Therefore charity is a general virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Nothing general is enumerated together with what
+is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues,
+viz. hope and faith, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "And now there remain
+faith, hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special
+virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as
+shown above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper
+object of love is the good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 1), so
+that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special
+kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of
+happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of
+charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love.
+Therefore charity is a special virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Charity is included in the definition of every virtue,
+not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue
+depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on (AA. 7, 8). In
+this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues,
+as explained in _Ethic._ ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on
+prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the last
+end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other
+ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of
+horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object
+the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows
+that it extends to the acts of a man's whole life, by commanding
+them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The precept of love is said to be a general command,
+because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end,
+according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is charity."
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Charity Is One Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits
+are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of
+charity--God and our neighbor--which are infinitely distant from one
+another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit,
+even though that object be one in reality, as shown above (Q. 17, A.
+6; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which
+God is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by
+reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But
+the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii,
+3, 11, 12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into
+a number of various species.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the
+object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of
+the Divine truth, according to Eph. 4:5: "One faith." Therefore
+charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine
+goodness.
+
+_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (A. 1) is a kind of
+friendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship
+are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end,
+and in this way there are three species of friendship, namely
+friendship for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous;
+secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which
+friendships are based; thus there is one species of friendship
+between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow
+travellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter
+on civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the
+Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).
+
+Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its
+end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of
+everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also
+one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not
+divided into several species.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were
+equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the
+principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of
+charity for God's sake.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore
+charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely
+God's goodness, which is His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: "Give
+glory to the Lord for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us with
+love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary
+and result from the first.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has
+various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to
+charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Charity Is the Most Excellent of the Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of
+the virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as
+it has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will,
+since it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the
+intellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the thing by which another works seems the less
+excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is
+beneath his master. Now "faith . . . worketh by charity," according
+to Gal. 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to
+be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something
+additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the
+object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent
+than charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): "The greater of
+these is charity."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since good, in human acts, depends on their being
+regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which
+is a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human
+acts. Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above (A. 3),
+namely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby,
+even human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological
+virtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since their
+object is God, are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual
+virtues, which consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that
+among the theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to
+that which attains God most.
+
+Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by
+another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive
+from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas
+charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that
+something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent
+than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues,
+just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent
+than the other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it
+appoints the mean in human operations or passions.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The operation of the intellect is completed by the
+thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the
+excellence of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the
+measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the
+will and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of
+the appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of
+the appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is
+the object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the
+soul are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves,
+because a thing is contained according to the mode of the container
+(De Causis xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul,
+are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul.
+Consequently it is better to know than to love the things that are
+beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to
+the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7, 8):
+whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of God,
+ranks before the knowledge of such things. Therefore charity is more
+excellent than faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by
+his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not
+prove.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but
+charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance
+therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous,
+as hope does, since what is already united has not the character of
+arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Any True Virtue Is Possible Without Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there can be true virtue without
+charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those
+who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the
+naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is
+possible without charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it
+comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now,
+in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their
+concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore
+true virtue is possible without charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, science and art are virtues, according to _Ethic._
+vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore
+true virtue can be without charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
+distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body
+to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." And yet
+true virtue is very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth
+temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
+things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore no
+true virtue is possible without charity.
+
+_I answer that,_ Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things
+directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the
+end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the
+proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and
+universal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and
+principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps.
+72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to God," and to this good man is
+ordered by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were, particular good
+may be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it
+can be directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while
+the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away
+from the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true
+virtue is that which is directed to man's principal good; thus also
+the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the
+disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best": and in this
+way no true virtue is possible without charity.
+
+If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end,
+then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as
+it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good
+is not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is
+ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as
+Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser,
+whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the
+miser's justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through
+fear of severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he
+curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude,
+whereby as Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he
+goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty'" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i,
+45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for
+instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a
+true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final
+and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible
+without charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one
+is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something
+that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is
+always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the
+actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always
+sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and
+directs it to his unbelief as end.
+
+There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in
+accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his
+possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even
+his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as
+stated above (Q. 10, A. 4; I-II, Q. 85, A. 2). In this way it is
+possible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not
+perfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the
+principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly
+true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable
+principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or
+chastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by
+charity, however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a relation
+to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life,
+as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 56, A. 3). Hence the comparison fails.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Charity Is the Form of the Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the true form of the
+virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential.
+Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it
+would follow that the other virtues are of the same species as
+charity: nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since
+then it would not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way
+the form of the virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their
+root and foundation, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in
+charity." Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the
+matter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making.
+Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not coincide
+with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end and the
+mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that
+charity is the form of the virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from
+the end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is
+the will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the
+form of an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently,
+in morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs
+give the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has
+been said (A. 7), that it is charity which directs the acts of all
+other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives
+the form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this
+sense that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are
+called virtues in relation to "informed" acts.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as
+being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of
+efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the
+aforesaid manner.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far
+as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom,
+and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the character
+of a material cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because
+it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is
+one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called
+the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it
+conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last
+end.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 24
+
+OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY
+(In Twelve Articles)
+
+We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which
+head there are twelve points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject?
+
+(2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine
+infusion?
+
+(3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural
+gifts?
+
+(4) Whether it increases in the person who has it?
+
+(5) Whether it increases by addition?
+
+(6) Whether it increases by every act?
+
+(7) Whether it increases indefinitely?
+
+(8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect?
+
+(9) Of the various degrees of charity;
+
+(10) Whether charity can diminish?
+
+(11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed?
+
+(12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Will Is the Subject of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of
+charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the
+Philosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part.
+Therefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated
+above (Q. 23, A. 6). But the reason is the subject of virtue.
+Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1
+Cor. 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity." Now the
+principle of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that
+charity is chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the
+will.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The object of charity is the good, which is also
+the object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its
+subject.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since, as stated in the First Part (Q. 80, A. 2),
+the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective
+which is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in
+different ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good
+apprehended by sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite
+or will is good under the universal aspect of good, according as it
+can be apprehended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not
+a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect
+alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the
+intellective appetite, i.e. the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of
+the intellective appetite, as proved in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2):
+wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of
+sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good
+which is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the
+concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9), the
+will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from
+the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not
+by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom, and
+transcends the rule of human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: "The
+charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Hence it is not
+in the reason, either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its
+rule, like justice and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship
+of the will to the reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 4), the
+free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not
+in the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose.
+For choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of
+the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence charity, whose object is the
+last end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in
+the free-will.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Charity Is Caused in Us by Infusion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not caused in us by
+infusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man
+naturally. Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the "Divine
+good," which is the object of charity, "is for all an object of
+dilection and love." Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by
+infusion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to love
+it. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good.
+Therefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no
+infused habit in order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do
+we need one in order to love God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
+commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and
+an unfeigned faith." Now these three have reference to human acts.
+Therefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from
+infusion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God
+is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), charity is a
+friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting
+happiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of
+gratuitous gifts, for, according to Rom. 6:23, "the grace of God is
+life everlasting": wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural
+facilities. Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be
+natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect
+does not transcend its cause.
+
+Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through
+acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy
+Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the
+participation of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above (Q.
+23, A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which is
+founded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all
+naturally. On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural
+fellowship, so the comparison fails.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet not to
+us, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on sensible
+things, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much as He
+is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable to us in
+this way, on account of the inclination of our appetite towards
+visible goods. Hence it is evident that for us to love God above all
+things in this way, it is necessary that charity be infused into our
+hearts.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that in us charity proceeds from "a
+pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith," this must
+be referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these things.
+Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to
+receive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the
+saying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): "Fear leads to
+charity," and of a gloss on Matt. 1:2: "Faith begets hope, and hope
+charity."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Charity Is Infused According to the Capacity of Our Natural
+Gifts?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity is infused according to the
+capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written (Matt. 25:15) that
+"He gave to every one according to his own virtue [Douay: 'proper
+ability']." Now, in man, none but natural virtue precedes charity,
+since there is no virtue without charity, as stated above (Q. 23, A.
+7). Therefore God infuses charity into man according to the measure
+of his natural virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, among things ordained towards one another, the
+second is proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things
+that the form is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous
+gifts, that glory is proportionate to grace. Now, since charity is a
+perfection of nature, it is compared to the capacity of nature as
+second to first. Therefore it seems that charity is infused according
+to the capacity of nature.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to the
+same measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to Matt.
+22:30 and Luke 20:36. Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are
+bestowed on the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the
+Master teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently
+applies to man.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 3:8): "The Spirit breatheth
+where He will," and (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things one and the
+same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will."
+Therefore charity is given, not according to our natural capacity,
+but according as the Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.
+
+_I answer that,_ The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause
+of that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater
+effect. Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature,
+as stated above (A. 2) it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on
+the sole grace of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the
+quantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on
+the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy
+Ghost Who "divides" His gifts "according as He will." Hence the
+Apostle says (Eph. 4:7): "To every one of us is given grace according
+to the measure of the giving of Christ."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The virtue in accordance with which God gives His gifts
+to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort of
+the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this
+disposition or effort, by moving man's mind either more or less,
+according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:12): "Who
+hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in
+light."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The form does not surpass the proportion of the matter.
+In like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus, for
+grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity
+and nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison
+fails.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The angel's is an intellectual nature, and it is
+consistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly
+whithersoever he is borne, as stated in the First Part (Q. 61, A. 6).
+Hence there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good
+in those who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and
+consequently those of the higher angels who remained steadfast became
+better than the others, and those who fell became worse. But man's is
+a rational nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in
+potentiality and sometimes in act: so that it is not necessarily
+borne wholly whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater
+natural gifts there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the
+comparison fails.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Charity Can Increase?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing
+increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely
+dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a
+spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in
+respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest
+charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore
+charity does not increase.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme receives no
+increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the
+greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good.
+Therefore charity cannot increase.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore wherever
+there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase of
+essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of
+essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity
+cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or
+corrupted, which is unreasonable.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [*Cf. Ep.
+clxxxv.] that "charity merits increase that by increase it may merit
+perfection."
+
+_I answer that,_ The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are
+called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the
+last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to
+God, Who is approached, "not by steps of the body but by the
+affections of the soul" [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and
+this approach is the result of charity, since it unites man's mind to
+God. Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that
+it can increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the
+way would cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he
+says (1 Cor. 12:31): "I show unto you yet a more excellent way."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to
+virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of
+objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater
+excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a
+thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual
+quantity of charity increases.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its
+object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it
+follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not
+every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the
+act.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Some have said that charity does not increase in its
+essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according
+to its fervor.
+
+But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since
+charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an
+essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet
+more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its
+subject. Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to
+act, so that an essential increase of charity implies ability to
+produce an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases
+essentially, not by beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject,
+as the objection imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in
+its subject.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Charity Increases by Addition?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases by addition. For
+just as increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be
+according to virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity
+results from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that
+"increase is addition to pre-existing magnitude." Therefore the
+increase of charity which is according to virtual quantity is by
+addition.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul,
+according to 1 John 2:10: "He that loveth his brother abideth in the
+light." Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in
+a house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also
+increases in the soul by addition.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the increase of charity is God's work, even as the
+causing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10: "He will increase the growth
+of the fruits of your justice." Now when God first infuses charity,
+He puts something in the soul that was not there before. Therefore
+also, when He increases charity, He puts something there which was
+not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater
+results from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved
+in _Phys._ iii, text. 59, and _Metaph._ ii, 4. Therefore charity does
+not increase by addition.
+
+_I answer that,_ Every addition is of something to something else: so
+that in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things
+added together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if
+charity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as
+distinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a
+distinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For
+God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which
+did not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which
+magnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless
+capable of being distinguished from the quantity to which it is
+added. Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose
+the distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other.
+
+Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric.
+Specific distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while
+numeric distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a
+habit may receive increase through extending to objects to which it
+did not extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one
+who acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored
+hitherto. But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest
+charity extends to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the
+addition which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as
+though the added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically
+from that to which it is added.
+
+It follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must
+presuppose a numerical distinction between them, which follows a
+distinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one
+white thing is added to another, although such an increase does not
+make a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in
+point, since the subject of charity is none other than the rational
+mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only take place
+by one rational mind being added to another; which is impossible.
+Moreover, even if it were possible, the result would be a greater
+lover, but not a more loving one. It follows, therefore, that charity
+can by no means increase by addition of charity to charity, as some
+have held to be the case.
+
+Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of
+charity more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of
+increase in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a
+form consists wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently,
+since the magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a
+form is greater is the same as to say that it is more in its subject,
+and not that another form is added to it: for this would be the case
+if the form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with
+its subject. Therefore charity increases by being intensified in its
+subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not
+by charity being added to charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and
+something else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity,
+it is distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this
+way we have the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in
+animals. But in so far as it is an accidental form, it is
+distinguishable only in respect of its subject, and in this way it
+has its proper increase, like other accidental forms, by way of
+intensity in its subject, for instance in things subject to
+rarefaction, as is proved in _Phys._ iv, 9. In like manner science,
+as a habit, has its quantity from its objects, and accordingly it
+increases by addition, when a man knows more things; and again, as an
+accidental form, it has a certain quantity through being in its
+subject, and in this way it increases in a man who knows the same
+scientific truths with greater certainty now than before. In the same
+way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that which it
+has from its object, it does not increase, as stated above: hence it
+follows that it increases solely by being intensified.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The addition of light to light can be understood
+through the light being intensified in the air on account of there
+being several luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not
+apply to the case in point, since there is but one luminary shedding
+forth the light of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The infusion of charity denotes a change to the state
+of _having_ charity from the state of _not having it,_ so that
+something must needs come which was not there before. On the other
+hand, the increase of charity denotes a change to _more having_ from
+_less having,_ so that there is need, not for anything to be there
+that was not there before, but for something to be more there that
+previously was less there. This is what God does when He increases
+charity, that is He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and
+the likeness of the Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by
+the soul.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE
+
+Whether Charity Increases Through Every Act of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases through every act
+of charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less.
+But every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more
+than a simple addition of charity, since it includes the perfection
+of charity. Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase
+charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are engendered
+by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act of
+charity. Now each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of virtue.
+Therefore also each virtuous act of charity conduces to the increase
+of charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory [*St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif.]
+says that "to stand still in the way to God is to go back." Now no
+man goes back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore
+whoever is moved by an act of charity goes forward in the way to God.
+Therefore charity increases through every act of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The effect does not surpass the power of its
+cause. But an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or
+slackness. Therefore it does not conduce to a more excellent charity,
+rather does it dispose one to a lower degree.
+
+_I answer that,_ The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like
+the increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is
+not a continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so
+much in so much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part
+of that time, as happens in local movement; but for a certain space
+of time nature works by disposing for the increase, without causing
+any actual increase, and afterwards brings into effect that to which
+it had disposed, by giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In
+like manner charity does not actually increase through every act of
+charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity,
+in so far as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again
+according to charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out
+into an act of more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity,
+and then his charity increases actually.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Every act of charity merits everlasting life, which,
+however, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper
+time. In like manner every act of charity merits an increase of
+charity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when we
+strive for that increase.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered, each
+act does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces
+towards that effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is
+the most perfect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it,
+reduces the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a
+stone.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man advances in the way to God, not merely by actual
+increase of charity, but also by being disposed to that increase.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Charity Increases Indefinitely?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not increase
+indefinitely. For every movement is towards some end and term, as
+stated in _Metaph._ ii, text. 8, 9. But the increase of charity is a
+movement. Therefore it tends to an end and term. Therefore charity
+does not increase indefinitely.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject. But
+the capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity
+is finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase,
+attain to the quantity of another finite thing however much greater,
+unless the amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the
+Philosopher states (Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an
+indefinite number of parts, and take these parts away and add them
+indefinitely to another line, we shall never arrive at any definite
+quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one from which we
+subtracted and the one to which we added what was subtracted. But
+this does not occur in the case in point: because there is no need
+for the second increase of charity to be less than the first, since
+rather is it probable that it would be equal or greater. As,
+therefore, the charity of the blessed is something finite, if the
+charity of the wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow
+that the charity of the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is
+absurd. Therefore the wayfarer's charity cannot increase indefinitely.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I
+had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if
+I may, by any means apprehend," on which words a gloss says: "Even if
+he has made great progress, let none of the faithful say: 'Enough.'
+For whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his
+destination." Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more
+and more.
+
+_I answer that,_ A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in
+three ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed
+measure, and when this has been reached it is no longer possible to
+go any further in that form, but if any further advance is made,
+another form is attained. An example of this is paleness, the bounds
+of which may, by continual alteration, be passed, either so that
+whiteness ensues, or so that blackness results. Secondly, on the part
+of the agent, whose power does not extend to a further increase of
+the form in its subject. Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which
+is not capable of ulterior perfection.
+
+Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of
+man's charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity
+itself considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a
+participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In
+like manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is
+possessed of infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject,
+no limit to this increase can be determined, because whenever charity
+increases, there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a
+further increase. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to
+fix any limits to the increase of charity in this life.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The increase of charity is directed to an end, which is
+not in this, but in a future life.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The capacity of the rational creature is increased by
+charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according to 2 Cor.
+6:11: "Our heart is enlarged"; so that it still remains capable of
+receiving a further increase.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds good in those things which have the
+same kind of quantity, but not in those which have different kinds:
+thus however much a line may increase it does not reach the quantity
+of a superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer's charity which
+follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the
+quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows open vision.
+Hence the argument does not prove.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Charity Can Be Perfect in This Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this
+life. For this would have been the case with the apostles before all
+others. Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not
+as though I had already attained, or were already perfect." Therefore
+charity cannot be perfect in this life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "whatever
+kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is perfect,
+cupidity is done away altogether." But this cannot be in this world,
+wherein it is impossible to live without sin, according to 1 John
+1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now all
+sin arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be
+perfect in this life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any
+more. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above
+(A. 7). Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v)
+"Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been
+brought to perfection, it exclaims, 'I desire to be dissolved and to
+be with Christ.'" Now this is possible in this life, as in the case
+of Paul. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.
+
+_I answer that,_ The perfection of charity may be understood in two
+ways: first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to
+the person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is
+perfect, if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is
+as lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He
+is infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since
+all created power is finite. Consequently no creature's charity can
+be perfect in this way; the charity of God alone can, whereby He
+loves Himself.
+
+On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he
+loves as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a
+man's whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the
+perfection of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this
+life, wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is
+impossible to think always actually of God, and to be moved by love
+towards Him. Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give
+his time to God and Divine things, while scorning other things except
+in so far as the needs of the present life demand. This is the
+perfection of charity that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not
+common to all who have charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his
+whole heart to God habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring
+anything contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common
+to all who have charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of
+heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that "he was a
+perfect wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which
+the way leads."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This is said on account of venial sins, which are
+contrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are
+incompatible, not with the perfection of the way, but with that of
+heaven.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The perfection of the way is not perfection simply,
+wherefore it can always increase.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 9]
+
+Whether Charity Is Rightly Distinguished into Three Degrees,
+Beginning,  Progress, and Perfection?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of
+charity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many
+degrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection.
+Therefore it is not right to put only one.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins to
+be. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as
+progressing and as beginning.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity may
+be, it can increase, as stated above (A. 7). Now for charity to
+increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be
+distinguished from progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees
+are unsuitably assigned to charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v)
+"As soon as charity is born it takes food," which refers to
+beginners, "after taking food, it waxes strong," which refers to
+those who are progressing, "and when it has become strong it is
+perfected," which refers to the perfect. Therefore there are three
+degrees of charity.
+
+_I answer that,_ The spiritual increase of charity may be considered
+in respect of a certain likeness to the growth of the human body. For
+although this latter growth may be divided into many parts, yet it
+has certain fixed divisions according to those particular actions or
+pursuits to which man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak
+of a man being an infant until he has the use of reason, after which
+we distinguish another state of man wherein he begins to speak and to
+use his reason, while there is again a third state, that of puberty
+when he begins to acquire the power of generation, and so on until he
+arrives at perfection.
+
+In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distinguished
+according to the different pursuits to which man is brought by the
+increase of charity. For at first it is incumbent on man to occupy
+himself chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting his concupiscences,
+which move him in opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in
+whom charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the
+second place man's chief pursuit is to aim at progress in good, and
+this is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief aim is to
+strengthen their charity by adding to it: while man's third pursuit
+is to aim chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God: this belongs to
+the perfect who "desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ."
+
+In like manner we observe in local motion that at first there is
+withdrawal from one term, then approach to the other term, and
+thirdly, rest in this term.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: All these distinct degrees which can be discerned in
+the increase of charity, are comprised in the aforesaid three, even
+as every division of continuous things is included in these
+three--the beginning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher
+states (De Coelo i, 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although those who are beginners in charity may
+progress, yet the chief care that besets them is to resist the sins
+which disturb them by their onslaught. Afterwards, however, when they
+come to feel this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection
+with greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and with the
+other holding the sword as related in 2 Esdr. 4:17 about those who
+built up Jerusalem.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even the perfect make progress in charity: yet this is
+not their chief care, but their aim is principally directed towards
+union with God. And though both the beginner and the proficient seek
+this, yet their solicitude is chiefly about other things, with the
+beginner, about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing
+in virtue.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 10]
+
+Whether Charity Can Decrease?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity can decrease. For contraries
+by their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease
+are contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above (A. 4),
+it seems that it can also decrease.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) "He
+loves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee": and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
+36) he says that "what kindles charity quenches cupidity." From this
+it seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity
+quenches charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides
+God, can increase in man. Therefore charity can decrease.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) "God makes
+the just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the man
+turns away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine
+operation." From this we may gather that when God preserves charity
+in man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity
+into him. Now at the first infusion of charity God infuses less
+charity into him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in
+preserving charity, He preserves less charity in him that prepares
+himself less. Therefore charity can decrease.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In Scripture, charity is compared to fire,
+according to Cant 8:6: "The lamps thereof," i.e. of charity, "are
+fire and flames." Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts.
+Therefore as long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot
+descend, i.e. decrease.
+
+_I answer that,_ The quantity which charity has in comparison with
+its proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase,
+as stated above (A. 4, ad 2).
+
+Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in
+comparison with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it
+can decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be
+either through an act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true
+that virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease
+altogether through cessation from act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 53,
+A. 3). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to friendship
+(Ethic. viii, 5) "that want of intercourse," i.e. the neglect to call
+upon or speak with one's friends, "has destroyed many a friendship."
+Now this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on its cause,
+and the cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when human acts
+cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last ceases
+altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, because it is not the
+result of human acts, but is caused by God alone, as stated above (A.
+2). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it does not for
+this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the cessation
+involves a sin.
+
+The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except
+either by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by
+God, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace
+in punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by
+way of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin.
+
+It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this
+decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But
+mortal sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but
+destroys it entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is
+contrary to charity, as we shall state further on (A. 12), and by way
+of merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against
+charity, he deserves that God should withdraw charity from him.
+
+In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either
+effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not
+touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial
+sin is a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man's love
+for the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act
+as regards the things directed to the end. Thus sick people
+sometimes, though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to
+their diet: and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false
+opinions that are derived from the principles, do not diminish the
+certitude of the principles. So too, venial sin does not merit
+diminution of charity; for when a man offends in a small matter he
+does not deserve to be mulcted in a great matter. For God does not
+turn away from man, more than man turns away from Him: wherefore he
+that is out of order in respect of things directed to the end, does
+not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby he is ordered to the
+last end.
+
+The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we
+speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption
+may be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are
+venial sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of
+charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Contraries affect the same subject when that subject
+stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in equal
+relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of
+increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument
+does not prove.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his end in
+creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its poison,
+as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e.
+less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by diminishing
+charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we must
+understand the saying: "He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside
+Thee," for he adds these words, "which he loveth not for Thee." This
+does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that
+which we love in venial sin, is loved for God's sake habitually
+though not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin,
+which is always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot
+diminish charity, for the reason given above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A movement of the free-will is requisite in the
+infusion of charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 3). Wherefore
+that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces
+dispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the
+other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the
+safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain in us while we
+sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an obstacle on
+the part of the intensity of the free-will's movement.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 11]
+
+Whether We Can Lose Charity When Once We Have It?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we
+have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who
+has charity cannot sin, for it is written (1 John 3:9): "Whosoever is
+born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he
+cannot sin, because he is born of God." But none save the children of
+God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes "the children of
+God from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
+17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love be
+not true, it should not be called love." Now, as he says again in a
+letter to Count Julian, "charity which can fail was never true."
+[*The quotation is from _De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam
+comitem,_ vii., among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly
+known as Paul the Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino.] Therefore it was
+no charity at all. Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot
+lose it.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang.
+xxx) that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to
+work it is not charity." Now no man loses charity by doing great
+things. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by some
+motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning,
+both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity
+cannot be lost.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Apoc. 2:4): "I have somewhat
+against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity."
+
+_I answer that,_ The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown
+above (A. 2; QQ. 23, 24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in
+three ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul
+to love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin
+through the power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He
+wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true
+at the same time--that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain
+man to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose
+charity. For the gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings
+of God whereby "whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered,"
+as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De
+Dono Persev. xiv).
+
+Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable
+of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin
+at all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good,
+as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).
+
+Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which
+is changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be
+compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of
+form in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view
+of habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be
+in its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not
+entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the
+forms of things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such
+things receives one form in such a way, that it retains the
+potentiality to another form, as though its potentiality were not
+completely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be
+lost by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a
+celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter,
+so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form,
+is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of the
+blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational
+mind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is
+possessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the
+wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because
+the latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is
+not actually directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is
+lost.
+
+It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs
+to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem
+good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste
+judges of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human
+mind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual
+disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as
+a man is, so does the end appear to him." Accordingly charity is
+inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains to charity
+cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God
+is seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.
+Therefore the charity of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity
+of the way can, because in this state God is not seen in His Essence,
+which is the essence of goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the
+power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills
+to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no
+true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only
+for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent
+with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the
+changeableness of the subject, and against the purpose of charity
+included in its act, this is not contrary to true charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The love of God ever works great things in its purpose,
+which is essential to charity; but it does not always work great
+things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Charity by reason of its act excludes every motive for
+sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting
+actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for
+sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 12]
+
+Whether Charity Is Lost Through One Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not lost through one
+mortal sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "When a man who has
+mounted to the stage of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that
+he will become empty or fall away suddenly; but he must needs do so
+gradually and by little and little." But man falls away by losing
+charity. Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (lx) addresses
+Peter thus: "Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not an
+averted love, but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never
+failed, and the words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the
+fount of charity." From this Bernard [*William of St. Thierry, De
+Nat. et Dig. Amoris. vi.] drew his assertion that "charity in Peter
+was not quenched, but cooled." But Peter sinned mortally in denying
+Christ. Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now a
+habit of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful act.
+Much less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor. Now,
+seemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love of
+God and one's neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things
+directed to the end, does not remove the love for the end, as stated
+above (A. 10). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there
+be a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some temporal
+good.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last end.
+Now the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not
+done away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless.
+Therefore charity can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin
+has been committed.
+
+_On the contrary,_ By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal
+death, according to Rom. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death." On the
+other hand whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it
+is written (John 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My
+Father: and I will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him," in
+which manifestation everlasting life consists, according to John
+17:3: "This is eternal life; that they may know Thee the . . . true
+God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Now no man can be worthy,
+at the same time, of eternal life and of eternal death. Therefore it
+is impossible for a man to have charity with a mortal sin. Therefore
+charity is destroyed by one mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ That one contrary is removed by the other contrary
+supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very
+nature, which consists in man's loving God above all things, and
+subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to
+God. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God
+as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the
+rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His
+commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its
+very nature is capable of destroying charity.
+
+If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of
+its subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin,
+for act is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the
+endurance of a habit in its subject does not require the endurance of
+its act, so that when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is
+not at once done away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends
+on the action of God Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the
+infusion and safekeeping of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion
+of light in the air, as stated above (A. 10, Obj. 3). Consequently,
+just as the light would cease at once in the air, were an obstacle
+placed to its being lit up by the sun, even so charity ceases at once
+to be in the soul through the placing of an obstacle to the
+outpouring of charity by God into the soul.
+
+Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to
+God's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of
+charity, since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to
+God's friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it
+follows that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal
+sin. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "man is
+enlightened by God's presence, but he is darkened at once by God's
+absence, because distance from Him is effected not by change of place
+but by aversion of the will."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Origen may be understood, in one way,
+that a man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go so
+far as to commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some
+previous negligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be
+dispositions to mortal sin, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 3).
+Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one mortal sin
+if he commits it.
+
+Since, however, he adds: "If some slight slip should occur, and he
+recover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether," we
+may reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied
+and falling away altogether, he means one who falls so as to sin
+through malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly, by
+actual contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity.
+Secondly, indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity,
+through some passion of desire or fear; it was by sinning against
+charity in this way, that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered
+it.
+
+The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Not every inordinate affection for things directed to
+the end, i.e., for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin, but only
+such as is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the
+inordinate affection is contrary to charity, as stated.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and hope
+do not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as stated
+above (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every mortal sin is
+contrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain
+determinate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even
+as charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that
+charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form
+regarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above (Q. 23, A.
+8).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 25
+
+OF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)
+
+We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will
+be twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The
+order in which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there
+are twelve points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we
+love our neighbor also?
+
+(2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity?
+
+(3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity?
+
+(4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity?
+
+(5) Whether one's own body?
+
+(6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity?
+
+(7) Whether sinners love themselves?
+
+(8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity?
+
+(9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship?
+
+(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?
+
+(11) Whether we ought to love the demons?
+
+(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Love of Charity Stops at God, or Extends to Our Neighbor?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and
+does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe
+Him fear, according Deut. 10:12: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord
+thy God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him?" Now
+the fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is
+distinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either
+servile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q.
+10, A. 2). Therefore also the love with which we love God, is
+distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that "to be
+loved is to be honored." Now the honor due to God, which is known as
+_latria,_ is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as
+_dulia._ Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct
+from that with which we love our neighbor.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Matt. 1:2.
+Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man,
+according to Jer. 17:5: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man."
+Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:21): "This commandment we
+have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 6; Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q.
+54, A. 3) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of
+different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the
+same habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its
+object, considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity
+that it is specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the
+object, and that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is
+specifically the same visual act whereby we see the light, and
+whereby we see the color under the aspect of light.
+
+Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since
+what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence
+it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God,
+and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity
+extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our
+neighbor.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love him, in
+two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him, as
+when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by
+reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human
+fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love.
+Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of
+God; as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising
+the ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for
+its justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God,
+as neither is such like love.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor regards the
+honored person's own good, for it is given to a person in recognition
+of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated specifically on
+account of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so
+long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas honor is
+distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals.
+Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity,
+in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which
+is God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according
+to each one's own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular
+honor of latria on account of His singular virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the
+principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us
+ministerially under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man
+loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he
+loved him for God's sake; and this is what charity does.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 2]
+
+Whether We Should Love Charity Out of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity need not be loved out of
+charity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in
+the two precepts of charity (Matt. 22:37-39): and neither of them
+includes charity, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor.
+Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of happiness,
+as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). But charity cannot participate in
+happiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
+(Q. 23, A. 1). But no man can have friendship for charity or for an
+accident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is
+essential to friendship, as stated in _Ethic._ viii. Therefore
+charity need not be loved out of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): "He that loves
+his neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself." But we love
+our neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also
+is loved out of charity.
+
+_I answer that,_ Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature
+of the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for
+since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the
+aspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to
+will is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the
+intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands,
+because this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason
+of its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is
+a spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved, wherefore
+from the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love.
+
+Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as
+stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Now by friendship a thing is loved in two
+ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom
+we wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend.
+It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved
+out of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all
+those whom we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and
+to the other virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God and our neighbor are those with whom we are
+friends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we
+love both God and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and
+our neighbor to love God, and this is to love charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual life,
+whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good which
+we desire for all whom we love out of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers friendship as referred to those
+with whom we are friends.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Irrational Creatures Also Ought to Be Loved Out of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be
+loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are
+conformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity,
+for He loves "all things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He
+loves, He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should
+love irrational creatures out of charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, charity is referred to God principally, and extends
+to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational
+creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance
+of image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they
+bear the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. I, Q. 45, A. 7]. Therefore
+charity extends also to irrational creatures.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the
+object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we
+believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes
+and birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that
+walk, and plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to
+irrational creatures.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The love of charity extends to none but God and
+our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational
+creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational
+life. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to what has been stated above (Q. 13, A.
+1) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is
+twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our
+friendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which
+we desire for our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational
+creature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of
+these reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which cannot have
+an irrational creature for its object: first because friendship is
+towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we
+cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not
+competent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to
+the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of
+its disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says
+(Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or evil befalling such
+like things, except metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship
+is based on some fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to
+friendship as to live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic.
+viii, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human
+life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational
+creatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third
+reason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship
+of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot
+attain. Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an
+irrational creature.
+
+Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we
+regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far,
+to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's
+use; thus too does God love them out of charity.
+
+Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the
+capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does:
+and so the comparison fails.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true,
+whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have
+a natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison
+fails.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 4]
+
+Whether a Man Ought to Love Himself Out of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man is [not] bound to love himself
+out of charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that
+there "can be no charity between less than two." Therefore no man has
+charity towards himself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual love
+and equality (Ethic. viii, 2, 7), which cannot be of one man towards
+himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Q. 23,
+A. 1). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards himself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be blameworthy,
+since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 23:4). Now a man
+deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2 Tim.
+3:1, 2): "In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be
+lovers of themselves." Therefore a man cannot love himself out of
+charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy
+friend as thyself." Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore
+we should love ourselves too out of charity.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated
+above (Q. 23, A. 1), we may consider charity from two standpoints:
+first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we
+must hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself,
+but something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas
+a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another.
+Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with
+which a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if
+we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do
+unto ourselves, hence we read in _Ethic._ ix, 4, 8, that "the origin
+of friendly relations with others lies in our relations to
+ourselves." Thus too with regard to principles we have something
+greater than science, namely understanding.
+
+Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature,
+namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and,
+consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man
+himself who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he
+loves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves also
+himself out of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks there of charity under the general
+notion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the
+same sense.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so far
+as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which they
+humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one's rational
+nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which pertain to
+the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is through
+charity that a man loves himself.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 5]
+
+Whether a Man Ought to Love His Body Out of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out
+of charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to
+associate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body,
+according to Rom. 7:24: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this
+death?" and Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be
+with Christ." Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship in
+the enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that
+enjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is towards
+those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot love
+us out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23, 26) that
+there are four things that we should love out of charity, and among
+them he reckons our own body.
+
+_I answer that,_ Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in
+respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of
+sin and its punishment.
+
+Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as
+the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God's
+service, according to Rom. 6:13: "Present . . . your members as
+instruments of justice unto God." Consequently, out of the love of
+charity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but
+we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of
+punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to long for
+the removal of such things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle did not shrink from the society of his
+body, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he
+was loth to be deprived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: "We would
+not be unclothed, but clothed over." He did, however, wish to escape
+from the taint of concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from
+the corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to
+hinder it from seeing God. Hence he says expressly: "From the body of
+this death."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by knowing
+and loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body, we are
+able to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the
+enjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into the
+body, viz., "the flush of health and incorruption," as Augustine
+states (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a
+fashion, a share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of
+charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Mutual love is found in the friendship which is for
+another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in
+respect of his soul, or in respect of his body.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 6]
+
+Whether We Ought to Love Sinners Out of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of
+charity. For it is written (Ps. 118:113): "I have hated the unjust."
+But David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated
+rather than loved, out of charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "love is proved by deeds" as Gregory says in a
+homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the
+unjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of
+hate, according to Ps. 100:8: "In the morning I put to death all the
+wicked of the land": and God commanded (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou
+shalt not suffer to live." Therefore sinners should not be loved out
+of charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire and
+wish good things for one's friends. Now the saints, out of charity,
+desire evil things for the wicked, according to Ps. 9:18: "May the
+wicked be turned into hell [*Douay and A. V.: 'The wicked shall be,'
+etc. See Reply to this Objection.]." Therefore sinners should not be
+loved out of charity.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will the
+same things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will, nor
+to rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary. Therefore
+sinners should not be loved out of charity.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it is proper to friends to associate together,
+according to _Ethic._ viii. But we ought not to associate with
+sinners, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: "Go ye out from among them."
+Therefore we should not love sinners out of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that
+"when it is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that
+we ought to look upon every man as our neighbor." Now sinners do not
+cease to be men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought
+to love sinners out of charity.
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in the sinner: his
+nature and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God,
+he has a capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity
+is based, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 23, AA. 1, 5), wherefore we ought
+to love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.
+
+On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle
+to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are
+opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or
+mother or kindred, according to Luke 12:26. For it is our duty to
+hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his
+being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of
+charity, for God's sake.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the object
+of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such hatred is
+perfect, of which he himself says (Ps. 138:22): "I have hated them
+with a perfect hatred." Now hatred of a person's evil is equivalent
+to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs to
+charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our
+friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of
+friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and
+we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover
+money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than
+money to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great
+wickedness, and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them
+friendliness. It is for this reason that both Divine and human laws
+command such like sinners to be put to death, because there is
+greater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending
+their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out of
+hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of
+which he prefers the public good to the life of the individual.
+Moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, if he
+be converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not
+converted, it profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the
+sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any more.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Such like imprecations which we come across in Holy
+Writ, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of prediction,
+not by way of wish, so that the sense is: "May the wicked be," that
+is, "The wicked shall be, turned into hell." Secondly, by way of
+wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the
+man's punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to
+Ps. 57:11: "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge,"
+since, according to Wis. 1:13, not even God "hath pleasure in the
+destruction of the wicked [Vulg.: 'living']" when He punishes them,
+but He rejoices in His justice, according to Ps. 10:8: "The Lord is
+just and hath loved justice." Thirdly, so that this desire is
+referred to the removal of the sin, and not to the punishment itself,
+to the effect, namely, that the sin be destroyed, but that the man
+may live.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will what
+they will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make
+them will what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is
+written (Jer. 15:19): "They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt
+not to be turned to them."
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on
+account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them.
+But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is
+no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them. For
+thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by Matt.
+9:11-13. Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards
+fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2 Cor. 6:17): "Go out
+from among them . . . and touch not the unclean thing," i.e. by
+consenting to sin.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Sinners Love Themselves?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sinners love themselves. For that
+which is the principle of sin, is most of all in the sinner. Now love
+of self is the principle of sin, since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
+xiv, 28) that it "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore sinners
+most of all love themselves.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sin does not destroy nature. Now it is in keeping
+with nature that every man should love himself: wherefore even
+irrational creatures naturally desire their own good, for instance,
+the preservation of their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love
+themselves.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, good is beloved by all, as Dionysius states (Div.
+Nom. iv). Now many sinners reckon themselves to be good. Therefore
+many sinners love themselves.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth
+iniquity, hateth his own soul."
+
+_I answer that,_ Love of self is common to all, in one way; in
+another way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to
+the wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he
+thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways:
+first, in respect of his substance and nature, and, this way all
+think themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and
+body. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love
+themselves, in so far as they love their own preservation.
+
+Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some
+predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the
+state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In
+this way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. For the
+reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive
+and corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of which the
+Apostle calls the "inward man," and the latter, the "outward man" (2
+Cor. 4:16). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the
+inward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way
+they think themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the
+wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward
+man, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not
+themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what
+they think themselves to be. But the good know themselves truly, and
+therefore truly love themselves.
+
+The Philosopher proves this from five things that are proper to
+friendship. For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to
+be and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he
+does good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company;
+fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in
+almost the same things. In this way the good love themselves, as to
+the inward man, because they wish the preservation thereof in its
+integrity, they desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods,
+indeed they do their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in
+entering into their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts
+in the present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future good,
+all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no
+clashing of wills, since their whole soul tends to one thing.
+
+On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be preserved in the
+integrity of the inward man, nor do they desire spiritual goods for
+him, nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in
+their own company by entering into their own hearts, because whatever
+they find there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor
+do they agree with themselves, on account of the gnawings of
+conscience, according to Ps. 49:21: "I will reprove thee and set
+before thy face."
+
+In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves,
+as regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas the good do not
+love themselves thus.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The love of self which is the principle of sin is that
+which is proper to the wicked, and reaches "to the contempt of God,"
+as stated in the passage quoted, because the wicked so desire
+external goods as to despise spiritual goods.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although natural love is not altogether forfeited by
+wicked men, yet it is perverted in them, as explained above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The wicked have some share of self-love, in so far as
+they think themselves good. Yet such love of self is not true but
+apparent: and even this is not possible in those who are very wicked.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Charity Requires That We Should Love Our Enemies?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not require us to love
+our enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that "this great
+good," namely, the love of our enemies, is "not so universal in its
+application, as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive us
+our trespasses." Now no one is forgiven sin without he have charity,
+because, according to Prov. 10:12, "charity covereth all sins."
+Therefore charity does not require that we should love our enemies.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, charity does not do away with nature. Now
+everything, even an irrational being, naturally hates its contrary,
+as a lamb hates a wolf, and water fire. Therefore charity does not
+make us love our enemies.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, charity "doth nothing perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Now
+it seems perverse to love one's enemies, as it would be to hate one's
+friends: hence Joab upbraided David by saying (2 Kings 19:6): "Thou
+lovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love thee."
+Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 4:44): "Love your enemies."
+
+_I answer that,_ Love of one's enemies may be understood in three
+ways. First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is
+perverse, and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that
+which is evil in another.
+
+Secondly love of one's enemies may mean that we love them as to their
+nature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires that we
+should love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor,
+we should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbor
+in general.
+
+Thirdly, love of one's enemies may be considered as specially
+directed to them, namely, that we should have a special movement of
+love towards our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely,
+because it does not require that we should have a special movement of
+love to every individual man, since this would be impossible.
+Nevertheless charity does require this, in respect of our being
+prepared in mind, namely, that we should be ready to love our enemies
+individually, if the necessity were to occur. That man should
+actually do so, and love his enemy for God's sake, without it being
+necessary for him to do so, belongs to the perfection of charity. For
+since man loves his neighbor, out of charity, for God's sake, the
+more he loves God, the more does he put enmities aside and show love
+towards his neighbor: thus if we loved a certain man very much, we
+would love his children though they were unfriendly towards us. This
+is the sense in which Augustine speaks in the passage quoted in the
+First Objection, the Reply to which is therefore evident.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Everything naturally hates its contrary as such. Now
+our enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself
+should be hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They
+are not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness:
+and it is as such that we are bound to love them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is wrong to love one's enemies as such: charity does
+not do this, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 9]
+
+Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation That We Should Show Our Enemies
+the Signs and Effects of Love?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his
+enemy the signs or effects of love. For it is written (1 John 3:18):
+"Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth."
+Now a man loves in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects
+of love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his enemies such
+signs and effects of love.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Our Lord said in the same breath (Matt. 5:44): "Love
+your enemies," and, "Do good to them that hate you." Now charity
+demands that we love our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we
+should "do good to them."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object of
+charity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx),
+that "love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great
+things, and if it ceases to work, it is no longer love." Hence
+charity towards our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But
+charity requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though he
+be an enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the signs and
+effects of love towards our enemies.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Matt. 5:44, "Do good to them that hate
+you," says: "To do good to one's enemies is the height of perfection"
+[*Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii]. Now charity does not require us to
+do that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not
+require us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies.
+
+_I answer that,_ The effects and signs of charity are the result of
+inward love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely
+necessary, for the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly
+love our enemies in general, but not individually, except as regards
+the mind being prepared to do so, as explained above (A. 8).
+
+We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and
+signs of love. For some of the signs and favors of love are shown to
+our neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or
+for a whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on a whole
+community: and the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should
+show such like favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For if we
+did not so, it would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to
+what is written (Lev. 19:18): "Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of
+the injury of thy citizens." But there are other favors or signs of
+love, which one shows to certain persons in particular: and it is not
+necessary for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors and
+signs of love, except as regards being ready in our minds, for
+instance to come to their assistance in a case of urgency, according
+to Prov. 25:21: "If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he
+thirst, give him . . . drink." Outside cases of urgency, to show such
+like favors to an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity, whereby
+we not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by evil, but
+also wish to overcome evil by good [*Rom. 12:21], which belongs to
+perfection: for then we not only beware of being drawn into hatred on
+account of the hurt done to us, but purpose to induce our enemy to
+love us on account of our kindliness.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 10]
+
+Whether We Ought to Love the Angels Out of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels
+out of charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity
+is a twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of
+the angels is not contained in the love of God, since they are
+created substances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of
+our neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common species.
+Therefore we are not bound to love them out of charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the
+angels have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as we do.
+But we have not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above (A. 3).
+Neither, therefore, have we towards the angels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship
+with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our
+companions; we cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give
+them the friendship of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): "If the
+name of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those
+who pity us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our
+neighbor includes also the holy angels from whom we receive many
+merciful favors."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), the friendship of
+charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in
+which men share in common with the angels. For it is written (Matt.
+22:30) that "in the resurrection . . . men shall be as the angels of
+God in heaven." It is therefore evident that the friendship of
+charity extends also to the angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us in a
+common species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the
+blessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter
+fellowship that the friendship of charity is founded.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate
+genus, by reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers
+of everlasting happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of
+our rational mind wherein we associate with the angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The companionship of the angels does not consist
+in outward fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive
+nature; it consists in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in
+this life, but perfect in heaven, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1).
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 11]
+
+Whether We Are Bound to Love the Demons Out of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of
+charity. For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their
+fellowship with us in a rational mind. But the demons also share in
+our fellowship thus, since natural gifts, such as life and
+understanding, remain in them unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div.
+Nom. iv). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the
+matter of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man loves
+the sinner out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also
+out of charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our
+neighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the
+passage of Augustine quoted above (A. 9). Now the demons are useful
+to us in many things, for "by tempting us they work crowns for us,"
+as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love
+the demons out of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 28:18): "Your league with
+death shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not
+stand." Now the perfection of a peace and covenant is through
+charity. Therefore we ought not to have charity for the demons who
+live in hell and compass death.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), in the sinner, we are bound,
+out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the name
+of demon is given to designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore
+demons should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying
+stress on the word, the question as to whether the spirits called
+demons ought to be loved out of charity, must be answered in
+accordance with the statement made above (AA. 2, 3), that a thing may
+be loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may be loved as
+the person who is the object of friendship, and thus we cannot have
+the friendship of charity towards the demons. For it is an essential
+part of friendship that one should be a well-wisher towards one's
+friend; and it is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the
+good of everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those
+spirits whom God has condemned eternally, since this would be in
+opposition to our charity towards God whereby we approve of His
+justice.
+
+Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be
+enduring as another's good. In this way we love irrational creatures
+out of charity, in as much as we wish them to endure, to give glory
+to God and be useful to man, as stated above (A. 3): and in this way
+too we can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as
+much as we desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts,
+unto God's glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The possession of everlasting happiness is not
+impossible for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon;
+consequently the friendship of charity which is based on the
+fellowship of everlasting life, rather than on the fellowship of
+nature, is possible towards the angels, but not towards the demons.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In this life, men who are in sin retain the possibility
+of obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are lost in
+hell, who, in this respect, are in the same case as the demons.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That the demons are useful to us is due not to
+their intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this
+leads us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their
+perverse intention to our profit.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 12]
+
+Whether Four Things Are Rightly Reckoned As to Be Loved Out of
+Charity, Viz. God, Our Neighbor, Our Body and Ourselves?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly
+reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor,
+our body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan.
+lxxxiii), "he that loveth not God, loveth not himself." Hence love of
+oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is
+not distinct from the love of God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole.
+But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be
+condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor. Since
+then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct from
+the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a man
+loves his neighbor's body, ought to be distinct from the love with
+which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not
+rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): "There
+are four things to be loved; one which is above us," namely God,
+"another, which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us," namely
+our neighbor, "and a fourth which is beneath us," namely our own body.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 5), the friendship of
+charity is based on the fellowship of happiness. Now, in this
+fellowship, one thing is considered as the principle from which
+happiness flows, namely God; a second is that which directly partakes
+of happiness, namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which
+happiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human body.
+
+Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its
+being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness,
+can be an object of love for two reasons, either through being
+identified with ourselves, or through being associated with us in
+partaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to
+be loved out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his
+neighbor.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The different relations between a lover and the various
+things loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly, since
+the relation between the human lover and God is different from his
+relation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of
+love, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other,
+so that the former love being removed the latter is taken away.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind that can be
+capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach
+directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable
+mind which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves
+himself in one way, and his own body in another.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and as to
+his body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness. Wherefore,
+on the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him;
+and our neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special object of love.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 26
+
+OF THE ORDER OF CHARITY
+(In Thirteen Articles)
+
+We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are
+thirteen points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there is an order in charity?
+
+(2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor?
+
+(3) Whether more than himself?
+
+(4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor?
+
+(5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?
+
+(6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another?
+
+(7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one
+who is more closely united to him?
+
+(8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or
+one who is united to him by other ties?
+
+(9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his
+father?
+
+(10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father?
+
+(11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother?
+
+(12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those
+whom we are kind to?
+
+(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Is Order in Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order in charity. For
+charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues.
+Neither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so
+is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is
+appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither,
+therefore, ought there to be any order in charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs,
+not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be
+ascribed to charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Cant 2:4): "He brought me into the
+cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me."
+
+_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the
+terms "before" and "after" are used in reference to some principle.
+Now order implies that certain things are, in some way, before or
+after. Hence wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also
+order of some kind. But it has been said above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 25,
+A. 12) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of
+happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is
+based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved
+out of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of
+that love, which is God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Charity tends towards the last end considered as last
+end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above (Q.
+23, A. 6). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of
+appetite and action, as was shown above (Q. 23, A. 7, ad 2; I-II, A.
+1, ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the First
+Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we find an order
+in reference to the First Principle.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation
+depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand,
+charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in the
+soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in things
+themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is
+more appropriate to charity than to faith.
+
+And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly
+about God, and secondarily about things referred to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and
+to the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is in
+this way that order is stated to be in charity.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Ought to Be Loved More Than Our Neighbor?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than
+our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 4:20): "He that loveth not
+his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?"
+Whence it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more
+lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to _Ethic._
+ix, 5, 12. Now God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is
+less lovable, out of charity, than our neighbor.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19:
+"Every beast loveth its like." Now man bears more likeness to his
+neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of
+charity, more than he loves God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God, according
+to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22, 27). Now God is not greater in
+Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be
+loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to love
+God more than our neighbor.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to
+be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's
+sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Luke
+14:26: "If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother,
+and wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be
+My disciple." Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more
+than our neighbor.
+
+_I answer that,_ Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject
+in which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that
+friendship is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler
+of the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends;
+hence to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now
+the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness,
+which consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it
+flows to all who are capable of happiness.
+
+Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of
+charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our
+neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness
+from Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being
+the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since
+each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a
+thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way
+that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were
+lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we
+are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more
+visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with
+it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle's argument.
+For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first
+lovable object we meet with, because "the soul learns, from those
+things it knows, to love what it knows not," as Gregory says in a
+homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves
+not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his neighbor
+is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our
+love: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The likeness we have to God precedes and causes the
+likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we
+share along with our neighbor in something received from God, we
+become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we
+ought to love God more than we love our neighbor.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Considered in His substance, God is equally in
+all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in
+anything. And yet our neighbor does not possess God's goodness equally
+with God, for God has it essentially, and our neighbor by
+participation.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Out of Charity, Man Is Bound to Love God More Than Himself?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to
+love God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8)
+that "a man's friendly relations with others arise from his friendly
+relations with himself." Now the cause is stronger than its effect.
+Therefore man's friendship towards himself is greater than his
+friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more
+than God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own good.
+Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself
+which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the
+reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves
+himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not
+love God more than himself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God.
+But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since this
+is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not
+bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): "If thou
+oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of
+Him in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take
+offense if him also thou lovest for God's sake." Now "the cause of a
+thing being such is yet more so." Therefore man ought to love God
+more than himself.
+
+_I answer that,_ The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of
+nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods
+bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of
+which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves
+God above all things and more than himself, but also every single
+creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by
+a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones
+do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each
+part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own
+particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the
+principal inclination of each part is towards common action conducive
+to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues
+whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own
+property and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much
+more is this realized with regard to the friendship of charity which
+is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace.
+
+Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common
+good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as in the
+universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share
+of that happiness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations
+towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of
+friendship, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly
+relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as
+becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to
+itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of
+God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love of
+friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the
+Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying
+Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Out of Charity, Man Ought to Love Himself More Than His
+Neighbor?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to
+love himself more than his neighbor. For the principal object of
+charity is God, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 25, AA. 1, 12). Now
+sometimes our neighbor is more closely united to God than we are
+ourselves. Therefore we ought to love such a one more than ourselves.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid
+injuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his
+neighbor's sake, according to Prov. 12:26: "He that neglecteth a loss
+for the sake of a friend, is just." Therefore a man ought, out of
+charity, to love his neighbor more than himself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:5) "charity seeketh not its
+own." Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most.
+Therefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than his
+neighbor.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:39): "Thou
+shalt love thy neighbor (Lev. 19:18: 'friend') as thyself." Whence it
+seems to follow that man's love for himself is the model of his love
+for another. But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of
+charity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.
+
+_I answer that,_ There are two things in man, his spiritual nature
+and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason
+of his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated
+above (Q. 25, A. 7): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of
+charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person.
+
+This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated
+above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 12), God is loved as the principle of good, on
+which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity,
+loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid
+good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that
+good. Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain
+union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union,
+the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more
+potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with
+him in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love
+himself more than his neighbor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to
+give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of
+happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The love of charity takes its quantity not only from
+its object which is God, but also from the lover, who is the man that
+has charity, even as the quantity of any action depends in some way
+on the subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to God,
+yet because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this man
+is to himself, it does not follow that a man is bound to love his
+neighbor more than himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend's
+sake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his
+spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue,
+which is a good of the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought
+not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from
+sin, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the saying,
+"'charity seeks not her own,' means that it prefers the common to the
+private good." Now the common good is always more lovable to the
+individual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is
+more lovable to the part, than the latter's own partial good, as
+stated above (A. 3).
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 5]
+
+Whether a Man Ought to Love His Neighbor More Than His Own Body?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to love his
+neighbor more than his own body. For his neighbor includes his
+neighbor's body. If therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more
+than his own body, it follows that he ought to love his neighbor's
+body more than his own.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his
+neighbor's, as stated above (A. 4). Now a man's own body is nearer to
+his soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our body more
+than our neighbor.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the sake
+of what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil his own
+body for his neighbor's safety: this belongs to the perfect,
+according to John 15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a
+man lay down his life for his friends." Therefore a man is not bound,
+out of charity, to love his neighbor more than his own body.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "we
+ought to love our neighbor more than our own body."
+
+_I answer that,_ Out of charity we ought to love more that which has
+more fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above
+(A. 2; Q. 25, A. 12). Now fellowship in the full participation of
+happiness which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a greater
+reason for loving, than the participation of happiness by way of
+overflow, which is the reason for loving one's own body. Therefore,
+as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more
+than our own body.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing
+seems to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say that
+we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers to
+his soul, which is his predominant part.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Our body is nearer to our soul than our
+neighbor, as regards the constitution of our own nature: but as
+regards the participation of happiness, our neighbor's soul is more
+closely associated with our own soul, than even our own body is.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every man is immediately concerned with the care
+of his own body, but not with his neighbor's welfare, except perhaps
+in cases of urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a
+man to imperil his own body for his neighbor's welfare, except in a
+case where he is under obligation to do so; and if a man of his own
+accord offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection
+of charity.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 6]
+
+Whether We Ought to Love One Neighbor More Than Another?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor
+more than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "One
+ought to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to
+all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time
+or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely
+united to us." Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than
+another.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving
+several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and
+the same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason is God,
+as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to
+love all our neighbors equally.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the
+Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an
+equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our
+neighbors equally.
+
+_On the contrary,_ One's obligation to love a person is proportionate
+to the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love.
+Now it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain
+neighbors, than against the love of others. Hence the commandment
+(Lev. 10:9), "He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him
+die," which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above.
+Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others.
+
+_I answer that,_ There have been two opinions on this question: for
+some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our
+neighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the
+outward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood
+as applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who
+are connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and
+not to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all
+including our enemies.
+
+But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the
+inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite,
+which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from
+Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural
+inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement
+that is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the
+inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it is
+becoming to earth to be beneath water. Consequently the inclination
+also of grace which is the effect of charity, must needs be
+proportionate to those actions which have to be performed outwardly,
+so that, to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense towards
+those to whom we ought to behave with greater kindness.
+
+We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought
+to love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the
+principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be
+that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to
+one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above (A. 1),
+wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to that
+principle.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of
+the good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all men equally
+out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good,
+namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater
+through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not
+to love all equally.
+
+Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two
+ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As
+regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because
+we cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not
+to be thus unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some
+more than others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter
+inequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of
+beneficence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some
+are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we
+ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to
+Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the quantity of love on the
+part of the good which we wish our friends.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 7]
+
+Whether We Ought to Love Those Who Are Better More Than Those Who Are
+More Closely United Us?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love those who are better
+more than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is
+in no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for
+some reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black
+mixed with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for
+some reason, according to Luke 14:26: "If any man come to Me, and
+hate not his father," etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful
+for any reason. Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who
+are better more than those who are more closely connected with us.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But God
+loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought
+to love the better man more than one who is more closely united to
+him.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in every friendship, that ought to be loved most
+which has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by
+natural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by
+nature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship
+of charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has
+more to do with better men than with those who are more closely
+united to us. Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men
+more than those who are more closely connected with us.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
+care of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
+the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now the inward affection of
+charity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity
+regards those who are nearer to us before those who are better.
+
+_I answer that,_ Every act should be proportionate both to its object
+and to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while,
+from the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus
+movement has its species from the term to which it tends, while the
+intensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved
+and the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species from
+its object, but its intensity is due to the lover.
+
+Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover.
+Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance
+with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his
+relation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater
+good to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity
+wishes to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it
+has various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it
+belongs to charity to wish God's justice to be maintained, in
+accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness.
+And this regards the species of love; for there are different species
+of love according to the different goods that we wish for those whom
+we love.
+
+On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to
+the man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more
+closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he
+wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater
+good he wishes for them.
+
+Again a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors
+are connected with us by their natural origin, a connection which
+cannot be severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are.
+But the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come
+and go, increase and decrease, as was shown above (Q. 24, AA. 4, 10,
+11). Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man
+who is more closely united to one, to be better than another, and so
+reach a higher degree of happiness.
+
+Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we
+love more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love
+them in more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us
+we have no other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are
+connected with us, we have certain other friendships, according to
+the way in which they are connected. Now since the good on which
+every other friendship of the virtuous is based, is directed, as to
+its end, to the good on which charity is based, it follows that
+charity commands each act of another friendship, even as the art
+which is about the end commands the art which is about the means.
+Consequently this very act of loving someone because he is akin or
+connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or for any
+like reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be commanded
+by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we
+love in more ways those who are more nearly connected with us.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their
+kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us and
+God. In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according
+to Micah 7:6: "A men's enemies are they of his own household."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Charity conforms man to God proportionately, by making
+man comport himself towards what is his, as God does towards what is
+His. For we may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to
+us which God does not will, because it becomes Him not to will them,
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 19, A. 10), when we were treating of the
+goodness of the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Charity elicits the act of love not only as regards the
+object, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The result is
+that the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 8]
+
+Whether We Ought to Love More Those Who Are Connected with Us by Ties
+of Blood?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love more those who
+are more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written
+(Prov. 18:24): "A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than
+a brother." Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv
+7): "The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to
+the ties of blood." Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that
+as to the latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract
+the former by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we
+ought not to love more than others those who are united to us by ties
+of blood.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): "I love not less
+you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in
+wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace." Surely we
+ought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than
+those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not
+love our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "Love is proved by deeds," as Gregory states (Hom.
+in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others than
+our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather than
+his father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of
+all.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The commandments of the decalogue contain a
+special precept about the honor due to our parents (Ex. 20:12).
+Therefore we ought to love more specially those who are united to us
+by ties of blood.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 7), we ought out of charity to
+love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our
+love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for
+loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and
+beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different
+persons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is
+more loved in matters touching that particular union in respect of
+which he is loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should
+compare one union with another. Accordingly we must say that
+friendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by
+natural origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic
+fellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting side by side
+on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to
+nature we should love our kindred most, in matters concerning
+relations between citizens, we should prefer our fellow-citizens, and
+on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. ix, 2) that "it is our duty to render to each class of people
+such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact the
+principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite our relations to a
+wedding . . . It would seem to be a special duty to afford our
+parents the means of living . . . and to honor them."
+
+The same applies to other kinds of friendship.
+
+If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union
+arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all
+others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas
+other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the
+friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be
+stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In as much as the friendship of comrades originates
+through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the
+love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose, for
+instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more
+stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in
+matters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in
+the providing of necessaries.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors
+respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in
+this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom
+he has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom
+he is bound to support in bodily sustenance.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The fact that in the battle a man obeys his officer
+rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less, not
+simply [but] relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on
+fellowship in battle.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 9]
+
+Whether a Man Ought, Out of Charity, to Love His Children More Than
+His Father?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his
+children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to
+whom we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good
+to our children than to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor.
+12:14): "Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but
+the parents for the children." Therefore a man ought to love his
+children more than his parents.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love
+their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states
+(Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more
+than his parents.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man's affections are conformed to God by charity.
+But God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also
+ought to love our children more than our parents.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "We
+ought to love God first, then our parents, then our children, and
+lastly those of our household."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 1; A. 7), the degrees of
+love may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the
+object. In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to
+God, the more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love
+his father more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his
+father as his principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good
+and more like God.
+
+Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of
+the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more
+closely connected with him, in which way a man's children are more
+lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
+viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of
+themselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the
+love of a father for his children, is more like a man's love for
+himself. Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is
+their child than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to
+their parents, as being part of them, than their parents are to them
+to whom they stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because
+parents have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at
+once, whereas the child begins to love his father after a lapse of
+time; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to
+Ecclus. 9:14: "Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be
+like to him."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The debt due to a principle is submission of respect
+and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence and
+care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in
+honor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of
+care.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is natural for a man as father to love his children
+more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but if we
+consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves his
+father more.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God loves
+us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is
+related to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to
+the father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to
+be provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless
+in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received
+to provide for his parents before all.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 10]
+
+Whether a Man Ought to Love His Mother More Than His Father?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more
+than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i,
+20), "the female produces the body in generation." Now man receives
+his soul, not from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in
+the First Part (Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 118). Therefore a man receives more
+from his mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to
+love her more than him.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due.
+Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that "mothers have greater love for
+their children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she
+knows more surely than the father who are her children."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, love should be more fond towards those who have
+labored for us more, according to Rom. 16:6: "Salute Mary, who hath
+labored much among you." Now the mother labors more than the father
+in giving birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written
+(Ecclus. 7:29): "Forget not the groanings of thy mother." Therefore a
+man ought to love his mother more than his father.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Jerome says on Ezech. 44:25 that "man ought to
+love God the Father of all, and then his own father," and mentions
+the mother afterwards.
+
+_I answer that,_ In making such comparisons as this, we must take the
+answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether
+the father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as
+mother. The reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference
+in such like matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed,
+as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [*Origen,
+Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "Good servants should be preferred to wicked
+children."
+
+Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the
+mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural
+origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the
+mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a
+passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the
+father is to be loved more.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the
+formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through
+the formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though
+this power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the
+matter of the body to receive that form.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This applies to another kind of love. For the
+friendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the
+friendship between child and parent: while the friendship we are
+speaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother
+through being begotten of them.
+
+The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 11]
+
+Whether a Man Ought to Love His Wife More Than His Father and Mother?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more
+than his father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another
+unless he love the latter more. Now it is written (Gen. 2:24) that "a
+man shell leave father and mother" on account of his wife. Therefore
+a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:33) that a husband should
+"love his wife as himself." Now a man ought to love himself more than
+his parents. Therefore he ought to love his wife also more than his
+parents.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, love should be greater where there are more reasons
+for loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the friendship of
+a man towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12)
+that "in this friendship there are the motives of utility, pleasure,
+and also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous." Therefore a
+man's love for his wife ought to be greater than his love for his
+parents.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to Eph. 5:28, "men ought to love their
+wives as their own bodies." Now a man ought to love his body less
+than his neighbor, as stated above (A. 5): and among his neighbors he
+should love his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents
+more than his wife.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9), the degrees of love may be
+taken from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those
+who love. On the part of the good which is the object loved, a man
+should love his parents more than his wife, because he loves them as
+his principles and considered as a more exalted good.
+
+But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more,
+because she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according to
+Matt. 19:6: "Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh."
+Consequently a man loves his wife more intensely, but his parents
+with greater reverence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A man does not in all respects leave his father and
+mother for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought to
+succor his parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all
+his kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal
+connection and co-habitation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man ought
+to love his wife equally with himself, but that a man's love for
+himself is the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with
+him.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There are also several reasons for a man's love for his
+father; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards good, are
+more weighty than those for which a man loves his wife; although the
+latter outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the union.
+
+As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in
+the words quoted, the particle "as" denotes not equality of love but
+the motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife
+is her being united to him in the flesh.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 12]
+
+Whether a Man Ought to Love More His Benefactor Than One He Has
+Benefited?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor
+more than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud.
+iv): "Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love
+him first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses
+to love, but declines to return love already given." Now a man's
+benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore
+we ought to love our benefactors above all.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a man
+or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is a
+more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against
+him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly
+actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those
+to whom we are kind.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most, and
+then one's father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25].
+Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should
+be loved above all others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that
+"benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather
+than vice versa."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 9, 11), a thing is loved more
+in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent
+good, secondly by reason of a closer connection. In the first way we
+ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle
+of good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more
+excellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father (A. 9).
+
+In the second way, however, we love those more who have received
+benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by
+four arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the
+handiwork of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: "He
+was made by so and so." Now it is natural to a man to love his own
+work (thus it is to be observed that poets love their own poems): and
+the reason is that we love _to be_ and _to live,_ and these are made
+manifest in our _action._ Secondly, because we all naturally love
+that in which we see our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor
+has some good of his in the recipient of his benefaction, and the
+recipient some good in the benefactor; but the benefactor sees his
+virtuous good in the recipient, while the recipient sees his useful
+good in the benefactor. Now it gives more pleasure to see one's
+virtuous good than one's useful good, both because it is more
+enduring,--for usefulness quickly flits by, and the pleasure of
+calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of having it
+present--and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous goods
+than the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is it
+the lover's part to act, since he wills and works the good of the
+beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so
+that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love
+is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more
+difficult to give than to receive favors: and we are most fond of
+things which have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what
+comes easy to us.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is some thing in the benefactor that incites the
+recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient,
+not through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of
+his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do
+through another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is more
+of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other
+hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more
+spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God also loves us more than we love Him, and parents
+love their children more than these love them. Yet it does not follow
+that we love all who have received good from us, more than any of our
+benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our parents,
+from whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on whom we
+have bestowed lesser benefits.
+_______________________
+
+THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 13]
+
+Whether the Order of Charity Endures in Heaven?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity does not endure
+in heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): "Perfect
+charity consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods
+less." Now charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will
+love those who are better more than either himself or those who are
+connected with him.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good. Now
+each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more
+good, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God's
+will: and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in
+heaven each one loves more those who are better, and consequently he
+loves others more than himself, and one who is not connected with
+him, more than one who is.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God's sake, for
+then will be fulfilled the words of 1 Cor. 15:28: "That God may be
+all in all." Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so
+that a man will love a better man more than himself, and one who is
+not connected with him, more than one who is.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory.
+Now the order of charity given above (AA. 2, 3, 4) is derived from
+nature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others.
+Therefore this order of charity will endure in heaven.
+
+_I answer that,_ The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as
+regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized
+simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order
+between man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be
+necessary, because, as we stated above (AA. 7, 9), the degrees of
+love may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man
+desires for another, or according to the intensity of love itself. In
+the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those
+who are less good, less than himself: because, by reason of the
+perfect conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the
+blessed will desire everyone to have what is due to him according to
+Divine justice. Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of
+merit to a yet greater reward, as happens now while it is possible
+for a man to desire both the virtue and the reward of a better man,
+whereas then the will of each one will rest within the limits
+determined by God. But in the second way a man will love himself more
+than even his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of
+love arises on the part of the person who loves, as stated above (AA.
+7, 9). Moreover it is for this that the gift of charity is bestowed
+by God on each one, namely, that he may first of all direct his mind
+to God, and this pertains to a man's love for himself, and that, in
+the second place, he may wish other things to be directed to God, and
+even work for that end according to his capacity.
+
+As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply
+love those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because
+the entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to
+God, wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with
+respect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be
+nearer to himself those who are nearer to God. For then one man will
+no longer succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein
+each man has to succor those who are closely connected with him
+rather than those who are not, no matter what be the nature of their
+distress: hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of
+charity, loves more those who are more closely united to him, for he
+is under a greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of
+charity. It will however be possible in heaven for a man to love in
+several ways one who is connected with him, since the causes of
+virtuous love will not be banished from the mind of the blessed. Yet
+all these reasons are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken
+from nighness to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument should be granted as to those who are
+connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love
+himself so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect,
+since perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man's charity
+directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as
+stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the order of charity in respect
+of the degree of good one wills the person one loves.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God will be to each one the entire reason of his love,
+for God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible
+supposition that God were not man's good, He would not be man's
+reason for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should
+love himself more than all else after God.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 27
+
+OF THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of
+charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow
+from that act.
+
+Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?
+
+(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as
+goodwill?
+
+(3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake?
+
+(4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
+
+(5) Whether God can be loved wholly?
+
+(6) Whether the love of God is according to measure?
+
+(7) Which is the better, to love one's friend, or one's enemy?
+
+(8) Which is the better, to love God, or one's neighbor?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 1]
+
+Whether to Be Loved Is More Proper to Charity Than to Love?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be
+loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those
+who are themselves better. But those who are better should be more
+loved. Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems to
+be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now, as
+the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "many would rather be loved
+than love, and lovers of flattery always abound." Therefore it is
+better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in
+keeping with charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "the cause of anything being such is yet more so."
+Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De Catech.
+Rud. iv) that "nothing incites another more to love you than that you
+love him first." Therefore charity consists in being loved rather
+than in loving.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that
+friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity
+is a kind of friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than
+in being loved.
+
+_I answer that,_ To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since
+charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its
+proper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the
+person loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent
+to him as coming under the common notion of good, in so far as
+another tends towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is
+clear that to love is more proper to charity than to be loved: for
+that which befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more
+competent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason of
+something else. This can be exemplified in two ways. First, in the
+fact that friends are more commended for loving than for being loved,
+indeed, if they be loved and yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly,
+because a mother, whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love
+than to be loved: for "some women," as the Philosopher observes
+(Ethic. viii, 8) "entrust their children to a nurse; they do love
+them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they happen not
+to be loved."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A better man, through being better, is more lovable;
+but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves more,
+however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man does
+not love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved:
+whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much
+as he ought to be loved.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "men wish to
+be loved in as much as they wish to be honored." For just as honor is
+bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which is in
+him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since good
+alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be honored,
+for the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good which is
+in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity seek
+to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good
+of charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue's good.
+Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be
+loved.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be
+loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way
+leading a man to love.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 2]
+
+Whether to Love Considered As an Act of Charity Is the Same As
+Goodwill?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that to love, considered as an act of
+charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says
+(Rhet. ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is
+goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit.
+Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above
+(Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the
+will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the
+act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to
+friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should
+wish his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and
+to live; the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the
+fourth, that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth,
+that he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain
+to goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill
+is neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship." Now
+charity is friendship, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Therefore
+goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.
+
+_I answer that,_ Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will
+whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs
+from actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive
+appetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For
+the love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every
+passion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of
+love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration
+of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the
+difference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says
+(Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire,
+that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the
+sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again
+such like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill
+sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a
+boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win. But the love,
+which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill,
+because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover
+and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as
+somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards
+him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby
+we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union
+of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an
+act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds
+union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5)
+that "goodwill is a beginning of friendship."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does not
+describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in
+which the act of love is chiefly manifested.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the
+good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is
+not denoted by goodwill.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to
+friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he
+says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in
+respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this
+belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Out of Charity God Ought to Be Loved for Himself?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for
+Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a
+homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to
+love those it knows not," where by things unknown he means the
+intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the
+objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of
+something else.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through
+something else, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God
+are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."
+Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for
+Himself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Matt. 1:1,
+and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his commentary
+on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract.
+ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear
+shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it seems
+that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some
+evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to
+enjoy is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be
+enjoyed" as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved
+for Himself.
+
+_I answer that,_ The preposition "for" denotes a relation of
+causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal,
+efficient, and material, to which a material disposition also is to
+be reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According
+to these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for
+another. In respect of the final cause, we love medicine, for
+instance, for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man
+for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good
+and therefore lovable; in respect of the efficient cause, we love
+certain men because, for instance, they are the sons of such and such
+a father; and in respect of the disposition which is reducible to the
+genus of a material cause, we speak of loving something for that
+which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for the favors
+received from him, although after we have begun to love our friend,
+we no longer love him for his favors, but for his virtue.
+Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love God, not for
+anything else, but for Himself. For He is not directed to anything
+else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor
+does He require to receive any form in order to be good, for His very
+substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other
+good things; nor again does goodness accrue to Him from aught else,
+but from Him to all other things. In the fourth way, however, He can
+be loved for something else, because we are disposed by certain
+things to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by
+Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the
+punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love what
+it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason for
+its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or
+efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man
+to love the unknown.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other
+things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them,
+but through Himself, according to John 4:42: "We now believe, not for
+thy saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is
+indeed the Saviour of the world."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain
+disposition, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8; Q. 19, AA. 4, 7, 10).
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 4]
+
+Whether God Can Be Loved Immediately in This Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in
+this life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De
+Trin. x, 1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since
+"we see now through a glass, in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12).
+Neither, therefore, do we love Him immediately.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is
+more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who is
+joined" to God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. 6:17). But
+man cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him
+immediately.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Isa.
+59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Now
+sin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is
+less able to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said
+to be "enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor.
+13:12. But charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage
+(1 Cor. 13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God
+immediately.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 3; Q. 84, A. 7), the
+act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the
+knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the
+appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows
+that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in
+respect of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power
+follows the mode of the knower.
+
+Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable
+and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness
+itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to
+us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things
+are knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term
+of knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.
+
+Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the
+appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and
+flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves
+God immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand,
+with regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God
+through other things, either as a cause through its effects, or by
+way of pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf.
+I, Q. 12, A. 12).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not
+follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love,
+since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin
+at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is
+known through another thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since to love God is something greater than to know
+Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God
+presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not
+rest in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love
+begins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular
+movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to
+God, and love begins with God as the last end, and passes on to
+creatures.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin, is
+removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by
+loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of
+spiritual union.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 5]
+
+Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q. 184, A. 2]
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love
+follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this
+would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved
+by us.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div.
+Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God,
+because "God is greater than our heart" (1 John 3:20). Therefore God
+cannot be loved wholly.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be loved
+wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves
+Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly
+loved by a creature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the
+Lord thy God with thy whole heart."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since love may be considered as something between
+lover and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the
+question may be understood in three ways, first so that the
+qualification "wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God
+is to be loved wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.
+
+Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the
+lover: and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought
+to love God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love
+of God, according to Deut. 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God
+with thy whole heart."
+
+Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to
+the thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the
+thing loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in
+proportion to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His
+goodness is infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely,
+because all power of creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is
+finite.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first
+three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the
+last takes it in the second sense.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 6]
+
+Whether in Loving God We Ought to Observe Any Mode?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in
+loving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and
+order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love
+of God is the best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above
+all . . . things, have charity." Therefore there ought to be a
+mode of the love of God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee,
+tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the
+desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought." But it would
+be useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were
+one. Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the measure
+which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode." Now the measure of
+the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore
+just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the
+exterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: "Your reasonable
+service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the
+cause of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure."
+
+_I answer that,_ As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above
+(Obj. 3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which
+determination is to be found both in the measure and in the thing
+measured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure
+essentially, because a measure is of itself the determining and
+modifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is
+found relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure.
+Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the
+thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure,
+whether by deficiency or by excess.
+
+Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end,
+because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be
+taken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9).
+Therefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means take their
+mode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the
+Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), "in every art, the desire for the end is
+endless and unlimited," whereas there is a limit to the means: thus
+the physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as perfect
+as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, for he does not
+give as much medicine as he can, but according as health demands so
+that if he give too much or too little, the medicine would be
+immoderate.
+
+Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of
+God, whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above
+(Q. 23, A. 6), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be
+taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little,
+but as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where
+the more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we
+love God the better our love is.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: That which is so by its essence takes precedence of
+that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the
+measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the
+goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something
+else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands
+before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine adds in the same passage, "the measure of
+our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart," that is to
+love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode
+which is proper to the measure.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: An affection, whose object is subject to
+reason's judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the
+Divine love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore
+it is not measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity
+between the interior act and external acts of charity. For the
+interior act of charity has the character of an end, since man's
+ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God, according to Ps.
+72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to my God"; whereas the exterior
+acts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both
+according to charity and according to reason.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 7]
+
+Whether It Is More Meritorious to Love an Enemy Than to Love a Friend?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to
+love a friend. For it is written (Matt. 5:46): "If you love them that
+love you, what reward shall you have?" Therefore it is not deserving
+of reward to love one's friend: whereas, as the same passage proves,
+to love one's enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more
+meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding
+from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God
+to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity
+love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's
+enemy than to love one's friend.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems to
+be more merit, since "every man shall receive his own reward
+according to his own labor" (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a
+greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it
+is more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one's
+enemy than to love one's friend.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The better an action is, the more meritorious it
+is. Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love
+a better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy
+who hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's friend
+than to love one's enemy.
+
+_I answer that,_ God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of
+charity, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). When therefore it is asked
+which is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or one's
+enemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the
+part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the
+reason for which we love him.
+
+In the first way, love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy,
+because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so
+that he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of
+love that passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its
+opposite is worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.
+
+In the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than
+one's friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible
+to love one's friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the
+only reason for loving one's enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose
+that both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the
+stronger through carrying a man's affections to things which are
+furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the
+power of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it
+throws its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is
+proved to be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the
+things we accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so
+much the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable
+matter.
+
+Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near
+than on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor
+those who are united to us than those who are far removed; and in
+this respect the love of friends, considered in itself, is more
+ardent and better than the love of one's enemy.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The words of Our Lord must be taken in their strict
+sense: because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in God's
+sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and this
+would seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way that
+we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends is
+meritorious, if we love them for God's sake, and not merely because
+they are our friends.
+
+The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said
+in the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the
+reason for loving, while the last considers the question on the part
+of those who are loved.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 8]
+
+Whether It Is More Meritorious to Love One's Neighbor Than to Love
+God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's
+neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem
+to be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love
+of our neighbor to the love of God, according to Rom. 9:3: "I wished
+myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren." Therefore it
+is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious
+to love one's friend, as stated above (A. 7). Now God is our chief
+friend, since "He hath first loved us" (1 John 4:10). Therefore it
+seems less meritorious to love God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more virtuous
+and meritorious since "virtue is about that which is difficult and
+good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one's
+neighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because
+there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's
+neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor
+than to love God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ That on account of which a thing is such, is yet
+more so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by
+reason of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God
+is more meritorious than the love of our neighbor.
+
+_I answer that,_ This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by
+considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love
+of God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its
+own sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom
+the movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to
+him that loves God (John 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved
+of My Father, and I will . . . manifest Myself to him." Secondly, the
+comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on
+the one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the
+other. In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while
+love of God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the
+comparison will be between perfect love of God, extending also to our
+neighbor, and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this
+commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his
+brother" (1 John 4:21).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire
+this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he was in
+a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state
+of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.
+
+We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in
+Ep. ad Rom.] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his
+neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For
+he wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which
+pertains to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in
+his neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A man's love for his friends is sometimes less
+meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall
+short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God.
+Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit,
+but is the entire reason for merit.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The _good_ has, more than the _difficult,_ to do
+with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that
+whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more
+difficult, and at the same time better.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 28
+
+OF JOY
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the effects which result from the principal act
+of charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the
+exterior effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered:
+(1) Joy, (2) Peace, (3) Mercy.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?
+
+(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?
+
+(3) Whether this joy can be full?
+
+(4) Whether it is a virtue?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Joy Is Effected in Us by Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity.
+For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But
+God, Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in
+this state of life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent
+from the Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us
+rather than joy.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit
+happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among
+those things whereby we merit happiness, according to Matt. 5:5:
+"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore
+sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown
+above (Q. 17, A. 6). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to Rom.
+12:12: "Rejoicing in hope." Therefore it is not the effect of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is
+poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us."
+But joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 14:17:
+"The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and
+joy in the Holy Ghost." Therefore charity is a cause of joy.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2, 3), when we
+were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but
+in contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the
+presence of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing
+loved exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in
+the love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of
+his friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from
+love, either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the
+loved object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or
+afflicted with some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is
+unchangeable, since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that
+He is loved, He is in those who love Him by His most excellent
+effect, according to 1 John 4:16: "He that abideth in charity,
+abideth in God, and God in him." Therefore spiritual joy, which is
+about God, is caused by charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be
+"absent from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He
+is present to some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle
+goes on to say (2 Cor. 5:6): "For we walk by faith and not by sight."
+Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him,
+by the indwelling of His grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about those
+things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to the
+same that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy about
+God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to
+grieve for things that are contrary to it.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways.
+First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself;
+secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us.
+The former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly:
+while the latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward
+to enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether
+perfect or imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's
+charity.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Spiritual Joy, Which Results from Charity, Is Compatible
+with an Admixture of Sorrow?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from
+charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to
+charity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4,
+6: "Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the
+truth." But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow,
+according to Rom. 12:15: "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with
+them that weep." Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible
+with an admixture of sorrow.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv),
+"penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again
+those we have deplored." But there is no true penance without
+charity. Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with
+Christ according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and
+to be with Christ." Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain
+sadness, according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is
+prolonged!" Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of
+sorrow.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom.
+Now such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16:
+"Her conversation hath no bitterness." Therefore the joy of charity
+is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), a twofold joy in God
+arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity;
+and with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself.
+This joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even
+as the good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of
+evil: hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord
+always."
+
+The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good
+as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything
+contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is
+compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves
+for that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either
+in us or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of some
+evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the sovereign
+good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he
+is hindered from participating in the Divine good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to Isa.
+59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins,
+or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from
+participating in the Divine good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate, after a
+fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the
+unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in
+the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for
+the delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a
+participation of the Divine good.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Spiritual Joy Which Proceeds from Charity, Can Be Filled?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from
+charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is
+our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it
+is meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is
+infinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy
+in God can never be filled.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the
+joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is
+greater than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a
+creature.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the
+fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature
+is finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be
+comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God
+can be filled.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said to His disciples (John 15:11): "That
+My joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled."
+
+_I answer that,_ Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first,
+on the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as
+much as it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy
+alone in Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is
+condignly due to the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any
+creature must needs be finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be
+understood on the part of the one who rejoices. Now joy is compared
+to desire, as rest to movement, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1,
+2), when we were treating of the passions: and rest is full when
+there is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when there remains
+nothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the
+movement of desire does not cease in us, because it still remains
+possible for us to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown
+above (Q. 24, AA. 4, 7). When once, however, perfect happiness has
+been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because then there
+will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain whatever he
+had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to Ps. 102:5:
+"Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Hence desire will be at
+rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so that the
+joy of the blessed is full to perfection--indeed over-full, since
+they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for
+"neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath
+prepared for them that love Him" (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant
+by the words of Luke 6:38: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken
+together, and running over shall they give into your bosom." Yet,
+since no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it
+follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on
+the contrary, man enters into it, according to Matt. 25:21: "Enter
+into the joy of thy Lord."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to
+the thing in which we rejoice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach the
+term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further
+will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term,
+some will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy
+will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully
+set at rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account
+of a fuller participation of the Divine happiness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect
+of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There
+is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as
+we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That you
+may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and
+spiritual understanding."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Joy Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary
+to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth
+and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which
+is _good,_ so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be
+virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
+But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4:
+"Rejoice in the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is not numbered among the theological virtues,
+nor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is
+evident from what has been said above (I-II, QQ. 57, 60, 62).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 2, 4), virtue is
+an operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an
+inclination to a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same
+habit there proceed several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of
+which follows from another. And since the subsequent acts do not
+proceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act,
+hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in reference to that
+preceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the
+virtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about the passions
+(I-II, Q. 25, AA. 2, 4) that love is the first affection of the
+appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the
+same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good,
+and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these
+acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but
+from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct
+from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it
+is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate
+self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of
+the vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 77, A. 4); so that it was
+necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices,
+because they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On
+the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely
+charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated
+above (here and A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but
+hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz.
+_difficult,_ and _possible to obtain;_ for which reason it is
+accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love
+any special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of
+charity, albeit not its first act.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 29
+
+OF PEACE (Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?
+
+(2) Whether all things desire peace?
+
+(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?
+
+(4) Whether peace is a virtue?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Peace Is the Same As Concord?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well
+ordered concord." Now we are speaking here of no other peace than
+that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace
+consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that
+peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the
+same as concord.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves
+identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace,
+viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): "God is not the
+God of dissension but of peace." Therefore peace is the same as
+concord.
+
+_On the contrary,_ There can be concord in evil between wicked men.
+But "there is no peace to the wicked" (Isa. 48:22). Therefore peace
+is not the same as concord.
+
+_I answer that,_ Peace includes concord and adds something thereto.
+Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace,
+wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.
+
+For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so
+far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to
+the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to
+diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the
+diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends
+sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite,
+according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit."
+Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to
+diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same
+time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the
+appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace,
+because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he
+wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for
+him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other
+hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord
+denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace
+denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even
+in one man.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is
+between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord,
+not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered,
+through one man agreeing with another in respect of something
+befitting to both of them. For if one man concord with another, not
+of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear
+of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace,
+because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is
+disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises
+that "peace is tranquillity of order," which tranquillity consists in
+all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If one man consent to the same thing together with
+another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to
+himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in
+agreement.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely
+dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man
+and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 2]
+
+Whether All Things Desire Peace?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For,
+according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But
+there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of
+knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the
+same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do
+not desire peace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain
+peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Matt.
+10:34): "I came not to send peace." Therefore all things do not
+desire peace.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign
+good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it
+is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command
+(Mk. 9:49): "Have peace among you." Therefore all things do not
+desire peace.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12, 14) that "all
+things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).
+
+_I answer that,_ From the very fact that a man desires a certain
+thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in
+consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining
+it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by
+a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are
+removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that
+whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires
+anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance,
+to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which
+Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or
+rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which
+consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence
+Dionysius says that "peace is the cause of consent and of
+connaturalness," where "consent" denotes the union of appetites
+proceeding from knowledge, and "connaturalness," the union of natural
+appetites.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing
+but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated
+above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter
+to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to
+break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that
+they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence
+all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that
+which they had heretofore.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as
+the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good
+apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can
+be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is
+truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so
+as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many
+defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed.
+Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace
+of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore
+it is written (Wis. 14:22): "Whereas they lived in a great war of
+ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as the true
+good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is
+a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the
+perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires
+by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the
+rational creature, according to Ps. 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in
+thy borders." The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this
+world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God,
+yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the
+peace.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Peace Is the Proper Effect of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of
+charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But
+some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens
+sometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its
+contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is
+contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even
+holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of
+their opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from
+one another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the
+effect of charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of different
+things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Isa. 32:17:
+"And the work of justice shall be peace." Therefore it is not the
+effect of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they
+that love Thy Law."
+
+_I answer that,_ Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above (A.
+1). The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to
+one object; while the other results from one's own appetite being
+united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is
+effected by charity--the first, in so far as man loves God with his
+whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires
+tend to one object--the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as
+ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's
+will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of
+friendship if people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4),
+and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the same
+things" (Sallust, Catilin.)
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Without sin no one falls from a state of
+sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making
+him place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not
+cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good.
+Hence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely
+apparentapparent.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends need not
+agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and
+especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small
+matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those
+who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an
+obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which
+precedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if
+there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to
+some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such
+a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man
+thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension,
+belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks
+that it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight
+matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect
+peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire
+fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the
+wayfarer.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so
+far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of
+charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes
+peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
+and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Peace Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a
+matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are
+precepts about keeping peace, for example: "Have peace among you"
+(Mk. 9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is
+meritorious to keep peace, according to Matt. 5:9: "Blessed are the
+peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Therefore
+peace is a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which
+are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. 5:20).
+Therefore peace is a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto.
+But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
+xix, 11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 28, A. 4), when a number of acts
+all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other,
+they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue
+from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For,
+though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not
+two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction:
+and fire produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction.
+
+Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God
+and of our neighbor, as shown above (A. 3), there is no other virtue
+except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in
+reference to joy (Q. 28, A. 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of
+charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is
+placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 69, AA. 1, 3). It is also numbered among the
+fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of
+its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in
+respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect
+of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 30
+
+OF MERCY* [*The one Latin word "misericordia" signifies either pity
+or mercy. The distinction between these two is that pity may stand
+either for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for
+the virtue.]
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person
+pitied?
+
+(2) To whom does it belong to pity?
+
+(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?
+
+(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Evil Is Properly the Motive of Mercy?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the
+motive of mercy. For, as shown above (Q. 19, A. 1; I-II, Q. 79, A. 1,
+ad 4; I, Q. 48, A. 6), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now
+fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not
+excite mercy.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now
+the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call for
+pity but drives it away." Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive
+of mercy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of
+evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8).
+Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is
+a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is
+the motive of mercy.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is
+heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him
+if we can. For mercy takes its name _misericordia_ from denoting a
+man's compassionate heart (_miserum cor_) for another's unhappiness.
+Now unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to
+beatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for,
+according to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), "happy is he who has
+whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." Hence, on the other
+hand, it belongs to unhappiness that a man should suffer what he
+wishes not.
+
+Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural
+appetite; thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a
+man wishes a thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a
+thing, not in itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat
+what is bad for him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.
+
+Accordingly the motive of _mercy,_ being something pertaining to
+_misery,_ is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's
+natural appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the
+contrary of which man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher
+says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether
+corruptive or distressing." Secondly, such like evils are yet more
+provocative of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice,
+wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our
+pity "when it is the result of an accident, as when something turns
+out ill, whereas we hoped well of it." Thirdly, they cause yet
+greater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as when evil
+befalls a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the
+Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "we pity most the distress of one
+who suffers undeservedly."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is essential to fault that it be voluntary; and in
+this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since,
+however, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having
+something connected with it that is against the sinner's will, it
+may, in this respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we
+pity and commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in
+Evang. xxxiv) that "true godliness is not disdainful but
+compassionate," and again it is written (Matt. 9:36) that Jesus
+"seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them: because they were
+distressed, and lying like sheep that have no shepherd."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it is
+directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself,
+except figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered
+to have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus.
+30:24): "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God" [*Cf. Q. 106, A. 3,
+ad 1].
+
+Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself,
+but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in
+ourselves, so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to
+us, as to be part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents,
+we do not pity their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in
+which sense the Philosopher says that "harshness drives pity away."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of
+good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the
+recollection of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are
+present to the senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so
+far as they represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Reason for Taking Pity Is a Defect in the Person Who Pities?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a
+defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be
+merciful, wherefore it is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies
+are over all His works." But there is no defect in God. Therefore a
+defect cannot be the reason for taking pity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in
+whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is
+false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in
+a desperate state are pitiless." Therefore it seems that the reason
+for taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But
+the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to
+contumely are pitiless." Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not
+a defect in the person who pities.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the
+reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to
+sorrow more easily, as we shall say further on (Q. 35, A. 1, ad 2).
+Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since pity is grief for another's distress, as
+stated above (A. 1), from the very fact that a person takes pity on
+anyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since
+sorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for
+another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as
+one's own.
+
+Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections,
+which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks
+upon his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his
+own, so that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt
+himself. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with
+one's friend" as being one of the signs of friendship, and the
+Apostle says (Rom. 12:15): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with
+them that weep."
+
+Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's
+evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the
+Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to
+them, and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may
+happen to themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who
+consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and
+timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem
+themselves happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no
+danger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.
+
+Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either
+because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being
+united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering
+in the same way.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as
+He loves us as belonging to Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear
+to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like manner this
+applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent
+on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of
+others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through
+having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are
+incited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the
+human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man think
+that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while
+they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Prov.
+27:4: "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." For the
+same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others,
+and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering
+deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
+xxxiv) that "false godliness," i.e. of the proud, "is not
+compassionate but disdainful."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Mercy Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief
+part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).
+Now choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled"
+(Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called
+a virtue. But mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of
+Sallust (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of
+doubt, should be free from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the
+mind does not easily see aright, when these things stand in the way."
+Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But
+nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
+9), and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore
+mercy is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they
+result from charity, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 4; Q. 29, A. 4). Now
+mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we
+weep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice.
+Therefore mercy is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is
+not an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its object,
+neither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral
+virtue, because neither is it about operations, for this belongs to
+justice; nor is it about passions, since it is not reduced to one of
+the twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7).
+Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "Cicero in
+praising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at
+once more humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when
+he says: 'Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful
+than thy mercy.'" Therefore mercy is a virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ Mercy signifies grief for another's distress. Now
+this grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive
+appetite, in which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas,
+in another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective
+appetite, in as much as one person's evil is displeasing to another.
+This movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in
+accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of
+the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
+Dei ix, 5) that "this movement of the mind" (viz. mercy) "obeys the
+reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is
+safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant."
+And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the
+soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 59,
+AA. 4, 5), it follows that mercy is a virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The words of Sallust are to be understood as applying
+to the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for thus it
+impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis,
+considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one
+another on the part of their respective estimation of another's
+evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to
+suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it
+esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well
+with the undeserving: "both of these are praiseworthy and come from
+the same disposition of character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking,
+however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state
+further on (Q. 36, A. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which
+is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other
+virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect,
+namely the misery of the person pitied.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue
+having relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called
+nemesis, because "they both proceed from the same character" (Rhet.
+ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but
+as passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet
+nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in
+which case they assume the character of a virtue.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Mercy Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues.
+For the worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is
+preferred before the worship of God, according to Osee 6:6 and Matt.
+12:7: "I have desired mercy and not sacrifice." Therefore mercy is
+the greatest virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8: "Godliness is profitable
+to all things," a gloss says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule of
+life consists in mercy and godliness." Now the Christian rule of life
+embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is
+contained in mercy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue is that which makes its subject good,"
+according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man
+like God, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for
+being more like God. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since
+of God is it said (Ps. 144:9) that "His tender mercies are over all
+His works," and (Luke 6:36) Our Lord said: "Be ye . . . merciful, as
+your Father also is merciful." Therefore mercy is the greatest of
+virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle after saying (Col. 3:12): "Put ye
+on . . . as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy," etc., adds
+(Col. 3:14): "Above all things have charity." Therefore mercy is not
+the greatest of virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways:
+first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In
+itself, mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to
+mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others
+in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence
+mercy is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His
+omnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth
+Sunday after Pentecost].
+
+On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the
+greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others,
+surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone
+above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to
+supply the defect of that which is beneath. [*"The quality of mercy
+is not strained./'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The
+throned monarch better than his crown." Merchant of Venice, Act IV,
+Scene i.]. Hence, as regards man, who has God above him, charity
+which unites him to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies
+the defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to
+our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all
+others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply
+the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not
+for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For
+He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in
+order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy,
+whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to
+Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being,
+according to Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for
+by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The sum total of the Christian religion consists in
+mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity,
+whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy
+for our neighbor.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the
+bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as
+regards similarity of works.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 31
+
+OF BENEFICENCE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity,
+(1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence,
+(3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity?
+
+(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?
+
+(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more
+closely united to us?
+
+(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Beneficence Is an Act of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity.
+For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit God,
+according to Job 35:7: "What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He
+receive of thy hand?" Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But
+this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of
+liberality and not of charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due, or
+as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice
+while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this
+respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is
+either an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an
+act of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
+(Q. 23, A. 1). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of
+friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) "doing good," i.e. being beneficent, "to
+one's friends." Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to
+others.
+
+_I answer that,_ Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This
+good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of
+good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of
+friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love
+includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated
+above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 2). Now the will carries into effect if
+possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, the result of
+an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend. Therefore
+beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of friendship or
+charity.
+
+But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some
+special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special
+character and will belong to some special virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "love
+moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the
+inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the
+superior to watch over the inferior:" and in this respect beneficence
+is an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to
+honor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to
+bestow good things on us.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal of
+gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward
+passion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to
+liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive
+desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part
+with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet
+desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the
+other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence
+belongs in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract
+from a man's friendship, if, through love, he give his friend
+something he would like to keep for himself; rather does this prove
+the perfection of his friendship.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the
+benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see
+therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of
+distress or defect.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 2]
+
+Whether We Ought to Do Good to All?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all.
+For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are unable to
+do good to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to the
+impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) "Give to the good, and
+receive not a sinner." But many men are sinners. Therefore we need
+not do good to all.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "Charity dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Now
+to do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were to
+do good to an enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to
+an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding
+communion with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of
+charity, we ought not to do good to all.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we have
+time, let us work good to all men."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 1), beneficence is an
+effect of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the
+inferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels,
+because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is superior
+in one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since
+the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should extend to
+all, but according as time and place require: because all acts of
+virtue must be modified with a view to their due circumstances.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to
+every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be
+bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds
+us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind
+to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a
+good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to
+all in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as
+for the faithful.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and his
+nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the
+maintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this
+would be to do evil rather than good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the common weal
+are deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents them from
+doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor
+lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they be in
+danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like
+distress, unless this be according to the order of justice.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 3]
+
+Whether We Ought to Do Good to Those Rather Who Are More Closely
+United to Us?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to those
+rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Luke
+14:12): "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends,
+nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen." Now these are the most closely
+united to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those rather
+who are more closely united to us, but preferably to strangers and to
+those who are in want: hence the text goes on: "But, when thou makest
+a feast, call the poor, the maimed," etc.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to help another in the battle is an act of very
+great goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help a
+fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe.
+Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the
+preference to those who are most closely united to us.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, we should pay what is due before conferring
+gratuitous favors. But it is a man's duty to be good to those who
+have been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our
+benefactors rather than to those who are closely united to us.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his
+children, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 9). Yet a man ought to be more
+beneficent to his children, since "neither ought the children to lay
+up for the parents," according to 2 Cor. 12:14. Therefore we are not
+bound to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to
+us.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "Since
+one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by
+reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance
+are more closely united to us."
+
+_I answer that,_ Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which
+is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that
+every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on
+the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next
+to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first
+and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as
+Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is
+an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most
+beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.
+
+Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to
+the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the
+intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens
+is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters,
+and so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various
+ways according to these various connections, because we ought in
+preference to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the
+matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with
+us. And yet this may vary according to the various requirements of
+time, place, or matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought,
+for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than
+one's own father, if he is not in such urgent need.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite our
+friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they
+may invite us in return, since that would be an act not of charity
+but of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought rather
+to invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must be
+understood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor those
+rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two, one be
+more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not
+possible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to
+help rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want
+as well as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a
+prudent man.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The common good of many is more Godlike than the good
+of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to
+endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the
+temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage
+together in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the
+soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as
+a private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country
+as a whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be
+preferred to one who is a blood relation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is one which
+should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather as
+belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may
+have another's goods, whether in money or in kind, either because he
+has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or in
+deposit or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what he
+owes, rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless perchance
+the case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take
+another's property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet,
+again, this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress:
+in which case, however, the claims on either side would have to be
+weighed with regard to such other conditions as a prudent man would
+take into consideration, because, on account of the different
+particular cases, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is
+impossible to lay down a general rule.
+
+The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the
+debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not
+because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral
+equity, as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor
+confers a benefit equal to that which a man receives from his
+parents: wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should give
+the first place to our parents before all others, unless, on the
+other side, there be such weightier motives, as need or some other
+circumstance, for instance the common good of the Church or state. In
+other cases we must take to account the connection and the benefit
+received; and here again no general rule can laid down.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a parent's love
+tends to conferring benefits, while the children's love tends to
+honor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it
+would be lawful to abandon one's children rather than one's parents,
+to abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the
+obligation we lie under towards them for the benefits we have
+received from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14).
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Beneficence Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue. For
+precepts are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make men
+virtuous (Ethic. i 9, 13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are
+prescribed as distinct from one another, for it is written (Matt.
+4:44): "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you." Therefore
+beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there are opposed
+to beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on our
+neighbor, for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore
+beneficence is a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, charity is not divided into several species: whereas
+there would seem to be several kinds of beneficence, according to the
+various kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a distinct virtue
+from charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The internal and the external act do not require
+different virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as
+external and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of
+goodwill. Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from
+charity, so neither is beneficence.
+
+_I answer that,_ Virtues differ according to the different aspects of
+their objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of
+beneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect
+of good, as explained above (A. 1). Wherefore beneficence is not a
+distinct virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Precepts are given, not about habits but about acts of
+virtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes distinction, not of
+habits, but of acts.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even as all benefits conferred on our neighbor, if we
+consider them under the common aspect of good, are to be traced to
+love, so all hurts considered under the common aspect of evil, are to
+be traced to hatred. But if we consider these same things under
+certain special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to
+certain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there are
+various kinds of benefits.
+
+Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 32
+
+OF ALMSDEEDS
+(In Ten Articles)
+
+We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?
+
+(2) Of the different kinds of alms;
+
+(3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal?
+
+(4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect?
+
+(5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept?
+
+(6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need?
+
+(7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods?
+
+(8) Who can give alms?
+
+(9) To whom should we give alms?
+
+(10) How should alms be given?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Almsgiving Is an Act of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity.
+For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible
+to give alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I
+should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not
+charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore almsgiving is not an act
+of charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of satisfaction,
+according to Dan. 4:24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Now
+satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of
+justice and not of charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of
+religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according to
+Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such
+sacrifices God's favor is obtained." Therefore almsgiving is not an
+act of charity, but of religion.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that to give for
+a good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially true
+of almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written 2 John 3:17: "He that hath the
+substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall
+put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?"
+
+_I answer that,_ External acts belong to that virtue which regards
+the motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to
+relieve one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being
+"a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion
+and for God's sake," which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above
+(Q. 30, AA. 1, 2). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly
+speaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its very name, for in
+Greek (_eleemosyne_) it is derived from having mercy (_eleein_) even
+as the Latin _miseratio_ is. And since mercy is an effect of charity,
+as shown above (Q. 30, A. 2, A. 3, Obj. 3), it follows that
+almsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of mercy.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: An act of virtue may be taken in two ways: first
+materially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and such an
+act of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having
+the habit of justice, do what is just, led by the natural light of
+reason, or through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak
+of a thing being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of
+justice is to do what is just, in the same way as a just man, i.e.
+with readiness and delight, and such an act of virtue cannot be
+without the virtue.
+
+Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give
+alms formally, i.e. for God's sake, with delight and readiness, and
+altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of one virtue
+being commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing it
+to this other virtue's end. It is in this way that almsgiving is
+reckoned among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in
+distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far
+as it is directed to placate God, it has the character of a
+sacrifice, and thus it is commanded by religion.
+
+Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so far as
+liberality removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise from
+excessive love of riches, the result of which is that one clings to
+them more than one ought.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Different Kinds of Almsdeeds Are Suitably Enumerated?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the different kinds of almsdeeds are
+unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds,
+namely, to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe
+the naked, to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the
+captive, to bury the dead; all of which are expressed in the
+following verse: "To visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe,
+harbor or bury."
+
+Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to instruct the
+ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to
+reprove the sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear with those who
+trouble and annoy us, and to pray for all, which are all contained in
+the following verse: "To counsel, reprove, console, to pardon,
+forbear, and to pray," yet so that counsel includes both advice and
+instruction.
+
+And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
+For the purpose of almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor. But a dead
+man profits nothing by being buried, else Our Lord would not have
+spoken truly when He said (Matt. 10:28): "Be not afraid of them who
+kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do." [*The
+quotation is from Luke 12:4.] This explains why Our Lord, in
+enumerating the works of mercy, made no mention of the burial of the
+dead (Matt. 25:35, 36). Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are
+unsuitably enumerated.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1), the purpose of giving alms
+is to relieve our neighbor's need. Now there are many needs of human
+life other than those mentioned above, for instance, a blind man
+needs a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man needs
+riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of
+the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of mercy.
+Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a defect.
+But no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or
+other. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who
+is ignorant of what he knows himself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): "Let him that
+hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him
+that hath abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful
+bounty; let him who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share
+his skill and profit with his neighbor; let him who has an
+opportunity of speaking with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned
+for retaining his talent, if when he has the chance he plead not with
+him the cause of the poor." Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are
+suitably enumerated in respect of those things whereof men have
+abundance or insufficiency.
+
+_I answer that,_ The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably
+taken from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect
+the soul, and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others
+affect the body, and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal
+need occurs either during this life or afterwards. If it occurs
+during this life, it is either a common need in respect of things
+needed by all, or it is a special need occurring through some
+accident supervening. In the first case, the need is either internal
+or external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved by solid
+food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have _to feed the hungry;_
+while the other is relieved by liquid food, viz. thirst, and in
+respect of this we have _to give drink to the thirsty._ The common
+need with regard to external help is twofold; one in respect of
+clothing, and as to this we have _to clothe the naked:_ while the
+other is in respect of a dwelling place, and as to this we have _to
+harbor the harborless._ Again if the need be special, it is either
+the result of an internal cause, like sickness, and then we have _to
+visit the sick,_ or it results from an external cause, and then we
+have _to ransom the captive._ After this life we give _burial to the
+dead._
+
+In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two
+ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this respect we have
+_prayer,_ whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human
+assistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to relieve a
+deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in
+the speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by _instructing,_
+and if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by
+_counselling._ Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the
+appetitive power, especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by
+_comforting._ Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate
+act; and this may be the subject of a threefold consideration. First,
+in respect of the sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his
+inordinate will, and thus the remedy takes the form of _reproof._
+Secondly, in respect of the person sinned against; and if the sin be
+committed against ourselves, we apply the remedy by _pardoning the
+injury,_ while, if it be committed against God or our neighbor, it is
+not in our power to pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii,
+15). Thirdly, in respect of the result of the inordinate act, on
+account of which the sinner is an annoyance to those who live with
+him, even beside his intention; in which case the remedy is applied
+by _bearing with him,_    especially with regard to those who sin out
+of weakness, according to Rom. 15:1: "We that are stronger, ought to
+bear the infirmities of the weak," and not only as regards their
+being infirm and consequently troublesome on account of their unruly
+actions, but also by bearing any other burdens of theirs with them,
+according to Gal. 6:2: "Bear ye one another's burdens."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Burial does not profit a dead man as though his body
+could be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord
+said that those who kill the body "have no more that they can do";
+and for this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with
+the other works of mercy, but those only which are more clearly
+necessary. Nevertheless it does concern the deceased what is done
+with his body: both that he may live in the memory of man whose
+respect he forfeits if he remain without burial, and as regards a
+man's fondness for his own body while he was yet living, a fondness
+which kindly persons should imitate after his death. It is thus that
+some are praised for burying the dead, as Tobias, and those who
+buried Our Lord; as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All other needs are reduced to these, for blindness and
+lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the blind, and to
+support the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick. In like
+manner to assist a man against any distress that is due to an
+extrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the
+wealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the
+purpose of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason
+for special mention of this particular need.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of the
+act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as to
+the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the evil
+of sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according to Prov.
+27:6: "Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful kisses
+of an enemy."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Nescience is not always a defect, but only when it is
+about what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to
+supply this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should
+observe the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in
+other virtuous acts.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Corporal Alms Are of More Account Than Spiritual Alms?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that corporal alms are of more account
+than spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to
+one who is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised
+because it relieves one who is in need. Now the body which is
+relieved by corporal alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit
+which is relieved by spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of
+more account.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if the
+kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says (Luke 14:12): "When
+thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are
+rich, lest perhaps they also invite thee again." Now there is always
+compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another,
+profits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: "My prayer shall be turned
+into my bosom": and he who teaches another, makes progress in
+knowledge, which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore
+corporal almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is
+comforted by it: wherefore it is written (Job 31:20): "If his sides
+have not blessed me," and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7):
+"The bowels of the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother." Now
+a corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a
+spiritual alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of more account than
+spiritual almsdeeds.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on
+the words, "Give to him that asketh of thee" (Matt. 5:42): "You
+should give so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when
+you refuse what another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of
+justice, and send him away empty; at times indeed you will give what
+is better than what is asked for, if you reprove him that asks
+unjustly." Now reproof is a spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual
+almsdeeds are preferable to corporal almsdeeds.
+
+_I answer that,_ There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds.
+First, simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the
+first place, for three reasons. First, because the offering is more
+excellent, since it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal
+gift, according to Prov. 4:2: "I will give you a good gift, forsake
+not My Law." Secondly, on account of the object succored, because the
+spirit is more excellent than the body, wherefore, even as a man in
+looking after himself, ought to look to his soul more than to his
+body, so ought he in looking after his neighbor, whom he ought to
+love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the acts themselves by which our
+neighbor is succored, because spiritual acts are more excellent than
+corporal acts, which are, in a fashion, servile.
+
+Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case,
+when some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a
+man in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the
+Philosopher observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man "money is
+better than philosophy," although the latter is better simply.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is better to give to one who is in greater want,
+other things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better, and
+is in want of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is
+thus in the case in point.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Compensation does not detract from merit and praise if
+it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended, does not
+detract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.), that "the
+less he sought fame, the more he became famous": and thus it is with
+spiritual almsdeeds.
+
+Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not
+detract from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in which the
+will of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in which it
+rests when it is inordinate.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Corporal Almsdeeds Have a Spiritual Effect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a
+spiritual effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual
+goods exceed corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no
+spiritual effect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal
+for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one
+ought not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect. If
+therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater
+the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what
+we read (Luke 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the
+treasury, and in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . . all."
+Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): "The alms of a man
+. . . shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye."
+
+_I answer that,_ Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways.
+First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have
+merely a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's
+corporal needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their
+cause, in so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God
+and his neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual
+fruit, according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy
+brother . . . place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most
+High, and it shall bring thee more profit than gold."
+
+Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have
+a spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a
+corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the
+above text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the
+poor, and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to their
+substance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He who gives an alms does not intend to buy a spiritual
+thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual things
+infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a
+spiritual fruit through the love of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in
+proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence
+corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Almsgiving Is a Matter of Precept?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of
+precept. For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now
+almsgiving is a matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my
+counsel be acceptable to the King; [Vulg.: 'to thee, and'] redeem
+thou thy sins with alms." Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of
+precept.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what is
+his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is
+lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter
+of precept.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the
+transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because
+positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if
+almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to
+some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave
+an alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can
+always be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in
+some other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be
+needful to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it
+seems that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of
+the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving.
+Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
+
+_On the contrary,_ No man is punished eternally for omitting to do
+what is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for
+omitting to give alms, as is clear from Matt. 25:41-43. Therefore
+almsgiving is a matter of precept.
+
+_I answer that,_ As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept,
+whatever is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a
+matter of precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that
+not only should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his
+well-doers, according to 1 John 3:18: "Let us not love in word, nor
+in tongue, but in deed, and in truth." And in order to be a person's
+well-wisher and well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done
+by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.
+
+Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that
+all almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is
+necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right
+reason. Now right reason demands that we should take into
+consideration something on the part of the giver, and something on
+the part of the recipient. On the part of the giver, it must be noted
+that he should give of his surplus, according to Luke 11:41: "That
+which remaineth, give alms." This surplus is to be taken in reference
+not only to himself, so as to denote what is unnecessary to the
+individual, but also in reference to those of whom he has charge (in
+which case we have the expression "necessary to the person" [*The
+official necessities of a person in position] taking the word
+"person" as expressive of dignity). Because each one must first of
+all look after himself and then after those over whom he has charge,
+and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others. Thus
+nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for the
+upkeep of one's own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the
+formation of another by the power of generation.
+
+On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in
+need, else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it
+is not possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we
+are not bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who
+could not be succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases
+the words of Ambrose apply, "Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou
+hast not fed him, thou hast slain him" [*Cf. Canon _Pasce,_ dist.
+lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are
+bound to give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms to one whose
+need is extreme: otherwise almsgiving, like any other greater good,
+is a matter of counsel.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to God's
+Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he did
+not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been
+speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter
+of precept.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours as to
+the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us alone
+but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we have
+over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii,
+18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as coming
+from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are
+you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the
+merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the
+hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
+have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot,
+the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you
+injure as many as you might help." Ambrose expresses himself in the
+same way.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit to give
+alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is
+evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored
+otherwise--on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods,
+which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge
+with probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly
+occur in the future, for this would be to think about the morrow,
+which Our Lord forbade us to do (Matt. 6:34), but he should judge
+what is superfluous and what necessary, according as things probably
+and generally occur.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to the
+precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle
+interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay:
+'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life
+that now is, and of that which is to come," and he says this because
+the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, "that
+thou mayest be longlived upon the land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness
+comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*_Pietas,_ whence our English
+word "Piety." Cf. also inf. Q. 101, A. 2.]
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 6]
+
+Whether One Ought to Give Alms Out of What One Needs?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of
+what one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only
+as regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our
+interior affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of
+charity, because this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the
+order of charity requires that a man should love himself more than
+his neighbor, it seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of
+what he needed, in order to succor his neighbor.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself, squanders
+his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done.
+Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
+care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
+the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now if a man gives of what
+he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from the
+care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems
+that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt be
+perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Now he that
+gives all he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but
+also what he needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he
+needs.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because
+without it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to
+give alms out of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance,
+if a man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had
+merely sufficient to support himself and his children, or others
+under his charge, he would be throwing away his life and that of
+others if he were to give away in alms, what was then necessary to
+him. Yet I say this without prejudice to such a case as might happen,
+supposing that by depriving himself of necessaries a man might help a
+great personage, and a support of the Church or State, since it would
+be a praiseworthy act to endanger one's life and the lives of those
+who are under our charge for the delivery of such a person, since the
+common good is to be preferred to one's own.
+
+Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it
+live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or
+those of whom he has charge. The "necessary" considered thus is not
+an invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's
+property, and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one
+might take much from him, and he would still have sufficient for the
+decencies of life in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is
+good to give alms of this kind of "necessary"; and it is a matter not
+of precept but of counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive
+oneself of one's own, in order to give to others to such an extent
+that the residue would be insufficient for one to live in keeping
+with one's station and the ordinary occurrences of life: for no man
+ought to live unbecomingly. There are, however, three exceptions to
+the above rule. The first is when a man changes his state of life,
+for instance, by entering religion, for then he gives away all his
+possessions for Christ's sake, and does the deed of perfection by
+transferring himself to another state. Secondly, when that which he
+deprives himself of, though it be required for the decencies of life,
+can nevertheless easily be recovered, so that he does not suffer
+extreme inconvenience. Thirdly, when he is in presence of extreme
+indigence in an individual, or great need on the part of the common
+weal. For in such cases it would seem praiseworthy to forego the
+requirements of one's station, in order to provide for a greater need.
+
+The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 7]
+
+Whether One May Give Alms Out of Ill-gotten Goods?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten
+goods. For it is written (Luke 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the
+mammon of iniquity." Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is
+lawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of
+ill-gotten riches.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the
+profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden
+(Deut. 23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God:
+"Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house
+of . . . thy God." In like manner gains from games of chance are
+ill-gotten, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "we take
+such like gains from our friends to whom we ought rather to give."
+And most of all are the profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby
+the Holy Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is
+lawful to give alms. Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten
+goods.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser
+evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property than to
+commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who
+is in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf.
+Canon _Pasce_ dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken):
+"Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast
+slain him". Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of
+ill-gotten goods.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): "Give alms
+from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not
+to hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from
+interest and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the
+Body of Christ."
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the
+first place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from
+whom it is gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained
+possession of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of
+such things a man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.
+
+Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it,
+and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it,
+because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly.
+This happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene
+the justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not
+to the giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar
+cases of illegal giving and receiving.
+
+Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful,
+but because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case
+of a woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so
+called, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the
+Law of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in
+taking the money. Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in
+alms what is thus acquired by an unlawful action.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), "Some have
+misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's
+property and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are
+fulfilling the commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be
+amended. Yet all riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in
+_De Quaest. Ev._ ii, 34, because "riches are not unjust save for
+those who are themselves unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or,
+according to Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 16:9, "Make unto
+yourselves friends," etc., "He calls mammon unjust, because it draws
+our affections by the various allurements of wealth." Or, because
+"among the many ancestors whose property you inherit, there is one
+who took the property of others unjustly, although you know nothing
+about it," as Basil says in a homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all
+riches are styled riches "of iniquity," i.e., of "inequality,"
+because they are not distributed equally among all, one being in
+need, and another in affluence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: We have already explained how alms may be given out of
+the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not made
+therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and through
+reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out of
+the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid,
+indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of
+chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary
+to the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his
+property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with
+the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play,
+and wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to
+restitution, and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms.
+Then again there would seem to be something unlawful as being against
+the positive civil law, which altogether forbids any such profits.
+Since, however, a civil law does not bind all, but only those who are
+subject to that law, and moreover may be abrogated through desuetude,
+it follows that all such as are bound by these laws are bound to make
+restitution of such gains, unless perchance the contrary custom
+prevail, or unless a man win from one who enticed him to play, in
+which case he is not bound to restitution, because the loser does not
+deserve to be paid back: and yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has
+won, so long as that positive law is in force, wherefore in this case
+he ought to give it away in alms.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All things are common property in a case of extreme
+necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take another's
+goods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who is
+willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain
+what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take
+something if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in
+need. If however this be possible without danger, he must ask the
+owner's consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme
+necessity.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 8]
+
+Whether One Who Is Under Another's Power Can Give Alms?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power can
+give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to
+whom they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to
+give alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as
+Ambrose [*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index
+to ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim.
+4:8: "'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things':
+The sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty
+by all," and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms.
+Therefore those who are in another's power can give alms.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gen. 3:16). But
+a wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it is
+related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge
+of her betrothed [*_Sponsus._ The matrimonial institutions of the
+Romans were so entirely different from ours that _sponsus_ is no
+longer accurately rendered either "husband" or "betrothed."]
+Therefore a person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under
+another's power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the subjection of children to their parents is
+founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1): "Children,
+obey your parents in the Lord." But, apparently, children may give
+alms out of their parents' property. For it is their own, since they
+are the heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily
+use, it seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so as to
+profit their souls. Therefore those who are under another's power can
+give alms.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, servants are under their master's power, according
+to Titus 2:9: "Exhort servants to be obedient to their masters." Now
+they may lawfully do anything that will profit their masters: and
+this would be especially the case if they gave alms for them.
+Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Alms should not be given out of another's
+property; and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his
+own labor as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who
+are subject to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of
+another's property. Therefore those who are under another's power
+cannot give alms.
+
+_I answer that,_ Anyone who is under another's power must, as such,
+be ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the
+natural order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to
+its superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is
+subject to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the
+superior's permission.
+
+Accordingly he that is under another's power must not give alms of
+anything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in
+so far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has
+something in respect of which he is not under the power of his
+superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being
+independent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms
+therefrom.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned by
+his superior, he can give alms from the property of his monastery, in
+accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such
+dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms
+without his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some
+probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would
+be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor
+does it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated
+in _De Eccles. Dogm._ lxxi, "it is a good thing to give one's
+property to the poor little by little, but it is better still to give
+all at once in order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to
+be needy with Christ."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A wife, who has other property besides her dowry which
+is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that property
+be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means, can give
+alms, out of that property, without asking her husband's permission:
+yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too much she
+impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms without
+the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases of
+necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply.
+For though the wife be her husband's equal in the marriage act, yet
+in matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the
+Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a
+betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her
+mother's consent.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: What belongs to the children belongs also to the
+father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small
+quantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless,
+perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any
+particular property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to
+the Fourth Objection is clear.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 9]
+
+Whether One Ought to Give Alms to Those Rather Who Are More Closely
+United to Us?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those
+rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus.
+12:4, 6): "Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do
+good to the humble and give not to the ungodly." Now it happens
+sometimes that those who are closely united to us are sinful and
+ungodly. Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to
+others.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive an eternal
+reward in return, according to Matt. 6:18: "And thy Father Who seeth
+in secret, will repay thee." Now the eternal reward is gained chiefly
+by the alms which are given to the saints, according to Luke 16:9:
+"Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall
+fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings," which passage
+Augustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have
+everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that
+shall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who
+succor them in their needs?" Therefore alms should be given to the
+more holy persons rather than to those who are more closely united to
+us.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man
+cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound
+to give alms to those who are most closely united to us.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have
+not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath
+denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "it
+falls to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of
+those who are more closely united to us." Nevertheless in this matter
+we must employ discretion, according to the various degrees of
+connection, holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one
+who is much holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful
+to the common weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to
+us, especially if the latter be not very closely united, and has no
+special claim on our care then and there, and who is not in very
+urgent need.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by
+encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an eternal
+reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this respect
+an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order of
+charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we should, in
+preference, help those who are more closely connected with us.
+Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "It is with commendable
+liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be
+in need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own
+family, who would be ashamed to beg help from others." Secondly,
+almsdeeds deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the
+recipient, who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that
+Augustine is speaking.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man does
+not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of
+comparison, as stated above (Q. 30, AA. 1, 2), so too, properly
+speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another's
+person; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take
+something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when
+he gives to others.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 10]
+
+Whether Alms Should Be Given in Abundance?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in
+abundance. For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most
+closely connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a
+way that they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says
+(De Officiis i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to
+others.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "We should not
+lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by
+degrees." But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms
+should not be given in abundance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): "Not that others
+should be eased," i.e. should live on you without working themselves,
+"and you burthened," i.e. impoverished. But this would be the result
+if alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms
+abundantly.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:93): "If thou have much,
+give abundantly."
+
+_I answer that,_ Alms may be considered abundant in relation either
+to the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when
+that which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give
+thus is praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Luke 21:3, 4) commended the
+widow because "of her want, she cast in all the living that she had."
+Nevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid down
+when we spoke of giving alms out of one's necessary goods (A. 9).
+
+On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways;
+first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is
+praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than
+sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to
+give to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor.
+13:3): "If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor," on which
+words a gloss comments: "Thus we are warned to be careful in giving
+alms, and to give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit
+many."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as exceeding
+the needs of the recipient.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on the
+part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to
+lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of
+life, wherefore he goes on to say: "Except we imitate Eliseus who
+slew his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household
+cares might keep him back" (3 Kings 19:21).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the passage quoted the words, "not that others
+should be eased or refreshed," refer to that abundance of alms which
+surpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not
+that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief.
+Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on
+account of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more
+daintily nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose
+says (De Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms to a man, you should
+take into consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the
+shame which proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has
+fallen from riches to indigence through no fault of his own."
+
+With regard to the words that follow, "and you burdened," they refer
+to abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the
+same passage, "he says this, not because it would be better to give
+in abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes
+them so to give that they lack not for themselves."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 33
+
+OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are
+eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
+
+(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?
+
+(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?
+
+(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?
+
+(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?
+
+(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through
+being corrected?
+
+(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?
+
+(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Fraternal Correction Is an Act of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of
+charity. For a gloss on Matt. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend
+against thee," says that "a man should reprove his brother out of
+zeal for justice." But justice is a distinct virtue from charity.
+Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of
+justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret admonition.
+Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of prudence, for
+a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
+fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue. Now
+it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Gal. 6:2:
+"Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of
+Christ," which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the
+correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with
+him, is not an act of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed.
+But almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 1).
+Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.
+
+_I answer that,_ The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which
+should be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be
+considered in two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner,
+secondly as conducing to the harm of others, by hurting or
+scandalizing them, or by being detrimental to the common good, the
+justice of which is disturbed by that man's sin.
+
+Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which
+applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner
+himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is
+directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone's
+evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person's
+good is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well.
+Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because
+thereby we drive out our brother's evil, viz. sin, the removal of
+which pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external
+loss, or of a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of
+virtue is more akin to charity than the good of the body or of
+external things. Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity
+rather than the healing of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an
+external bodily need. There is another correction which applies a
+remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered as hurtful to others,
+and especially to the common good. This correction is an act of
+justice, whose concern it is to safeguard the rectitude of justice
+between one man and another.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This gloss speaks of the second correction which is an
+act of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it
+takes justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further
+on (Q. 58, A. 5), in which sense again all "sin is iniquity" (1 John
+3:4), through being contrary to justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), prudence
+regulates whatever is directed to the end, about which things counsel
+and choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by prudence, we
+perform some action aright which is directed to the end of some
+virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action belongs chiefly
+to the virtue to whose end it is directed. Since, then, the
+admonition which is given in fraternal correction is directed to the
+removal of a brother's sin, which removal pertains to charity, it is
+evident that this admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which
+virtue commands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence,
+which executes and directs the action.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Fraternal correction is not opposed to forbearance with
+the weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a man bears with a
+sinner, in so far as he is not disturbed against him, and retains his
+goodwill towards him: the result being that he strives to make him do
+better.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Fraternal Correction Is a Matter of Precept?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter
+of precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according
+to the saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: "Accursed
+be he who says that God has commanded anything impossible." Now it is
+written (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can
+correct whom He hath despised." Therefore fraternal correction is not
+a matter of precept.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to
+the precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not come
+under any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of
+precept.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin,
+which has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are
+found to omit fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
+i, 9): "Not only those of low degree, but also those of high
+position, refrain from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity,
+not by the claims of charity." Therefore fraternal correction is not
+a matter of precept.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due.
+If, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it is due
+to our brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man
+owes anyone a material due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he
+must not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek
+him out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we should have to go
+seeking for those who need correction, in order that we might correct
+them; which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the great
+number of sinners, for whose correction one man could not suffice,
+and because religious would have to leave the cloister in order to
+reprove men, which would be unbecoming. Therefore fraternal
+correction is not a matter of precept.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): "You become
+worse than the sinner if you fail to correct him." But this would not
+be so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some precept.
+Therefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept.
+
+_I answer that,_ Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We must
+observe, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law forbid
+sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now
+sinful acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter
+how, or when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature
+they are connected with an evil end, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6:
+wherefore negative precepts bind always and for all times. On the
+other hand, acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing
+the due circumstances, which are requisite in order that an act be
+virtuous; namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be
+done. And since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end
+depends on the formal aspect of the end, the chief of these
+circumstances of a virtuous act is this aspect of the end, which in
+this case is the good of virtue. If therefore such a circumstance be
+omitted from a virtuous act, as entirely takes away the good of
+virtue, such an act is contrary to a precept. If, however, the
+circumstance omitted from a virtuous act be such as not to destroy
+the virtue altogether, though it does not perfectly attain the good
+of virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
+ii, 9) says that if we depart but little from the mean, it is not
+contrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much from the mean
+virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction is directed
+to a brother's amendment: so that it is a matter of precept, in so
+far as it is necessary for that end, but not so as we have to correct
+our erring brother at all places and times.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In all good deeds man's action is not efficacious
+without the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his
+power. Hence Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): "Since we
+ignore who is predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our
+feelings, that we wish all to be saved." Consequently we ought to do
+our brethren the kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God's
+help.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 32, A. 5, ad 4), all the precepts
+about rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the precept
+about the honor due to parents.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Fraternal correction may be omitted in three ways.
+
+First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct
+someone. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "If a man refrains
+from chiding and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable
+time for so doing, or because he fears lest, if he does so, they may
+become worse, or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others
+who are weak and need to be instructed in a life of goodness and
+virtue, this does not seem to result from covetousness, but to be
+counselled by charity."
+
+Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one
+commits a mortal sin, namely, "when" (as he says in the same passage)
+"one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous
+pain or death; provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by
+such things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity."
+This would seem to be the case when a man reckons that he might
+probably withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so,
+through fear or covetousness.
+
+Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or
+covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults, and yet
+not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw
+him from sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through fear or
+covetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to
+these things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to
+correct wrongdoers.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: We are bound to pay that which is due to some fixed and
+certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good, without
+waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to find
+him. Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should seek
+him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he that
+has spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in
+order to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound
+to seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any
+certain person, but to all our neighbors in general, whether those
+favors be material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow
+them when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine says (De
+Doctr. Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance.
+For this reason he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 1) that "Our Lord warns
+us not to be listless in regard of one another's sins: not indeed by
+being on the lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting
+what we see": else we should become spies on the lives of others,
+which is against the saying of Prov. 24:19: "Lie not in wait, nor
+seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest."
+It is evident from this that there is no need for religious to leave
+their cloister in order to rebuke evil-doers.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Fraternal Correction Belongs Only to Prelates?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to
+prelates alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.] says: "Let
+priests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother
+sin against thee,'" etc. Now prelates having charge of others were
+usually designated under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that
+fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms. Now
+corporal almsgiving belongs to those who are placed above others in
+temporal matters, i.e. to the rich. Therefore fraternal correction
+belongs to those who are placed above others in spiritual matters,
+i.e. to prelates.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, when one man reproves another he moves him by his
+rebuke to something better. Now in the physical order the inferior is
+moved by the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which
+follows the order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone to correct
+inferiors.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, Can. Tam
+Sacerdotes): "Both priests and all the rest of the faithful should be
+most solicitous for those who perish, so that their reproof may
+either correct their sinful ways, or, if they be incorrigible, cut
+them off from the Church."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), correction is twofold. One
+is an act of charity, which seeks in a special way the recovery of an
+erring brother by means of a simple warning: such like correction
+belongs to anyone who has charity, be he subject or prelate.
+
+But there is another correction which is an act of justice purposing
+the common good, which is procured not only by warning one's brother,
+but also, sometimes, by punishing him, that others may, through fear,
+desist from sin. Such a correction belongs only to prelates, whose
+business it is not only to admonish, but also to correct by means of
+punishments.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Even as regards that fraternal correction which is
+common to all, prelates have a grave responsibility, as Augustine
+says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "for just as a man ought to bestow temporal
+favors on those especially of whom he has temporal care, so too ought
+he to confer spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and the
+like, on those who are entrusted to his spiritual care." Therefore
+Jerome does not mean that the precept of fraternal correction
+concerns priests only, but that it concerns them chiefly.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as he who has the means wherewith to give corporal
+assistance is rich in this respect, so he whose reason is gifted with
+a sane judgment, so as to be able to correct another's wrong-doing,
+is, in this respect, to be looked on as a superior.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even in the physical order certain things act mutually
+on one another, through being in some respect higher than one
+another, in so far as each is somewhat in act, and somewhat in
+potentiality with regard to another. In like manner one man can
+correct another in so far as he has a sane judgment in a matter
+wherein the other sins, though he is not his superior simply.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 4]
+
+Whether a Man Is Bound to Correct His Prelate?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no man is bound to correct his
+prelate. For it is written (Ex. 19:12): "The beast that shall touch
+the mount shall be stoned," [*Vulg.: 'Everyone that shall touch the
+mount, dying he shall die.'] and (2 Kings 6:7) it is related that the
+Lord struck Oza for touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark
+signify our prelates. Therefore prelates should not be corrected by
+their subjects.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Gal. 2:11, "I withstood him to the face,"
+adds: "as an equal." Therefore, since a subject is not equal to his
+prelate, he ought not to correct him.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) that "one ought not
+to presume to reprove the conduct of holy men, unless one thinks
+better of oneself." But one ought not to think better of oneself than
+of one's prelate. Therefore one ought not to correct one's prelate.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in his Rule: "Show mercy not only
+to yourselves, but also to him who, being in the higher position
+among you, is therefore in greater danger." But fraternal correction
+is a work of mercy. Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.
+
+_I answer that,_ A subject is not competent to administer to his
+prelate the correction which is an act of justice through the
+coercive nature of punishment: but the fraternal correction which is
+an act of charity is within the competency of everyone in respect of
+any person towards whom he is bound by charity, provided there be
+something in that person which requires correction.
+
+Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power extends to whatever
+is contained under the object of that power or habit: thus vision
+extends to all things comprised in the object of sight. Since,
+however, a virtuous act needs to be moderated by due circumstances,
+it follows that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do
+so in a becoming manner, not with impudence and harshness, but with
+gentleness and respect. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): "An
+ancient man rebuke not, but entreat him as a father." Wherefore
+Dionysius finds fault with the monk Demophilus (Ep. viii), for
+rebuking a priest with insolence, by striking and turning him out of
+the church.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It would seem that a subject touches his prelate
+inordinately when he upbraids him with insolence, as also when he
+speaks ill of him: and this is signified by God's condemnation of
+those who touched the mount and the ark.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To withstand anyone in public exceeds the mode of
+fraternal correction, and so Paul would not have withstood Peter
+then, unless he were in some way his equal as regards the defense of
+the faith. But one who is not an equal can reprove privately and
+respectfully. Hence the Apostle in writing to the Colossians (4:17)
+tells them to admonish their prelate: "Say to Archippus: Fulfil thy
+ministry [*Vulg.: 'Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received
+in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.' Cf. 2 Tim. 4:5]." It must be
+observed, however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought
+to rebuke his prelate even publicly. Hence Paul, who was Peter's
+subject, rebuked him in public, on account of the imminent danger of
+scandal concerning faith, and, as the gloss of Augustine says on Gal.
+2:11, "Peter gave an example to superiors, that if at any time they
+should happen to stray from the straight path, they should not
+disdain to be reproved by their subjects."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To presume oneself to be simply better than one's
+prelate, would seem to savor of presumptuous pride; but there is no
+presumption in thinking oneself better in some respect, because, in
+this life, no man is without some fault. We must also remember that
+when a man reproves his prelate charitably, it does not follow that
+he thinks himself any better, but merely that he offers his help to
+one who, "being in the higher position among you, is therefore in
+greater danger," as Augustine observes in his Rule quoted above.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 5]
+
+Whether a Sinner Ought to Reprove a Wrongdoer?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a
+wrongdoer. For no man is excused from obeying a precept by having
+committed a sin. But fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as
+stated above (A. 2). Therefore it seems that a man ought not to
+forbear from such like correction for the reason that he has
+committed a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account than
+corporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain from
+administering corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on account
+of a previous sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 John 1:8): "If we say that we have
+no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore if, on account of a sin, a
+man is hindered from reproving his brother, there will be none to
+reprove the wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is unreasonable:
+therefore the former is also.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): "He that is
+subject to vice should not correct the vices of others." Again it is
+written (Rom. 2:1): "Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest
+thyself. For thou dost the same things which thou judgest."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 2), to correct a wrongdoer
+belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is gifted with right
+judgment. Now sin, as stated above (I-II, Q. 85, AA. 1, 2), does not
+destroy the good of nature so as to deprive the sinner's reason of
+all right judgment, and in this respect he may be competent to find
+fault with others for committing sin. Nevertheless a previous sin
+proves somewhat of a hindrance to this correction, for three reasons.
+First because this previous sin renders a man unworthy to rebuke
+another; and especially is he unworthy to correct another for a
+lesser sin, if he himself has committed a greater. Hence Jerome says
+on the words, "Why seest thou the mote?" etc. (Matt. 7:3): "He is
+speaking of those who, while they are themselves guilty of mortal
+sin, have no patience with the lesser sins of their brethren."
+
+Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on account of the
+scandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector's sin be well known,
+because it would seem that he corrects, not out of charity, but more
+for the sake of ostentation. Hence the words of Matt. 7:4, "How
+sayest thou to thy brother?" etc. are expounded by Chrysostom [*Hom.
+xvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]
+thus: "That is--'With what object?' Out of charity, think you, that
+you may save your neighbor?" No, "because you would look after your
+own salvation first. What you want is, not to save others, but to
+hide your evil deeds with good teaching, and to seek to be praised by
+men for your knowledge."
+
+Thirdly, on account of the rebuker's pride; when, for instance, a man
+thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart, sets himself
+above his neighbor, judging the latter's sins with harsh severity, as
+though he himself were a just man. Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
+Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "To reprove the faults of others is the duty
+of good and kindly men: when a wicked man rebukes anyone, his rebuke
+is the latter's acquittal." And so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
+in Monte ii, 19): "When we have to find fault with anyone, we should
+think whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then we must
+remember that we are men, and might have been guilty of it; or that
+we once had it on our conscience, but have it no longer: and then we
+should bethink ourselves that we are all weak, in order that our
+reproof may be the outcome, not of hatred, but of pity. But if we
+find that we are guilty of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but
+groan with him, and invite him to repent with us." It follows from
+this that, if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, he does not
+sin, nor does he bring a further condemnation on himself, although
+thereby he proves himself deserving of condemnation, either in his
+brother's or in his own conscience, on account of his previous sin.
+
+Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 6]
+
+Whether One Ought to Forbear from Correcting Someone, Through Fear
+Lest He Become Worse?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to forbear from
+correcting someone through fear lest he become worse. For sin is
+weakness of the soul, according to Ps. 6:3: "Have mercy on me, O
+Lord, for I am weak." Now he that has charge of a sick person, must
+not cease to take care of him, even if he be fractious or
+contemptuous, because then the danger is greater, as in the case of
+madmen. Much more, therefore should one correct a sinner, no matter
+how badly he takes it.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Jerome vital truths are not to be
+foregone on account of scandal. Now God's commandments are vital
+truths. Since, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of
+precept, as stated above (A. 2), it seems that it should not be
+foregone for fear of scandalizing the person to be corrected.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. 3:8) we should not do
+evil that good may come of it. Therefore, in like manner, good should
+not be omitted lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction is a good
+thing. Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the person
+corrected become worse.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 9:8): "Rebuke not a scorner
+lest he hate thee," where a gloss remarks: "You must not fear lest
+the scorner insult you when you rebuke him: rather should you bear in
+mind that by making him hate you, you may make him worse." Therefore
+one ought to forego fraternal correction, when we fear lest we may
+make a man worse.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3) the correction of the
+wrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, and is directed
+to the common good, has coercive force. Such correction should not be
+omitted lest the person corrected be disturbed, both because if he is
+unwilling to amend his ways of his own accord, he should be made to
+cease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be incorrigible,
+the common good is safeguarded in this way, since the order of
+justice is observed, and others are deterred by one being made an
+example of. Hence a judge does not desist from pronouncing sentence
+of condemnation against a sinner, for fear of disturbing him or his
+friends.
+
+The other fraternal correction is directed to the amendment of the
+wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely admonishes.
+Consequently when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take
+the warning, and will become worse, such fraternal correction should
+be foregone, because the means should be regulated according to the
+requirements of the end.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The doctor uses force towards a madman, who is
+unwilling to submit to his treatment; and this may be compared with
+the correction administered by prelates, which has coercive power,
+but not with simple fraternal correction.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Fraternal correction is a matter of precept, in so far
+as it is an act of virtue, and it will be a virtuous act in so far as
+it is proportionate to the end. Consequently whenever it is a
+hindrance to the end, for instance when a man becomes worse through
+it, it is longer a vital truth, nor is it a matter of precept.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is directed to an end, becomes good through
+being directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal correction
+hinders the end, namely the amendment of our brother, it is no longer
+good, so that when such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted
+lest evil should befall.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Precept of Fraternal Correction Demands That a Private
+Admonition Should Precede Denunciation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of fraternal correction
+does not demand that a private admonition should precede
+denunciation. For, in works of charity, we should above all follow
+the example of God, according to Eph. 5:1, 2: "Be ye followers of
+God, as most dear children, and walk in love." Now God sometimes
+punishes a man for a sin, without previously warning him in secret.
+Therefore it seems that there is no need for a private admonition to
+precede denunciation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn
+from the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the
+commandments of Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find
+that a hidden sin is publicly denounced, without any previous
+admonition in private. Thus we read (Gen. 37:2) that "Joseph accused
+his brethren to his father of a most wicked crime": and (Acts 5:4, 9)
+that Peter publicly denounced Ananias and Saphira who had secretly
+"by fraud kept back the price of the land," without beforehand
+admonishing them in private: nor do we read that Our Lord admonished
+Judas in secret before denouncing him. Therefore the precept does not
+require that secret admonition should precede public denunciation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce.
+Now one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without
+previously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the
+Decretal (Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that "nothing else
+need precede accusation except inscription." [*The accuser was bound
+by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The
+effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound
+himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same
+punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.]
+Therefore it seems that the precept does not require that a secret
+admonition should precede public denunciation.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it does not seem probable that the customs observed
+by religious in general are contrary to the precepts of Christ. Now
+it is customary among religious orders to proclaim this or that one
+for a fault, without any previous secret admonition. Therefore it
+seems that this admonition is not required by the precept.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a
+prelate sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in
+particular, to tell him if they know of anything that requires
+correction. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to tell them
+this, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the precept does
+not require secret admonition before public denunciation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the
+words, "Rebuke him between thee and him alone" (Matt. 18:15): "Aiming
+at his amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from
+shame he might begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to
+make a better man, you make worse." Now we are bound by the precept
+of charity to beware lest our brother become worse. Therefore the
+order of fraternal correction comes under the precept.
+
+_I answer that,_ With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is
+necessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public or
+secret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only for
+the sinner, that he may become better, but also for others, who know
+of his sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should
+be denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apostle (1
+Tim. 5:20): "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may
+have fear," which is to be understood as referring to public sins, as
+Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).
+
+On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord
+seem to apply (Matt. 18:15): "If thy brother shall offend against
+thee," etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others,
+he no longer sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he
+disturbs. Since, however, a man's neighbor may take offense even at
+his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further
+distinction. For certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor
+either in his body or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots
+secretly to betray his country to its enemies, or when a heretic
+secretly turns other men away from the faith. And since he that sins
+thus in secret, sins not only against you in particular, but also
+against others, it is necessary to take steps to denounce him at
+once, in order to prevent him doing such harm, unless by chance you
+were firmly persuaded that this evil result would be prevented by
+admonishing him secretly. On the other hand there are other sins
+which injure none but the sinner, and the person sinned against,
+either because he alone is hurt by the sinner, or at least because he
+alone knows about his sin, and then our one purpose should be to
+succor our sinning brother: and just as the physician of the body
+restores the sick man to health, if possible, without cutting off a
+limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a limb which is least
+indispensable, in order to preserve the life of the whole body, so
+too he who desires his brother's amendment should, if possible, so
+amend him as regards his conscience, that he keep his good name.
+
+For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not
+only in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses, if he
+lose his good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are
+restrained from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man
+finds his honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome
+says on Matt. 18:15: "If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke
+him in private, lest he persist in his sin if he should once become
+shameless or unabashed." Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning
+brother's good name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the
+dishonor of others, according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad
+pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii): "When a few of those who bear a name for
+holiness are reported falsely or proved in truth to have done
+anything wrong, people will seek by busily repeating it to make it
+believed of all": and also because when one man's sin is made public
+others are incited to sin likewise.
+
+Since, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a good name,
+Our Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother and so
+deliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his
+good name. Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret
+admonition to precede public denunciation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore hidden
+sins are to the judgment of God, just what public sins are to the
+judgment of man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by
+secretly admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration,
+either while they wake or while they sleep, according to Job
+33:15-17: "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth
+upon men . . . then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching
+instructeth them in what they are to learn, that He may withdraw a
+man from the things he is doing."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though it were
+public, wherefore He could have made it known at once. Yet He did
+not, but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The sin
+of Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God's
+executor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to
+Joseph it is probable that he warned his brethren, though Scripture
+does not say so. Or we may say that the sin was public with regard to
+his brethren, wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused
+"his brethren."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When there is danger to a great number of people, those
+words of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not sin
+against thee alone.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Proclamations made in the chapter of religious are
+about little faults which do not affect a man's good name, wherefore
+they are reminders of forgotten faults rather than accusations or
+denunciations. If, however, they should be of such a nature as to
+injure our brother's good name, it would be contrary to Our Lord's
+precept, to denounce a brother's fault in this manner.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a Divine
+precept, according to Acts 5:29: "We ought to obey God rather then
+men." Therefore when a prelate commands anyone to tell him anything
+that he knows to need correction, the command rightly understood
+supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal correction,
+whether the command be addressed to all in general, or to some
+particular individual. If, on the other hand, a prelate were to issue
+a command in express opposition to this order instituted by Our Lord,
+both would sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as
+disobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he ought not to be
+obeyed, because a prelate is not the judge of secret things, but God
+alone is, wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of
+hidden matters, except in so far as they are made known through
+certain signs, as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a
+prelate can command just as a judge, whether secular or
+ecclesiastical, can bind a man under oath to tell the truth.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Before the Public Denunciation Witnesses Ought to Be Brought
+Forward?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that before the public denunciation
+witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not
+to be made known to others, because by so doing "a man would betray
+his brother's sins instead of correcting them," as Augustine says (De
+Verb. Dom. xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known
+a brother's sin to others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one
+ought not to bring witnesses forward before the public denunciation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no man
+brings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin. Neither therefore
+ought one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our
+brother.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove something.
+But witnesses afford no proof in secret matters. Therefore it is
+useless to bring witnesses forward in such cases.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says in his Rule that "before bringing it
+to the notice of witnesses . . . it should be put before the
+superior." Now to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is to
+tell the Church. Therefore witnesses should not be brought forward
+before the public denunciation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 18:16): "Take with thee one
+or two more, that in the mouth of two," etc.
+
+_I answer that,_ The right way to go from one extreme to another is
+to pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning
+of fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects
+another between this one and himself alone, while He wished the end
+to be public, when such a one would be denounced to the Church.
+Consequently it is befitting that a citation of witnesses should be
+placed between the two extremes, so that at first the brother's sin
+be indicated to a few, who will be of use without being a hindrance,
+and thus his sin be amended without dishonoring him before the public.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some have understood the order of fraternal correction
+to demand that we should first of all rebuke our brother secretly,
+and that if he listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and his sin
+be altogether hidden, they say that we should go no further in the
+matter, whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of several
+by various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter, according to Our
+Lord's command. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in his
+Rule that "we are bound to reveal" a brother's sin, if it "will cause
+a worse corruption in the heart." Wherefore we must say otherwise
+that when the secret admonition has been given once or several times,
+as long as there is probable hope of his amendment, we must continue
+to admonish him in private, but as soon as we are able to judge with
+any probability that the secret admonition is of no avail, we must
+take further steps, however secret the sin may be, and call
+witnesses, unless perhaps it were thought probable that this would
+not conduce to our brother's amendment, and that he would become
+worse: because on that account one ought to abstain altogether from
+correcting him, as stated above (A. 6).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his own sin:
+yet they may be necessary that we may amend a brother's sin. Hence
+the comparison fails.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There may be three reasons for citing witnesses. First,
+to show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says: secondly,
+to prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine says (loc.
+cit.): thirdly, "to prove that the man who rebuked his brother, has
+done what he could," as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth. lx).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Augustine means that the matter ought to be made known
+to the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as the
+prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than
+others, but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i.e. as
+holding the position of judge.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 34
+
+OF HATRED
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which
+is opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy
+of charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4)
+offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal
+correction.
+
+Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is possible to hate God?
+
+(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
+
+(3) Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?
+
+(4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor?
+
+(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
+
+(6) From what capital sin does it arise?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is Possible for Anyone to Hate God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius
+says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the first good and beautiful is an object
+of love and dilection to all." But God is goodness and beauty itself.
+Therefore He is hated by none.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36, 39 it is
+written that "all things call upon truth . . . and (all men) do well
+like of her works." Now God is the very truth according to John 14:6.
+Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to
+Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore
+none can hate Him.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that
+hate Thee ascendeth continually," and (John 15:24): "But now they
+have both seen and hated both Me and My Father."
+
+_I answer that,_ As shown above (I-II, Q. 29, A. 1), hatred is a
+movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion
+save by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in
+two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence;
+secondly, in His effects, when, to wit, "the invisible things" of God
+. . . "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
+made" (Rom. 1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which
+no man can hate--for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is
+impossible for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.
+
+Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be
+contrary to the human will, since _to be, to live, to understand,_
+which are effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore
+again God cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the
+Author of such like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are
+contrary to an inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment,
+and the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are
+repugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration
+of them, God may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they
+look upon Him as forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument is true of those who see God's Essence,
+which is the very essence of goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument is true in so far as God is apprehended
+as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of all, among
+which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the
+source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to be
+like God, Who is Being itself.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Hatred of God Is the Greatest of Sins?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of
+sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost,
+since it cannot be forgiven, according to Matt. 12:32. Now hatred of
+God is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy
+Ghost, as may be seen from what has been said above (Q. 14, A. 2).
+Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now an
+unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further away
+from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless knows
+Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than the
+sin of hatred against God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of those
+of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which is
+punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin.
+Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The best is opposite to the worst, according to
+the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to
+the love of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God
+is man's worst sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God,
+as stated above (Q. 10, A. 3): and this aversion would not have the
+character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt
+consists in a voluntary aversion from God.
+
+Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the
+hatred of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly.
+For just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it
+directly shun what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is
+directly averted from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for
+instance, a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in
+so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which
+aversion from God is connected. Now that which is so by itself,
+always takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore
+hatred of God is more grievous than other sins.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one thing
+not to do good things, and another to hate the giver of good things,
+even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin
+deliberately." This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good
+things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy
+Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin
+against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost
+denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the
+kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found
+in every kind of that sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary:
+wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it
+becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is
+proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its
+sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith;
+and hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of
+God is a greater sin than unbelief.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God the
+author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on
+them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the
+Divine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God
+commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other
+hand, to break out into hatred of God when He inflicts those
+punishments, is to hate God's very justice, and that is a most
+grievous sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes
+it is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked
+to hate justice than not to have done it."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 3]
+
+Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not
+always a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according
+to Prov. 8:8: "All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor
+perverse in them." Now, it is written (Luke 14:26): "If any man come
+to Me, and hate not his father and mother . . . he cannot be My
+disciple." Therefore hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But it
+is in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is written
+(Rom. 1:30): "Detractors, hateful to God." Therefore it is possible
+to hate certain people without committing a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a
+"wandering away from what is according to nature," according to
+Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a
+thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing.
+Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 2:9): "He that . . . hateth
+his brother, is in darkness." Now spiritual darkness is sin.
+Therefore there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above (I-II, Q.
+29, A. 2); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of
+that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of
+what he holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not
+in respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in
+respect of sin and lack of justice.
+
+Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and
+whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate
+our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our
+love for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in
+him, since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his
+evil. Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it
+simply, is always sinful.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must honor our
+parents--as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must hate them
+in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection
+of Divine justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his
+nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which
+they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we should
+love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show
+hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we
+should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are
+hostile to us.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Hatred of Our Neighbor Is the Most Grievous Sin Against Our
+Neighbor?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most
+grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 3:15):
+"Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." Now murder is the most
+grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we give
+our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to love.
+Therefore hatred is the worst.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as
+Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a
+man hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e.g. theft, murder and
+adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.
+
+Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
+ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Matt. 5:19, "He that
+shall break one of these least commandments," says: "The commandments
+of Moses, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count
+for little in their reward, but they count for much if they be
+disobeyed. On the other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou
+shalt not be angry, Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in
+their reward, but little in the transgression." Now hatred is an
+internal movement like anger and desire. Therefore hatred of one's
+brother is a less grievous sin than murder.
+
+_I answer that,_ Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two
+counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins,
+secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned
+against. On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than
+external actions that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder
+of man's will, which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the
+root of sin, so that if a man's outward actions were to be
+inordinate, without any disorder in his will, they would not be
+sinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through ignorance or
+out of zeal for justice: and if there be anything sinful in a man's
+outward sins against his neighbor, it is all to be traced to his
+inward hatred.
+
+On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a
+man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for
+the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Hatred Is a Capital Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred
+is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the
+virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief
+of the capital sins, and the origin of all others.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations of
+our passions, according to Rom. 7:5: "The passions of sins . . . did
+work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now all other
+passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown
+above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned
+one of the capital sins.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more
+than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should be
+reckoned a capital sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among
+the seven capital sins.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital
+vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is
+contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and
+when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it
+is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail
+in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all
+in that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is
+first in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first
+and foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good,
+and especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good.
+Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but
+the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and
+therefore it is not a capital vice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 18, "the virtue of
+a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its
+nature." Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first
+and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the
+foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be
+first among the vices, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's
+natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of
+one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be
+first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of
+an already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason
+that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred of
+such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is,
+however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which,
+namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on
+account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil
+must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Hatred Arises from Envy?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy
+is sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow,
+for, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate.
+Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor
+is referred to our love of God, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26,
+A. 2). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of
+God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy
+those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to
+be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred
+does not arise from envy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is
+caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows
+into hatred." Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy
+cometh hatred."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), hatred of his neighbor is a
+man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love
+which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from
+that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which
+is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally
+avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states
+(Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so
+does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love
+whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it
+assumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever
+displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it assumes the
+aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor's
+good, it follows that our neighbor's good becomes hateful to us, so
+that "out of envy cometh hatred."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive
+power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of
+circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so
+according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement,
+love gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has
+obtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure
+in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure
+causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for the
+object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures, wherefore
+love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor
+afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place
+in God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been
+stated above (A. 1), that God is not an object of hatred, except in
+so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and
+consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed
+to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred
+of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred
+towards God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in
+various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger
+and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks
+upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore
+hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at
+first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a
+certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of
+vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes
+so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is
+part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy
+formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by
+anger.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 35
+
+OF SLOTH
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy
+is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or
+about our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we
+must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether sloth is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special vice?
+
+(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(4) Whether it is a capital sin?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Sloth Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are
+neither praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a
+kind of sorrow, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as
+we stated above (I-II, Q. 35, A. 8). Therefore sloth is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a
+sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x,
+[*De Institutione Caenobiorum]): "The monk is troubled with sloth
+chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and
+inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at
+regular and fixed intervals." Therefore sloth is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is, seemingly,
+no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian says (De
+Instit. Monast. x) that "sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at
+being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other monasteries
+and those which are a long way off are much better than the one we
+dwell in": all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore sloth
+is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus. 21:2:
+"Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent." Now Cassian says (De
+Instit. Monast. x): "Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth is
+not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance."
+Therefore sloth is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now
+such is sloth (_acedia_): for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): "Bow down
+thy shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not
+grieved (_acedieris_) with her bands." Therefore sloth is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14)
+is an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind,
+that he wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence
+sloth implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on
+Ps. 106:18, "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the
+definition of some who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind
+which neglects to begin good."
+
+Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its
+effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is
+apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand,
+pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is,
+in truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth,
+sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow
+also which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so
+oppresses man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the
+Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be "swallowed
+up with overmuch sorrow."
+
+Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow
+for spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in
+point of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an
+evil movement of the appetite, as appears from what has been said
+above (Q. 10, A. 2; I-II, Q. 74, A. 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they are
+blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just as
+they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good.
+Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame:
+whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for
+good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in
+this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The passions of the sensitive appetite may
+either be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal
+sin. And since the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows
+that on account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to
+commit some particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may
+become more insistent, through certain bodily transmutations occurring
+at certain fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose
+one to sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by
+sloth towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and
+to be parched by the sun's heat.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think
+too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man
+contemns the good things he has received from God, this, far from
+being a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such
+like contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we
+reckon evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the
+goods of others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have
+received ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of sin
+should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance;
+by flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin,
+as in lust; for which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): "Fly
+fornication"; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought
+diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some
+trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more
+we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us,
+and forthwith sloth dies away.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Sloth Is a Special Vice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that
+which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of
+vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite
+spiritual good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of
+continence, and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then
+sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above (A. 1), it seems
+that sloth is not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed to
+joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth
+should not be reckoned a special vice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object,
+which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special
+virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now
+nothing, seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this
+be a special vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual
+goods, is that they are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of
+weariness: while dislike of toil, and love of bodily repose seem to
+be due to the same cause, viz. idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing
+but laziness, which seems untrue, for idleness is opposed to
+carefulness, whereas sloth is opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not
+a special vice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from
+the other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take
+spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice,
+because, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 1), every vice shuns the
+spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that
+sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as
+toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's
+pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices,
+whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.
+
+Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual
+goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each
+virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good,
+about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is
+proper to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which
+consists in its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to
+have that spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In
+like manner the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual
+good which is in each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special
+vice, but to every vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which
+charity rejoices, belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth.
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Sloth Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every
+mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth
+seems contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the
+precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less grievous
+than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain in deed
+from some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a
+mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal
+sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore
+sloth is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man. But
+sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit.
+Caenob. x, l) that "sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a
+most vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit." Therefore sloth is
+not always a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): "The sorrow of the
+world worketh death." But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow
+"according to God," which is contrasted with sorrow of the world.
+Therefore it is a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 88, AA. 1, 2), mortal sin
+is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the
+effect of charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which
+by its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason
+of its genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity
+is joy in God, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 1), while sloth is sorrow
+about spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore
+sloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be
+observed with regard to all sins that are mortal in respect of their
+genus, that they are not mortal, save when they attain to their
+perfection. Because the consummation of sin is in the consent of
+reason: for we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human
+acts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a
+mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, without attaining to
+the consent of reason, it is a venial sin on account of the
+imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus of adultery, the
+concupiscence that goes no further than the sensuality is a venial
+sin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a mortal
+sin. So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality
+alone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and
+then it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason,
+which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of the Divine
+good, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the spirit. In
+this case it is evident that sloth is a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing the
+Sabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept,
+implicitly commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind
+about the Divine good is contrary thereto.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any spiritual
+good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged to
+adhere. Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do
+acts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of
+sloth; but when he is sorry to have to do something for God's sake.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in holy
+men, but they do not reach to the consent of reason.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Sloth Should Be Accounted a Capital Vice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a
+capital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful
+acts, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 5). Now sloth does not move one to
+action, but on the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it
+should not be accounted a capital sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are
+assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to
+sloth, viz. "malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness
+in regard to the commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful
+things." Now these do not seem in reality to arise from sloth. For
+"spite" is, seemingly the same as hatred, which arises from envy, as
+stated above (Q. 34, A. 6); "malice" is a genus which contains all
+vices, and, in like manner, a "wandering" of the mind after unlawful
+things is to be found in every vice; "sluggishness" about the
+commandments seems to be the same as sloth, while "faint-heartedness"
+and "despair" may arise from any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly
+accounted a capital sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the
+vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as a man
+shirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is
+sorrow, and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth:
+and of sorrow he says that it gives rise to "spite,
+faint-heartedness, bitterness, despair," whereas he states that from
+sloth seven things arise, viz. "idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of
+the mind, restlessness of the body, instability, loquacity,
+curiosity." Therefore it seems that either Gregory or Isidore has
+wrongly assigned sloth as a capital sin together with its daughters.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that
+sloth is a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital
+vice is one which easily gives rise to others as being their final
+cause. Now just as we do many things on account of pleasure, both in
+order to obtain it, and through being moved to do something under the
+impulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account of sorrow,
+either that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing
+something under pressure thereof. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of
+sorrow, as stated above (A. 2; I-II, Q. 85, A. 8), it is fittingly
+reckoned a capital sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from doing
+things that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do
+certain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such
+as weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth. For
+since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5, 6) "no man can
+be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant," it
+follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that
+man shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other
+things that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in
+spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body,
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of
+sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant
+objects, and secondly he even struggles against such things as cause
+sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of
+sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of
+"despair," while avoidance of those goods which are the means to the
+end, in matters of difficulty which come under the counsels, is the
+effect of "faint-heartedness," and in matters of common
+righteousness, is the effect of "sluggishness about the
+commandments." The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow
+is sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is
+called "spite"; and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods
+themselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is
+properly called "malice." In so far as a man has recourse to eternal
+objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called "wandering after
+unlawful things." From this it is clear how to reply to the
+objections against each of the daughters: for "malice" does not
+denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be
+understood as explained. Nor is "spite" taken as synonymous with
+hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same
+applies to the others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also given
+by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly
+(Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated
+above (A. 2), sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man
+shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of
+any other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is sorry on
+account of the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to
+sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in so far as it spurns the Divine
+good. Moreover the things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth
+and sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for
+"bitterness" which Isidore states to be the result of sorrow, is an
+effect of "spite." "Idleness" and "drowsiness" are reduced to
+"sluggishness about the precepts": for some are idle and omit them
+altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil them with negligence.
+All the other five which he reckons as effects of sloth, belong to
+the "wandering of the mind after unlawful things." This tendency to
+wander, if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing
+after various things without rhyme or reason, is called "uneasiness
+of the mind," but if it pertains to the imaginative power, it is
+called "curiosity"; if it affect the speech it is called "loquacity";
+and in so far as it affects a body that changes place, it is called
+"restlessness of the body," when, to wit, a man shows the
+unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of
+his body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to
+another, it is called "instability"; or "instability" may denote
+changeableness of purpose.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 36
+
+OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)
+
+We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is envy?
+
+(2) Whether it is a sin?
+
+(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Envy Is a Kind of Sorrow?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the
+object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the
+envious man that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which
+is racked by the prosperity of another." Therefore envy is not a kind
+of sorrow.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of
+pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says
+(Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as are like them in genus,
+in knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation." Therefore envy
+is not a kind of sorrow.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who
+are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above (I-II, Q.
+47, A. 3) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack
+little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are
+envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy
+is not a kind of sorrow.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects
+have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection of
+goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above (I-II,
+Q. 32, A. 3) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of
+envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "we envy those who
+have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or which we
+possessed at some time." Therefore sloth is not a kind of sorrow.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a
+species of sorrow, and says that "envy is sorrow for another's good."
+
+_I answer that,_ The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it
+may happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and
+in this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in
+two ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's good, in so far
+as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man
+grieves for his enemy's prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some
+harm: such like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as
+the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9).
+
+Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in
+so far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or
+excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good:
+and consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name
+consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the
+Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from being
+reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for
+sorrow to be about good, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since envy is about another's good name in so far as it
+diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a man
+is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in
+reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed
+from one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors
+to rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a
+commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner
+whom he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far
+removed from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who
+are near him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is
+against our will that these should be in better repute than we are,
+and that gives rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes
+pleasure in so far as it is in agreement with the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters where he
+is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses him in
+such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to
+him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort;
+wherefore, if his effort fails through the other's reputation
+surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love to be
+honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are
+envious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may
+befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in
+something great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the
+little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that "we can envy those
+only whom we think better in some respect than ourselves."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Recollection of past goods in so far as we have had
+them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes sorrow;
+and in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that, above
+all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says
+(Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much
+in order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending
+little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that
+others have acquired goods.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Envy Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to
+Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): "Let her have
+companions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and
+be nettled when they are praised." But no one should be advised to
+commit a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin.
+
+Objection 2: Further, "Envy is sorrow for another's good," as
+Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes
+praiseworthy: for it is written (Prov. 29:2): "When the wicked shall
+bear rule, the people shall mourn." Therefore envy is not always a
+sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good
+zeal, according to Ps. 68:10: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me
+up." Therefore envy is not always a sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is a
+kind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "When the foul
+sore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself
+shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes
+the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed,
+while the limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is
+gnashing with the teeth." Therefore envy is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made
+desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), envy is sorrow for another's
+good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First, when a man
+grieves for another's good, through fear that it may cause harm
+either to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy,
+as stated above (A. 1), and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory says
+(Moral. xxii, 11): "It very often happens that without charity being
+lost, both the destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and again his
+glory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he falls, we
+believe that some are deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we
+dread lest many suffer unjustly."
+
+Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it,
+but because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly
+speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this
+zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor.
+14:1: "Be zealous for spiritual gifts": while, if it be about
+temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may
+grieve over another's good, because he who happens to have that good
+is unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by
+virtuous goods, which make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher
+states, is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the
+worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow _nemesis_ [*The
+nearest equivalent is "indignation." The use of the word "nemesis" to
+signify "revenge" does not represent the original Greek.], saying
+that it belongs to good morals. But he says this because he
+considered temporal goods in themselves, in so far as they may seem
+great to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to
+the teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are
+unworthy, are so disposed according to God's just ordinance, either
+for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such
+goods are as nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are
+prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in
+Holy Writ, according to Ps. 36:1: "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor
+envy them that work iniquity," and elsewhere (Ps. 72:2, 3): "My steps
+had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw
+the prosperity of sinners [*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion
+of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners']." Fourthly, we
+grieve over a man's good, in so far as his good surpasses ours; this
+is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the
+Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over
+what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor's good.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought to
+strive to progress with those who are better than we are.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers sorrow for another's good in
+the first sense given above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a
+certain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Nothing hinders a sin from being penal accidentally, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 87, A. 2) when we were treating of sins.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Envy Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since
+envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
+Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason,
+as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. I-II, Q. 74, A. 4].
+Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy can
+be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I myself have seen and
+known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and
+looked bitterly on its foster-brother." Therefore envy is not a
+mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But
+envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to _nemesis_, which is a
+passion, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy
+is not a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the little
+one." Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore
+envy is a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For
+the genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to
+the aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul
+derives its spiritual life, according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that
+we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Now
+the object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by
+contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good,
+while envy grieves over it, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is
+evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.
+
+Nevertheless, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5, ad 1),
+in every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in
+the sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of
+concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of
+anger, in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find
+sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are
+venial sins.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion of
+the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts, the
+principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not a
+mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have
+not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is
+manifest.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is
+contrary both to _nemesis_ and to pity, but for different reasons.
+For it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being
+contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his
+neighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's
+evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same
+passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is
+contrary to _nemesis_ on the part of the man whose good grieves the
+envious man, for _nemesis_ is sorrow for the good of the undeserving
+according to Ps. 72:3: "I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the
+prosperity of sinners" [*Douay: "because I had a zeal on occasion of
+the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners"], whereas the envious
+grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is
+clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now
+pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is
+contrary to pity and charity.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Envy Is a Capital Vice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the
+capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the
+daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that
+"those who love honor and glory are more envious." Therefore envy is
+not a capital vice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than the
+other vices which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
+45): "The leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived mind
+under some kind of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the
+soul to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their wild
+outcry." Now envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for Gregory says
+(Moral. v, 46): "Though in every evil thing that is done, the venom
+of our old enemy is infused into the heart of man, yet in this
+wickedness the serpent stirs his whole bowels and discharges the bane
+of spite fitted to enter deep into the mind." Therefore envy is not a
+capital sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly assigned
+by Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who says that from envy arise "hatred,
+tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor's misfortunes, and
+grief for his prosperity." For joy at our neighbor's misfortunes and
+grief for his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears from
+what has been said above (A. 3). Therefore these should not be
+assigned as daughters of envy.
+
+On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) who
+states that envy is a capital sin and assigns the aforesaid daughters
+thereto.
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual good,
+so envy is grief for our neighbor's good. Now it has been stated
+above (Q. 35, A. 4) that sloth is a capital vice for the reason that
+it incites man to do certain things, with the purpose either of
+avoiding sorrow or of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy is
+accounted a capital vice for the same reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), "the capital vices
+are so closely akin to one another that one springs from the other.
+For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by corrupting
+the mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves for the power
+of an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should acquire
+that power." Consequently the notion of a capital vice does not
+exclude its originating from another vice, but it demands that it
+should have some principal reason for being itself the origin of
+several kinds of sin. However it is perhaps because envy manifestly
+arises from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either
+by Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. v, 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It does not follow from the passage quoted that envy is
+the greatest of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to envy, he
+is enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart, for as
+quoted further on in the same passage, "by the envy of the devil,
+death came into the world" (Wis. 2:24).
+
+There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most
+grievous sins, viz. envy of another's spiritual good, which envy is a
+sorrow for the increase of God's grace, and not merely for our
+neighbor's good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost,
+because thereby a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who
+is glorified in His works.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The number of envy's daughters may be understood for
+the reason that in the struggle aroused by envy there is something by
+way of beginning, something by way of middle, and something by way of
+term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower another's
+reputation, and this either secretly, and then we have
+_tale-bearing,_ or openly, and then we have _detraction._ The middle
+consists in the fact that when a man aims at defaming another, he is
+either able to do so, and then we have _joy at another's misfortune,_
+or he is unable, and then we have _grief at another's prosperity._
+The term is hatred itself, because just as good which delights causes
+love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 6).
+Grief at another's prosperity is in one way the very same as envy,
+when, to Wit, a man grieves over another's prosperity, in so far as
+it gives the latter a good name, but in another way it is a daughter
+of envy, in so far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper
+notwithstanding his efforts to prevent it. On the other hand, _joy at
+another's misfortune_ is not directly the same as envy, but is a
+result thereof, because grief over our neighbor's good which is envy,
+gives rise to joy in his evil.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 37
+
+OF DISCORD, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO PEACE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall
+consider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention, which is
+on the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz.
+schism, quarrelling, war, and sedition. Under the first head there
+are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether discord is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 37, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Discord Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a sin. For to
+disaccord with man is to sever oneself from another's will. But this
+does not seem to be a sin, because God's will alone, and not our
+neighbor's, is the rule of our own will. Therefore discord is not a
+sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever induces another to sin, sins also himself.
+But it appears not to be a sin to incite others to discord, for it is
+written (Acts 23:6) that Paul, knowing that the one part were
+Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, cried out in the council: "Men
+brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope
+and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when he had
+so said, there arose a dissension between the Pharisees and the
+Sadducees." Therefore discord is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not to be found in a
+holy man. But discord is to be found even among holy men, for it is
+written (Acts 15:39): "There arose a dissension" between Paul and
+Barnabas, "so that they departed one from another." Therefore discord
+is not a sin, and least of all a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ "Dissensions," that is, discords, are reckoned
+among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), of which it is said
+afterwards (Gal. 5:21) that "they who do such things shall not obtain
+the kingdom of God." Now nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from
+the kingdom of God. Therefore discord is a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Discord is opposed to concord. Now, as stated above
+(Q. 29, AA. 1, 3) concord results from charity, in as much as charity
+directs many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the
+Divine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord
+is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord.
+
+But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in
+two ways: first, directly; secondly, accidentally. Now, human acts
+and movements are said to be direct when they are according to one's
+intention. Wherefore a man directly disaccords with his neighbor,
+when he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and
+his neighbor's good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal
+sin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity,
+although the first movements of such discord are venial sins by
+reason of their being imperfect acts.
+
+The accidental in human acts is that which occurs beside the
+intention. Hence when several intend a good pertaining to God's
+honor, or our neighbor's profit, while one deems a certain thing
+good, and another thinks contrariwise, the discord is in this case
+accidentally contrary to the Divine good or that of our neighbor.
+Such like discord is neither sinful nor against charity, unless it be
+accompanied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by
+undue obstinacy, since it has also been stated above (Q. 29, AA. 1,
+3, ad 2) that the concord which is an effect of charity, is union of
+wills not of opinions. It follows from this that discord is sometimes
+the sin of one party only, for instance, when one wills a good which
+the other knowingly resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both
+parties, as when each dissents from the other's good, and loves his
+own.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: One man's will considered in itself is not the rule of
+another man's will; but in so far as our neighbor's will adheres to
+God's will, it becomes in consequence, a rule regulated according to
+its proper measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord with such a
+will, because by that very fact one disaccords with the Divine rule.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as a man's will that adheres to God is a right
+rule, to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man's will that is
+opposed to God is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good.
+Hence to cause a discord, whereby a good concord resulting from
+charity is destroyed, is a grave sin: wherefore it is written (Prov.
+6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh
+His soul detesteth," which seventh is stated (Prov. 6:19) to be "him
+that soweth discord among brethren." On the other hand, to arouse a
+discord whereby an evil concord (i.e. concord in an evil will) is
+destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to be commended for
+sowing discord among those who concorded together in evil, because
+Our Lord also said of Himself (Matt. 10:34): "I came not to send
+peace, but the sword."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental
+and not direct: because each intended some good, yet the one thought
+one thing good, while the other thought something else, which was
+owing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not about things
+necessary to salvation. Moreover all this was ordained by Divine
+providence, on account of the good which would ensue.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 37, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Discord Is a Daughter of Vainglory?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a daughter of
+vainglory. For anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. Now discord
+is apparently the daughter of anger, according to Prov. 15:18: "A
+passionate man stirreth up strifes." Therefore it is not a daughter
+of vainglory.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine expounding the words of John 7:39, "As yet
+the Spirit was not given," says (Tract. xxxii) "Malice severs,
+charity unites." Now discord is merely a separation of wills.
+Therefore discord arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from
+vainglory.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever gives rise to many evils, would seem to be
+a capital vice. Now such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on
+Matt. 12:25, "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made
+desolate," says: "Just as concord makes small things thrive, so
+discord brings the greatest things to ruin." Therefore discord should
+itself be reckoned a capital vice, rather than a daughter of
+vainglory.
+
+On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
+
+_I answer that,_ Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so
+far, to wit, as one man's will holds fast to one thing, while the
+other man's will holds fast to something else. Now if a man's will
+holds fast to its own ground, this is due to the act that he prefers
+what is his own to that which belongs to others, and if he do this
+inordinately, it is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord,
+whereby a man holds to his own way of thinking, and departs from that
+of others, is reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Strife is not the same as discord, for strife consists
+in external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should arise from
+anger, which incites the mind to hurt one's neighbor; whereas discord
+consists in a divergence in the movements of wills, which arises from
+pride or vainglory, for the reason given above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In discord we may consider that which is the term
+_wherefrom,_ i.e. another's will from which we recede, and in this
+respect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is
+the term _whither,_ i.e. something of our own to which we cling, and
+in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment
+the term _whither_ is more important than the term _wherefrom_
+(because the end is of more account than the beginning), discord is
+accounted a daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may
+arise from both for different reasons, as stated.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The reason why concord makes small things thrive, while
+discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because "the more united a
+force is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the
+weaker it becomes" (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is
+part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills,
+and in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as
+though it were a capital vice.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 38
+
+OF CONTENTION
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether contention is a mortal sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 38, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Contention Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For
+there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be
+found in them, according to Luke 22:24: "And there was also a strife
+amongst" the disciples of Jesus, "which of them should . . . be the
+greatest." Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his
+neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Phil. 1:17):
+"Some out of contention preach Christ," and afterwards he says (Phil.
+1:18): "In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice." Therefore
+contention is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it happens that people contend either in the courts
+or in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a good
+intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with
+heretics. Hence a gloss on 1 Kings 14:1, "It came to pass one day,"
+etc. says: "Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless
+they are first challenged to dispute." Therefore contention is not a
+mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to
+Job 39:32: "Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily silenced?"
+And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said of him
+(Job 42:7): "You have not spoken the thing that is right before me,
+as my servant Job hath." Therefore contention is not always a mortal
+sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is against the precept of the Apostle who says
+(2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words." Moreover (Gal. 5:20)
+contention is included among the works of the flesh, and as stated
+there (Gal. 5:21) "they who do such things shall not obtain the
+kingdom of God." Now whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God
+and is against a precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a
+mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore
+just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention
+signifies contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts
+various contrary things in a speech, this is called _contentio,_
+which Tully calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren.
+iv), where he says that "it consists in developing a speech from
+contrary things," for instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning,
+and a most bitter end."
+
+Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with
+regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with
+regard to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must
+consider whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be
+blamed, or against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to
+the manner, we must consider whether his manner of contending is in
+keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would
+be praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that
+"contention is a sharp speech suitable for proof and refutation"--or
+whether it exceeds the demands of the persons and matter in dispute,
+in which case it is blameworthy.
+
+Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the
+truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose
+[*Cf. Gloss. Ord. in Rom. i, 29] defines contention: "Contention is a
+disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence." If, however,
+contention denote a disavowal of what is false, with the proper
+measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a
+disavowal of falsehood, together with an inordinate manner, it can be
+a venial sin, unless the contention be conducted so inordinately, as
+to give scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Tim.
+2:14): "Contend not in words," adds, "for it is to no profit, but to
+the subverting of the hearers."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The disciples of Christ contended together, not with
+the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for
+what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their
+contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought
+not to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were
+not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and
+for this reason Our Lord checked them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those who preached Christ "out of contention," were to
+be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith,
+but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that
+they thought they would "raise affliction" to the Apostle who was
+preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their
+contention, but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that
+Christ would be made known--since evil is sometimes the occasion of
+good results.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in
+contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or in
+a disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense
+Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when,
+whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e. in
+respect of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For Job
+had said (13:3): "I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to
+reason with God": yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to
+defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be
+inordinate in mind or in speech.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 38, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Contention Is a Daughter of Vainglory?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a daughter of
+vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (1
+Cor. 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and
+contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men?" Now zeal
+pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the voice.
+But the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares
+(Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the matter
+of pride and vainglory, according to 1 Cor. 8:1: "Knowledge puffeth
+up." Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by
+knowledge we do not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore
+contention is not a daughter of vainglory.
+
+On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 37, A. 2), discord is a daughter
+of vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings to his
+own opinion, rather than acquiesce with the other. Now it is proper
+to pride and vainglory to seek one's own glory. And just as people
+are discordant when they hold to their own opinion in their hearts,
+so are they contentious when each defends his own opinion by words.
+Consequently contention is reckoned a daughter of vainglory for the
+same reason as discord.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so far as
+a man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or with
+whom he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to
+something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he
+clings to his own opinion, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2, ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The contention of which we are speaking puts on a loud
+voice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not the
+chief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention
+arises from the same source as the raising of the voice.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by goods
+even those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is
+proud of his humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does
+so not directly but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one
+contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why
+the _per se_ and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not
+result from the contraries of those things which are the occasion of
+pride.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 39
+
+OF SCHISM
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to
+deeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first
+place, then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether schism is a special sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is graver than unbelief?
+
+(3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;
+
+(4) Of the punishment inflicted on them.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Schism Is a Special Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that schism is not a special sin. For
+"schism," as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad Victor. et Pancrat.),
+"denotes a division." But every sin causes a division, according to
+Isa. 59: "Your sins have divided between you and your God." Therefore
+schism is not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys the
+Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the
+Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) "is
+disobedience against the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin
+is a schism.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, heresy also divides a man from the unity of faith.
+If, therefore, the word schism denotes a division, it would seem not
+to differ, as a special sin, from the sin of unbelief.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; Contra Crescon.
+ii, 4) distinguishes between schism and heresy, for he says that a
+"schismatic is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same
+worship, as others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the
+community, whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that
+of the Catholic Church." Therefore schism is not a generic sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its
+name "from being a scission of minds," and scission is opposed to
+unity. Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and
+essentially opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical
+order, the species is not constituted by that which is accidental.
+Now, in the moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and
+that which results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental.
+Hence the sin of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the
+reason that the schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity
+which is the effect of charity: because charity unites not only one
+person to another with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole
+Church in unity of spirit.
+
+Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully
+and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church;
+for this is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several
+individuals among themselves is subordinate to the unity of the
+Church, even as the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural
+body is subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the unity of
+the Church consists in two things; namely, in the mutual connection
+or communion of the members of the Church, and again in the
+subordination of all the members of the Church to the one head,
+according to Col. 2:18, 19: "Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and
+not holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands,
+being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the
+increase of God." Now this Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent
+in the Church is the Sovereign Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are
+those who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold
+communion with those members of the Church who acknowledge his
+supremacy.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The division between man and God that results from sin
+is not intended by the sinner: it happens beside his intention as a
+result of his turning inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is
+not schism properly so called.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The essence of schism consists in rebelliously
+disobeying the commandments: and I say "rebelliously," since a
+schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church,
+and refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do
+this, wherefore not every sin is a schism.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those
+things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For heresy
+is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed
+to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith and
+charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks
+charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although
+whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This
+is what Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians
+[*In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10]: "I consider the difference between schism
+and heresy to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs
+a man from the Church." Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is
+the road to the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6: "From which
+things," i.e. charity and the like, "some going astray, are turned
+aside into vain babbling," so too, schism is the road to heresy.
+Wherefore Jerome adds (In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that "at the outset it
+is possible, in a certain respect, to find a difference between
+schism and heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some
+heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for
+separating from the Church."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Schism Is a Graver Sin Than Unbelief?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
+For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Deut.
+25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of
+the stripes be." Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely
+than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Ex. 32:28)
+that some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of
+idolatry: whereas of the sin of schism we read (Num. 16:30): "If the
+Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them
+down, and all things that belong to them, and they go down alive into
+hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God."
+Moreover the ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from
+the rule of David were most severely punished (4 Kings 17). Therefore
+the sin of schism is graver than the sin of unbelief.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "The good of the multitude is greater and more
+godlike than the good of the individual," as the Philosopher states
+(Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude,
+namely, ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the
+particular good of one man, namely the faith of an individual.
+Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil,
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed
+to charity, which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is
+opposed, as shown above (Q. 10, A. 2; Q. 23, A. 6). Therefore schism
+is a graver sin than unbelief.
+
+_On the contrary,_ That which results from an addition to something
+else surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy
+results from something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt
+doctrine, as Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (A. 1, ad
+3). Therefore schism is a less grievous sin than unbelief.
+
+_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways:
+first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to
+its circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in
+number, so too they can be varied in an infinite number of ways:
+wherefore if one were to ask in general which of two sins is the
+graver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity
+derived from the sin's genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is
+taken from its object, as shown above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1; I-II, Q.
+73, A. 3). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to the greater good is,
+in respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance a sin committed
+against God is graver than a sin committed against one's neighbor.
+
+Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God
+Himself, according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith
+is founded; whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which
+is a participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore
+it is manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous
+than the sin of schism, although it may happen that a particular
+schismatic sins more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either
+because his contempt is greater, or because his sin is a source of
+greater danger, or for some similar reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It had already been declared to that people by the law
+which they had received that there was one God, and that no other God
+was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among
+them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for those
+who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be
+punished in an unwonted manner: it was enough that they should be
+punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well
+known among them that Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it
+behooved those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in a
+miraculous and unwonted manner.
+
+We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more
+severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to
+seditions and schisms. For it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): "This city
+since days gone by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and
+wars were raised therein [*Vulg.: 'This city is a rebellious city,
+and hurtful to the kings and provinces, and . . . wars were raised
+therein of old']." Now sometimes a more severe punishment is
+inflicted for an habitual sin (as stated above, I-II, Q. 105, A. 2,
+ad 9), because punishments are medicines intended to keep man away
+from sin: so that where there is greater proneness to sin, a more
+severe punishment ought to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes,
+they were punished not only for the sin of schism, but also for that
+of idolatry as stated in the passage quoted.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the
+good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic
+good to which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank
+in the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like
+manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed,
+is less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Charity has two objects; one is its principal object
+and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object and is
+our neighbor's good. Now schism and other sins against our neighbor,
+are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good, which is
+less than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these
+sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred of
+God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object,
+is not less grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins
+committed by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem
+to be the greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of
+the multitude.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Schismatics Have Any Power?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics have some power. For
+Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): "Just as those who come back to
+the Church after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who
+return after being ordained, are not ordained again." Now Order is a
+kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power since they
+retain their Orders.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt. [*De Bap. contra
+Donat. vi, 5]): "One who is separated can confer a sacrament even as
+he can have it." But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very
+great power. Therefore schismatics who are separated from the Church,
+have a spiritual power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Pope Urban II [*Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf.
+Can. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1] says: "We command that persons
+consecrated by bishops who were themselves consecrated according to
+the Catholic rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the
+Roman Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders
+should be acknowledged, when they return to the unity of the Church,
+provided they be of commendable life and knowledge." But this would
+not be so, unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics.
+Therefore schismatics have spiritual power.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu.
+1, can. Novatianus): "He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the
+concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church,
+and from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power
+or honor."
+
+_I answer that,_ Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the
+other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is
+conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of
+the Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: as
+appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated,
+is not consecrated again unless it has been broken up. Consequently
+such a power as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who has
+received it by consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall
+into schism or heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he
+come back to the Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, however,
+the lower power ought not to exercise its act, except in so far as it
+is moved by the higher power, as may be seen also in the physical
+order, it follows that such persons lose the use of their power, so
+that it is not lawful for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this
+power has its effect in sacramental acts, because therein man acts
+only as God's instrument, so that sacramental effects are not
+precluded on account of any fault whatever in the person who confers
+the sacrament.
+
+On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is
+conferred by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not
+adhere to the recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in
+heretics and schismatics; and consequently they neither absolve nor
+excommunicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and
+if they do, it is invalid.
+
+Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual
+power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second
+power, or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to
+the essence of the power, but to its lawful use.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Right That Schismatics Should Be Punished with
+Excommunication?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished
+with excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a
+share in the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5)
+that "Baptism can be received from a schismatic." Therefore it seems
+that excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is the duty of Christ's faithful to lead back
+those who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain
+persons (Ezech. 34:4): "That which was driven away you have not
+brought again, neither have you sought that which was lost." Now
+schismatics are more easily brought back by such as may hold
+communion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be
+excommunicated.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and the
+same sin, according to Nahum 1:9: "God will not judge the same twice"
+[*Septuagint version]. Now some receive a temporal punishment for the
+sin of schism, according to 23, qu. 5 [*Gratianus, Decretum, P. II,
+causa XXIII, qu. 5, can. 44, Quali nos (RP I, 943)], where it is
+stated: "Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who
+are severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must
+be punished by the secular power." Therefore they ought not to be
+punished with excommunication.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Num. 16:26): "Depart from the tents
+of these wicked men," those, to wit, who had caused the schism, "and
+touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins."
+
+_I answer that,_ According to Wis. 11:11, "By what things a man
+sinneth, by the same also he should be punished" [Vulg.: 'he is
+tormented']. Now a schismatic, as shown above (A. 1), commits a
+twofold sin: first by separating himself from communion with the
+members of the Church, and in this respect the fitting punishment for
+schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse
+submission to the head of the Church, wherefore, since they are
+unwilling to be controlled by the Church's spiritual power, it is
+just that they should be compelled by the secular power.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a schismatic,
+save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man to quit
+this life, marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom he may
+receive it, whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that
+mark, which is bestowed in Baptism.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse whereby
+a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the
+Church those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation
+brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their
+separation, they are sometimes led to do penance.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The punishments of the present life are medicinal, and
+therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel a man,
+another is added: just as physicians employ several bod[il]y
+medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when
+excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs
+the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment
+suffices, another should not be employed.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 40
+
+OF WAR
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?
+
+(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?
+
+(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is Always Sinful to Wage War?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war.
+Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who
+wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to
+Matt. 26:52: "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword."
+Therefore all wars are unlawful.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin.
+But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Matt.
+5:39): "But I say to you not to resist evil"; and (Rom. 12:19): "Not
+revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath."
+Therefore war is always sinful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of
+virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as
+is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take
+place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are
+slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial.
+Therefore it seems that war is a sin in itself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the
+centurion [*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: "If the Christian Religion
+forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the
+Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their arms,
+and to give up soldiering altogether. _On the contrary,_ they were
+told: 'Do violence to no man . . . and be content with your pay'
+[*Luke 3:14]. If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he
+did not forbid soldiering."
+
+_I answer that,_ In order for a war to be just, three things are
+necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the
+war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private
+individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his
+rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the
+business of a private individual to summon together the people, which
+has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is
+committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to
+watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject
+to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the
+sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances,
+when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle
+(Rom. 13:4): "He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's
+minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil"; so
+too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in
+defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said
+to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor: and
+deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner"; and for this reason
+Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): "The natural order conducive
+to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel
+war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority."
+
+Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are
+attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of
+some fault. Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super
+Jos.): "A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges
+wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to
+make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore
+what it has seized unjustly."
+
+Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful
+intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the
+avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words
+quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud.
+Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]): "True religion looks upon as peaceful those
+wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty,
+but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and
+of uplifting the good." For it may happen that the war is declared by
+the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered
+unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra
+Faust. xxii, 74): "The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst
+for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of
+revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are
+rightly condemned in war."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To take
+the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone,
+without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority."
+On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private
+person) by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public
+person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak,
+of God, is not to "take the sword," but to use it as commissioned by
+another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those
+who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword,
+yet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they
+repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De Serm.
+Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so
+that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from
+resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes
+for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of
+those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
+Marcellin. cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish with a kindly
+severity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will.
+For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good
+for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the
+happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil
+will, like an internal enemy."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are
+not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord "came
+not to send upon earth" (Matt. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
+Bonif. clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we
+go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring,
+so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them
+to the prosperity of peace."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all
+forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in
+slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no
+such danger, and hence they were called "exercises of arms" or
+"bloodless wars," as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference
+incorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i].
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for Clerics and Bishops to Fight?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight.
+For, as stated above (A. 1), wars are lawful and just in so far as
+they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at
+the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of
+prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): "The wolf comes upon
+the sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are
+faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and
+was not, leaveth the sheep, and flieth, for he fears lest the wolf
+hurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice." Therefore it
+is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur): "As
+untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said
+that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and
+covertly; for which reason we commanded our people to gather
+together, and ordered them to go down to the seashore." Therefore it
+is lawful for bishops to fight.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man does
+a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another, according
+to Rom. 1:32: "They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not
+only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do
+them." Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce
+others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce
+others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that
+Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of
+Adrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is
+lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and
+meritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni
+timore) that if "a man die for the true faith, or to save his
+country, or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly
+reward." Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It was said to Peter as representing bishops and
+clerics (Matt. 16:52): "Put up again thy sword into the scabbard
+[Vulg.: 'its place'] [*"Scabbard" is the reading in John 18:11]."
+Therefore it is not lawful for them to fight.
+
+_I answer that,_ Several things are requisite for the good of a human
+society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a
+number of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i,
+1), while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another,
+that they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore
+those who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy
+themselves with things of small importance. Thus according to human
+laws, soldiers who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to
+engage in commerce [*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.].
+
+Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a
+bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general
+one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that
+they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine
+things, the praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong
+to the duties of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enterprises
+are forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so
+too are warlike pursuits, according to 2 Tim. 2:4: "No man being a
+soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business." The second
+reason is a special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are
+directed to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ
+is represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor. 11:26: "As often as
+you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the
+death of the Lord, until He come." Wherefore it is unbecoming for
+them to slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should
+be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed
+what they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been
+decreed that those who shed blood, even without sin, become
+irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully
+do that which renders him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is
+altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to
+the shedding of blood.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who
+brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the
+oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse
+themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons,
+according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): "The weapons of
+our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God." Such are
+salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate,
+the sentence of excommunication.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their
+superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms
+themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight
+justly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual
+helps. Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were
+commanded to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this
+purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the
+front: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up
+arms themselves.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 23, A. 4, ad 2) every power, art or
+virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to
+the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as
+having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are
+deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel
+other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up
+arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is
+unbecoming their personality.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war,
+nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their
+being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act
+may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who
+have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q., 40, Art. 3]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Lay Ambushes in War?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in
+war. For it is written (Deut. 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after
+that which is just." But ambushes, since they are a kind of
+deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to
+lay ambushes even in a just war.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to
+faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith
+with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states
+(Contra Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with
+one's enemy, as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems
+that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 7:12): "Whatsoever you would
+that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to
+observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is
+our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions
+to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on
+war by laying ambushes.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos):
+"Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be
+carried on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the
+authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the
+city of Hai (Joshua 8:2).
+
+_I answer that,_ The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive
+the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two
+ways. First, through being told something false, or through the
+breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to
+deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain "rights of war
+and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies," as
+Ambrose states (De Officiis i).
+
+Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do
+not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always
+bound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have
+to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it,
+according to Matt. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy, to dogs."
+Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the
+enemy. For this reason among other things that a soldier has to learn
+is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's
+knowledge, as stated in the Book on _Strategy_ [*Stratagematum i, 1]
+by Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush
+which may be lawfully employed in a just war.
+
+Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they
+contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have
+an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide
+anything from him.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Fight on Holy Days?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy
+days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God.
+Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex.
+20:8: for "sabbath" is interpreted "rest." But wars are full of
+unrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, certain persons are reproached (Isa. 58:3) because
+on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of
+strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it
+unlawful to fight on holy days.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal harm.
+But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed.
+Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of
+avoiding temporal harm.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Mac. 2:41): The Jews rightly
+determined . . . saying: "Whosoever shall come up against us to fight
+on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him."
+
+_I answer that,_ The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those
+things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body.
+Hence Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (John 7:23): "Are you
+angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?"
+Hence physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days.
+Now there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal
+(whereby many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both
+temporal and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an
+individual. Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common
+weal of the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days,
+provided there be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt
+God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain
+from fighting.
+
+However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight
+on a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the
+Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 41
+
+OF STRIFE
+(In Two Articles)
+[*Strife here denotes fighting between individuals]
+
+We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether strife is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a daughter of anger?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 41, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Strife Is Always a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not always a sin. For
+strife seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x) that
+the word "rixosus [quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling [rictu]
+of a dog, because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he
+delights in brawling, and provokes contention." Now contention is not
+always a sin. Neither, therefore, is strife.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is related (Gen. 26:21) that the servants of
+Isaac "digged" another well, "and for that they quarrelled likewise."
+Now it is not credible that the household of Isaac quarrelled
+publicly, without being reproved by him, supposing it were a sin.
+Therefore strife is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, strife seems to be a war between individuals. But
+war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Strifes [*The Douay version has 'quarrels'] are
+reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), and "they who do
+such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Therefore strifes
+are not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins.
+
+_I answer that,_ While contention implies a contradiction of words,
+strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on
+Gal. 5:20 says that "strifes are when persons strike one another
+through anger." Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it
+takes place between private persons, being declared not by public
+authority, but rather by an inordinate will. Therefore strife is
+always sinful. In fact it is a mortal sin in the man who attacks
+another unjustly, for it is not without mortal sin that one inflicts
+harm on another even if the deed be done by the hands. But in him who
+defends himself, it may be without sin, or it may sometimes involve a
+venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends on his
+intention and on his manner of defending himself. For if his sole
+intention be to withstand the injury done to him, and he defend
+himself with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say
+properly that there is strife on his part. But if, on the other hand,
+his self-defense be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a
+sin. It is a venial sin, if a slight movement of hatred or vengeance
+obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed moderation in defending
+himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes for his assailant with
+the fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting grievous harm on
+him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Strife is not just the same as contention: and there
+are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which express
+the inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is always
+ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, "ever ready to
+contradict," that is to say, whether the other man says or does well
+or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the
+passage proceeds, "and delights in brawling." Thirdly, "he" provokes
+others to quarrel, wherefore it goes on, "and provokes contention."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The sense of the text is not that the servants of Isaac
+quarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country quarrelled with
+them: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore
+the calumny [*Cf. Gen. 26:20].
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In order for a war to be just it must be declared by
+authority of the governing power, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1);
+whereas strife proceeds from a private feeling of anger or hatred.
+For if the servants of a sovereign or judge, in virtue of their
+public authority, attack certain men and these defend themselves, it
+is not the former who are said to be guilty of strife, but those who
+resist the public authority. Hence it is not the assailants in this
+case who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those who defend
+themselves inordinately.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 41, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Strife Is a Daughter of Anger?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger.
+For it is written (James 4:1): "Whence are wars and contentions? Are
+they not . . . from your concupiscences, which war in your members?"
+But anger is not in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a
+daughter, not of anger, but of concupiscence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth and
+puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels." Now strife is apparently
+the same as quarrel. Therefore it seems that strife is a daughter of
+pride or vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 18:6): "The lips of a fool
+intermeddle with strife." Now folly differs from anger, for it is
+opposed, not to meekness, but to wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife
+is not a daughter of anger.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): "Hatred stirreth up
+strifes." But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral.
+xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger, but of envy.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it is written (Prov. 17:19): "He that studieth
+discords, soweth [Vulg.: 'loveth'] quarrels." But discord is a
+daughter of vainglory, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2). Therefore
+strife is also.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that "anger gives
+rise to strife"; and it is written (Prov. 15:18; 29:22): "A
+passionate man stirreth up strifes."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), strife denotes an antagonism
+extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another. Now there
+are two ways in which one man may intend to harm another. In one way
+it is as though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which in
+this case is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is
+directed to the hurt of one's enemy either openly or secretly. In
+another way a man intends to hurt another who knows and withstands
+his intention. This is what we mean by strife, and belongs properly
+to anger which is the desire of vengeance: for the angry man is not
+content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him
+to feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what
+he has done, as may be seen from what has been said above about the
+passion of anger (I-II, Q. 46, A. 6, ad 2). Therefore, properly
+speaking, strife arises from anger.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2), all the
+irascible passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty, so
+that whatever is the immediate outcome of anger, arises also from
+concupiscence as from its first root.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Boasting and puffing up of self which are the result of
+anger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional cause of
+quarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being
+preferred to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results in
+quarrel and strife.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 48, A. 3) hinders the
+judgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to folly. Hence
+they have a common effect, since it is due to a defect in the reason
+that a man designs to hurt another inordinately.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is not
+the proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it is
+beside his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner,
+since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees
+himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel.
+But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the proper effect of anger, for the
+reason given above.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the hearts
+of those who are guilty of strife, and so he that "studies," i.e.,
+intends to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among
+themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by
+directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that
+strife is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 42
+
+OF SEDITION
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is a special sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 42, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Sedition Is a Special Sin Distinct from Other Sins?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not a special sin
+distinct from other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a
+seditious man is one who sows dissent among minds, and begets
+discord." Now, by provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no
+other kind of sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems
+that sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism
+takes its name from scission, as stated above (Q. 39, A. 1).
+Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that
+of schism.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every special sin that is distinct from other sins,
+is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now
+sedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those
+vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where
+both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a
+special sin, distinct from other sins.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other
+sins (2 Cor. 12:20).
+
+_I answer that,_ Sedition is a special sin, having something in
+common with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has
+something in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain
+antagonism, and it differs from them in two points. First, because
+war and strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas
+sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, or the
+preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on 2 Cor. 12:20 says
+that "seditions are tumults tending to fight," when, to wit, a number
+of people make preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly,
+they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against
+external foes, being as it were between one people and another,
+whereas strife is between one individual and another, or between few
+people on one side and few on the other side, while sedition, in its
+proper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as
+when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part.
+Wherefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good,
+namely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A seditious man is one who incites others to sedition,
+and since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that a
+seditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but
+between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only
+in him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one
+another inordinately.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Sedition differs from schism in two respects. First,
+because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the multitude,
+viz. ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to the
+temporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city or
+kingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a
+material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dissent.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord,
+since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between
+the parts of a multitude.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 42, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Sedition Is Always a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin.
+For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the
+gloss quoted above (A. 1). But fighting is not always a mortal sin,
+indeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above (Q. 40, A.
+1). Much more, therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above (A.
+1, ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes
+without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a
+tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some
+dissension in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to
+retain the tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore
+there can be sedition without mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle forbids seditions together with other
+things that are mortal sins (2 Cor. 12:20).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), sedition is contrary
+to the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom.
+Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that "wise men understand the
+word people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly
+of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and
+for the common good." Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which
+sedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it
+follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common
+good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its
+gravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it
+assails surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife.
+
+Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors,
+who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by
+them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the
+common good, and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves
+seditious, even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because
+he defends himself, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common
+good, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1). But sedition runs counter to the
+common good of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Discord from what is not evidently good, may be without
+sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without sin:
+and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity
+of the multitude, which is a manifest good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A tyrannical government is not just, because it is
+directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the
+ruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; _Ethic._ viii, 10).
+Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this
+kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately,
+that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance
+than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather
+that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition
+among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for
+this is tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler,
+and to the injury of the multitude.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 43
+
+OF SCANDAL
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to
+beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice,
+those, to wit, whereby one harms one's neighbor unjustly. But scandal
+seems to be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here
+consider scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is scandal?
+
+(2) Whether scandal is a sin?
+
+(3) Whether it is a special sin?
+
+(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized?
+
+(6) Whether they can give scandal?
+
+(7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal?
+
+(8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Scandal Is Fittingly Defined As Being Something Less Rightly
+Said or Done That Occasions Spiritual Downfall?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is unfittingly defined as
+"something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual
+downfall." For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on (A. 2).
+Now, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), a sin is a
+"word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God." Therefore the
+definition given above is insufficient, since it omits "thought" or
+"desire."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, since among virtuous or right acts one is more
+virtuous or more right than another, that one alone which has perfect
+rectitude would not seem to be a "less" right one. If, therefore,
+scandal is something "less" rightly said or done, it follows that
+every virtuous act except the best of all, is a scandal.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, an occasion is an accidental cause. But nothing
+accidental should enter a definition, because it does not specify the
+thing defined. Therefore it is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say
+that it is an "occasion."
+
+Obj. 4: Further, whatever a man does may be the occasion of another's
+spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are indeterminate.
+Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions another's
+spiritual downfall, any deed or word can be a scandal: and this seems
+unreasonable.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, a man occasions his neighbor's spiritual downfall
+when he offends or weakens him. Now scandal is condivided with
+offense and weakness, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): "It is good
+not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy
+brother is offended or scandalized, or weakened." Therefore the
+aforesaid definition of scandal is unfitting.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Jerome in expounding Matt. 15:12, "Dost thou know
+that the Pharisees, when they heard this word," etc. says: "When we
+read 'Whosoever shall scandalize,' the sense is 'Whosoever shall, by
+deed or word, occasion another's spiritual downfall.'"
+
+_I answer that,_ As Jerome observes the Greek _skandalon_ may be
+rendered offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For
+when a body, while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it
+may happen to stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such
+an obstacle is a _skandalon_.
+
+In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be
+disposed to a spiritual downfall by another's word or deed, in so
+far, to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example,
+moves another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called.
+
+Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall,
+except that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly
+right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his
+downfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as "something less
+rightly done or said, that occasions another's spiritual downfall."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the heart,
+wherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an obstacle
+conducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come under the
+head of scandal.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A thing is said to be less right, not because something
+else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack of
+rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or
+through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man
+were to "sit at meat in the idol's temple" (1 Cor. 8:10), though this
+is not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention,
+yet, since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of
+worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man's spiritual
+downfall. Hence the Apostle says (1 Thess. 5:22): "From all
+appearance of evil refrain yourselves." Scandal is therefore
+fittingly described as something done "less rightly," so as to
+comprise both whatever is sinful in itself, and all that has an
+appearance of evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 75, AA. 2, 3; I-II, Q. 80, A.
+1), nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man's spiritual downfall,
+which is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another man's words or
+deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that
+downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a cause, but
+an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an accidental
+cause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions should not
+make mention of things that are accidental, since what is accidental
+to one, may be proper to something else: thus the accidental cause is
+mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Another's words or deed may be the cause of another's
+sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man
+either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into
+sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature
+as to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly
+commits a sin or does something that has an appearance of sin. In
+this case he that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an
+occasion of another's spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called
+"active scandal." One man's word or deed is the accidental cause of
+another's sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does
+what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one,
+through being ill-disposed, is led into sin, for instance, into envy
+of another's good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not,
+so far as he is concerned, afford an occasion of the other's
+downfall, but it is this other one who takes the occasion according
+to Rom. 7:8: "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me
+all manner of concupiscence." Wherefore this is "passive," without
+"active scandal," since he that acts rightly does not, for his own
+part, afford the occasion of the other's downfall. Sometimes
+therefore it happens that there is active scandal in the one together
+with passive scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin being
+induced thereto by another; sometimes there is active without passive
+scandal, for instance when one, by word or deed, provokes another to
+sin, and the latter does not consent; and sometimes there is passive
+without active scandal, as we have already said.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: "Weakness" denotes proneness to scandal; while
+"offense" signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin,
+which resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and
+"scandal" is the stumbling that results in downfall.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Scandal Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a sin. For sins do not
+occur from necessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2). Now it is written (Matt. 18:7): "It must
+needs be that scandals come." Therefore scandal is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no sin arises from a sense of dutifulness, because
+"a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Matt. 7:18). But scandal
+may come from a sense of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to Peter
+(Matt. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal unto Me," in reference to which
+words Jerome says that "the Apostle's error was due to his sense of
+dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil." Therefore
+scandal is not always a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. But he that stumbles
+does not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall,
+can be without sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Scandal is "something less rightly said or done."
+Now anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. Therefore scandal is
+always with sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As already said (A. 1, ad 4), scandal is of two
+kinds, passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal
+in the person who gives scandal, and so occasions a spiritual
+downfall. Accordingly passive scandal is always a sin in the person
+scandalized; for he is not scandalized except in so far as he
+succumbs to a spiritual downfall, and that is a sin.
+
+Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the part of the
+person whose action has occasioned the scandal, as for instance, when
+a person is scandalized at another's good deed. In like manner active
+scandal is always a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either
+what he does is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it
+should always be left undone out of that love for our neighbor which
+binds each one to be solicitous for his neighbor's spiritual welfare;
+so that if he persist in doing it he acts against charity.
+
+Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person
+scandalized, as stated above (A. 1, ad 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These words, "It must needs be that scandals come," are
+to be understood to convey, not the absolute, but the conditional
+necessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that whatever
+God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken
+conjointly with such foreknowledge, as explained in the First Part
+(Q. 14, A. 13, ad 3; Q. 23, A. 6, ad 2).
+
+Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring is a necessity
+of end, because they are useful in order that "they . . . who are
+reproved may be made manifest" (1 Cor. 11:19).
+
+Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of man who fails
+to shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man
+partaking of unsuitable food might say that such a man must needs
+injure his health, which is to be understood on the condition that he
+does not change his diet. In like manner it must needs be that
+scandals come, so long as men fail to change their evil mode of
+living.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In that passage scandal denotes any kind of hindrance:
+for Peter wished to hinder Our Lord's Passion out of a sense of
+dutifulness towards Christ.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: No man stumbles spiritually, without being kept back
+somewhat from advancing in God's way, and that is at least a venial
+sin.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Scandal Is a Special Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. For
+scandal is "something said or done less rightly." But this applies to
+every kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and
+consequently, scandal is not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every special kind of sin, or every special kind of
+injustice, may be found separately from other kinds, as stated in
+_Ethic._ v, 3, 5. But scandal is not to be found separately from
+other sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is constituted by something which
+specifies the moral act. But the notion of scandal consists in its
+being something done in the presence of others: and the fact of a sin
+being committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance,
+does not seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal
+is not a special sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A special virtue has a special sin opposed to it.
+But scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is
+written (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat, thy brother be
+grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity." Therefore
+scandal is a special sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), scandal is twofold, active
+and passive. Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through
+another's word or deed a man may fall into any kind of sin: and the
+fact that a man takes occasion to sin from another's word or deed,
+does not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply
+a special deformity in opposition to a special virtue.
+
+On the other hand, active scandal may be understood in two ways,
+directly and accidentally. The scandal is accidental when it is
+beside the agent's intention, as when a man does not intend, by his
+inordinate deed or word, to occasion another's spiritual downfall,
+but merely to satisfy his own will. In such a case even active
+scandal is not a special sin, because a species is not constituted by
+that which is accidental.
+
+Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his inordinate word
+or deed, to draw another into sin, and then it becomes a special kind
+of sin on account of the intention of a special kind of end, because
+moral actions take their species from their end, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6). Hence, just as theft and murder
+are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention
+of doing a special injury to one's neighbor: so too, scandal is a
+special kind of sin, because thereby a man intends a special harm to
+his neighbor, and it is directly opposed to fraternal correction,
+whereby a man intends the removal of a special kind of harm.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Any sin may be the matter of active scandal, but it may
+derive the formal aspect of a special sin from the end intended, as
+stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Active scandal can be found separate from other sins,
+as when a man scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not a sin
+in itself, but has an appearance of evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Scandal does not derive the species of a special sin
+from the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the end,
+as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Scandal Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. For every
+sin that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (Q.
+24, A. 12; Q. 35, A. 3). But scandal is contrary to charity, as
+stated above (AA. 2, 3). Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves the punishment of
+eternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal
+damnation, according to Matt. 18:6: "He that shall scandalize one of
+these little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a
+mill-stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be
+drowned in the depth of the sea." For, as Jerome says on this
+passage, "it is much better to receive a brief punishment for a
+fault, than to await everlasting torments." Therefore scandal is a
+mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every sin committed against God is a mortal sin,
+because mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is a
+sin against God, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:12): "When you wound
+the weak conscience of the brethren [*Vulg.: 'When you sin thus
+against the brethren and wound their weak conscience'], you sin
+against Christ." Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It may be a venial sin to lead a person into
+venial sin: and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal
+may be a venial sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), scandal denotes a stumbling
+whereby a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall. Consequently
+passive scandal may sometimes be a venial sin, when it consists in a
+stumbling and nothing more; for instance, when a person is disturbed
+by a movement of venial sin occasioned by another's inordinate word
+or deed: while sometimes it is a mortal sin, when the stumbling
+results in a downfall, for instance, when a person goes so far as to
+commit a mortal sin through another's inordinate word or deed.
+
+Active scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be a venial sin;
+for instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a person either
+commits a venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself,
+but has some appearance of evil. On the other hand, it is sometimes a
+mortal sin, either because a person commits a mortal sin, or because
+he has such contempt for his neighbor's spiritual welfare that he
+declines, for the sake of procuring it, to forego doing what he
+wishes to do. But in the case of active direct scandal, as when a
+person intends to lead another into sin, if he intends to lead him
+into mortal sin, his own sin will be mortal; and in like manner if he
+intends by committing a mortal sin himself, to lead another into
+venial sin; whereas if he intends, by committing a venial sin, to
+lead another into venial sin, there will be a venial sin of scandal.
+
+And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Passive Scandal May Happen Even to the Perfect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that passive scandal may happen even to
+the perfect. For Christ was supremely perfect: and yet He said to
+Peter (Matt. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal to Me." Much more therefore
+can other perfect men suffer scandal.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a
+person's spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their
+progress along the spiritual way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: "We
+would have come to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath
+hindered us." Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins,
+according to 1 John 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive
+ourselves." Now passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is
+sometimes venial, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore passive scandal
+may be found in perfect men.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Jerome, in commenting on Matt. 18:6, "He that
+shall scandalize one of these little ones," says: "Observe that it is
+the little one that is scandalized, for the elders do not take
+scandal."
+
+_I answer that,_ Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person
+who takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man
+can be unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The
+elders, i.e. the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is
+unchangeable, for though they adhere to their superiors, they do so
+only in so far as these adhere to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16:
+"Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." Wherefore, however
+much others may appear to them to conduct themselves ill in word or
+deed, they themselves do not stray from their righteousness,
+according to Ps. 124:1: "They that trust in the Lord shall be as
+Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in
+Jerusalem." Therefore scandal is not found in those who adhere to God
+perfectly by love, according to Ps. 118:165: "Much peace have they
+that love Thy law, and to them there is no stumbling-block
+(_scandalum_)."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 2, ad 2), in this passage, scandal
+is used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance. Hence Our
+Lord said to Peter: "Thou art a scandal to Me," because he was
+endeavoring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of
+external actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of
+others, from tending to God in the internal acts of the will,
+according to Rom. 8:38, 39: "Neither death, nor life . . . shall be
+able to separate us from the love of God."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins through the
+weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking scandal
+in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although there
+can be an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: "My
+feet were almost moved."
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Active Scandal Can Be Found in the Perfect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that active scandal can be found in the
+perfect. For passion is the effect of action. Now some are
+scandalized passively by the words or deeds of the perfect, according
+to Matt. 15:12: "Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard
+this word, were scandalized?" Therefore active scandal can be found
+in the perfect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the
+state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles: for
+it is written (Gal. 2:14): "When I saw that they walked not uprightly
+unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas," i.e. Peter, "before
+them all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the
+gentiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles
+to live as do the Jews?" Therefore active scandal can be in the
+perfect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin. But venial
+sins may be in perfect men. Therefore active scandal may be in
+perfect men.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Active scandal is more opposed to perfection, than
+passive scandal. But passive scandal cannot be in the perfect. Much
+less, therefore, can active scandal be in them.
+
+_I answer that,_ Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a
+man says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion
+another's spiritual downfall, and that is only when what he says or
+does is inordinate. Now it belongs to the perfect to direct all their
+actions according to the rule of reason, as stated in 1 Cor. 14:40:
+"Let all things be done decently and according to order"; and they
+are careful to do this in those matters chiefly wherein not only
+would they do wrong, but would also be to others an occasion of
+wrongdoing. And if indeed they fail in this moderation in such words
+or deeds as come to the knowledge of others, this has its origin in
+human weakness wherein they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not
+fall short so far as to stray far from the order of reason, but only
+a little and in some slight matter: and this is not so grave that
+anyone can reasonably take therefrom an occasion for committing sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Passive scandal is always due to some active scandal;
+yet this active scandal is not always in another, but in the very
+person who is scandalized, because, to wit, he scandalizes himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of Augustine (Ep. xxviii, xl, lxxxii)
+and of Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed, in withdrawing
+from the gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the Jews, because
+he did this somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles who had been
+converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless Peter's action
+was not so grave a sin as to give others sufficient ground for
+scandal. Hence they were guilty of passive scandal, while there was
+no active scandal in Peter.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The venial sins of the perfect consist chiefly in
+sudden movements, which being hidden cannot give scandal. If,
+however, they commit any venial sins even in their external words or
+deeds, these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to
+give scandal.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Spiritual Goods Should Be Foregone on Account of Scandal?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual goods ought to be foregone
+on account of scandal. For Augustine (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2)
+teaches that "punishment for sin should cease, when the peril of
+schism is feared." But punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since
+it is an act of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone
+on account of scandal.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing. Yet
+one ought to desist therefrom on account of scandal, according to
+Matt. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your
+pearls before swine lest . . . turning upon you, they tear you."
+Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, since fraternal correction is an act of charity, it
+is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity, in
+order to avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes (De
+Civ. Dei i, 9). Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on
+account of scandal.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Jerome [*Hugh de S. Cher., In Matth. xviii; in Luc.
+xvii, 2] says that in order to avoid scandal we should forego
+whatever it is possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold
+truth, i.e. "the truth of life, of justice and of doctrine." Now the
+observance of the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be
+omitted without prejudice to the aforesaid threefold truth, else
+whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and yet such
+things are the greatest of spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works
+should be omitted on account of scandal.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the avoidance of any sin is a spiritual good, since
+any sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that one
+ought sometimes to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandalizing
+one's neighbor, for instance, when by sinning venially, one would
+prevent someone else from committing a mortal sin: because one is
+bound to hinder the damnation of one's neighbor as much as one can
+without prejudice to one's own salvation, which is not precluded by a
+venial sin. Therefore one ought to forego a spiritual good in order
+to avoid scandal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech. vii): "If people
+are scandalized at the truth, it is better to allow the birth of
+scandal, than to abandon the truth." Now spiritual goods belong,
+above all others, to the truth. Therefore spiritual goods are not to
+be foregone on account of scandal.
+
+_I answer that,_ Whereas scandal is twofold, active and passive, the
+present question does not apply to active scandal, for since active
+scandal is "something said or done less rightly," nothing ought to be
+done that implies active scandal. The question does, however, apply
+to passive scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be
+foregone in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction must be made in
+spiritual goods. For some of them are necessary for salvation, and
+cannot be foregone without mortal sin: and it is evident that no man
+ought to commit a mortal sin, in order to prevent another from
+sinning, because according to the order of charity, a man ought to
+love his own spiritual welfare more than another's. Therefore one
+ought not to forego that which is necessary for salvation, in order
+to avoid giving scandal.
+
+Again a distinction seems necessary among spiritual things which are
+not necessary for salvation: because the scandal which arises from
+such things sometimes proceeds from malice, for instance when a man
+wishes to hinder those spiritual goods by stirring up scandal. This
+is the "scandal of the Pharisees," who were scandalized at Our Lord's
+teaching: and Our Lord teaches (Matt. 15:14) that we ought to treat
+such like scandal with contempt. Sometimes scandal proceeds from
+weakness or ignorance, and such is the "scandal of little ones." In
+order to avoid this kind of scandal, spiritual goods ought to be
+either concealed, or sometimes even deferred (if this can be done
+without incurring immediate danger), until the matter being explained
+the scandal cease. If, however, the scandal continue after the matter
+has been explained, it would seem to be due to malice, and then it
+would no longer be right to forego that spiritual good in order to
+avoid such like scandal.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the infliction of punishment it is not the
+punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal
+properties in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the
+nature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident
+that the infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and
+more grievous sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will
+no longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is
+speaking, when, to wit, the excommunication of a few threatens to
+bring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it would be
+contrary to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: With regard to a man's doctrine two points must be
+considered, namely, the truth which is taught, and the act of
+teaching. The first of these is necessary for salvation, to wit, that
+he whose duty it is to teach should not teach what is contrary to the
+truth, and that he should teach the truth according to the
+requirements of times and persons: wherefore on no account ought he
+to suppress the truth and teach error in order to avoid any scandal
+that might ensue. But the act itself of teaching is one of the
+spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2), and so the same
+is to be said of it as of the other works of mercy, of which we shall
+speak further on (ad 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 33, A. 1), fraternal correction
+aims at the correction of a brother, wherefore it is to be reckoned
+among spiritual goods in so far as this end can be obtained, which is
+not the case if the brother be scandalized through being corrected.
+And so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid scandal, no
+spiritual good is foregone.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice
+comprises not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also
+whatever is a means of obtaining salvation more perfectly, according
+to 1 Cor. 12:31: "Be zealous for the better gifts." Wherefore neither
+the counsels nor even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted
+in order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or
+deferred, on account of the scandal of the little ones, as stated
+above. Sometimes, however, the observance of the counsels and the
+fulfilment of the works of mercy are necessary for salvation. This
+may be seen in the case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels,
+and of those whose duty it is to relieve the wants of others, either
+in temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in spiritual
+matters (as by instructing the ignorant), whether such duties arise
+from their being enjoined as in the case of prelates, or from the
+need on the part of the person in want; and then the same applies to
+these things as to others that are necessary for salvation.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Some have said that one ought to commit a venial sin in
+order to avoid scandal. But this implies a contradiction, since if it
+ought to be done, it is no longer evil or sinful, for a sin cannot be
+a matter of choice. It may happen however that, on account of some
+circumstance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be were
+it not for that circumstance: thus an idle word is a venial sin, when
+it is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered for a reasonable cause,
+it is neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not deprive
+a man of grace which is his means of salvation, yet, in so far as it
+disposes him to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Temporal Goods Should Be Foregone on Account of Scandal?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods should be foregone on
+account of scandal. For we ought to love our neighbor's spiritual
+welfare which is hindered by scandal, more than any temporal goods
+whatever. But we forego what we love less for the sake of what we
+love more. Therefore we should forego temporal goods in order to
+avoid scandalizing our neighbor.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Jerome's rule [*Cf. A. 7, Obj. 4],
+whatever can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth,
+should be omitted in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can
+be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth. Therefore they
+should be foregone in order to avoid scandal.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no temporal good is more necessary than food. But we
+ought to forego taking food on account of scandal, according to Rom.
+14:15: "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died." Much
+more therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on account
+of scandal.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the most fitting way of safeguarding and recovering
+temporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful to have
+recourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues: for it is written
+(Matt. 5:40): "If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take
+away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him"; and (1 Cor. 6:7):
+"Already indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have
+lawsuits one with another. Why do you not rather take wrong? why do
+you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore it seems
+that we ought to forego temporal goods on account of scandal.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego least of all those
+temporal goods which are connected with spiritual goods: and yet we
+ought to forego them on account of scandal. For the Apostle while
+sowing spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he
+"should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ" as we read 1 Cor.
+9:12. For a like reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain
+countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much more, therefore, ought we
+to forego other temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Blessed Thomas of Canterbury demanded the
+restitution of Church property, notwithstanding that the king took
+scandal from his doing so.
+
+_I answer that,_ A distinction must be made in temporal goods: for
+either they are ours, or they are consigned to us to take care of
+them for someone else; thus the goods of the Church are consigned to
+prelates, and the goods of the community are entrusted to all such
+persons as have authority over the common weal. In this latter case
+the care of such things (as of things held in deposit) devolves of
+necessity on those persons to whom they are entrusted, wherefore,
+even as other things that are necessary for salvation, they are not
+to be foregone on account of scandal. On the other hand, as regards
+those temporalities of which we have the dominion, sometimes, on
+account of scandal, we are bound to forego them, and sometimes we are
+not so bound, whether we forego them by giving them up, if we have
+them in our possession, or by omitting to claim them, if they are in
+the possession of others. For if the scandal arise therefrom through
+the ignorance or weakness of others (in which case, as stated above,
+A. 7, it is scandal of the little ones) we must either forego such
+temporalities altogether, or the scandal must be abated by some other
+means, namely, by some kind of admonition. Hence Augustine says (De
+Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20): "Thou shouldst give so as to injure
+neither thyself nor another, as much as thou canst lend, and if thou
+refusest what is asked, thou must yet be just to him, indeed thou
+wilt give him something better than he asks, if thou reprove him that
+asks unjustly." Sometimes, however, scandal arises from malice. This
+is scandal of the Pharisees: and we ought not to forego temporal
+goods for the sake of those who stir up scandals of this kind, for
+this would both be harmful to the common good, since it would give
+wicked men an opportunity of plunder, and would be injurious to the
+plunderers themselves, who would remain in sin as long as they were
+in possession of another's property. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
+13): "Sometimes we ought to suffer those who rob us of our
+temporalities, while sometimes we should resist them, as far as
+equity allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our
+property, but also lest those who take what is not theirs may lose
+themselves."
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If it were permissible for wicked men to rob other
+people of their property, this would tend to the detriment of the
+truth of life and justice. Therefore we are not always bound to
+forego our temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Apostle had no intention of counselling total
+abstinence from food on account of scandal, because our welfare
+requires that we should take food: but he intended to counsel
+abstinence from a particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal,
+according to 1 Cor. 8:13: "I will never eat flesh, lest I should
+scandalize my brother."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19)
+this precept of Our Lord is to be understood of the preparedness of
+the mind, namely, that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to
+suffer being harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But
+sometimes it is not expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The same
+applies to the saying of the Apostle.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The scandal which the Apostle avoided, arose from an
+error of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence it
+behooved him to forego it for the time being, so that they might be
+taught first of all that such a payment was a duty. For a like reason
+the Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries where it
+is not customary to pay them.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 44
+
+OF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are
+eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?
+
+(2) Whether there should be one or two?
+
+(3) Whether two suffice?
+
+(4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with
+thy whole heart"?
+
+(5) Whether it is fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc.?
+
+(6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?
+
+(7) Of the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself";
+
+(8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Any Precept Should Be Given About Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given about
+charity. For charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it
+is the form of the virtues as stated above (Q. 23, A. 8), while the
+precepts are about the virtues themselves. Now, according to the
+common saying, the mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no
+precepts should be given about charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the
+Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of the
+Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that
+arises from a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a
+necessity. Therefore no precept should be given about charity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to
+which the precepts are directed, as shown above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2;
+Q. 100, A. 9). If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity,
+they should have a place among the chief precepts which are those of
+the decalogue. But they have no place there. Therefore no precepts
+should be given about charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Whatever God requires of us is included in a
+precept. Now God requires that man should love Him, according to
+Deut. 10:12. Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the
+love of charity, which is the love of God.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 16, A. 1; I-II, Q. 99, A. 1), a
+precept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a
+matter of precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is
+due in two ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something
+else. In every affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake,
+because it has the character of a good for its own sake: while that
+which is directed to the end is due for the sake of something else:
+thus for a physician, it is due for its own sake, that he should
+heal, while it is due for the sake of something else that he should
+give a medicine in order to heal. Now the end of the spiritual life
+is that man be united to God, and this union is effected by charity,
+while all things pertaining to the spiritual life are ordained to
+this union, as to their end. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5):
+"The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good
+conscience, and an unfeigned faith." For all the virtues, about whose
+acts the precepts are given, are directed either to the freeing of
+the heart from the whirl of the passions--such are the virtues that
+regulate the passions--or at least to the possession of a good
+conscience--such are the virtues that regulate operations--or to the
+having of a right faith--such are those which pertain to the worship
+of God: and these three things are required of man that he may love
+God. For an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of
+the passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience
+gives man a horror for God's justice, through fear of His
+punishments; and an untrue faith draws man's affections to an untrue
+representation of God, and separates him from the truth of God. Now
+in every genus that which is for its own sake takes precedence of
+that which is for the sake of another, wherefore the greatest precept
+is that of charity, as stated in Matt. 22:39.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 10) when we were
+treating of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under
+those precepts which are about the other acts of virtue: for
+instance, this precept, "Honor thy father and thy mother," does not
+prescribe that this should be done out of charity. The act of love
+does, however, fall under special precepts.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty,
+except in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed, as
+may be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But
+the precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own will,
+wherefore it is not opposed to charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the
+love of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of
+charity had not to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue,
+since they are included in all of them.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Should Have Been Given Two Precepts of Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been given two
+precepts of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to
+virtue, as stated above (A. 1, Obj. 3). Now charity is one virtue, as
+shown above (Q. 33, A. 5). Therefore only one precept of charity
+should have been given.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22, 27),
+charity loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently
+directed to love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
+God." Therefore there was no need to add the precept about loving our
+neighbor.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts.
+But it is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided
+we put not aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Luke 15:26):
+"If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he
+cannot be My disciple." Therefore the precept of the love of God is
+not distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8): "He that loveth his
+neighbor hath fulfilled the Law." But a law is not fulfilled unless
+all its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included
+in the love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the
+love of our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two
+precepts of charity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:21): "This commandment we
+have from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 91, A. 3; Q. 94, A. 2)
+when we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to the
+Law what propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these
+latter, the conclusions are virtually contained in the first
+principles. Hence whoever knows the principles as to their entire
+virtual extent has no need to have the conclusions put separately
+before him. Since, however, some who know the principles are unable
+to consider all that is virtually contained therein, it is necessary,
+for their sake, that scientific conclusions should be traced to their
+principles. Now in practical matters wherein the precepts of the Law
+direct us, the end has the character of principle, as stated above
+(Q. 23, A. 7, ad 2; Q. 26, A. 1, ad 1): and the love of God is the
+end to which the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it
+behooved us to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also
+of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are less
+intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of these precepts
+is included in the other.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts,
+one of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are
+given about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts
+of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved in
+that which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an
+explicit precept about both, for the reason given above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The means derive their goodness from their relation to
+the end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives its malice
+from the same source and from no other.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the end
+is included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each
+precept to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Two Precepts of Charity Suffice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that two precepts of charity do not
+suffice. For precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are
+distinguished by their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love
+four things out of charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and
+his own body, as shown above (Q. 25, A. 12; Q. 26), it seems that
+there ought to be four precepts of charity, so that two are not
+sufficient.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also joy,
+peace and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts of
+the virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also in
+avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good,
+and by the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to
+have been not only positive, but also negative precepts about
+charity; and so two precepts of charity are not sufficient.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 22:40): "On these two
+commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."
+
+_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), is a kind of
+friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another,
+wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity is not possible
+between less than two": and it has been explained how one may love
+oneself out of charity (Q. 25, A. 4). Now since good is the object of
+dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is
+fitting that there should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we
+are induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to
+love our neighbor for God's sake, as for the sake of our end.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23), "though
+four things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need of a
+precept as regards the second and fourth," i.e. love of oneself and
+of one's own body. "For however much a man may stray from the truth,
+the love of himself and of his own body always remains in him." And
+yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that
+he should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and
+this is done by his loving God and his neighbor.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 28, A. 4; Q. 29, A. 3), the other
+acts of charity result from the act of love as effects from their
+cause. Hence the precepts of love virtually include the precepts
+about the other acts. And yet we find that, for the sake of the
+laggards, special precepts were given about each act--about joy
+(Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always"--about peace (Heb. 12:14):
+"Follow peace with all men"--about beneficence (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst
+we have time, let us work good to all men"--and Holy Writ contains
+precepts about each of the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by
+anyone who considers the matter carefully.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To do good is more than to avoid evil, and therefore
+the positive precepts virtually include the negative precepts.
+Nevertheless we find explicit precepts against the vices contrary to
+charity: for, against hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17): "Thou shalt
+not hate thy brother in thy heart"; against sloth (Ecclus. 6:26): "Be
+not grieved with her bands"; against envy (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be
+made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one
+another"; against discord (1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the same
+thing, and that there be no schisms among you"; and against scandal
+(Rom. 14:13): "That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in
+your brother's way."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Fittingly Commanded That Man Should Love God with His
+Whole Heart?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man
+should love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act
+is not a matter of precept, as shown above (A. 1, ad 1; I-II, Q. 100,
+A. 9). Now the words "with thy whole heart" signify the mode of the
+love of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should
+love God with his whole heart.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks nothing"
+(Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that God be
+loved with the whole heart, whoever does something not pertaining to
+the love of God, acts counter to the precept, and consequently sins
+mortally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God.
+Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to
+perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64),
+"to be whole is to be perfect." But that which belongs to perfection
+is not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we
+ought not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the
+Lord thy God with thy whole heart."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an
+act is a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now
+it is requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on
+its own matter, but also that it should be endued with its due
+circumstances, whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be
+loved as the last end, to which all things are to be referred.
+Therefore some kind of totality was to be indicated in connection
+with the precept of the love of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue does
+not prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and
+higher virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its
+own proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy
+whole heart."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold
+signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always
+actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly,
+in the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God,
+so that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this
+is the perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this
+latter perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity,
+since it does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the
+use of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels are
+directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding
+reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible,
+temporal things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the
+mind and hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 5]
+
+Whether to the Words, "Thou Shalt Love the Lord Thy God with Thy
+Whole Heart," It Was Fitting to Add "and with Thy Whole Soul, and
+with Thy Whole Strength"?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou
+shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with
+thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength" (Deut. 6:5). For heart
+does not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a
+bodily action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual
+sense. Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself
+or part of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous to mention both
+heart and soul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal
+depends on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the
+Lord thy God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with
+all thy strength."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in Matt. 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which
+words do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is
+unfittingly worded in Deut. 6.
+
+On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.
+
+_I answer that,_ This precept is differently worded in various
+places: for, as we said in the first objection, in Deut. 6 three
+points are mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole
+soul," and "with thy whole strength." In Matt. 22 we find two of
+these mentioned, viz. "with thy whole heart" and "with thy whole
+soul," while "with thy whole strength" is omitted, but "with thy
+whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark 12 we find all four, viz. "with thy
+whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with thy whole mind,"
+and "with thy whole force" which is the same as "strength." Moreover,
+these four are indicated in Luke 10, where in place of "strength" or
+"force" we read "with all thy might." [*St. Thomas is explaining the
+Latin text which reads "ex tota fortitudine tua" (Deut.), "ex tota
+virtue tua" (Mk.), and "ex omnibus viribus tuis" (Luke), although the
+Greek in all three cases has _ex holes tes ischyos_, which the Douay
+renders "with thy whole strength."]
+
+Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one
+of them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We
+must therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here
+denoted by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the
+principle of all the movements of the body, so too the will,
+especially as regards the intention of the last end which is the
+object of charity, is the principle of all the movements of the soul.
+Now there are three principles of action that are moved by the will,
+namely, the intellect which is signified by "the mind," the lower
+appetitive power, signified by "the soul"; and the exterior executive
+power signified by "strength," "force" or "might." Accordingly we are
+commanded to direct our whole intention to God, and this is signified
+by the words "with thy whole heart"; to submit our intellect to God,
+and this is expressed in the words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate
+our appetite according to God, in the words "with thy whole soul";
+and to obey God in our external actions, and this is to love God with
+our whole "strength," "force" or "might."
+
+Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished
+work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in
+Chrysostom's works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in
+the contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers
+"heart" to the thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to
+the intellect. Again some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting
+the intellect, "with thy whole soul" as signifying the will, "with
+thy mind" as pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory
+of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), "heart" signifies the vegetative soul,
+"soul" the sensitive, and "mind" the intellective soul, because our
+nourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to be referred by
+us to God.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 6]
+
+Whether It Is Possible in This Life to Fulfil This Precept of the
+Love of God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil
+this precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius,
+Exposit. Cath. Fid.] "accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded
+anything impossible." But God gave this commandment, as is clear from
+Deut. 6:5. Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this
+life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally,
+since according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than
+"a transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly
+commandments." If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by
+wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal
+sin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8):
+"(Who also) will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Tim.
+3:10): "Let them minister, having no crime."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the way
+of salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord is
+lightsome, enlightening the eyes." Now it is useless to direct anyone
+to what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this
+precept in this life.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the
+fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou
+shalt love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal
+concupiscence remains, that can be restrained by continence, man
+cannot love God with all his heart.
+
+_I answer that,_ A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly,
+and imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end
+intended by the author of the precept is reached; yet it is
+fulfilled, imperfectly however, when although the end intended by its
+author is not reached, nevertheless the order to that end is not
+departed from. Thus if the commander of an army order his soldiers to
+fight, his command will be perfectly obeyed by those who fight and
+conquer the foe, which is the commander's intention; yet it is
+fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those who fight without gaining the
+victory, provided they do nothing contrary to military discipline.
+Now God intends by this precept that man should be entirely united to
+Him, and this will be realized in heaven, when God will be "all in
+all," according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence this precept will be observed
+fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though
+imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one man will fulfil
+it more perfectly than another, and so much the more, as he
+approaches by some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that the precept can be fulfilled
+after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately without
+conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this, so too
+he that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does nothing
+against the love of God, does not sin mortally.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii), "why
+should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man
+attains it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows
+whither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed it
+out."
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Precept of Love of Our Neighbor Is Fittingly Expressed?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our
+neighbor is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to
+all men, even to our enemies, as may be seen in Matt. 5:44. But the
+word "neighbor" denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to
+exist towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is
+unfittingly expressed.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the
+origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to
+ourselves," whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin
+of one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than
+that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his
+neighbor as himself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally.
+Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love his
+neighbor as himself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 22:39): "The second"
+commandment "is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
+thyself."
+
+_I answer that,_ This precept is fittingly expressed, for it
+indicates both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason
+for loving is indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason
+why we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh
+to us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity
+for glory. Nor does it matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother"
+according to 1 John 4:21, or "friend," according to Lev. 19:18,
+because all these words express the same affinity.
+
+The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself." This does
+not mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in
+like manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the
+end, namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as
+he loves himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is
+a _holy_ love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a
+man should not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good
+things, even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so
+that his love for his neighbor may be a _righteous_ love. Thirdly, as
+regards the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his
+neighbor, not for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of
+wishing his neighbor well, even as he wishes himself well, so that
+his love for his neighbor may be a _true_ love: since when a man
+loves his neighbor for his own profit or pleasure, he does not love
+his neighbor truly, but loves himself.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Order of Charity Is Included in the Precept?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity is not included
+in the precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But
+if man loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man
+more, he wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept.
+Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently
+delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was
+given above (Q. 26) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it
+is not included in the precept.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the love
+of our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the words,
+"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore the order of
+charity is not included in the precept.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches
+us first of all by His Law, according to Jer. 31:33: "I will give My
+Law in their heart [*Vulg.: 'in their bowels, and I will write it in
+their heart']." Now God causes in us the order of charity, according
+to Cant. 2:4: "He set in order charity in me." Therefore the order of
+charity comes under the precept of the Law.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 1), the mode which is
+essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which
+prescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential
+to the virtue, since it is based on the proportion of love to the
+thing beloved, as shown above (Q. 25, A. 12; Q. 26, AA. 1, 2). It is
+therefore evident that the order of charity must come under the
+precept.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so that
+if he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to
+gratify more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an
+injustice to the one he ought to love more.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The order of those four things we have to love out of
+charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to love
+God with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we must
+love Him above all things. When we are commanded to love our neighbor
+"as ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our neighbor.
+In like manner where we are commanded (1 John 3:16) "to lay down our
+souls," i.e. the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we are given
+to understand that a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own
+body; and again when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to "work good . . .
+especially to those who are of the household of the faith," and when
+a man is blamed (1 Tim. 5:8) if he "have not care of his own, and
+especially of those of his house," it means that we ought to love
+most those of our neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely
+united to us.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love thy
+neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 45
+
+OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity;
+and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the
+first head there are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy
+Ghost?
+
+(2) What is its subject?
+
+(3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?
+
+(4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?
+
+(5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?
+
+(6) Which beatitude corresponds to it?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Wisdom Should Be Reckoned Among the Gifts of the Holy Ghost?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among
+the gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the
+virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Now virtue is directed
+to the good alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19)
+that "no man makes bad use of the virtues." Much more therefore are
+the gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is
+directed to evil also, for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain
+wisdom is "earthly, sensual, devilish." Therefore wisdom should not
+be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) "wisdom is
+the knowledge of Divine things." Now that knowledge of Divine things
+which man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the
+wisdom which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural
+knowledge of Divine things belongs to faith which is a theological
+virtue, as explained above (Q. 4, A. 5; I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore
+wisdom should be called a virtue rather than a gift.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): "Behold the fear of the
+Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is
+understanding." And in this passage according to the rendering of the
+Septuagint which Augustine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we
+read: "Behold piety, that is wisdom." Now both fear and piety are
+gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned
+among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as though it were distinct from
+the others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
+shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding."
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it
+belongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that
+cause we are able to form a most certain judgment about other causes,
+and according thereto all things should be set in order. Now the
+highest cause may be understood in two ways, either simply or in some
+particular genus. Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any
+particular genus, and by its means is able to judge and set in order
+all the things that belong to that genus, is said to be wise in that
+genus, for instance in medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor.
+3:10: "As a wise architect, I have laid a foundation." On the other
+hand, he who knows the cause that is simply the highest, which is
+God, is said to be wise simply, because he is able to judge and set
+in order all things according to Divine rules.
+
+Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1
+Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated
+in the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), "the Spirit searcheth all things,
+yea the deep things of God." Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a
+gift of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first in the
+sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a kind
+of likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or
+a perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21).
+And just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find
+a highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by
+knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things
+something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to
+a last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing,
+according to Jer. 4:22: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good
+they have no knowledge." Now whoever turns away from his due end,
+must needs fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end.
+Wherefore, if he fixes his end in external earthly things, his
+"wisdom" is called "earthly," if in the goods of the body, it is
+called "sensual wisdom," if in some excellence, it is called
+"devilish wisdom" because it imitates the devil's pride, of which it
+is written (Job 41:25): "He is king over all the children of pride."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost,
+differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the
+latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is "descending
+from above" (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since
+faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to
+the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the
+gift of wisdom presupposes faith, because "a man judges well what he
+knows" (Ethic. i, 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of God is a
+manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of faith by
+worshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this reason
+piety is stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason,
+because if a man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a right
+judgment about Divine things.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Wisdom Is in the Intellect As Its Subject?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its
+subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity of
+God." Now charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the
+intellect, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore wisdom is not in
+the intellect as its subject.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): "The wisdom of
+doctrine is according to her name," for wisdom (_sapientia_) may be
+described as "sweet-tasting science (_sapida scientia_)," and this
+would seem to regard the appetite, to which it belongs to taste
+spiritual pleasure or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite
+rather than in the intellect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected by
+the gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two
+things where one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in
+the intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "wisdom is
+contrary to folly." But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom
+is also.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), wisdom denotes a certain
+rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of
+judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason,
+secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about
+which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after
+inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt
+the science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges
+of such matters by a kind of connaturality.
+
+Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue
+to pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made
+its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to
+judge aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine
+things, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things."
+
+Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of
+charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is
+joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently wisdom which is a
+gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has
+its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 14, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause, whence
+also wisdom (_sapientia_) takes its name, in so far as it denotes a
+certain sweetness (_saporem_). Hence the Reply to the Second
+Objection is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text
+quoted. For, apparently this is not the case, because such an
+exposition of the text would only fit the Latin word for wisdom,
+whereas it does not apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other
+languages. Hence it would seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands
+for the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised by all.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and
+judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of
+wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of
+knowledge, according to human ideas.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Wisdom Is Merely Speculative, or Practical Also?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely
+speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom
+which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual
+virtue, is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a
+gift, speculative and not practical.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of
+operation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things
+which are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation
+we seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we labor under a
+mighty bundle of wants." Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine
+things, in which there is no toiling under a load, since according to
+Wis. 8:16, "her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any
+tediousness." Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and not
+practical or active.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 4:5): "Walk with wisdom
+towards them that are without." Now this pertains to action.
+Therefore wisdom is not merely speculative, but also practical.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher
+part of the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is
+the domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same
+authority (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and
+consultation of the heavenly," i.e. Divine, "types" [*Cf. I, Q. 79,
+A. 9; I-II, Q. 74, A. 7]; it considers them, in so far as it
+contemplates Divine things in themselves, and it consults them, in so
+far as it judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs human
+acts according to Divine rules.
+
+Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also
+practical.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of
+things to which it extends, as stated in _De Causis,_ prop. x, xvii.
+Wherefore from the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more excellent
+than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more
+intimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to
+direct us not only in contemplation but also in action.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in
+themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are
+the subject-matter of human actions.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A thing is considered in itself before being compared
+with something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all
+contemplation which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards
+the direction of human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from
+the direction of wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in
+human acts; on the contrary the result of wisdom is to make the
+bitter sweet, and labor a rest.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Wisdom Can Be Without Grace, and with Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom can be without grace and with
+mortal sin. For saints glory chiefly in such things as are
+incompatible with mortal sin, according to 2 Cor. 1:12: "Our glory is
+this, the testimony of our conscience." Now one ought not to glory in
+one's wisdom, according to Jer. 9:23: "Let not the wise man glory in
+his wisdom." Therefore wisdom can be without grace and with mortal
+sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of Divine things, as stated
+above (A. 1). Now one in mortal sin may have knowledge of the Divine
+truth, according to Rom. 1:18: "(Those men that) detain the truth of
+God in injustice." Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of
+charity: "Nothing surpasses this gift of God, it is this alone that
+divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of
+eternal perdition." But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it
+does not divide the children of the kingdom from the children of
+perdition. Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter
+into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins."
+
+_I answer that,_ The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as
+stated above (A. 1), enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or
+of other things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain
+connaturalness or union with Divine things, which is the effect of
+charity, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 23, A. 5). Hence the wisdom of
+which we are speaking presupposes charity. Now charity is
+incompatible with mortal sin, as shown above (Q. 24, A. 12).
+Therefore it follows that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot
+be together with mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These words are to be understood as referring to
+worldly wisdom, or to wisdom in Divine things acquired through human
+reasons. In such wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov.
+30:2: "The wisdom of men is not with Me": But they do glory in Divine
+wisdom according to 1 Cor. 1:30: "(Who) of God is made unto us
+wisdom."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers, not the wisdom of which we
+speak but that which is acquired by the study and research of reason,
+and is compatible with mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although wisdom is distinct from charity, it
+presupposes it, and for that very reason divides the children of
+perdition from the children of the kingdom.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Wisdom Is in All Who Have Grace?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in all who have grace.
+For it is more to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. Now it is only for
+the perfect to hear wisdom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: "We speak wisdom
+among the perfect." Since then not all who have grace are perfect, it
+seems that much less all who have grace have wisdom.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "The wise man sets things in order," as the
+Philosopher states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is written (James 3:17)
+that the wise man "judges without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom
+that is from above . . . is . . . without judging, without
+dissimulation']". Now it is not for all that have grace, to judge, or
+put others in order, but only for those in authority. Therefore
+wisdom is not in all that have grace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "Wisdom is a remedy against folly," as Gregory says
+(Moral. ii, 49). Now many that have grace are naturally foolish, for
+instance madmen who are baptized or those who without being guilty of
+mortal sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all that
+have grace.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Whoever is without mortal sin, is beloved of God;
+since he has charity, whereby he loves God, and God loves them that
+love Him (Prov. 8:17). Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that "God loveth
+none but him that dwelleth with wisdom." Therefore wisdom is in all
+those who have charity and are without mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ The wisdom of which we are speaking, as stated above
+(A. 4), denotes a certain rectitude of judgment in the contemplation
+and consultation of Divine things, and as to both of these men obtain
+various degrees of wisdom through union with Divine things. For the
+measure of right judgment attained by some, whether in the
+contemplation of Divine things or in directing human affairs
+according to Divine rules, is no more than suffices for their
+salvation. This measure is wanting to none who is without mortal sin
+through having sanctifying grace, since if nature does not fail in
+necessaries, much less does grace fail: wherefore it is written (1
+John 2:27): "(His) unction teacheth you of all things."
+
+Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of wisdom, both as
+to the contemplation of Divine things (by both knowing more exalted
+mysteries and being able to impart this knowledge to others) and as to
+the direction of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being
+able to direct not only themselves but also others according to those
+rules). This degree of wisdom is not common to all that have
+sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces, which
+the Holy Ghost dispenses as He will, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: "To one
+indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom," etc.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks there of wisdom, as extending
+to the hidden mysteries of Divine things, as indeed he says himself (2
+Cor. 1:7): "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is
+hidden."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although it belongs to those alone who are in
+authority to direct and judge other men, yet every man is competent to
+direct and judge his own actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad
+Demophil.).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Baptized idiots, like little children, have the
+habit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not
+the act, on account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of
+reason in them.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Seventh Beatitude Corresponds to the Gift of Wisdom?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond
+to the gift of wisdom. For the seventh beatitude is: "Blessed are the
+peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Now both
+these things belong to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps.
+118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy law," and, as the
+Apostle says (Rom. 5:5), "the charity of God is poured forth in our
+hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," and Who is "the Spirit
+of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]" (Rom. 8:15).
+Therefore the seventh beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity
+rather than to wisdom.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a thing is declared by its proximate effect rather
+than by its remote effect. Now the proximate effect of wisdom seems
+to be charity, according to Wis. 7:27: "Through nations she conveyeth
+herself into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and prophets":
+whereas peace and the adoption of sons seem to be remote effects,
+since they result from charity, as stated above (Q. 29, A. 3).
+Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be determined
+in respect of the love of charity rather than in respect of peace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (James 3:17): "The wisdom, that is
+from above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy to
+be persuaded, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits,
+judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'without judging, without
+dissimulation']." Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom
+should not refer to peace rather than to the other effects of
+heavenly wisdom.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) that
+"wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in whom there is no movement of
+rebellion, but only obedience to reason."
+
+_I answer that,_ The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the
+gift of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward. The merit
+is denoted in the words, "Blessed are the peacemakers." Now a
+peacemaker is one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others:
+and in both cases this is the result of setting in due order those
+things in which peace is established, for "peace is the tranquillity
+of order," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). Now it
+belongs to wisdom to set things in order, as the Philosopher declares
+(Metaph. i, 2), wherefore peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to
+wisdom. The reward is expressed in the words, "they shall be called
+the children of God." Now men are called the children of God in so
+far as they participate in the likeness of the only-begotten and
+natural Son of God, according to Rom. 8:29, "Whom He foreknew . . .
+to be made conformable to the image of His Son," Who is Wisdom
+Begotten. Hence by participating in the gift of wisdom, man attains
+to the sonship of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it belongs to
+wisdom to make peace by setting things in order. Likewise the Holy
+Ghost is called the "Spirit of adoption" in so far as we receive from
+Him the likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten Wisdom.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: These words refer to the Uncreated Wisdom, which in the
+first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and
+consequently reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is
+infused wisdom. Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the
+cause but the effect of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 3) it belongs to wisdom, as a gift,
+not only to contemplate Divine things, but also to regulate human
+acts. Now the first thing to be effected in this direction of human
+acts is the removal of evils opposed to wisdom: wherefore fear is
+said to be "the beginning of wisdom," because it makes us shun evil,
+while the last thing is like an end, whereby all things are reduced
+to their right order; and it is this that constitutes peace. Hence
+James said with reason that "the wisdom that is from above" (and this
+is the gift of the Holy Ghost) "first indeed is chaste," because it
+avoids the corruption of sin, and "then peaceable," wherein lies the
+ultimate effect of wisdom, for which reason peace is numbered among
+the beatitudes. As to the things that follow, they declare in
+becoming order the means whereby wisdom leads to peace. For when a
+man, by chastity, avoids the corruption of sin, the first thing he
+has to do is, as far as he can, to be moderate in all things, and in
+this respect wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly, in those matters
+in which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be guided by the
+advice of others, and as to this we are told further that wisdom is
+"easy to be persuaded." These two are conditions required that man
+may be at peace with himself. But in order that man may be at peace
+with others it is furthermore required, first that he should not be
+opposed to their good; this is what is meant by "consenting to the
+good." Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor's deficiencies,
+sympathy in his heart, and succor in his actions, and this is denoted
+by the words "full of mercy and good fruits." Thirdly, he should
+strive in all charity to correct the sins of others, and this is
+indicated by the words "judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The
+wisdom that is from above . . . is . . . without judging, without
+dissimulation'," lest he should purpose to sate his hatred under
+cover of correction.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 46
+
+OF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this
+head there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?
+
+(2) Whether folly is a sin?
+
+(3) To which capital sin is it reducible?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 46, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Folly Is Contrary to Wisdom?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For
+seemingly unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not
+seem to be the same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about
+Divine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine and human
+things. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the other.
+But folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1 Cor.
+3:18): "If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him
+become a fool, that he may be wise." Therefore folly is not opposed
+to wisdom.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But
+wisdom is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jer. 10:14): "Every
+man is become a fool for knowledge," and wisdom is a kind of
+knowledge. Moreover, it is written (Isa. 47:10): "Thy wisdom and thy
+knowledge, this hath deceived thee." Now it belongs to folly to be
+deceived. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that "a
+fool is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is
+unconcerned when he is injured." But this pertains to spiritual
+wisdom, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not
+opposed to wisdom.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of
+wisdom is given as a remedy against folly."
+
+_I answer that,_ _Stultitia (Folly)_ seems to take its name from
+_stupor;_ wherefore Isidore says (loc. cit.): "A fool is one who
+through dullness (_stuporem_) remains unmoved." And folly differs
+from fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that
+folly implies apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while
+fatuity denotes entire privation of the spiritual sense. Therefore
+folly is fittingly opposed to wisdom.
+
+For "sapiens" (_wise_) as Isidore says (Etym. x) "is so named from
+_sapor_ (savor), because just as the taste is quick to distinguish
+between savors of meats, so is a wise man in discerning things and
+causes." Wherefore it is manifest that _folly_ is opposed to _wisdom_
+as its contrary, while _fatuity_ is opposed to it as a pure negation:
+since the fatuous man lacks the sense of judgment, while the fool has
+the sense, though dulled, whereas the wise man has the sense acute
+and penetrating.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Isidore (Etym. x), "unwisdom is contrary
+to wisdom because it lacks the savor of discretion and sense"; so
+that unwisdom is seemingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear
+to be a fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that
+judgment, which is according to the highest cause, for if a man fails
+in judgment about some trivial matter, he is not for that reason
+called a fool.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as there is an evil wisdom, as stated above (Q.
+45, A. 1, ad 1), called "worldly wisdom," because it takes for the
+highest cause and last end some worldly good, so too there is a good
+folly opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly
+things: and it is of this folly that the Apostle speaks.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is the wisdom of the world that deceives and makes
+us foolish in God's sight, as is evident from the Apostle's words (1
+Cor. 3:19).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: To be unconcerned when one is injured is sometimes due
+to the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but only for
+heavenly things. Hence this belongs not to worldly but to Divine
+wisdom, as Gregory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it is
+the result of a man's being simply stupid about everything, as may be
+seen in idiots, who do not discern what is injurious to them, and
+this belongs to folly simply.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Folly Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not a sin. For no sin arises
+in us from nature. But some are fools naturally. Therefore folly is
+not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "Every sin is voluntary," according to Augustine (De
+Vera Relig. xiv). But folly is not voluntary. Therefore it is not a
+sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine precept. But folly
+is not contrary to any precept. Therefore folly is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 1:32): "The prosperity of
+fools shall destroy them." But no man is destroyed save for sin.
+Therefore folly is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Folly, as stated above (A. 1), denotes dullness of
+sense in judging, and chiefly as regards the highest cause, which is
+the last end and the sovereign good. Now a man may in this respect
+contract dullness in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural
+indisposition, as in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no
+sin. Secondly, by plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his
+sense is rendered incapable of perceiving Divine things, according to
+1 Cor. 2:14, "The sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of
+the Spirit of God," even as sweet things have no savor for a man
+whose taste is infected with an evil humor: and such like folly is a
+sin.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Though no man wishes to be a fool, yet he wishes those
+things of which folly is a consequence, viz. to withdraw his sense
+from spiritual things and to plunge it into earthly things. The same
+thing happens in regard to other sins; for the lustful man desires
+pleasure, without which there is no sin, although he does not desire
+sin simply, for he would wish to enjoy the pleasure without sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Folly is opposed to the precepts about the
+contemplation of truth, of which we have spoken above (Q. 16) when
+we were treating of knowledge and understanding.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 46, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Folly Is a Daughter of Lust?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not a daughter of lust. For
+Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the daughters of lust, among
+which however he makes no mention of folly. Therefore folly does not
+proceed from lust.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:19): "The wisdom of this
+world is foolishness with God." Now, according to Gregory (Moral. x,
+29) "the wisdom of this world consists in covering the heart with
+crafty devices;" and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a
+daughter of duplicity rather than of lust.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, anger especially is the cause of fury and madness in
+some persons; and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises from
+anger rather than from lust.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 7:22): "Immediately he
+followeth her," i.e. the harlot . . . "not knowing that he is drawn
+like a fool to bonds."
+
+_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 2), folly, in so far as it is
+a sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be
+incapable of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is plunged
+into earthly things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of
+pleasures; and these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore
+the folly which is a sin, arises chiefly from lust.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is part of folly that a man should have a distaste
+for God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust,
+pertaining to folly, namely, "hatred of God" and "despair of the life
+to come"; thus he divides folly into two parts as it were.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: These words of the Apostle are to be understood, not
+causally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is
+folly with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to
+worldly wisdom, is a cause of this folly.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 48, AA. 2, 3, 4), produces a great change in the nature
+of the body, wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which
+results from a bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is
+caused by a spiritual impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged into
+earthly things, arises chiefly from lust, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+TREATISE ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (QQ. 47-170)
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 47
+
+OF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF
+(In Sixteen Articles)
+
+After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence
+consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider
+prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding
+gift; fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning
+prudence.
+
+Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason?
+
+(2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also
+in the speculative reason?
+
+(3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars?
+
+(4) Whether it is virtue?
+
+(5) Whether it is a special virtue?
+
+(6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues?
+
+(7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues?
+
+(8) Whether its proper act is command?
+
+(9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence?
+
+(10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many?
+
+(11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same
+in species as that which regards the common good?
+
+(12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?
+
+(13) Whether prudence is in the wicked?
+
+(14) Whether prudence is in all good men?
+
+(15) Whether prudence is in us naturally?
+
+(16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Prudence Is in the Cognitive or in the Appetitive Faculty?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but
+in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv):
+"Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and
+those that hinder." Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the
+appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs
+to prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the
+appetitive faculty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1). Therefore
+prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art it
+is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case
+of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse." Now the moral virtues,
+of which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas
+art is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather
+than in the rational faculty.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): "Prudence is
+the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who
+sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the
+event of uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but
+to the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence
+belongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty,
+because by the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and
+offers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future
+from knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to prudence,
+belongs properly to the reason, because this is done by a process of
+comparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is
+in the reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4) the will moves all the
+faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty
+is love, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Accordingly
+prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as
+love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say
+that "prudence is love discerning aright that which helps from that
+which hinders us in tending to God." Now love is said to discern
+because it moves the reason to discern.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as
+they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at
+the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence
+considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end.
+Now of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in
+the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs
+more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi,
+5, 7, 9) that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as choice
+presupposes counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been
+already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also
+be ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence
+directs the choice by means of counsel.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely,
+but in its application to action, which is the end of the practical
+reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to
+prudence, since, the end being of most import in everything, it
+follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst of all.
+Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is
+"something more than a merely rational habit," such as art is, since,
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4) it includes application to
+action, which application is an act of the will.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Prudence Belongs to the Practical Reason Alone or Also to
+the Speculative Reason?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the
+practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written
+(Prov. 10:23): "Wisdom is prudence to a man." Now wisdom consists
+chiefly in contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is
+concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of
+fuller knowledge." Now this belongs to the speculative reason.
+Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same
+part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical
+but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore
+prudence also is both practical and speculative.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence
+is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the
+practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a
+prudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now
+counsel is about things that we have to do in relation to some end:
+and the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the
+practical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in
+the practical reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 45, AA. 1, 3), wisdom considers the
+absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest
+cause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in
+the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all
+human life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for
+the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be
+prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare,
+so he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is
+said to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is
+wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is
+not about the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good,
+and this is not the best thing of all. And so it is stated
+significantly that "prudence is wisdom for man," but not wisdom
+absolutely.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the
+word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether
+speculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act
+itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a
+matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently
+comes under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards
+its specification in relation to its object which is the "necessary
+true," it comes under neither counsel nor prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every application of right reason in the work of
+production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the
+application of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those
+wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in
+_Ethic._ iii, 3. Since then, the speculative reason makes things such
+as syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process follows
+certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is
+possible to have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so
+we find such a thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative
+prudence.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Prudence Takes Cognizance of Singulars?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of
+singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).
+But "reason deals with universals," according to _Phys._ i, 5.
+Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason
+cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence
+which is right reason, is not about singulars.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is
+not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are
+devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of
+singulars.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence
+does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of
+singulars also."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), to prudence belongs
+not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to
+action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can
+conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the
+thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now
+actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the
+prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the
+singulars about which actions are concerned.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals,
+and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases:
+hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also
+particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to
+matter, as stated in _De Anima_ iii.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot
+be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are uncertain"
+(Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of
+singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule,
+and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does
+not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects,
+but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and
+experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not
+mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its
+princip[al] subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind
+of application it extends to this sense.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Prudence Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For
+Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of
+what to desire and what to avoid." Now science is condivided with
+virtue, as appears in the _Predicaments_ (vi). Therefore prudence is
+not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a
+virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore
+art is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written
+(2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort
+of graving, and to devise ingeniously (_prudenter_) all that there
+may be need of in the work." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is
+immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): "Set bounds
+to thy prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence,
+temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 56, A. 1)
+when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which
+makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." Now good may
+be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing
+that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good,
+under the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power.
+Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, without
+regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature
+of a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say,
+to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the
+aspect of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the
+rectitude of the appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because
+they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in
+other words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of
+good.
+
+Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3) to
+apply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right
+appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the
+other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues
+have it, among which virtues it is enumerated.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for
+any kind of right reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art,
+because art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in
+order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a
+virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing
+to do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a
+particular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet,
+by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in
+matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the
+uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for
+counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as
+stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence
+itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on
+other things according to prudence.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Prudence Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For
+no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general,
+since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that
+follows a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as
+a wise man decides." Now right reason is reason in accordance with
+prudence, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a
+special virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the
+effect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that
+of prudence, right action as regards the means." Now in every virtue
+certain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore
+prudence is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But prudence
+has not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to action"
+(Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore
+prudence is not a special virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is distinct from and numbered among the other
+virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and
+prudence, justice and fortitude."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since acts and habits take their species from their
+objects, as shown above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 2; Q. 54, A. 2),
+any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from
+other objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good
+habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special,
+not merely according to the consideration of its matter, but rather
+according to its formal aspect, as explained above (I-II, Q. 54, A.
+2, ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the subject matter of the
+acts of different habits, and also of different powers, according to
+its different formal aspects. Now a yet greater difference of object
+is requisite for a difference of powers than for a difference of
+habits, since several habits are found in the same power, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 1). Consequently any difference in the aspect
+of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will _a fortiori_
+require a difference of habits.
+
+Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as
+stated above (A. 2), it is differentiated from the other intellectual
+virtues by a material difference of objects. _Wisdom,_    _knowledge_
+and _understanding_ are about necessary things, whereas _art_ and
+_prudence_ are about contingent things, art being concerned with
+_things made,_ that is, with things produced in external matter, such
+as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with
+_things done,_ that is, with things that have their being in the doer
+himself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4). On the other hand
+prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a
+formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power,
+wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral
+virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue,
+distinct from all other virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of
+moral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an
+intellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in
+common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral
+virtue is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the
+aspect of virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument proves that prudence helps all the
+virtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove
+that it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus
+from containing a species which is operative in every other species
+of that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so
+far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true:
+but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are
+the object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Prudence Appoints the End to Moral Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral
+virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in
+the appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral
+virtue, as reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the
+appetitive power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral
+virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but
+he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts
+of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to
+irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures,
+according to _Polit._ i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are
+directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is "right reason
+applied to action," as stated above (A. 2). Therefore all actions are
+directed to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the
+end to all moral virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is
+concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are
+concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral
+virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral
+virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while
+prudence ensures the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not
+belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to
+regulate the means.
+
+_I answer that,_ The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good
+of the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius
+declares (Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of
+necessity pre-exist in the reason.
+
+Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things
+naturally known, about which is _understanding,_ and certain things
+of which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about
+which is _science,_ so in the practical reason, certain things
+pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of
+the moral virtues, since the end is in practical matters what
+principles are in speculative matters, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 7,
+ad 2; I-II, Q. 13, A. 3); while certain things are in the practical
+reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather
+from the ends themselves. About these is prudence, which applies
+universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical
+matters. Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the
+end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Natural reason known by the name of _synderesis_
+appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above (I, Q. 79, A. 12):
+but prudence does not do this for the reason given above.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they
+appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is
+appointed by natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence,
+which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it
+follows that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and
+moves them: yet _synderesis_ moves prudence, just as the
+understanding of principles moves science.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 7]
+
+Whether It Belongs to Prudence to Find the Mean in Moral Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to
+find the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is
+the end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to
+moral virtues, as shown above (A. 6). Therefore it does not find the
+mean in them.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have
+no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to
+have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs
+to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as
+shown above (A. 5, Obj. 1). Therefore prudence does not cause the
+mean in moral virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral
+virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as
+Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a
+second nature in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not
+appoint the mean to moral virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In the foregoing definition of moral virtue
+(A. 5, Obj. 1) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by
+reason . . . even as a wise man decides."
+
+_I answer that,_ The proper end of each moral virtue consists
+precisely in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends
+that man should not stray from reason for the sake of his
+concupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right
+judgment of reason through fear or daring. Moreover this end is
+appointed to man according to natural reason, since natural reason
+dictates to each one that he should act according to reason.
+
+But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and
+by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For
+though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet
+this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are
+directed to the end.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in
+matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to
+belong to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and
+operations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong
+to virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends
+to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in
+all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of
+nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this
+purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Command Is the Chief Act of Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of
+prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine
+(De Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid
+ambushes." Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the
+prudent man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to
+command" seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been
+said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 6). Therefore command is not the chief
+act of prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to
+rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other
+powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the
+reason. Therefore command is not an act of prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that
+"prudence commands."
+
+_I answer that,_ Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as
+stated above (A. 2). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in
+regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there
+are three such acts. The first is _to take counsel,_ which belongs to
+discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above (I-II,
+Q. 14, A. 1). The second act is _to judge of what one has
+discovered,_ and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the
+practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its
+third act is _to command,_ which act consists in applying to action
+the things counselled and judged. And since this act approaches
+nearer to the end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the
+chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence.
+
+In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists
+in judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily
+against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so
+involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment,
+and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the
+reverse in prudence, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 5, for it is more
+imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the
+chief act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good
+and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the
+avoidance of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an
+act of prudence that does not continue in heaven.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good things
+discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to
+prudence which takes good counsel.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes
+motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of
+the reason, as stated above (I-II, Q. 17, A. 1).
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 9]
+
+Whether Solicitude Belongs to Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that solicitude does not belong to
+prudence. For solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says
+(Etym. x) that "a solicitous man is a restless man." Now motion
+belongs chiefly to the appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does
+also. But prudence is not in the appetitive power, but in the reason,
+as stated above (A. 1). Therefore solicitude does not belong to
+prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to solicitude,
+wherefore it is related (1 Kings 9:20) that Samuel said to Saul: "As
+for the asses which were lost three days ago, be not solicitous,
+because they are found." Now the certainty of truth belongs to
+prudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is
+in opposition to prudence rather than belonging to it.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the "magnanimous
+man is slow and leisurely." Now slowness is contrary to solicitude.
+Since then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for "good is not
+opposed to good," as stated in the _Predicaments_ (viii) it would
+seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 4:7): "Be prudent . . . and
+watch in prayers." But watchfulness is the same as solicitude.
+Therefore solicitude belongs to prudence.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be
+solicitous through being shrewd (_solers_) and alert (_citus_), in so
+far as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to
+do whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief
+act is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in
+matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that
+"one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in
+taking counsel." Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to
+prudence, and for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv)
+that "prudence keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we
+be deceived unawares by evil counsel."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to the
+principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction and
+command of reason, wherein solicitude consists.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "equal
+certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter
+according to its proper mode." And since the matter of prudence is
+the contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty
+of prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The magnanimous man is said to be "slow and leisurely"
+not because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not
+over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where
+he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for
+over-much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since
+fear makes us take counsel, as stated above (I-II, Q. 44, A. 2) when
+we were treating of the passion of fear.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 10]
+
+Whether Solicitude Belongs to Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not extend to the
+governing of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common
+good is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore
+prudence is not directed to the common good.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for
+himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their own.
+Therefore they are not prudent.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance
+and fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only
+to a man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou,
+is a faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath
+appointed over his family?"
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some
+have held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only
+to the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man
+is not bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is
+opposed to charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13:5):
+wherefore the Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): "Not seeking
+that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be
+saved." Moreover it is contrary to right reason, which judges the
+common good to be better than the good of the individual.
+
+Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge,
+and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is
+evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the
+individual, but also the common good of the multitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now
+just as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is
+called "legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the
+common good is called "political" prudence, for the latter stands in
+the same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to
+moral virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in
+consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the
+individual good is impossible without the common good of the family,
+state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict.
+Memor. iv, 6] of the ancient Romans that "they would rather be poor
+in a rich empire than rich in a poor empire." Secondly, because,
+since man is a part of the home and state, he must needs consider
+what is good for him by being prudent about the good of the many. For
+the good disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole;
+thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that "any part which does not
+harmonize with its whole, is offensive."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the
+common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as
+stated in _Ethic._ v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice,
+since these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the
+universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 11]
+
+Whether Prudence About One's Own Good Is Specifically the Same As
+That Which Extends to the Common Good?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same
+specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and
+prudence are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue is
+the same in a good man and in a good ruler." Now political prudence
+is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were.
+Since then prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence
+and political prudence are the same habit.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by
+things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular good,
+which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the
+common good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence
+and political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.
+
+_On the contrary,_ "Political prudence," which is directed to the
+common good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things
+as relate to the common good of the household or family, and
+"monastic economy" which is concerned with things affecting the good
+of one person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner
+there are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above
+differences of matter.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5; Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), the
+species of habits differ according to the difference of object
+considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things
+directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above
+(I-II, Prolog.; Q. 102, A. 1), wherefore the species of habits differ
+by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the
+good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are
+different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of
+prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is
+"prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good;
+another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of
+the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the
+common good of the state or kingdom.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is
+substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is
+the same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This
+is called "prudence" in respect of the common notion of prudence,
+i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is called
+"political," as being directed to the common good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it
+belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well,"
+wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good
+ruler. Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs
+specifically, even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated
+by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the
+other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits
+directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically
+although their ends are subordinate to one another. In like manner,
+though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the
+many, that does not prevent this difference from making the habits
+differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed
+to the last end is above the other habits and commands them.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 12]
+
+Whether Prudence Is in Subjects, or Only in Their Rulers?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only
+in their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that
+"prudence alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues
+are common to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is
+not a virtue but a true opinion."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in _Polit._ i, 5 that "a slave is not
+competent to take counsel." But prudence makes a man take good
+counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or
+subjects.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above (A. 8).
+But command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only
+of rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are
+two kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and
+belongs to rulers, while the other "retains the common name
+political," and is about "individual actions." Now it belongs also to
+subjects to perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is
+not only in rulers but also in subjects.
+
+_I answer that,_ Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing
+belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to
+reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and
+governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the
+slave as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to
+be ruled and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a
+slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject.
+
+Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share
+in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately
+competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is
+in the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but
+in the subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood
+strictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as
+such.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as
+he is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he
+does take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: By prudence a man commands not only others, but also
+himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers.
+_______________________
+
+THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 13]
+
+Whether Prudence Can Be in Sinners?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For
+our Lord said (Luke 16:8): "The children of this world are more
+prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of
+light." Now the children of this world are sinners. Therefore there
+be prudence in sinners.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But
+there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence also.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vi, 7, "we say that to be of
+good counsel is the work of prudent man especially." Now many sinners
+can take good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it
+is impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good." Now no sinner
+is a good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.
+
+_I answer that,_ Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence,
+which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a
+prudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be
+done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are
+fitting for an evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he
+takes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man
+is called "a good robber," and in this way may speak of "a prudent
+robber," by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of
+committing robbery. This is the prudence of which the Apostle says
+(Rom. 8:6): "The prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is death,"
+because, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of the
+flesh.
+
+The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises
+fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a
+twofold source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is
+not the common end of all human life, but of some particular affair;
+thus when a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of
+sailing a ship, he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent
+sailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as
+when a man takes counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even
+about things concerning life as a whole, but fails to make an
+effective command.
+
+The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel,
+judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole
+life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in
+sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while
+imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that
+which is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since
+that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is
+only in the wicked.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the
+first prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent
+absolutely, but that they are prudent in "their generation."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the
+appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the
+other hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First
+because its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such
+ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue,
+which rectify the appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there
+is no prudence, as shown above (I-II, Q. 58, A. 5); secondly because
+prudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless the
+appetite be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object is
+more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is
+more opposed to sin, which arises from a disorder of the appetite.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for
+some particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for
+the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel
+into effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good
+only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12)
+there is "cleverness," [*_deinotike_] i.e. natural diligence which
+may be directed to both good and evil; or "cunning," [*_panourgia_]
+which is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be
+"false prudence" or "prudence of the flesh."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 14]
+
+Whether Prudence Is in All Who Have Grace?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace.
+Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to
+be done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore
+not all who have grace have prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as
+stated above (A. 8, Obj. 2; A. 13, Obj. 3). Yet many have grace who do
+not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others.
+Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young
+people are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace.
+Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace.
+
+_On the contrary,_ No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man
+can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46)
+that "the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect
+prudently what they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have
+grace have prudence.
+
+_I answer that,_ The virtues must needs be connected together, so that
+whoever has one has all, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Now
+ whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the
+other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above
+(A. 4), he must, of necessity, have prudence also.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient
+with regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is
+given to all who have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things"
+(1 John 2:27). There is also another diligence which is more than
+sufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself
+and for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also
+in all things relating to human life; and such diligence as this is
+not in all who have grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those who require to be guided by the counsel of
+others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves
+in this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and
+can discern good from evil counsel.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of
+acts, wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic.
+ii, 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act.
+On the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion.
+Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the
+use of reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even
+as in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it
+is also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This
+by practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the
+other virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong meat is
+for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to
+the discerning of good and evil."
+_______________________
+
+FIFTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 15]
+
+Whether Prudence Is in Us by Nature?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The
+Philosopher says that things connected with prudence "seem to be
+natural," namely "synesis, gnome" [*_synesis_ and _gnome_, Cf. I-II,
+Q. 57, A. 6] and the like, but not those which are connected with
+speculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the
+same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now
+prudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: "In the ancient is
+wisdom, and in length of days prudence." Therefore prudence is
+natural.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than
+with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain
+natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De
+Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that
+"intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it
+therefore demands experience and time." Now prudence is an
+intellectual virtue, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore prudence is in
+us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience.
+
+_I answer that,_ As shown above (A. 3), prudence includes knowledge
+both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which
+prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards
+the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of
+speculative science, because the primary universal principles of
+either are known naturally, as shown above (A. 6): except that the
+common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the
+Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the
+speculative reason is better than that which is according to man":
+whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the
+speculative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from
+nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through
+teaching.
+
+On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are
+the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because
+this matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now
+the right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a
+natural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated
+above (I-II, Q. 51, A. 1; Q. 63, A. 1) that some, from a natural
+inclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to right
+ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment
+about such like ends.
+
+But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed,
+are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and
+affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to
+something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man
+naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man
+has a greater aptitude than another in discerning them, just as it
+happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since
+then prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated
+above (A. 6; I-II, Q. 57, A. 5), it follows that prudence is not from
+nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to
+prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had
+said before (Ethic. vi, 5, 11) that "they are the principles of the
+_ou heneka_" [*Literally, 'for the sake of which' (are the means)],
+namely, the end; and so he does not mention _euboulia_ among them,
+because it takes counsel about the means.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their
+natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but
+also because of their long experience.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining
+an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species
+act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his
+reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently
+extends to an infinity of singulars.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 16]
+
+Whether Prudence Can Be Lost Through Forgetfulness?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through
+forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is
+more certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of
+action. But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is
+prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same
+things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now
+the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of
+many memories," as he states at the beginning of his _Metaphysics_
+(i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems
+that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of
+universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through
+forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that
+"forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence."
+
+_I answer that,_ Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one
+can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because
+they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge
+alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above
+(A. 8), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies
+the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation.
+Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but
+rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+vi, 5) that "pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence":
+wherefore it is written (Dan. 13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and
+lust hath subverted thy heart," and (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt thou
+take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: 'wise']."
+
+Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the
+latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison
+fails, as stated above [*Cf. I-II, Q. 53, A. 1].
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The experience required by prudence results not from
+memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of
+universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (A. 3).
+Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the
+principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 48
+
+OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE
+(In One Article)
+
+We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are
+four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Which are the parts of prudence?
+
+(2) Of its integral parts;
+
+(3) Of its subjective parts;
+
+(4) Of its potential parts.
+_______________________
+
+ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 48, Art.]
+
+Whether Three Parts of Prudence Are Fittingly Assigned?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned
+unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of
+prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight."
+Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus
+ascribes to prudence six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding,"
+"circumspection," "foresight," "docility" and "caution." Aristotle
+says (Ethic. vi, 9, 10, 11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and
+"gnome" belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he
+mentions "conjecture," "shrewdness," "sense" and "understanding." And
+another Greek philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q. 80, Obj. 4] says that
+ten things are connected with prudence, namely, "good counsel,"
+"shrewdness," "foresight," "regnative [*Regnativa]," "military,"
+"political" and "domestic prudence," "dialectics," "rhetoric" and
+"physics." Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is
+either excessive or deficient.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But
+politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences. Therefore
+they are not parts of prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the
+intellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility,
+belong not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits.
+Therefore they should not be set down as parts of prudence.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts
+of the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above (I-II, Q.
+16, A. 1). Therefore, just as "eubulia" which refers to counsel, is
+connected with prudence, and "synesis" and "gnome" which refer to
+judgment, so also ought something to have been assigned corresponding
+to use.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above (Q.
+47, A. 9). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among
+the parts of prudence.
+
+_I answer that,_ Parts are of three kinds, namely, _integral,_ as
+wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; _subjective,_ as ox
+and lion are parts of animal; and _potential,_ as the nutritive and
+sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be
+assigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral
+parts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of
+a virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of
+all the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of
+prudence, namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with the addition of
+a seventh, viz. _memory_ mentioned by Tully; and _eustochia_ or
+_shrewdness_ mentioned by Aristotle. For the _sense_ of prudence is
+also called _understanding_: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+vi, 11): "Of such things one needs to have the sense, and this is
+understanding." Of these eight, five belong to prudence as a
+cognitive virtue, namely, _memory, reasoning, understanding,
+_docility_ and _shrewdness:_ while the three others belong thereto,
+as commanding and applying knowledge to action, namely, _foresight,
+circumspection_ and _caution._ The reason of their difference is seen
+from the fact that three things may be observed in reference to
+knowledge. In the first place, knowledge itself, which, if it be of
+the past, is called _memory,_ if of the present, whether contingent
+or necessary, is called _understanding_ or _intelligence._ Secondly,
+the acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to
+which pertains _docility,_ or by _discovery,_ and to this belongs to
+_eustochia_, i.e. "a happy conjecture," of which _shrewdness_ is a
+part, which is a "quick conjecture of the middle term," as stated in
+Poster. i, 9. Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed
+from things known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this
+belongs to _reasoning._ And the reason, in order to command aright,
+requires to have three conditions. First, to order that which is
+befitting the end, and this belongs to _foresight;_ secondly, to
+attend to the circumstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs
+to _circumspection;_ thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to
+_caution._
+
+The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way
+the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence
+whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a
+multitude, which differ specifically as stated above (Q. 47, A. 11).
+Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into
+various species according to the various kinds of multitude. There is
+the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose;
+thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that
+governs this is called _military._ There is also the multitude that
+is united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a
+home or family, and this is ruled by _domestic prudence_: and such
+again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of
+which is _regnative prudence_ in the ruler, and _political prudence,_
+simply so called, in the subjects.
+
+If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also
+speculative knowledge, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 2) then its
+parts include _dialectics,_ _rhetoric_ and _physics,_ according to
+three methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the
+attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to _physics_ (if
+physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The
+second method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises,
+and this belongs to _dialectics._ The third method is to employ
+conjectures in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade
+somewhat, and this belongs to _rhetoric._ It may be said, however,
+that these three belong also to prudence properly so called, since it
+argues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes from
+probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.
+
+The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it,
+which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having,
+as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the
+parts of prudence are _good counsel,_ which concerns counsel,
+_synesis,_ which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence,
+and _gnome,_ which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the
+law: while _prudence_ is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The various enumerations differ, either because
+different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is
+mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another
+enumeration. Thus Tully includes "caution" and "circumspection" under
+"foresight," and "reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under
+"understanding."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as
+sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply
+may be gathered from what has been said.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by
+taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with
+things pertaining to prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Right command and right use always go together, because
+the reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of the
+lower powers, which pertain to use.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 49
+
+OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under
+this head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Memory;
+
+(2) Understanding or Intelligence;
+
+(3) Docility;
+
+(4) Shrewdness;
+
+(5) Reason;
+
+(6) Foresight;
+
+(7) Circumspection;
+
+(8) Caution.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Memory Is a Part of Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For
+memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the
+sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part
+(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience,
+whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part
+of prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards
+future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated
+in _Ethic._ vi, 2, 7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory
+among the parts of prudence.
+
+_I answer that,_ Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as
+stated above (Q. 47, A. 5). Now in such like matters a man can be
+directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true,
+but by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles
+must be proportionate to their conclusions, and "like must be
+concluded from like" (Ethic. vi [*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need
+experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases:
+wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual
+virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time." Now
+experience is the result of many memories as stated in _Metaph._ i,
+1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence
+memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6), prudence applies
+universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence
+many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for
+prudence, and memory is one of them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while
+its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says
+in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16, 24], memory not
+only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.
+
+There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when
+a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet
+somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us
+more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the
+mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we
+were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these
+illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions
+easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some
+corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on
+sensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive
+part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his
+memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may
+pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says
+(De Memor. et Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to
+us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other."
+Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to
+remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less
+it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric
+[*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the figures
+of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we
+wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that
+"reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria
+ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing
+frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one
+thing to another by a kind of natural order.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future
+from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to
+take good counsel for the future.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Understanding* Is a Part of Prudence?
+[*Otherwise intuition; Aristotle's word is _nous_]
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of
+prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part
+of the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding
+and prudence, according to _Ethic._ vi, 3. Therefore understanding
+should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the
+Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (Q. 8, AA. 1,
+8). But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what
+has been said above (Q. 4, A. 8; I-II, Q. 62, A. 2). Therefore
+understanding does not pertain to prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic.
+vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and
+immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not
+a part of prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts
+"intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i,
+8] mentions "understanding," which comes to the same.
+
+_I answer that,_ Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual
+power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is
+taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first
+principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds
+from certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every
+process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding.
+Therefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole
+process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding.
+Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a
+conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated
+above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6), it applies the knowledge of some universal
+principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a
+singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must
+proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of
+universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is an
+intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative
+principles, but also practical universal principles, such as "One
+should do evil to no man," as shown above (Q. 47, A. 6). The other
+understanding, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 11, is cognizant of an
+extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent practical
+matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the
+syllogism of prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6). Now this
+primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place.
+Wherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right
+estimate of some particular end.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is
+a quick insight into divine things, as shown above (Q. 8, AA. 1, 2).
+It is in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as
+stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The right estimate about a particular end is called
+both "understanding," in so far as its object is a principle, and
+"sense," in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the
+Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we
+need to have the sense, and this is understanding." But this is to be
+understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know
+proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a
+particular.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Docility Should Be Accounted a Part of Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that docility should not be accounted a
+part of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every
+intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But
+docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it
+should not be accounted a part of prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our
+power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are
+praised or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this
+is befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it
+is not a part of prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since
+it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are also
+called "preceptors." Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the
+opinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 1; Q. 47, A. 3) prudence
+is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such
+matters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all
+sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of
+time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of
+being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a
+sane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "It is right to pay no less
+attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such
+persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to
+their demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into
+principles." Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not on thy own
+prudence," and (Ecclus. 6:35): "Stand in the multitude of the
+ancients" (i.e. the old men), "that are wise, and join thyself from
+thy heart to their wisdom." Now it is a mark of docility to be ready
+to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part
+of prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although docility is useful for every intellectual
+virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given
+above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for
+other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for
+much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must
+carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings
+of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor
+despising them through pride.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but
+also for himself, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 12, ad 3). Hence as
+stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for
+prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned should
+be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether
+self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Shrewdness Is Part of Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence.
+For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for
+demonstrations, as stated in _Poster._ i, 34. Now the reasoning of
+prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies.
+Therefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to
+_Ethic._ vi, 5, 7, 9. Now there is no place in good counsel for
+shrewdness [*Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of
+_eustochia_, i.e. "a happy conjecture": for the latter is
+"unreasoning and rapid," whereas counsel needs to be slow, as stated
+in _Ethic._ vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be accounted a
+part of prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, shrewdness as stated above (Q. 48) is a "happy
+conjecture." Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of
+conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to
+prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one
+who is shrewd and alert (_solers citus_)." But solicitude belongs to
+prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore shrewdness does
+also.
+
+_I answer that,_ Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters
+of action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways,
+both in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it
+oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility
+consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from
+another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right
+estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for _eustochia_,
+of which it is a part. For _eustochia_ is a happy conjecture about
+any matter, while shrewdness is "an easy and rapid conjecture in
+finding the middle term" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the
+philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q. 48, Obj. 1] who calls shrewdness a
+part of prudence, takes it for _eustochia_, in general, hence he
+says: "Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered
+rapidly."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the
+middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical
+syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends
+they are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher
+says (Poster. i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9)
+to prove that _euboulia_, i.e. good counsel, is not _eustochia_,
+which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a
+man may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing,
+and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in
+taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for
+instance, something has to be done without warning. It is for this
+reason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters,
+wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric
+and prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the
+sense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable
+to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Reason Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part
+of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof.
+But prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5).
+Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned
+a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be
+reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason
+is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom
+and science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason
+should not be reckoned a part of prudence
+
+Obj. 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from
+the intelligence, as stated above (I, Q. 79, A. 8). If therefore
+intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add
+reason.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the
+opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.
+
+_I answer that,_ The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as
+stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from
+certain things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore
+it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And
+since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called
+requisite or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason
+should be numbered among these parts.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its
+good use.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet
+the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those
+things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need
+for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as
+do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of
+action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of
+things intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less
+certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are
+nevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there
+is no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in
+_Ethic._ iii, 3. Hence, although in certain other intellectual
+virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above
+all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly
+apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and
+uncertain.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although intelligence and reason are not different
+powers, yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence
+takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth [*Cf.
+II-II, Q. 8, A. 1], while reason is so called from being inquisitive
+and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as explained
+above (A. 2; Q. 47, A. 2, 3).
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Foresight* Should Be Accounted a Part of Prudence?
+[*"Providentia," which may be translated either "providence" or
+"foresight."]
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a
+part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems
+to be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x),
+"a prudent man is one who sees from afar (_porro videns_)": and this
+is also the derivation of _providentia_ (foresight), according to
+Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of
+prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be
+also speculative, because _seeing,_ whence we have the word "to
+foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore
+foresight is not a part of prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its
+secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these
+seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not
+part of prudence.
+
+On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who
+number foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above (Q. 48).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 1, ad 2, AA. 6, 13),
+prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work
+is to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things
+are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet
+nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters
+of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has
+become a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be
+undone. In like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity,
+since it is necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.
+
+Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by
+man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of
+these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the
+notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present
+has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of
+them must needs be the principal to which all the others are
+subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and
+predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the
+principal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is
+required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular
+thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very
+name of prudence is taken from foresight (_providentia_) as from its
+principal part.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Speculation is about universal and necessary things,
+which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and
+always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know
+them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but
+only to practical matters.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Right order to an end which is included in the notion
+of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command,
+without which no right order to the end is possible.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Circumspection Can Be a Part of Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of
+prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's
+surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be
+considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore
+circumspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral
+virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote
+nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection
+apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see
+things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant
+things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part
+of prudence in addition to foresight.
+
+On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above (Q.
+48).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), it belongs to prudence
+chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done
+aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.
+
+Since, however, prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 3) is about
+singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of
+circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable
+to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end,
+by reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of
+love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to
+arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise
+in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence
+the need of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means
+with the circumstances.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Though the number of possible circumstances be
+infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment
+of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few
+in number.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because
+prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of
+moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing
+of circumstances.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that
+which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to
+circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view
+of the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its
+own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Caution Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part
+of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required.
+Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib.
+Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which
+directs the virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same
+faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now
+it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to
+avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of
+prudence, distinct from foresight.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no
+man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore
+caution does not belong to prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk
+cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']."
+
+_I answer that,_ The things with which prudence is concerned, are
+contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with
+true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety
+of these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil,
+and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs
+caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on
+our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of
+acts of virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the
+opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different
+in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both
+belong to the one virtue of prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of
+frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against
+them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether,
+or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and
+by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be
+grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them,
+although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the
+surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 50
+
+OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence.
+And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man
+rules himself (Q. 47, seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species
+of prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are
+four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
+
+(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of
+prudence?
+
+(4) Whether military prudence is?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 1]
+
+Whether a Species of Prudence Is Regnative?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a
+species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the
+preservation of justice, since according to _Ethic._ v, 6 the prince
+is the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to
+justice rather than to prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a
+kingdom (_regnum_) is one of six species of government. But no
+species of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of
+government, which are "aristocracy," "polity," also called
+"timocracy" [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and
+"democracy." Therefore neither should a regnative species be ascribed
+to a kingdom.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to
+certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according
+to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a
+part of prudence to be "legislative." Therefore it is not becoming to
+substitute regnative prudence in its place.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that
+"prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince." Therefore a
+special kind of prudence is regnative.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, AA. 8, 10), it belongs to
+prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we
+find a special kind of governance and command, there must be a
+special kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special
+and perfect kind of governance in one who has to govern not only
+himself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because
+a government is the more perfect according as it is more universal,
+extends to more matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in
+its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged
+with the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species
+of prudence is reckoned to be regnative.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to
+prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with
+prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated
+above (Q. 47, A. 5, ad 1; I-II, Q. 58, A. 2, ad 4). For this reason
+also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the
+common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance
+of prudence. Hence these two virtues--prudence and justice--belong
+most properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign
+and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the
+earth." Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and
+execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species
+of prudence which is directive, rather than to justice which is
+executive.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in
+_Ethic._ viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be
+denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under
+regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse
+forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not
+pertain to prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the
+principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this
+applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as
+they have a share of kingly government.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Political Prudence Is Fittingly Accounted a Part of Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly
+accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political
+prudence, as stated above (A. 1). But a part should not be reckoned a
+species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should not be
+reckoned a part of prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their
+various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as
+what the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as
+regards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence
+distinct from regnative prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each
+individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence
+commonly so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of
+prudence called political.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the
+prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a
+master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the
+common name political, and deals with individuals."
+
+_I answer that,_ A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his
+ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate
+beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and
+inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves
+in motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of
+their own actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not
+in their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand,
+men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the
+commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their
+free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required
+in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their
+superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is
+called political.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species
+of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of
+regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence,
+even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence
+of a thing retains the name of "proper."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the
+species of a habit, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 5). Now the same
+actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect,
+as by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various
+departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political
+prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in
+relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we
+speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 3]
+
+Whether a Part of Prudence Should Be Reckoned to Be Domestic?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a
+part of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5)
+"prudence is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic
+prudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to
+_Ethic._ i, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13) prudence is only in
+good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people,
+since many sinners are provident in governing their household.
+Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of
+prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject,
+so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political
+is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to
+regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither
+should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there
+are various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one
+of which is domestic, another legislative, and another political."
+
+_I answer that,_ Different aspects of an object, in respect of
+universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality,
+diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act
+of virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident
+that a household is a mean between the individual and the city or
+kingdom, since just as the individual is part of the household, so is
+the household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as
+prudence commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct
+from political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from
+both.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as
+its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in _Polit. i, 3. On the
+other hand, the end of political prudence is "a good life in general"
+as regards the conduct of the household. In _Ethic._ i, 1 the
+Philosopher speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way
+of example and in accordance with the opinion of many.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters
+of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in
+regard to "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the
+household, for which above all a virtuous life is required.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The father has in his household an authority
+like that of a king, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 10, but he has not the
+full power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a
+distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Military Prudence Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be
+reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art,
+according to _Ethic._ vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the
+art of warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8).
+Therefore military prudence should not be accounted a species of
+prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as military business is contained under
+political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of
+tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of
+prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither
+therefore should any be assigned to military business.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in
+warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather
+than to prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 24:6): "War is managed by due
+ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels."
+Now it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great
+need in warfare for that species of prudence which is called
+"military."
+
+_I answer that,_ Whatever things are done according to art or reason,
+should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with
+nature, and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a
+twofold tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to
+withstand outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she
+has provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby
+they are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but
+also with the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an
+assailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance
+with reason, there should be not only "political" prudence, which
+disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common
+good, but also a "military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are
+repelled.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has
+certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as
+arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good,
+it belongs rather to prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the profit
+of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the
+service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of the
+entire common good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The execution of military service belongs to fortitude,
+but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the
+commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 51
+
+OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with
+prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head
+there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether _euboulia_ is a virtue?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?
+
+(3) Whether _synesis_ is a special virtue?
+
+(4) Whether _gnome_ is a special virtue?
+
+[*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of
+deliberating well (_euboulia_), of judging well according to common
+law (_synesis_), and of judging well according to general law
+(_gnome_), respectively.]
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 1]
+
+Whether _Euboulia_ Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that _euboulia_ is not a virtue. For,
+according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19) "no man makes evil
+use of virtue." Now some make evil use of _euboulia_ or good counsel,
+either through devising crafty counsels in order to achieve evil
+ends, or through committing sin in order that they may achieve good
+ends, as those who rob that they may give alms. Therefore _euboulia_
+is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to _Phys._ vii.
+But _euboulia_ is concerned with counsel, which implies doubt and
+research, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore _euboulia_
+is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 65). Now _euboulia_ is not connected with the other
+virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly men are
+slow in taking counsel. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9)
+_euboulia_ "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of virtue
+consists in right reason. Therefore _euboulia_ is a virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 4) the nature of a human
+virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of
+man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a
+research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and
+whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man,
+as stated in _Ethic._ x. But _euboulia_ signifies goodness of
+counsel, for it is derived from the _eu_, good, and _boule_, counsel,
+being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good
+counsel." Hence it is evident that _euboulia_ is a human virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an
+evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even
+as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in
+coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from
+false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence
+both the aforesaid processes are contrary to _euboulia,_ as the
+Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does
+not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies
+perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his
+parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which
+counsel is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive
+appetite, which are still more imperfect.
+
+It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to
+the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with
+certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which
+are contingent.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In no sinner as such is _euboulia_ to be found: since
+all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good counsel requires
+not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also
+other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be neither
+too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking
+counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due
+circumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the
+other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things
+which are directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not
+take good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in
+matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 2]
+
+Whether _Euboulia_ Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue
+from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the
+"prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel." Now this
+belongs to _euboulia_ as stated above. Therefore _euboulia_ is not
+distinct from prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are
+specified chiefly by their end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q.
+18, AA. 4, 6). Now _euboulia_ and prudence are directed to the same
+end, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 9, not indeed to some particular end,
+but to the common end of all life. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a
+distinct virtue from prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision
+belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to
+the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to
+_euboulia,_ while decision belongs to prudence. There _euboulia_ is
+not a distinct virtue from prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Prudence is preceptive, according to _Ethic._ vi,
+10. But this does not apply to _euboulia_. Therefore _euboulia_ is a
+distinct virtue from prudence.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), virtue is properly directed
+to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ
+according to different acts, especially when there is a different
+kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same
+kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the
+goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all
+these belong to the same virtue of charity.
+
+Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor
+have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different
+causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good
+command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another.
+Consequently _euboulia_ which makes man take good counsel must needs
+be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. And
+since counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal,
+so _euboulia_ is directed to prudence as to a principal virtue,
+without which it would be no virtue at all, even as neither are the
+moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by
+commanding it, to _euboulia_ by eliciting it.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Different acts are directed in different degrees to the
+one end which is "a good life in general" [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for
+counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The
+last named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the
+other two acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have
+certain proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the
+discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty.
+Hence this proves not that _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue from
+prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a
+principal virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even in speculative matters the rational science of
+dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct
+from demonstrative science, which decides the truth.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 3]
+
+Whether _Synesis_ Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that _synesis_ is not a virtue. Virtues
+are not in us by nature, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1. But _synesis_
+is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11).
+Therefore _synesis_ is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), _synesis_ is
+nothing but "a faculty of judging." But judgment without command can
+be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it
+seems that _synesis_ is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be
+a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for
+it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore _synesis_ be
+reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is
+no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and
+consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable.
+Therefore _synesis_ is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But
+_euboulia_, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is
+_synesis_ a virtue, as being good judgment.
+
+_I answer that,_ _synesis_ signifies a right judgment, not indeed
+about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters,
+about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of
+_synesis_ are said to be _synetoi,_ i.e. "persons of sense," or
+_eusynetoi,_ i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand,
+those who lack this virtue are called _asynetoi,_ i.e. "senseless."
+
+Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must
+correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of
+counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause,
+for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to
+judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at
+research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing
+to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of
+imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such
+persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in
+the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the
+common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need,
+besides _euboulia_, for another virtue, which judges well, and this
+is called _synesis._
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power
+apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the
+right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well
+disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are,
+whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted
+and misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to
+receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to
+nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift
+of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the
+cognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with
+distorted, but with true and correct ideas: this belongs to _synesis_
+which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly,
+through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result
+being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a
+good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but
+this judgment is about the ends, whereas _synesis_ is rather about
+the means.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a
+universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the
+particular matter of action, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or
+execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which
+judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal
+virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 4]
+
+Whether _Gnome_ Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that _gnome_ is not a special virtue
+distinct from _synesis._ For a man is said, in respect of _synesis,_
+to have good judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment,
+unless he judge aright in all things. Therefore _synesis_ extends to
+all matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of
+good judgment called _gnome._
+
+Obj. 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now
+there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. _euboulia,_ and only
+one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there is only
+one virtue of good judgment, viz. _synesis._
+
+Obj. 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart
+from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and
+with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 5.
+Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore
+there is no intellectual virtue about such matters.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that
+_gnome_ is a special virtue.
+
+_I answer that_ cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower
+principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher
+principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from
+it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident
+that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is
+sometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus
+monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active
+seminal force, and yet they come under the order of a higher
+principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine
+Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one could
+not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is
+possible if we consider Divine Providence.
+
+Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not
+covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of
+the enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back
+his deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to
+judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common
+laws, according to which _synesis_ judges: and corresponding to such
+higher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of
+judgment, which is called _gnome,_ and which denotes a certain
+discrimination in judgment.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: _Synesis_ judges rightly about all actions that are
+covered by the common rules: but certain things have to be judged
+beside these common rules, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper
+principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common
+principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which
+aims at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration
+which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence
+_euboulia_ to which the research of counsel belongs is one for all,
+but not so _synesis_ whose act is judicial. Command considers in all
+matters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all
+things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand,
+among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of
+such things by his reason: this belongs to _gnome,_ which denotes a
+certain discrimination in judgment.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 52
+
+OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to
+prudence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
+Holy Ghost?
+
+(2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence?
+
+(3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?
+
+(4) Whether the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," etc.
+corresponds to the gift of counsel?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Counsel Should Be Reckoned Among the Gifts of the Holy Ghost?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among
+the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as
+a help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for
+the purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the
+virtue of prudence, or even of _euboulia_, as is evident from what
+has been said (Q. 47, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 51, AA. 1, 2). Therefore counsel
+should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy
+Ghost and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are not
+given to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the gifts
+of the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But
+counsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy
+Ghost specially to certain persons, according to 1 Macc. 2:65:
+"Behold . . . your brother Simon is a man of counsel." Therefore
+counsel should be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than
+among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Rom. 8:14): "Whosoever are led by the
+Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." But counselling is not
+consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the
+Holy Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who "have received
+the spirit of adoption of sons," it would seem that counsel should
+not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): "(The Spirit of the
+Lord) shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of
+fortitude."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), the gifts of
+the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable
+to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according
+to the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature
+through time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but
+not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22).
+Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the
+research of reason to perform any particular action, and this
+research is called counsel. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the
+rational creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned
+among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Prudence or _euboulia_, whether acquired or infused,
+directs man in the research of counsel according to principles that
+the reason can grasp; hence prudence or _euboulia_ makes man take
+good counsel either for himself or for another. Since, however, human
+reason is unable to grasp the singular and contingent things which
+may occur, the result is that "the thoughts of mortal men are
+fearful, and our counsels uncertain" (Wis. 9:14). Hence in the
+research of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who
+comprehends all things: and this is done through the gift of counsel,
+whereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human
+affairs, those who are unable to take counsel for themselves, seek
+counsel from those who are wiser.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel
+others, may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be
+counselled by God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for
+salvation is common to all holy persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost
+according to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which
+is the "faculty of will and reason" [*Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly
+the gift of counsel is befitting the children of God in so far as the
+reason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Gift of Counsel Corresponds to the Virtue of Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not
+fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest
+point of that which is underneath touches that which is above," as
+Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact
+with the angel in respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are
+inferior to the gifts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Since,
+then, counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, while command
+is its highest act, and judgment comes between, it seems that the
+gift corresponding to prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of
+judgment or command.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the
+higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in _De Causis._ Now
+prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only
+speculative but also practical, as shown above (Q. 9, A. 3).
+Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of
+prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated
+above (Q. 47, A. 8). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that man
+should be directed by God, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the gift
+of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The gift of counsel is about what has to be done
+for the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter.
+Therefore they correspond to one another.
+
+_I answer that,_ A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and
+is perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement,
+as a body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the
+rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a
+lower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the
+supreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which
+denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through
+being ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift
+of counsel, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the gift of counsel
+corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved,
+but to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost,
+the position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a
+mover, as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), it follows that it
+would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence by the
+name of command or judgment rather than of counsel whereby it is
+possible to signify that the counselled mind is moved by another
+counselling it.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to
+prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by a kind of
+extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel
+corresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the
+same things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The mover that is moved, moves through being moved.
+Hence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by the
+Holy Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Gift of Counsel Remains in Heaven?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain
+in heaven. For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of
+an end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an
+end, since there man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of
+counsel is not in heaven.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take
+counsel in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes
+(Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there
+is no counsel in heaven.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God,
+according to 1 John 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to
+Him." But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Rom. 11:34,
+"Who hath been His counsellor?" Therefore neither to the saints in
+heaven is the gift of counsel becoming.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): "When either the
+guilt or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate
+of the heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have
+won in the conflict, or not to have won."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2; I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), the gifts
+of the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational
+creature by God. Now we must observe two points concerning the motion
+of the human mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which
+is moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition when
+it is in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover is the principle
+of the movement alone, when the movement ceases, the action of the
+mover ceases as regards the thing moved, since it has already reached
+the term of movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases
+being built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover is
+cause not only of the movement, but also of the form to which the
+movement tends, then the action of the mover does not cease even
+after the form has been attained: thus the sun lightens the air even
+after it is lightened. In this way, then, God causes in us virtue and
+knowledge, not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as
+we persevere in them: and it is thus that God causes in the blessed a
+knowledge of what is to be done, not as though they were ignorant,
+but by continuing that knowledge in them.
+
+Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or
+men, do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but
+concern the government of things according to Divine Providence. As
+regards these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God
+moves the mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the
+wayfarer, in another. For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in
+matters of action, by soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt;
+whereas there is simple nescience in the mind of the blessed as
+regards the things they do not know. From this nescience the angel's
+mind is cleansed, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does
+there precede in them any research of doubt, for they simply turn to
+God; and this is to take counsel of God, for as Augustine says (Gen.
+ad lit. v, 19) "the angels take counsel of God about things beneath
+them": wherefore the instruction which they receive from God in such
+matters is called "counsel."
+
+Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God
+preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them
+in their nescience of what has to be done.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an end,
+or resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such as
+the acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which
+they themselves have attained, for example the ministrations of the
+angels, and the prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of
+counsel finds a place in them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state
+of life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven. Even so
+neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as
+on the way thither.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving it:
+and the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the
+source whence they receive.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Fifth Beatitude, Which Is That of Mercy, Corresponds to
+the Gift of Counsel?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of
+mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the
+beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 69, A. 1).
+Now we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the
+fifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other to counsel.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for
+salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not
+necessary for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation,
+according to James 2:13, "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not
+done mercy." On the other hand poverty is not necessary for
+salvation, but belongs to the life of perfection, according to Matt.
+19:21. Therefore the beatitude of poverty corresponds to the gift of
+counsel, rather than to the beatitude of mercy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they
+denote a certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of
+virtue. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as
+appears from Gal. 5:22, 23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of
+mercy correspond to the gift of counsel.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): "Counsel is
+befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered
+from evils so great, to pardon, and to give."
+
+_I answer that,_ Counsel is properly about things useful for an end.
+Hence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all
+correspond to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1
+Tim. 4:8, "Godliness [*_Pietas,_ whence our English word _pity,_
+which is the same as mercy; see note on II-II, Q. 30, A. 1] is
+profitable to all things." Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially
+corresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing
+mercy.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although counsel directs in all the acts of
+virtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason
+given above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost
+guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life
+whether they be necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work
+of mercy is necessary for salvation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the
+ultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an
+action which is the end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical
+knowledge is numbered among the fruits, but only such things as
+pertain to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among
+these we find "goodness" and "benignity" which correspond to mercy.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 53
+
+OF IMPRUDENCE
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine
+says (Contra Julian. iv, 3): "There are vices opposed to every
+virtue, not only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as
+temerity is opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of
+kinship and not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in
+opposition to prudence we have craftiness."
+
+Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in
+evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a
+defect either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for
+prudence, and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to
+prudence, those namely which are due to abuse of the things required
+for prudence. And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of
+these considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of
+negligence which is opposed to solicitude.
+
+Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special sin?
+
+(3) Of precipitation or temerity;
+
+(4) Of thoughtlessness;
+
+(5) Of inconstancy;
+
+(6) Concerning the origin of these vices.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Imprudence Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every
+sin is voluntary, according to Augustine [*De Vera Relig. xiv];
+whereas imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be
+imprudent. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, none but original sin comes to man with his birth.
+But imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young are
+imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to
+original justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But
+imprudence is not taken away by repentance. Therefore imprudence is
+not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away
+save by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence, according to Prov.
+21:20, "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of
+the just, and the imprudent [Douay: 'foolish'] man shall spend it."
+Therefore imprudence is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first, as a
+privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly speaking it is not taken
+as a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for
+this can be without any sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes
+lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this
+sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man's negligence in striving
+to have prudence.
+
+Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act
+of reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, whereas the
+right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man
+despises counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions which
+require consideration in the act of prudence. In this way imprudence
+is a sin in respect of prudence considered under its proper aspect,
+since it is not possible for a man to act against prudence, except by
+infringing the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends.
+Wherefore, if this should happen through aversion from the Divine
+Law, it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately
+through contempt and rejection of the Divine teaching: whereas if he
+act beside the Law and without contempt, and without detriment to
+things necessary for salvation, it will be a venial sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but the
+rash man wills the act of imprudence, because he wishes to act
+precipitately. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "he who
+sins willingly against prudence is less to be commended."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes imprudence in the negative sense.
+It must be observed however that lack of prudence or of any other
+virtue is included in the lack of original justice which perfected
+the entire soul. Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed
+to original sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus the lack
+of this prudence ceases; but acquired prudence is not restored as to
+the habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly
+speaking the sin of imprudence consists.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Imprudence Is a Special Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For
+whoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But
+imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above (A.
+1). Therefore imprudence is not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge
+is. But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of
+the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be
+reckoned among those causes.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances
+of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil results
+from each single defect." Now many things are requisite for prudence;
+for instance, reason, intelligence, docility, and so on, as stated
+above (QQ. 48, 49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence,
+so that it is not a special sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above
+(A. 1). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is
+one special vice.
+
+_I answer that,_ A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways;
+first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all
+sins; secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices,
+which are its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be
+general on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated
+of all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as
+neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with
+special acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by
+participation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just
+as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs
+them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no
+sin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason,
+which defect belongs to imprudence.
+
+If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in
+some particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin,
+then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in
+three ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of
+prudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the
+individual, from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above
+(Q. 48; Q. 50, A. 7), so also we distinguish various kinds of
+imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of
+prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the
+several acts of reason. Thus, by defect of "counsel" to which
+_euboulia_ corresponds, "precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of
+imprudence; by defect of "judgment," to which _synesis_ (judging well
+according to common law) and _gnome_ (judging well according to
+general law) refer, there is "thoughtlessness"; while "inconstancy"
+and "negligence" correspond to the "command" which is the proper act
+of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things
+which are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts
+of prudence. Since however all these things are intended for the
+direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all
+the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above.
+Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in
+"thoughtlessness"; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable
+to "precipitation"; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of
+shrewdness, belong to "negligence" and "inconstancy."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers generality by participation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since knowledge is further removed from morality than
+prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows
+that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on
+account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent
+result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes
+of sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a
+moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a special sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When various circumstances are corrupted for the
+same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same
+species of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and
+when one ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are
+various species: for instance, if one man were to take another's
+property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this
+would constitute the species called sacrilege, while if another were
+to take another's property when he ought not, merely through the lust
+of possession, this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack
+of those things which are requisite for prudence, does not constitute
+a diversity of species, except in so far as they are directed to
+different acts of reason, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Precipitation Is a Sin Included in Imprudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included
+in imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence;
+whereas precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to
+Gregory, who says (Moral. ii, 49) that the gift of "counsel is given
+as a remedy to precipitation." Therefore precipitation is not a sin
+contained under imprudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now
+rashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride. Therefore
+precipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste. Now
+sin happens in counselling not only through being over hasty but also
+through being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes
+by, and through corruption of other circumstances, as stated in
+_Ethic._ vi, 9. Therefore there is no reason for reckoning
+precipitation as a sin contained under imprudence, rather than
+slowness, or something else of the kind pertaining to inordinate
+counsel.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 4:19): "The way of the wicked
+is darksome, they know not where they fall." Now the darksome ways of
+ungodliness belong to imprudence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to
+fall or to be precipitate.
+
+_I answer that,_ Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of
+the soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is
+said to be precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is
+brought down from above by the impulse either of its own movement or
+of another's, and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit
+of the soul is the reason, and the base is reached in the action
+performed by the body; while the steps that intervene by which one
+ought to descend in orderly fashion are _memory_ of the past,
+_intelligence_ of the present, _shrewdness_ in considering the future
+outcome, _reasoning_ which compares one thing with another,
+_docility_ in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes counsel
+descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed into
+action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking
+these steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then
+inordinate counsel pertains to imprudence, it is evident that the
+vice of precipitation is contained under imprudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel and
+to the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as stated above
+(Q. 52, A. 2), and consequently precipitation is opposed to both.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Things are said to be done rashly when they are not
+directed by reason: and this may happen in two ways; first through
+the impulse of the will or of a passion, secondly through contempt of
+the directing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly
+speaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride,
+which refuses to submit to another's ruling. But precipitation refers
+to both, so that rashness is contained under precipitation, although
+precipitation refers rather to the first.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Many things have to be considered in the research of
+reason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one
+should be slow in taking counsel." Hence precipitation is more
+directly opposed to rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for
+the latter bears a certain likeness to right counsel.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Thoughtlessness Is a Special Sin Included in Imprudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin
+included in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to any
+sin, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is unspotted"; and
+yet it incites us to be thoughtless, according to Matt. 10:19, "Take
+no thought how or what to speak." Therefore thoughtlessness is not a
+sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to
+many things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and
+therefore to a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is
+contained under thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is
+not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason,
+viz. _counsel,_ _judgment_ about what has been counselled, and
+_command_ [*Cf. Q. 47, A. 8]. Now thought precedes all these acts,
+since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore
+thoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 4:25): "Let thy eyes look
+straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps." Now this
+pertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness.
+Therefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence.
+
+_I answer that,_ Thought signifies the act of the intellect in
+considering the truth about something. Now just as research belongs
+to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in
+speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise
+judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research
+by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles.
+Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack
+of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far,
+to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of
+those things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore
+evident that thoughtlessness is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we
+have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the
+words quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no
+opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or
+through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of God
+alone, because "as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes
+to God," according to 2 Paral. 20:12: else if man, instead of doing
+what he can, were to be content with awaiting God's assistance, he
+would seem to tempt God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All thought about those things of which counsel takes
+cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment,
+wherefore this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently
+thoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a
+determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things
+have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in
+speculative matters, because actions are about singulars.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Inconstancy Is a Vice Contained Under Imprudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained
+under imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of
+perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult
+matters belongs to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to
+fortitude rather than to prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (James 3:16): "Where jealousy [Douay:
+'envy'] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil
+work." But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains
+not to imprudence but to envy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to
+persevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of
+"incontinency" in pleasurable matters, and of "effeminacy" or
+"squeamishness" in unpleasant matters, according to _Ethic._ vii, 1.
+Therefore inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good
+to the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to
+imprudence. Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to
+imprudence.
+
+_I answer that,_ Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good
+purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, for a
+man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account
+of something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this
+withdrawal completed except through a defect of reason, which is
+deceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since
+it can resist the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it
+is due to its own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has
+conceived; hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a
+defect in the reason. Now just as all rectitude of the practical
+reason belongs in some degree to prudence, so all lack of that
+rectitude belongs to imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its
+completion, belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitation is due
+to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in
+the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises from a defect in the act
+of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant because his reason
+fails in commanding what has been counselled and judged.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The good of prudence is shared by all the moral
+virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral
+virtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater
+impulse to the contrary.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Envy and anger, which are the source of contention,
+cause inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which power the
+origin of inconstancy is due, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the
+appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers
+evil concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows
+(which points to a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands
+firm, in the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the
+persevering man, against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance
+seem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason; and to this
+power inconstancy pertains also.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Aforesaid Vices Arise from Lust?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from
+lust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (A. 5, ad 2).
+But envy is a distinct vice from lust.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (James 1:8): "A double-minded man is
+inconstant in all his ways." Now duplicity does not seem to pertain
+to lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of
+covetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the
+aforesaid vices do not arise from lust.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect
+of reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than
+carnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual
+vices rather than from carnal vices.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the
+aforesaid vices arise from lust.
+
+_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) "pleasure
+above all corrupts the estimate of prudence," and chiefly sexual
+pleasure which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight.
+Now the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue
+consists in abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the
+aforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical
+reason, as stated above (AA. 2, 5), it follows that they arise
+chiefly from lust.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the
+reason to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by
+destroying the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher
+says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "the man who is incontinent through anger
+listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent
+through lust does not listen to it at all."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Duplicity also is something resulting from lust, just
+as inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the
+mind from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1,
+sc. 1) that "love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the
+more as they lead us away from reason.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 54
+
+OF NEGLIGENCE
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether negligence is a special sin?
+
+(2) To which virtue is it opposed?
+
+(3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Negligence Is a Special Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For
+negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in
+every virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special
+sin. Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins
+neglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in
+sin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not
+a special sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every special sin has a determinate matter. But
+negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither
+about evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence
+if he omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done
+negligently, they are no longer good. Therefore it seems that
+negligence is not a special vice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Sins committed through negligence, are
+distinguished from those which are committed through contempt.
+
+_I answer that,_ Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every
+lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence
+is a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin
+according as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain
+sins are special through being about a special matter, as lust is
+about sexual matters, while some vices are special on account of
+their having a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of
+matter, and such are all vices affecting an act of reason, since
+every act of reason extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then
+solicitude is a special act of reason, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9),
+it follows that negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a
+special sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because
+the more we love (_diligimus_) a thing the more solicitous are we
+about it. Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for
+every virtue, in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every
+virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an
+act of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence
+just as precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of
+reason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in
+any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the
+lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is
+found more or less in all sins.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good
+that one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done
+negligently, but because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of
+goodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through lack of
+solicitude, or some due circumstance be omitted.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Negligence Is Opposed to Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not opposed to
+prudence. For negligence seems to be the same as idleness or
+laziness, which belongs to sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi,
+45). Now sloth is not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated
+above (Q. 35, A. 3). Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence.
+But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the
+executive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to
+prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But
+negligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is
+_precipitation,_ nor a defect of judgment, since that is
+_thoughtlessness,_ nor a defect of command, because that is
+_inconstancy._ Therefore negligence does not pertain to imprudence.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Eccles. 7:19): "He that feareth God,
+neglecteth nothing." But every sin is excluded by the opposite
+virtue. Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to
+prudence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): "A babbler and a
+fool (_imprudens_) will regard no time." Now this is due to
+negligence. Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence.
+
+_I answer that,_ Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now
+solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to
+prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to
+imprudence. This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore
+observes (Etym. x) "a negligent man is one who fails to choose (_nec
+eligens_)": and the right choice of the means belongs to prudence.
+Therefore negligence pertains to imprudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to
+which choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote
+slowness of execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in
+setting about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the
+execution itself. Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from
+sloth, which is "an oppressive sorrow," i.e. hindering, the mind from
+action [*Cf. Q. 35, A. 1; I-II, Q. 35, A. 8].
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Omission regards the external act, for it
+consists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is
+opposed to justice, and is an effect of negligence, even as the
+execution of a just deed is the effect of right reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Negligence regards the act of command, which
+solicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this
+act otherwise than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in
+commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the
+negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because
+according to Prov. 15:27, "by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth
+from evil." Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though
+negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites
+man to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above (I-II,
+Q. 44, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions, that "fear makes
+us take counsel."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Negligence Can Be a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin.
+For a gloss of Gregory [*Moral. ix. 34] on Job 9:28, "I feared all my
+works," etc. says that "too little love of God aggravates the
+former," viz. negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the love
+of God is done away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a
+mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ecclus. 7:34, "For thy negligences purify
+thyself with a few," says: "Though the offering be small it cleanses
+the negligences of many sins." Now this would not be, if negligence
+were a mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed for
+mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice
+was prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal
+sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 19:16): "He that neglecteth
+his own life [Vulg.: 'way'] shall die."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 3), negligence arises out
+of a certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of
+solicitude on the part of the reason in commanding what it should
+command, or as it should command. Accordingly negligence may happen
+to be a mortal sin in two ways. First on the part of that which is
+omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a
+circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin.
+Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will be so remiss about
+Divine things, as to fall away altogether from the charity of God,
+such negligence is a mortal sin, and this is the case chiefly when
+negligence is due to contempt.
+
+But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance
+that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial
+sin, provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some
+lack of fervor, to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First
+through lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence
+that is a venial sin: secondly through lack of charity itself, in
+which sense we say that a man loves God less when he loves Him with a
+merely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is a mortal
+sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the same authority (gloss), a small
+offering made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man
+not only from venial but also from mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When negligence consists in the omission of that which
+is necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest
+genus of sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions, are
+more hidden, wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them
+in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public
+confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not be confessed in
+public.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 55
+
+OF VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a
+resemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(3) Whether craftiness is a special sin?
+
+(4) Of guile;
+
+(5) Of fraud;
+
+(6) Of solicitude about temporal things;
+
+(7) Of solicitude about the future;
+
+(8) Of the origin of these vices.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Prudence of the Flesh Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin.
+For prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it
+governs them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither
+therefore is any prudence a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it
+is lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, "for no man
+ever hated his own flesh" (Eph. 5:29). Therefore prudence of the
+flesh is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he
+tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or
+of the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any
+prudence of the flesh be accounted among sins.
+
+_On the contrary,_ No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness
+according to Wis. 14:9, "To God the wicked and his wickedness are
+hateful alike." Now it is written (Rom. 8:7): "The prudence [Vulg.:
+'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God." Therefore prudence of the
+flesh is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 13), prudence regards
+things which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence
+prudence of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who
+looks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is
+evident that this is a sin, because it involves a disorder in man
+with respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods of
+the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 2, A. 5). Therefore prudence of
+the flesh is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Justice and temperance include in their very nature
+that which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the
+curbing of concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense.
+On the other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing
+(_providendo_), as stated above (Q. 47, A. 1; Q. 49, A. 6), which can
+extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken
+simply in a good sense, yet, if something be added, it may be taken
+in a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to
+be a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on
+account of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal
+agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the
+good of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in
+a good of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it
+is thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the
+flesh.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The devil tempts us, not through the good of the
+appetible object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence
+implies direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "prudence
+of the devil," as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is
+the aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as
+worldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence we speak
+of "carnal" and again of "worldly" prudence, according to Luke 16:8,
+"The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in
+their generation," etc. The Apostle includes all in the "prudence of
+the flesh," because we covet the external things of the world on
+account of the flesh.
+
+We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called
+"wisdom," as stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1), we may distinguish a
+threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation.
+Hence it is written (James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is
+"earthly, sensual and devilish," as explained above (Q. 45, A. 1, ad
+1), when we were treating of wisdom.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Prudence of the Flesh Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal
+sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since
+this implies contempt of God. Now "the prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of
+the flesh . . . is not subject to the law of God" (Rom. 8:7).
+Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin.
+Now prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost,
+for "it cannot be subject to the law of God" (Rom. 8:7), and so it
+seems to be an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against
+the Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good,
+as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed
+to that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore
+prudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is
+itself a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the
+nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining
+to the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence,
+diminishes sin [*Cf. Prov. 6:30]. Therefore prudence of the flesh has
+not of itself the nature of a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1; A. 13), a man is
+said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to
+the end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to
+some particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or
+something else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be
+taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so
+that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the
+flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so
+doing, since he cannot have several last ends, as stated above (I-II,
+Q. 1, A. 5).
+
+If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as
+corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it
+happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affection for some
+pleasure of the flesh, without turning away from God by a mortal sin;
+in which case he does not place the end of his whole life in carnal
+pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin
+and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers
+the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about
+one's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no longer prudence
+of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh as a means
+to an end.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby
+a man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and
+this is a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the
+Holy Ghost. For when it is stated that "it cannot be subject to the
+law of God," this does not mean that he who has prudence of the
+flesh, cannot be converted and submit to the law of God, but that
+carnal prudence itself cannot be subject to God's law, even as
+neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that which is
+hot may become cold.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is
+shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed
+to prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in
+some very grave matter.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Craftiness Is a Special Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For
+the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they
+induce us to be crafty, according to Prov. 1:4, "To give craftiness
+[Douay: 'subtlety'] to little ones." Therefore craftiness is not a
+sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 13:16): "The crafty [Douay:
+'prudent'] man doth all things with counsel." Therefore, he does so
+either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no
+sin seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to
+carnal or worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin
+distinct from prudence of the flesh.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, "The
+simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn," says (Moral. x, 29):
+"The wisdom of this world is to hide one's thoughts by artifice, to
+conceal one's meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make
+out the truth to be false," and further on he adds: "This prudence is
+acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by children." Now the
+above things seem to belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not
+distinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently it seems
+not to be a special sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 4:2): "We renounce the
+hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor
+adulterating the word of God." Therefore craftiness is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Prudence is _right reason applied to action,_ just
+as science is _right reason applied to knowledge._ In speculative
+matters one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in
+one way when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to
+be true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false premises,
+that appear to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion.
+Even so a sin may be against prudence, through having some
+resemblance thereto, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the
+reason is directed to an end which is good not in truth but in
+appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the flesh; secondly,
+when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man
+uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and this
+belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin opposed
+to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as
+prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is
+craftiness sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of
+their mutual resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is
+taken in a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in _Ethic._ vi, 12.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for
+an evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false
+and counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if
+it be directed to a good end.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Under "worldly prudence" Gregory included everything
+that can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness
+also.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Guile Is a Sin Pertaining to Craftiness?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to
+craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men.
+Yet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Cor.
+12:16, "Being crafty I caught you by guile." Therefore guile is not
+always a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue,
+according to Ps. 5:11, "They dealt deceitfully with their tongues."
+Now craftiness like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore
+guile does not pertain to craftiness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:20): "Guile [Douay:
+'Deceit'] is in the heart of them that think evil things." But the
+thought of evil things does not always pertain to craftiness.
+Therefore guile does not seem to belong to craftiness.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to
+Eph. 4:14, "By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to
+deceive": and guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to
+craftiness.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to craftiness to
+adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in
+order to attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of
+such ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as
+regards the process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly
+to craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end belongs
+to prudence. Secondly the adopting of such like ways may be
+considered with regard to their actual execution, and in this way it
+belongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a certain execution of
+craftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense,
+and improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the
+execution of craftiness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The execution of craftiness with the purpose of
+deceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the
+chief place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to
+another man, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence
+guile is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in
+deeds, according to Ps. 104:25, "And to deal deceitfully with his
+servants." Guile is also in the heart, according to Ecclus. 19:23,
+"His interior is full of deceit," but this is to devise deceits,
+according to Ps. 37:13: "They studied deceits all the day long."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs
+devise certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part
+he devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end.
+Nevertheless it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by
+violence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult,
+it is of less frequent occurrence.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Fraud Pertains to Craftiness?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness.
+For a man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be
+deceived, which is the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves
+praise for allowing himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Cor. 6:1,
+"Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore
+fraud does not belong to craftiness.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or
+receiving external things, for it is written (Acts 5:1) that "a
+certain man named Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of
+land, and by fraud kept back part of the price of the land." Now it
+pertains to injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain
+external things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to
+craftiness which is opposed to prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the
+frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written (Prov. 1:18)
+concerning some "that they practice frauds [Douay: 'deceits'] against
+their own souls." Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The object of fraud is to deceive, according to
+Job 13:9, "Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent
+[Douay: 'deceitful'] dealings?" Now craftiness is directed to the
+same object. Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness.
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as _guile_ consists in the execution of
+craftiness, so also does _fraud._ But they seem to differ in the fact
+that _guile_ belongs in general to the execution of craftiness,
+whether this be effected by words, or by deeds, whereas _fraud_
+belongs more properly to the execution of craftiness by deeds.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be
+deceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of
+being deceived, and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The execution of craftiness may be carried out
+by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and
+accordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or
+illiberality.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against
+themselves or their own souls; it is through God's just judgment that
+what they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to
+Ps. 7:16, "He is fallen into the hole he made."
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 6]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Be Solicitous About Temporal Matters?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal
+matters. Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects,
+according to Rom. 12:8, "He that ruleth, with solicitude." Now
+according to the Divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things,
+according to Ps. 8:8, "Thou hast subjected all things under his
+feet," etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he
+works. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things
+whereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 3:10):
+"If any man will not work, neither let him eat." Therefore it is
+lawful to be solicitous about temporal things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy,
+according to 2 Tim. 1:17, "When he was come to Rome, he carefully
+sought me." Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes
+connected with works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous
+to watch over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore
+solicitude about temporal things is not unlawful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 6:31): "Be not
+solicitous . . . saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink,
+or wherewith shall we be clothed?" And yet such things are very
+necessary.
+
+_I answer that,_ Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain
+something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when
+there is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when
+success is assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may
+be unlawful in three ways. First on the part of the object of
+solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence
+Augustine says (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): "When Our Lord said: 'Be
+not solicitous, ' etc. . . . He intended to forbid them either to
+make such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do
+whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the Gospel."
+Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through
+too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the
+result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which
+ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written
+(Matt. 13:22) that "the care of this world . . . chokes up the word."
+Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack
+necessary things if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives
+three motives for laying aside this fear. First, on account of the
+yet greater favors bestowed by God on man, independently of his
+solicitude, viz. his body and soul (Matt. 6:26); secondly, on account
+of the care with which God watches over animals and plants without
+the assistance of man, according to the requirements of their nature;
+thirdly, because of Divine providence, through ignorance of which the
+gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all others.
+Consequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of all
+about spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be granted
+us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use
+them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them
+and be over solicitous about them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily
+labor is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on
+Matt. 6:31, "Be not solicitous," that "labor is necessary, but
+solicitude must be banished," namely superfluous solicitude which
+unsettles the mind.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things
+is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful,
+unless it be superfluous.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 7]
+
+Whether We Should Be Solicitous About the Future?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we should be solicitous about the
+future. For it is written (Prov. 6:6-8): "Go to the ant, O sluggard,
+and consider her ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no
+guide, nor master . . . provideth her meat for herself in the summer,
+and gathereth her food in the harvest." Now this is to be solicitous
+about the future. Therefore solicitude about the future is
+praiseworthy.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is
+chiefly about the future, since its principal part is _foresight of
+future things,_ as stated above (Q. 49, A. 6, ad 1). Therefore it is
+virtuous to be solicitous about the future.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for
+the morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read (John 12:6)
+that Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and
+(Acts 4:34-37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which
+had been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous
+about the future.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 6:34): "Be not . . .
+solicitous for tomorrow"; where "tomorrow" stands for the future, as
+Jerome says in his commentary on this passage.
+
+_I answer that,_ No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with
+its due circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to
+Eccles. 8:6, "There is a time and opportunity for every business";
+which applies not only to external deeds but also to internal
+solicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude;
+thus solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and
+solicitude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly if a
+man were solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be
+needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging to a future time.
+Hence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude, saying:
+"Be . . . not solicitous for tomorrow," wherefore He adds, "for the
+morrow will be solicitous for itself," that is to say, the morrow
+will have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the
+soul. This is what He means by adding: "Sufficient for the day is
+the evil thereof," namely, the burden of solicitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is
+this that is proposed for our example.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it
+would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, if a
+man were to seek temporal things, to which the terms "past" and
+"future" apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the
+needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for
+solicitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17),
+"when we see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these
+needful things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the
+morrow, since even Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse,
+and we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the
+necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on account of a
+threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not condemn those who
+according to human custom, provide themselves with such things, but
+those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these things."
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 8]
+
+Whether These Vices Arise from Covetousness?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that these vices do not arise from
+covetousness. As stated above (Q. 43, A. 6) lust is the chief cause
+of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to
+right reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from
+lust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
+"Venus is full of guile and her girdle is many colored" and that "he
+who is incontinent in desire acts with cunning."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence,
+as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13). Now, since prudence is in the reason,
+the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride
+and vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride
+rather than from covetousness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold
+of other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of
+which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use
+of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the
+aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a
+daughter of covetousness.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3; Q. 47, A. 13), carnal
+prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain
+resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among
+all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason
+appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the
+undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice,
+the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices
+arise chiefly from covetousness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of
+concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising
+its act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason,
+albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust.
+When the Philosopher says that "Venus is full of guile," he is
+referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away
+suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means
+of craftiness but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and
+pleasure; wherefore he adds that "Venus doth cozen the wits of the
+wisest man" [*Cf. Iliad xiv, 214-217].
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to
+pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or
+apes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use
+of fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from
+covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by
+excellence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with
+precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the
+aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use
+stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from
+hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the
+Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2, 3) [*Cf. _Ethic._ vii, 6].
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 56
+
+OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which
+head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) The precepts of prudence;
+
+(2) The precepts relating to the opposite vices.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 56, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Should Have Included a Precept
+of Prudence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue should
+have included a precept of prudence. For the chief precepts should
+include a precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts are
+those of the decalogue. Since then prudence is the chief of the moral
+virtues, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have
+included a precept of prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the teaching of the Gospel contains the Law
+especially with regard to the precepts of the decalogue. Now the
+teaching of the Gospel contains a precept of prudence (Matt. 10:16):
+"Be ye . . . prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents." Therefore the
+precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the other lessons of the Old Testament are directed
+to the precepts of the decalogue: wherefore it is written (Malach.
+4:4): "Remember the law of Moses My servant, which I commanded him in
+Horeb." Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include precepts
+of prudence; for instance (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not upon thy own
+prudence"; and further on (Prov. 4:25): "Let thine eyelids go before
+thy steps." Therefore the Law also should have contained a precept of
+prudence, especially among the precepts of the decalogue.
+
+The contrary however appears to anyone who goes through the precepts
+of the decalogue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3; A. 5, ad 1)
+when we were treating of precepts, the commandments of the decalogue
+being given to the whole people, are a matter of common knowledge to
+all, as coming under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost
+among the things dictated by natural reason are the ends of human
+life, which are to the practical order what naturally known
+principles are to the speculative order, as shown above (Q. 47, A.
+6). Now prudence is not about the end, but about the means, as stated
+above (Q. 47, A. 6). Hence it was not fitting that the precepts of
+the decalogue should include a precept relating directly to prudence.
+And yet all the precepts of the decalogue are related to prudence, in
+so far as it directs all virtuous acts.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although prudence is simply foremost among all the
+moral virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its
+object under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary
+condition for a precept, as stated above (Q. 44, A. 1; I-II, Q. 99,
+AA. 1, 5). Hence it behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which are
+those of the decalogue, to refer to justice rather than to prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of
+perfection. Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all
+matters relating to right conduct, whether ends or means: wherefore
+it behooved the Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as the rest of the teaching of the Old Testament
+is directed to the precepts of the decalogue as its end, so it
+behooved man to be instructed by the subsequent lessons of the Old
+Testament about the act of prudence which is directed to the means.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 56, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Prohibitive Precepts Relating to the Vices Opposed to
+Prudence Are Fittingly Propounded in the Old Law?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the prohibitive precepts relating to
+the vices opposed to prudence are unfittingly propounded in the Old
+Law. For such vices as imprudence and its parts which are directly
+opposed to prudence are not less opposed thereto, than those which
+bear a certain resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and vices
+connected with it. Now the latter vices are forbidden in the Law: for
+it is written (Lev. 19:13): "Thou shalt not calumniate thy neighbor,"
+and (Deut. 25:13): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a
+greater and a less." Therefore there should have also been
+prohibitive precepts about the vices directly opposed to prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there is room for fraud in other things than in
+buying and selling. Therefore the Law unfittingly forbade fraud
+solely in buying and selling.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, there is the same reason for prescribing an act of
+virtue as for prohibiting the act of a contrary vice. But acts of
+prudence are not prescribed in the Law. Therefore neither should any
+contrary vices have been forbidden in the Law.
+
+The contrary, however, appears from the precepts of the Law which are
+quoted in the first objection.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), justice, above all, regards
+the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a
+precept, because justice tends to render that which is due to
+another, as we shall state further on (Q. 58, A. 2). Now craftiness,
+as to its execution, is committed chiefly in matters of justice, as
+stated above (Q. 55, A. 8): and so it was fitting that the Law should
+contain precepts forbidding the execution of craftiness, in so far as
+this pertains to injustice, as when a man uses guile and fraud in
+calumniating another or in stealing his goods.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Those vices that are manifestly opposed to prudence, do
+not pertain to injustice in the same way as the execution of
+craftiness, and so they are not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and
+guile are, which latter pertain to injustice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All guile and fraud committed in matters of injustice,
+can be understood to be forbidden in the prohibition of calumny (Lev.
+19:13). Yet fraud and guile are wont to be practiced chiefly in
+buying and selling, according to Ecclus. 26:28, "A huckster shall not
+be justified from the sins of the lips": and it is for this reason
+that the Law contained a special precept forbidding fraudulent buying
+and selling.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All the precepts of the Law that relate to acts of
+justice pertain to the execution of prudence, even as the precepts
+prohibitive of stealing, calumny and fraudulent selling pertain to
+the execution of craftiness.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 57
+
+OF RIGHT
+(In Four Articles)
+
+After considering prudence we must in due sequence consider justice,
+the consideration of which will be fourfold:
+
+(1) Of justice;
+
+(2) Of its parts;
+
+(3) Of the corresponding gift;
+
+(4) Of the precepts relating to justice.
+
+Four points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2)
+Justice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether right is the object of justice?
+
+(2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive
+right?
+
+(3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right?
+
+(4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Right Is the Object of Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that right is not the object of justice.
+For the jurist Celsus says [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1] that
+"right is the art of goodness and equality." Now art is not the
+object of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore
+right is not the object of justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "Law," according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), "is a kind
+of right." Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence,
+wherefore the Philosopher [*Ethic. vi, 8] reckons "legislative" as
+one of the parts of prudence. Therefore right is not the object of
+justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for
+Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving
+God alone, and consequently governing aright all things subject to
+man." Now right (_jus_) does not pertain to Divine things, but only
+to human affairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "_fas_ is the
+Divine law, and _jus,_ the human law." Therefore right is not the
+object of justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "_jus_ (right) is
+so called because it is just." Now the _just_ is the object of
+justice, for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "all are
+agreed in giving the name of justice to the habit which makes men
+capable of doing just actions."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is proper to justice, as compared with the other
+virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it
+denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are
+wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for
+equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other
+hand the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit
+him in relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in the
+works of the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue
+tends as to its proper object, depends on its relation to the agent
+only, whereas the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to
+the agent, is set up by its relation to others. Because a man's work
+is said to be just when it is related to some other by way of some
+kind of equality, for instance the payment of the wage due for a
+service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as having the
+rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act of justice,
+without taking into account the way in which it is done by the agent:
+whereas in the other virtues nothing is declared to be right unless
+it is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason justice has
+its own special proper object over and above the other virtues, and
+this object is called the just, which is the same as _right._ Hence
+it is evident that right is the object of justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is usual for words to be distorted from their
+original signification so as to mean something else: thus the word
+"medicine" was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a
+sick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this
+is done. In like manner the word _jus_ (right) was first of all used
+to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to
+designate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further to
+denote the place where justice is administered, thus a man is said to
+appear _in jure_ [*In English we speak of a court of law, a barrister
+at law, etc.], and yet further, we say even that a man, who has the
+office of exercising justice, administers the _jus_ even if his
+sentence be unjust.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsman
+an expression of the things to be made externally by his craft, which
+expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists
+in the mind an expression of the particular just work which the
+reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this
+rule be expressed in writing it is called a "law," which according to
+Isidore (Etym. v, 1) is "a written decree": and so law is not the
+same as right, but an expression of right.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot
+offer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a
+perfectly just repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not
+properly called _jus_ but _fas,_ because, to wit, God is satisfied if
+we accomplish what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man
+repay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him entirely.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Right Is Fittingly Divided into Natural Right and Positive
+Right?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that right is not fittingly divided into
+natural right and positive right. For that which is natural is
+unchangeable, and is the same for all. Now nothing of the kind is to
+be found in human affairs, since all the rules of human right fail in
+certain cases, nor do they obtain force everywhere. Therefore there
+is no such thing as natural right.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a thing is called "positive" when it proceeds from
+the human will. But a thing is not just, simply because it proceeds
+from the human will, else a man's will could not be unjust. Since
+then the "just" and the "right" are the same, it seems that there is
+no positive right.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Divine right is not natural right, since it
+transcends human nature. In like manner, neither is it positive
+right, since it is based not on human, but on Divine authority.
+Therefore right is unfittingly divided into natural and positive.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "political
+justice is partly natural and partly legal," i.e. established by law.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) the "right" or the "just" is
+a work that is adjusted to another person according to some kind of
+equality. Now a thing can be adjusted to a man in two ways: first by
+its very nature, as when a man gives so much that he may receive
+equal value in return, and this is called "natural right." In another
+way a thing is adjusted or commensurated to another person, by
+agreement, or by common consent, when, to wit, a man deems himself
+satisfied, if he receive so much. This can be done in two ways: first
+by private agreement, as that which is confirmed by an agreement
+between private individuals; secondly, by public agreement, as when
+the whole community agrees that something should be deemed as though
+it were adjusted and commensurated to another person, or when this is
+decreed by the prince who is placed over the people, and acts in its
+stead, and this is called "positive right."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: That which is natural to one whose nature is
+unchangeable, must needs be such always and everywhere. But man's
+nature is changeable, wherefore that which is natural to man may
+sometimes fail. Thus the restitution of a deposit to the depositor is
+in accordance with natural equality, and if human nature were always
+right, this would always have to be observed; but since it happens
+sometimes that man's will is unrighteous there are cases in which a
+deposit should not be restored, lest a man of unrighteous will make
+evil use of the thing deposited: as when a madman or an enemy of the
+common weal demands the return of his weapons.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The human will can, by common agreement, make a thing
+to be just provided it be not, of itself, contrary to natural
+justice, and it is in such matters that positive right has its place.
+Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "in the case of the
+legal just, it does not matter in the first instance whether it takes
+one form or another, it only matters when once it is laid down." If,
+however, a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the human
+will cannot make it just, for instance by decreeing that it is lawful
+to steal or to commit adultery. Hence it is written (Isa. 10:1): "Woe
+to them that make wicked laws."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Divine right is that which is promulgated by God.
+Such things are partly those that are naturally just, yet their
+justice is hidden to man, and partly are made just by God's decree.
+Hence also Divine right may be divided in respect of these two
+things, even as human right is. For the Divine law commands certain
+things because they are good, and forbids others, because they are
+evil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others
+evil because they are forbidden.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Right of Nations Is the Same As the Natural Right?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the right of nations is the same as
+the natural right. For all men do not agree save in that which is
+natural to them. Now all men agree in the right of nations; since the
+jurist [*Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] "the right of
+nations is that which is in use among all nations." Therefore the
+right of nations is the natural right.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, slavery among men is natural, for some are naturally
+slaves according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2). Now "slavery
+belongs to the right of nations," as Isidore states (Etym. v, 4).
+Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, right as stated above (A. 2) is divided into natural
+and positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive right, since
+all nations never agreed to decree anything by common agreement.
+Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that "right is either
+natural, or civil, or right of nations," and consequently the right
+of nations is distinct from natural right.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the natural right or just is
+that which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with
+another person. Now this may happen in two ways; first, according as
+it is considered absolutely: thus a male by [his] very nature is
+commensurate with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent
+is commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a thing is
+naturally commensurate with another person, not according as it is
+considered absolutely, but according to something resultant from it,
+for instance the possession of property. For if a particular piece of
+land be considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should
+belong to one man more than to another, but if it be considered in
+respect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of
+the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one
+and not of another man, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. ii, 2).
+
+Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend
+a thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural, is
+common to us and other animals according to the first kind of
+commensuration. But the right of nations falls short of natural right
+in this sense, as the jurist [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] says
+because "the latter is common to all animals, while the former is
+common to men only." On the other hand to consider a thing by
+comparing it with what results from it, is proper to reason,
+wherefore this same is natural to man in respect of natural reason
+which dictates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i, 1; De
+Just. et Jure i, 9): "whatever natural reason decrees among all men,
+is observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations." This
+suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular
+man should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on
+natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful
+to this man to be ruled by a wiser man, and to the latter to be
+helped by the former, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2).
+Wherefore slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in
+the second way, but not in the first.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since natural reason dictates matters which are
+according to the right of nations, as implying a proximate equality,
+it follows that they need no special institution, for they are
+instituted by natural reason itself, as stated by the authority
+quoted above.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Paternal Right and Right of Dominion Should Be Distinguished
+As Special Species?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that "paternal right" and "right of
+dominion" should not be distinguished as special species. For it
+belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, as Ambrose
+states (De Offic. i, 24). Now right is the object of justice, as
+stated above (A. 1). Therefore right belongs to each one equally; and
+we ought not to distinguish the rights of fathers and masters as
+distinct species.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the law is an expression of what is just, as stated
+above (A. 1, ad 2). Now a law looks to the common good of a city or
+kingdom, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2), but not to the private
+good of an individual or even of one household. Therefore there is no
+need for a special right of dominion or paternal right, since the
+master and the father pertain to a household, as stated in _Polit._
+i, 2.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, there are many other differences of degrees among
+men, for instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are
+princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to
+them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) distinguishes right
+of dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct from civil
+right.
+
+_I answer that,_ Right or just depends on commensuration with another
+person. Now "another" has a twofold signification. First, it may
+denote something that is other simply, as that which is altogether
+distinct; as, for example, two men neither of whom is subject to the
+other, and both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and
+between these according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is the
+"just" simply. Secondly a thing is said to be other from something
+else, not simply, but as belonging in some way to that something
+else: and in this way, as regards human affairs, a son belongs to his
+father, since he is part of him somewhat, as stated in _Ethic._ viii,
+12, and a slave belongs to his master, because he is his instrument,
+as stated in _Polit._ i, 2 [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 11]. Hence a father
+is not compared to his son as to another simply, and so between them
+there is not the just simply, but a kind of just, called "paternal."
+In like manner neither is there the just simply, between master and
+servant, but that which is called "dominative." A wife, though she is
+something belonging to the husband, since she stands related to him
+as to her own body, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 5:28), is
+nevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his
+father, or a slave from his master: for she is received into a kind
+of social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for justice between
+husband and wife than between father and son, or master and slave,
+because, as husband and wife have an immediate relation to the
+community of the household, as stated in _Polit._ i, 2, 5, it follows
+that between them there is "domestic justice" rather than "civic."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to justice to render to each one his right,
+the distinction between individuals being presupposed: for if a man
+gives himself his due, this is not strictly called "just." And since
+what belongs to the son is his father's, and what belongs to the
+slave is his master's, it follows that properly speaking there is not
+justice of father to son, or of master to slave.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as
+such, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man, is
+something having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence
+in so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards them in
+a way: and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the
+relations of father to his son, and of a master to his slave; but in
+so far as each is something belonging to another, the perfect idea of
+"right" or "just" is wanting to them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All other differences between one person and another in
+a state, have an immediate relation to the community of the state and
+to its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the perfect
+sense of justice. This "just" however is distinguished according to
+various offices, hence when we speak of "military," or "magisterial,"
+or "priestly" right, it is not as though such rights fell short of
+the simply right, as when we speak of "paternal" right, or right of
+"dominion," but for the reason that something proper is due to each
+class of person in respect of his particular office.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 58
+
+OF JUSTICE
+(In Twelve Articles)
+
+We must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is justice?
+
+(2) Whether justice is always towards another?
+
+(3) Whether it is a virtue?
+
+(4) Whether it is in the will as its subject?
+
+(5) Whether it is a general virtue?
+
+(6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every
+virtue?
+
+(7) Whether there is a particular justice?
+
+(8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own?
+
+(9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only?
+
+(10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?
+
+(11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own?
+
+(12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Justice Is Fittingly Defined As Being the Perpetual and
+Constant Will to Render to Each One His Right?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined
+justice as being "the perpetual and constant will to render to each
+one his right" [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10]. For, according
+to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a
+man "capable of doing what is just, and of being just in action and
+in intention." Now "will" denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore
+justice is unfittingly defined as being a will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the
+will were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is
+unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is
+rectitude. Therefore justice is not the will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore
+justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is
+unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say
+that it is both "perpetual" and "constant."
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his
+right. Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows
+that it is in none but the sovereign: which is absurd.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice
+is love serving God alone." Therefore it does not render to each one
+his right.
+
+_I answer that,_ The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if
+understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the
+principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of
+the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the
+proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our
+intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on (A. 2).
+Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object
+is indicated in the words, "Rendering to each one his right," since,
+as Isidore says (Etym. x), "a man is said to be just because he
+respects the rights (_jus_) of others."
+
+Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be
+virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be
+virtuous it needs first of all to be done "knowingly," secondly to be
+done "by choice," and "for a due end," thirdly to be done
+"immovably." Now the first of these is included in the second, since
+"what is done through ignorance is involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1).
+Hence the definition of justice mentions first the "will," in order
+to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is
+made afterwards of its "constancy" and "perpetuity" in order to
+indicate the firmness of the act.
+
+Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the
+act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from
+that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would
+reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that
+"justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a
+constant and perpetual will": and this is about the same definition
+as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice
+is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions
+in accordance with his choice."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is
+customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus
+Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that "faith is to believe what
+one sees not."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but
+causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on
+the part of the will's act which endures for ever, and thus God's
+will alone is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject,
+because, to wit, a man wills to do a certain thing always, and this
+is a necessary condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the
+conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in some
+particular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find
+a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite that
+one should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all
+cases.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Since "perpetual" does not imply perpetuity of the act
+of the will, it is not superfluous to add "constant": for while the
+"perpetual will" denotes the purpose of observing justice always,
+"constant" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way
+of command and direction, because a judge is the "personification of
+justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the
+other hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by
+way of execution.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as
+stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), so too the service of God includes
+rendering to each one his due.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Justice Is Always Towards Another?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not always towards
+another. For the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22) that "the justice of God is
+by faith of Jesus Christ." Now faith does not concern the dealings of
+one man with another. Neither therefore does justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), "it
+belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his
+authority over the things that are subject to him." Now the sensitive
+appetite is subject to man, according to Gen. 4:7, where it is
+written: "The lust thereof," viz. of sin, "shall be under thee, and
+thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore it belongs to justice to
+have dominion over one's own appetite: so that justice is towards
+oneself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else is
+co-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards
+another.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no
+less than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are rectified
+by justice, according to Prov. 11:5, "The justice of the upright
+shall make his way prosperous." Therefore justice is about our
+dealings not only with others, but also with ourselves.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of
+justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse."
+Now this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore
+justice is concerned only about our dealings with others.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 57, A. 1) since justice by its
+name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another,
+for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as
+it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (Q. 57,
+A. 1; I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) this otherness which justice demands must
+needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to
+supposits [*Cf. I, Q. 29, A. 2] and wholes and, properly speaking,
+not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the
+hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing
+hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed
+metaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a
+distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards
+another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak
+metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the
+reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so
+many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is
+said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and
+concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to
+each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the
+Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this "metaphorical justice."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby
+the ungodly is justified: it consists in the due coordination of the
+parts of the soul, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) where we were
+treating of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to
+metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all
+by himself.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God's justice is from eternity in respect of the
+eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice
+consists); although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since
+nothing is co-eternal with God.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified
+by the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues. But
+his dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in
+relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom
+they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special
+virtue, and this is justice.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Justice Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is
+written (Luke 17:10): "When you shall have done all these things that
+are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done
+that which we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a
+virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to a
+profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition
+of godliness." Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a
+virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is
+not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious.
+But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is
+of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous
+actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now
+those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning
+behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher
+(Metaph. ix) [*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to
+justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems
+that justice is not a moral virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire
+structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance,
+prudence, fortitude and justice.
+
+_I answer that,_ A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and
+man himself good" [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice.
+For a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason,
+which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since
+justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders
+man's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7),
+good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he
+says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the luster of virtue appears above all
+in justice."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the
+person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing
+him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what
+he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously.
+Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom "teacheth
+temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
+things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in
+life."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from _constraint,_ and
+this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other
+arises from the obligation of a _command,_ or from the necessity of
+obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of
+virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does
+not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary
+in this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation,
+according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to
+me, for a necessity lieth upon me."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not by
+making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings
+with other men.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Justice Is in the Will As Its Subject?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not in the will as its
+subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in
+the will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will
+as its subject.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it
+belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another.
+Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is
+not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral
+virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is
+"rational by participation," viz. the irascible and the
+concupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore
+justice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and
+concupiscible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is
+rectitude of the will observed for its own sake."
+
+_I answer that,_ The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that
+virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an
+act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through
+knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the
+intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said
+to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate
+principle of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in
+some appetitive power as its subject.
+
+Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason
+and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension,
+and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in
+the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Again the act of rendering his due to
+each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because
+sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider
+the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the
+reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible
+as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
+v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (A.
+1).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Since the will is the rational appetite, when the
+rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the
+will on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains
+the name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the
+name of truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The will is borne towards its object consequently on
+the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one
+thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation
+to another, and this belongs to justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are
+_rational by participation,_ but the entire _appetitive_ faculty, as
+stated in _Ethic._ i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason.
+Now the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can
+be the subject of moral virtue.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Justice Is a General Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For
+justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7,
+"She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude."
+Now the "general" is not specified or reckoned together with the
+species contained under the same "general." Therefore justice is not
+a general virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are
+temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is
+reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in
+any way be reckoned a general virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above
+(A. 2). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a
+general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against
+oneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice
+is every virtue."
+
+_I answer that,_ Justice, as stated above (A. 2) directs man in his
+relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as
+regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his
+relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a
+community, serves all those who are included in that community.
+Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to
+another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are
+included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts
+to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that
+whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the
+whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such
+virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain
+other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which
+justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice,
+in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense
+that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the
+law to direct to the common good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A.
+2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general,
+is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the
+law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the other
+virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state
+further on (AA. 7, 12).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite,
+viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are
+appetitive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are
+cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the
+intellective appetite as its subject, which can have the universal
+good as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence
+justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Things referable to oneself are referable to
+another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal
+justice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a
+general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general
+sin; hence it is written (1 John 3:4) that all "sin is iniquity."
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Justice, As a General Virtue, Is Essentially the Same As All
+Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is
+essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+v, 1) that "virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but
+differ in their mode of being." Now things that differ merely in
+their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore
+justice is essentially the same as every virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all
+virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to
+the Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but the whole of
+virtue." Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as
+all virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that
+virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of
+temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be
+directed to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the
+acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the
+common good of the multitude, which transcends the good of one single
+individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all
+virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of
+the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without
+use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be
+so. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that
+does not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good;
+and so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all
+virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are
+able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable
+to be virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2)
+that "the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the
+virtue of the good citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is
+general justice, whereby a man is directed to the common good.
+Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and
+it is possible to have one without the other.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First,
+by _predication:_ thus "animal" is general in relation to man and
+horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must
+needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it
+is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of
+the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is
+said to be general _virtually;_ thus a universal cause is general in
+relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to
+all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in
+this sense there is no need for that which is "general" to be
+essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is
+general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it
+is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said (A. 5),
+legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as
+it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is
+to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may
+be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all
+the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as
+it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
+Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its
+proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too
+legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so
+far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it
+is in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it
+is secondarily and administratively in his subjects.
+
+However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so
+far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid
+legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless
+virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially
+the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in
+this sense that the Philosopher speaks.
+
+Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument again takes legal justice for the
+virtue commanded by legal justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act
+to that virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a
+further end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue
+considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to
+that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially
+distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the
+common good; and this virtue is legal justice.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 7]
+
+Whether There Is a Particular Besides a General Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a
+general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as
+neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man
+sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is
+no need for a particular justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to
+"one" and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another in
+matters relating to the multitude, as shown above (AA. 5, 6).
+Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man
+to another in matters relating to the individual.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, between the individual and the general public stands
+the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general
+justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the
+individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice
+directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not
+the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a
+legal justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom in his commentary on Matt. 5:6,
+"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom.
+xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or
+the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), legal justice is not
+essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which
+directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other
+virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular
+goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another
+individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice
+there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to
+himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal
+justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his
+relations to other individuals.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in
+his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so
+immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so
+mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a
+man immediately to the good of another individual.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The common good of the realm and the particular good of
+the individual differ not only in respect of the _many_ and the
+_few,_ but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the _common_
+good differs from the aspect of the _individual_ good, even as the
+aspect of _whole_ differs from that of _part._ Wherefore the
+Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "they are wrong who maintain that
+the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and
+not specifically."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The household community, according to the Philosopher
+(Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely
+"of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of
+which one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between
+such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice,
+viz. _domestic_ justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 6.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Particular Justice Has a Special Matter?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special
+matter. Because a gloss on Gen. 2:14, "The fourth river is
+Euphrates," says: "Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated
+through what country it flows, because justice pertains to all the
+parts of the soul." Now this would not be the case, if justice had a
+special matter, since every special matter belongs to a special
+power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that "the soul
+has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz.
+temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;" and he says that "the
+fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues." Therefore
+particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no
+special matter.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating
+to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters
+relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and
+not special.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular
+justice to be specially about those things which belong to social
+life.
+
+_I answer that,_ Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of
+moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason,
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can
+rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external
+actions, and also those external things of which man can make use.
+And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by
+means of which men can communicate with one another, that the
+relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in
+respect of internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in
+himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not
+about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external
+actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in
+so far as one man is related to another through them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part
+of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will
+which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and
+accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not
+directly but by a kind of diffusion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the cardinal
+virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each
+having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of
+virtue. In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted:
+for he says that "prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and
+avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures,
+fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with passing trials, justice
+is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues,
+that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between
+one man and another."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A man's internal passions which are a part of moral
+matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs
+to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external
+actions, are capable of being directed to another man. Consequently
+it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 9]
+
+Whether Justice Is About the Passions?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that justice is about the passions. For
+the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about
+pleasure and pain." Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions,
+as stated above [*I-II, Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1] when
+we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral
+virtue, is about the passions.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's
+operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations
+cannot be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is
+owing to disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the
+aforesaid operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and
+overmuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs
+be about the passions.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, even as particular justice is towards another person
+so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it
+would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently
+about the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is
+about operations.
+
+_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question may be gathered
+from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from
+the will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 22, A. 3; Q. 59, A. 4), for it is only the sensitive
+appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not
+about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the
+irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the
+matter, because justice is about man's relations with another, and we
+are not directed immediately to another by the internal passions.
+Therefore justice is not about the passions.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as
+its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but
+every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be
+acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure
+and pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this
+is an evil, and that a good": and in this way too they belong to
+justice, since "a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions"
+(Ethic. i, 8).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: External operations are as it were between external
+things, which are their matter, and internal passions, which are
+their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one
+of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may
+steal another's property, not through the desire to have the thing,
+but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet
+another's property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the
+directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external
+things, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the
+passions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the
+passions. Hence justice hinders theft of another's property, in so
+far as stealing is contrary to the equality that should be maintained
+in external things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from an
+immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations
+take their species, not from the internal passions but from external
+things as being their objects, it follows that, external operations
+are essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral
+virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The common good is the end of each individual
+member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of
+each part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end
+of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to
+the common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions
+whereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than
+particular justice which is directed to the good of another
+individual: although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in
+the point of their external operations, in so far, to wit, as "the law
+commands us to perform the actions of a courageous person . . . the
+actions of a temperate person . . . and the actions of a gentle
+person" (Ethic. v, 5).
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 10]
+
+Whether the Mean of Justice Is the Real Mean?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real
+mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now
+moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which
+observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore justice
+observes the rational and not the real mean.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither
+excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is
+clearly the case with the virtues, according to _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now
+justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in _Ethic._
+v. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe
+the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean
+varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one
+is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case
+in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same
+punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice
+also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the
+mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical"
+proportion, so that it is the real mean.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9; I-II, Q. 59, A. 4), the other
+moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation
+of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is
+the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are
+vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such
+like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to
+another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so
+that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our
+regard.
+
+On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so
+far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly
+proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice
+consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external
+thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between
+greater and less, as stated in _Metaph._ x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf.
+_Ethic._ v, 4]: wherefore justice observes the real mean.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore
+justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways.
+First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good;
+and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply
+in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through
+being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil
+through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it
+is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who
+can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is
+about things that are good simply.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a
+prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each
+injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and
+this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 11]
+
+Whether the Act of Justice Is to Render to Each One His Own?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the act of justice is not to render
+to each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to
+justice the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we
+give them what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice
+does not consist in rendering to each one his own.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that "beneficence which
+we may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice." Now it
+pertains to liberality to give to another of one's own, not of what
+is his. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to
+each one his own.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute things
+duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder, adultery
+and so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his seems to
+belong solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act of
+justice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in
+rendering to each one his own.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "It is justice
+that renders to each one what is his, and claims not another's
+property; it disregards its own profit in order to preserve the
+common equity."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 8, 10), the matter of justice
+is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use
+by it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are
+related by justice. Now each man's own is that which is due to him
+according to equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of
+justice is nothing else than to render to each one his own.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary
+virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected with
+it, as we shall state further on (Q. 80, A. 1). Wherefore to succor
+the needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally
+beneficent, which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction
+ascribed to justice as to their principal virtue.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of
+justice, the name of "profit" is extended to whatever is excessive,
+and whatever is deficient is called "loss." The reason for this is
+that justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary
+interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein those
+expressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred to
+all other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to
+each one of what is his own.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 12]
+
+Whether Justice Stands Foremost Among All Moral Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among
+all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to
+each one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of
+one's own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a
+greater virtue than justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than
+itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all
+the virtues, according to _Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is
+more excellent than justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and
+"good," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3. But fortitude is about more
+difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death,
+according to _Ethic._ iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent
+than justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most
+resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man."
+
+_I answer that,_ If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it
+stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the
+common good transcends the individual good of one person. In this
+sense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent
+of the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than
+either the evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of
+particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two
+reasons. The first reason may be taken from the subject, because
+justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational
+appetite or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the
+sensitive appetite, whereunto appertain the passions which are the
+matter of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from
+the object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect of
+the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is
+praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed
+towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another
+person, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.
+i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most
+profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing
+good to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the
+brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and
+justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does
+so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own
+virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through
+consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed
+towards all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again
+liberality which gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby
+one renders to each man what is his.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the
+latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a
+virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although fortitude is about the most difficult things,
+it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas
+justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 59
+
+OF INJUSTICE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether injustice is a special vice?
+
+(2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?
+
+(3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?
+
+(4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Injustice Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For
+it is written (1 John 3:4): "All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'Whosoever
+committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity']." Now
+iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a
+kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as
+inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But
+injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it
+is opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness,
+and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is
+not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the
+will. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus
+Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a
+special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.
+
+_I answer that,_ Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal
+injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially
+a special vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the
+common good which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as
+regards the intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to
+all kinds of sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the
+common good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose
+from injustice, in accord with what has been said above about justice
+(Q. 58, AA. 5, 6). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an
+inequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to
+have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such
+as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a
+particular vice opposed to particular justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Even as legal justice is referred to human
+common good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to
+which all sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be
+iniquity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to
+all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both
+to justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways
+as stated above (Q. 58, A. 9, ad 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The will, like the reason, extends to all moral
+matters, i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to
+another person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in
+the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and
+the same applies to injustice.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 2]
+
+Whether a Man Is Called Unjust Through Doing an Unjust Thing?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing
+an unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper object of justice is the
+just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a
+man should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust
+through doing an unjust thing.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they
+hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do
+suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of
+doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not
+be false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is
+unjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he
+does an unjust thing.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper
+act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does
+what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever
+does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may
+do an unjust thing without being unjust."
+
+_I answer that,_ Even as the object of justice is something equal in
+external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal,
+through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to
+him. To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of
+its proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may
+happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not
+unjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the
+operation and its proper object. For the operation takes its species
+and name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in
+things directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and
+the indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence if a man do that
+which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for
+instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is
+unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but
+only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is
+unjust: hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly,
+this may happen on account of a lack of proportion between the
+operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a
+passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice,
+for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's
+complacency. In the latter case properly speaking it arises from a
+habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit
+is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust
+intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which
+sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man
+may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without
+having the habit of injustice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct and
+formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from
+choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the
+sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as
+the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The object of temperance is not something established
+externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance,
+i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man
+himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be
+said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like manner
+neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there is
+dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as
+regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is
+similarity in all respects.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 3]
+
+Whether We Can Suffer Injustice Willingly?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly.
+For injustice is inequality, as stated above (A. 2). Now a man by
+injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another.
+Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another.
+But whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily.
+Therefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be
+inflicted by himself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for
+having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished
+according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable
+burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man
+can do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a
+man suffers injustice voluntarily.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers
+that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one
+who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it
+is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice
+voluntarily.
+
+_On the contrary,_ To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are
+contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore
+on the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.
+
+_I answer that,_ Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent,
+whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in
+the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in
+_Phys._ iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is
+the will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does
+voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he
+suffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a
+principle in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather
+than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly
+speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an
+injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so
+to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to
+be done involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally),
+or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to
+another more than he owes him).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he
+does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality. For a
+man's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if
+he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by
+another's action.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An individual person may be considered in two ways.
+First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on
+himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin,
+intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because
+injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person.
+Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the
+State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and
+image; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to
+himself, but to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in
+accordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle
+declares in respect of the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): "If any man
+violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now
+in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is
+that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above
+(A. 2), and the formal and essential element is on the part of
+the will of agent and patient, as stated above (A. 2).
+Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and
+injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the
+material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an
+injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other
+man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and
+on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an
+injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury
+unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Whoever Does an Injustice Sins Mortally?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice
+sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is
+sometimes a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they
+do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter."
+Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs
+but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and
+should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher
+declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an
+injustice sins mortally.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues" [*Peter
+Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary thereto
+that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the
+other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin
+to do an injustice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal
+sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the
+law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to
+murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on (Q.
+64, seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 12, A. 5), when we were
+treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is
+contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury
+inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which
+moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always
+consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that
+to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
+understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls
+"ignorance of particular circumstances" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which
+deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not
+excuse: and he who does an injustice through ignorance, does no
+injustice except accidentally, as stated above (A. 2)
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls
+short of the perfection of an unjust deed, in so far as what he does
+may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who
+suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such
+thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter
+is not hurt or displeased.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues
+are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder
+affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 60
+
+OF JUDGMENT
+(In Six Articles)
+
+In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are
+six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?
+
+(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?
+
+(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?
+
+(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written
+law?
+
+(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Judgment Is an Act of Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice.
+The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what
+he knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive
+faculty. Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence.
+Therefore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which
+is in the will, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4).
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual man
+judgeth all things." Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue
+of charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost
+Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity
+rather than to justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its
+proper matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure in
+everything," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore
+judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral
+virtues.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But
+the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then
+judges are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the
+proper act of justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until justice be
+turned into judgment."
+
+_I answer that,_ Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as
+such. Now a judge (_judex_) is so called because he asserts the right
+(_jus dicens_) and right is the object of justice, as stated above
+(Q. 57, A. 1). Consequently the original meaning of the word
+"judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to
+decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from
+the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about
+matters relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which denotes a
+right decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For
+this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that "men have
+recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The word "judgment," from its original meaning of a
+right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a
+right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a
+right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the
+virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is
+an act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or
+define. The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which
+depends his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of
+justice, judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of
+fortitude, it proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act
+of justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of
+prudence in so far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore
+_synesis_ which belongs to prudence is said to "judge rightly," as
+stated above (Q. 51, A. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity,
+has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to the
+Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces
+judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces
+judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling
+of the law.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself, whereas
+justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown above (Q.
+58, A. 2). Now man is master in things concerning himself, but not in
+matters relating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are
+in question, there is no need for judgment other than that of a
+virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as explained
+above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further need for
+the judgment of a superior, who is "able to reprove both, and to put
+his hand between both" [*Job 9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more
+specifically to justice than to any other virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue [*Cf. Q.
+58, A. 6], commanding and prescribing what is just; while it is in
+the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue. Hence
+judgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to
+justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Judge?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished
+except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with
+punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Matt.
+7:1, "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged." Therefore it is
+unlawful to judge.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that
+judgest another man's servant[?] To his own lord he standeth or
+falleth." Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it
+lawful to judge.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 John 1:8, "If we
+say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now it is unlawful
+for a sinner to judge, according to Rom. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable,
+O man, whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest
+another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which
+thou judgest." Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint
+judges and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the
+people with just judgment."
+
+_I answer that,_ Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of
+justice. Now it follows from what has been stated above (A. 1, ad 1,
+3) that three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of
+justice: first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice;
+secondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it
+be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one
+of these be lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First,
+when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is
+called "perverted" or "unjust": secondly, when a man judges about
+matters wherein he has no authority, and this is called judgment "by
+usurpation": thirdly, when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man,
+without any solid motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden
+matter, and then it is called judgment by "suspicion" or "rash"
+judgment.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is
+about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine
+states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment
+about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply believe,
+since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on
+Matt. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in
+the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], He
+forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from
+bitterness of heart.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore it is
+written (Deut. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on
+(Deut. 1:17), "because it is the judgment of God."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not
+judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom
+[*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Matt. 7:1, "Judge not." Above all
+does this hold when such sins are public, because there would be an
+occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they
+are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the
+judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove
+or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
+in Monte ii, 19): "If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as
+another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to
+strive against it together with us." And yet it is not through acting
+thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned
+once again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be
+equally deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 3]
+
+Whether It Is Unlawful to Form a Judgment from Suspicions?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment
+from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion
+about an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that
+suspicion is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible
+to have any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars.
+Since then human judgment is about human acts, which are about
+singular and contingent matters, it seems that no judgment would be
+lawful, if it were not lawful to judge from suspicions.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him
+unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a
+man's opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the
+injury of another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not
+unlawful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an
+injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (A.
+1). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus,
+as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4). Therefore a judgment based on
+suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this
+is false, because "we cannot avoid suspicions," according to a gloss
+of Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before
+the time." Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to
+be unlawful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus
+Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] in comment on
+the words of Matt. 7:1, "Judge not," etc., says: "By this commandment
+our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly
+motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his
+own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part
+on mere suspicion."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion
+denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to
+three causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this
+very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to
+think evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, "The fool when he
+walketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men
+fools." Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards
+another: for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with
+or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of
+him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this
+is due to long experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
+13) that "old people are very suspicious, for they have often
+experienced the faults of others." The first two causes of suspicion
+evidently connote perversity of the affections, while the third
+diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to
+certainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently
+suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes,
+the more vicious it is.
+
+Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a
+man begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications.
+This is a venial and a light sin; for "it belongs to human temptation
+without which no man can go through this life," according to a gloss
+on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the time." The second degree is when
+a man, from slight indications, esteems another man's wickedness as
+certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since
+it cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss
+goes on to say: "If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are
+human, we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from
+forming a definite and fixed opinion." The third degree is when a
+judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains
+directly to injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts, not
+indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting the
+matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable
+witnesses.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of another
+without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore does
+him an injury.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since justice and injustice are about external
+operations, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. 8, 10, 11; Q. 59, A. 1, ad
+3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it
+is betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as
+stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as
+it is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the
+external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or
+anger to murder.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Doubts Should Be Interpreted for the Best?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for
+the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most
+part. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the
+number of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the imagination and
+thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Gen. 8:21).
+Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for
+the best.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he
+leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things,
+and turns neither to this side nor to that." Now he who interprets a
+doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should
+not be done.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with
+regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the
+worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works." Therefore it
+seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be
+interpreted for the worst.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him
+not judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in
+the best sense."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 2), from the very fact
+that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures
+and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure
+another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have
+evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him
+good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may
+happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err
+frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less
+frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in
+the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge
+of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good
+or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take
+no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there
+is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly,
+and of his evil if he judge falsely because "the true is the good of
+the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in _Ethic._ vi,
+2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with
+things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the good
+and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the
+person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy
+of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and
+deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we
+ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless
+there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge
+falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our
+good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither
+does it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of
+contingent singulars in themselves.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for the
+best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we
+have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's, in
+order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure,
+it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be
+efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against
+a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or
+for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when
+judging of things we should try to interpret each thing according as
+it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best
+as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 5]
+
+Whether We Should Always Judge According to the Written Law?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge
+according to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging
+unjustly. But written laws sometimes contain injustice, according to
+Isa. 10:1, "Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write,
+write injustice." Therefore we ought not always to judge according to
+the written law.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, judgment has to be formed about individual
+happenings. But no written law can cover each and every individual
+happening, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it
+seems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written
+law.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver's
+intention may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if
+the lawgiver himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore
+we ought not always to judge according to the written law.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "In these
+earthly laws, though men judge about them when they are making them,
+when once they are established and passed, the judges may judge no
+longer of them, but according to them."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), judgment is nothing else but
+a decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes just
+in two ways: first by the very nature of the case, and this is called
+"natural right," secondly by some agreement between men, and this is
+called "positive right," as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2). Now laws are
+written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but in
+different ways. For the written law does indeed contain natural
+right, but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its
+force, not from the law but from nature: whereas the written law both
+contains positive right, and establishes it by giving it force of
+authority.
+
+Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else
+judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive
+right.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as the written law does not give force to the
+natural right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force, because
+neither can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law
+contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has
+no binding force. For positive right has no place except where "it
+matters not," according to the natural right, "whether a thing be
+done in one way or in another"; as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2, ad 2).
+Wherefore such documents are to be called, not laws, but rather
+corruptions of law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 95, A. 2): and
+consequently judgment should not be delivered according to them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even as unjust laws by their very nature are, either
+always or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so too
+laws that are rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they
+were observed they would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore
+in such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to the
+letter of the law, but according to equity which the lawgiver has in
+view. Hence the jurist says [*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque
+consult. 25]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it
+allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those
+useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man." In
+such cases even the lawgiver himself would decide otherwise; and if
+he had foreseen the case, he might have provided for it by law.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Judgment Is Rendered Perverse by Being Usurped?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by
+being usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now
+truth is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from
+the person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses
+nothing, no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is
+meant by judgment.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is
+related to the praise of some that they punished sins without having
+authority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the
+Egyptian (Ex. 2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri
+the son of Salu (Num. 25:7-14), and "it was reputed to him unto
+justice" (Ps. 105:31). Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not
+to injustice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now
+prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters
+concerning the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not
+unlawful.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to
+judge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown
+above (A. 1, ad 1, 3; A. 2). But a judgment is not described as
+unjust, if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge
+of the law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by
+usurpation, i.e. without authority.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that
+judgest another man's servant?"
+
+_I answer that,_ Since judgment should be pronounced according to the
+written law, as stated above (A. 5), he that pronounces judgment,
+interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some
+particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to
+interpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by
+public authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by
+public authority, which extends over those who are subject to the
+community. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force
+another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority,
+so too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment
+that is pronounced by other than the public authority.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When the truth is declared there is no obligation to
+accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes.
+On the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is
+unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by authority
+received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to follow from
+Acts 7:24, 25, where it is said that "striking the Egyptian . . . he
+thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand would save
+Israel [Vulg.: 'them']." Or it may be replied that Moses slew the
+Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked,
+without himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence.
+Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that "whoever does not ward
+off a blow from a fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the
+striker"; and he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with
+Augustine (QQ. Exod. qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just
+as "the soil gives proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs
+before the useful seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful
+although it gave a sign of great fertility," in so far, to wit, as it
+was a sign of the power whereby he was to deliver his people.
+
+With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for
+God by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest,
+he was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his
+concern as of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex.
+22:20; Lev. 20; Deut. 13, 17].
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as
+the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not
+usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal
+matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have
+been committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of
+the individual, and consequently their absence does not make a
+judgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority which
+gives a judgment its coercive force.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 61
+
+OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts,
+which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative
+justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts,
+i.e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will
+be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And
+since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we
+must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and
+distributive justice; (2) restitution.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and
+commutative?
+
+(2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?
+
+(3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?
+
+(4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as
+counter-passion?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Two Species of Justice Are Suitably Assigned, Viz.
+Commutative and Distributive?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are
+unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is
+hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is
+directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of
+the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many,
+both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and
+because the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De
+Offic. ii, 15): "He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to
+expect that he will receive again." Therefore distribution does not
+belong to any species of justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is
+his own, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 2). But when things are
+distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes
+possessed of something which belonged to the community. Therefore
+this does not pertain to justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in
+the subject, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 6). But it belongs
+exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution
+does not always belong to justice.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods" (Ethic.
+v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice.
+Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of
+legal justice.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a
+virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to
+one person, while distributive justice consists in giving something
+to many. Therefore they are not different species of justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and
+says (Ethic. v, 2) that "one directs distributions, the other,
+commutations."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, AA. 7, 8), particular
+justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the
+community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be
+considered in relation to a part. In the first place there is the
+order of one part to another, to which corresponds the order of one
+private individual to another. This order is directed by commutative
+justice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two
+persons. In the second place there is the order of the whole towards
+the parts, to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to
+the community in relation to each single person. This order is
+directed by distributive justice, which distributes common goods
+proportionately. Hence there are two species of justice, distributive
+and commutative.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as a private individual is praised for moderation
+in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation
+to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein
+distributive justice directs.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too
+that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also:
+so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a
+number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his
+own.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The act of distributing the goods of the community,
+belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods;
+and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those
+goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just
+distribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made
+not to the state but to the members of a family, and such
+distribution can be made by authority of a private individual.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Movement takes its species from the term
+_whereunto._ Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common
+good those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the
+contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to
+particular individuals by way of distribution.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not
+only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of
+different kinds of due: because common property is due to an
+individual in one way, and his personal property in another way.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Mean Is to Be Observed in the Same Way in Distributive As
+in Commutative Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is
+to be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of
+these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above (A. 1). Now
+the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or
+fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way
+in both distributive and commutative justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the
+mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then, one
+virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the
+same.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive justice
+we have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a person's
+deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for instance, in
+punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished more than
+one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is observed
+in the same way in both kinds of justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3, 4) that the
+mean in distributive justice is observed according to "geometrical
+proportion," whereas in commutative justice it follows "arithmetical
+proportion."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), in distributive justice
+something is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs
+to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is
+proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in
+respect of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person
+receives all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a
+more prominent position in the community. This prominence in an
+aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy
+according to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in
+various ways according to various forms of community. Hence in
+distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality
+between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things
+and persons: in such a way that even as one person surpasses another,
+so that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted
+to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3, 4) that the mean
+in the latter case follows "geometrical proportion," wherein equality
+depends not on quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6
+is to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion equals
+11/2; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half:
+whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6
+exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.
+
+On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual
+on account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen
+chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is
+found primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing,
+so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as
+he has become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The
+result of this will be equality according to the "arithmetical mean"
+which is gauged according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the
+mean between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by
+the former, by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5,
+and one of them receives 1 out of the other's belongings, the one
+that is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be left with 4:
+and so there will be justice if both be brought back to the mean, 1
+being taken from him that has 6, and given to him that has 4, for
+then both will have 5 which is the mean.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the other moral virtues the rational, not the real
+mean, is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean; wherefore
+the mean, in justice, depends on the diversity of things.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Equality is the general form of justice, wherein
+distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find
+equality of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find
+equality of arithmetical proportion.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In actions and passions a person's station affects the
+quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a prince
+than a private person. Hence in distributive justice a person's
+station is considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is
+considered in so far as it causes a diversity of things.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 3]
+
+Whether There Is a Different Matter for Both Kinds of Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a different matter for
+both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of
+virtue, as in the case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if
+distributive and commutative justice have different matters, it would
+seem that they are not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the distribution that has to do with distributive
+justice is one of "wealth or of honors, or of whatever can be
+distributed among the members of the community" (Ethic. v, 2), which
+very things are the subject matter of commutations between one person
+and another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Therefore the
+matters of distributive and commutative justice are not distinct.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs from
+that of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ
+specifically, where there is no specific difference, there ought to
+be no diversity of matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons
+commutative justice as one species, and yet this has many kinds of
+matter. Therefore the matter of these species of justice is,
+seemingly, not of many kinds.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is stated in _Ethic._ v, 2 that "one kind of
+justice directs distributions, and another commutations."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 51, AA. 8, 10), justice is about
+certain external operations, namely distribution and commutation.
+These consist in the use of certain externals, whether things,
+persons or even works: of things, as when one man takes from or
+restores to another that which is his; of persons, as when a man does
+an injury to the very person of another, for instance by striking or
+insulting him, or even by showing respect for him; and of works, as
+when a man justly exacts a work of another, or does a work for him.
+Accordingly, if we take for the matter of each kind of justice the
+things themselves of which the operations are the use, the matter of
+distributive and commutative justice is the same, since things can be
+distributed out of the common property to individuals, and be the
+subject of commutation between one person and another; and again
+there is a certain distribution and payment of laborious works.
+
+If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the
+principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things,
+and works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For
+distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice
+directs commutations that can take place between two persons. Of
+these some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when
+anyone uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will,
+and this may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In
+either case the offence may be committed against the other man's
+chattel or person, or against a person connected with him. If the
+offence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, it is
+called "theft," if openly, it is called "robbery." If it be against
+another man's person, it may affect either the very substance of his
+person, or his dignity. If it be against the substance of his person,
+a man is injured secretly if he is treacherously slain, struck or
+poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or
+maimed. If it be against his personal dignity, a man is injured
+secretly by false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is
+deprived of his good name, and openly, by being accused in a court of
+law, or by public insult. If it be against a personal connection, a
+man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly (for the most
+part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the latter be
+induced to leave his master: which things can also be done openly.
+The same applies to other personal connections, and whatever injury
+may be committed against the principal, may be committed against them
+also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to leave his master are
+properly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a slave
+is his master's chattel, is referred to theft. Voluntary commutations
+are when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person.
+And if he transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no debt, as
+in the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but of liberality.
+A voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far as it includes the
+notion of debt, and this may occur in many ways. First when one man
+simply transfers his thing to another in exchange for another thing,
+as happens in selling and buying. Secondly when a man transfers his
+thing to another, that the latter may have the use of it with the
+obligation of returning it to its owner. If he grant the use of a
+thing gratuitously, it is called "usufruct" in things that bear
+fruit; and simply "borrowing" on "loan" in things that bear no fruit,
+such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even the use is granted
+gratis, it is called "letting" or "hiring." Thirdly, a man transfers
+his thing with the intention of recovering it, not for the purpose of
+its use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a "deposit," or under
+some obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when one man
+stands security for another. In all these actions, whether voluntary
+or involuntary, the mean is taken in the same way according to the
+equality of repayment. Hence all these actions belong to the one same
+species of justice, namely commutative justice. And this suffices for
+the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Just Is Absolutely the Same As Retaliation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as
+retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the
+judgment of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with
+his deeds, according to Matt. 7:2: "With what measure you judge, you
+shall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured
+to you again." Therefore the just is absolutely the same as
+retaliation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in either kind of justice something is given to
+someone according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice this
+equality regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly
+on what a person has done for the good of the community; while in
+commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has
+suffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there is retaliation
+in respect of the deed committed. Therefore it would seem that the
+just is absolutely the same as retaliation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based on
+the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for he who
+does an injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary
+and involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify the
+mean of justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on
+us. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as
+retaliation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just
+is not always the same as retaliation.
+
+_I answer that,_ Retaliation (_contrapassum_) denotes equal passion
+repaid for previous action; and the expression applies most properly
+to injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of
+his neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back.
+This kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23, 24): "He shall
+render life for life, eye for eye," etc. And since also to take away
+what belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows that
+secondly retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes
+loss to another, should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss
+is also found in the Law (Ex. 22:1): "If any man steal an ox or a
+sheep, and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and
+four sheep for one sheep." Thirdly retaliation is transferred to
+voluntary commutations, where action and passion are on both sides,
+although voluntariness detracts from the nature of passion, as stated
+above (Q. 59, A. 3).
+
+In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of
+equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely
+that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not
+always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action.
+Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one
+who is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species
+that he might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not
+only struck back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner
+when a man despoils another of his property against the latter's
+will, the action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of
+that thing, because the man who caused another's loss, himself would
+lose nothing, and so he is punished by making restitution several
+times over, because not only did he injure a private individual, but
+also the common weal, the security of whose protection he has
+infringed. Nor again would there be equality of passion in voluntary
+commutations, were one always to exchange one's chattel for another
+man's, because it might happen that the other man's chattel is much
+greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to equalize
+passion and action in commutations according to a certain
+proportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented.
+Hence retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but
+there is no place for it in distributive justice, because in
+distributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing
+and thing or between passion and action (whence the expression
+_contrapassum_), but according to proportion between things and
+persons, as stated above (A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with
+the conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are
+apportioned to merits, and punishments to sins.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When a man who has served the community is paid for his
+services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive,
+justice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not
+between the thing received and the thing done, but between the thing
+received by one person and the thing received by another according to
+the respective conditions of those persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is
+aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence
+it requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a
+difference, not on our part, but on the part of the thing.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 62
+
+OF RESTITUTION
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Of what is it an act?
+
+(2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what
+one has taken away?
+
+(3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away?
+
+(4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away?
+
+(5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from
+whom something has been taken?
+
+(6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to
+restore it?
+
+(7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution?
+
+(8) Whether one is bound to restore at once?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Restitution Is an Act of Commutative Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not an act of
+commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due.
+Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due.
+Therefore restitution is not the act of any part of justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be
+restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and
+passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution
+would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away.
+Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation,
+but also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man
+less than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of
+commutative than of distributive justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is
+an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another.
+Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs
+commutations.
+
+_I answer that,_ To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a
+person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in
+restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment
+of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice.
+Hence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one
+person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for
+instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or
+theft.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: That which is not due to another is not his properly
+speaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is
+a mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another
+what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution,
+since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same
+in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which considers that
+thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is not
+restitution properly so called.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In so far as the word restitution denotes something
+done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem
+originally to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass
+from one person to another, since they remain the same both
+substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as
+the term "commutation" has passed from such like things to those
+actions and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit
+on another person, so too the term "restitution" is applied, to
+things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in
+their effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt
+by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or
+dishonored by injurious words.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to
+whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing,
+when the latter receives so much the more according as he received
+less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative
+justice.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Restitution of What Has Been Taken Away Is Necessary for
+Salvation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what
+has been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary
+for salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has
+been taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does
+not seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from
+another.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for
+salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is
+impossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one
+has taken away another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it
+is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from
+another.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man
+loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that
+which has been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it
+is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is
+seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since "to lack little
+is almost the same as to lack nothing at all," as the Philosopher
+says (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a
+benefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the
+benefice, since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is
+not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): "Unless a
+man restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven."
+
+_I answer that,_ Restitution as stated above (A. 1) is an act of
+commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore
+restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; since it
+is by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it
+be taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no
+need for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since
+therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it
+follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been
+taken unjustly.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it
+suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God
+and our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14).
+Wherefore when that which has been taken cannot be restored in
+equivalent, compensation should be made as far as possible: for
+instance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make
+compensation either in money or in honor, the condition of either
+party being duly considered according to the judgment of a good man.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There are three ways in which one may take away
+another's good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly,
+as when a man reveals another's sin, while observing the right order
+of so doing, and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by
+saying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore
+that man's good name, by confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly,
+by saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals another's
+sin contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound
+to restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an
+untruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed
+him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name, he must
+compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases, as stated above
+(ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be
+undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its
+effect, viz. the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in the
+opinion of other men.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: There are several ways of preventing a man from
+obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view
+the honor of God or the good of the Church, one procures its being
+conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation
+whatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if
+the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, through
+hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefice has
+been definitely assigned to anyone, one prevents its being conferred
+on a worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred on him, one
+is bound to make some compensation, after taking account of the
+circumstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a
+prudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man
+had not obtained the benefice and might have been prevented in many
+ways from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had
+already been assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some undue
+cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had
+deprived a man of what he already possessed, and consequently he would
+be bound to compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to his
+means.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 3]
+
+Whether It Suffices to Restore the Exact Amount Taken?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the
+exact amount taken. For it is written (Ex. 22:1): "If a man shall
+steal an ox or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five
+oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Now everyone is bound
+to keep the commandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is
+bound to restore four- or fivefold.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "What things soever were written, were written for
+our learning" (Rom. 15:4). Now Zachaeus said (Luke 19:8) to our Lord:
+"If I have wronged any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold."
+Therefore a man is bound to restore several times over the amount he
+has taken unjustly.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no one can be unjustly deprived of what he is not
+bound to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than the
+amount of his theft, under the head of damages. Therefore a man is
+bound to pay it, and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the
+exact amount.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Restitution re-establishes equality where an
+unjust taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by
+repaying the exact amount taken. Therefore there is no obligation to
+restore more than the exact amount taken.
+
+_I answer that,_ When a man takes another's thing unjustly, two
+things must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the
+thing, which inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the
+case in loans. The other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent
+with equality on the part of the thing, as when a person intends to
+use violence but fails.
+
+As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitution,
+since thereby equality is re-established; and for this it is enough
+that a man restore just so much as he has belonging to another. But
+as regards the sin, the remedy is applied by punishment, the
+infliction of which belongs to the judge: and so, until a man is
+condemned by the judge, he is not bound to restore more than he took,
+but when once he is condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty.
+
+Hence it is clear how to answer the First Objection: because this law
+fixes the punishment to be inflicted by the judge. Nor is this
+commandment to be kept now, because since the coming of Christ no man
+is bound to keep the judicial precepts, as stated above (I-II, Q.
+104, A. 3). Nevertheless the same might be determined by human law,
+and then the same answer would apply.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Zachaeus said this being willing to do more than he was
+bound to do; hence he had said already: "Behold . . . the half of my
+goods I give to the poor."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: By condemning the man justly, the judge can exact more
+by way of damages; and yet this was not due before the sentence.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 4]
+
+Whether a Man Is Bound to Restore What He Has Not Taken?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore what he has
+not taken. For he that has inflicted a loss on a man is bound to
+remove that loss. Now it happens sometimes that the loss sustained is
+greater than the thing taken: for instance, if you dig up a man's
+seeds, you inflict on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest,
+and thus you would seem to be bound to make restitution accordingly.
+Therefore a man is bound to restore what he has not taken.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, he who retains his creditor's money beyond the
+stated time, would seem to occasion his loss of all his possible
+profits from that money, and yet he does not really take them.
+Therefore it seems that a man is bound to restore what he did not
+take.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now a
+man is bound to restore to God more than he has received from Him,
+according to Matt. 25:26, "Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not,
+and gather where I have not strewed." Therefore it is just that one
+should restore to a man also, something that one has not taken.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Restitution belongs to justice, because it
+re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore what one did not
+take, there would not be equality. Therefore it is not just to make
+such a restitution.
+
+_I answer that,_ Whoever brings a loss upon another person,
+seemingly, takes from him the amount of the loss, since, according to
+the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so called from a man having
+_less_* than his due. [*The derivation is more apparent in English
+than in Latin, where _damnum_ stands for _loss,_ and _minus_ for
+_less._ Aristotle merely says that to have more than your own is
+called "gain," and to have less than you started with is called
+"loss."] Therefore a man is bound to make restitution according to
+the loss he has brought upon another.
+
+Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by being deprived of
+what he actually has; and a loss of this kind is always to be made
+good by repayment in equivalent: for instance if a man damnifies
+another by destroying his house he is bound to pay him the value of
+the house. Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him from
+obtaining what he was on the way to obtain. A loss of this kind need
+not be made good in equivalent; because to have a thing virtually is
+less than to have it actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing
+is to have it merely virtually or potentially, and so were he to be
+indemnified by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not
+the exact value taken from him, but more, and this is not necessary
+for salvation, as stated above. However he is bound to make some
+compensation, according to the condition of persons and things.
+
+From this we see how to answer the First and Second Objections:
+because the sower of the seed in the field, has the harvest, not
+actually but only virtually. In like manner he that has money has the
+profit not yet actually but only virtually: and both may be hindered
+in many ways.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God requires nothing from us but what He Himself has
+sown in us. Hence this saying is to be understood as expressing
+either the shameful thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he
+had received nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects
+from us the fruit of His gifts, which fruit is from Him and from us,
+although the gifts themselves are from God without us.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Restitution Must Always Be Made to the Person from Whom a
+Thing Has Been Taken?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that restitution need not always be made
+to the person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful
+to injure anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man
+himself, or to others, were one to restore to him what has been taken
+from him; if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword.
+Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom
+a thing has been taken.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does not
+deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully that
+which another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and
+receiver who are guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always
+necessary to make restitution to the person from whom one has taken
+something.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it is
+sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from whom a
+thing has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he is too
+far away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need
+not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we have
+received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors from
+others (our parents for instance) than from a lender or depositor.
+Therefore sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather than
+make restitution to one from whom we have taken something.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it is useless to restore a thing which reverts to
+the restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly taken
+something from the Church and makes restitution to the Church, it
+reverts into his hands, since he is the guardian of the Church's
+property. Therefore he ought not to restore to the Church from whom
+he has taken: and so restitution should not always be made to the
+person from whom something has been taken away.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 13:7): "Render . . . to all
+men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom
+custom."
+
+_I answer that,_ Restitution re-establishes the equality of
+commutative justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of
+thing to thing, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 58, A. 10). Now this
+equalizing of things is impossible, unless he that has less than his
+due receive what is lacking to him: and for this to be done,
+restitution must be made to the person from whom a thing has been
+taken.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously
+injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some
+other, it should not be restored to him there and then, because
+restitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made,
+since all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who
+retains another's property must not appropriate it, but must either
+reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over
+to another to keep it more securely.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways. First
+through the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as is
+the case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves
+to lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to
+him: and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he
+must not retain the price, but must use it for some pious object.
+Secondly a man gives unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful
+purpose, albeit the giving itself is not unlawful, as when a woman
+receives payment for fornication: wherefore she may keep what she has
+received. If, however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit,
+she would be bound to restitution.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown
+altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance
+by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or
+living): but not without previously making a careful inquiry about
+his person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead,
+restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon as one
+with him. If he be very far away, what is due to him should be sent
+to him, especially if it be of great value and can easily be sent:
+else it should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for him, and
+the owner should be advised of the fact.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A man is bound, out of his own property, to succor his
+parents, or those from whom he has received greater benefits; but he
+ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to others;
+and he would be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is
+due to another. Exception must be made in cases of extreme need, for
+then he could and should even take what belongs to another in order
+to succor a parent.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: There are three ways in which a prelate can rob the
+Church of her property. First by laying hands on Church property
+which is committed, not to him but to another; for instance, if a
+bishop appropriates the property of the chapter. In such a case it is
+clear that he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those
+who are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another person
+(for instance a relative or a friend) Church property committed to
+himself: in which case he must make restitution to the Church, and
+have it under his own care, so as to hand it over to his successor.
+Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands on Church property, merely in
+intention, when, to wit, he begins to have a mind to hold it as his
+own and not in the name of the Church: in which case he must make
+restitution by renouncing his intention.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 6]
+
+Whether He That Has Taken a Thing Is Always Bound to Restitution?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not
+always bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality
+of justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him
+that has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that
+which belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed
+into another's hands. Therefore it should be restored, not by the
+person that took it, but by the one that has it.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by
+making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the
+case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always
+bound to restitution.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the same thing should not be restored several times.
+Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one
+of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing
+is not always bound to restitution.
+
+_On the contrary,_ He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now
+restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a
+thing is bound to restore it.
+
+_I answer that,_ With regard to a man who has taken another's
+property, two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the
+taking. By reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as
+long as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in
+addition to what is his, should be taken away from him, and given to
+him who lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On the
+other hand, the taking of the thing that is another's property, may
+be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will of
+the owner, as in theft and robbery: in which case the thief is bound
+to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of
+the injurious action, even though the thing is no longer in his
+possession. For just as a man who strikes another, though he gain
+nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured person, so too he
+that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make compensation for
+the loss incurred, although he be no better off; and in addition he
+must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes
+another's property for his own profit but without committing an
+injury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a loan:
+and then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason of
+the thing, but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost the
+thing: for he is bound to compensate the person who has done him a
+favor, and he would not be doing so if the latter were to lose
+thereby. Thirdly, a man takes another's property without injury to
+the latter or profit to himself, as in the case of a deposit;
+wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on account
+of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; but he is bound
+to restitution on account of the thing taken. Consequently if this
+thing be taken from him without any fault on his part, he is not
+bound to restitution, although he would be, if he were to lose the
+thing through a grievous fault on his part.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The chief end of restitution is, not that he who has
+more than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than
+his due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for
+restitution in those things which one man may receive from another
+without loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from
+another's candle. Consequently although he that has taken something
+from another, may have ceased to have what he took, through having
+transferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what
+is his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the thing, on
+account of the injurious taking, and he that has it, on account of
+the thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to
+other men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so
+he may make restitution of another's property through the priest to
+whom he confesses.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since restitution is chiefly directed to the
+compensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing
+has been taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has
+received sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound
+to any further restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund
+the person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse
+them from so doing.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Restitution Is Binding on Those Who Have Not Taken?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not binding on those
+who have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. Now
+none should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are
+bound to restitution save the one who has taken.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, justice does not bind one to increase another's
+property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who
+takes a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way
+whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the
+gainer, both because he would receive restitution many times over,
+and because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken
+away from someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore
+the others are not bound to restitution.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in
+order to safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would
+expose himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or
+withstand him. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not
+betraying or withstanding a thief.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:32): "They who do such
+things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also
+they that consent to them that do them." Therefore in like manner
+they that consent are bound to restitution.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), a person is bound to
+restitution not only on account of someone else's property which he
+has taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever
+is cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in
+two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces
+another to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the
+taking, by moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel,
+or consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving.
+Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving him shelter or any
+other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by
+taking part in the theft or robbery, as a fellow evil-doer.
+Indirectly, when a man does not prevent another from evil-doing
+(provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by omitting
+the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or
+robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by
+sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows:
+
+"By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by
+participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing."
+
+It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the
+cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of
+command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is
+bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent;
+namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place.
+Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver
+of thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of
+participation; when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty.
+Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do
+so; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to safeguard
+justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their neglect
+thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of
+their preserving justice here below.
+
+In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to
+restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the
+efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is
+bound to restitution, only when it may be judged with probability
+that the unjust taking resulted from such causes.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the
+sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by
+counselling, or by commanding, or in any other way whatever.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the
+principal in the deed; first of all, the _commander;_ secondly, the
+_executor,_ and in due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of
+them make restitution, another is not bound to make restitution to
+the same person. Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who
+took possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those who have
+already made restitution. When a man commands an unjust taking that
+does not follow, no restitution has to be made, since its end is
+chiefly to restore the property of the person who has been unjustly
+injured.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand
+or reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when he
+is obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of
+earthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they
+are invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain
+justice.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 8]
+
+Whether a Man Is Bound to Immediate Restitution, or May He Put It Off?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate
+restitution, and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative
+precepts do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making
+restitution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore a
+man is not bound to immediate restitution.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it is
+sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore no man is
+bound to immediate restitution.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice.
+Now time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts.
+Since then the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of
+virtue, but are determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it
+seems that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a
+man be bound to restore at once.
+
+_On the contrary,_ All matters of restitution seem to come under one
+head. Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not
+delay compensation, as appears from Lev. 19:13, "The wages of him
+that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the
+morning." Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of
+restitution, to delay, and restitution should be made at once.
+
+_I answer that,_ Even as it is a sin against justice to take
+another's property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold
+the property of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him
+of the use of what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is
+clear that it is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time; and
+one is bound to renounce one's sin at once, according to Ecclus.
+21:2, "Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent." Consequently one
+is bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for a
+respite from the person who is empowered to grant the use of the
+thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the precept about the making of restitution is
+affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us to
+withhold another's property.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When one is unable to restore at once, this very
+inability excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is
+altogether excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable
+to make it. He is, however, bound either himself or through another
+to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a
+remission or a respite.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Whenever the omission of a circumstance is contrary to
+virtue that circumstance must be looked upon as determinate, and we
+are bound to observe it: and since delay of restitution involves a
+sin of unjust detention which is opposed to just detention, it stands
+to reason that the time is determinate in the point of restitution
+being immediate.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 63
+
+OF RESPECT OF PERSONS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of
+justice. First we shall consider respect of persons which is opposed
+to distributive justice; secondly we shall consider the vices opposed
+to commutative justice.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether respect of persons is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities?
+
+(3) Whether it takes place in showing honor?
+
+(4) Whether it takes place in judicial sentences?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Respect of Persons Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For
+the word "person" includes a reference to personal dignity [*Cf. I,
+Q. 29, A. 3, ad 2]. Now it belongs to distributive justice to
+consider personal dignity. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in human affairs persons are of more importance than
+things, since things are for the benefit of persons and not
+conversely. But respect of things is not a sin. Much less, therefore,
+is respect of persons.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems to
+respect persons, since of two men circumstanced alike He sometimes
+upraises one by grace, and leaves the other in sin, according to
+Matt. 24:40: "Two shall be in a bed [Vulg.: 'field'] [*'Bed' is the
+reading of Luke 17:34], one shall be taken, and one shall be left."
+Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Nothing but sin is forbidden in the Divine law.
+Now respect of persons is forbidden, Deut. 1:17: "Neither shall you
+respect any man's person." Therefore respect of persons is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Respect of persons is opposed to distributive
+justice. For the equality of distributive justice consists in
+allotting various things to various persons in proportion to their
+personal dignity. Accordingly, if one considers that personal
+property by reason of which the thing allotted to a particular person
+is due to him, this is respect not of the person but of the cause.
+Hence a gloss on Eph. 6:9, "There is no respect of persons with God
+[Vulg.: 'Him']," says that "a just judge regards causes, not
+persons." For instance if you promote a man to a professorship on
+account of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider the due
+cause, not the person; but if, in conferring something on someone,
+you consider in him not the fact that what you give him is
+proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this particular
+man (e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the person,
+since you give him something not for some cause that renders him
+worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And any
+circumstance that does not amount to a reason why this man be worthy
+of this gift, is to be referred to his person: for instance if a man
+promote someone to a prelacy or a professorship, because he is rich
+or because he is a relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may
+happen, however, that a circumstance of person makes a man worthy as
+regards one thing, but not as regards another: thus consanguinity
+makes a man worthy to be appointed heir to an estate, but not to be
+chosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority: wherefore
+consideration of the same circumstance of person will amount to
+respect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows,
+accordingly, that respect of persons is opposed to distributive
+justice in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but
+sin is opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In distributive justice we consider those circumstances
+of a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect of
+persons we consider circumstances that do not so result.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of
+things which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things
+pertaining to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions
+ought to be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the
+persons themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though
+it were; and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy,
+absolutely speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is a twofold giving. One belongs to justice, and
+occurs when we give a man his due: in such like givings respect of
+persons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality, when one
+gives gratis that which is not a man's due: such is the bestowal of
+the gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In such a
+giving there is no place for respect of persons, because anyone may,
+without injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom he
+will, according to Matt. 20:14, 15, "Is it not lawful for me to do
+what I will? . . . Take what is thine, and go thy way."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Respect of Persons Takes Place in the Dispensation of
+Spiritual Goods?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take
+place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. For it would seem to
+savor of respect of persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity
+or benefice on account of consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a
+cause whereby a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice.
+Yet this apparently is not a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are
+wont to do so. Therefore the sin of respect of persons does not take
+place in the conferring of spiritual goods.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a
+poor man seems to pertain to respect of persons, according to James
+2:2, 3. Nevertheless dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees
+are more readily granted to the rich and powerful than to others.
+Therefore the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in
+the dispensation of spiritual goods.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to jurists [*Cap. Cum dilectus.] it
+suffices to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one
+choose the better man. But it would seem to savor of respect of
+persons to choose one who is less good for a higher position.
+Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, according to the law of the Church (Cap. Cum
+dilectus.) the person to be chosen should be "a member of the flock."
+Now this would seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more
+competent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore respect of
+persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:1): "Have not the faith of
+our Lord Jesus Christ . . . with respect of persons." On these words
+a gloss of Augustine says: "Who is there that would tolerate the
+promotion of a rich man to a position of honor in the Church, to the
+exclusion of a poor man more learned and holier?" [*Augustine, Ep. ad
+Hieron. clxvii.]
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), respect of persons is a sin,
+in so far as it is contrary to justice. Now the graver the matter in
+which justice is transgressed, the more grievous the sin: so that,
+spiritual things being of greater import than temporal, respect of
+persons is a more grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in
+dispensing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when
+something is allotted to a person out of proportion to his deserts,
+it must be observed that a person's worthiness may be considered in
+two ways. First, simply and absolutely: and in this way the man who
+abounds the more in the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy.
+Secondly, in relation to the common good; for it happens at times
+that the less holy and less learned man may conduce more to the
+common good, on account of worldly authority or activity, or
+something of the kind. And since the dispensation of spiritualities
+is directed chiefly to the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7,
+"The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit,"
+it follows that in the dispensation of spiritualities the simply less
+good are sometimes preferred to the better, without respect of
+persons, just as God sometimes bestows gratuitous graces on the less
+worthy.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We must make a distinction with regard to a prelate's
+kinsfolk: for sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely
+speaking, and in relation to the common good: and then if they are
+preferred to the more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in
+the dispensation of spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical
+superior is not the owner, with power to give them away as he will,
+but the dispenser, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of
+us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries
+of God." Sometimes however the prelate's kinsfolk are as worthy as
+others, and then without respect of persons he can lawfully give
+preference to his kindred since there is at least this advantage,
+that he can trust the more in their being of one mind with him in
+conducting the business of the Church. Yet he would have to forego so
+doing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take an example from him
+and give the goods of the Church to their kindred without regard to
+their deserts.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Dispensations for contracting marriage came into use
+for the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace: and this is more
+necessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing, so
+that there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more
+readily to such persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In order that an election be not rebutted in a court of
+law, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to elect
+the better man, because otherwise every election might have a flaw.
+But as regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect
+one who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to the
+common good. For if it is possible to have one who is more competent
+for a post, and yet another be preferred, it is necessary to have
+some cause for this. If this cause have anything to do with the
+matter in point, he who is elected will, in this respect, be more
+competent; and if that which is taken for cause have nothing to do
+with the matter, it will clearly be respect of persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The man who is taken from among the members of a
+particular Church, is generally speaking more useful as regards the
+common good, since he loves more the Church wherein he was brought
+up. For this reason it was commanded (Deut. 17:15): "Thou mayest not
+make a man of another nation king, who is not thy brother."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Respect of Persons Takes Place in Showing Honor and Respect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take
+place in showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing
+else than "reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue,"
+as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes
+should be honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of
+whom it is written (Ex. 20:12): "Honor thy father and thy mother."
+Again masters, though they be wicked, should be honored by their
+servants, according to 1 Tim. 6:1: "Whoever are servants under the
+yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor." Therefore it
+seems that it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is commanded (Lev. 19:32): "Rise up before the
+hoary head, and, honor the person of the aged man." But this seems to
+savor of respect of persons, since sometimes old men are not
+virtuous; according to Dan. 13:5: "Iniquity came out from the
+ancients of the people [*Vulg.: 'Iniquity came out of Babylon from
+the ancient judges, that seemed to govern the people.']." Therefore
+it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, on the words of James 2:1, "Have not the faith . . .
+with respect of persons," a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. ad Hieron.
+clxvii.] says: "If the saying of James, 'If there shall come into
+your assembly a man having a golden ring,' etc., refer to our daily
+meetings, who sins not here, if however he sin at all?" Yet it is
+respect of persons to honor the rich for their riches, for Gregory
+says in a homily (xxviii in Evang.): "Our pride is blunted, since in
+men we honor, not the nature wherein they are made to God's image,
+but wealth," so that, wealth not being a due cause of honor, this
+will savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a sin to
+respect persons in showing honor.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on James 2:1, says: "Whoever honors the
+rich for their riches, sins," and in like manner, if a man be honored
+for other causes that do not render him worthy of honor. Now this
+savors of respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect
+persons in showing honor.
+
+_I answer that,_ To honor a person is to recognize him as having
+virtue, wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of a person being
+honored. Now it is to be observed that a person may be honored not
+only for his own virtue, but also for another's: thus princes and
+prelates, although they be wicked, are honored as standing in God's
+place, and as representing the community over which they are placed,
+according to Prov. 26:8, "As he that casteth a stone into the heap of
+Mercury, so is he that giveth honor to a fool." For, since the
+gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to Mercury, "the heap of
+Mercury" signifies the casting up of an account, when a merchant
+sometimes substitutes a pebble [*_Lapillus_ or _calculus_ whence the
+English word 'calculate'] for one hundred marks. So too, is a fool
+honored if he stand in God's place or represent the whole community:
+and in the same way parents and masters should be honored, on account
+of their having a share of the dignity of God Who is the Father and
+Lord of all. The aged should be honored, because old age is a sign of
+virtue, though this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to Wis.
+4:8, 9, "venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by
+the number of years; but the understanding of a man is gray hairs,
+and a spotless life is old age." The rich ought to be honored by
+reason of their occupying a higher position in the community: but if
+they be honored merely for their wealth, it will be the sin of
+respect of persons.
+
+Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Sin of Respect of Persons Takes Place in Judicial
+Sentences?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does
+not take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is
+opposed to distributive justice, as stated above (A. 1): whereas
+judicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice.
+Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial
+sentences.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now
+it is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since a
+heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a
+prince than on one who injures the person of others. Therefore
+respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): "In judging be
+merciful to the fatherless." But this seems to imply respect of the
+person of the needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of
+persons is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 18:5): "It is not good to
+accept the person in judgment [*Vulg.: 'It is not good to accept the
+person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.']."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 60, A. 1), judgment is an act of
+justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice,
+those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of
+persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is
+allotted to a person out of that proportion to him in which the
+equality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment
+is rendered corrupt by respect of persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view
+of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to
+commutative and distributive justice: because it may be decided by
+judgment how some common good is to be distributed among many, and
+how one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him.
+Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of judgment, in as
+much as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes from one and
+gives to another, and this belongs to distributive justice. In this
+way respect of persons may take place in any judgment.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When a person is more severely punished on account of a
+crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of
+persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in that case,
+a diversity of things, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 10, ad 3; Q. 61, A.
+2, ad 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy
+as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying
+of Ex. 23:3 would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in
+judgment."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 64
+
+OF MURDER
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative
+justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in
+relation to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed
+with regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation
+to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one's neighbor
+against his will: and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or
+by word. By deed when one's neighbor is injured either in his own
+person, or in a person connected with him, or in his possessions.
+
+We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the
+first place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the
+greatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful to kill a sinner?
+
+(3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public
+person only?
+
+(4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric?
+
+(5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?
+
+(6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man?
+
+(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
+
+(8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is Unlawful to Kill Any Living Thing?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the
+Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): "They that resist the ordinance of God
+purchase to themselves damnation [*Vulg.: 'He that resisteth the
+power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase
+themselves damnation.']." Now Divine providence has ordained that all
+living things should be preserved, according to Ps. 146:8, 9, "Who
+maketh grass to grow on the mountains . . . Who giveth to beasts
+their food." Therefore it seems unlawful to take the life of any
+living thing.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life.
+Now life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same
+reason it is apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not
+appointed save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be
+inflicted, according to the Divine law, on one who killed another
+man's ox or sheep (Ex. 22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals
+is a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "When we hear
+it said, 'Thou shalt not kill,' we do not take it as referring to
+trees, for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because
+they have no fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words,
+'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a man."
+
+_I answer that,_ There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for
+which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are
+for the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds
+from imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the
+generation of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal,
+and lastly a man, so too things, like the plants, which merely have
+life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man.
+Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of
+animals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher states
+(Polit. i, 3).
+
+Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that
+animals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and this cannot be
+done unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to
+take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for
+the use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of
+God Himself: for it is written (Gen. 1:29, 30): "Behold I have given
+you every herb . . . and all trees . . . to be your meat, and to all
+beasts of the earth": and again (Gen. 9:3): "Everything that moveth
+and liveth shall be meat to you."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals
+and plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), "by a most just ordinance of the
+Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of
+reason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it
+were by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is
+that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of
+others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He that kills another's ox, sins, not through killing
+the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore
+this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or
+robbery.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Kill Sinners?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For
+our Lord in the parable (Matt. 13) forbade the uprooting of the
+cockle which denotes wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is
+forbidden by God is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now
+according to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance,
+according to Ezech. 33:11, "I desire not the death of the wicked, but
+that the wicked turn from his way and live." Therefore it seems
+altogether unjust to kill sinners.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to do
+that which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac.
+vii) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in
+itself, since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and "we
+wish our friends to live and to exist," according to _Ethic._ ix, 4.
+Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt not
+suffer to live"; and (Ps. 100:8): "In the morning I put to death all
+the wicked of the land."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it is lawful to kill dumb
+animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man's use, as
+the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed
+to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is
+naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that
+if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member,
+through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will
+be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every
+individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to
+whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the
+community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and
+advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good,
+since "a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump" (1 Cor. 5:6).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the
+cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when
+the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them,
+either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they
+have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to
+the good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our
+Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that
+vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that
+the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the
+good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the
+slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes
+slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas
+sometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what
+is expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate
+according to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous
+to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin
+without grievously harming others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and
+consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as
+he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the
+slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is
+useful to others. This is expressed in Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was
+in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless
+beasts, and made like to them," and Prov. 11:29: "The fool shall
+serve the wise." Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man
+so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man
+who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse
+than a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit.
+i, 1 and _Ethic._ vii, 6).
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 3]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for a Private Individual to Kill a Man Who Has
+Sinned?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a
+man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine
+law. Yet, on account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded
+(Ex. 32:27): "Let every man kill his brother, and friend, and
+neighbor." Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a
+sinner.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3), man, on account of
+sin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful for any private
+individual to kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful.
+Therefore for the same reason, it is lawful for any private
+individual to kill a man who has sinned.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves praise
+for doing what is useful for the common good. Now the slaying of
+evildoers is useful for the common good, as stated above (A. 2).
+Therefore it is deserving of praise if even private individuals kill
+evil-doers.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [*Can. Quicumque
+percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8]: "A man who, without exercising public
+authority, kills an evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and
+all the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not
+given him."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it is lawful to kill an
+evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole
+community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the
+community's welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a
+decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the health
+of the whole body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to
+persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and
+not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The person by whose authority a thing is done really
+does the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence
+according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "He slays not who owes
+his service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the
+instrument to him that wields it." Wherefore those who, at the Lord's
+command, slew their neighbors and friends, would seem not to have
+done this themselves, but rather He by whose authority they acted
+thus: just as a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his
+sovereign, and the executioner slays the robber by the authority of
+the judge.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in
+the case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill
+it; whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is
+required, not for their sake, but on account of the owner's loss. On
+the other hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from
+good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn
+him to death for the common good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful for any private individual to do anything
+for the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful to
+some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of
+the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the
+parts for the welfare of the whole.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for Clerics to Kill Evil-doers?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers. For
+clerics especially should fulfil the precept of the Apostle (1 Cor.
+4:16): "Be ye followers of me as I also am of Christ," whereby we are
+called upon to imitate God and His saints. Now the very God whom we
+worship puts evildoers to death, according to Ps. 135:10, "Who smote
+Egypt with their firstborn." Again Moses made the Levites slay
+twenty-three thousand men on account of the worship of the calf (Ex.
+32), the priest Phinees slew the Israelite who went in to the woman
+of Madian (Num. 25), Samuel killed Agag king of Amalec (1 Kings 15),
+Elias slew the priests of Baal (3 Kings 18), Mathathias killed the
+man who went up to the altar to sacrifice (1 Mac. 2); and, in the New
+Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira (Acts 5). Therefore it
+seems that even clerics may kill evil-doers.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and is
+more united to God. Now the secular power as "God's minister"
+lawfully puts evil-doers to death, according to Rom. 13:4. Much more
+therefore may clerics, who are God's ministers and have spiritual
+power, put evil-doers to death.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office, may lawfully
+exercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the princely
+office to slay evildoers, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore those
+clerics who are earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 3:2, 3): "It behooveth . . .
+a bishop to be without crime [*Vulg.: 'blameless.' 'Without crime' is
+the reading in Tit. 1:7] . . . not given to wine, no striker."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons.
+First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon
+is represented the Passion of Christ slain "Who, when He was struck
+did not strike [Vulg.: 'When He suffered, He threatened not']" (1
+Pet. 2:23). Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: for
+ministers should imitate their master, according to Ecclus. 10:2, "As
+the judge of the people is himself, so also are his ministers." The
+other reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of
+the New Law, wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is
+appointed: wherefore they should abstain from such things in order
+that they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God works in all things without exception whatever is
+right, yet in each one according to its mode. Wherefore everyone
+should imitate God in that which is specially becoming to him. Hence,
+though God slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that
+all should imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put
+Ananias and Saphira to death by his own authority or with his own
+hand, but published their death sentence pronounced by God. The
+Priests or Levites of the Old Testament were the ministers of the Old
+Law, which appointed corporal penalties, so that it was fitting for
+them to slay with their own hands.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The ministry of clerics is concerned with better things
+than corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual
+welfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with minor
+matters.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of earthly
+princes, not that they may inflict capital punishment themselves, but
+that this may be carried into effect by others in virtue of their
+authority.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 5]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Kill Oneself?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For
+murder is a sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man
+can do an injustice to himself, as is proved in _Ethic._ v, 11.
+Therefore no man sins by killing himself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public
+authority, to kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority
+is sometimes an evil-doer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a
+lesser danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a
+man to cut off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his
+whole body. Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater
+evil, for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a
+man may kill himself.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Samson killed himself, as related in Judges 16, and
+yet he is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11). Therefore it is lawful
+for a man to kill himself.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it is related (2 Mac. 14:42) that a certain Razias
+killed himself, "choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the
+hands of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble
+birth." Now nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful.
+Therefore suicide is not unlawful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "Hence it
+follows that the words 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of
+a man--not another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills
+himself, kills nothing else than a man."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three
+reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result
+being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists
+corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the
+inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love
+himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to
+the natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as
+such, belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community,
+and so, as such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing
+himself he injures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
+v, 11). Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to
+His power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own
+life, sins against God, even as he who kills another's slave, sins
+against that slave's master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment
+of a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to
+pronounce sentence of death and life, according to Deut. 32:39, "I
+will kill and I will make to live."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to
+justice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a man should
+have towards himself: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to
+oneself. In relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by
+reason also of its opposition to justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to
+death an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man is
+judge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises
+public authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever:
+although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man is made master of himself through his free-will:
+wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters
+which pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free-will. But the
+passage from this life to another and happier one is subject not to
+man's free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for
+man to take his own life that he may pass to a happier life, nor that
+he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, because
+the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the
+Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon
+oneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to
+adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is
+unlawful to take one's own life on account of one's having committed
+a sin, both because by so doing one does oneself a very great injury,
+by depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance, and because
+it is not lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the
+public authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself
+lest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on herself the
+very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sin of another. For
+she commits no sin in being violated by force, provided she does not
+consent, since "without consent of the mind there is no stain on the
+body," as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that
+fornication and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man's,
+especially one's own, life: since the latter is most grievous,
+because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love.
+Moreover it is most dangerous since no time is left wherein to
+expiate it by repentance. Again it is not lawful for anyone to take
+his own life for fear he should consent to sin, because "evil must
+not be done that good may come" (Rom. 3:8) or that evil may be
+avoided especially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain
+event, for it is uncertain whether one will at some future time
+consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man from sin under any
+temptation whatever.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "not even Samson
+is to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies
+under the ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought
+many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him to do this." He
+assigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the
+time of persecution took their own lives, and who are commemorated by
+the Church.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from
+being slain by another, for the sake of the good of virtue, and that
+he may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to avoid
+penal evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason
+some, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to act
+from fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a weakness
+of soul unable to bear penal evils, as the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
+7) and Augustine (De Civ. Dei 22, 23) declare.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 6]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Kill the Innocent?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill
+the innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on
+the contrary "the fear of the Lord driveth out sin" (Ecclus. 1:27).
+Now Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was
+willing to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin,
+kill an innocent person.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, among those sins that are committed against one's
+neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous
+injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is
+a greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the
+latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life
+to the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to
+kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a
+righteous person.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is
+not a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of
+justice, to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who
+is bound to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man
+whom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses;
+and again the executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to
+death the man who has been unjustly sentenced.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 23:7): "The innocent and just
+person thou shalt not put to death."
+
+_I answer that,_ An individual man may be considered in two ways:
+first, in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we
+consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in
+every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God
+has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as
+stated above (A. 2) the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in
+relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. On the other
+hand the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common
+good, since they are the chief part of the community. Therefore it is
+in no way lawful to slay the innocent.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both
+the sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God's command kills
+an innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he
+executes: indeed his obedience to God's commands is a proof that he
+fears Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the
+essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just
+man, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first,
+because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in
+opposition to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a
+man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to
+justice: thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater
+good: fourthly, because he despises God more, according to Luke
+10:16, "He that despiseth you despiseth Me." On the other hand it is
+accidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be
+received by God into glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If the judge knows that a man who has been convicted by
+false witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the
+witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the
+innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment
+by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if
+he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not
+he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be
+guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has
+condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable
+error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the
+executions of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest
+injustice, he does not sin by carrying out the sentence, because he
+has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he
+who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Kill a Man in Self-defense?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in
+self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "I do not
+agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by
+him; unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one
+does it not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so,
+provided it be in keeping with one's person." Now he who kills a man
+in self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this
+would seem to be unlawful.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "How are they free from
+sin in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man's
+life for the sake of these contemptible things?" Now among
+contemptible things he reckons "those which men may forfeit
+unwillingly," as appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and
+the chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful
+for any man to take another's life for the sake of the life of his
+own body.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his
+clericis] says in the Decretals: "Concerning the clerics about whom
+you have consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in
+self-defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they
+may return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree; know
+that in no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any
+circumstances whatever." Now clerics and laymen are alike bound to
+observe the moral precepts. Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen
+to kill anyone in self-defense.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or
+adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or
+adultery or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since
+the spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body.
+Therefore no man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in
+order to save his own life.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to
+Matt. 7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according
+to Rom. 12:19: "Not defending [Douay: 'revenging'] yourselves, my
+dearly beloved." Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man,
+is also unlawful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:2): "If a thief be found
+breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die;
+he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood." Now it is much more
+lawful to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a
+man guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.
+
+_I answer that,_ Nothing hinders one act from having two effects,
+only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the
+intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is
+intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since
+this is accidental as explained above (Q. 43, A. 3; I-II, Q. 12, A.
+1). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is
+the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor.
+Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life,
+is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep
+itself in _being,_ as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding
+from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out
+of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses
+more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he
+repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because
+according to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel
+casual.], "it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does
+not exceed the limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary
+for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in
+order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more
+care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to
+take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the
+common good, as stated above (A. 3), it is not lawful for a man to
+intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public
+authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer
+this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against
+the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers,
+although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when
+one man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The
+passage quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the
+same sense. Hence he says pointedly, "for the sake of these things,"
+whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to
+the Second Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Irregularity results from the act though sinless of
+taking a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly
+condemns a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a
+man in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him,
+but to defend himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily
+directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence
+sometimes results the taking of a man's life.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The defense forbidden in this passage is that which
+comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not defending
+yourselves--that is, not striking your enemy back."
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 8]
+
+Whether One Is Guilty of Murder Through Killing Someone by Chance?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through
+killing someone by chance. For we read (Gen. 4:23, 24) that Lamech
+slew a man in mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does
+not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gen.
+4:23], and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one
+incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): "If . . . one strike a
+woman with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue
+thereupon, he shall render life for life." Yet this may happen
+without any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty
+of murder through killing someone by chance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons
+prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not
+due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs
+the guilt of murder.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "When we
+do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we
+unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be
+imputed to us." Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is
+killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore
+the person who did it is not accounted guilty.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) "chance
+is a cause that acts beside one's intention." Hence chance
+happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary.
+And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera
+Relig. xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.
+
+Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly
+voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally,
+according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental
+cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide
+results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of
+voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes
+another's death through occupying himself with unlawful things which
+he ought to avoid: secondly, when he does not take sufficient care.
+Hence, according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and
+take due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is
+not guilty of that person's death: whereas if he be occupied with
+something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due
+care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his action
+results in someone's death.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a
+man's life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He that strikes a woman with child does something
+unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or
+of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide,
+especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to the canons a penalty is inflicted on those
+who cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, or
+failing to take sufficient care.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 65
+
+OF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person.
+Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) The mutilation of members;
+
+(2) Blows;
+
+(3) Imprisonment;
+
+(4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries
+are aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with
+others?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 1]
+
+Whether in Some Cases It May Be Lawful to Maim Anyone?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim
+anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that "sin consists
+in departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is
+contrary to nature." Now according to nature it is appointed by God
+that a man's body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary
+to nature that it should be deprived of a member. Therefore it seems
+that it is always a sin to maim a person.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the
+parts of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). But it
+is unlawful to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by
+public authority. Therefore neither is it lawful to maim anyone,
+except perhaps by public authority.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the
+welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself
+for the sake of the soul's welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P.
+I, sect. 4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves that they
+might preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other
+reason to maim a person.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for
+tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since a member is part of the whole human body, it
+is for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence
+a member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is
+expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself
+useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen
+to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to
+the whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and
+retains its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury
+to the whole body. But as the whole of man is directed as to his end
+to the whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above
+(Q. 61, A. 1; Q. 64, AA. 2, 5), it may happen that although the
+removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may
+nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so far as
+it is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of
+restraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is
+lawfully deprived of life altogether on account of certain more
+heinous sins, so is he deprived of a member on account of certain
+lesser sins. But this is not lawful for a private individual, even
+with the consent of the owner of the member, because this would
+involve an injury to the community, to whom the man and all his parts
+belong. If, however, the member be decayed and therefore a source of
+corruption to the whole body, then it is lawful with the consent of
+the owner of the member, to cut away the member for the welfare of
+the whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own
+welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent of the
+person whose business it is to care for the welfare of the person who
+has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether unlawful to maim
+anyone.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a particular
+nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus death and
+corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the particular
+nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping with
+universal nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to
+the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is
+nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common
+good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The life of the entire man is not directed to something
+belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is directed
+to his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to take
+anyone's life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted
+the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be
+directed to the good of one man, and consequently in certain cases
+can pertain to him.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A member should not be removed for the sake of the
+bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to
+further the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further
+one's spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member,
+because sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no
+case is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever.
+Hence Chrysostom, in his exposition on Matt. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in
+Matth.), "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the
+kingdom of heaven," says: "Not by maiming themselves, but by
+destroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself,
+since they are murderers who do such things." And further on he says:
+"Nor is lust tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more
+importunate, for the seed springs in us from other sources, and
+chiefly from an incontinent purpose and a careless mind: and
+temptation is curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by
+curbing one's thoughts."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for Parents to Strike Their Children, or
+Masters Their Slaves?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their
+children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4):
+"You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger"; and further on
+(Eph. 9:6): "And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves
+[Vulg.: 'to them'] forbearing threatenings." Now some are provoked to
+anger by blows, and become more troublesome when threatened.
+Therefore neither should parents strike their children, nor masters
+their slaves.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a father's
+words are admonitory and not coercive." Now blows are a kind of
+coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their
+children.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this
+belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2).
+If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for
+the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any
+person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same
+conclusion follows.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the
+rod hateth his son," and further on (Prov. 23:13): "Withhold not
+correction from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he
+shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul
+from hell." Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): "Torture and fetters
+are for a malicious slave."
+
+_I answer that,_ Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as
+when it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while
+a blow merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much
+less harm than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a
+person a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice.
+Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to
+his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike
+another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And
+since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave
+to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child,
+and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused
+chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher
+states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their
+children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their
+children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on
+them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear from
+threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that
+they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation
+of correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their
+threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness
+temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The greater power should exercise the greater coercion.
+Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city
+has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable
+punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the
+father and the master who preside over the family household, which is
+an imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is
+exercised by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows,
+which do not inflict irreparable harm.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a
+willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to
+those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by
+blows.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 3]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Imprison a Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which
+deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above (I-II,
+Q. 18, A. 2). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter for
+imprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is
+unlawful to imprison a man.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice. Now
+according to Ecclus. 15:14, "God left man in the hand of his own
+counsel." Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by
+chains or prisons.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from
+doing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from
+doing this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order
+to restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put
+a man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same
+conclusion follows.
+
+_On the contrary,_ We read in Lev. 24 that a man was imprisoned for
+the sin of blasphemy.
+
+_I answer that,_ In the goods of the body three things may be
+considered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of the
+body, and this is injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or
+rest of the senses, and to this striking or anything causing a sense
+of pain is opposed. Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and
+this is hindered by binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention.
+
+Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man,
+unless it be done according to the order of justice, either in
+punishment, or as a measure of precaution against some evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A man who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to
+lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use of
+his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the order of His wisdom God
+sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to
+Job 5:12: "Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so
+that their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes
+He allows them to do what they will." In like manner, according to
+human justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain
+ones.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a
+time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man
+prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from
+striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in
+general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong
+primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him
+from doing not only evil but also good deeds.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Sin Is Aggravated by the Fact That the Aforesaid Injuries
+Are Perpetrated on Those Who Are Connected with Others?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact
+that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are
+connected with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character
+from inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil
+inflicted on a man's own person is more against his will than that
+which is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an
+injury inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do injuries
+to orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17): "He will
+not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when she
+poureth out her complaint." Now the widow and the orphan are not
+connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated
+through an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own
+just as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary
+for him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the
+case of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now
+these injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary
+commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 28:32) as though indicating
+an aggravating circumstance: "Thy sons and thy daughters shall be
+given to another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg.: 'May thy sons
+and thy daughters be given,' etc.]."
+
+_I answer that,_ Other things being equal, an injury is a more
+grievous sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is
+that it is a more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in
+authority than a private individual, because it conduces to the
+injury of the whole community, as stated above (I-II, Q. 73, A. 9).
+Now when an injury is inflicted on one who is connected in any way
+with another, that injury affects two persons, so that, other things
+being equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen,
+however, that in view of certain circumstances, a sin committed
+against one who is not connected with any other person, is more
+grievous, on account of either the dignity of the person, or the
+greatness of the injury.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: An injury inflicted on a person connected with others
+is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than if it
+were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view it
+is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the
+person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man
+is guilty through injuring the other one in himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted
+upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the same
+injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they have
+no one to turn to for relief.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the
+adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is
+concerned, for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed
+her by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her
+husband, since "the wife hath not power of her own body; but the
+husband" (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. Of
+adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to
+chastity, we shall speak in the treatise on Temperance (Q. 154, A. 8).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 66
+
+OF THEFT AND ROBBERY
+(In Nine Articles)
+
+We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man
+injures his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery.
+
+Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own?
+
+(3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another's property?
+
+(4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft?
+
+(5) Whether every theft is a sin?
+
+(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?
+
+(7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity?
+
+(8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin?
+
+(9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is Natural for Man to Possess External Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess
+external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is
+God's. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God,
+according to Ps. 23:1, "The earth is the Lord's," etc. Therefore it
+is not natural for man to possess external things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man (Luke
+12:18), "I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my
+goods," says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: "Tell me: which are thine?
+where did you take them from and bring them into being?" Now whatever
+man possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man
+does not naturally possess external things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad
+Gratianum, i, 1]) "dominion denotes power." But man has no power over
+external things, since he can work no change in their nature.
+Therefore the possession of external things is not natural to man.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 8:8): "Thou hast subjected all
+things under his feet."
+
+_I answer that,_ External things can be considered in two ways.
+First, as regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power
+of man, but only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey.
+Secondly, as regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural
+dominion over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is
+able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his
+account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as
+stated above (Q. 64, A. 1). It is by this argument that the
+Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external
+things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural dominion of man over
+other creatures, which is competent to man in respect of his reason
+wherein God's image resides, is shown forth in man's creation (Gen.
+1:26) by the words: "Let us make man to our image and likeness: and
+let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea," etc.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God has sovereign dominion over all things: and
+He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the
+sustenance of man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion
+over things, as regards the power to make use of them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external
+things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received
+them from another, namely from God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the dominion over
+external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to
+God alone, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for a Man to Possess a Thing As His Own?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as
+his own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now
+according to the natural law all things are common property: and the
+possession of property is contrary to this community of goods.
+Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external
+thing to himself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted
+above (A. 1, Obj. 2), says: "The rich who deem as their own property
+the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by
+going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and
+appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use." Now it
+would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of
+common goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what
+belongs to the community.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp.], and his words
+are quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.]: "Let no
+man call his own that which is common property": and by "common" he
+means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it
+seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): "The
+'Apostolici' are those who with extreme arrogance have given
+themselves that name, because they do not admit into their communion
+persons who are married or possess anything of their own, such as
+both monks and clerics who in considerable number are to be found in
+the Catholic Church." Now the reason why these people are heretics
+was because severing themselves from the Church, they think that
+those who enjoy the use of the above things, which they themselves
+lack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to
+maintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess property.
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things are competent to man in respect of
+exterior things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and
+in this regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover
+this is necessary to human life for three reasons. First because
+every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than
+that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk
+the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as
+happens where there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because
+human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is
+charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas
+there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing
+indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to
+man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed
+that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the
+things possessed.
+
+The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external
+things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external
+things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready
+to communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says
+(1 Tim. 6:17, 18): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give
+easily, to communicate to others," etc.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not
+that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in
+common and that nothing should be possessed as one's own: but because
+the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but
+rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as
+stated above (Q. 57, AA. 2, 3). Hence the ownership of possessions is
+not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by
+human reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand
+to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts unlawfully if
+by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man
+does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking
+possession of something which at first was common property, and gives
+others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately
+from using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): "Why are you
+rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit
+of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?"
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When Ambrose says: "Let no man call his own that which
+is common," he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore he
+adds: "He who spends too much is a robber."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Essence of Theft Consists in Taking Another's Thing
+Secretly?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take
+another's thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not,
+apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends
+to diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as
+indicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some (Isa. 3:9):
+"They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not
+hid it." Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should
+consist in taking another's thing secretly.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp., A. 2, Obj. 3,
+Can. Sicut hi.]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals [*Dist.
+xlvii]: "It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than to
+refuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off." Therefore
+just as theft consists in taking another's thing, so does it consist
+in keeping it back.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that
+which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with
+another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it
+is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's
+thing secretly.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): "_Fur_ (thief) is derived
+from _furvus_ and so from _fuscus_ (dark), because he takes advantage
+of the night."
+
+_I answer that,_ Three things combine together to constitute theft.
+The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives
+to each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take
+possession of what is another's. The second thing belongs to theft as
+distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such
+as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be
+about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another's not as
+a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or
+as a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his
+daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft.
+The third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and
+consists in a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it
+belongs properly to theft that it consists in "taking another's thing
+secretly."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a man
+employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and
+guile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a
+species of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is
+merely a circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both
+because it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the same
+kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust
+detention is included in an unjust taking.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person
+simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit
+belongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is
+the depositary's, and the thing stolen is the thief's, not simply,
+but as regards its custody.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Theft and Robbery Are Sins of Different Species?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of
+different species. For theft and robbery differ as "secret" and
+"manifest": because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery
+is to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of
+sins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically.
+Therefore theft and robbery are not different species of sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6). Now theft and robbery
+are directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another's
+property. Therefore they do not differ specifically.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of
+possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore
+Isidore says (Etym. x) that "he who commits a rape is called a
+corrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted." Now
+it is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or
+secretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken by
+force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and
+robbery do not differ.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft
+from robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that
+robbery is done openly.
+
+_I answer that,_ Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in
+as much as one man does another an injustice. Now "no man suffers an
+injustice willingly," as stated in _Ethic._ v, 9. Wherefore theft and
+robbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking being
+involuntary on the part of the person from whom something is taken.
+Now the involuntary is twofold, namely, through violence and through
+ignorance, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect
+of robbery differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ
+specifically.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is not
+derived from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to
+justice: and so where there is a different kind of involuntary, there
+is a different species of sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The remote end of robbery and theft is the same. But
+this is not enough for identity of species, because there is a
+difference of proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing
+by his own power, but the thief, by cunning.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the part of
+the woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as regards the
+others from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the
+part of the woman to whom violence is done.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Theft Is Always a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin
+is commanded by God, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): "He hath
+commanded no man to do wickedly." Yet we find that God commanded
+theft, for it is written (Ex. 12:35, 36): "And the children of Israel
+did as the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg.: 'as Moses had
+commanded']. . . and they stripped the Egyptians." Therefore theft is
+not always a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes it,
+he seems to commit a theft, for he takes another's property. Yet this
+seems lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold. [*See
+loc. cit. in Reply.] Therefore it seems that theft is not always a
+sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to sin,
+because he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy
+its equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his
+own property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another.
+Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 20:15): "Thou shalt not steal."
+
+_I answer that,_ If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will
+find that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its
+opposition to justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that
+for this reason theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking
+of what belongs to another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud
+committed by the thief, by laying hands on another's property
+secretly and cunningly. Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a
+sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is no theft for a man to take another's property
+either secretly or openly by order of a judge who has commanded him
+to do so, because it becomes his due by the very fact that it is
+adjudicated to him by the sentence of the court. Hence still less was
+it a theft for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the
+Egyptians at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done on
+account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the Egyptians
+without any cause: wherefore it is written significantly (Wis.
+10:19): "The just took the spoils of the wicked."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must be
+made. For some there are that were never in anyone's possession, for
+instance precious stones and jewels, found on the seashore, and such
+the finder is allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst.
+II, i, De rerum divis.]. The same applies to treasure hidden
+underground long since and belonging to no man, except that according
+to civil law the finder is bound to give half to the owner of the
+land, if the treasure trove be in the land of another person [*Inst.
+II, i, 39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris]. Hence in the parable of the
+Gospel (Matt. 13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden
+in a field that he bought the field, as though he purposed thus to
+acquire the right of possessing the whole treasure. On the other Land
+the treasure-trove may be nearly in someone's possession: and then if
+anyone take it with the intention, not of keeping it but of returning
+it to the owner who does not look upon such things as unappropriated,
+he is not guilty of theft. In like manner if the thing found appears
+to be unappropriated, and if the finder believes it to be so,
+although he keep it, he does not commit a theft [*Inst. II, i, 47].
+In any other case the sin of theft is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De
+acquirend. rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II, i, 48]: wherefore Augustine
+says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb. Apost.): "If thou hast
+found a thing and not returned it, thou hast stolen it" (Dig. xiv, 5,
+can. Si quid invenisti).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He who by stealth takes his own property which is
+deposited with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound
+either to restitution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is
+clearly guilty of sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his
+burden. On the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own property,
+if this be unjustly detained by another, he sins indeed; yet not
+because he burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to
+restitution or compensation: but he sins against general justice by
+disregarding the order of justice and usurping judgment concerning
+his own property. Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor
+to allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbor by acting
+this way.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Theft Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it is
+written (Prov. 6:30): "The fault is not so great when a man hath
+stolen." But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is
+not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death. But
+in the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity, according
+to Ex. 22:1, "If any man steal an ox or a sheep . . . he shall
+restore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep."
+Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great
+things. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with
+eternal death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a
+quill. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save
+for a mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to
+Zech. 5:3, "This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the
+earth; for every thief shall be judged as is there written."
+Therefore theft is a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 59, A. 4; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5), a
+mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life
+of the soul. Now charity consists principally in the love of God, and
+secondarily in the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our
+wishing and doing him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our
+neighbor in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another
+habitually, human society would be undone. Therefore theft, as being
+opposed to charity, is a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The statement that theft is not a great fault is in
+view of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through
+necessity. This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we
+shall show further on (A. 7). Hence the text continues: "For he
+stealeth to fill his hungry soul." Secondly, theft is stated not to
+be a great fault in comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is
+punished with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that
+"if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold . . . but he that is an
+adulterer . . . shall destroy his own soul."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than
+retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment which
+is pronounced against sinners "according to truth" (Rom. 2:2).
+Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death
+punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such
+as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some
+horrible deformity. Hence according to the present judgment the pain
+of death is not inflicted for theft which does not inflict an
+irreparable harm, except when it is aggravated by some grave
+circumstance, as in the case of sacrilege which is the theft of a
+sacred thing, of peculation, which is theft of common property, as
+Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.), and of kidnaping which is
+stealing a man, for which the pain of death is inflicted (Ex. 21:16).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Reason accounts as nothing that which is little: so
+that a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters:
+and the person who takes such things can presume that this is not
+against the will of the owner. And if a person take such like very
+little things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet
+if his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a
+mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be
+through consent in a mere thought.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 7]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Steal Through Stress of Need?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need.
+For penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is
+stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): "If anyone, through stress
+of hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do
+penance for three weeks." Therefore it is not lawful to steal through
+stress of need.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "there are
+some actions whose very name implies wickedness," and among these he
+reckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done for
+a good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to remedy
+a need.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now,
+according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal
+in order to succor one's neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore
+neither is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one's own needs.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In cases of need all things are common property,
+so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property,
+for need has made it common.
+
+_I answer that,_ Things which are of human right cannot derogate from
+natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order
+established by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for
+the purpose of succoring man's needs by their means. Wherefore the
+division and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do
+not preclude the fact that man's needs have to be remedied by means
+of these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in
+superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring
+the poor. For this reason Ambrose [*Loc. cit., A. 2, Obj. 3] says,
+and his words are embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut
+ii): "It is the hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's
+cloak that you store away, the money that you bury in the earth is
+the price of the poor man's ransom and freedom."
+
+Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is
+impossible for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each
+one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out
+of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need.
+Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is
+evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be
+at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and
+there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to
+succor his own need by means of another's property, by taking it
+either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or
+robbery.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This decretal considers cases where there is no urgent
+need.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly
+and use another's property in a case of extreme need: because that
+which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own property
+by reason of that need.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In a case of a like need a man may also take secretly
+another's property in order to succor his neighbor in need.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Robbery May Be Committed Without Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin.
+For spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the
+essence of robbery, according to what has been said (A. 4). Now it is
+lawful to take spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De Patriarch.
+4 [*De Abraham i, 3]): "When the conqueror has taken possession of
+the spoils, military discipline demands that all should be reserved
+for the sovereign," in order, to wit, that he may distribute them.
+Therefore in certain cases robbery is lawful.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his. Now
+the things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine says
+(Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. xciii.): "You falsely call things your own,
+for you do not possess them justly, and according to the laws of
+earthly kings you are commanded to forfeit them." Therefore it seems
+that one may lawfully rob unbelievers.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from
+their subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would seem
+a grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that
+case nearly every prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases
+robbery is lawful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to God
+in sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds
+of robbery, according to Isa. 61:8, "I am the Lord that love
+judgment, and hate robbery in a holocaust." Therefore it is not
+lawful to take anything by robbery.
+
+_I answer that,_ Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion
+employed in taking unjustly from a man that which is his. Now in
+human society no man can exercise coercion except through public
+authority: and, consequently, if a private individual not having
+public authority takes another's property by violence, he acts
+unlawfully and commits a robbery, as burglars do. As regards princes,
+the public power is entrusted to them that they may be the guardians
+of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use violence or
+coercion, save within the bounds of justice--either by fighting
+against the enemy, or against the citizens, by punishing evil-doers:
+and whatever is taken by violence of this kind is not the spoils of
+robbery, since it is not contrary to justice. On the other hand to
+take other people's property violently and against justice, in the
+exercise of public authority, is to act unlawfully and to be guilty
+of robbery; and whoever does so is bound to restitution.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A distinction must be made in the matter of spoils. For
+if they who take spoils from the enemy, are waging a just war, such
+things as they seize in the war become their own property. This is no
+robbery, so that they are not bound to restitution. Nevertheless even
+they who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils through
+cupidity arising from an evil intention, if, to wit, they fight
+chiefly not for justice but for spoil. For Augustine says (De Verb.
+Dom. xix; Serm. lxxxii) that "it is a sin to fight for booty." If,
+however, those who take the spoil, are waging an unjust war, they are
+guilty of robbery, and are bound to restitution.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Unbelievers possess their goods unjustly in so far as
+they are ordered by the laws of earthly princes to forfeit those
+goods. Hence these may be taken violently from them, not by private
+but by public authority.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is no robbery if princes exact from their subjects
+that which is due to them for the safe-guarding of the common good,
+even if they use violence in so doing: but if they extort something
+unduly by means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary is. Hence
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): "If justice be disregarded, what
+is a king but a mighty robber? since what is a robber but a little
+king?" And it is written (Ezech. 22:27): "Her princes in the midst of
+her, are like wolves ravening the prey." Wherefore they are bound to
+restitution, just as robbers are, and by so much do they sin more
+grievously than robbers, as their actions are fraught with greater
+and more universal danger to public justice whose wardens they are.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 9]
+
+Whether Theft Is a More Grievous Sin Than Robbery?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that theft is a more grievous sin than
+robbery. For theft adds fraud and guile to the taking of another's
+property: and these things are not found in robbery. Now fraud and
+guile are sinful in themselves, as stated above (Q. 55, AA. 4, 5).
+Therefore theft is a more grievous sin than robbery.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, shame is fear about a wicked deed, as stated in
+_Ethic._ iv, 9. Now men are more ashamed of theft than of robbery.
+Therefore theft is more wicked than robbery.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the more persons a sin injures the more grievous it
+would seem to be. Now the great and the lowly may be injured by
+theft: whereas only the weak can be injured by robbery, since it is
+possible to use violence towards them. Therefore the sin of theft
+seems to be more grievous than the sin of robbery.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to the laws robbery is more severely
+punished than theft.
+
+_I answer that,_ Robbery and theft are sinful, as stated above (AA.
+4, 6), on account of the involuntariness on the part of the person
+from whom something is taken: yet so that in theft the
+involuntariness is due to ignorance, whereas in robbery it is due to
+violence. Now a thing is more involuntary through violence than
+through ignorance, because violence is more directly opposed to the
+will than ignorance. Therefore robbery is a more grievous sin than
+theft. There is also another reason, since robbery not only inflicts
+a loss on a person in his things, but also conduces to the ignominy
+and injury of his person, and this is of graver import than fraud or
+guile which belong to theft. Hence the Reply to the First Objection
+is evident.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Men who adhere to sensible things think more of
+external strength which is evidenced in robbery, than of internal
+virtue which is forfeit through sin: wherefore they are less ashamed
+of robbery than of theft.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although more persons may be injured by theft than by
+robbery, yet more grievous injuries may be inflicted by robbery than
+by theft: for which reason also robbery is more odious.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 67
+
+OF THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE, IN JUDGING
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice,
+that consist in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall consider
+(1) those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and
+(2) injurious words uttered extra-judicially.
+
+Under the first head five points occur for our consideration: (1) The
+injustice of a judge in judging; (2) The injustice of the prosecutor
+in accusing; (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself;
+(4) The injustice of the witnesses in giving evidence; (5) The
+injustice of the advocate in defending.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to
+deliver judgment in opposition to the truth which is known to him?
+
+(3) Whether a judge can justly sentence a man who is not accused?
+
+(4) Whether he can justly remit the punishment?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 1]
+
+Whether a Man Can Justly Judge One Who Is Not Subject to His
+Jurisdiction?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man can justly judge one who is not
+subject to his jurisdiction. For it is stated (Dan. 13) that Daniel
+sentenced the ancients who were convicted of bearing false witness.
+But these ancients were not subject to Daniel; indeed they were
+judges of the people. Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that is
+not subject to his jurisdiction.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Christ was no man's subject, indeed He was "King of
+kings and Lord of lords" (Apoc. 19:16). Yet He submitted to the
+judgment of a man. Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge
+one that is not subject to his jurisdiction.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to the law [*Cap. Licet ratione, de Foro
+Comp.] a man is tried in this or that court according to his kind of
+offense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject of the man
+whose business it is to judge in that particular place, for instance
+when the defendant belongs to another diocese or is exempt. Therefore
+it seems that a man may judge one that is not his subject.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Regist. xi, epist. 64] in commenting on
+Deut. 23:25, "If thou go into thy friend's corn," etc. says: "Thou
+mayest not put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is entrusted
+to another."
+
+_I answer that,_ A judge's sentence is like a particular law
+regarding some particular fact. Wherefore just as a general law
+should have coercive power, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 9),
+so too the sentence of a judge should have coercive power, whereby
+either party is compelled to comply with the judge's sentence; else
+the judgment would be of no effect. Now coercive power is not
+exercised in human affairs, save by those who hold public authority:
+and those who have this authority are accounted the superiors of
+those over whom they preside whether by ordinary or by delegated
+authority. Hence it is evident that no man can judge others than his
+subjects and this in virtue either of delegated or of ordinary
+authority.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In judging those ancients Daniel exercised an
+authority delegated to him by Divine instinct. This is indicated where
+it is said (Dan. 13:45) that "the Lord raised up the . . . spirit of a
+young boy."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In human affairs a man may submit of his own accord to
+the judgment of others although these be not his superiors, an
+example of which is when parties agree to a settlement by
+arbitrators. Wherefore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be
+upheld by a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising
+authority in the case, have not of themselves full power of coercion.
+Accordingly in this way did Christ of his own accord submit to human
+judgment: and thus too did Pope Leo [*Leo IV] submit to the judgment
+of the emperor [*Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii, qu. 7].
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The bishop of the defendant's diocese becomes
+the latter's superior as regards the fault committed, even though he
+be exempt: unless perchance the defendant offend in a matter exempt
+from the bishop's authority, for instance in administering the
+property of an exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a
+theft, or a murder or the like, he may be justly condemned by the
+ordinary.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for a Judge to Pronounce Judgment Against the
+Truth That He Knows, on Account of Evidence to the Contrary?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment
+against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the
+contrary. For it is written (Deut. 17:9): "Thou shalt come to the
+priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that
+time; and thou shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the truth
+of the judgment." Now sometimes certain things are alleged against
+the truth, as when something is proved by means of false witnesses.
+Therefore it is unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment according
+to what is alleged and proved in opposition to the truth which he
+knows.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in pronouncing judgment a man should conform to the
+Divine judgment, since "it is the judgment of God" (Deut. 1:17). Now
+"the judgment of God is according to the truth" (Rom. 2:2), and it
+was foretold of Christ (Isa. 11:3, 4): "He shall not judge according
+to the sight of the eyes, nor reprove according to the hearing of the
+ears. But He shall judge the poor with justice, and shall reprove
+with equity for the meek of the earth." Therefore the judge ought not
+to pronounce judgment according to the evidence before him if it be
+contrary to what he knows himself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the reason why evidence is required in a court of
+law, is that the judge may have a faithful record of the truth of the
+matter, wherefore in matters of common knowledge there is no need of
+judicial procedure, according to 1 Tim. 5:24, "Some men's sins are
+manifest, going before to judgment." Consequently, if the judge by
+his personal knowledge is aware of the truth, he should pay no heed
+to the evidence, but should pronounce sentence according to the truth
+which he knows.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the word "conscience" denotes application of
+knowledge to a matter of action as stated in the First Part (Q. 79,
+A. 13). Now it is a sin to act contrary to one's knowledge. Therefore
+a judge sins if he pronounces sentence according to the evidence but
+against his conscience of the truth.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Ambrose, Super Ps. 118, serm. 20] says
+in his commentary on the Psalter: "A good judge does nothing
+according to his private opinion but pronounces sentence according to
+the law and the right." Now this is to pronounce judgment according
+to what is alleged and proved in court. Therefore a judge ought to
+pronounce judgment in accordance with these things, and not according
+to his private opinion.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 60, AA. 2, 6) it is the
+duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as much as he exercises
+public authority, wherefore his judgment should be based on
+information acquired by him, not from his knowledge as a private
+individual, but from what he knows as a public person. Now the latter
+knowledge comes to him both in general and in particular--in general
+through the public laws, whether Divine or human, and he should admit
+no evidence that conflicts therewith--in some particular matter,
+through documents and witnesses, and other legal means of
+information, which in pronouncing his sentence, he ought to follow
+rather than the information he has acquired as a private individual.
+And yet this same information may be of use to him, so that he can
+more rigorously sift the evidence brought forward, and discover its
+weak points. If, however, he is unable to reject that evidence
+juridically, he must, as stated above, follow it in pronouncing
+sentence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The reason why, in the passage quoted, it is stated
+that the judges should first of all be asked their reasons, is to
+make it clear that the judges ought to judge the truth in accordance
+with the evidence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To judge belongs to God in virtue of His own power:
+wherefore His judgment is based on the truth which He Himself knows,
+and not on knowledge imparted by others: the same is to be said of
+Christ, Who is true God and true man: whereas other judges do not
+judge in virtue of their own power, so that there is no comparison.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Apostle refers to the case where something is well
+known not to the judge alone, but both to him and to others, so that
+the guilty party can by no means deny his guilt (as in the case of
+notorious criminals), and is convicted at once from the evidence of
+the fact. If, on the other hand, it be well known to the judge, but
+not to others, or to others, but not to the judge, then it is
+necessary for the judge to sift the evidence.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In matters touching his own person, a man must form his
+conscience from his own knowledge, but in matters concerning the
+public authority, he must form his conscience in accordance with the
+knowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 3]
+
+Whether a Judge May Condemn a Man Who Is Not Accused?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a judge may pass sentence on a man
+who is not accused. For human justice is derived from Divine justice.
+Now God judges the sinner even though there be no accuser. Therefore
+it seems that a man may pass sentence of condemnation on a man even
+though there be no accuser.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, an accuser is required in judicial procedure in
+order that he may relate the crime to the judge. Now sometimes the
+crime may come to the judge's knowledge otherwise than by accusation;
+for instance, by denunciation, or by evil report, or through the
+judge himself being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may condemn a
+man without there being an accuser.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the deeds of holy persons are related in Holy Writ,
+as models of human conduct. Now Daniel was at the same time the
+accuser and the judge of the wicked ancients (Dan. 13). Therefore it
+is not contrary to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while
+being at the same time his accuser.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose in his commentary on 1 Cor. 5:2,
+expounding the Apostle's sentence on the fornicator, says that "a
+judge should not condemn without an accuser, since our Lord did not
+banish Judas, who was a thief, yet was not accused."
+
+_I answer that,_ A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as
+the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as
+to one who is the personification of justice." Now, as stated above
+(Q. 58, A. 2), justice is not between a man and himself but between
+one man and another. Hence a judge must needs judge between two
+parties, which is the case when one is the prosecutor, and the other
+the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases the judge cannot sentence
+a man unless the latter has an accuser, according to Acts 25:16: "It
+is not the custom of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he
+who is accused have his accusers present, and have liberty to make
+his answer, to clear himself of the crimes" of which he is accused.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God, in judging man, takes the sinner's conscience as
+his accuser, according to Rom. 2:15, "Their thoughts between
+themselves accusing, or also defending one another"; or again, He
+takes the evidence of the fact as regards the deed itself, according
+to Gen. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to Me from the
+earth."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Public disgrace takes the place of an accuser. Hence a
+gloss on Gen. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood," etc. says:
+"There is no need of an accuser when the crime committed is
+notorious." In a case of denunciation, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 7),
+the amendment, not the punishment, of the sinner is intended:
+wherefore when a man is denounced for a sin, nothing is done against
+him, but for him, so that no accuser is required. The punishment that
+is inflicted is on account of his rebellion against the Church, and
+since this rebellion is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser.
+The fact that the judge himself was an eye-witness, does not
+authorize him to proceed to pass sentence, except according to the
+order of judicial procedure.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God, in judging man, proceeds from His own knowledge of
+the truth, whereas man does not, as stated above (A. 2). Hence a man
+cannot be accuser, witness and judge at the same time, as God is.
+Daniel was at once accuser and judge, because he was the executor of
+the sentence of God, by whose instinct he was moved, as stated above
+(A. 1, ad 1).
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Judge Can Lawfully Remit the Punishment?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the judge can lawfully remit the
+punishment. For it is written (James 2:13): "Judgment without mercy"
+shall be done "to him that hath not done mercy." Now no man is
+punished for not doing what he cannot do lawfully. Therefore any
+judge can lawfully do mercy by remitting the punishment.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, human judgment should imitate the Divine judgment.
+Now God remits the punishment to sinners, because He desires not the
+death of the sinner, according to Ezech. 18:23. Therefore a human
+judge also may lawfully remit the punishment to one who repents.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is lawful for anyone to do what is profitable to
+some one and harmful to none. Now the remission of his punishment
+profits the guilty man and harms nobody. Therefore the judge can
+lawfully loose a guilty man from his punishment.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 13:8, 9) concerning anyone
+who would persuade a man to serve strange gods: "Neither let thy eye
+spare him to pity and conceal him, but thou shalt presently put him
+to death": and of the murderer it is written (Deut. 19:12, 13): "He
+shall die. Thou shalt not pity him."
+
+_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said (AA. 2,
+3), with regard to the question in point, two things may be observed
+in connection with a judge. One is that he has to judge between
+accuser and defendant, while the other is that he pronounces the
+judicial sentence, in virtue of his power, not as a private
+individual but as a public person. Accordingly on two counts a judge
+is hindered from loosing a guilty person from his punishment. First
+on the part of the accuser, whose right it sometimes is that the
+guilty party should be punished--for instance on account of some
+injury committed against the accuser--because it is not in the power
+of a judge to remit such punishment, since every judge is bound to
+give each man his right. Secondly, he finds a hindrance on the part
+of the commonwealth, whose power he exercises, and to whose good it
+belongs that evil-doers should be punished.
+
+Nevertheless in this respect there is a difference between judges of
+lower degree and the supreme judge, i.e. the sovereign, to whom the
+entire public authority is entrusted. For the inferior judge has no
+power to exempt a guilty man from punishment against the laws imposed
+on him by his superior. Wherefore Augustine in commenting on John
+19:11, "Thou shouldst not have any power against Me," says (Tract.
+cxvi in Joan.): "The power which God gave Pilate was such that he was
+under the power of Caesar, so that he was by no means free to acquit
+the person accused." On the other hand the sovereign who has full
+authority in the commonwealth, can lawfully remit the punishment to a
+guilty person, provided the injured party consent to the remission,
+and that this do not seem detrimental to the public good.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There is a place for the judge's mercy in matters that
+are left to the judge's discretion, because in like matters a good
+man is slow to punish as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But
+in matters that are determined in accordance with Divine or human
+laws, it is not left to him to show mercy.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God has supreme power of judging, and it concerns Him
+whatever is done sinfully against anyone. Therefore He is free to
+remit the punishment, especially since punishment is due to sin
+chiefly because it is done against Him. He does not, however, remit
+the punishment, except in so far as it becomes His goodness, which is
+the source of all laws.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If the judge were to remit punishment inordinately, he
+would inflict an injury on the community, for whose good it behooves
+ill-deeds to be punished, in order that men may avoid sin. Hence the
+text, after appointing the punishment of the seducer, adds (Deut.
+13:11): "That all Israel hearing may fear, and may do no more
+anything like this." He would also inflict harm on the injured
+person; who is compensated by having his honor restored in the
+punishment of the man who has injured him.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 68
+
+OF MATTERS CONCERNING UNJUST ACCUSATION
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. Under
+this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether a man is bound to accuse?
+
+(2) Whether the accusation should be made in writing?
+
+(3) How is an accusation vitiated?
+
+(4) How should those be punished who have accused a man wrongfully?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 1]
+
+Whether a Man Is Bound to Accuse?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to accuse. For no
+man is excused on account of sin from fulfilling a Divine precept,
+since he would thus profit by his sin. Yet on account of sin some are
+disqualified from accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of
+evil fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not yet
+proved to be innocent [*1 Tim. 1:5]. Therefore a man is not bound by
+a Divine precept to accuse.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every duty depends on charity which is "the end of
+the precept" [*Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. 1]:
+wherefore it is written (Rom. 13:8): "Owe no man anything, but to
+love one another." Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that
+man owes to all both of high and of low degree, both superiors and
+inferiors. Since therefore subjects should not accuse their
+superiors, nor persons of lower degree, those of a higher degree, as
+shown in several chapters (Decret. II, qu. vii), it seems that it is
+no man's duty to accuse.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no man is bound to act against the fidelity which he
+owes his friend; because he ought not to do to another what he would
+not have others do to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary
+to the fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written (Prov.
+11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but he that
+is faithful, concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend."
+Therefore a man is not bound to accuse.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 5:1): "If any one sin, and
+hear the voice of one swearing, and is a witness either because he
+himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall
+bear his iniquity."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 33, AA. 6, 7; Q. 67, A. 3, ad
+2), the difference between denunciation and accusation is that in
+denunciation we aim at a brother's amendment, whereas in accusation
+we intend the punishment of his crime. Now the punishments of this
+life are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not the
+final time of retribution, but in their character of medicine,
+conducing either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of
+the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punishment of
+evil-doers. The former of these is intended in denunciation, as
+stated, whereas the second regards properly accusation. Hence in the
+case of a crime that conduces to the injury of the commonwealth, a
+man is bound to accusation, provided he can offer sufficient proof,
+since it is the accuser's duty to prove: as, for example, when
+anyone's sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual corruption of the
+community. If, however, the sin be not such as to affect the
+community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is not bound
+to attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he cannot duly
+accomplish.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin from doing
+what men are under an obligation to do: for instance from meriting
+eternal life, and from receiving the sacraments of the Church. Nor
+does a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous fault to fail
+to do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are perfections of
+man.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Subjects are debarred from accusing their superiors,
+"if it is not the affection of charity but their own wickedness that
+leads them to defame and disparage the conduct of their superiors"
+[*Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7]--or again if
+the subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty of
+crime [*Decret. II, qu. vii, can. Praesumunt.]. Otherwise, provided
+they be in other respects qualified to accuse, it is lawful for
+subjects to accuse their superiors out of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is contrary to fidelity to make known secrets
+to the injury of a person; but not if they be revealed for the good of
+the community, which should always be preferred to a private good.
+Hence it is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to the common
+good: and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are sufficient
+witnesses to prove it.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Necessary for the Accusation to Be Made in Writing?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for the accusation to be made
+in writing. For writing was devised as an aid to the human memory of
+the past. But an accusation is made in the present. Therefore the
+accusation needs not to be made in writing.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Per
+scripta) that "no man may accuse or be accused in his absence." Now
+writing seems to be useful in the fact that it is a means of
+notifying something to one who is absent, as Augustine declares (De
+Trin. x, 1). Therefore the accusation need not be in writing: and all
+the more that the canon declares that "no accusation in writing
+should be accepted."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a man's crime is made known by denunciation, even as
+by accusation. Now writing is unnecessary in denunciation. Therefore
+it is seemingly unnecessary in accusation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can.
+Accusatorum) that "the role of accuser must never be sanctioned
+without the accusation be in writing."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 67, A. 3), when the process in a
+criminal case goes by way of accusation, the accuser is in the
+position of a party, so that the judge stands between the accuser and
+the accused for the purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it
+behooves one to proceed on certainties, as far as possible. Since
+however verbal utterances are apt to escape one's memory, the judge
+would be unable to know for certain what had been said and with what
+qualifications, when he comes to pronounce sentence, unless it were
+drawn up in writing. Hence it has with reason been established that
+the accusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure,
+should be put into writing.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Words are so many and so various that it is difficult
+to remember each one. A proof of this is the fact that if a number of
+people who have heard the same words be asked what was said, they
+will not agree in repeating them, even after a short time. And since
+a slight difference of words changes the sense, even though the
+judge's sentence may have to be pronounced soon afterwards, the
+certainty of judgment requires that the accusation be drawn up in
+writing.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Writing is needed not only on account of the absence of
+the person who has something to notify, or of the person to whom
+something is notified, but also on account of the delay of time as
+stated above (ad 1). Hence when the canon says, "Let no accusation be
+accepted in writing" it refers to the sending of an accusation by one
+who is absent: but it does not exclude the necessity of writing when
+the accuser is present.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The denouncer does not bind himself to give proofs:
+wherefore he is not punished if he is unable to prove. For this
+reason writing is unnecessary in a denunciation: and it suffices that
+the denunciation be made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in
+virtue of her office, to the correction of the brother.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 3]
+
+Whether an Accusation Is Rendered Unjust by Calumny, Collusion or
+Evasion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust
+by calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu.
+iii [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.], "calumny consists
+in falsely charging a person with a crime." Now sometimes one man
+falsely accuses another of a crime through ignorance of fact which
+excuses him. Therefore it seems that an accusation is not always
+rendered unjust through being slanderous.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "collusion
+consists in hiding the truth about a crime." But seemingly this is
+not unlawful, because one is not bound to disclose every crime, as
+stated above (A. 1; Q. 33, A. 7). Therefore it seems that an
+accusation is not rendered unjust by collusion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "evasion
+consists in withdrawing altogether from an accusation." But this can
+be done without injustice: for it is stated there also: "If a man
+repent of having made a wicked accusation and inscription* in a
+matter which he cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the
+innocent party whom he has accused, let them acquit one another."
+[*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the
+writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was
+that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation,
+to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if
+proved guilty.] Therefore evasion does not render an accusation
+unjust.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is stated by the same authority: "The rashness
+of accusers shows itself in three ways. For they are guilty either of
+calumny, or of collusion, or of evasion."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), accusation is ordered for
+the common good which it aims at procuring by means of knowledge of
+the crime. Now no man ought to injure a person unjustly, in order to
+promote the common good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when
+making an accusation: first through acting unjustly against the
+accused, by charging him falsely with the commission of a crime, i.e.
+by calumniating him; secondly, on the part of the commonwealth, whose
+good is intended chiefly in an accusation, when anyone with wicked
+intent hinders a sin being punished. This again happens in two ways:
+first by having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This
+belongs to collusion (_prevaricatio_) for "he that is guilty of
+collusion is like one who rides astraddle (_varicator_), because he
+helps the other party, and betrays his own side" [*Append. Grat. ad
+can. Si quem poenituerit.]. Secondly by withdrawing altogether from
+the accusation. This is evasion (_tergiversatio_) for by desisting
+from what he had begun he seems to turn his back (_tergum vertere_).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A man ought not to proceed to accuse except of what he
+is quite certain about, wherein ignorance of fact has no place. Yet
+he who falsely charges another with a crime is not a calumniator
+unless he gives utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it
+happens sometimes that a man through levity of mind proceeds to
+accuse someone, because he believes too readily what he hears, and
+this pertains to rashness; while, on the other hand sometimes a man
+is led to make an accusation on account of an error for which he is
+not to blame. All these things must be weighed according to the
+judge's prudence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of
+calumny, who through levity of mind or an error for which he is not
+to be blamed has uttered a false accusation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not everyone who hides the truth about a crime is
+guilty of collusion, but only he who deceitfully hides the matter
+about which he makes the accusation, by collusion with the defendant,
+dissembling his proofs, and admitting false excuses.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from the
+accusation, by renouncing the intention of accusing, not anyhow, but
+inordinately. There are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly
+desist from accusing without committing a sin--in one way, in the
+very process of accusation, if it come to his knowledge that the
+matter of his accusation is false, and then by mutual consent the
+accuser and the defendant acquit one another--in another way, if the
+accusation be quashed by the sovereign to whom belongs the care of
+the common good, which it is intended to procure by the accusation.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 4]
+
+Whether an Accuser Who Fails to Prove His Indictment Is Bound to the
+Punishment of Retaliation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the accuser who fails to prove his
+indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation. For
+sometimes a man is led by a just error to make an accusation, in
+which case the judge acquit the accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu.
+iii. [*Append. Grat., ad can. Si quem poenituerit.] Therefore the
+accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the
+punishment of retaliation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if the punishment of retaliation ought to be
+inflicted on one who has accused unjustly, this will be on account of
+the injury he has done to someone--but not on account of any injury
+done to the person of the accused, for in that case the sovereign
+could not remit this punishment, nor on account of an injury to the
+commonwealth, because then the accused could not acquit him.
+Therefore the punishment of retaliation is not due to one who has
+failed to prove his accusation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the one same sin does not deserve a twofold
+punishment, according to Nahum 1:9 [*Septuagint version]: "God shall
+not judge the same thing a second time." But he who fails to prove
+his accusation, incurs the punishment due to defamation [*Can.
+Infames, caus. vi, qu. 1], which punishment even the Pope seemingly
+cannot remit, according to a statement of Pope Gelasius [*Callist. I,
+Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.]: "Although we are able to save souls by
+Penance, we are unable to remove the defamation." Therefore he is not
+bound to suffer the punishment of retaliation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): "He that fails to
+prove his accusation, must himself suffer the punishment which his
+accusation inferred."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), in a case, where the
+procedure is by way of accusation, the accuser holds the position of
+a party aiming at the punishment of the accused. Now the duty of the
+judge is to establish the equality of justice between them: and the
+equality of justice requires that a man should himself suffer
+whatever harm he has intended to be inflicted on another, according
+to Ex. 21:24, "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Consequently it is just
+that he who by accusing a man has put him in danger of being punished
+severely, should himself suffer a like punishment.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5) justice does not
+always require counterpassion, because it matters considerably
+whether a man injures another voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury
+deserves punishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when the
+judge becomes aware that a man has made a false accusation, not with
+a mind to do harm, but involuntarily through ignorance or a just
+error, he does not impose the punishment of retaliation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He who accuses wrongfully sins both against the person
+of the accused and against the commonwealth; wherefore he is punished
+on both counts. This is the meaning of what is written (Deut.
+19:18-20): "And when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find
+that the false witness hath told a lie against his brother: they
+shall render to him as he meant to do to his brother," and this
+refers to the injury done to the person: and afterwards, referring to
+the injury done to the commonwealth, the text continues: "And thou
+shalt take away the evil out of the midst of thee, that others
+hearing may fear, and may not dare to do such things." Specially,
+however, does he injure the person of the accused, if he accuse him
+falsely. Wherefore the accused, if innocent, may condone the injury
+done to himself, particularly if the accusation were made not
+calumniously but out of levity of mind. But if the accuser desist
+from accusing an innocent man, through collusion with the latter's
+adversary, he inflicts an injury on the commonwealth: and this cannot
+be condoned by the accused, although it can be remitted by the
+sovereign, who has charge of the commonwealth.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The accuser deserves the punishment of retaliation in
+compensation for the harm he attempts to inflict on his neighbor: but
+the punishment of disgrace is due to him for his wickedness in
+accusing another man calumniously. Sometimes the sovereign remits the
+punishment, and not the disgrace, and sometimes he removes the
+disgrace also: wherefore the Pope also can remove this disgrace. When
+Pope Gelasius says: "We cannot remove the disgrace," he may mean
+either the disgrace attaching to the deed (_infamia facti_), or that
+sometimes it is not expedient to remove it, or again he may be
+referring to the disgrace inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian
+states (Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 69
+
+OF SINS COMMITTED AGAINST JUSTICE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider those sins which are committed against justice
+on the part of the defendant. Under this head there are four points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to
+one's condemnation?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful to defend oneself with calumnies?
+
+(3) Whether it is lawful to escape condemnation by appealing?
+
+(4) Whether it is lawful for one who has been condemned to defend
+himself by violence if he be able to do so?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 1]
+
+Whether One Can, Without a Mortal Sin, Deny the Truth Which Would
+Lead to One's Condemnation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem one can, without a mortal sin, deny the
+truth which would lead to one's condemnation. For Chrysostom says
+(Hom. xxxi super Ep. ad Heb.): "I do not say that you should lay bare
+your guilt publicly, nor accuse yourself before others." Now if the
+accused were to confess the truth in court, he would lay bare his
+guilt and be his own accuser. Therefore he is not bound to tell the
+truth: and so he does not sin mortally if he tell a lie in court.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as it is an officious lie when one tells a lie
+in order to rescue another man from death, so is it an officious lie
+when one tells a lie in order to free oneself from death, since one
+is more bound towards oneself than towards another. Now an officious
+lie is considered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore if the
+accused denies the truth in court, in order to escape death, he does
+not sin mortally.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated
+above (Q. 24, A. 12). But that the accused lie by denying himself to
+be guilty of the crime laid to his charge is not contrary to charity,
+neither as regards the love we owe God, nor as to the love due to our
+neighbor. Therefore such a lie is not a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Whatever is opposed to the glory of God is a
+mortal sin, because we are bound by precept to "do all to the glory
+of God" (1 Cor. 10:31). Now it is to the glory of God that the
+accused confess that which is alleged against him, as appears from
+the words of Josue to Achan, "My son, give glory to the Lord God of
+Israel, and confess and tell me what thou hast done, hide it not"
+(Joshua 7:19). Therefore it is a mortal sin to lie in order to cover
+one's guilt.
+
+_I answer that,_ Whoever acts against the due order of justice, sins
+mortally, as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4). Now it belongs to the order
+of justice that a man should obey his superior in those matters to
+which the rights of his authority extend. Again, the judge, as stated
+above (Q. 67, A. 1), is the superior in relation to the person whom
+he judges. Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge
+the truth which the latter exacts from him according to the form of
+law. Hence if he refuse to tell the truth which he is under
+obligation to tell, or if he mendaciously deny it, he sins mortally.
+If, on the other hand, the judge asks of him that which he cannot ask
+in accordance with the order of justice, the accused is not bound to
+satisfy him, and he may lawfully escape by appealing or otherwise:
+but it is not lawful for him to lie.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When a man is examined by the judge according to the
+order of justice, he does not lay bare his own guilt, but his guilt
+is unmasked by another, since the obligation of answering is imposed
+on him by one whom he is bound to obey.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To lie, with injury to another person, in order to
+rescue a man from death is not a purely officious lie, for it has an
+admixture of the pernicious lie: and when a man lies in court in
+order to exculpate himself, he does an injury to one whom he is bound
+to obey, since he refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He who lies in court by denying his guilt, acts both
+against the love of God to whom judgment belongs, and against the
+love of his neighbor, and this not only as regards the judge, to whom
+he refuses his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished
+if he fail to prove his accusation. Hence it is written (Ps. 140:4):
+"Incline not my heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins": on
+which words a gloss says: "Shameless men are wont by lying to deny
+their guilt when they have been found out." And Gregory in expounding
+Job 31:33, "If as a man I have hid my sin," says (Moral. xxii, 15):
+"It is a common vice of mankind to sin in secret, by lying to hide
+the sin that has been committed, and when convicted to aggravate the
+sin by defending oneself."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for the Accused to Defend Himself with
+Calumnies?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself
+with calumnies. Because, according to civil law (Cod. II, iv, De
+transact. 18), when a man is on trial for his life it is lawful for
+him to bribe his adversary. Now this is done chiefly by defending
+oneself with calumnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his
+life does not sin if he defend himself with calumnies.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, an accuser who is guilty of collusion with the
+accused, is punishable by law (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem
+poenit.). Yet no punishment is imposed on the accused for collusion
+with the accuser. Therefore it would seem lawful for the accused to
+defend himself with calumnies.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and
+declineth from evil, the fool leapeth over and is confident." Now
+what is done wisely is no sin. Therefore no matter how a man declines
+from evil, he does not sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In criminal cases an oath has to be taken against
+calumnious allegations (Extra, De juramento calumniae, cap.
+Inhaerentes): and this would not be the case if it were lawful to
+defend oneself with calumnies. Therefore it is not lawful for the
+accused to defend himself with calumnies.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is one thing to withhold the truth, and another
+to utter a falsehood. The former is lawful sometimes, for a man is
+not bound to divulge all truth, but only such as the judge can and
+must require of him according to the order of justice; as, for
+instance, when the accused is already disgraced through the
+commission of some crime, or certain indications of his guilt have
+already been discovered, or again when his guilt is already more or
+less proven. On the other hand it is never lawful to make a false
+declaration.
+
+As regards what he may do lawfully, a man can employ either lawful
+means, and such as are adapted to the end in view, which belongs to
+prudence; or he can use unlawful means, unsuitable to the proposed
+end, and this belongs to craftiness, which is exercised by fraud and
+guile, as shown above (Q. 55, AA. 3, seqq.). His conduct in the
+former case is praiseworthy, in the latter sinful. Accordingly it is
+lawful for the accused to defend himself by withholding the truth
+that he is not bound to avow, by suitable means, for instance by not
+answering such questions as he is not bound to answer. This is not to
+defend himself with calumnies, but to escape prudently. But it is
+unlawful for him, either to utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth
+that he is bound to avow, or to employ guile or fraud, because fraud
+and guile have the force of a lie, and so to use them would be to
+defend oneself with calumnies.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Human laws leave many things unpunished, which
+according to the Divine judgment are sins, as, for example, simple
+fornication; because human law does not exact perfect virtue from
+man, for such virtue belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a
+number of people as human law has to direct. That a man is sometimes
+unwilling to commit a sin in order to escape from the death of the
+body, the danger of which threatens the accused who is on trial for
+his life, is an act of perfect virtue, since "death is the most
+fearful of all temporal things" (Ethic. iii, 6). Wherefore if the
+accused, who is on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins
+indeed by inducing him to do what is unlawful, yet the civil law does
+not punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to be lawful.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If the accuser is guilty of collusion with the accused
+and the latter is guilty, he incurs punishment, and so it is evident
+that he sins. Wherefore, since it is a sin to induce a man to sin, or
+to take part in a sin in any way--for the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32),
+that "they . . . are worthy of death . . . that consent" to those who
+sin--it is evident that the accused also sins if he is guilty of
+collusion with his adversary. Nevertheless according to human laws no
+punishment is inflicted on him, for the reason given above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The wise man hides himself not by slandering others but
+by exercising prudence.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 3]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for the Accused to Escape Judgment by Appealing?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for the accused to escape
+judgment by appealing. The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "Let every soul
+be subject to the higher powers." Now the accused by appealing
+refuses to be subject to a higher power, viz. the judge. Therefore he
+commits a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, ordinary authority is more binding than that which
+we choose for ourselves. Now according to the Decretals (II, qu. vi,
+cap. A judicibus) it is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen by
+common consent. Much less therefore is it lawful to appeal from
+ordinary judges.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever is lawful once is always lawful. But it is
+not lawful to appeal after the tenth day [*Can. Anteriorum, caus. ii,
+qu. 6], nor a third time on the same point [*Can. Si autem, caus. ii,
+qu. 6]. Therefore it would seem that an appeal is unlawful in itself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Paul appealed to Caesar (Acts 25).
+
+_I answer that,_ There are two motives for which a man appeals. First
+through confidence in the justice of his cause, seeing that he is
+unjustly oppressed by the judge, and then it is lawful for him to
+appeal, because this is a prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid
+down (Decret. II, qu. vi, can. Omnis oppressus): "All those who are
+oppressed are free, if they so wish, to appeal to the judgment of the
+priests, and no man may stand in their way." Secondly, a man appeals
+in order to cause a delay, lest a just sentence be pronounced against
+him. This is to defend oneself calumniously, and is unlawful as
+stated above (A. 2). For he inflicts an injury both on the judge,
+whom he hinders in the exercise of his office, and on his adversary,
+whose justice he disturbs as far as he is able. Hence it is laid down
+(II, qu. vi, can. Omnino puniendus): "Without doubt a man should be
+punished if his appeal be declared unjust."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A man should submit to the lower authority in so far as
+the latter observes the order of the higher authority. If the lower
+authority departs from the order of the higher, we ought not to
+submit to it, for instance "if the proconsul order one thing and the
+emperor another," according to a gloss on Rom. 13:2. Now when a judge
+oppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he departs from the order
+of the higher authority, whereby he is obliged to judge justly. Hence
+it is lawful for a man who is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to
+the authority of the higher power, by appealing either before or
+after sentence has been pronounced. And since it is to be presumed
+that there is no rectitude where true faith is lacking, it is
+unlawful for a Catholic to appeal to an unbelieving judge, according
+to Decret. II, qu. vi, can. _Catholicus:_ "The Catholic who appeals
+to the decision of a judge of another faith shall be excommunicated,
+whether his case be just or unjust." Hence the Apostle also rebuked
+those who went to law before unbelievers (1 Cor. 6:6).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is due to a man's own fault or neglect that, of his
+own accord, he submits to the judgment of one in whose justice he has
+no confidence. Moreover it would seem to point to levity of mind for
+a man not to abide by what he has once approved of. Hence it is with
+reason that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing from the
+decision of judges of our own choice, who have no power save by
+virtue of the consent of the litigants. On the other hand the
+authority of an ordinary judge depends, not on the consent of those
+who are subject to his judgment, but on the authority of the king or
+prince who appointed him. Hence, as a remedy against his unjust
+oppression, the law allows one to have recourse to appeal, so that
+even if the judge be at the same time ordinary and chosen by the
+litigants, it is lawful to appeal from his decision, since seemingly
+his ordinary authority occasioned his being chosen as arbitrator. Nor
+is it to be imputed as a fault to the man who consented to his being
+arbitrator, without adverting to the fact that he was appointed
+ordinary judge by the prince.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The equity of the law so guards the interests of
+the one party that the other is not oppressed. Thus it allows ten days
+for appeal to be made, this being considered sufficient time for
+deliberating on the expediency of an appeal. If on the other hand
+there were no fixed time limit for appealing, the certainty of
+judgment would ever be in suspense, so that the other party would
+suffer an injury. The reason why it is not allowed to appeal a third
+time on the same point, is that it is not probable that the judges
+would fail to judge justly so many times.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 4]
+
+Whether a Man Who Is Condemned to Death May Lawfully Defend Himself
+If He Can?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man who is condemned to death may
+lawfully defend himself if he can. For it is always lawful to do that
+to which nature inclines us, as being of natural right, so to speak.
+Now, to resist corruption is an inclination of nature not only in men
+and animals but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore if he can
+do so, the accused, after condemnation, may lawfully resist being put
+to death.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as a man, by resistance, escapes the death to
+which he has been condemned, so does he by flight. Now it is lawful
+seemingly to escape death by flight, according to Ecclus. 9:18, "Keep
+thee far from the man that hath power to kill [and not to quicken]"
+[*The words in the brackets are not in the Vulgate]. Therefore it is
+also lawful for the accused to resist.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 24:11): "Deliver them that are
+led to death: and those that are drawn to death forbear not to
+deliver." Now a man is under greater obligation to himself than to
+another. Therefore it is lawful for a condemned man to defend himself
+from being put to death.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): "He that resisteth
+the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist,
+purchase to themselves damnation." Now a condemned man, by defending
+himself, resists the power in the point of its being ordained by God
+"for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of the good"
+[*1 Pet. 2:14]. Therefore he sins in defending himself.
+
+_I answer that,_ A man may be condemned to death in two ways. First
+justly, and then it is not lawful for the condemned to defend
+himself, because it is lawful for the judge to combat his resistance
+by force, so that on his part the fight is unjust, and consequently
+without any doubt he sins.
+
+Secondly a man is condemned unjustly: and such a sentence is like the
+violence of robbers, according to Ezech. 22:21, "Her princes in the
+midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood."
+Wherefore even as it is lawful to resist robbers, so is it lawful, in
+a like case, to resist wicked princes; except perhaps in order to
+avoid scandal, whence some grave disturbance might be feared to arise.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Reason was given to man that he might ensue those
+things to which his nature inclines, not in all cases, but in
+accordance with the order of reason. Hence not all self-defense is
+lawful, but only such as is accomplished with due moderation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When a man is condemned to death, he has not to kill
+himself, but to suffer death: wherefore he is not bound to do
+anything from which death would result, such as to stay in the place
+whence he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those who
+lead him to death, in order that he may not suffer what is just for
+him to suffer. Even so, if a man were condemned to die of hunger, he
+does not sin if he partakes of food brought to him secretly, because
+to refrain from taking it would be to kill himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the wise man does not direct that one
+should deliver a man from death in opposition to the order of
+justice: wherefore neither should a man deliver himself from death by
+resisting against justice.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 70
+
+OF INJUSTICE WITH REGARD TO THE PERSON OF THE WITNESS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider injustice with regard to the person of the
+witness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether a man is bound to give evidence?
+
+(2) Whether the evidence of two or three witnesses suffices?
+
+(3) Whether a man's evidence may be rejected without any fault on his
+part?
+
+(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to bear false witness?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 1]
+
+Whether a Man Is Bound to Give Evidence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to give evidence.
+Augustine says (QQ. Gen. 1:26) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 33, 34],
+that when Abraham said of his wife (Gen. 20:2), "She is my sister,"
+he wished the truth to be concealed and not a lie be told. Now, by
+hiding the truth a man abstains from giving evidence. Therefore a man
+is not bound to give evidence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to act deceitfully. Now it is
+written (Prov. 11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully revealeth
+secrets, but he that is faithful concealeth the thing committed to
+him by his friend." Therefore a man is not always bound to give
+evidence, especially on matters committed to him as a secret by a
+friend.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, clerics and priests, more than others, are bound to
+those things that are necessary for salvation. Yet clerics and
+priests are forbidden to give evidence when a man is on trial for his
+life. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to give evidence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Can. Quisquis, caus. xi, qu. 3, cap.
+Falsidicus; cf. Isidore, Sentent. iii, 55] says: "Both he who
+conceals the truth and he who tells a lie are guilty, the former
+because he is unwilling to do good, the latter because he desires to
+hurt."
+
+_I answer that,_ We must make a distinction in the matter of giving
+evidence: because sometimes a certain man's evidence is necessary,
+and sometimes not. If the necessary evidence is that of a man subject
+to a superior whom, in matters pertaining to justice, he is bound to
+obey, without doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points
+which are required of him in accordance with the order of justice,
+for instance on manifest things or when ill-report has preceded. If
+however he is required to give evidence on other points, for instance
+secret matters, and those of which no ill-report has preceded, he is
+not bound to give evidence. On the other hand, if his evidence be
+required by authority of a superior whom he is bound to obey, we must
+make a distinction: because if his evidence is required in order to
+deliver a man from an unjust death or any other penalty, or from
+false defamation, or some loss, in such cases he is bound to give
+evidence. Even if his evidence is not demanded, he is bound to do
+what he can to declare the truth to someone who may profit thereby.
+For it is written (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy
+from the hand of the sinner"; and (Prov. 24:11): "Deliver them that
+are led to death"; and (Rom. 1:32): "They are worthy of death, not
+only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do
+them," on which words a gloss says: "To be silent when one can
+disprove is to consent." In matters pertaining to a man's
+condemnation, one is not bound to give evidence, except when one is
+constrained by a superior in accordance with the order of justice;
+since if the truth of such a matter be concealed, no particular
+injury is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens the
+accuser, it matters not since he risked the danger of his own accord:
+whereas it is different with the accused, who incurs the danger
+against his will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of concealment of the truth in a
+case when a man is not compelled by his superior's authority to
+declare the truth, and when such concealment is not specially
+injurious to any person.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A man should by no means give evidence on
+matters secretly committed to him in confession, because he knows such
+things, not as man but as God's minister: and the sacrament is more
+binding than any human precept. But as regards matters committed to
+man in some other way under secrecy, we must make a distinction.
+Sometimes they are of such a nature that one is bound to make them
+known as soon as they come to our knowledge, for instance if they
+conduce to the spiritual or corporal corruption of the community, or
+to some grave personal injury, in short any like matter that a man is
+bound to make known either by giving evidence or by denouncing it.
+Against such a duty a man cannot be obliged to act on the plea that
+the matter is committed to him under secrecy, for he would break the
+faith he owes to another. On the other hand sometimes they are such as
+one is not bound to make known, so that one may be under obligation
+not to do so on account of their being committed to one under secrecy.
+In such a case one is by no means bound to make them known, even if
+the superior should command; because to keep faith is of natural
+right, and a man cannot be commanded to do what is contrary to natural
+right.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is unbecoming for ministers of the altar to
+slay a man or to cooperate in his slaying, as stated above
+(Q. 64, A. 4); hence according to the order of justice they
+cannot be compelled to give evidence when a man is on trial for his
+life.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Evidence of Two or Three Persons Suffices?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the evidence of two or three persons
+is not sufficient. For judgment requires certitude. Now certitude of
+the truth is not obtained by the assertions of two or three
+witnesses, for we read that Naboth was unjustly condemned on the
+evidence of two witnesses (3 Kings 21). Therefore the evidence of two
+or three witnesses does not suffice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in order for evidence to be credible it must agree.
+But frequently the evidence of two or three disagrees in some point.
+Therefore it is of no use for proving the truth in court.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. iv, can. Praesul.):
+"A bishop shall not be condemned save on the evidence of seventy-two
+witnesses; nor a cardinal priest of the Roman Church, unless there be
+sixty-four witnesses. Nor a cardinal deacon of the Roman Church,
+unless there be twenty-seven witnesses; nor a subdeacon, an acolyte,
+an exorcist, a reader or a doorkeeper without seven witnesses." Now
+the sin of one who is of higher dignity is more grievous, and
+consequently should be treated more severely. Therefore neither is
+the evidence of two or three witnesses sufficient for the
+condemnation of other persons.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 17:6): "By the mouth of two
+or three witnesses shall he die that is to be slain," and further on
+(Deut. 19:15): "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word
+shall stand."
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "we must
+not expect to find certitude equally in every matter." For in human
+acts, on which judgments are passed and evidence required, it is
+impossible to have demonstrative certitude, because they are about
+things contingent and variable. Hence the certitude of probability
+suffices, such as may reach the truth in the greater number of cases,
+although it fail in the minority. Now it is probable that the
+assertion of several witnesses contains the truth rather than the
+assertion of one: and since the accused is the only one who denies,
+while several witness affirm the same as the prosecutor, it is
+reasonably established both by Divine and by human law, that the
+assertion of several witnesses should be upheld. Now all multitude is
+comprised of three elements, the beginning, the middle and the end.
+Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 1), "we reckon
+'all' and 'whole' to consist of three parts." Now we have a triple
+voucher when two agree with the prosecutor: hence two witnesses are
+required; or for the sake of greater certitude three, which is the
+perfect number. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 4:12): "A threefold
+cord is not easily broken": and Augustine, commenting on John 8:17,
+"The testimony of two men is true," says (Tract. xxxvi) that "there
+is here a mystery by which we are given to understand that Trinity
+wherein is perpetual stability of truth."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: No matter how great a number of witnesses may be
+determined, the evidence might sometimes be unjust, since is written
+(Ex. 23:2): "Thou shalt not follow the multitude to do evil." And yet
+the fact that in so many it is not possible to have certitude without
+fear of error, is no reason why we should reject the certitude which
+can probably be had through two or three witnesses, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If the witnesses disagree in certain principal
+circumstances which change the substance of the fact, for instance in
+time, place, or persons, which are chiefly in question, their
+evidence is of no weight, because if they disagree in such things,
+each one would seem to be giving distinct evidence and to be speaking
+of different facts. For instance, one say that a certain thing
+happened at such and such a time or place, while another says it
+happened at another time or place, they seem not to be speaking of
+the same event. The evidence is not weakened if one witness says that
+he does not remember, while the other attests to a determinate time
+or place. And if on such points as these the witness for prosecution
+and defense disagree altogether, and if they be equal in number on
+either side, and of equal standing, the accused should have the
+benefit of the doubt, because the judge ought to be more inclined to
+acquit than to condemn, except perhaps in favorable suits, such as a
+pleading for liberty and the like. If, however, the witnesses for the
+same side disagree, the judge ought to use his own discretion in
+discerning which side to favor, by considering either the number of
+witnesses, or their standing, or the favorableness of the suit, or
+the nature of the business and of the evidence.
+
+Much more ought the evidence of one witness to be rejected if he
+contradict himself when questioned about what he has seen and about
+what he knows; not, however, if he contradict himself when questioned
+about matters of opinion and report, since he may be moved to answer
+differently according to the different things he has seen and heard.
+
+On the other hand if there be discrepancy of evidence in
+circumstances not touching the substance of the fact, for instance,
+whether the weather were cloudy or fine, whether the house were
+painted or not, or such like matters, such discrepancy does not
+weaken the evidence, because men are not wont to take much notice of
+such things, wherefore they easily forget them. Indeed, a discrepancy
+of this kind renders the evidence more credible, as Chrysostom states
+(Hom. i in Matth.), because if the witnesses agreed in every point,
+even in the minutest of details, they would seem to have conspired
+together to say the same thing: but this must be left to the prudent
+discernment of the judge.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This passage refers specially to the bishops, priests,
+deacons and clerics of the Roman Church, on account of its dignity:
+and this for three reasons. First because in that Church those men
+ought to be promoted whose sanctity makes their evidence of more
+weight than that of many witnesses. Secondly, because those who have
+to judge other men, often have many opponents on account of their
+justice, wherefore those who give evidence against them should not be
+believed indiscriminately, unless they be very numerous. Thirdly,
+because the condemnation of any one of them would detract in public
+opinion from the dignity and authority of that Church, a result which
+would be more fraught with danger than if one were to tolerate a
+sinner in that same Church, unless he were very notorious and
+manifest, so that a grave scandal would arise if he were tolerated.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 3]
+
+Whether a Man's Evidence Can Be Rejected Without Any Fault of His?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man's evidence ought not to be
+rejected except on account of some fault. For it is inflicted as a
+penalty on some that their evidence is inadmissible, as in the case
+of those who are branded with infamy. Now a penalty must not be
+inflicted save for a fault. Therefore it would seem that no man's
+evidence ought to be rejected save on account of a fault.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "Good is to be presumed of every one, unless the
+contrary appear" [*Cap. Dudum, de Praesumpt.]. Now it pertains to a
+man's goodness that he should give true evidence. Since therefore
+there can be no proof of the contrary, unless there be some fault of
+his, it would seem that no man's evidence should be rejected save for
+some fault.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no man is rendered unfit for things necessary for
+salvation except by some sin. But it is necessary for salvation to
+give true evidence, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore no man should
+be excluded from giving evidence save for some fault.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Regist. xiii, 44): "As to the bishop
+who is said to have been accused by his servants, you are to know
+that they should by no means have been heard": which words are
+embodied in the Decretals (II, qu. 1, can. Imprimis).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the authority of evidence is
+not infallible but probable; and consequently the evidence for one
+side is weakened by whatever strengthens the probability of the
+other. Now the reliability of a person's evidence is weakened,
+sometimes indeed on account of some fault of his, as in the case of
+unbelievers and persons of evil repute, as well as those who are
+guilty of a public crime and who are not allowed even to accuse;
+sometimes, without any fault on his part, and this owing either to a
+defect in the reason, as in the case of children, imbeciles and
+women, or to personal feeling, as in the case of enemies, or persons
+united by family or household ties, or again owing to some external
+condition, as in the case of poor people, slaves, and those who are
+under authority, concerning whom it is to be presumed that they might
+easily be induced to give evidence against the truth.
+
+Thus it is manifest that a person's evidence may be rejected either
+with or without some fault of his.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If a person is disqualified from giving evidence this
+is done as a precaution against false evidence rather than as a
+punishment. Hence the argument does not prove.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Good is to be presumed of everyone unless the contrary
+appear, provided this does not threaten injury to another: because,
+in that case, one ought to be careful not to believe everyone
+readily, according to 1 John 4:1: "Believe not every spirit."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To give evidence is necessary for salvation, provided
+the witness be competent, and the order of justice observed. Hence
+nothing hinders certain persons being excused from giving evidence,
+if they be considered unfit according to law.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Always a Mortal Sin to Give False Evidence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always a mortal sin to give
+false evidence. For a person may happen to give false evidence,
+through ignorance of fact. Now such ignorance excuses from mortal
+sin. Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal
+sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a lie that benefits someone and hurts no man is
+officious, and this is not a mortal sin. Now sometimes a lie of this
+kind occurs in false evidence, as when a person gives false evidence
+in order to save a man from death, or from an unjust sentence which
+threatens him through other false witnesses or a perverse judge.
+Therefore in such cases it is not a mortal sin to give false evidence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a witness is required to take an oath in order that
+he may fear to commit a mortal sin of perjury. But this would not be
+necessary, if it were already a mortal sin to give false evidence.
+Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 19:5): "A false witness shall
+not be unpunished."
+
+_I answer that,_ False evidence has a threefold deformity. The first
+is owing to perjury, since witnesses are admitted only on oath and on
+this count it is always a mortal sin. Secondly, owing to the
+violation of justice, and on this account it is a mortal sin
+generically, even as any kind of injustice. Hence the prohibition of
+false evidence by the precept of the decalogue is expressed in this
+form when it is said (Ex. 20:16), "Thou shalt not bear false witness
+against thy neighbor." For one does nothing against a man by
+preventing him from doing someone an injury, but only by taking away
+his justice. Thirdly, owing to the falsehood itself, by reason of
+which every lie is a sin: on this account, the giving of false
+evidence is not always a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In giving evidence a man ought not to affirm as
+certain, as though he knew it, that about which he is not certain;
+and he should confess his doubt in doubtful terms, and that which he
+is certain about, in terms of certainty. Owing however to the frailty
+of the human memory, a man sometimes thinks he is certain about
+something that is not true; and then if after thinking over the
+matter with due care he deems himself certain about that false thing,
+he does not sin mortally if he asserts it, because the evidence which
+he gives is not directly and intentionally, but accidentally contrary
+to what he intends.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An unjust judgment is not a judgment, wherefore the
+false evidence given in an unjust judgment, in order to prevent
+injustice is not a mortal sin by virtue of the judgment, but only by
+reason of the oath violated.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Men abhor chiefly those sins that are against God, as
+being most grievous; and among them is perjury: whereas they do not
+abhor so much sins against their neighbor. Consequently, for the
+greater certitude of evidence, the witness is required to take a oath.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 71
+
+OF INJUSTICE IN JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF COUNSEL
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the injustice which takes place in judgment on
+the part of counsel, and under this head there are four points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?
+
+(2) Whether certain persons should be prohibited from exercising the
+office of advocate?
+
+(3) Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?
+
+(4) Whether he sins if he accept a fee for defending a suit?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 1]
+
+Whether an Advocate Is Bound to Defend the Suits of the Poor?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate is bound to defend the
+suits of the poor. For it is written (Ex. 23:5): "If thou see the ass
+of him that hateth thee lie underneath his burden, thou shalt not
+pass by, but shall lift him up with him." Now no less a danger
+threatens the poor man whose suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than
+if his ass were to lie underneath its burden. Therefore an advocate
+is bound to defend the suits of the poor.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix in Evang.): "Let him
+that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let
+him that hath abundance of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful
+bounty; let him who is a servant to art share his skill with his
+neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy
+plead the cause of the poor: for the slightest gift you have received
+will be reputed a talent." Now every man is bound, not to hide but
+faithfully to dispense the talent committed to him; as evidenced by
+the punishment inflicted on the servant who hid his talent (Matt.
+25:30). Therefore an advocate is bound to plead for the poor.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the precept about performing works of mercy, being
+affirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this is
+chiefly in cases of need. Now it seems to be a case of need when the
+suit of a poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore it seems that in
+such a case an advocate is bound to defend the poor man's suit.
+
+_On the contrary,_ He that lacks food is no less in need than he that
+lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give food is not always
+bound to feed the needy. Therefore neither is an advocate always
+bound to defend the suits of the poor.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since defense of the poor man's suit belongs to the
+works of mercy, the answer to this inquiry is the same as the one
+given above with regard to the other works of mercy (Q. 32, AA. 5,
+9). Now no man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those
+who need it. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28),
+"since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly
+who by reason of place, time, or any other circumstance, by a kind of
+chance are more closely united to us." He says "by reason of place,"
+because one is not bound to search throughout the world for the needy
+that one may succor them; and it suffices to do works of mercy to
+those one meets with. Hence it is written (Ex. 23:4): "If thou meet
+thy enemy's ass going astray, bring it back to him." He says also "by
+reason of time," because one is not bound to provide for the future
+needs of others, and it suffices to succor present needs. Hence it is
+written (1 John 3:17): "He that . . . shall see his brother in need,
+and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God
+abide in him?" Lastly he says, "or any other circumstance," because
+one ought to show kindness to those especially who are by any tie
+whatever united to us, according to 1 Tim. 5:8, "If any man have not
+care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
+the faith and is worse than an infidel."
+
+It may happen however that these circumstances concur, and then we
+have to consider whether this particular man stands in such a need
+that it is not easy to see how he can be succored otherwise, and then
+one is bound to bestow the work of mercy on him. If, however, it is
+easy to see how he can be otherwise succored, either by himself, or
+by some other person still more closely united to him, or in a better
+position to help him, one is not bound so strictly to help the one in
+need that it would be a sin not to do so: although it would be
+praiseworthy to do so where one is not bound to. Therefore an
+advocate is not always bound to defend the suits of the poor, but
+only when the aforesaid circumstances concur, else he would have to
+put aside all other business, and occupy himself entirely in
+defending the suits of poor people. The same applies to a physician
+with regard to attendance on the sick.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: So long as the ass lies under the burden, there is no
+means of help in this case, unless those who are passing along come
+to the man's aid, and therefore they are bound to help. But they
+would not be so bound if help were possible from another quarter.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A man is bound to make good use of the talent bestowed
+on him, according to the opportunities afforded by time, place, and
+other circumstances, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Not every need is such that it is one's duty to remedy
+it, but only such as we have stated above.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Fitting That the Law Should Debar Certain Persons from
+the Office of Advocate?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for the law to debar certain
+persons from the office of advocate. For no man should be debarred
+from doing works of mercy. Now it belongs to the works of mercy to
+defend a man's suit, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore no man should
+be debarred from this office.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, contrary causes have not, seemingly, the same
+effect. Now to be busy with Divine things and to be busy about sin
+are contrary to one another. Therefore it is unfitting that some
+should be debarred from the office of advocate, on account of
+religion, as monks and clerics, while others are debarred on account
+of sin, as persons of ill-repute and heretics.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now it is
+a duty of love for an advocate to plead a person's cause. Therefore
+it is unfitting that certain persons should be debarred from pleading
+the cause of others, while they are allowed to advocate their own
+cause.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to Decret. III, qu. vii, can. _Infames,_
+many persons are debarred from the office of advocate.
+
+_I answer that,_ In two ways a person is debarred from performing a
+certain act: first because it is impossible to him, secondly because
+it is unbecoming to him: but, whereas the man to whom a certain act
+is impossible, is absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom
+an act is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity may
+do away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly some are debarred from
+the office of advocate because it is impossible to them through lack
+of sense--either interior, as in the case of madmen and minors--or
+exterior, as in the case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs
+to have both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the
+justice of the cause he defends, and also speech and hearing, that he
+may speak and hear what is said to him. Consequently those who are
+defective in these points, are altogether debarred from being
+advocates either in their own or in another's cause. The becomingness
+of exercising this office is removed in two ways. First, through a
+man being engaged in higher things. Wherefore it is unfitting that
+monks or priests should be advocates in any cause whatever, or that
+clerics should plead in a secular court, because such persons are
+engaged in Divine things. Secondly, on account of some personal
+defect, either of body (for instance a blind man whose attendance in
+a court of justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill
+becomes one who has disdained to be just himself, to plead for the
+justice of another. Wherefore it is unbecoming that persons of ill
+repute, unbelievers, and those who have been convicted of grievous
+crimes should be advocates. Nevertheless this unbecomingness is
+outweighed by necessity: and for this reason such persons can plead
+either their own cause or that of persons closely connected with
+them. Moreover, clerics can be advocates in the cause of their own
+church, and monks in the cause of their own monastery, if the abbot
+direct them to do so.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Certain persons are sometimes debarred by
+unbecomingness, and others by inability from performing works of
+mercy: for not all the works of mercy are becoming to all persons:
+thus it ill becomes a fool to give counsel, or the ignorant to teach.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as virtue is destroyed by "too much" and "too
+little," so does a person become incompetent by "more" and "less."
+For this reason some, like religious and clerics, are debarred from
+pleading in causes, because they are above such an office; and others
+because they are less than competent to exercise it, such as persons
+of ill-repute and unbelievers.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The necessity of pleading the causes of others is not
+so pressing as the necessity of pleading one's own cause, because
+others are able to help themselves otherwise: hence the comparison
+fails.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 3]
+
+Whether an Advocate Sins by Defending an Unjust Cause?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending
+an unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing
+a desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if he can
+defend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals a
+desperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but
+ought to be praised, if he defends an unjust cause.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing a sin.
+Yet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief (Decret. II,
+qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an advocate does not sin by
+defending an unjust cause, when once he has undertaken its defense.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate to
+use unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by producing false
+witnesses, or alleging false laws), than to defend an unjust cause,
+since the former is a sin against the form, the latter against the
+matter of justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make
+use of such underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to
+lay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an advocate
+does not sin by defending an unjust cause.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (2 Paralip. 19:2): "Thou helpest the
+ungodly . . . and therefore thou didst deserve . . . the wrath of the
+Lord." Now an advocate by defending an unjust cause, helps the
+ungodly. Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by
+counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or
+assist an action is, in a way, to do it, and the Apostle says (Rom.
+1:32) that "they . . . are worthy of death, not only they that do" a
+sin, "but they also that consent to them that do" it. Hence it was
+stated above (Q. 62, A. 7), that all such are bound to restitution.
+Now it is evident that an advocate provides both assistance and
+counsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if knowingly he
+defends an unjust cause, without doubt he sins grievously, and is
+bound to restitution of the loss unjustly incurred by the other party
+by reason of the assistance he has provided. If, however, he defends
+an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be excused
+according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The physician injures no man by undertaking to heal a
+desperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in an
+unjust cause, unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads
+unjustly. Hence the comparison fails. For though he may seem to
+deserve praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by
+reason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for an evil
+end.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If an advocate believes from the outset that the cause
+is just, and discovers afterwards while the case is proceeding that
+it is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as to
+help the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to
+the other party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce his
+client to give way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the
+opposing party.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 40, A. 3), it is lawful for a
+soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently
+concealing what he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent
+falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says
+(De offic. iii, 29). Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending
+his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue,
+but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for an Advocate to Take a Fee for Pleading?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for
+pleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human
+remuneration, according to Luke 14:12, "When thou makest a dinner or
+a supper, call not thy friends . . . nor thy neighbors who are rich:
+lest perhaps they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to
+thee." Now it is a work of mercy to plead another's cause, as stated
+above (A. 1). Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take
+payment in money for pleading.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, spiritual things are not to be bartered with
+temporal things. But pleading a person's cause seems to be a
+spiritual good since it consists in using one's knowledge of law.
+Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs towards
+the pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the judge and
+of the witness. Now, according to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.),
+"the judge should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness true
+evidence." Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that "an
+advocate may lawfully sell his pleading, and a lawyer his advice."
+
+_I answer that,_ A man may justly receive payment for granting what
+he is not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not
+always bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people's
+causes. Wherefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act
+against justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a
+sick person to heal him, and to all like persons; provided, however,
+they take a moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the
+matter in hand, for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the
+country. If, however, they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they
+sin against justice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.)
+that "it is customary to demand from them restitution of what they
+have extorted by a wicked excess, but not what has been given to them
+in accordance with a commendable custom."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he
+can do from motives of mercy: else no man could lawfully sell
+anything, since anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when
+a man does give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, but
+a Divine reward. In like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads
+the cause of a poor man, should have in view not a human but a Divine
+meed; and yet he is not always bound to give his services
+gratuitously.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Though knowledge of law is something spiritual, the use
+of that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body: hence it
+is lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no craftsman
+would be allowed to make profit by his art.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The judge and witnesses are common to either
+party, since the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the
+witness to give true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to
+one side rather than to the other: and consequently judges receive out
+of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and witnesses receive
+their expenses (not as payment for giving evidence, but as a fee for
+their labor) either from both parties or from the party by whom they
+are adduced, because no man "serveth as a soldier at any time at his
+own charge [*Vulg.: 'Who serveth as a soldier,']" (1 Cor. 9:7). On the
+other hand an advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully
+accept fee from the party he assists.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 72
+
+OF REVILING
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered
+extrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting,
+(3) tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is reviling?
+
+(2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin?
+
+(3) Whether one ought to check revilers?
+
+(4) Of the origin of reviling.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Reviling Consists in Words?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not consist in words.
+Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is
+a kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's
+neighbor, either in his person, or in his belongings. Therefore
+reviling does not consist in words.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can be
+dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore it
+seems that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing or
+a taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt.
+Therefore reviling does not consist in words.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing.
+Now reviling is perceived by the hearing according to Jer. 20:10, "I
+heard reviling [Douay: 'contumelies'] on every side." Therefore
+reviling consists in words.
+
+_I answer that,_ Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and
+this happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence,
+one person dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the
+excellence for which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed,
+whereof we have spoken above (Q. 64, seqq.). Secondly, when a man
+publishes something against another's honor, thus bringing it to the
+knowledge of the latter and of other men. This reviling properly so
+called, and is done by some kind of signs. Now, according to
+Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), "compared with words all other
+signs are very few, for words have obtained the chief place among men
+for the purpose of expressing whatever the mind conceives." Hence
+reviling, properly speaking, consists in words: wherefore, Isidore
+says (Etym. x) that a reviler (_contumeliosus_) "is hasty and bursts
+out (_tumet_) in injurious words." Since, however, things are also
+signified by deeds, which on this account have the same significance
+as words, it follows that reviling in a wider sense extends also to
+deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Rom. 1:30, "contumelious, proud," says:
+"The contumelious are those who by word or deed revile and shame
+others."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our words, if we consider them in their essence, i.e.
+as audible sounds, injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the
+ear, as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs
+conveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many
+kinds of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his
+honor, or of the respect due to him from others. Hence the reviling
+is greater if one man reproach another in the presence of many: and
+yet there may still be reviling if he reproach him by himself, in so
+far as the speaker acts unjustly against the respect due to the
+hearer.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: One man slights another by deeds in so far as such
+deeds cause or signify that which is against that other man's honor.
+In the former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some other
+kind of injustice, of which we have spoken above (QQ. 64, 65, 66):
+where as in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds
+have the significant force of words.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Railing and taunts consist in words, even as reviling,
+because by all of them a man's faults are exposed to the detriment of
+his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault
+of guilt, which is exposed by _reviling_ words. Secondly, there is
+the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by _taunts_
+(_convicium_), because _vice_ is commonly spoken of in connection
+with not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man says
+spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not revile
+him: whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only taunts but
+also reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his
+inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him for
+any kind of excellence. This is done by _upbraiding_ words, and
+properly speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man that one
+has succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written (Ecclus.
+20:15): "He will give a few things and upbraid much." Nevertheless
+these terms are sometimes employed one for the other.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Reviling or Railing Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal
+sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act of
+a virtue, viz. of wittiness (_eutrapelia_) [*Cf. I-II, Q. 60, A. 5]
+to which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher
+(Ethic. iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and
+yet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the
+Apostle says (Gal. 3:1): "O senseless Galatians!," and our Lord said
+(Luke 24:25): "O foolish and slow of heart to believe!" Therefore
+railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of its
+genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its genus
+cannot become venial, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, AA. 4, 6). Hence
+if by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to
+railing or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin.
+But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who
+utters a reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger.
+Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its
+genus.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal
+punishment of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment
+of hell, according to Matt. 5:22, "Whosoever shall say to his brother
+. . . Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." Therefore railing
+or reviling is a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), words are injurious to other
+persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification depends
+on the speaker's inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it seems
+that we ought to consider with what intention the words are uttered.
+Since then railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring, if
+the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other man, this is
+properly and essentially to give utterance to railing or reviling:
+and this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since a man
+loves his honor no less than his possessions. If, on the other hand,
+a man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the
+intention, not of dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting
+him or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not
+formally and essentially, but accidentally and materially, in so far
+to wit as he says that which might be a railing or reviling. Hence
+this may be sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without any sin at
+all. Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters, and
+one should use such words with moderation, because the railing might
+be so grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dishonor the
+person against whom it is uttered. In such a case a man might commit
+a mortal sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other
+man: just as were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by
+striking him in fun, he would not be without blame.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight mockery,
+not with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the object of
+the mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and this may
+be without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. On the other
+hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object of
+his witty mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful,
+as stated in the passage quoted.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or damnify him
+in his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too, for the
+purpose of correction, may one say a mocking word to a person whom
+one has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples
+"foolish," and the Apostle called the Galatians "senseless." Yet, as
+Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), "seldom and only when
+it is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, and then
+so as to urge God's service, not our own."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on the
+intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it be
+a slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and be
+uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the
+fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by
+such a word to give but little pain.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 3]
+
+Whether One Ought to Suffer Oneself to Be Reviled?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be
+reviled. For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the
+reviler. But one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to
+suffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now one
+ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written
+(Prov. 26:10): "He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger."
+Therefore neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it is
+said: "Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay" [*Heb. 10:30]. Now by
+submitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to
+Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.): "If thou wilt be revenged, be
+silent; thou hast dealt him a fatal blow." Therefore one ought not by
+silence to submit to reviling words, but rather answer back.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 37:13): "They that sought evils
+to me spoke vain things," and afterwards (Ps. 37:14) he says: "But I
+as a deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth."
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as we need patience in things done against us,
+so do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of
+patience in those things done against us refer to the preparedness of
+the mind, according to Augustine's (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19)
+exposition on our Lord's precept, "If one strike thee on thy right
+cheek, turn to him also the other" [*The words as quoted by St.
+Thomas are a blending of Matt. 5:39 and Luke 6:29]: that is to say, a
+man ought to be prepared to do so if necessary. But he is not always
+bound to do this actually: since not even did our Lord do so, for
+when He received a blow, He said: "Why strikest thou Me?" (John
+18:23). Consequently the same applies to the reviling words that are
+said against us. For we are bound to hold our minds prepared to
+submit to be reviled, if it should be expedient. Nevertheless it
+sometimes behooves us to withstand against being reviled, and this
+chiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler; namely,
+that his daring may be checked, and that he may not repeat the
+attempt, according to Prov. 26:5, "Answer a fool according to his
+folly, lest he imagine himself to be wise." Secondly, for the good of
+many who would be prevented from progressing in virtue on account of
+our being reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super Ezech.): "Those
+who are so placed that their life should be an example to others,
+ought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their preaching
+be not heard by those who could have heard it, and they continue
+their evil conduct through contempt of a good life."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The daring of the railing reviler should be checked
+with moderation, i.e. as a duty of charity, and not through lust for
+one's own honor. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:4): "Answer not a fool
+according to his folly, lest thou be like him."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When one man prevents another from being reviled there
+is not the danger of lust for one's own honor as there is when a man
+defends himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to
+proceed from a sense of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It would be an act of revenge to keep silence with the
+intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be
+praiseworthy to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it
+is written (Ecclus. 8:4): "Strive not with a man that is full of
+tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Reviling Arises from Anger?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger.
+For it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where pride is, there shall also be
+reviling [Douay: 'reproach']." But anger is a vice distinct from
+pride. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:3): "All fools are meddling
+with revilings [Douay: 'reproaches']." Now folly is a vice opposed to
+wisdom, as stated above (Q. 46, A. 1); whereas anger is opposed to
+meekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of
+reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: for it
+is a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger.
+Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "anger gives
+rise to revilings."
+
+_I answer that,_ While one sin may arise from various causes, it is
+nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which
+it is wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected
+with its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger's end,
+which is revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take
+revenge on another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises
+chiefly from anger.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Reviling is not directed to the end of pride which is
+excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride.
+Nevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who
+think themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and
+inflict injuries on them, because they are more easily angered,
+through deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done
+against their will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6)
+"anger listens imperfectly to reason": wherefore an angry man suffers
+a defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence
+reviling arises from folly on account of the latter's kinship with
+anger.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) "an
+angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about
+this." Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger
+rather than to hatred.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 73
+
+OF BACKBITING [*Or detraction]
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is backbiting?
+
+(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(3) Of its comparison with other sins;
+
+(4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Backbiting Is Suitably Defined As the Blackening of Another's
+Character by Secret Words?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some
+[*Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii.], "the blackening of
+another's good name by words uttered in secret." For "secretly" and
+"openly" are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a
+sin, because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by
+few. Now that which does not constitute the species of a sin, does
+not belong to its essence, and should not be included in its
+definition. Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting
+that it should be done by secret words.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the notion of a good name implies something known to
+the public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened by
+backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered
+openly.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish something
+already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is blackened, even
+without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when one reveals
+the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore not every
+blackening of a good name is backbiting.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 10:11): "If a serpent bite
+in silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth."
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as one man injures another by deed in two
+ways--openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence--and
+secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures
+another by words in two ways--in one way, openly, and this is done by
+reviling him, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 1)--and in another way
+secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one
+man openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think
+little of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that
+reviling is detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the
+other hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect
+rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his honor
+but his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he,
+for his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the
+person against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends
+and aims at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting
+differs from reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the
+words are uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and
+the backbiter secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, i.e. as
+regards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honor, the
+backbiter injuring his good name.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced all
+injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the
+kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances "secretly" and
+"openly," because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence
+and by ignorance, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 4; I-II, Q. 6, AA. 5, 8).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The words of a backbiter are said to be secret, not
+altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said,
+because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On
+the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face.
+Wherefore if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several,
+it is a case of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he
+alone be present: although if a man speak ill of an absent person to
+one man alone, he destroys his good name not altogether but partly.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A man is said to backbite (_detrahere_) another, not
+because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good
+name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly.
+Directly, in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about
+him; secondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly,
+by revealing something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his
+good deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by
+gainsaying his good, or by maliciously concealing it, or by
+diminishing it.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Backbiting Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For
+no act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin,
+which pertains to backbiting, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), is an act
+of the virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's sin
+in order that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby
+a man accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, "Have nothing to do with
+detractors," says: "The whole human race is in peril from this vice."
+But no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many
+refrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found
+in all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine in a homily _on the Fire of Purgatory_
+[*Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a
+slight sin "to speak ill without hesitation or forethought." But this
+pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:30): "Backbiters, hateful to
+God," which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, "lest it be
+deemed a slight sin because it consists in words."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 72, A. 2), sins of word should
+be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting
+by its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore,
+properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in
+order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to
+blacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's
+good name seems the most precious, since for lack of it he is
+hindered from doing many things well. For this reason it is written
+(Ecclus. 41:15): "Take care of a good name, for this shall continue
+with thee, more than a thousand treasures precious and great."
+Therefore backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.
+Nevertheless it happens sometimes that a man utters words, whereby
+someone's good name is tarnished, and yet he does not intend this,
+but something else. This is not backbiting strictly and formally
+speaking, but only materially and accidentally as it were. And if
+such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some necessary good,
+and with attention to the due circumstances, it is not a sin and
+cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of lightness
+of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal sin,
+unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature, as to
+cause a notable injury to a man's good name, especially in matters
+pertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of
+the words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a
+man his good name, no less than any other thing one has taken from
+him, in the manner stated above (Q. 62, A. 2) when we were treating
+of restitution.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a man's
+hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or
+accuse him for the good of public justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to
+be found throughout the whole of mankind, but "almost," both because
+"the number of fools is infinite," [*Eccles. 1:15] and few are they
+that walk in the way of salvation, [*Cf. Matt. 7:14] and because there
+are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of
+heart, so as to injure someone's good name at least slightly, for it
+is written (James 3:2): "If any man offend not in word, the same is a
+perfect man."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Augustine is referring to the case when a man
+utters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but
+through lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Backbiting Is the Gravest of All Sins Committed Against One's
+Neighbor?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins
+committed against one's neighbor. Because a gloss on Ps. 108:4,
+"Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me," a gloss
+says: "Those who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of
+future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that
+was soon to rise again." From this it seems to follow that backbiting
+is by so much a graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to
+kill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the
+other sins that are committed against one's neighbor. Therefore
+backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than reviling,
+because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret backbiting.
+Now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery, because
+adultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling severs
+utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more grievous
+than adultery: and yet of all other sins a man commits against his
+neighbor, adultery is most grave.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting arises
+from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a
+graver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than
+reviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity of
+the defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous
+defect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2):
+"What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt
+into their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the
+less they see of the truth?" Therefore backbiting is the most
+grievous sin committed against one's neighbor.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word.
+But backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft
+are sins of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other
+sins committed against one's neighbor.
+
+_I answer that,_ The essential gravity of sins committed against
+one's neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him,
+since it is thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the
+greater the good taken away, the greater the injury. And while man's
+good is threefold, namely the good of his soul, the good of his body,
+and the good of external things; the good of the soul, which is the
+greatest of all, cannot be taken from him by another save as an
+occasional cause, for instance by an evil persuasion, which does not
+induce necessity. On the other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the
+body and of external things, can be taken away by violence. Since,
+however, the goods of the body excel the goods of external things,
+those sins which injure a man's body are more grievous than those
+which injure his external things. Consequently, among other sins
+committed against one's neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since
+it deprives man of the life which he already possesses: after this
+comes adultery, which is contrary to the right order of human
+generation, whereby man enters upon life. In the last place come
+external goods, among which a man's good name takes precedence of
+wealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods, wherefore it is
+written (Prov. 22:1): "A good name is better than great riches."
+Therefore backbiting according to its genus is a more grievous sin
+than theft, but is less grievous than murder or adultery.
+Nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or
+extenuating circumstances.
+
+The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to
+the sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if
+he sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of
+word have a certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur
+through a slip of the tongue, and without much forethought.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith of His
+members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our faith.
+Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting, in as
+much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as
+robbery is a graver sin than theft, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 9).
+Yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the
+gravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union of
+bodies, but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the
+reviler is not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man,
+but is only the occasional cause of division among those who were
+united, in so far, to wit, as by declaring the evils of another, he
+for his own part severs that man from the friendship of other men,
+though they are not forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a
+backbiter is a murderer _occasionally,_ since by his words he gives
+another man an occasion for hating or despising his neighbor. For
+this reason it is stated in the Epistle of Clement [*Ad Jacob. Ep. i]
+that "backbiters are murderers," i.e. occasionally; because "he that
+hateth his brother is a murderer" (1 John 3:15).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the Philosopher
+states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes place in
+secret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but rather of
+envy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's glory.
+Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than
+reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just as
+anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin
+depends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on the thing to which the
+sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away
+from.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Since "a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his mouth"
+(Prov. 15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves and
+believes what he says, and consequently more and more hates his
+neighbor, and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less.
+This effect however may also result from other sins pertaining to
+hate of one's neighbor.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is a Grave Sin for the Listener to Suffer the Backbiter?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter
+does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations
+to others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer
+his own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): "Just as
+we ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so
+ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited
+by their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater."
+Therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who
+backbite others.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): "In no wise speak
+against the truth." Now sometimes a person tells the truth while
+backbiting, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore it seems that one
+is not always bound to withstand a backbiter.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to others.
+Now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten: for
+Pope Pius [*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus. vi,
+qu. 1]: "Not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good
+persons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted
+through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, are
+humbled by backbiting." Therefore one ought not to withstand
+backbiters.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Take care not to
+have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract
+others nor listen to backbiters."
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Apostle (Rom. 1:32), they "are
+worthy of death . . . not only they that" commit sins, "but they also
+that consent to them that do them." Now this happens in two ways.
+First, directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or
+when the sin is pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he
+does not withstand him when he might do so, and this happens
+sometimes, not because the sin is pleasing to him, but on account of
+some human fear.
+
+Accordingly we must say that if a man listens to backbiting without
+resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he
+becomes a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite,
+or at least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his
+hatred of the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor,
+and sometimes more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): "It
+is difficult to say which is the more to be condemned[:] the
+backbiter or he that listens to backbiting." If however the sin is
+not pleasing to him, and he fails to withstand the backbiter, through
+fear, negligence, or even shame, he sins indeed, but much less than
+the backbiter, and, as a rule venially. Sometimes too this may be a
+mortal sin, either because it is his official duty to correct the
+backbiter, or by reason of some consequent danger; or on account of
+the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes be a mortal
+sin, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: No man hears himself backbitten, because when a man is
+spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly
+speaking, but reviling, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Yet it is
+possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his
+knowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his
+discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name,
+unless this endanger the good of others, as stated above (Q. 72, A.
+3). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as he
+suffers patiently being detracted himself. But it is not left to his
+discretion to permit an injury to be done to another's good name,
+hence he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for
+the same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man's ass
+lying "underneath his burden," as commanded in Deut. 21:4 [*Ex. 23:5].
+
+Reply Obj. 2: One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by
+endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows
+that he is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with
+words, for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our
+pained demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting,
+because according to Prov. 25:23, "the north wind driveth away rain,
+as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The profit one derives from being backbitten is due,
+not to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God
+Who produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less
+withstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even
+though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 74
+
+OF TALE-BEARING
+[*_Susurratio,_ i.e. whispering]
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
+
+(2) Which of the two is the more grievous?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 74, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Tale-bearing Is a Sin Distinct from Backbiting?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin
+from backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): "The _susurro_ (tale-bearer)
+takes his name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks
+disparagingly not to the face but into the ear." But to speak of
+another disparagingly belongs to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing
+is not a distinct sin from backbiting.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): "Thou shalt not be an
+informer [Douay: 'a detractor'] nor a tale-bearer [Douay:
+'whisperer'] among the people." But an informer is apparently the
+same as a backbiter. Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from
+backbiting.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer
+[Douay: 'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed." But a
+double-tongued man is apparently the same as a backbiter, because a
+backbiter speaks with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with
+another in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a
+backbiter.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 1:29, 30, "Tale-bearers,
+backbiters [Douay: 'whisperers, detractors']" says: "Tale-bearers sow
+discord among friends; backbiters deny or disparage others' good
+points."
+
+_I answer that,_ The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter,
+and also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil
+secretly of their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are
+sometimes used one for the other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, "Be
+not called a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']" says: "i.e. a
+backbiter." They differ however in end, because the backbiter intends
+to blacken his neighbor's good name, wherefore he brings forward
+those evils especially about his neighbor which are likely to defame
+him, or at least to depreciate his good name: whereas a tale-bearer
+intends to sever friendship, as appears from the gloss quoted above
+and from the saying of Prov. 26:20, "Where the tale-bearer is taken
+away, contentions shall cease." Hence it is that a tale-bearer speaks
+such ill about his neighbors as may stir his hearer's mind against
+them, according to Ecclus. 28:11, "A sinful man will trouble his
+friends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A tale-bearer is called a backbiter in so far as he
+speaks ill of another; yet he differs from a backbiter since he
+intends not to speak ill as such, but to say anything that may stir
+one man against another, though it be good simply, and yet has a
+semblance of evil through being unpleasant to the hearer.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An informer differs from a tale-bearer and a backbiter,
+for an informer is one who charges others publicly with crimes,
+either by accusing or by railing them, which does not apply to a
+backbiter or tale-bearer.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A double-tongued person is properly speaking a
+tale-bearer. For since friendship is between two, the tale-bearer
+strives to sever friendship on both sides. Hence he employs a double
+tongue towards two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other:
+wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer [Douay:
+'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed," and then it is
+added, "for he hath troubled many that were peace."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 74, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Backbiting Is a Graver Sin Than Tale-bearing?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than
+tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a
+backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for
+such things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name:
+whereas a tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently
+evil, because to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore
+backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, he that deprives a man of his good name, deprives
+him not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is minded
+to scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is
+reproached against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] (2 Paralip.
+19:2): "Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord."
+But tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore
+backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (James 4:11): "He that backbiteth
+[Douay: 'detracteth'] his brother . . . detracteth the law," and
+consequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of
+backbiting seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as
+stated above (Q. 20, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3). On the other hand the
+sin of tale-bearing is against one's neighbor. Therefore the sin of
+backbiting is graver than the sin of tale-bearing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): "An evil mark of
+disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay:
+'whisperer'] hatred, and enmity, and reproach."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 73, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 8),
+sins against one's neighbor are the more grievous, according as they
+inflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the
+greater, according to the greatness of the good which it takes away.
+Now of all one's external goods a friend takes the first place, since
+"no man can live without friends," as the Philosopher declares
+(Ethic. viii, 1). Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): "Nothing can be
+compared to a faithful friend." Again, a man's good name whereof
+backbiting deprives him, is most necessary to him that he may be
+fitted for friendship. Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than
+backbiting or even reviling, because a friend is better than honor,
+and to be loved is better than to be honored, according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. viii).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The species and gravity of a sin depend on the end
+rather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its end,
+tale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the
+backbiter says worse things.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A good name is a disposition for friendship, and a bad
+name is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short of
+the thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to a
+disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what
+conduces directly to enmity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He that backbites his brother, seems to detract the
+law, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one's neighbor:
+while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more directly
+against this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially against
+God, because "God is charity" (1 John 4:16), and for this reason it
+is written (Prov. 6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord
+hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," and the seventh is "he
+(Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord among brethren."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 75
+
+OF DERISION
+[*Or mockery]
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins
+whereby one's neighbor is injured by words?
+
+(2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 75, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Derision Is a Special Sin Distinct from Those Already
+Mentioned?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin
+distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is
+apparently the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to
+reviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from reviling.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no man is derided except for something reprehensible
+which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they be imputed to
+a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts
+to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct
+from the foregoing vices.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury
+they inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by
+derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is
+detrimental to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin
+distinct from the foregoing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is
+described as "making fun." Now all the foregoing are done seriously
+and not in jest. Therefore derision differs from all of them.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 72, A. 2), sins of word should
+be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these
+sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those
+who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure
+the honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good
+name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider
+intends to shame the person he derides. And since this end is
+distinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is
+distinct from the foregoing sins.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but
+differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i.e. by
+words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the
+nose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall
+laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the
+species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs
+from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as
+Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect
+and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the glory
+of a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our glory is this,
+the testimony of our conscience." Hence, on the other hand, for doing
+a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor and
+good name in the eyes of others--and for this purpose the reviler and
+the backbiter speak of another person--while in his own eyes, he
+loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed
+at reprehensible deeds being imputed to him--and for this purpose the
+derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision
+agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to
+the end.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good, according
+to Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast." Wherefore
+he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him inflicts a
+special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 75, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Derision Can Be a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin.
+Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem
+contrary to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among
+friends, wherefore it is known as "making fun." Therefore derision
+cannot be a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that which
+is done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal sin
+when it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin to
+relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore says
+(De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that "he who continues to do what he has
+repented of, is a derider and not a penitent." It would likewise
+follow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to
+Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 15) "the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who
+derides the horse, i.e. the just man, and his rider, i.e. God."
+Therefore derision is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins than
+derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest.
+But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less
+therefore is derision a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 3:34): "He derideth [Vulg.:
+'shall scorn'] the scorners." But God's derision is eternal
+punishment for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Ps. 2:4, "He
+that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them." Therefore derision is a
+mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ The object of derision is always some evil or
+defect. Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but
+seriously: consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule
+(whence the terms 'derision' and 'jesting'), this is because it is
+considered to be slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight
+in two ways: first, in itself, secondly, in relation to the person.
+When anyone makes game or fun of another's evil or defect, because it
+is a slight evil in itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its
+genus. On the other hand this defect may be considered as a slight
+evil in relation to the person, just as we are wont to think little
+of the defects of children and imbeciles: and then to make game or
+fun of a person, is to scorn him altogether, and to think him so
+despicable that his misfortune troubles us not one whit, but is held
+as an object of derision. In this way derision is a mortal sin, and
+more grievous than reviling, which is also done openly: because the
+reviler would seem to take another's evil seriously; whereas the
+derider does so in fun, and so would seem the more to despise and
+dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a
+grievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a greater
+respect is due to the person derided.
+
+Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the
+things of God, according to Isa. 37:23, "Whom hast thou reproached,
+and whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy
+voice?" and he replies: "Against the Holy One of Israel." In the
+second place comes derision of one's parents, wherefore it is written
+(Prov. 30:17): "The eye that mocketh at his father, and that
+despiseth the labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of
+the brooks pick it out, and the young eagles eat it." Further, the
+derision of good persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of
+virtue, and against this it is written (Job 12:4): "The simplicity of
+the just man is laughed to scorn." Such like derision does very much
+harm: because it turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory
+(Moral. xx, 14), "Who when they perceive any good points appearing in
+the acts of others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a
+mischievous reviling."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in relation
+to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something against
+charity in relation to the person who is the object of the jest, on
+account of contempt, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he has
+repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly, in
+so far as either's behavior is like a derider's. Nor is it true that
+to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but
+only dispositively and imperfectly.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Derision considered in itself is less grievous than
+backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but jest.
+Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as
+stated above, and then it is a grave sin.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 76
+
+OF CURSING
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?
+
+(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?
+
+(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
+
+(4) Of its comparison with other sins.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Curse Anyone?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is
+unlawful to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ
+spoke, according to 2 Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14),
+"Bless and curse not." Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Dan. 3:82,
+"O ye sons of men, bless the Lord." Now the same mouth cannot both
+bless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James.
+Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him some
+evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be a
+kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone,
+indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil.
+Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his
+obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it
+lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): "While
+the ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul." Much less
+therefore is it lawful to curse a man.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, "How shall I curse whom God
+hath not cursed?" says: "There cannot be a just cause for cursing a
+sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments." Now one man cannot know
+another man's sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore
+no man may lawfully curse another.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 27:26): "Cursed be he that
+abideth not in the words of this law." Moreover Eliseus cursed the
+little boys who mocked him (4 Kings 2:24).
+
+_I answer that,_ To curse (_maledicere_) is the same as to speak ill
+(_malum dicere_). Now "speaking" has a threefold relation to the
+thing spoken. First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is
+expressed in the indicative mood: in this way _maledicere_ signifies
+simply to tell someone of another's evil, and this pertains to
+backbiting, wherefore tellers of evil (_maledici_) are sometimes
+called backbiters. Secondly, speaking is related to the thing spoken,
+by way of cause, and this belongs to God first and foremost, since He
+made all things by His word, according to Ps. 32:9, "He spoke and
+they were made"; while secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his
+word, commands others and thus moves them to do something: it is for
+this purpose that we employ verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly,
+"speaking" is related to the thing spoken by expressing the
+sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed in words; and
+for this purpose we employ the verb in the optative mood.
+
+Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by
+way of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds.
+And here we must observe that to do something and to will it are
+consequent on one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness,
+as shown above (I-II, Q. 20, A. 3). Hence in these two ways of evil
+speaking, by way of command and by way of desire, there is the same
+aspect of lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or
+desires another's evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself,
+then evil speaking will be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is
+meant by cursing. On the other hand if a man commands or desires
+another's evil under the aspect of good, it is lawful; and it may be
+called cursing, not strictly speaking, but accidentally, because the
+chief intention of the speaker is directed not to evil but to good.
+
+Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the
+aspect of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and
+thus a judge lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just
+penalty: thus too the Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the
+same way the prophets in the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on
+sinners, as though conforming their will to Divine justice, although
+such like imprecation may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes
+evil is spoken under the aspect of useful, as when one wishes a
+sinner to suffer sickness or hindrance of some kind, either that he
+may himself reform, or at least that he may cease from harming others.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called with an
+evil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of good, is
+not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good simply, in
+fact rather is it in conformity therewith.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be considered.
+His nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful to curse
+it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed,
+according to Job 3:8, "Let them curse it who curse the day." Yet when
+a sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same
+reason he judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he
+is said to curse his own soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be perceived in
+themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest sin, which
+has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom
+God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to know
+who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Curse an Irrational Creature?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational
+creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to
+punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects
+either of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse
+them.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but the
+nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the
+devil, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse
+an irrational creature.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as bodies,
+or transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral. iv,
+2), "it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to curse
+what exists." Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational
+creature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Matt.
+21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1.
+
+_I answer that,_ Benediction and malediction, properly speaking,
+regard things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational
+creatures: while good and evil are said to happen to irrational
+creatures in relation to the rational creature for whose sake they
+are. Now they are related to the rational creature in several ways.
+First by way of ministration, in so far as irrational creatures
+minister to the needs of man. In this sense the Lord said to man
+(Gen. 3:17): "Cursed is the earth in thy work," so that its
+barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also David cursed the
+mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding (Moral. iv,
+3). Again the irrational creature is related to the rational creature
+by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in
+signification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is related
+to rational creatures as something containing them, namely by way of
+time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account
+of the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on account of
+the consequent penalties. In this sense also we may understand David
+to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in 2 Kings 1:21,
+namely on account of the people slaughtered there.
+
+But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a
+sin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is
+idle and vain and consequently unlawful.
+
+From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Cursing Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For
+Augustine in a homily _on the Fire of Purgatory_ [*Serm. civ in the
+appendix of St. Augustine's works] reckons cursing among slight sins.
+But such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a
+venial Sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the
+mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing
+sometimes arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a
+mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words. But evil deeds
+are not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing a mortal
+sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the
+kingdom of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God,
+according to 1 Cor. 6:10, "Nor cursers [Douay: 'railers'], nor
+extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God." Therefore cursing is
+a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ The evil words of which we are speaking now are
+those whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or
+desire. Now to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil
+by commanding it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity whereby
+we love our neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a
+mortal sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, as the
+person whom we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect.
+Hence it is written (Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or
+mother, dying let him die."
+
+It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial
+sin either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in
+cursing him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters
+the curse; because he may say such words through some slight
+movement, or in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word
+should be weighed chiefly with regard to the speaker's intention, as
+stated above (Q. 72, A. 2).
+
+From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Cursing Is a Graver Sin Than Backbiting?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is a graver sin than
+backbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy, as implied
+in the canonical epistle of Jude (verse 9) where it is said that
+"when Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended
+about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment
+of blasphemy [Douay: 'railing speech']," where blasphemy stands for
+cursing, according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver sin than
+backbiting. Therefore cursing is a graver sin than backbiting.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, murder is more grievous than backbiting, as stated
+above (Q. 73, A. 3). But cursing is on a par with the sin of murder;
+for Chrysostom says (Hom. xix, super Matth.): "When thou sayest:
+'Curse him down with his house, away with everything,' you are no
+better than a murderer." Therefore cursing is graver than backbiting.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to cause a thing is more than to signify it. But the
+curser causes evil by commanding it, whereas the backbiter merely
+signifies an evil already existing. Therefore the curser sins more
+grievously than the backbiter.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is impossible to do well in backbiting, whereas
+cursing may be either a good or an evil deed, as appears from what
+has been said (A. 1). Therefore backbiting is graver than cursing.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part (Q. 48, A. 5), evil is
+twofold, evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the two, evil
+of fault is the worse (I, Q. 48, A. 6). Hence to speak evil of fault
+is worse than to speak evil of punishment, provided the mode of
+speaking be the same. Accordingly it belongs to the reviler, the
+tale-bearer, the backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault,
+whereas it belongs to the evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to
+speak evil of punishment, and not evil of fault except under the
+aspect of punishment. But the mode of speaking is not the same, for
+in the case of the four vices mentioned above, evil of fault is
+spoken by way of assertion, whereas in the case of cursing evil of
+punishment is spoken, either by causing it in the form of a command,
+or by wishing it. Now the utterance itself of a person's fault is a
+sin, in as much as it inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, and it is
+more grievous to inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, other
+things being equal.
+
+Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin
+than the cursing which expresses a mere desire; while the cursing
+which is expressed by way of command, since it has the aspect of a
+cause, will be more or less grievous than backbiting, according as it
+inflicts an injury more or less grave than the blackening of a man's
+good name. Moreover this must be taken as applying to these vices
+considered in their essential aspects: for other accidental points
+might be taken into consideration, which would aggravate or extenuate
+the aforesaid vices.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To curse a creature, as such, reflects on God, and thus
+accidentally it has the character of blasphemy; not so if one curse a
+creature on account of its fault: and the same applies to backbiting.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 3), cursing, in one way, includes
+the desire for evil, where if the curser desire the evil of another's
+violent death, he does not differ, in desire, from a murderer, but he
+differs from him in so far as the external act adds something to the
+act of the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers cursing by way of command.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 77
+
+OF CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary
+commutations. First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed
+in buying and selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which
+occurs in loans. In connection with the other voluntary commutations
+no special kind of sin is to be found distinct from rapine and theft.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is
+lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?
+
+(2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold;
+
+(3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold?
+
+(4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price
+than was paid for it?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Sell a Thing for More Than Its Worth?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more
+than its worth. In the commutations of human life, civil laws
+determine that which is just. Now according to these laws it is just
+for buyer and seller to deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De
+Rescind. Vend. 8, 15): and this occurs by the seller selling a thing
+for more than its worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than
+its worth. Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its
+worth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to all would seem to be natural
+and not sinful. Now Augustine relates that the saying of a certain
+jester was accepted by all, "You wish to buy for a song and to sell
+at a premium," which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, "It is
+naught, it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away,
+then he will boast." Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more
+than its worth.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty
+demands be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on
+utility, the amount of the recompense for a favor received should
+depend on the utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility
+sometimes is worth more than the thing given, for instance if the
+receiver be in great need of that thing, whether for the purpose of
+avoiding a danger, or of deriving some particular benefit. Therefore,
+in contracts of buying and selling, it is lawful to give a thing in
+return for more than its worth.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 7:12): "All things . . .
+whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them."
+But no man wishes to buy a thing for more than its worth. Therefore
+no man should sell a thing to another man for more than its worth.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit
+in order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this
+is to deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says
+(De Offic. iii, 15): "Contracts should be entirely free from
+double-dealing: the seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the
+buyer upon one that bids against him."
+
+But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two
+ways. First, as considered in themselves, and from this point of
+view, buying and selling seem to be established for the common
+advantage of both parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to
+the other, and vice versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).
+Now whatever is established for the common advantage, should not be
+more of a burden to one party than to another, and consequently all
+contracts between them should observe equality of thing and thing.
+Again, the quality of a thing that comes into human use is measured
+by the price given for it, for which purpose money was invented, as
+stated in _Ethic._ v, 5. Therefore if either the price exceed the
+quantity of the thing's worth, or, conversely, the thing exceed the
+price, there is no longer the equality of justice: and consequently,
+to sell a thing for more than its worth, or to buy it for less than
+its worth, is in itself unjust and unlawful.
+
+Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as
+accidentally tending to the advantage of one party, and to the
+disadvantage of the other: for instance, when a man has great need of
+a certain thing, while another man will suffer if he be without it.
+In such a case the just price will depend not only on the thing sold,
+but on the loss which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will
+be lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though
+the price paid be not more than it is worth to the owner. Yet if the
+one man derive a great advantage by becoming possessed of the other
+man's property, and the seller be not at a loss through being without
+that thing, the latter ought not to raise the price, because the
+advantage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to a
+circumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man should sell what is not
+his, though he may charge for the loss he suffers.
+
+On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from
+something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller
+something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 2) human law is given
+to the people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it is not
+given to the virtuous alone. Hence human law was unable to forbid all
+that is contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit
+whatever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats other
+matters as though they were lawful, not by approving of them, but by
+not punishing them. Accordingly, if without employing deceit the
+seller disposes of his goods for more than their worth, or the buyer
+obtain them for less than their worth, the law looks upon this as
+licit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be
+too great, because then even human law demands restitution to be
+made, for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half
+the amount of the just price of a thing [*Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind.
+Vend. 2, 8].
+
+On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is
+contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is
+reckoned unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in
+buying and selling: and he who has received more than he ought must
+make compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be
+considerable. I add this condition, because the just price of things
+is not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of
+estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to
+destroy the equality of justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says "this jester, either by looking into
+himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are
+inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since
+in reality this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire that
+justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination." And
+then he gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book
+to a man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is
+evident that this common desire is not from nature but from vice,
+wherefore it is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In commutative justice we consider chiefly real
+equality. On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we
+consider equality of usefulness, so that the recompense should depend
+on the usefulness accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to
+the thing bought.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 2]
+
+Whether a Sale Is Rendered Unlawful Through a Fault in the Thing Sold?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a sale is not rendered unjust and
+unlawful through a fault in the thing sold. For less account should
+be taken of the other parts of a thing than of what belongs to its
+substance. Yet the sale of a thing does not seem to be rendered
+unlawful through a fault in its substance: for instance, if a man
+sell instead of the real metal, silver or gold produced by some
+chemical process, which is adapted to all the human uses for which
+silver and gold are necessary, for instance in the making of vessels
+and the like. Much less therefore will it be an unlawful sale if the
+thing be defective in other ways.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, any fault in the thing, affecting the quantity,
+would seem chiefly to be opposed to justice which consists in
+equality. Now quantity is known by being measured: and the measures
+of things that come into human use are not fixed, but in some places
+are greater, in others less, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 7).
+Therefore just as it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of
+the thing sold, it seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful through
+the thing sold being defective.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the thing sold is rendered defective by lacking a
+fitting quality. But in order to know the quality of a thing, much
+knowledge is required that is lacking in most buyers. Therefore a
+sale is not rendered unlawful by a fault (in the thing sold).
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11): "It is
+manifestly a rule of justice that a good man should not depart from
+the truth, nor inflict an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any
+connection with fraud."
+
+_I answer that,_ A threefold fault may be found pertaining to the
+thing which is sold. One, in respect of the thing's substance: and if
+the seller be aware of a fault in the thing he is selling, he is
+guilty of a fraudulent sale, so that the sale is rendered unlawful.
+Hence we find it written against certain people (Isa. 1:22), "Thy
+silver is turned into dross, thy wine is mingled with water": because
+that which is mixed is defective in its substance.
+
+Another defect is in respect of quantity which is known by being
+measured: wherefore if anyone knowingly make use of a faulty measure
+in selling, he is guilty of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it
+is written (Deut. 25:13, 14): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in
+thy bag, a greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a
+greater bushel and a less," and further on (Deut. 25:16): "For the
+Lord . . . abhorreth him that doth these things, and He hateth all
+injustice."
+
+A third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance, if a man
+sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one: and if anyone do
+this knowingly he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, and the sale, in
+consequence, is illicit.
+
+In all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraudulent sale,
+but he is also bound to restitution. But if any of the foregoing
+defects be in the thing sold, and he knows nothing about this, the
+seller does not sin, because he does that which is unjust materially,
+nor is his deed unjust, as shown above (Q. 59, A. 2). Nevertheless he
+is bound to compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his
+knowledge. Moreover what has been said of the seller applies equally
+to the buyer. For sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his
+goods to be specifically of lower value, as when a man sells gold
+instead of copper, and then if the buyer be aware of this, he buys it
+unjustly and is bound to restitution: and the same applies to a
+defect in quantity as to a defect in quality.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Gold and silver are costly not only on account of the
+usefulness of the vessels and other like things made from them, but
+also on account of the excellence and purity of their substance.
+Hence if the gold or silver produced by alchemists has not the true
+specific nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent
+and unjust, especially as real gold and silver can produce certain
+results by their natural action, which the counterfeit gold and
+silver of alchemists cannot produce. Thus the true metal has the
+property of making people joyful, and is helpful medicinally against
+certain maladies. Moreover real gold can be employed more frequently,
+and lasts longer in its condition of purity than counterfeit gold. If
+however real gold were to be produced by alchemy, it would not be
+unlawful to sell it for the genuine article, for nothing prevents art
+from employing certain natural causes for the production of natural
+and true effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things
+produced by the art of the demons.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The measures of salable commodities must needs be
+different in different places, on account of the difference of
+supply: because where there is greater abundance, the measures are
+wont to be larger. However in each place those who govern the state
+must determine the just measures of things salable, with due
+consideration for the conditions of place and time. Hence it is not
+lawful to disregard such measures as are established by public
+authority or custom.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 16) the price of
+things salable does not depend on their degree of nature, since at
+times a horse fetches a higher price than a slave; but it depends on
+their usefulness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or
+buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing sold, but
+only of such as render the thing adapted to man's use, for instance,
+that the horse be strong, run well and so forth. Such qualities the
+seller and buyer can easily discover.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Seller Is Bound to State the Defects of the Thing Sold?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the
+defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer
+to buy, he would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods
+offered for sale. Now judgment about a thing and knowledge of that
+thing belong to the same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable
+to the seller if the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be
+hurried into buying a thing without carefully inquiring into its
+condition.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents him
+carrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the goods
+he has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic.
+iii, 13) pictures a man as saying: "Could anything be more absurd
+than for a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: 'I offer
+this unhealthy horse for sale?'" Therefore the seller is not bound to
+state the defects of the thing sold.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to
+know the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound to
+offer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters
+pertaining to virtue, though one should not tell anyone what is
+false. Much less therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of
+what he offers for sale, as though he were counseling the buyer.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one
+offers for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. Now
+sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, without
+any defect in the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat
+to a place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will
+come after him carrying wheat; because if the buyers knew this they
+would give a lower price. But apparently the seller need not give the
+buyer this information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he
+tell him the faults of the goods he is selling.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10): "In all
+contracts the defects of the salable commodity must be stated; and
+unless the seller make them known, although the buyer has already
+acquired a right to them, the contract is voided on account of the
+fraudulent action."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of
+danger or loss, although a man need not always give another the help
+or counsel which would be for his advantage in any way; but only in
+certain fixed cases, for instance when someone is subject to him, or
+when he is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who offers
+goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger, by the
+very fact that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may
+occasion loss or danger to the buyer--loss, if, by reason of this
+defect, the goods are of less value, and he takes nothing off the
+price on that account--danger, if this defect either hinder the use
+of the goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a
+lame for a fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or
+poisonous food for wholesome. Wherefore if such like defects be
+hidden, and the seller does not make them known, the sale will be
+illicit and fraudulent, and the seller will be bound to compensation
+for the loss incurred.
+
+On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for instance if a horse
+have but one eye, or if the goods though useless to the buyer, be
+useful to someone else, provided the seller take as much as he ought
+from the price, he is not bound to state the defect of the goods,
+since perhaps on account of that defect the buyer might want him to
+allow a greater rebate than he need. Wherefore the seller may look to
+his own indemnity, by withholding the defect of the goods.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is manifest:
+for "a man judges of what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if the
+defects of the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them is
+not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made
+known to him. The case would be different if the defects were
+manifest.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There is no need to publish beforehand by the public
+crier the defects of the goods one is offering for sale, because if
+he were to begin by announcing its defects, the bidders would be
+frightened to buy, through ignorance of other qualities that might
+render the thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated
+to each individual that offers to buy: and then he will be able to
+compare the various points one with the other, the good with the bad:
+for nothing prevents that which is defective in one respect being
+useful in many others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although a man is not bound strictly speaking to tell
+everyone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is so
+bound in a case when, unless he tells the truth, his conduct would
+endanger another man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this
+case.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The defect in a thing makes it of less value now than
+it seems to be: but in the case cited, the goods are expected to be
+of less value at a future time, on account of the arrival of other
+merchants, which was not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the
+seller, since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him,
+does not seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is
+going to happen. If however he were to do so, or if he lowered his
+price, it would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does
+not seem to be bound to do this as a debt of justice.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 4]
+
+Whether, in Trading, It Is Lawful to Sell a Thing at a Higher Price
+Than What Was Paid for It?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful, in trading, to sell
+a thing for a higher price than we paid for it. For Chrysostom [*Hom.
+xxxviii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John
+Chrysostom] says on Matt. 21:12: "He that buys a thing in order that
+he may sell it, entire and unchanged, at a profit, is the trader who
+is cast out of God's temple." Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in
+his commentary on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have not known learning, or
+trading" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "What is
+trade," says he, "but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of
+retailing at a higher price?" and he adds: "Such were the tradesmen
+whom Our Lord cast out of the temple." Now no man is cast out of the
+temple except for a sin. Therefore such like trading is sinful.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a higher
+price than their worth, or to buy them for less than their value, as
+shown above (A. 1). Now if you sell a thing for a higher price than
+you paid for it, you must either have bought it for less than its
+value, or sell it for more than its value. Therefore this cannot be
+done without sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Shun, as you would
+the plague, a cleric who from being poor has become wealthy, or who,
+from being a nobody has become a celebrity." Now trading would net
+seem to be forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness.
+Therefore it is a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to sell
+at a higher price.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have
+not known learning," [*Cf. Obj. 1] says: "The greedy tradesman
+blasphemes over his losses; he lies and perjures himself over the
+price of his wares. But these are vices of the man, not of the craft,
+which can be exercised without these vices." Therefore trading is not
+in itself unlawful.
+
+_I answer that,_ A tradesman is one whose business consists in the
+exchange of things. According to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3),
+exchange of things is twofold; one, natural as it were, and
+necessary, whereby one commodity is exchanged for another, or money
+taken in exchange for a commodity, in order to satisfy the needs of
+life. Such like trading, properly speaking, does not belong to
+tradesmen, but rather to housekeepers or civil servants who have to
+provide the household or the state with the necessaries of life. The
+other kind of exchange is either that of money for money, or of any
+commodity for money, not on account of the necessities of life, but
+for profit, and this kind of exchange, properly speaking, regards
+tradesmen, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3). The former
+kind of exchange is commendable because it supplies a natural need:
+but the latter is justly deserving of blame, because, considered in
+itself, it satisfies the greed for gain, which knows no limit and
+tends to infinity. Hence trading, considered in itself, has a certain
+debasement attaching thereto, in so far as, by its very nature, it
+does not imply a virtuous or necessary end. Nevertheless gain which
+is the end of trading, though not implying, by its nature, anything
+virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote anything sinful
+or contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing prevents gain from being
+directed to some necessary or even virtuous end, and thus trading
+becomes lawful. Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate
+gain which he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his
+household, or for the assistance of the needy: or again, a man may
+take to trade for some public advantage, for instance, lest his
+country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an end,
+but as payment for his labor.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The saying of Chrysostom refers to the trading which
+seeks gain as a last end. This is especially the case where a man
+sells something at a higher price without its undergoing any change.
+For if he sells at a higher price something that has changed for the
+better, he would seem to receive the reward of his labor.
+Nevertheless the gain itself may be lawfully intended, not as a last
+end, but for the sake of some other end which is necessary or
+virtuous, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not everyone that sells at a higher price than he
+bought is a tradesman, but only he who buys that he may sell at a
+profit. If, on the contrary, he buys not for sale but for possession,
+and afterwards, for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade
+transaction even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this,
+either because he has bettered the thing, or because the value of the
+thing has changed with the change of place or time, or on account of
+the danger he incurs in transferring the thing from one place to
+another, or again in having it carried by another. In this sense
+neither buying nor selling is unjust.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Clerics should abstain not only from things that are
+evil in themselves, but even from those that have an appearance of
+evil. This happens in trading, both because it is directed to worldly
+gain, which clerics should despise, and because trading is open to so
+many vices, since "a merchant is hardly free from sins of the lips"
+[*'A merchant is hardly free from negligence, and a huckster shall
+not be justified from the sins of the lips'] (Ecclus. 26:28). There
+is also another reason, because trading engages the mind too much
+with worldly cares, and consequently withdraws it from spiritual
+cares; wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:4): "No man being a
+soldier to God entangleth himself with secular businesses."
+Nevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage in the first
+mentioned kind of exchange, which is directed to supply the
+necessaries of life, either by buying or by selling.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 78
+
+OF THE SIN OF USURY
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans:
+and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent,
+which is to receive usury?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of
+consideration, by way of payment for the loan?
+
+(3) Whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money
+taken in usury?
+
+(4) Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is a Sin to Take Usury for Money Lent?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to take usury for
+money lent. For no man sins through following the example of Christ.
+But Our Lord said of Himself (Luke 19:23): "At My coming I might have
+exacted it," i.e. the money lent, "with usury." Therefore it is not a
+sin to take usury for lending money.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is
+unspotted," because, to wit, it forbids sin. Now usury of a kind is
+allowed in the Divine law, according to Deut. 23:19, 20: "Thou shalt
+not fenerate to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but
+to the stranger": nay more, it is even promised as a reward for the
+observance of the Law, according to Deut. 28:12: "Thou shalt
+fenerate* to many nations, and shalt not borrow of any one."
+[*_Faeneraberis_--'Thou shalt lend upon usury.' The Douay version has
+simply 'lend.' The objection lays stress on the word _faeneraberis:_
+hence the necessity of rendering it by 'fenerate.'] Therefore it is
+not a sin to take usury.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in human affairs justice is determined by civil
+laws. Now civil law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems to
+be lawful.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the counsels are not binding under sin. But, among
+other counsels we find (Luke 6:35): "Lend, hoping for nothing
+thereby." Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept a
+price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is
+not bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is
+lawful for him sometimes to accept a price for lending it.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, silver made into coins does not differ specifically
+from silver made into a vessel. But it is lawful to accept a price
+for the loan of a silver vessel. Therefore it is also lawful to
+accept a price for the loan of a silver coin. Therefore usury is not
+in itself a sin.
+
+Obj. 7: Further, anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its owner
+freely gives him. Now he who accepts the loan, freely gives the
+usury. Therefore he who lends may lawfully take the usury.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to
+any of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt
+not be hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with
+usuries."
+
+_I answer that,_ To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself,
+because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads
+to inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this
+evident, we must observe that there are certain things the use of
+which consists in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use
+it for drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore
+in such like things the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart
+from the thing itself, and whoever is granted the use of the thing,
+is granted the thing itself and for this reason, to lend things of
+this kind is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted
+to sell wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be selling
+the same thing twice, or he would be selling what does not exist,
+wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of injustice. In like
+manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or wheat, and asks for
+double payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in equal measure,
+the other, the price of the use, which is called usury.
+
+On the other hand, there are things the use of which does not consist
+in their consumption: thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to
+destroy it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for
+instance, one man may hand over to another the ownership of his house
+while reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa,
+he may grant the use of the house, while retaining the ownership. For
+this reason a man may lawfully make a charge for the use of his
+house, and, besides this, revendicate the house from the person to
+whom he has granted its use, as happens in renting and letting a
+house.
+
+Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3)
+was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and consequently
+the proper and principal use of money is its consumption or
+alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very
+nature unlawful to take payment for the use of money lent, which
+payment is known as usury: and just as a man is bound to restore
+other ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore the money which he
+has taken in usury.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In this passage usury must be taken figuratively for
+the increase of spiritual goods which God exacts from us, for He
+wishes us ever to advance in the goods which we receive from Him: and
+this is for our own profit not for His.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their
+brethren, i.e. from other Jews. By this we are given to understand
+that to take usury from any man is evil simply, because we ought to
+treat every man as our neighbor and brother, especially in the state
+of the Gospel, whereto all are called. Hence it is said without any
+distinction in Ps. 14:5: "He that hath not put out his money to
+usury," and (Ezech. 18:8): "Who hath not taken usury [*Vulg.: 'If a
+man . . . hath not lent upon money, nor taken any increase . . . he
+is just.']." They were permitted, however, to take usury from
+foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in order to avoid a
+greater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to which they were prone
+according to Isa. 56:11, they should take usury from the Jews who
+were worshippers of God.
+
+Where we find it promised to them as a reward, "Thou shalt fenerate
+to many nations," etc., fenerating is to be taken in a broad sense
+for lending, as in Ecclus. 29:10, where we read: "Many have refused
+to fenerate, not out of wickedness," i.e. they would not lend.
+Accordingly the Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth,
+so that they would be able to lend to others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account
+of the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be
+deprived of many advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and
+punishments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted
+usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice, but
+lest the advantage of many should be hindered. Hence it is that in
+civil law [*Inst. II, iv, de Usufructu] it is stated that "those
+things according to natural reason and civil law which are consumed
+by being used, do not admit of usufruct," and that "the senate did
+not (nor could it) appoint a usufruct to such things, but established
+a quasi-usufruct," namely by permitting usury. Moreover the
+Philosopher, led by natural reason, says (Polit. i, 3) that "to make
+money by usury is exceedingly unnatural."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A man is not always bound to lend, and for this reason
+it is placed among the counsels. Yet it is a matter of precept not to
+seek profit by lending: although it may be called a matter of counsel
+in comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees, who deemed some kinds
+of usury to be lawful, just as love of one's enemies is a matter of
+counsel. Or again, He speaks here not of the hope of usurious gain,
+but of the hope which is put in man. For we ought not to lend or do
+any good deed through hope in man, but only through hope in God.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: He that is not bound to lend, may accept repayment for
+what he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is repaid
+according to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent.
+Wherefore if he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no
+other use but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of
+something non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: The principal use of a silver vessel is not its
+consumption, and so one may lawfully sell its use while retaining
+one's ownership of it. On the other hand the principal use of silver
+money is sinking it in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its
+use and at the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent.
+It must be observed, however, that the secondary use of silver
+vessels may be an exchange, and such use may not be lawfully sold. In
+like manner there may be some secondary use of silver money; for
+instance, a man might lend coins for show, or to be used as security.
+
+Reply Obj. 7: He who gives usury does not give it voluntarily simply,
+but under a certain necessity, in so far as he needs to borrow money
+which the owner is unwilling to lend without usury.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Ask for Any Other Kind of Consideration for
+Money Lent?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one may ask for some other kind of
+consideration for money lent. For everyone may lawfully seek to
+indemnify himself. Now sometimes a man suffers loss through lending
+money. Therefore he may lawfully ask for or even exact something else
+besides the money lent.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 5, one is in duty bound by
+a point of honor, to repay anyone who has done us a favor. Now to
+lend money to one who is in straits is to do him a favor for which he
+should be grateful. Therefore the recipient of a loan, is bound by a
+natural debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful to
+bind oneself to an obligation of the natural law. Therefore it is not
+unlawful, in lending money to anyone, to demand some sort of
+compensation as condition of the loan.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as there is real remuneration, so is there
+verbal remuneration, and remuneration by service, as a gloss says on
+Isa. 33:15, "Blessed is he that shaketh his hands from all bribes
+[*Vulg.: 'Which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? . . .
+He that shaketh his hands from all bribes.']." Now it is lawful to
+accept service or praise from one to whom one has lent money.
+Therefore in like manner it is lawful to accept any other kind of
+remuneration.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, seemingly the relation of gift to gift is the same
+as of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept money for money given.
+Therefore it is lawful to accept repayment by loan in return for a
+loan granted.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the lender, by transferring his ownership of a sum
+of money removes the money further from himself than he who entrusts
+it to a merchant or craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive interest
+for money entrusted to a merchant or craftsman. Therefore it is also
+lawful to receive interest for money lent.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, a man may accept a pledge for money lent, the use of
+which pledge he might sell for a price: as when a man mortgages his
+land or the house wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to
+receive interest for money lent.
+
+Obj. 7: Further, it sometimes happens that a man raises the price of
+his goods under guise of loan, or buys another's goods at a low
+figure; or raises his price through delay in being paid, and lowers
+his price that he may be paid the sooner. Now in all these cases
+there seems to be payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to
+be manifestly illicit. Therefore it seems to be lawful to expect or
+exact some consideration for money lent.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Among other conditions requisite in a just man it
+is stated (Ezech. 18:17) that he "hath not taken usury and increase."
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), a thing
+is reckoned as money "if its value can be measured by money."
+Consequently, just as it is a sin against justice, to take money, by
+tacit or express agreement, in return for lending money or anything
+else that is consumed by being used, so also is it a like sin, by
+tacit or express agreement to receive anything whose price can be
+measured by money. Yet there would be no sin in receiving something
+of the kind, not as exacting it, nor yet as though it were due on
+account of some agreement tacit or expressed, but as a gratuity:
+since, even before lending the money, one could accept a gratuity,
+nor is one in a worse condition through lending.
+
+On the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation for a loan, in
+respect of such things as are not appreciated by a measure of money,
+for instance, benevolence, and love for the lender, and so forth.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A lender may without sin enter an agreement with the
+borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he
+ought to have, for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid
+a loss. It may also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss
+than the lender incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the lender
+with what he has gained. But the lender cannot enter an agreement for
+compensation, through the fact that he makes no profit out of his
+money: because he must not sell that which he has not yet and may be
+prevented in many ways from having.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Repayment for a favor may be made in two ways. In one
+way, as a debt of justice; and to such a debt a man may be bound by a
+fixed contract; and its amount is measured according to the favor
+received. Wherefore the borrower of money or any such thing the use
+of which is its consumption is not bound to repay more than he
+received in loan: and consequently it is against justice if he be
+obliged to pay back more. In another way a man's obligation to
+repayment for favor received is based on a debt of friendship, and
+the nature of this debt depends more on the feeling with which the
+favor was conferred than on the greatness of the favor itself. This
+debt does not carry with it a civil obligation, involving a kind of
+necessity that would exclude the spontaneous nature of such a
+repayment.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If a man were, in return for money lent, as though
+there had been an agreement tacit or expressed, to expect or exact
+repayment in the shape of some remuneration of service or words, it
+would be the same as if he expected or exacted some real
+remuneration, because both can be priced at a money value, as may be
+seen in the case of those who offer for hire the labor which they
+exercise by work or by tongue. If on the other hand the remuneration
+by service or words be given not as an obligation, but as a favor,
+which is not to be appreciated at a money value, it is lawful to
+take, exact, and expect it.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Money cannot be sold for a greater sum than the amount
+lent, which has to be paid back: nor should the loan be made with a
+demand or expectation of aught else but of a feeling of benevolence
+which cannot be priced at a pecuniary value, and which can be the
+basis of a spontaneous loan. Now the obligation to lend in return at
+some future time is repugnant to such a feeling, because again an
+obligation of this kind has its pecuniary value. Consequently it is
+lawful for the lender to borrow something else at the same time, but
+it is unlawful for him to bind the borrower to grant him a loan at
+some future time.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: He who lends money transfers the ownership of the money
+to the borrower. Hence the borrower holds the money at his own risk
+and is bound to pay it all back: wherefore the lender must not exact
+more. On the other hand he that entrusts his money to a merchant or
+craftsman so as to form a kind of society, does not transfer the
+ownership of his money to them, for it remains his, so that at his
+risk the merchant speculates with it, or the craftsman uses it for
+his craft, and consequently he may lawfully demand as something
+belonging to him, part of the profits derived from his money.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: If a man in return for money lent to him pledges
+something that can be valued at a price, the lender must allow for
+the use of that thing towards the repayment of the loan. Else if he
+wishes the gratuitous use of that thing in addition to repayment, it
+is the same as if he took money for lending, and that is usury,
+unless perhaps it were such a thing as friends are wont to lend to
+one another gratis, as in the case of the loan of a book.
+
+Reply Obj. 7: If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than
+that which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is
+manifestly a case of usury: because this waiting for the payment of
+the price has the character of a loan, so that whatever he demands
+beyond the just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price
+for a loan, which pertains to usury. In like manner if a buyer wishes
+to buy goods at a lower price than what is just, for the reason that
+he pays for the goods before they can be delivered, it is a sin of
+usury; because again this anticipated payment of money has the
+character of a loan, the price of which is the rebate on the just
+price of the goods sold. On the other hand if a man wishes to allow a
+rebate on the just price in order that he may have his money sooner,
+he is not guilty of the sin of usury.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 3]
+
+Whether a Man Is Bound to Restore Whatever Profits He Has Made Out of
+Money Gotten by Usury?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore whatever
+profits he has made out of money gotten by usury. For the Apostle
+says (Rom. 11:16): "If the root be holy, so are the branches."
+Therefore likewise if the root be rotten so are the branches. But the
+root was infected with usury. Therefore whatever profit is made
+therefrom is infected with usury. Therefore he is bound to restore it.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is laid down (Extra, De Usuris, in the Decretal:
+'Cum tu sicut asseris'): "Property accruing from usury must be sold,
+and the price repaid to the persons from whom the usury was
+extorted." Therefore, likewise, whatever else is acquired from
+usurious money must be restored.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which a man buys with the proceeds of usury is
+due to him by reason of the money he paid for it. Therefore he has no
+more right to the thing purchased than to the money he paid. But he
+was bound to restore the money gained through usury. Therefore he is
+also bound to restore what he acquired with it.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A man may lawfully hold what he has lawfully
+acquired. Now that which is acquired by the proceeds of usury is
+sometimes lawfully acquired. Therefore it may be lawfully retained.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), there are certain things
+whose use is their consumption, and which do not admit of usufruct,
+according to law (ibid., ad 3). Wherefore if such like things be
+extorted by means of usury, for instance money, wheat, wine and so
+forth, the lender is not bound to restore more than he received
+(since what is acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing
+but of human industry), unless indeed the other party by losing some
+of his own goods be injured through the lender retaining them: for
+then he is bound to make good the loss.
+
+On the other hand, there are certain things whose use is not their
+consumption: such things admit of usufruct, for instance house or
+land property and so forth. Wherefore if a man has by usury extorted
+from another his house or land, he is bound to restore not only the
+house or land but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since
+they are the fruits of things owned by another man and consequently
+are due to him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The root has not only the character of matter, as money
+made by usury has; but has also somewhat the character of an active
+cause, in so far as it administers nourishment. Hence the comparison
+fails.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Further, Property acquired from usury does not belong
+to the person who paid usury, but to the person who bought it. Yet he
+that paid usury has a certain claim on that property just as he has
+on the other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed that
+such property should be assigned to the persons who paid usury, since
+the property is perhaps worth more than what they paid in usury, but
+it is commanded that the property be sold, and the price be restored,
+of course according to the amount taken in usury.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The proceeds of money taken in usury are due to the
+person who acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as
+instrumental cause, but on account of his own industry as principal
+cause. Wherefore he has more right to the goods acquired with
+usurious money than to the usurious money itself.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Borrow Money Under a Condition of Usury?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to borrow money
+under a condition of usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32) that
+they "are worthy of death . . . not only they that do" these sins,
+"but they also that consent to them that do them." Now he that
+borrows money under a condition of usury consents in the sin of the
+usurer, and gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he sins also.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, for no temporal advantage ought one to give another
+an occasion of committing a sin: for this pertains to active scandal,
+which is always sinful, as stated above (Q. 43, A. 2). Now he that
+seeks to borrow from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore
+he is not to be excused on account of any temporal advantage.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit
+one's money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems
+altogether unlawful to deposit one's money with a usurer, even as it
+would be unlawful to deposit one's sword with a madman, a maiden with
+a libertine, or food with a glutton. Neither therefore is it lawful
+to borrow from a usurer.
+
+_On the contrary,_ He that suffers injury does not sin, according to
+the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore justice is not a mean
+between two vices, as stated in the same book (ch. 5). Now a usurer
+sins by doing an injury to the person who borrows from him under a
+condition of usury. Therefore he that accepts a loan under a
+condition of usury does not sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet
+it is lawful to make use of another's sin for a good end, since even
+God uses all sin for some good, since He draws some good from every
+evil as stated in the Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked
+whether it were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swearing
+by false gods (which is a manifest sin, for he gives Divine honor to
+them) Augustine (Ep. xlvii) answered that he who uses, not for a bad
+but for a good purpose, the oath of a man that swears by false gods,
+is a party, not to his sin of swearing by demons, but to his good
+compact whereby he kept his word. If however he were to induce him to
+swear by false gods, he would sin.
+
+Accordingly we must also answer to the question in point that it is
+by no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition of
+usury: yet it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready
+to do so and is a usurer by profession; provided the borrower have a
+good end in view, such as the relief of his own or another's need.
+Thus too it is lawful for a man who has fallen among thieves to point
+out his property to them (which they sin in taking) in order to save
+his life, after the example of the ten men who said to Ismahel (Jer.
+41:8): "Kill us not: for we have stores in the field."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: He who borrows for usury does not consent to the
+usurer's sin but makes use of it. Nor is it the usurer's acceptance
+of usury that pleases him, but his lending, which is good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion,
+not for taking usury, but for lending; it is the usurer who finds an
+occasion of sin in the malice of his heart. Hence there is passive
+scandal on his part, while there is no active scandal on the part of
+the person who seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a reason
+why the other person should desist from borrowing if he is in need,
+since this passive scandal arises not from weakness or ignorance but
+from malice.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If one were to entrust one's money to a usurer lacking
+other means of practising usury; or with the intention of making a
+greater profit from his money by reason of the usury, one would be
+giving a sinner matter for sin, so that one would be a participator
+in his guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom one entrusts
+one's money has other means of practising usury, there is no sin in
+entrusting it to him that it may be in safer keeping, since this is
+to use a sinner for a good purpose.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 79
+
+OF THE QUASI-INTEGRAL PARTS OF JUSTICE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are
+_to do good,_ and _to decline from evil,_ and the opposite vices.
+Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether these two are parts of justice?
+
+(2) Whether transgression is a special sin?
+
+(3) Whether omission is a special sin?
+
+(4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 1]
+
+Whether to Decline from Evil and to Do Good Are Parts of Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good
+are not parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform a
+good deed and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the
+whole. Therefore to decline from evil and to do good should not be
+reckoned parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 33:15, "Turn away from evil and do
+good," says: "The former," i.e. to turn away from evil, "avoids sin,
+the latter," i.e. to do good, "deserves the life and the palm." But
+any part of a virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to
+decline from evil is not a part of justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things that are so related that one implies the
+other, are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now declining
+from evil is implied in doing good: since no one does evil and good
+at the same time. Therefore declining from evil and doing good are
+not parts of justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares that
+"declining from evil and doing good" belong to the justice of the law.
+
+_I answer that,_ If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs
+to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they
+cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the
+sense of "all virtue" [*Cf. Q. 58, A. 5]. And yet even if justice be
+taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good;
+namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.
+
+On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good
+as due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special
+justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid
+the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's neighbor;
+while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the
+community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil.
+
+Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of
+special justice, because each is required for the perfect act of
+justice. For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our
+relations with others, as shown above (Q. 58, A. 2): and it pertains
+to the same cause to establish and to preserve that which it has
+established. Now a person establishes the equality of justice by
+doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves
+the already established equality of justice by declining from evil,
+that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Good and evil are here considered under a special
+aspect, by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason why
+these two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of
+good and evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral
+virtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with the
+passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean, which is the same
+as to avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding
+evil come to the same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other
+hand justice is concerned with operations and external things,
+wherein to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the
+equality established is another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To decline from evil, considered as a part of justice,
+does not denote a pure negation, viz. "not to do evil"; for this does
+not deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it implies
+a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term
+"decline" shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person
+resists against an instigation to do evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Doing good is the completive act of justice, and the
+principal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more
+imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a
+material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the
+formal and completive part.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Transgression Is a Special Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that transgression is not a special sin.
+For no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now
+transgression is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose
+says (De Parad. viii) that sin is "a transgression of the Divine
+law." Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus. But
+transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is a "word,
+deed or desire against the law of God," according to Augustine
+(Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature,
+or custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no species contains all the parts into which its
+genus is divided. Now the sin of transgression extends to all the
+capital vices, as well as to sins of thought, word and deed.
+Therefore transgression is not a special sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice.
+
+_I answer that,_ The term transgression is derived from bodily
+movement and applied to moral actions. Now a person is said to
+transgress in bodily movement, when he steps (_graditur_) beyond
+(_trans_) a fixed boundary--and it is a negative precept that fixes
+the boundary that man must not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore
+to transgress, properly speaking, is to act against a negative
+precept.
+
+Now materially considered this may be common to all the species of
+sin, because man transgresses a Divine precept by any species of
+mortal sin. But if we consider it formally, namely under its special
+aspect of an act against a negative precept, it is a special sin in
+two ways. First, in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin
+that are opposed to the other virtues: for just as it belongs
+properly to legal justice to consider a precept as binding, so it
+belongs properly to a transgression to consider a precept as an
+object of contempt. Secondly, in so far as it is distinct from
+omission which is opposed to an affirmative precept.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Even as legal justice is "all virtue" (Q. 58, A. 5) as
+regards its subject and matter, so legal injustice is materially "all
+sin." It is in this way that Ambrose defined sin, considering it from
+the point of view of legal injustice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The natural inclination concerns the precepts of the
+natural law. Again, a laudable custom has the force of a precept;
+since as Augustine says in an epistle _on the Fast of the Sabbath_
+(Ep. xxxvi), "a custom of God's people should be looked upon as law."
+Hence both sin and transgression may be against a laudable custom and
+against a natural inclination.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All these species of sin may include transgression, if
+we consider them not under their proper aspects, but under a special
+aspect, as stated above. The sin of omission, however, is altogether
+distinct from the sin of transgression.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Omission Is a Special Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that omission is not a special sin. For
+every sin is either original or actual. Now omission is not original
+sin, for it is not contracted through origin; nor is it actual sin,
+for it may be altogether without act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71,
+A. 5) when we were treating of sins in general. Therefore omission is
+not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every sin is voluntary. Now omission sometimes is
+not voluntary but necessary, as when a woman is violated after taking
+a vow of virginity, or when one lose that which one is under an
+obligation to restore, or when a priest is bound to say Mass, and is
+prevented from doing so. Therefore omission is not always a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time when any special sin
+begins. But this is not possible in the case of omission, since one
+is not altered by not doing a thing, no matter when the omission
+occurs, and yet the omission is not always sinful. Therefore omission
+is not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue.
+But it is not possible to assign any special virtue to which omission
+is opposed, both because the good of any virtue can be omitted, and
+because justice to which it would seem more particularly opposed,
+always requires an act, even in declining from evil, as stated above
+(A. 1, ad 2), while omission may be altogether without act. Therefore
+omission is not a special sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 4:17): "To him . . . who
+knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin."
+
+_I answer that,_ omission signifies the non-fulfilment of a good, not
+indeed of any good, but of a good that is due. Now good under the
+aspect of due belongs properly to justice; to legal justice, if the
+thing due depends on Divine or human law; to special justice, if the
+due is something in relation to one's neighbor. Wherefore, in the
+same way as justice is a special virtue, as stated above (Q. 58, AA.
+6, 7), omission is a special sin distinct from the sins which are
+opposed to the other virtues; and just as doing good, which is the
+opposite of omitting it, is a special part of justice, distinct from
+avoiding evil, to which transgression is opposed, so too is omission
+distinct from transgression.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Omission is not original but actual sin, not as though
+it had some act essential to it, but for as much as the negation of
+an act is reduced to the genus of act, and in this sense non-action
+is a kind of action, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6, ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Omission, as stated above, is only of such good as is
+due and to which one is bound. Now no man is bound to the impossible:
+wherefore no man sins by omission, if he does not do what he cannot.
+Accordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity, is guilty of
+an omission, not through not having virginity, but through not
+repenting of her past sin, or through not doing what she can to
+fulfil her vow by observing continence. Again a priest is not bound
+to say Mass, except he have a suitable opportunity, and if this be
+lacking, there is no omission. And in like manner, a person is bound
+to restitution, supposing he has the wherewithal; if he has not and
+cannot have it, he is not guilty of an omission, provided he does
+what he can. The same applies to other similar cases.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as the sin of transgression is opposed to negative
+precepts which regard the avoidance of evil, so the sin of omission
+is opposed to affirmative precepts, which regard the doing of good.
+Now affirmative precepts bind not for always, but for a fixed time,
+and at that time the sin of omission begins. But it may happen that
+then one is unable to do what one ought, and if this inability is
+without any fault on his part, he does not omit his duty, as stated
+above (ad 2; I-II, Q. 71, A. 5). On the other hand if this inability
+is due to some previous fault of his (for instance, if a man gets
+drunk at night, and cannot get up for matins, as he ought to), some
+say that the sin of omission begins when he engages in an action that
+is illicit and incompatible with the act to which he is bound. But
+this does not seem to be true, for supposing one were to rouse him by
+violence and that he went to matins, he would not omit to go, so
+that, evidently, the previous drunkenness was not an omission, but
+the cause of an omission. Consequently, we must say that the omission
+begins to be imputed to him as a sin, when the time comes for the
+action; and yet this is on account of a preceding cause by reason of
+which the subsequent omission becomes voluntary.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Omission is directly opposed to justice, as stated
+above; because it is a non-fulfilment of a good of virtue, but only
+under the aspect of due, which pertains to justice. Now more is
+required for an act to be virtuous and meritorious than for it to be
+sinful and demeritorious, because "good results from an entire cause,
+whereas evil arises from each single defect" [*Dionysius, De Div.
+Nom. iv]. Wherefore the merit of justice requires an act, whereas an
+omission does not.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 4]
+
+Whether a Sin of Omission Is More Grievous Than a Sin of
+Transgression?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous
+than a sin of transgression. For _delictum_ would seem to signify the
+same as _derelictum_ [*Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx], and
+therefore is seemingly the same as an omission. But _delictum_
+denotes a more grievous offence than transgression, because it
+deserves more expiation as appears from Lev. 5. Therefore the sin of
+omission is more grievous than the sin of transgression.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as
+the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). Now to do good is a more
+excellent part of justice, than to decline from evil, to which
+transgression is opposed, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore
+omission is a graver sin than transgression.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sins of transgression may be either venial or
+mortal. But sins of omission seem to be always mortal, since they are
+opposed to an affirmative precept. Therefore omission would seem to
+be a graver sin than transgression.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the pain of loss which consists in being deprived of
+seeing God and is inflicted for the sin of omission, is a greater
+punishment than the pain of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of
+transgression, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super Matth.). Now
+punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of omission
+is graver than the sin of transgression.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to
+accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain
+from an evil deed, i.e. _to transgress,_ than not to accomplish a
+good deed, which is _to omit._
+
+_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from
+virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest remoteness, according to
+_Metaph._ x [*Didot. ed. ix, 4]. Wherefore a thing is further removed
+from its contrary than from its simple negation; thus black is
+further removed from white than not-white is, since every black is
+not-white, but not conversely. Now it is evident that transgression
+is contrary to an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation
+thereof: for instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to give
+one's parents due reverence, while it is a sin of transgression to
+revile them or injure them in any way. Hence it is evident that,
+simply and absolutely speaking, transgression is a graver sin than
+omission, although a particular omission may be graver than a
+particular transgression.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: _Delictum_ in its widest sense denotes any kind of
+omission; but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission of
+something concerning God, or for a man's intentional and as it were
+contemptuous dereliction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity,
+for which reason it demands a greater expiation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The opposite of _doing good_ is both _not doing good,_
+which is an omission, and _doing evil,_ which is a transgression: but
+the first is opposed by contradiction, the second by contrariety,
+which implies greater remoteness: wherefore transgression is the more
+grievous sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, so
+is transgression opposed to negative precepts: wherefore both,
+strictly speaking, have the character of mortal sin. Transgression
+and omission, however, may be taken broadly for any infringement of
+an affirmative or negative precept, disposing to the opposite of such
+precept: and so taking both in a broad sense they may be venial sins.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: To the sin of transgression there correspond both the
+pain of loss on account of the aversion from God, and the pain of
+sense, on account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. In
+like manner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the
+pain of sense, according to Matt. 7:19, "Every tree that bringeth not
+forth good fruit shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire";
+and this on account of the root from which it grows, although it does
+not necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 80
+
+OF THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE
+(In One Article)
+
+We must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the
+virtues annexed thereto; under which head there are two points of
+consideration:
+
+(1) What virtues are annexed to justice?
+
+(2) The individual virtues annexed to justice.
+_______________________
+
+ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 80, Art.]
+
+Whether the Virtues Annexed to Justice Are Suitably Enumerated?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are
+unsuitably enumerated. Tully [*De Invent. ii, 53] reckons six, viz.
+"religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth." Now revenge
+is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby revenge is
+taken for injuries inflicted, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 4).
+Therefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to
+justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven,
+viz. "innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection,
+humanity," several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the
+virtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz.
+"obedience" in respect of one's superiors, "discipline" with regard
+to inferiors, "equity" as regards equals, "fidelity" and
+"truthfulness" towards all; and of these "truthfulness" alone is
+mentioned by Tully. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated
+insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons
+nine parts annexed to justice viz. "liberality, kindliness, revenge,
+commonsense, [*_eugnomosyne_] piety, gratitude, holiness, just
+exchange" and "just lawgiving"; and of all these it is evident that
+Tully mentions none but "revenge." Therefore he would appear to have
+made an incomplete enumeration.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions _epieikeia_ as
+being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any
+of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to
+justice are insufficiently enumerated.
+
+_I answer that,_ Two points must be observed about the virtues
+annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have
+something in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that
+in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue.
+Accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above
+(Q. 58, A. 2), all the virtues that are directed to another person
+may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the
+essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his
+due according to equality, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 11). Wherefore
+in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the
+perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of
+equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For
+certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are
+unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man
+renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered
+to God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, "What shall I
+render to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?"
+In this respect _religion_ is annexed to justice since, according to
+Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and
+ceremonial rites or worship to "some superior nature that men call
+divine." Secondly, it is not possible to make to one's parents an
+equal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares
+(Ethic. viii, 14); and thus _piety_ is annexed to justice, for
+thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man "renders service
+and constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his
+country." Thirdly, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man
+is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus _observance_ is
+annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53)
+in the "deference and honor rendered to those who excel in worth."
+
+A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a
+twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
+13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which
+one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due
+is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On
+the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in
+respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies
+necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so
+necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this
+has more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered
+from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to
+this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he
+is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed _truth,_
+whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and future
+things are told without perversion. It may also be considered from
+the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the
+reward he receives with what he has done--sometimes in good things;
+and then annexed to justice we have _gratitude_ which "consists in
+recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in
+desiring to pay them back," as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)--and
+sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed _revenge,_
+whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), "we resist force,
+injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by self-defense."
+[*St. Thomas read _obscurum,_ and explains it as meaning
+_derogatory,_ infra Q. 108, A. 2. Cicero, however, wrote _obfuturum,_
+i.e. _hurtful._]
+
+There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces
+to greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured.
+This due is the concern of _liberality,_ _affability_ or
+_friendship,_ or the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid
+enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in
+them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in
+accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice:
+whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though
+not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge,
+belongs to the virtue annexed to justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral
+parts of justice, namely, _declining from evil,_ to which _innocence_
+belongs, and _doing good,_ to which the six others belong. Of these,
+two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely,
+_friendship_ in the external conduct and _concord_ internally; two
+regard our relations toward superiors, namely, _piety_ to parents,
+and _religion_ to God; while two regard our relations towards
+inferiors, namely, _condescension,_ in so far as their good pleases
+us, and _humanity,_ whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore
+says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be "humane, through having a
+feeling of love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity
+whereby we uphold one another." In this sense _friendship_ is
+understood as directing our external conduct towards others, from
+which point of view the Philosopher treats of it in _Ethic._ iv, 6.
+_Friendship_ may also be taken as regarding properly the affections,
+and as the Philosopher describes it in _Ethic._ viii and ix. In this
+sense three things pertain to friendship, namely, _benevolence_ which
+is here called _affection_; _concord,_ and _beneficence_ which is
+here called _humanity._ These three, however, are omitted by Tully,
+because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a due.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: _Obedience_ is included in observance, which Tully
+mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to
+persons who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his
+words" [*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in
+_truthfulness_ as to the observance of one's promises: yet
+_truthfulness_ covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on
+(Q. 109, AA. 1, 3). _Discipline_ is not due as a necessary duty,
+because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a
+superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors,
+according to Matt. 24:45, "A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord
+hath appointed over his family": and for this reason it is omitted by
+Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by
+Macrobius; and equity under _epieikeia_ or under _friendship._
+
+Reply Obj. 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true
+justice. To particular justice belongs _justice of exchange,_ which
+he describes as "the habit of observing equality in commutations." To
+legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes
+_legislative justice,_ which he describes as "the science of
+political commutations relating to the community." As regards things
+which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he
+mentions _common sense_ or _good judgment,_* which is our guide in
+such like matters, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 4) in the treatise on
+prudence: wherefore he says that it is a "voluntary justification,"
+because by his own free will man observes what is just according to
+his judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas
+indicates the Greek derivation: _eugnomosyne_ quasi 'bona _gnome_.']
+These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice
+as their executor. _Eusebeia_ (piety) means _good worship_ and
+consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is
+the science of "the service of God" (he speaks after the manner of
+Socrates who said that 'all the virtues are sciences') [*Aristotle,
+_Ethic._ vi, 13]: and _holiness_ comes to the same, as we shall state
+further on (Q. 81, A. 8). _Eucharistia_ (gratitude) means "good
+thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says
+(Etym. x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to
+do good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that
+"kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence." _Liberality_ would
+seem to pertain to _humanity._
+
+Reply Obj. 5: _Epieikeia_ is annexed, not to particular but to legal
+justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of
+_eugnomosyne_ (common sense).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 81
+
+OF RELIGION
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as
+our present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety,
+(3) observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship,
+(8) liberality, (9) _epieikeia_. Of the other virtues that have been
+mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of
+concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for
+instance, of right commutations and of innocence. Of legislative
+justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.
+
+Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in
+itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.
+
+Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God?
+
+(2) Whether religion is a virtue?
+
+(3) Whether religion is one virtue?
+
+(4) Whether religion is a special virtue?
+
+(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?
+
+(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
+
+(7) Whether religion has any external actions?
+
+(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Religion Directs Man to God Alone?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not direct man to God
+alone. It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled
+before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows
+in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world."
+Now "to visit the fatherless and widows" indicates an order between
+oneself and one's neighbor, and "to keep oneself unspotted from this
+world" belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore
+religion does not imply order to God alone.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that "since in
+speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere
+wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred
+and relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of
+tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of
+Divine worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that
+religion is nothing else but the worship of God." Therefore religion
+signifies a relation not only to God but also to our kindred.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, seemingly _latria_ pertains to religion. Now
+"_latria_ signifies servitude," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x,
+1). And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor,
+according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another."
+Therefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to
+worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying
+of Cato [*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], "Worship thy parents."
+Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to
+God.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject
+to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious,
+but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances,
+and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does
+not denote a relation of subjection of man to God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that "religion consists
+in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that
+men call divine."
+
+_I answer that,_ as Isidore says (Etym. x), "according to Cicero, a
+man is said to be religious from _religio,_ because he often ponders
+over, and, as it were, reads again (_relegit_), the things which
+pertain to the worship of God," so that religion would seem to take
+its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine
+worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our
+hearts, according to Prov. 3:6, "In all thy ways think on Him."
+According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name
+from the fact that "we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by
+our neglect" [*St. Augustine plays on the words _reeligere,_ i.e. to
+choose over again, and _negligere,_ to neglect or despise.]. Or
+again, religion may be derived from _religare_ (to bind together),
+wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): "May religion bind us
+to the one Almighty God." However, whether religion take its name
+from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been
+lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a
+relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our
+unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely
+directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by
+sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and
+immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God
+alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has
+other acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which
+it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue
+which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are
+concerned with the means. Accordingly "to visit the fatherless and
+widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and
+an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from
+this world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or
+of some similar virtue as eliciting.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to
+one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense,
+but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the
+passage quoted, Augustine says: "In a stricter sense religion seems
+to denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever
+there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special
+kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a
+special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme
+dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to
+Him, which is known as _latria_ in Greek; and therefore it belongs to
+religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: We are said to worship those whom we honor, and to
+cultivate [*In the Latin the same word _colere_ stands for "worship"
+and "cultivate"] a man's memory or presence: we even speak of
+cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer (_agricola_) is
+one who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant (_incola_) is one who
+cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor
+is due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is
+due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is _Eusebeia_ or
+_Theosebeia_, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Although the name "religious" may be given to all in
+general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who
+consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing
+from human affairs. Thus also the term "contemplative" is applied,
+not to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole
+lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for
+man's sake but for God's sake, according to the word of the Apostle
+(Gal. 4:14), "You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as
+Christ Jesus."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Religion Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly
+it belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an
+act of fear which is a gift, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 9). Therefore
+religion is not a virtue but a gift.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will,
+wherefore it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit"
+[*Ethic. ii, 6]. Now, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3) _latria_ belongs
+to religion, and _latria_ denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore
+religion is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is
+in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the
+dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer
+ceremonial worship to the Godhead" [*Cf. A. 1], and ceremonial
+matters, as stated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 3, ad 2; Q. 101), do not
+belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a
+virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is enumerated with the other virtues, as
+appears from what has been said above (Q. 80).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, A. 3; I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4)
+"a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good
+likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to
+a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the
+aspect of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes
+suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a
+becoming manner. But order comes under the aspect of good, just as
+mode and species, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since
+then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to
+God, it is evident that religion is a virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of
+fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through
+reverence for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as
+the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more
+excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as
+stated above (Q. 9, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 8).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his
+master, and so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad
+Furiam.], by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due
+service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so
+voluntarily.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that
+man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should
+do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of
+natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Religion Is One Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion
+directs us to God, as stated above (A. 1). Now in God there are three
+Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically
+from one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for
+a difference of virtue, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 2, ad 2).
+Therefore religion is not one virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since
+habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of
+religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to
+sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid
+to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God Himself.
+Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would
+seem that religion is not one virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 4:5): "One God [Vulg.:
+'Lord'], one faith." Now true religion professes faith in one God.
+Therefore religion is one virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), habits
+are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now
+it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect,
+namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of
+things. Wherefore He Himself says (Malach. 1:6): "If . . . I be a
+father, where is My honor?" For it belongs to a father to beget and
+to govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the
+creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one
+religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the
+aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and
+governs them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore
+religion is one virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: By the one same act man both serves and worships God,
+for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due:
+while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is
+under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong
+all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears
+witness to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God,
+either by offering something to God, or by assuming something Divine.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The worship of religion is paid to images, not as
+considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to
+God incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the
+image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither _latria_
+nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that
+religious worship is paid to the images of Christ.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Religion Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from the Others?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a special virtue
+distinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "Any
+action whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true
+sacrifice." But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every
+virtuous deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a
+special virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the
+glory of God." Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence
+of God, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2; A. 2). Therefore religion is not
+a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from
+the charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to _Ethic._
+ viii, 8 "to be honored is almost to be loved." Therefore the
+religion whereby we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from
+observance, or _dulia,_ or piety whereby we honor our neighbor.
+Therefore religion is not a special virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from
+the other parts.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there
+is a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the
+good to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God.
+Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to
+God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses
+all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special
+honor due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor is
+due to different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father,
+another to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is
+a special virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in so
+far as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove
+that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other
+virtues, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's honor,
+belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong
+to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God by
+reason of their specific character.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The object of love is the good, but the object of honor
+and reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is
+communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is
+not. Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the
+charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby
+God is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our
+neighbor.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Religion Is a Theological Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue.
+Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that "God is worshiped by faith,
+hope and charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to
+religion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological
+virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its
+object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to
+God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore religion is a
+theological virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual,
+or moral, as is clear from what has been said (I-II, QQ. 57, 58, 62).
+Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue,
+because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth:
+nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the
+mean between too much and too little, for one cannot worship God too
+much, according to Ecclus. 43:33, "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as
+much as you can; for He is above all praise." Therefore it remains
+that it is a theological virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral
+virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4) religion pays due worship to
+God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that
+which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter
+and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered,
+viz. God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is
+worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we
+reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Q. 1,
+AA. 1, 2, 4) that God is the object of faith, not only because we
+believe in a God, but because we believe God.
+
+Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God
+is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are
+done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is
+related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and
+consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the
+last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred
+to the end.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an end,
+moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with
+matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith,
+hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper
+object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion,
+which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says
+that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Religion directs man to God not as its object but as
+its end.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual,
+but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a
+mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by
+establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say "equality," I
+do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God
+as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability
+and God's acceptance.
+
+And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the
+Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as
+regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom
+it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some
+other circumstance.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Religion Should Be Preferred to the Other Moral Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to
+the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in
+its observing the mean, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. But religion
+fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an
+absolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than
+the other moral virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more
+praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater
+need: wherefore it is written (Isa. 57:7): "Deal thy bread to the
+hungry." But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to
+Ps. 15:2, "I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my
+goods." Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the
+other virtues whereby man's needs are relieved.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the greater the obligation to do a thing, the less
+praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the
+Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me." Now the
+more a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since,
+then, what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him,
+it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human
+virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The precepts pertaining to religion are given
+precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of
+precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts
+of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief
+of the moral virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness
+from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end
+the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above (A. 5; Q. 4, A.
+7), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And
+religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so
+far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor
+of God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of
+the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is
+the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no
+less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of his will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of its
+usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the
+offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God
+not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His
+glory, and on account of its usefulness to us.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the
+luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it be
+done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Religion Has an External Act?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that religion has not an external act. It
+is written (John 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him,
+must adore Him in spirit and in truth." Now external acts pertain,
+not to the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which
+adoration belongs, has acts that are not external but internal.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and
+honor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one
+were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since
+then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed
+properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of
+inferior creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in
+showing reverence to God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca for
+finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are
+wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals
+is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to
+the true God, Who is "exalted above all gods" [*Ps. 94:3]. Therefore
+it would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore
+religion has no bodily actions.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh
+have rejoiced in the living God." Now just as internal actions belong
+to the heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the
+flesh. Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by
+internal but also by external actions.
+
+_I answer that,_ We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake
+(because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add
+anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we
+revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its
+perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to
+its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened
+by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the
+human mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the
+sensible world, since "invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being
+understood by the things that are made," as the Apostle says (Rom.
+1:20). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of
+corporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby, as by
+signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God.
+Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others
+and belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are
+secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important
+and directly intended in the worship of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: These external things are offered to God, not as though
+He stood in need of them, according to Ps. 49:13, "Shall I eat the
+flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats?" but as signs
+of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves
+acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "The
+visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible
+sacrifice."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things
+pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual
+things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the
+idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Religion Is the Same As Sanctity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity.
+Religion is a special virtue, as stated above (A. 4): whereas
+sanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and
+fulfil our just obligations to God, according to Andronicus [*De
+Affectibus]. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanctity is free from all
+uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity." Now
+purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels
+bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would
+seem that sanctity is not the same as religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things that are opposite members of a division are
+not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above
+(Q. 80, ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as
+distinct from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as
+religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 1:74, 75): "That . . . we may
+serve Him . . . in holiness and justice." Now, "to serve God" belongs
+to religion, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3, ad 2). Therefore
+religion is the same as sanctity.
+
+_I answer that,_ The word "sanctity" seems to have two
+significations. In one way it denotes purity; and this signification
+fits in with the Greek, for _hagios_ means "unsoiled." In another way
+it denotes firmness, wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was
+applied to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be
+violated. Hence a thing is said to be sacred (_sancitum_) when it is
+ratified by law. Again, in Latin, this word _sanctus_ may be
+connected with purity, if it be resolved into _sanguine tinctus,_
+"since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were
+sprinkled with the victim's blood," according to Isidore (Etym. x).
+In either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to
+those things that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only
+men, but also the temple, vessels and such like things are said to be
+sanctified through being applied to the worship of God. For purity is
+necessary in order that the mind be applied to God, since the human
+mind is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things
+depreciate by admixture with baser things, for instance, silver by
+being mixed with lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the
+Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence it
+is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God. Wherefore
+it is written (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness,
+without which no man shall see God." Again, firmness is required for
+the mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last
+end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most
+immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom. 8:38, 39): "I am sure that
+neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me [*Vulg.: 'shall be
+able to separate us'] from the love of God."
+
+Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and
+its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but
+only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it
+gives God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine
+worship, such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is
+called sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but
+also the works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of
+certain good works disposes himself to the worship of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence;
+and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it
+has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the
+acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is
+said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all
+the virtues to the common good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to have the
+character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of
+virginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "it is honored
+not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Sanctity differs from religion as explained above, not
+really but logically.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 82
+
+OF DEVOTION
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider
+the interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts;
+secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary.
+The interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer.
+Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of
+prayer.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether devotion is a special act?
+
+(2) Whether it is an act of religion?
+
+(3) Of the cause of devotion?
+
+(4) Of its effect?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Devotion Is a Special Act?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That
+which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now
+devotion seems to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Paralip.
+29:31): "All the multitude offered victims, and praises, and
+holocausts with a devout mind." Therefore devotion is not a special
+act.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no special kind of act is common to various genera
+of acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts, namely,
+corporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate
+devoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a
+special act.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every special act belongs either to an appetitive or
+to a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as
+may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either
+faculty, as enumerated above (I, QQ. 78, seqq.; I-II, Q. 23, A. 4).
+Therefore devotion is not a special act.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (I-II,
+Q. 21, AA. 34). But devotion has a special reason for merit.
+Therefore devotion is a special act.
+
+_I answer that,_ Devotion is derived from "devote" [*The Latin
+_devovere_ means "to vow"]; wherefore those persons are said to be
+"devout" who, in a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject
+themselves wholly to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a
+devotee was one who vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety
+of his army, as Livy relates of the two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x,
+28). Hence devotion is apparently nothing else but the will to give
+oneself readily to things concerning the service of God. Wherefore it
+is written (Ex. 35:20, 21) that "the multitude of the children of
+Israel . . . offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and
+devout mind." Now it is evident that the will to do readily what
+concerns the service of God is a special kind of act. Therefore
+devotion is a special act of the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the
+thing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their
+acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both
+itself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above (I-II, Q.
+9, A. 3). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a
+man offers himself for the service of God Who is the last end, it
+follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they
+be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts
+of the other powers that are moved by the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Devotion is to be found in various genera of acts, not
+as a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover is found
+virtually in the movements of the things moved.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the soul,
+and is a movement of the will, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Devotion Is an Act of Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion.
+Devotion, as stated above (A. 1), consists in giving oneself up to
+God. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to
+Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "the Divine love produces ecstasy, for it
+takes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved."
+Therefore devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, charity precedes religion; and devotion seems to
+precede charity; since, in the Scriptures, charity is represented by
+fire, while devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of
+fire [*Cant. 8:6; Ps. 52:6]. Therefore devotion is not an act of
+religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, by religion man is directed to God alone, as stated
+above (Q. 81, A. 1). But devotion is directed also to men; for we
+speak of people being devout to certain holy men, and subjects are
+said to be devoted to their masters; thus Pope Leo says [*Serm. viii,
+De Pass. Dom.] that the Jews "out of devotion to the Roman laws,"
+said: "We have no king but Caesar." Therefore devotion is not an act
+of religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Devotion is derived from _devovere,_ as stated
+(A. 1). But a vow is an act of religion. Therefore devotion is also
+an act of religion.
+
+_I answer that,_ It belongs to the same virtue, to will to do
+something, and to have the will ready to do it, because both acts
+have the same object. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
+1): "It is justice whereby men both will end do just actions." Now it
+is evident that to do what pertains to the worship or service of God,
+belongs properly to religion, as stated above (Q. 81). Wherefore it
+belongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do such things, and
+this is to be devout. Hence it is evident that devotion is an act of
+religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It belongs immediately to charity that man should give
+himself to God, adhering to Him by a union of the spirit; but it
+belongs immediately to religion, and, through the medium of religion,
+to charity which is the principle of religion, that man should give
+himself to God for certain works of Divine worship.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Bodily fatness is produced by the natural heat in the
+process of digestion, and at the same time the natural heat thrives,
+as it were, on this fatness. In like manner charity both causes
+devotion (inasmuch as love makes one ready to serve one's friend) and
+feeds on devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded and
+increased by the practice and consideration of friendly deeds.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Devotion to God's holy ones, dead or living, does not
+terminate in them, but passes on to God, in so far as we honor God in
+His servants. But the devotion of subjects to their temporal masters
+is of another kind, just as service of a temporal master differs from
+the service of God.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Contemplation or Meditation Is the Cause of Devotion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that contemplation or meditation is not
+the cause of devotion. No cause hinders its effect. But subtle
+considerations about abstract matters are often a hindrance to
+devotion. Therefore contemplation or meditation is not the cause of
+devotion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if contemplation were the proper and essential cause
+of devotion, the higher objects of contemplation would arouse greater
+devotion. But the contrary is the case: since frequently we are urged
+to greater devotion by considering Christ's Passion and other
+mysteries of His humanity than by considering the greatness of His
+Godhead. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if contemplation were the proper cause of devotion,
+it would follow that those who are most apt for contemplation, are
+also most apt for devotion. Yet the contrary is to be noticed, for
+devotion is frequently found in men of simplicity and members of the
+female sex, who are defective in contemplation. Therefore
+contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 38:4): "In my meditation a fire
+shall flame out." But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore
+meditation is the cause of devotion.
+
+_I answer that,_ The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, of
+Whom Ambrose, commenting on Luke 9:55, says that "God calls whom He
+deigns to call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane
+Samaritans, had He so willed, He would have made devout." But the
+intrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or
+contemplation. For it was stated above (A. 1) that devotion is an act
+of the will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the
+service of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some
+consideration, since the object of the will is a good understood.
+Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that "the will
+arises from the intelligence." Consequently meditation must needs be
+the cause of devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives
+the thought of surrendering himself to God's service. Indeed a
+twofold consideration leads him thereto. The one is the consideration
+of God's goodness and loving kindness, according to Ps. 72:28, "It is
+good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God": and
+this consideration wakens love [*_Dilectio,_ the interior act of
+charity; cf. Q. 27] which is the proximate cause of devotion. The
+other consideration is that of man's own shortcomings, on account of
+which he needs to lean on God, according to Ps. 120:1, 2, "I have
+lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to
+me: my help is from the Lord, Who made heaven and earth"; and this
+consideration shuts out presumption whereby man is hindered from
+submitting to God, because he leans on His strength.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The consideration of such things as are of a nature to
+awaken our love [*Ibid.] of God, causes devotion; whereas the
+consideration of foreign matters that distract the mind from such
+things is a hindrance to devotion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, the
+strongest incentive to love [*Ibid.] and consequently to devotion,
+because God is supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the
+human mind that it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge,
+but also to the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible
+objects known to us. Chief among these is the humanity of Christ,
+according to the words of the Preface [*Preface for Christmastide],
+"that through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to the love of
+things invisible." Wherefore matters relating to Christ's humanity
+are the chief incentive to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding
+hand, although devotion itself has for its object matters concerning
+the Godhead.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Science and anything else conducive to greatness, is to
+man an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly
+surrender himself to God. The result is that such like things
+sometimes occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and
+women devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man
+perfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this
+very fact his devotion is increased.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Joy Is an Effect of Devotion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not an effect of devotion. As
+stated above (A. 3, ad 2), Christ's Passion is the chief incentive to
+devotion. But the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the
+soul, according to Lam. 3:19, "Remember my poverty . . . the wormwood
+and the gall," which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (Lam.
+3:20) it is said: "I will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall
+languish within me." Therefore delight or joy is not the effect of
+devotion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, devotion consists chiefly in an interior sacrifice
+of the spirit. But it is written (Ps. 50:19): "A sacrifice to God is
+an afflicted spirit." Therefore affliction is the effect of devotion
+rather than gladness or joy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Homine xii) [*Orat.
+funebr. de Placilla Imp.] that "just as laughter proceeds from joy,
+so tears and groans are signs of sorrow." But devotion makes some
+people shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not the effect of
+devotion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ We say in the Collect [*Thursday after fourth
+Sunday of Lent]: "That we who are punished by fasting may be
+comforted by a holy devotion."
+
+_I answer that,_ The direct and principal effect of devotion is the
+spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is its secondary and
+indirect effect. For it has been stated (A. 3) that devotion is
+caused by a twofold consideration: chiefly by the consideration of
+God's goodness, because this consideration belongs to the term, as it
+were, of the movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and
+the direct result of this consideration is joy, according to Ps.
+76:4, "I remembered God, and was delighted"; but accidentally this
+consideration causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy
+God fully, according to Ps. 41:3, "My soul hath thirsted after the
+strong living God," and afterwards it is said (Ps. 41:4): "My tears
+have been my bread," etc. Secondarily devotion is caused as stated
+(A. 3), by the consideration of one's own failings; for this
+consideration regards the term from which man withdraws by the
+movement of his devout will, in that he trusts not in himself, but
+subjects himself to God. This consideration has an opposite tendency
+to the first: for it is of a nature to cause sorrow directly (when
+one thinks over one's own failings), and joy accidentally, namely,
+through hope of the Divine assistance. It is accordingly evident that
+the first and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the secondary
+and accidental effect is that "sorrow which is according to God" [*2
+Cor. 7:10].
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the consideration of Christ's Passion there is
+something that causes sorrow, namely, the human defect, the removal
+of which made it necessary for Christ to suffer [*Luke 24:25]; and
+there is something that causes joy, namely, God's loving-kindness to
+us in giving us such a deliverance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on
+account of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is
+rejoiced, by the consideration of God's goodness, and by the hope of
+the Divine help.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but also
+through a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when one
+considers something that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are wont
+to shed tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover their
+children or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost. In this way
+tears arise from devotion.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 83
+
+OF PRAYER (In Seventeen Articles)
+
+We must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive
+power?
+
+(2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God?
+
+(3) Whether prayer is an act of religion?
+
+(4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone?
+
+(5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?
+
+(6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray?
+
+(7) Whether we ought to pray for others?
+
+(8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?
+
+(9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer;
+
+(10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?
+
+(11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?
+
+(12) Whether prayer should be vocal?
+
+(13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer?
+
+(14) Whether prayer should last a long time?
+
+(15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16]
+
+(16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? [*Art.
+15]
+
+(17) of the different kinds of prayer.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Prayer Is an Act of the Appetitive Power?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive
+power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is
+heard by God, according to Ps. 9:38, "The Lord hath heard the desire
+of the poor." Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the
+appetitive power: and therefore prayer is also.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): "It is useful to
+begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves
+to God and unite ourselves to Him." Now union with God is effected by
+love which belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs
+to the appetitive power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there
+are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is
+"the understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend
+what a thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and "analysis,"
+whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may
+be added, namely, "reasoning," whereby we proceed from the known to
+the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations.
+Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the
+appetitive power.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that "to pray is to speak."
+Now speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not
+of the appetitive, but of the intellective power.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to Cassiodorus [*Comment. in Ps. 38:13]
+"prayer (_oratio_) is spoken reason (_oris ratio_)." Now the
+speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative
+merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only
+apprehends but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another in two
+ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this
+happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause;
+secondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the
+reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the
+cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things
+in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and in this way it belongs
+to reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of
+the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by
+commanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way,
+disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to
+be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or
+its superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command and to ask or
+beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something
+to be effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the
+reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this reason the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us to do
+what is best."
+
+Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [*This last
+paragraph refers to the Latin word _oratio_ (prayer) which originally
+signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from _os,_
+_oris_ (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which
+sense Augustine [*Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14]: says (De Verb. Dom.)
+that "prayer is a petition," and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii,
+24) that "to pray is to ask becoming things of God." Accordingly it
+is evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor, either
+because desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition is
+like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily
+they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than God
+hears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of
+Isa. 65:24, "And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will
+hear."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1, ad
+3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders
+the act of reason, under the motion of the will, from tending to an
+end such as charity which is union with God. Now prayer tends to God
+through being moved by the will of charity, as it were, and this in
+two ways. First, on the part of the object of our petition, because
+when we pray we ought principally to ask to be united to God,
+according to Ps. 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will
+I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days
+of my life." Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who ought to
+approach the person whom he petitions, either locally, as when he
+petitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions God. Hence
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "when we call upon God in our
+prayers, we unveil our mind in His presence": and in the same sense
+Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer is the raising up
+of the mind to God."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but
+to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something by
+way of command or of petition, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Becoming to Pray?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer
+seems to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to
+the person to whom we pray. But according to Matt. 6:32, "Your Father
+knoweth that you have need of all these things." Therefore it is not
+becoming to pray to God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we
+pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But God's mind is
+unchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Kings 15:29, "But the
+Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to
+repentance." Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not,
+than to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii,
+1), "nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers."
+But God is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to
+pray to God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 18:1): "We ought always to
+pray, and not to faint."
+
+_I answer that,_ Among the ancients there was a threefold error
+concerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by
+Divine providence; whence it would follow that it is useless to pray
+and to worship God at all: of these it is written (Malach. 3:14):
+"You have said: He laboreth in vain that serveth God." Another
+opinion held that all things, even in human affairs, happen of
+necessity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness of Divine
+providence, or through the compelling influence of the stars, or on
+account of the connection of causes: and this opinion also excluded
+the utility of prayer. There was a third opinion of those who held
+that human affairs are indeed ruled by Divine providence, and that
+they do not happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of
+Divine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed by prayers
+and other things pertaining to the worship of God. All these opinions
+were disproved in the First Part (Q. 19, AA. 7, 8; Q. 22, AA. 2, 4;
+Q. 115, A. 6; Q. 116). Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the
+utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs
+subject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part
+of the Divine disposition.
+
+In order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine
+providence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also
+from what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now
+among other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects.
+Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions, not that thereby
+they may change the Divine disposition, but that by those actions
+they may achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine
+disposition: and the same is to be said of natural causes. And so is
+it with regard to prayer. For we pray not that we may change the
+Divine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has
+disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers, in other words "that by
+asking, men may deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity
+has disposed to give," as Gregory says (Dial. i, 8).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We need to pray to God, not in order to make known to
+Him our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded of the
+necessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, our motive in praying is, not that we
+may change the Divine disposition, but that, by our prayers, we may
+obtain what God has appointed.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God bestows many things on us out of His liberality,
+even without our asking for them: but that He wishes to bestow
+certain things on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good,
+namely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, and
+that we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. Hence
+Chrysostom says [*Implicitly (Hom. ii, de Orat.; Hom. xxx in Genes.;
+Cf. Caten. Aur. on Luke 18)]: "Think what happiness is granted thee,
+what honor bestowed on thee, when thou conversest with God in prayer,
+when thou talkest with Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt,
+whatever thou desirest."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Prayer Is an Act of Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion.
+Since religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its
+subject. But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above
+(A. 1). Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but of
+the gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the act of _latria_ falls under a necessity of
+precept. But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of
+precept, but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else
+than a petition for what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not
+an act of religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to religion that one "offers
+worship and ceremonial rites to the Godhead" [*Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53].
+But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but to ask to obtain
+something from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 140:2): "Let my prayer be
+directed as incense in Thy sight": and a gloss on the passage says
+that "it was to signify this that under the Old Law incense was said
+to be offered for a sweet smell to the Lord." Now this belongs to
+religion. Therefore prayer is an act of religion.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, AA. 2, 4), it belongs
+properly to religion to show honor to God, wherefore all those things
+through which reverence is shown to God, belong to religion. Now man
+shows reverence to God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects
+himself to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as the
+Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is properly an
+act of religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end,
+as stated above (Q. 82, A. 1, ad 1), and therefore religion, which is
+in the will, directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence of
+God. Now among the other powers of the soul the intellect is the
+highest, and the nearest to the will; and consequently after devotion
+which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the intellective
+part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by it religion
+directs man's intellect to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is a matter of precept not only that we should ask
+for what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to
+desire comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a
+precept of religion, which precept is expressed in Matt. 7:7, where
+it is said: "Ask and ye shall receive" [*Vulg.: 'Ask and it shall be
+given you.'].
+
+Reply Obj. 3: By praying man surrenders his mind to God, since he
+subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to
+Him, as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (A. 1, Obj.
+2). Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things, whether
+bodily members, or those external things that are employed for God's
+service, so too, prayer surpasses other acts of religion.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 4]
+
+Whether We Ought to Pray to God Alone?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to pray to God alone. Prayer
+is an act of religion, as stated above (A. 3). But God alone is to be
+worshiped by religion. Therefore we should pray to God alone.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of the
+prayer. But it belongs to God alone to know one's prayer, both
+because frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God
+alone knows, rather than by words, according to the saying of the
+Apostle (1 Cor. 14:15), "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray
+also with the understanding": and again because, as Augustine says
+(De Cura pro mortuis xiii) the "dead, even the saints, know not what
+the living, even their own children, are doing." Therefore we ought
+to pray to God alone.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if we pray to any of the saints, this is only
+because they are united to God. Now some yet living in this world, or
+even some who are in Purgatory, are closely united to God by grace,
+and yet we do not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to
+the saints who are in Paradise.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 5:1), "Call . . . if there be
+any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints."
+
+_I answer that,_ Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as
+to be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. In
+the first way we offer prayer to God alone, since all our prayers
+ought to be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God
+alone gives, according to Ps. 83:12, "The Lord will give grace and
+glory." But in the second way we pray to the saints, whether angels
+or men, not that God may through them know our petitions, but that
+our prayers may be effective through their prayers and merits. Hence
+it is written (Apoc. 8:4) that "the smoke of the incense," namely
+"the prayers of the saints ascended up before God." This is also
+clear from the very style employed by the Church in praying: since we
+beseech the Blessed Trinity "to have mercy on us," while we ask any
+of the saints "to pray for us."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To Him alone do we offer religious worship when
+praying, from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so
+doing we confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those
+whom we call upon as our advocates in God's presence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The dead, if we consider their natural condition, do
+not know what takes place in this world, especially the interior
+movements of the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral.
+xii, 21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what
+happens to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart,
+is made known to them in the Word: and it is most becoming to their
+exalted position that they should know the petitions we make to them
+by word or thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to
+them are known to them through Divine manifestation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Those who are in this world or in Purgatory, do not yet
+enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we think
+or say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to them,
+but ask it of the living by speaking to them.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 5]
+
+Whether We Ought to Ask for Something Definite When We Pray?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything
+definite when we pray to God. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth.
+iii, 24), "to pray is to ask becoming things of God"; wherefore it is
+useless to pray for what is inexpedient, according to James 4:3, "You
+ask, and receive not: because you ask amiss." Now according to Rom.
+8:26, "we know not what we should pray for as we ought." Therefore we
+ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, those who ask another person for something definite
+strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves. But we
+ought not to endeavor to make God will what we will; on the contrary,
+we ought to strive to will what He wills, according to a gloss on Ps.
+32:1, "Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just." Therefore we ought not to ask
+God for anything definite when we pray.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, evil things are not to be sought from God; and as to
+good things, God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is useless
+to ask a person to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we
+ought not to ask God for anything definite in our prayers.
+
+_On the contrary,_ our Lord (Matt. 6 and Luke 11) taught His
+disciples to ask definitely for those things which are contained in
+the petitions of the Lord's Prayer.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to Valerius Maximus [*Fact. et Dict.
+Memor. vii, 2], "Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods
+for nothing else but that they should grant us good things, because
+they at any rate know what is good for each one whereas when we pray
+we frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain."
+This opinion is true to a certain extent, as to those things which
+may have an evil result, and which man may use ill or well, such as
+"riches, by which," as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict.
+Memor. vii, 2), "many have come to an evil end; honors, which have
+ruined many; power, of which we frequently witness the unhappy
+results; splendid marriages, which sometimes bring about the total
+wreck of a family." Nevertheless there are certain goods which man
+cannot ill use, because they cannot have an evil result. Such are
+those which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit it: and
+these the saints seek absolutely when they pray, as in Ps. 79:4,
+"Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved," and again in Ps. 118:35,
+"Lead me into the path of Thy commandments."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although man cannot by himself know what he ought to
+pray for, "the Spirit," as stated in the same passage, "helpeth our
+infirmity," since by inspiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask
+for what is right. Hence our Lord said (John 4:24) that true adorers
+"must adore . . . in spirit and in truth."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When in our prayers we ask for things concerning our
+salvation, we conform our will to God's, of Whom it is written (1
+Tim. 2:4) that "He will have all men to be saved."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God so invites us to take good things, that we may
+approach to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires
+and devout prayers.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Man Ought to Ask God for Temporal Things When He Prays?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal
+things when he prays. We seek what we ask for in prayer. But we
+should not seek for temporal things, for it is written (Matt. 6:33):
+"Seek ye . . . first the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all
+these things shall be added unto you," that is to say, temporal
+things, which, says He, we are not to seek, but they will be added to
+what we seek. Therefore temporal things are not to be asked of God in
+prayer.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no one asks save for that which he is solicitous
+about. Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things,
+according to the saying of Matt. 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your
+life, what you shall eat." Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal
+things when we pray.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, by prayer our mind should be raised up to God. But
+by asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath it,
+against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18), "While we look not
+at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen.
+For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are
+not seen are eternal." Therefore man ought not to ask God for
+temporal things when he prays.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, man ought not to ask of God other than good and
+useful things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, are
+harmful, not only in a spiritual sense, but also in a material sense.
+Therefore we should not ask God for them in our prayers.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 30:8): "Give me only the
+necessaries of life."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep.
+cxxx, 12): "It is lawful to pray for what it is lawful to desire."
+Now it is lawful to desire temporal things, not indeed principally,
+by placing our end therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in
+tending towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means
+of supporting the life of the body, and are of service to us as
+instruments in performing acts of virtue, as also the Philosopher
+states (Ethic. i, 8). Augustine too says the same to Proba (ad
+Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 6, 7) when he states that "it is
+not unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for a livelihood, and no
+more; for this sufficiency is desired, not for its own sake, but for
+the welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed in a
+way befitting one's station, so as not to be out of keeping with
+those among whom we have to live. Accordingly we ought to pray that
+we may keep these things if we have them, and if we have them not,
+that we may gain possession of them."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We should seek temporal things not in the first but in
+the second place. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,
+16): "When He says that this" (i.e. the kingdom of God) "is to be
+sought first, He implies that the other" (i.e. temporal goods) "is to
+be sought afterwards, not in time but in importance, this as being
+our good, the other as our need."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not all solicitude about temporal things is forbidden,
+but that which is superfluous and inordinate, as stated above (Q. 55,
+A. 6).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When our mind is intent on temporal things in order
+that it may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when it is
+intent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is not
+lowered by them, but raises them to a higher level.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: From the very fact that we ask for temporal things not
+as the principal object of our petition, but as subordinate to
+something else, we ask God for them in the sense that they may be
+granted to us in so far as they are expedient for salvation.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 7]
+
+Whether We Ought to Pray for Others?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for others. In
+praying we ought to conform to the pattern given by our Lord. Now in
+the Lord's Prayer we make petitions for ourselves, not for others;
+thus we say: "Give us this day our daily bread," etc. Therefore we
+should not pray for others.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prayer is offered that it may be heard. Now one of
+the conditions required for prayer that it may be heard is that one
+pray for oneself, wherefore Augustine in commenting on John 16:23,
+"If you ask the Father anything in My name He will give it you," says
+(Tract. cii): "Everyone is heard when he prays for himself, not when
+he prays for all; wherefore He does not say simply 'He will give it,'
+but 'He will give it you.'" Therefore it would seem that we ought not
+to pray for others, but only for ourselves.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, we are forbidden to pray for others, if they are
+wicked, according to Jer. 7:16, "Therefore do not then pray for this
+people . . . and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee." On
+the other hand we are not bound to pray for the good, since they are
+heard when they pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem that we
+ought not to pray for others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 5:16): "Pray one for another,
+that you may be saved."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), when we pray we ought to ask
+for what we ought to desire. Now we ought to desire good things not
+only for ourselves, but also for others: for this is essential to the
+love which we owe to our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 12;
+Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 31, A. 1). Therefore charity requires us to pray for
+others. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.) [*Opus
+Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "Necessity
+binds us to pray for ourselves, fraternal charity urges us to pray
+for others: and the prayer that fraternal charity proffers is sweeter
+to God than that which is the outcome of necessity."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Cyprian says (De orat. Dom.), "We say 'Our Father'
+and not 'My Father,' 'Give us' and not 'Give me,' because the Master
+of unity did not wish us to pray privately, that is for ourselves
+alone, for He wished each one to pray for all, even as He Himself
+bore all in one."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is a condition of prayer that one pray for oneself:
+not as though it were necessary in order that prayer be meritorious,
+but as being necessary in order that prayer may not fail in its
+effect of impetration. For it sometimes happens that we pray for
+another with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to
+his salvation, and yet it is not granted on account of some obstacle
+on the part of the person we are praying for, according to Jer. 15:1,
+"If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards
+this people." And yet the prayer will be meritorious for the person
+who prays thus out of charity, according to Ps. 34:13, "My prayer
+shall be turned into my bosom, i.e. though it profit them not, I am
+not deprived of my reward," as the gloss expounds it.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: We ought to pray even for sinners, that they may be
+converted, and for the just that they may persevere and advance in
+holiness. Yet those who pray are heard not for all sinners but for
+some: since they are heard for the predestined, but not for those who
+are foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we correct the
+brethren, has an effect in the predestined but not in the reprobate,
+according to Eccles. 7:14, "No man can correct whom God hath
+despised." Hence it is written (1 John 5:16): "He that knoweth his
+brother to sin a sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life
+shall be given to him, who sinneth not to death." Now just as the
+benefit of correction must not be refused to any man so long as he
+lives here below, because we cannot distinguish the predestined from
+the reprobate, as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xv), so too no
+man should be denied the help of prayer.
+
+We ought also to pray for the just for three reasons: First, because
+the prayers of a multitude are more easily heard, wherefore a gloss
+on Rom. 15:30, "Help me in your prayers," says: "The Apostle rightly
+tells the lesser brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if
+they be united together in one mind, become great, and it is
+impossible for the prayers of a multitude not to obtain" that which
+is possible to be obtained by prayer. Secondly, that many may thank
+God for the graces conferred on the just, which graces conduce to the
+profit of many, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 1:11). Thirdly, that
+the more perfect may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they
+need the prayers of the less perfect.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 8]
+
+Whether We Ought to Pray for Our Enemies?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for our enemies.
+According to Rom. 15:4, "what things soever were written, were
+written for our learning." Now Holy Writ contains many imprecations
+against enemies; thus it is written (Ps. 6:11): "Let all my enemies
+be ashamed and be . . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be troubled
+very speedily [*Vulg.: 'Let them be turned back and be ashamed.']."
+Therefore we too should pray against rather than for our enemies.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to be revenged on one's enemies is harmful to them.
+But holy men seek vengeance of their enemies according to Apoc. 6:10,
+"How long . . . dost Thou not . . . revenge our blood on them that
+dwell on earth?" Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their
+enemies, according to Ps. 57:11, "The just shall rejoice when he
+shall see the revenge." Therefore we should not pray for our enemies,
+but against them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man's deed should not be contrary to his prayer. Now
+sometimes men lawfully attack their enemies, else all wars would be
+unlawful, which is opposed to what we have said above (Q. 40, A. 1).
+Therefore we should not pray for our enemies.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:44): "Pray for them that
+persecute and calumniate you."
+
+_I answer that,_ To pray for another is an act of charity, as stated
+above (A. 7). Wherefore we are bound to pray for our enemies in the
+same manner as we are bound to love them. Now it was explained above
+in the treatise on charity (Q. 25, AA. 8, 9), how we are bound to
+love our enemies, namely, that we must love in them their nature, not
+their sin, and that to love our enemies in general is a matter of
+precept, while to love them in the individual is not a matter of
+precept, except in the preparedness of the mind, so that a man must
+be prepared to love his enemy even in the individual and to help him
+in a case of necessity, or if his enemy should beg his forgiveness.
+But to love one's enemies absolutely in the individual, and to assist
+them, is an act of perfection.
+
+In like manner it is a matter of obligation that we should not
+exclude our enemies from the general prayers which we offer up for
+others: but it is a matter of perfection, and not of obligation, to
+pray for them individually, except in certain special cases.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The imprecations contained in Holy Writ may be
+understood in four ways. First, according to the custom of the
+prophets "to foretell the future under the veil of an imprecation,"
+as Augustine states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21]. Secondly, in the
+sense that certain temporal evils are sometimes inflicted by God on
+the wicked for their correction. Thirdly, because they are understood
+to be pronounced, not against the men themselves, but against the
+kingdom of sin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroying sin by the
+correction of men. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our will to the
+Divine justice with regard to the damnation of those who are
+obstinate in sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine states in the same book (De Serm. Dom. in
+Monte i, 22), "the martyrs' vengeance is the overthrow of the kingdom
+of sin, because they suffered so much while it reigned": or as he
+says again (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. lxviii), "their prayer for
+vengeance is expressed not in words but in their minds, even as the
+blood of Abel cried from the earth." They rejoice in vengeance not
+for its own sake, but for the sake of Divine justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful to attack one's enemies, that they may be
+restrained from sin: and this is for their own good and for the good
+of others. Consequently it is even lawful in praying to ask that
+temporal evils be inflicted on our enemies in order that they may
+mend their ways. Thus prayer and deed will not be contrary to one
+another.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 9]
+
+Whether the Seven Petitions of the Lord's Prayer Are Fittingly
+Assigned?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the seven petitions of the Lord's
+Prayer are not fittingly assigned. It is useless to ask for that to
+be hallowed which is always holy. But the name of God is always holy,
+according to Luke 1:49, "Holy is His name." Again, His kingdom is
+everlasting, according to Ps. 144:13, "Thy kingdom is a kingdom of
+all ages." Again, God's will is always fulfilled, according to Isa
+46:10, "All My will shall be done." Therefore it is useless to ask
+for "the name of God to be hallowed," for "His kingdom to come," and
+for "His will to be done."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, one must withdraw from evil before attaining good.
+Therefore it seems unfitting for the petitions relating to the
+attainment of good to be set forth before those relating to the
+removal of evil.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one asks for a thing that it may be given to one.
+Now the chief gift of God is the Holy Ghost, and those gifts that we
+receive through Him. Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly
+assigned, since they do not correspond to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, according to Luke, only five petitions are mentioned
+in the Lord's Prayer, as appears from the eleventh chapter. Therefore
+it was superfluous for Matthew to mention seven.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it seems useless to seek to win the benevolence of
+one who forestalls us by his benevolence. Now God forestalls us by
+His benevolence, since "He first hath loved us" ( 1 John 4:19).
+Therefore it is useless to preface the petitions with the words our
+"Father Who art in heaven," which seem to indicate a desire to win
+God's benevolence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The authority of Christ, who composed this prayer,
+suffices.
+
+_I answer that,_ The Lord's Prayer is most perfect, because, as
+Augustine says (ad Probam Ep. cxxx, 12), "if we pray rightly and
+fittingly, we can say nothing else but what is contained in this
+prayer of our Lord." For since prayer interprets our desires, as it
+were, before God, then alone is it right to ask for something in our
+prayers when it is right that we should desire it. Now in the Lord's
+Prayer not only do we ask for all that we may rightly desire, but
+also in the order wherein we ought to desire them, so that this
+prayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all our
+affections. Thus it is evident that the first thing to be the object
+of our desire is the end, and afterwards whatever is directed to the
+end. Now our end is God towards Whom our affections tend in two ways:
+first, by our willing the glory of God, secondly, by willing to enjoy
+His glory. The first belongs to the love whereby we love God in
+Himself, while the second belongs to the love whereby we love
+ourselves in God. Wherefore the first petition is expressed thus:
+"Hallowed be Thy name," and the second thus: "Thy kingdom come," by
+which we ask to come to the glory of His kingdom.
+
+To this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one way, by its
+very nature, in another way, accidentally. Of its very nature the
+good which is useful for an end directs us to that end. Now a thing
+is useful in two ways to that end which is beatitude: in one way,
+directly and principally, according to the merit whereby we merit
+beatitude by obeying God, and in this respect we ask: "Thy will be
+done on earth as it is in heaven"; in another way instrumentally, and
+as it were helping us to merit, and in this respect we say: "Give us
+this day our daily bread," whether we understand this of the
+sacramental Bread, the daily use of which is profitable to man, and
+in which all the other sacraments are contained, or of the bread of
+the body, so that it denotes all sufficiency of food, as Augustine
+says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11), since the Eucharist is the chief
+sacrament, and bread is the chief food: thus in the Gospel of Matthew
+we read, "supersubstantial," i.e. "principal," as Jerome expounds it.
+
+We are directed to beatitude accidentally by the removal of
+obstacles. Now there are three obstacles to our attainment of
+beatitude. First, there is sin, which directly excludes a man from
+the kingdom, according to 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, "Neither fornicators, nor
+idolaters, etc., shall possess the kingdom of God"; and to this refer
+the words, "Forgive us our trespasses." Secondly, there is temptation
+which hinders us from keeping God's will, and to this we refer when
+we say: "And lead us not into temptation," whereby we do not ask not
+to be tempted, but not to be conquered by temptation, which is to be
+led into temptation. Thirdly, there is the present penal state which
+is a kind of obstacle to a sufficiency of life, and to this we refer
+in the words, "Deliver us from evil."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 5), when
+we say, "Hallowed be Thy name, we do not mean that God's name is not
+holy, but we ask that men may treat it as a holy thing," and this
+pertains to the diffusion of God's glory among men. When we say, "Thy
+kingdom come, we do not imply that God is not reigning now," but "we
+excite in ourselves the desire for that kingdom, that it may come to
+us, and that we may reign therein," as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep.
+cxxx, 11). The words, "Thy will be done" rightly signify, "'May Thy
+commandments be obeyed' on earth as in heaven, i.e. by men as well as
+by angels" (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 6). Hence these three
+petitions will be perfectly fulfilled in the life to come; while the
+other four, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the
+needs of the present life.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since prayer is the interpreter of desire, the order of
+the petitions corresponds with the order, not of execution, but of
+desire or intention, where the end precedes the things that are
+directed to the end, and attainment of good precedes removal of evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 11) adapts the
+seven petitions to the gifts and beatitudes. He says: "If it is fear
+of God whereby blessed are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God's
+name be hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby
+blessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may come, so that
+we become meek and no longer resist Him. If it is knowledge whereby
+blessed are they that mourn, let us pray that His will be done, for
+thus we shall mourn no more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed ere
+they that hunger, let us pray that our daily bread be given to us. If
+it is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive the
+trespasses of others that our own may be forgiven. If it is
+understanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart, let us pray lest
+we have a double heart by seeking after worldly things which ere the
+occasion of our temptations. If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the
+peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God, let us pray
+to be delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we shall by that
+very fact become the free children of God."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Enchiridion cxvi), "Luke
+included not seven but five petitions in the Lord's Prayer, for by
+omitting it, he shows that the third petition is a kind of repetition
+of the two that precede, and thus helps us to understand it";
+because, to wit, the will of God tends chiefly to this--that we come
+to the knowledge of His holiness and to reign together with Him.
+Again the last petition mentioned by Matthew, "Deliver us from evil,"
+is omitted by Luke, so that each one may know himself to be delivered
+from evil if he be not led into temptation.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Prayer is offered up to God, not that we may bend Him,
+but that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask: which
+confidence is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of His
+charity in our regard, whereby he wills our good--wherefore we say:
+"Our Father"; and of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfil
+it--wherefore we say: "Who art in heaven."
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 10]
+
+Whether Prayer Is Proper to the Rational Creature?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not proper to the rational
+creature. Asking and receiving apparently belong to the same subject.
+But receiving is becoming also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and
+Holy Ghost. Therefore it is competent to them to pray: for the Son
+said (John 14:16): "I will ask My [Vulg.: 'the'] Father," and the
+Apostle says of the Holy Ghost (Rom. 8:26): "The Spirit . . . asketh
+for us."
+
+Obj. 2: Angels are above rational creatures, since they are
+intellectual substances. Now prayer is becoming to the angels,
+wherefore we read in the Ps. 96:7: "Adore Him, all you His angels."
+Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creature.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the same subject is fitted to pray as is fitted to
+call upon God, since this consists chiefly in prayer. But dumb
+animals are fitted to call upon God, according to Ps. 146:9, "Who
+giveth to beasts their food and to the young ravens that call upon
+Him." Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creatures.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Prayer is an act of reason, as stated above (A.
+1). But the rational creature is so called from his reason. Therefore
+prayer is proper to the rational creature.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) prayer is an act of reason,
+and consists in beseeching a superior; just as command is an act of
+reason, whereby an inferior is directed to something. Accordingly
+prayer is properly competent to one to whom it is competent to have
+reason, and a superior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the
+Divine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason. Therefore
+prayer is unbecoming both the Divine Persons and dumb animals, and it
+is proper to the rational creature.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in respect of
+their nature, whereas prayer belongs to one who receives through
+grace. The Son is said to ask or pray in respect of His assumed, i.e.
+His human, nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and the Holy
+Ghost is said to ask, because He makes us ask.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 8), intellect
+and reason are not distinct powers in us: but they differ as the
+perfect from the imperfect. Hence intellectual creatures which are
+the angels are distinct from rational creatures, and sometimes are
+included under them. In this sense prayer is said to be proper to the
+rational creature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The young ravens are said to call upon God, on account
+of the natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way, desire
+to attain the Divine goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey
+God, on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved by God.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 11]
+
+Whether the Saints in Heaven Pray for Us?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the saints in heaven do not pray for
+us. A man's action is more meritorious for himself than for others.
+But the saints in heaven do not merit for themselves, neither do they
+pray for themselves, since they are already established in the term.
+Neither therefore do they pray for us.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the saints conform their will to God perfectly, so
+that they will only what God wills. Now what God wills is always
+fulfilled. Therefore it would be useless for the saints to pray for
+us.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as the saints in heaven are above, so are those
+in Purgatory, for they can no longer sin. Now those in Purgatory do
+not pray for us, on the contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither
+do the saints in heaven pray for us.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if the saints in heaven pray for us, the prayers of
+the higher saints would be more efficacious; and so we ought not to
+implore the help of the lower saints' prayers but only of those of
+the higher saints.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore the
+souls of the saints pray for us, so long as they are separated from
+their bodies, we ought not to call upon Saint Peter, but on his soul,
+to pray for us: yet the Church does the contrary. The saints
+therefore do not pray for us, at least before the resurrection.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): "This is . . . he
+that prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias
+the prophet of God."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6), the error of
+Vigilantius consisted in saying that "while we live, we can pray one
+for another; but that after we are dead, none of our prayers for
+others can be heard, seeing that not even the martyrs' prayers are
+granted when they pray for their blood to be avenged." But this is
+absolutely false, because, since prayers offered for others proceed
+from charity, as stated above (AA. 7, 8), the greater the charity of
+the saints in heaven, the more they pray for wayfarers, since the
+latter can be helped by prayers: and the more closely they are united
+to God, the more are their prayers efficacious: for the Divine order
+is such that lower beings receive an overflow of the excellence of
+the higher, even as the air receives the brightness of the sun.
+Wherefore it is said of Christ (Heb. 7:25): "Going to God by His own
+power . . . to make intercession for us" [*Vulg.: 'He is able to save
+for ever them that come to God by Him, always living to make
+intercession for us.']. Hence Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6): "If
+the apostles and martyrs while yet in the body and having to be
+solicitous for themselves, can pray for others, how much more now
+that they have the crown of victory and triumph."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The saints in heaven, since they are blessed, have no
+lack of bliss, save that of the body's glory, and for this they pray.
+But they pray for us who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss: and
+their prayers are efficacious in impetrating through their previous
+merits and through God's acceptance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The saints impetrate what ever God wishes to take place
+through their prayers: and they pray for that which they deem will be
+granted through their prayers according to God's will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Those who are in Purgatory though they are above us on
+account of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the pains
+which they suffer: and in this respect they are not in a condition to
+pray, but rather in a condition that requires us to pray for them.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: It is God's will that inferior beings should be helped
+by all those that are above them, wherefore we ought to pray not only
+to the higher but also to the lower saints; else we should have to
+implore the mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens sometime that
+prayers addressed to a saint of lower degree are more efficacious,
+either because he is implored with greater devotion, or because God
+wishes to make known his sanctity.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: It is because the saints while living merited to pray
+for us, that we invoke them under the names by which they were known
+in this life, and by which they are better known to us: and also in
+order to indicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the
+saying of Ex. 3:6, "I am the God of Abraham," etc.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 12]
+
+Whether Prayer Should Be Vocal?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prayer ought not to be vocal. As
+stated above (A. 4), prayer is addressed chiefly to God. Now God
+knows the language of the heart. Therefore it is useless to employ
+vocal prayer.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prayer should lift man's mind to God, as stated
+above (A. 1, ad 2). But words, like other sensible objects, prevent
+man from ascending to God by contemplation. Therefore we should not
+use words in our prayers.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prayer should be offered to God in secret, according
+to Matt. 6:6, "But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy
+chamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret." But
+prayer loses its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer
+should not be vocal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 141:2): "I cried to the Lord
+with my voice, with my voice I made supplication to the Lord."
+
+_I answer that,_ Prayer is twofold, common and individual. Common
+prayer is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church
+representing the body of the faithful: wherefore such like prayer
+should come to the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is
+offered: and this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer.
+Therefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of the Church
+should say these prayers even in a loud voice, so that they may come
+to the knowledge of all.
+
+On the other hand individual prayer is that which is offered by any
+single person, whether he pray for himself or for others; and it is
+not essential to such a prayer as this that it be vocal. And yet the
+voice is employed in such like prayers for three reasons. First, in
+order to excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person
+praying is raised to God, because by means of external signs, whether
+of words or of deeds, the human mind is moved as regards
+apprehension, and consequently also as regards the affections. Hence
+Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9) that "by means of words and
+other signs we arouse ourselves more effectively to an increase of
+holy desires." Hence then alone should we use words and such like
+signs when they help to excite the mind internally. But if they
+distract or in any way impede the mind we should abstain from them;
+and this happens chiefly to those whose mind is sufficiently prepared
+for devotion without having recourse to those signs. Wherefore the
+Psalmist (Ps. 26:8) said: "My heart hath said to Thee: 'My face hath
+sought Thee,'" and we read of Anna (1 Kings 1:13) that "she spoke in
+her heart." Secondly, the voice is used in praying as though to pay a
+debt, so that man may serve God with all that he has from God, that
+is to say, not only with his mind, but also with his body: and this
+applies to prayer considered especially as satisfactory. Hence it is
+written (Osee 14:3): "Take away all iniquity, and receive the good:
+and we will render the calves of our lips." Thirdly, we have recourse
+to vocal prayer, through a certain overflow from the soul into the
+body, through excess of feeling, according to Ps. 15:9, "My heart
+hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Vocal prayer is employed, not in order to tell God
+something He does not know, but in order to lift up the mind of the
+person praying or of other persons to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Words about other matters distract the mind and hinder
+the devotion of those who pray: but words signifying some object of
+devotion lift up the mind, especially one that is less devout.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum
+falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "Our Lord forbids one to
+pray in presence of others in order that one may be seen by others.
+Hence when you pray, do nothing strange to draw men's attention,
+either by shouting so as to be heard by others, or by openly striking
+the heart, or extending the hands, so as to be seen by many. And yet,
+according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 3), "it is not
+wrong to be seen by men, but to do this or that in order to be seen
+by men."
+_______________________
+
+THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 13]
+
+Whether Attention Is a Necessary Condition of Prayer?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that attention is a necessary condition of
+prayer. It is written (John 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that
+adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But prayer is not
+in spirit unless it be attentive. Therefore attention is a necessary
+condition of prayer.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prayer is "the ascent of the mind to God"
+[*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii, 24]. But the mind does not ascend to
+God if the prayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary
+condition of prayer.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is a necessary condition of prayer that it should
+be altogether sinless. Now if a man allows his mind to wander while
+praying he is not free of sin, for he seems to make light of God;
+even as if he were to speak to another man without attending to what
+he was saying. Hence Basil says [*De Constit. Monach. i] that the
+"Divine assistance is to be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind
+wandering hither and thither: because he that prays thus not only
+will not obtain what he asks, nay rather will he provoke God to
+anger." Therefore it would seem a necessary condition of prayer that
+it should be attentive.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Even holy men sometimes suffer from a wandering of
+the mind when they pray, according to Ps. 39:13, "My heart hath
+forsaken me."
+
+_I answer that,_ This question applies chiefly to vocal prayer.
+Accordingly we must observe that a thing is necessary in two ways.
+First, a thing is necessary because thereby the end is better
+obtained: and thus attention is absolutely necessary for prayer.
+Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary when without it something
+cannot obtain its effect. Now the effect of prayer is threefold. The
+first is an effect which is common to all acts quickened by charity,
+and this is merit. In order to realize this effect, it is not
+necessary that prayer should be attentive throughout; because the
+force of the original intention with which one sets about praying
+renders the whole prayer meritorious, as is the case with other
+meritorious acts. The second effect of prayer is proper thereto, and
+consists in impetration: and again the original intention, to which
+God looks chiefly, suffices to obtain this effect. But if the
+original intention is lacking, prayer lacks both merit and
+impetration: because, as Gregory [*Hugh St. Victor, Expos. in Reg. S.
+Aug. iii] says, "God hears not the prayer of those who pay no
+attention to their prayer." The third effect of prayer is that which
+it produces at once; this is the spiritual refreshment of the mind,
+and for this effect attention is a necessary condition: wherefore it
+is written (1 Cor. 14:14): "If I pray in a tongue . . . my
+understanding is without fruit."
+
+It must be observed, however, that there are three kinds of attention
+that can be brought to vocal prayer: one which attends to the words,
+lest we say them wrong, another which attends to the sense of the
+words, and a third, which attends to the end of prayer, namely, God,
+and to the thing we are praying for. That last kind of attention is
+most necessary, and even idiots are capable of it. Moreover this
+attention, whereby the mind is fixed on God, is sometimes so strong
+that the mind forgets all other things, as Hugh of St. Victor states
+[*De Modo Orandi ii].
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To pray in spirit and in truth is to set about praying
+through the instigation of the Spirit, even though afterwards the
+mind wander through weakness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The human mind is unable to remain aloft for long on
+account of the weakness of nature, because human weakness weighs down
+the soul to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that when,
+while praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, of a sudden
+it wanders off through weakness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Purposely to allow one's mind to wander in prayer is
+sinful and hinders the prayer from having fruit. It is against this
+that Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "When you pray God with
+psalms and hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips
+pronounce." But to wander in mind unintentionally does not deprive
+prayer of its fruit. Hence Basil says (De Constit. Monach. i): "If
+you are so truly weakened by sin that you are unable to pray
+attentively, strive as much as you can to curb yourself, and God will
+pardon you, seeing that you are unable to stand in His presence in a
+becoming manner, not through negligence but through frailty."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 14]
+
+Whether Prayer Should Last a Long Time?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prayer should not be continual. It is
+written (Matt. 6:7): "When you are praying, speak not much." Now one
+who prays a long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal
+prayer. Therefore prayer should not last a long time.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prayer expresses the desire. Now a desire is all the
+holier according as it is centered on one thing, according to Ps.
+26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after."
+Therefore the shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable to God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems to be wrong to transgress the limits fixed
+by God, especially in matters concerning Divine worship, according to
+Ex. 19:21: "Charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass
+the limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of them should
+perish." But God has fixed for us the limits of prayer by instituting
+the Lord's Prayer (Matt. 6). Therefore it is not right to prolong our
+prayer beyond its limits.
+
+Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It would seem that we ought to pray
+continually. For our Lord said (Luke 18:1): "We ought always to pray,
+and not to faint": and it is written (1 Thess. 5:17): "Pray without
+ceasing."
+
+_I answer that,_ We may speak about prayer in two ways: first, by
+considering it in itself; secondly, by considering it in its cause.
+The cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought
+to arise: and this desire ought to be in us continually, either
+actually or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in
+whatever we do out of charity; and we ought to "do all things to the
+glory of God" (1 Cor. 10:31). From this point of view prayer ought to
+be continual: wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9):
+"Faith, hope and charity are by themselves a prayer of continual
+longing." But prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual,
+because we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine says
+(ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), "we pray to God with our lips at certain
+intervals and seasons, in order to admonish ourselves by means of
+such like signs, to take note of the amount of our progress in that
+desire, and to arouse ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof."
+Now the quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for
+instance the quantity of the dose should be commensurate with health.
+And so it is becoming that prayer should last long enough to arouse
+the fervor of the interior desire: and when it exceeds this measure,
+so that it cannot be continued any longer without causing weariness,
+it should be discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep.
+cxxx): "It is said that the brethren in Egypt make frequent but very
+short prayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest that vigilant and
+erect attention which is so necessary in prayer slacken and languish,
+through the strain being prolonged. By so doing they make it
+sufficiently clear not only that this attention must not be forced if
+we are unable to keep it up, but also that if we are able to
+continue, it should not be broken off too soon." And just as we must
+judge of this in private prayers by considering the attention of the
+person praying, so too, in public prayers we must judge of it by
+considering the devotion of the people.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx), "to pray with
+many words is not the same as to pray long; to speak long is one
+thing, to be devout long is another. For it is written that our Lord
+passed the whole night in prayer, and that He 'prayed the longer' in
+order to set us an example." Further on he says: "When praying say
+little, yet pray much so long as your attention is fervent. For to
+say much in prayer is to discuss your need in too many words: whereas
+to pray much is to knock at the door of Him we pray, by the
+continuous and devout clamor of the heart. Indeed this business is
+frequently done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather
+than with speech."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Length of prayer consists, not in praying for many
+things, but in the affections persisting in the desire of one thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Our Lord instituted this prayer, not that we might use
+no other words when we pray, but that in our prayers we might have
+none but these things in view, no matter how we express them or think
+of them.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: One may pray continually, either through having a
+continual desire, as stated above; or through praying at certain
+fixed times, though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect,
+whether in the person who prays--because he remains more devout even
+after praying, or in some other person--as when by his kindness a man
+incites another to pray for him, even after he himself has ceased
+praying.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 15]
+
+Whether Prayer Is Meritorious?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not meritorious. All merit
+proceeds from grace. But prayer precedes grace, since even grace is
+obtained by means of prayer according to Luke 11:13, "(How much more)
+will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask
+Him!" Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if prayer merits anything, this would seem to be
+chiefly that which is besought in prayer. Yet it does not always
+merit this, because even the saints' prayers are frequently not
+heard; thus Paul was not heard when he besought the sting of the
+flesh to be removed from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious
+act.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prayer is based chiefly on faith, according to James
+1:6, "But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering." Now faith is not
+sufficient for merit, as instanced in those who have lifeless faith.
+Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words of Ps. 34:13, "My prayer
+shall be turned into my bosom," explains them as meaning, "if my
+prayer does not profit them, yet shall not I be deprived of my
+reward." Now reward is not due save to merit. Therefore prayer is
+meritorious.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 13) prayer, besides causing
+spiritual consolation at the time of praying, has a twofold efficacy
+in respect of a future effect, namely, efficacy in meriting and
+efficacy in impetrating. Now prayer, like any other virtuous act, is
+efficacious in meriting, because it proceeds from charity as its
+root, the proper object of which is the eternal good that we merit to
+enjoy. Yet prayer proceeds from charity through the medium of
+religion, of which prayer is an act, as stated above (A. 3), and with
+the concurrence of other virtues requisite for the goodness of
+prayer, viz. humility and faith. For the offering of prayer itself to
+God belongs to religion, while the desire for the thing that we pray
+to be accomplished belongs to charity. Faith is necessary in
+reference to God to Whom we pray; that is, we need to believe that we
+can obtain from Him what we seek. Humility is necessary on the part
+of the person praying, because he recognizes his neediness. Devotion
+too is necessary: but this belongs to religion, for it is its first
+act and a necessary condition of all its secondary acts, as stated
+above (Q. 82, AA. 1, 2).
+
+As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this from the grace
+of God to Whom we pray, and Who instigates us to pray. Wherefore
+Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cv, 1): "He would not urge us to
+ask, unless He were willing to give"; and Chrysostom [*Cf. Catena
+Aurea of St. Thomas on Luke 18. The words as quoted are not to be
+found in the words of Chrysostom] says: "He never refuses to grant
+our prayers, since in His loving-kindness He urged us not to faint in
+praying."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is
+meritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which
+impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a
+gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is "a gift of God," as
+Augustine states (De Persever. xxiii).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes the merit of prayer regards chiefly something
+distinct from the object of one's petition. For the chief object of
+merit is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition of
+prayer extends sometimes to certain other things, as stated above
+(AA. 6, 7). Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for ourselves
+be not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and sometimes by
+asking for and desiring such things we lose merit for instance if we
+ask of God the accomplishment of some sin, which would be an impious
+prayer. And sometimes it is not necessary for salvation, nor yet
+manifestly contrary thereto; and then although he who prays may merit
+eternal life by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain what he asks
+for. Hence Augustine says (Liber. Sentent. Prosperi sent. ccxii): "He
+who faithfully prays God for the necessaries of this life, is both
+mercifully heard, and mercifully not heard. For the physician knows
+better than the sick man what is good for the disease." For this
+reason, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed for the removal of the
+sting in his flesh, because this was not expedient. If, however, we
+pray for something that is useful for our beatitude, through being
+conducive to salvation, we merit it not only by praying, but also by
+doing other good deeds: therefore without any doubt we receive what
+we ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: "since certain things
+are not denied us, but are deferred that they may be granted at a
+suitable time," according to Augustine (Tract. cii in Joan.): and
+again this may be hindered if we persevere not in asking for it.
+Wherefore Basil says (De Constit. Monast. i): "The reason why
+sometimes thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast
+asked amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because thou hast
+asked for what was not good for thee, or because thou hast ceased
+asking." Since, however, a man cannot condignly merit eternal life
+for another, as stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 6), it follows that
+sometimes one cannot condignly merit for another things that pertain
+to eternal life. For this reason we are not always heard when we pray
+for others, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2, 3). Hence it is that four
+conditions are laid down; namely, to ask--"for ourselves--things
+necessary for salvation--piously--perseveringly"; when all these four
+concur, we always obtain what we ask for.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Prayer depends chiefly on faith, not for its efficacy
+in meriting, because thus it depends chiefly on charity, but for its
+efficacy in impetrating, because it is through faith that man comes
+to know of God's omnipotence and mercy, which are the source whence
+prayer impetrates what it asks for.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 16]
+
+Whether Sinners Impetrate Anything from God by Their Prayers?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sinners impetrate nothing from God by
+their prayers. It is written (John 9:31): "We know that God doth not
+hear sinners"; and this agrees with the saying of Prov. 28:9, "He
+that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be
+an abomination." Now an abominable prayer impetrates nothing from
+God. Therefore sinners impetrate nothing from God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the just impetrate from God what they merit, as
+stated above (A. 15, ad 2). But sinners cannot merit anything since
+they lack grace and charity which is the "power of godliness,"
+according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of
+godliness, but denying the power thereof." and so their prayer is
+impious, and yet piety is required in order that prayer may be
+impetrative, as stated above (A. 15, ad 2). Therefore sinners
+impetrate nothing by their prayers.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xiv in the Opus Imperfectum
+falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "The Father is
+unwilling to hear the prayer which the Son has not inspired." Now in
+the prayer inspired by Christ we say: "Forgive us our trespasses as
+we forgive them that trespass against us": and sinners do not fulfil
+this. Therefore either they lie in saying this, and so are unworthy
+to be heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because
+they do not observe the form of prayer instituted by Christ.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super Joan.): "If God
+were not to hear sinners, the publican would have vainly said: Lord,
+be merciful to me a sinner"; and Chrysostom [*Hom. xviii of the same
+Opus Imperfectum] says: "Everyone that asketh shall receive, that is
+to say whether he be righteous or sinful."
+
+_I answer that,_ In the sinner, two things are to be considered: his
+nature which God loves, and the sin which He hates. Accordingly when
+a sinner prays for something as sinner, i.e. in accordance with a
+sinful desire, God hears him not through mercy but sometimes through
+vengeance when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For
+"God refuses in mercy what He grants in anger," as Augustine declares
+(Tract. lxxiii in Joan.). On the other hand God hears the sinner's
+prayer if it proceed from a good natural desire, not out of justice,
+because the sinner does not merit to be heard, but out of pure mercy
+[*Cf. A. 15, ad 1], provided however he fulfil the four conditions
+given above, namely, that he beseech for himself things necessary for
+salvation, piously and perseveringly.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine states (Tract. xliv super Joan.), these
+words were spoken by the blind man before being anointed, i.e.
+perfectly enlightened, and consequently lack authority. And yet there
+is truth in the saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which
+sense also the sinner's prayer is said to be an abomination.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There can be no godliness in the sinner's prayer as
+though his prayer were quickened by a habit of virtue: and yet his
+prayer may be godly in so far as he asks for something pertaining to
+godliness. Even so a man who has not the habit of justice is able to
+will something just, as stated above (Q. 59, A. 2). And though his
+prayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, because merit
+depends on justice, whereas impetration rests on grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 7, ad 1) the Lord's Prayer is
+pronounced in the common person of the whole Church: and so if anyone
+say the Lord's Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbor's
+trespasses, he lies not, although his words do not apply to him
+personally: for they are true as referred to the person of the
+Church, from which he is excluded by merit, and consequently he is
+deprived of the fruit of his prayer. Sometimes, however, a sinner is
+prepared to forgive those who have trespassed against him, wherefore
+his prayers are heard, according to Ecclus. 28:2, "Forgive thy
+neighbor if he hath hurt thee, and then shall thy sins be forgiven to
+thee when thou prayest."
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 17]
+
+Whether the Parts of Prayer Are Fittingly Described As Supplications,
+Prayers, Intercessions, and Thanksgivings?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prayer are unfittingly
+described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and
+thanksgivings. Supplication would seem to be a kind of adjuration.
+Yet, according to Origen (Super Matth. Tract. xxxv), "a man who
+wishes to live according to the gospel need not adjure another, for
+if it be unlawful to swear, it is also unlawful to adjure." Therefore
+supplication is unfittingly reckoned a part of prayer.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "to
+pray is to ask becoming things of God." Therefore it is unfitting to
+distinguish "prayers" from "intercessions."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, thanksgivings regard the past, while the others
+regard the future. But the past precedes the future. Therefore
+thanksgivings are unfittingly placed after the others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ suffices the authority of the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:1).
+
+_I answer that,_ Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First,
+that the person who prays should approach God Whom he prays: this is
+signified in the word "prayer," because prayer is "the raising up of
+one's mind to God." The second is that there should be a petition,
+and this is signified in the word "intercession." In this case
+sometimes one asks for something definite, and then some say it is
+"intercession" properly so called, or we may ask for some thing
+indefinitely, for instance to be helped by God, or we may simply
+indicate a fact, as in John 11:3, "Behold, he whom Thou lovest is
+sick," and then they call it "insinuation." The third condition is
+the reason for impetrating what we ask for: and this either on the
+part of God, or on the part of the person who asks. The reason of
+impetration on the part of God is His sanctity, on account of which
+we ask to be heard, according to Dan. 9:17, 18, "For Thy own sake,
+incline, O God, Thy ear"; and to this pertains "supplication"
+(_obsecratio_) which means a pleading through sacred things, as when
+we say, "Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord." The reason for
+impetration on the part of the person who asks is "thanksgiving";
+since "through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to
+receive yet greater benefits," as we say in the collect [*Ember
+Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor
+Bishop]. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 2:1 says that "in the Mass, the
+consecration is preceded by supplication," in which certain sacred
+things are called to mind; that "prayers are in the consecration
+itself," in which especially the mind should be raised up to God; and
+that "intercessions are in the petitions that follow, and
+thanksgivings at the end."
+
+We may notice these four things in several of the Church's collects.
+Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday the words, "Almighty eternal
+God" belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words, "Who hast
+given to Thy servants," etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words,
+"grant, we beseech Thee," belong to intercession; and the words at
+the end, "Through Our Lord," etc. belong to supplication.
+
+In the _Conferences of the Fathers_ (ix, cap. 11, seqq.) we read:
+"Supplication is bewailing one's sins; prayer is vowing something to
+God; intercession is praying for others; thanksgiving is offered by
+the mind to God in ineffable ecstasy." The first explanation,
+however, is the better.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: "Supplication" is an adjuration not for the purpose of
+compelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore mercy.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: "Prayer" in the general sense includes all the things
+mentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it denotes
+properly the ascent to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Among things that are diverse the past precedes the
+future; but the one and same thing is future before it is past. Hence
+thanksgiving for other benefits precedes intercession: but one and
+the same benefit is first sought, and finally, when it has been
+received, we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer
+whereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer is preceded by
+supplication, whereby through the consideration of God's goodness we
+dare approach Him.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 84
+
+OF ADORATION (In Three Articles)
+
+In due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria, and in
+the first place, adoration whereby one uses one's body to reverence
+God; secondly, those acts whereby some external thing is offered to
+God; thirdly, those acts whereby something belonging to God is
+assumed.
+
+Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether adoration is an act of latria?
+
+(2) Whether adoration denotes an internal or an external act?
+
+(3) Whether adoration requires a definite place?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 84, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Adoration Is an Act of Latria or Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that adoration is not an act of latria or
+religion. The worship of religion is due to God alone. But adoration
+is not due to God alone: since we read (Gen. 18:2) that Abraham
+adored the angels; and (3 Kings 1:23) that the prophet Nathan, when
+he was come in to king David, "worshiped him bowing down to the
+ground." Therefore adoration is not an act of religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the worship of religion is due to God as the object
+of beatitude, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3): whereas
+adoration is due to Him by reason of His majesty, since a gloss on
+Ps. 28:2, "Adore ye the Lord in His holy court," says: "We pass from
+these courts into the court where we adore His majesty." Therefore
+adoration is not an act of latria.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the worship of one same religion is due to the three
+Persons. But we do not adore the three Persons with one adoration,
+for we genuflect at each separate invocation of Them [*At the
+adoration of the Cross, on Good Friday]. Therefore adoration is nol
+an act of latria.
+
+_On the contrary,_ are the words quoted Matt. 4:10: "The Lord thy God
+shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou serve."
+
+_I answer that,_ Adoration is directed to the reverence of the person
+adored. Now it is evident from what we have said (Q. 81, AA. 2, 4)
+that it is proper to religion to show reverence to God. Hence the
+adoration whereby we adore God is an act of religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Reverence is due to God on account of His excellence,
+which is communicated to certain creatures not in equal measure, but
+according to a measure of proportion; and so the reverence which we
+pay to God, and which belongs to latria, differs from the reverence
+which we pay to certain excellent creatures; this belongs to dulia,
+and we shall speak of it further on (Q. 103). And since external
+actions are signs of internal reverence, certain external tokens
+significative of reverence are offered to creatures of excellence,
+and among these tokens the chief is adoration: yet there is one thing
+which is offered to God alone, and that is sacrifice. Hence Augustine
+says (De Civ. Dei x, 4): "Many tokens of Divine worship are employed
+in doing honor to men, either through excessive humility, or through
+pernicious flattery; yet so that those to whom these honors are given
+are recognized as being men to whom we owe esteem and reverence and
+even adoration if they be far above us. But who ever thought it his
+duty to sacrifice to any other than one whom he either knew or deemed
+or pretended to be a God?" Accordingly it was with the reverence due
+to an excellent creature that Nathan adored David; while it was the
+reverence due to God with which Mardochai refused to adore Aman
+fearing "lest he should transfer the honor of his God to a man"
+(Esther 13:14).
+
+Again with the reverence due to an excellent creature Abraham adored
+the angels, as did also Josue (Jos. 5:15): though we may understand
+them to have adored, with the adoration of latria, God Who appeared
+and spoke to them in the guise of an angel. It was with the reverence
+due to God that John was forbidden to adore the angel (Apoc. 22:9),
+both to indicate the dignity which he had acquired through Christ,
+whereby man is made equal to an angel: wherefore the same text goes
+on: "I am thy fellow-servant and of thy brethren"; as also to exclude
+any occasion of idolatry, wherefore the text continues: "Adore God."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Every Divine excellency is included in His majesty: to
+which it pertains that we should be made happy in Him as in the
+sovereign good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since there is one excellence of the three
+Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is due to them and
+consequently one adoration. It is to represent this that where it is
+related (Gen. 18:2) that three men appeared to Abraham, we are told
+that he addressed one, saying: "Lord, if I have found favor in thy
+sight," etc. The triple genuflection represents the Trinity of
+Persons, not a difference of adoration.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 84, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Adoration Denotes an Action of the Body?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that adoration does not denote an act of
+the body. It is written (John 4:23): "The true adorers shall adore
+the Father in spirit and in truth." Now what is done in spirit has
+nothing to do with an act of the body. Therefore adoration does not
+denote an act of the body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the word adoration is taken from _oratio_ (prayer).
+But prayer consists chiefly in an interior act, according to 1 Cor.
+14:15, "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the
+understanding." Therefore adoration denotes chiefly a spiritual act.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, acts of the body pertain to sensible knowledge:
+whereas we approach God not by bodily but by spiritual sense.
+Therefore adoration does not denote an act of the body.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ex. 20:5, "Thou shalt not adore them,
+nor serve them," says: "Thou shalt neither worship them in mind, nor
+adore them outwardly."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 12), since we
+are composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and sensible, we offer
+God a twofold adoration; namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in
+the internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which
+consists in an exterior humbling of the body. And since in all acts
+of latria that which is without is referred to that which is within
+as being of greater import, it follows that exterior adoration is
+offered on account of interior adoration, in other words we exhibit
+signs of humility in our bodies in order to incite our affections to
+submit to God, since it is connatural to us to proceed from the
+sensible to the intelligible.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Even bodily adoration is done in spirit, in so far as
+it proceeds from and is directed to spiritual devotion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as prayer is primarily in the mind, and
+secondarily expressed in words, as stated above (Q. 83, A. 12), so
+too adoration consists chiefly in an interior reverence of God, but
+secondarily in certain bodily signs of humility; thus when we
+genuflect we signify our weakness in comparison with God, and when we
+prostrate ourselves we profess that we are nothing of ourselves.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Though we cannot reach God with the senses, our mind is
+urged by sensible signs to approach God.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 84, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Adoration Requires a Definite Place?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that adoration does not require a definite
+place. It is written (John 4:21): "The hour cometh, when you shall
+neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, adore the Father"; and
+the same reason seems to apply to other places. Therefore a definite
+place is not necessary for adoration.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, exterior adoration is directed to interior
+adoration. But interior adoration is shown to God as existing
+everywhere. Therefore exterior adoration does not require a definite
+place.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the same God is adored in the New as in the Old
+Testament. Now in the Old Testament they adored towards the west,
+because the door of the Tabernacle looked to the east (Ex. 26:18
+seqq.). Therefore for the same reason we ought now to adore towards
+the west, if any definite place be requisite for adoration.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 56:7): "My house shall be
+called the house of prayer," which words are also quoted (John 2:16).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the chief part of adoration
+is the internal devotion of the mind, while the secondary part is
+something external pertaining to bodily signs. Now the mind
+internally apprehends God as not comprised in a place; while bodily
+signs must of necessity be in some definite place and position. Hence
+a definite place is required for adoration, not chiefly, as though it
+were essential thereto, but by reason of a certain fittingness, like
+other bodily signs.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: By these words our Lord foretold the cessation of
+adoration, both according to the rite of the Jews who adored in
+Jerusalem, and according to the rite of the Samaritans who adored on
+Mount Garizim. For both these rites ceased with the advent of the
+spiritual truth of the Gospel, according to which "a sacrifice is
+offered to God in every place," as stated in Malach. 1:11.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A definite place is chosen for adoration, not on
+account of God Who is adored, as though He were enclosed in a place,
+but on account of the adorers; and this for three reasons. First,
+because the place is consecrated, so that those who pray there
+conceive a greater devotion and are more likely to be heard, as may
+be seen in the prayer of Solomon (3 Kings 8). Secondly, on account of
+the sacred mysteries and other signs of holiness contained therein.
+Thirdly, on account of the concourse of many adorers, by reason of
+which their prayer is more likely to be heard, according to Matt.
+18:20, "Where there are two or three gathered together in My name,
+there am I in the midst of them."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is a certain fittingness in adoring towards the
+east. First, because the Divine majesty is indicated in the movement
+of the heavens which is from the east. Secondly, because Paradise was
+situated in the east according to the Septuagint version of Gen. 2:8,
+and so we signify our desire to return to Paradise. Thirdly, on
+account of Christ Who is "the light of the world" [*John 8:12; 9:5],
+and is called "the Orient" (Zech. 6:12); "Who mounteth above the
+heaven of heavens to the east" (Ps. 67:34), and is expected to come
+from the east, according to Matt. 24:27, "As lightning cometh out of
+the east, and appeareth even into the west; so shall also the coming
+of the Son of Man be."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 85
+
+OF SACRIFICE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+In due sequence we must consider those acts whereby external things
+are offered to God. These give rise to a twofold consideration:
+(1) Of things given to God by the faithful; (2) Of vows, whereby
+something is promised to Him.
+
+Under the first head we shall consider sacrifices, oblations,
+first-fruits, and tithes. About sacrifices there are four points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?
+
+(2) Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?
+
+(3) Whether the offering of a sacrifice is a special act of virtue?
+
+(4) Whether all are bound to offer sacrifice?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Offering a Sacrifice to God Is of the Law of Nature?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not of
+the natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common among
+all men. Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read of
+some, e.g. Melchisedech (Gen. 14:18), offering bread and wine in
+sacrifice, and of certain animals being offered by some, and others
+by others. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the natural
+law.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, things that are of the natural law were observed by
+all just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor
+that Adam did so, of whom nevertheless it is written (Wis. 10:2) that
+wisdom "brought him out of his sin." Therefore the offering of
+sacrifice is not of the natural law.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5, 19) that
+sacrifices are offered in signification of something. Now words which
+are chief among signs, as he again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3),
+"signify, not by nature but by convention," according to the
+Philosopher (Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the
+natural law.
+
+_On the contrary,_ At all times and among all nations there has
+always been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by
+all is seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of
+the natural law.
+
+_I answer that,_ Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a
+higher being, on account of the defects which he perceives in
+himself, and in which he needs help and direction from someone above
+him: and whatever this superior being may be, it is known to all
+under the name of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are
+naturally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural
+reason in accordance with man's natural inclination that he should
+tender submission and honor, according to his mode, to that which is
+above man. Now the mode befitting to man is that he should employ
+sensible signs in order to signify anything, because he derives his
+knowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural reason
+that man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in
+sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those who make
+certain offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority. Now
+this is what we mean by a sacrifice, and consequently the offering of
+sacrifice is of the natural law.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 95, A. 2), certain things
+belong generically to the natural law, while their determination
+belongs to the positive law; thus the natural law requires that
+evildoers should be punished; but that this or that punishment should
+be inflicted on them is a matter determined by God or by man. In like
+manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the natural
+law, and consequently all are agreed on this point, but the
+determination of sacrifices is established by God or by man, and this
+is the reason for their difference.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Adam, Isaac and other just men offered sacrifice to God
+in a manner befitting the times in which they lived, according to
+Gregory, who says (Moral. iv, 3) that in olden times original sin was
+remitted through the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture
+mention all the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have
+something special connected with them. Perhaps the reason why we read
+of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may be that, as the origin of
+sin is ascribed to him, the origin of sanctification ought not to be
+represented as typified in him. Isaac was a type of Christ, being
+himself offered in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should
+be represented as offering a sacrifice.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is natural to man to express his ideas by signs, but
+the determination of those signs depends on man's pleasure.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Sacrifice Should Be Offered to God Alone?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sacrifice should not be offered to
+the most high God alone. Since sacrifice ought to be offered to God,
+it would seem that it ought to be offered to all such as are
+partakers of the Godhead. Now holy men are made "partakers of the
+Divine nature,"    according to 2 Pet. 1:4; wherefore of them is it
+written (Ps. 81:6): "I have said, You are gods": and angels too are
+called "sons of God,"    according to Job 1:6. Thus sacrifice should
+be offered to all these.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the greater a person is the greater the honor due to
+him from man. Now the angels and saints are far greater than any
+earthly princes: and yet the subjects of the latter pay them much
+greater honor, by prostrating before them, and offering them gifts,
+than is implied by offering an animal or any other thing in
+sacrifice. Much more therefore may one offer sacrifice to the angels
+and saints.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, temples and altars are raised for the offering of
+sacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised to angels and saints.
+Therefore sacrifices also may be offered to them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:20): "He that sacrificeth to
+gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a sacrifice is offered in
+order that something may be represented. Now the sacrifice that is
+offered outwardly represents the inward spiritual sacrifice, whereby
+the soul offers itself to God according to Ps. 50:19, "A sacrifice to
+God is an afflicted spirit," since, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 7; Q.
+84, A. 2), the outward acts of religion are directed to the inward
+acts. Again the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God as its
+beginning by creation, and its end by beatification: and according to
+the true faith God alone is the creator of our souls, as stated in
+the First Part (QQ. 90, A. 3; 118, A. 2), while in Him alone the
+beatitude of our soul consists, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 8; Q.
+2, A. 8; Q. 3, AA. 1, 7, 8). Wherefore just as to God alone ought we
+to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to offer outward
+sacrifices to Him alone: even so "in our prayers and praises we
+proffer significant words to Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the
+things which we designate thereby," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei
+x, 19). Moreover we find that in every country the people are wont to
+show the sovereign ruler some special sign of honor, and that if this
+be shown to anyone else, it is a crime of high-treason. Therefore, in
+the Divine law, the death punishment is assigned to those who offer
+Divine honor to another than God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The name of the Godhead is communicated to certain
+ones, not equally with God, but by participation; hence neither is
+equal honor due to them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The offering of a sacrifice is measured not by the
+value of the animal killed, but by its signification, for it is done
+in honor of the sovereign Ruler of the whole universe. Wherefore, as
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), "the demons rejoice, not in the
+stench of corpses, but in receiving divine honors."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 19), "we do not
+raise temples and priesthoods to the martyrs, because not they but
+their God is our God. Wherefore the priest says not: I offer
+sacrifice to thee, Peter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their
+triumphs, and urge ourselves to imitate them."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Offering of Sacrifice Is a Special Act of Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the offering of sacrifice is not a
+special act of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "A true
+sacrifice is any work done that we may cleave to God in holy
+fellowship." But not every good work is a special act of some
+definite virtue. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special
+act of a definite virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the mortification of the body by fasting belongs to
+abstinence, by continence belongs to chastity, by martyrdom belongs
+to fortitude. Now all these things seem to be comprised in the
+offering of sacrifice, according to Rom. 12:1, "Present your bodies a
+living sacrifice." Again the Apostle says (Heb. 13:16): "Do not
+forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor
+is obtained." Now it belongs to charity, mercy and liberality to do
+good and to impart. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a
+special act of a definite virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a sacrifice is apparently anything offered to God.
+Now many things are offered to God, such as devotion, prayer, tithes,
+first-fruits, oblations, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not
+appear to be a special act of a definite virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The law contains special precepts about
+sacrifices, as appears from the beginning of Leviticus.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7), where an
+act of one virtue is directed to the end of another virtue it
+partakes somewhat of its species; thus when a man thieves in order to
+commit fornication, his theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of
+fornication, so that even though it were not a sin otherwise, it
+would be a sin from the very fact that it was directed to
+fornication. Accordingly, sacrifice is a special act deserving of
+praise in that it is done out of reverence for God; and for this
+reason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But it happens
+that the acts of the other virtues are directed to the reverence of
+God, as when a man gives alms of his own things for God's sake, or
+when a man subjects his own body to some affliction out of reverence
+for God; and in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called
+sacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not deserving
+of praise save through being done out of reverence for God: such acts
+are properly called sacrifices, and belong to the virtue of religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The very fact that we wish to cling to God in a
+spiritual fellowship pertains to reverence for God: and consequently
+the act of any virtue assumes the character of a sacrifice through
+being done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Man's good is threefold. There is first his soul's good
+which is offered to God in a certain inward sacrifice by devotion,
+prayer and other like interior acts: and this is the principal
+sacrifice. The second is his body's good, which is, so to speak,
+offered to God in martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third
+is the good which consists of external things: and of these we offer
+a sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our possession to God
+immediately, and indirectly when we share them with our neighbor for
+God's sake.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A "sacrifice," properly speaking, requires that
+something be done to the thing which is offered to God, for instance
+animals were slain and burnt, the bread is broken, eaten, blessed.
+The very word signifies this, since "sacrifice" is so called because
+a man does something sacred (_facit sacrum_). On the other hand an
+"oblation" is properly the offering of something to God even if
+nothing be done thereto, thus we speak of offering money or bread at
+the altar, and yet nothing is done to them. Hence every sacrifice is
+an oblation, but not conversely. "First-fruits" are oblations,
+because they were offered to God, according to Deut. 26, but they are
+not a sacrifice, because nothing sacred was done to them. "Tithes,"
+however, are neither a sacrifice nor an oblation, properly speaking,
+because they are not offered immediately to God, but to the ministers
+of Divine worship.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 4]
+
+Whether All Are Bound to Offer Sacrifices?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all are not bound to offer
+sacrifices. The Apostle says (Rom. 3:19): "What things soever the Law
+speaketh, it speaketh to them that are in the Law." Now the law of
+sacrifices was not given to all, but only to the Hebrew people.
+Therefore all are not bound to offer sacrifices.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify
+something. But not everyone is capable of understanding these
+significations. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, priests [*_Sacerdotes:_ Those who give or administer
+sacred things (_sacra dantes_): cf. 1 Cor. 4:1] are so called because
+they offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. Therefore not
+all are bound to offer sacrifices.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The offering of sacrifices of is of the natural
+law, as stated above (A. 1). Now all are bound to do that which is of
+the natural law. Therefore all are bound to offer sacrifice to God.
+
+_I answer that,_ Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above (A. 2). The
+first and principal is the inward sacrifice, which all are bound to
+offer, since all are obliged to offer to God a devout mind. The other
+is the outward sacrifice, and this again is twofold. There is a
+sacrifice which is deserving of praise merely through being offered
+to God in protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation
+of offering this sacrifice was not the same for those under the New
+or the Old Law, as for those who were not under the Law. For those
+who are under the Law are bound to offer certain definite sacrifices
+according to the precepts of the Law, whereas those who were not
+under the Law were bound to perform certain outward actions in God's
+honor, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not definitely to
+this or that action. The other outward sacrifice is when the outward
+actions of the other virtues are performed out of reverence for God;
+some of which are a matter of precept; and to these all are bound,
+while others are works of supererogation, and to these all are not
+bound.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: All were not bound to offer those particular
+sacrifices which were prescribed in the Law: but they were bound to
+some sacrifices inward or outward, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Though all do not know explicitly the power of
+the sacrifices, they know it implicitly, even as they have implicit
+faith, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 6, 7).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The priests offer those sacrifices which are
+specially directed to the Divine worship, not only for themselves but
+also for others. But there are other sacrifices, which anyone can
+offer to God for himself as explained above (AA. 2, 3).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 86
+
+OF OBLATIONS AND FIRST-FRUITS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must next consider oblations and first-fruits. Under this head
+there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether any oblations are necessary as a matter of precept?
+
+(2) To whom are oblations due?
+
+(3) of what things they should be made?
+
+(4) In particular, as to first-fruits, whether men are bound to offer
+them?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Men Are Under a Necessity of Precept to Make Oblations?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to make
+oblations. Men are not bound, at the time of the Gospel, to observe
+the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above (I-II, Q.
+103, AA. 3, 4). Now the offering of oblations is one of the
+ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, since it is written (Ex. 23:14):
+"Three times every year you shall celebrate feasts with Me," and
+further on (Ex. 23:15): "Thou shalt not appear empty before Me."
+Therefore men are not now under a necessity of precept to make
+oblations.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, before they are made, oblations depend on man's
+will, as appears from our Lord's saying (Matt. 5:23), "If . . . thou
+offer thy gift at the altar," as though this were left to the choice
+of the offerer: and when once oblations have been made, there is no
+way of offering them again. Therefore in no way is a man under a
+necessity of precept to make oblations.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if anyone is bound to give a certain thing to the
+Church, and fails to give it, he can be compelled to do so by being
+deprived of the Church's sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to
+refuse the sacraments of the Church to those who refuse to make
+oblations according to a decree of the sixth council [*Can. Trullan,
+xxiii, quoted I, qu. i, can. Nullus]: "Let none who dispense Holy
+Communion exact anything of the recipient, and if they exact anything
+let them be deposed." Therefore it is not necessary that men should
+make oblations.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says [*Gregory VII; Concil. Roman. v, can.
+xii]: "Let every Christian take care that he offer something to God
+at the celebration of Mass."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 85, A. 3, ad 3), the term
+"oblation" is common to all things offered for the Divine worship, so
+that if a thing be offered to be destroyed in worship of God, as
+though it were being made into something holy, it is both an oblation
+and a sacrifice. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 29:18): "Thou shalt
+offer the whole ram for a burnt-offering upon the altar; it is an
+oblation to the Lord, a most sweet savor of the victim of the Lord";
+and (Lev. 2:1): "When anyone shall offer an oblation of sacrifice to
+the Lord, his offering shall be of fine flour." If, on the other
+hand, it be offered with a view to its remaining entire and being
+deputed to the worship of God or to the use of His ministers, it will
+be an oblation and not a sacrifice. Accordingly it is essential to
+oblations of this kind that they be offered voluntarily, according to
+Ex. 25:2, of "every man that offereth of his own accord you shall
+take them." Nevertheless it may happen in four ways that one is bound
+to make oblations. First, on account of a previous agreement: as when
+a person is granted a portion of Church land, that he may make
+certain oblations at fixed times, although this has the character of
+rent. Secondly, by reason of a previous assignment or promise; as
+when a man offers a gift among the living, or by will bequeaths to
+the Church something whether movable or immovable to be delivered at
+some future time. Thirdly, on account of the need of the Church, for
+instance if her ministers were without means of support. Fourthly, on
+account of custom; for the faithful are bound at certain solemn
+feasts to make certain customary oblations. In the last two cases,
+however, the oblation remains voluntary, as regards, to wit, the
+quantity or kind of the thing offered.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Under the New Law men are not bound to make oblations
+on account of legal solemnities, as stated in Exodus, but on account
+of certain other reasons, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Some are bound to make oblations, both before making
+them, as in the first, third, and fourth cases, and after they have
+made them by assignment or promise: for they are bound to offer in
+reality that which has been already offered to the Church by way of
+assignment.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Those who do not make the oblations they are
+bound to make may be punished by being deprived of the sacraments, not
+by the priest himself to whom the oblations should be made, lest he
+seem to exact, something for bestowing the sacraments, but by someone
+superior to him.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Oblations Are Due to Priests Alone?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that oblations are not due to priests
+alone. For chief among oblations would seem to be those that are
+deputed to the sacrifices of victims. Now whatever is given to the
+poor is called a "victim" in Scripture according to Heb. 13:16, "Do
+not forget to do good and to impart, for by such victims [Douay:
+'sacrifices'] God's favor is obtained." Much more therefore are
+oblations due to the poor.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in many parishes monks have a share in the
+oblations. Now "the case of clerics is distinct from the case of
+monks," as Jerome states [*Ep. xiv, ad Heliod.]. Therefore oblations
+art not due to priests alone.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, lay people with the consent of the Church buy
+oblations such as loaves and so forth, and they do so for no other
+reason than that they may make use thereof themselves. Therefore
+oblations may have reference to the laity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A canon of Pope Damasus [*Damasus I] quoted X, qu.
+i [*Can. Hanc consuetudinem], says: "None but the priests whom day by
+day we see serving the Lord may eat and drink of the oblations which
+are offered within the precincts of the Holy Church: because in the
+Old Testament the Lord forbade the children of Israel to eat the
+sacred loaves, with the exception of Aaron and his sons" (Lev. 24:8,
+9).
+
+_I answer that,_ The priest is appointed mediator and stands, so to
+speak, _between_ the people and God, as we read of Moses (Deut. 5:5),
+wherefore it belongs to him to set forth the Divine teachings and
+sacraments before the people; and besides to offer to the Lord things
+appertaining to the people, their prayers, for instance, their
+sacrifices and oblations. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): "Every
+high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things
+that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for
+sins." Hence the oblations which the people offer to God concern the
+priests, not only as regards their turning them to their own use, but
+also as regards the faithful dispensation thereof, by spending them
+partly on things appertaining to the Divine worship, partly on things
+touching their own livelihood (since they that serve the altar
+partake with the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13), and partly for the
+good of the poor, who, as far as possible, should be supported from
+the possessions of the Church: for our Lord had a purse for the use
+of the poor, as Jerome observes on Matt. 17:26, "That we may not
+scandalize them."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is given to the poor is not a sacrifice
+properly speaking; yet it is called a sacrifice in so far as it is
+given to them for God's sake. In like manner, and for the same
+reason, it can be called an oblation, though not properly speaking,
+since it is not given immediately to God. Oblations properly so
+called fall to the use of the poor, not by the dispensation of the
+offerers, but by the dispensation of the priests.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Monks or other religious may receive oblations under
+three counts. First, as poor, either by the dispensation of the
+priests, or by ordination of the Church; secondly, through being
+ministers of the altar, and then they can accept oblations that are
+freely offered; thirdly, if the parishes belong to them, and they can
+accept oblations, having a right to them as rectors of the Church.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Oblations when once they are consecrated, such
+as sacred vessels and vestments, cannot be granted to the use of the
+laity: and this is the meaning of the words of Pope Damasus. But those
+which are unconsecrated may be allowed to the use of layfolk by
+permission of the priests, whether by way of gift or by way of sale.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 3]
+
+Whether a Man May Make Oblations of Whatever He Lawfully Possesses?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a man may not make oblations of
+whatever he lawfully possesses. According to human law [*Dig. xii, v,
+de Condict. ob. turp. vel iniust. caus. 4] "the whore's is a shameful
+trade in what she does but not in what she takes," and consequently
+what she takes she possesses lawfully. Yet it is not lawful for her
+to make an oblation with her gains, according to Deut. 23:18, "Thou
+shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of the Lord
+thy God." Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever
+one possesses lawfully.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in the same passage it is forbidden to offer "the
+price of a dog" in the house of God. But it is evident that a man
+possesses lawfully the price of a dog he has lawfully sold. Therefore
+it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever we possess lawfully.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Malachi 1:8): "If you offer the lame
+and the sick, is it not evil?" Yet an animal though lame or sick is a
+lawful possession. Therefore it would seem that not of every lawful
+possession may one make an oblation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 3:9): "Honor the Lord with
+thy substance." Now whatever a man possesses lawfully belongs to his
+substance. Therefore he may make oblations of whatever he possesses
+lawfully.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. cxiii),
+"shouldst thou plunder one weaker than thyself and give some of the
+spoil to the judge, if he should pronounce in thy favor, such is the
+force of justice that even thou wouldst not be pleased with him: and
+if this should not please thee, neither does it please thy God."
+Hence it is written (Ecclus. 34:21): "The offering of him that
+sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten is stained." Therefore it is
+evident that an oblation must not be made of things unjustly acquired
+or possessed. In the Old Law, however, wherein the figure was
+predominant, certain things were reckoned unclean on account of their
+signification, and it was forbidden to offer them. But in the New Law
+all God's creatures are looked upon as clean, as stated in Titus
+1:15: and consequently anything that is lawfully possessed,
+considered in itself, may be offered in oblation. But it may happen
+accidentally that one may not make an oblation of what one possesses
+lawfully; for instance if it be detrimental to another person, as in
+the case of a son who offers to God the means of supporting his
+father (which our Lord condemns, Matt. 15:5), or if it give rise to
+scandal or contempt, or the like.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the Old Law it was forbidden to make an offering of
+the hire of a strumpet on account of its uncleanness, and in the New
+Law, on account of scandal, lest the Church seem to favor sin if she
+accept oblations from the profits of sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the Law, a dog was deemed an unclean
+animal. Yet other unclean animals were redeemed and their price could
+be offered, according to Lev. 27:27, "If it be an unclean animal, he
+that offereth it shall redeem it." But a dog was neither offered nor
+redeemed, both because idolaters used dogs in sacrifices to their
+idols, and because they signify robbery, the proceeds of which cannot
+be offered in oblation. However, this prohibition ceased under the
+New Law.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The oblation of a blind or lame animal was declared
+unlawful for three reasons. First, on account of the purpose for
+which it was offered, wherefore it is written (Malach. 1:8): "If you
+offer the blind in sacrifice, is it not evil?" and it behooved
+sacrifices to be without blemish. Secondly, on account of contempt,
+wherefore the same text goes on (Malach. 1:12): "You have profaned"
+My name, "in that you say: The table of the Lord is defiled and that
+which is laid thereupon is contemptible." Thirdly, on account of a
+previous vow, whereby a man has bound himself to offer without
+blemish whatever he has vowed: hence the same text says further on
+(Malach. 1:14): "Cursed is the deceitful man that hath in his flock a
+male, and making a vow offereth in sacrifice that which is feeble to
+the Lord." The same reasons avail still in the New Law, but when they
+do not apply the unlawfulness ceases.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Men Are Bound to Pay First-fruits?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to pay
+first-fruits. After giving the law of the first-born the text
+continues (Ex. 13:9): "It shall be as a sign in thy hand," so that,
+apparently, it is a ceremonial precept. But ceremonial precepts are
+not to be observed in the New Law. Neither therefore ought
+first-fruits to be paid.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, first-fruits were offered to the Lord for a special
+favor conferred on that people, wherefore it is written (Deut. 26:2,
+3): "Thou shalt take the first of all thy fruits . . . and thou shalt
+go to the priest that shall be in those days, and say to him: I
+profess this day before the Lord thy God, that I am come into the
+land, for which He swore to our fathers, that He would give it us."
+Therefore other nations are not bound to pay first-fruits.
+
+Obj. 3: That which one is bound to do should be something definite.
+But neither in the New Law nor in the Old do we find mention of a
+definite amount of first-fruits. Therefore one is not bound of
+necessity to pay them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is laid down (16, qu. vii, can. Decimas): "We
+confirm the right of priests to tithes and first-fruits, and
+everybody must pay them."
+
+_I answer that,_ First-fruits are a kind of oblation, because they
+are offered to God with a certain profession (Deut. 26); where the
+same passage continues: "The priest taking the basket containing the
+first-fruits from the hand of him that bringeth the first-fruits,
+shall set it before the altar of the Lord thy God," and further on
+(Deut. 26:10) he is commanded to say: "Therefore now I offer the
+first-fruits of the land, which the Lord hath given me." Now the
+first-fruits were offered for a special reason, namely, in
+recognition of the divine favor, as though man acknowledged that he
+had received the fruits of the earth from God, and that he ought to
+offer something to God in return, according to 1 Paral 29:14, "We
+have given Thee what we received of Thy hand." And since what we
+offer God ought to be something special, hence it is that man was
+commanded to offer God his first-fruits, as being a special part of
+the fruits of the earth: and since a priest is "ordained for the
+people in the things that appertain to God" (Heb. 5:1), the
+first-fruits offered by the people were granted to the priest's use.
+Wherefore it is written (Num. 18:8): "The Lord said to Aaron: Behold
+I have given thee the charge of My first-fruits." Now it is a point
+of natural law that man should make an offering in God's honor out of
+the things he has received from God, but that the offering should be
+made to any particular person, or out of his first-fruits, or in such
+or such a quantity, was indeed determined in the Old Law by divine
+command; but in the New Law it is fixed by the declaration of the
+Church, in virtue of which men are bound to pay first-fruits
+according to the custom of their country and the needs of the
+Church's ministers.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The ceremonial observances were properly speaking signs
+of the future, and consequently they ceased when the foreshadowed
+truth was actually present. But the offering of first-fruits was for
+a sign of a past favor, whence arises the duty of acknowledgment in
+accordance with the dictate of natural reason. Hence taken in a
+general sense this obligation remains.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: First-fruits were offered in the Old Law, not only on
+account of the favor of the promised land given by God, but also on
+account of the favor of the fruits of the earth, which were given by
+God. Hence it is written (Deut. 26:10): "I offer the first-fruits of
+the land which the Lord hath given me," which second motive is common
+among all people. We may also reply that just as God granted the land
+of promise to the Jews by a special favor, so by a general favor He
+bestowed the lordship of the earth on the whole of mankind, according
+to Ps. 113:24, "The earth He has given to the children of men."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezech. 45:13, 14; cf. Cap.
+Decimam, de Decim. Primit. et Oblat.]: "According to the tradition of
+the ancients the custom arose for those who had most to give the
+priests a fortieth part, and those who had least, one sixtieth, in
+lieu of first-fruits." Hence it would seem that first-fruits should
+vary between these limits according to the custom of one's country.
+And it was reasonable that the amount of first-fruits should not be
+fixed by law, since, as stated above, first-fruits are offered by way
+of oblation, a condition of which is that it should be voluntary.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 87
+
+OF TITHES
+(In Four Articles)
+
+Next we must consider tithes, under which head there are four points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether men are bound by precept to pay tithes?
+
+(2) Of what things ought tithes to be paid?
+
+(3) To whom ought they to be paid?
+
+(4) Who ought to pay tithes?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Men Are Bound to Pay Tithes Under a Necessity of Precept?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to pay
+tithes. The commandment to pay tithes is contained in the Old Law
+(Lev. 27:30), "All tithes of the land, whether of corn or of the
+fruits of trees, are the Lord's," and further on (Lev. 27:32): "Of
+all the tithes of oxen and sheep and goats, that pass under the
+shepherd's rod, every tenth that cometh shall be sanctified to the
+Lord." This cannot be reckoned among the moral precepts, because
+natural reason does not dictate that one ought to give a tenth part,
+rather than a ninth or eleventh. Therefore it is either a judicial or
+a ceremonial precept. Now, as stated above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 3; Q.
+104, A. 3), during the time of grace men are hound neither to the
+ceremonial nor to the judicial precepts of the Old Law. Therefore men
+are not bound now to pay tithes.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, during the time of grace men are bound only to those
+things which were commanded by Christ through the Apostles, according
+to Matt. 28:20, "Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I
+have commanded you"; and Paul says (Acts 20:27): "I have not spared
+to declare unto you all the counsel of God." Now neither in the
+teaching of Christ nor in that of the apostles is there any mention
+of the paying of tithes: for the saying of our Lord about tithes
+(Matt. 23:23), "These things you ought to have done" seems to refer
+to the past time of legal observance: thus Hilary says (Super Matth.
+can. xxiv): "The tithing of herbs, which was useful in foreshadowing
+the future, was not to be omitted." Therefore during the time of
+grace men are not bound to pay tithes.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, during the time of grace, men are not more bound to
+the legal observances than before the Law. But before the Law tithes
+were given, by reason not of a precept but of a vow. For we read
+(Gen. 28:20, 22) that Jacob "made a vow" saying: "If God shall be
+with me, and shall keep me in the way by which I walk . . . of all
+the things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee."
+Neither, therefore, during the time of grace are men bound to pay
+tithes.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, in the Old Law men were bound to pay three kinds of
+tithe. For it is written (Num. 18:23, 24): "The sons of Levi . . .
+shall . . . be content with the oblation of tithes, which I have
+separated for their uses and necessities." Again, there were other
+tithes of which we read (Deut. 14:22, 23): "Every year thou shalt set
+aside the tithes of all thy fruits, that the earth bringeth forth
+year by year; and thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God in the place
+which He shall choose." And there were yet other tithes, of which it
+is written (Deut. 14:28): "The third year thou shalt separate another
+tithe of all things that grow to thee at that time, and shalt lay it
+up within thy gates. And the Levite that hath no other part nor
+possession with thee, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the
+widow, that are within thy gates, shall . . . eat and be filled." Now
+during the time of grace men are not bound to pay the second and
+third tithes. Neither therefore are they bound to pay the first.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, a debt that is due without any time being fixed for
+its payment, must be paid at once under pain of sin. Accordingly if
+during the time of grace men are bound, under necessity of precept,
+to pay tithes in those countries where tithes are not paid, they
+would all be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the
+ministers of the Church for dissembling. But this seems unreasonable.
+Therefore during the time of grace men are not bound under necessity
+of precept to pay tithes.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Append. Serm. cclxxcii], whose words
+are quoted 16, qu. i [*Can. Decimae], says: "It is a duty to pay
+tithes, and whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to
+another."
+
+_I answer that,_ In the Old Law tithes were paid for the sustenance
+of the ministers of God. Hence it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring
+all the tithes into My [Vulg.: 'the'] store-house that there may be
+meat in My house." Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was
+partly moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly
+judicial, deriving its force from its divine institution. Because
+natural reason dictates that the people should administer the
+necessaries of life to those who minister the divine worship for the
+welfare of the whole people even as it is the people's duty to
+provide a livelihood for their rulers and soldiers and so forth.
+Hence the Apostle proves this from human custom, saying (1 Cor. 9:7):
+"Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge? Who planteth
+a vineyard and eateth not of the fruit thereof?" But the fixing of
+the proportion to be offered to the ministers of divine worship does
+not belong to the natural law, but was determined by divine
+institution, in accordance with the condition of that people to whom
+the law was being given. For they were divided into twelve tribes,
+and the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was engaged exclusively
+in the divine ministry and had no possessions whence to derive a
+livelihood: and so it was becomingly ordained that the remaining
+eleven tribes should give one-tenth part of their revenues to the
+Levites [*Num. 18:21] that the latter might live respectably; and
+also because some, through negligence, would disregard this precept.
+Hence, so far as the tenth part was fixed, the precept was judicial,
+since all institutions established among this people for the special
+purpose of preserving equality among men, in accordance with this
+people's condition, are called "judicial precepts." Nevertheless by
+way of consequence these institutions foreshadowed something in the
+future, even as everything else connected with them, according to 1
+Cor. 12, "All these things happened to them in figure." In this
+respect they had something in common with the _ceremonial precepts,_
+which were instituted chiefly that they might be signs of the future.
+Hence the precept about paying tithes foreshadowed something in the
+future. For ten is, in a way, the perfect number (being the first
+numerical limit, since the figures do not go beyond ten but begin
+over again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth, which is
+the sign of perfection, reserving the nine other parts for himself,
+acknowledged by a sign that imperfection was his part, and that the
+perfection which was to come through Christ was to be hoped for from
+God. Yet this proves it to be, not a ceremonial but a judicial
+precept, as stated above.
+
+There is this difference between the ceremonial and judicial precepts
+of the Law, as we stated above (I-II, Q. 104, A. 3), that it is
+unlawful to observe the ceremonial precepts at the time of the New
+Law, whereas there is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during
+the time of grace although they are not binding. Indeed they are
+bound to be observed by some, if they be ordained by the authority of
+those who have power to make laws. Thus it was a judicial precept of
+the Old Law that he who stole a sheep should restore four sheep (Ex.
+22:1), and if any king were to order this to be done his subjects
+would be bound to obey. In like manner during the time of the New Law
+the authority of the Church has established the payment of tithe;
+thus showing a certain kindliness, lest the people of the New Law
+should give less to the ministers of the New Testament than did the
+people of the Old Law to the ministers of the Old Testament; for the
+people of the New Law are under greater obligations, according to
+Matt. 5:20, "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes
+and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," and,
+moreover, the ministers of the New Testament are of greater dignity
+than the ministers of the Old Testament, as the Apostle shows (2 Cor.
+3:7, 8).
+
+Accordingly it is evident that man's obligation to pay tithes arises
+partly from natural law, partly from the institution of the Church;
+who, nevertheless, in consideration of the requirements of time and
+persons might ordain the payment of some other proportion.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The precept about paying tithes, in so far as it was a
+moral precept, was given in the Gospel by our Lord when He said
+(Matt. 10:10) [*The words as quoted are from Luke 10:7: Matthew has
+'meat' instead of 'hire']: "The workman is worthy of his hire," and
+the Apostle says the same (1 Cor. 9:4 seqq.). But the fixing of the
+particular proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Before the time of the Old Law the ministry of the
+divine worship was not entrusted to any particular person; although
+it is stated that the first-born were priests, and that they received
+a double portion. For this very reason no particular portion was
+directed to be given to the ministers of the divine worship: but when
+they met with one, each man of his own accord gave him what he deemed
+right. Thus Abraham by a kind of prophetic instinct gave tithes to
+Melchisedech, the priest of the Most High God, according to Gen.
+14:20, and again Jacob made a vow to give tithes [*Gen. 28:20],
+although he appears to have vowed to do so, not by paying them to
+ministers, but for the purpose of the divine worship, for instance
+for the fulfilling of sacrifices, hence he said significantly: "I
+will offer tithes to Thee."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The second kind of tithe, which was reserved for the
+offering of sacrifices, has no place in the New Law, since the legal
+victims had ceased. But the third kind of tithe which they had to eat
+with the poor, is increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded us
+to give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our surplus,
+according to Luke 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms." Moreover
+the tithes that are given to the ministers of the Church should be
+dispensed by them for the use of the poor.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The ministers of the Church ought to be more
+solicitous for the increase of spiritual goods in the people, than for
+the amassing of temporal goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to
+make use of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his
+livelihood from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest he should
+occasion a hindrance to the Gospel of Christ [*1 Cor. 9:12]. Nor did
+they sin who did not contribute to his upkeep, else the Apostle would
+not have omitted to reprove them. In like manner the ministers of the
+Church rightly refrain from demanding the Church's tithes, when they
+could not demand them without scandal, on account of their having
+fallen into desuetude, or for some other reason. Nevertheless those
+who do not give tithes in places where the Church does not demand them
+are not in a state of damnation, unless they be obstinate, and
+unwilling to pay even if tithes were demanded of them.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Men Are Bound to Pay Tithes of All Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to give tithes of
+all things. The paying of tithes seems to be an institution of the
+Old Law. Now the Old Law contains no precept about personal tithes,
+viz. those that are payable on property acquired by one's own act,
+for instance by commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is bound to
+pay tithes on such things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is not right to make oblations of that which is
+ill-gotten, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 3). Now oblations, being
+offered to God immediately, seem to be more closely connected with
+the divine worship than tithes which are offered to the ministers.
+Therefore neither should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in the last chapter of Leviticus (30, 32) the
+precept of paying tithes refers only to "corn, fruits of trees" and
+animals "that pass under the shepherd's rod." But man derives a
+revenue from other smaller things, such as the herbs that grow in his
+garden and so forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound
+to pay tithes.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, man cannot pay except what is in his power. Now a
+man does not always remain in possession of all his profit from land
+and stock, since sometimes he loses them by theft or robbery;
+sometimes they are transferred to another person by sale; sometimes
+they are due to some other person, thus taxes are due to princes, and
+wages due to workmen. Therefore one ought not to pay tithes on such
+like things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 28:22): "Of all things that
+Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee."
+
+_I answer that,_ In judging about a thing we should look to its
+principle. Now the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt
+whereby carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things,
+according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:11), "If we have
+sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your
+carnal things?" [thus implying that on the contrary "it is no great
+matter if we reap your carnal things"] [*The phrase in the brackets
+is omitted in the Leonine edition]. For this debt is the principle on
+which is based the commandment of the Church about the payment of
+tithes. Now whatever man possesses comes under the designation of
+carnal things. Therefore tithes must be paid on whatever one
+possesses.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In accordance with the condition of that people there
+was a special reason why the Old Law did not include a precept about
+personal tithes; because, to wit, all the other tribes had certain
+possessions wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient
+livelihood for the Levites who had no possessions, but were not
+forbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations as the
+other Jews did. On the other hand the people of the New Law are
+spread abroad throughout the world, and many of them have no
+possessions, but live by trade, and these would contribute nothing to
+the support of God's ministers if they did not pay tithes on their
+trade profits. Moreover the ministers of the New Law are more
+strictly forbidden to occupy themselves in money-making trades,
+according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man being a soldier to God, entangleth
+himself with secular business." Wherefore in the New Law men are
+bound to pay personal tithes, according to the custom of their
+country and the needs of the ministers: hence Augustine, whose words
+are quoted 16, qu. 1, cap. Decimae, says [*Append. Serm. cclxxvii]:
+"Tithes must be paid on the profits of soldiering, trade or craft."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Things are ill-gotten in two ways. First, because the
+getting itself was unjust: such, for instance, are things gotten by
+robbery, theft or usury: and these a man is bound to restore, and not
+to pay tithes on them. If, however, a field be bought with the
+profits of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce,
+because the latter is not gotten usuriously but given by God. On the
+other hand certain things are said to be ill-gotten, because they are
+gotten of a shameful cause, for instance of whoredom or
+stage-playing, and the like. Such things a man is not bound to
+restore, and consequently he is bound to pay tithes on them in the
+same way as other personal tithes. Nevertheless the Church must not
+accept the tithe so long as those persons remain in sin, lest she
+appear to have a share in their sins: but when they have done
+penance, tithes may be accepted from them on these things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Things directed to an end must be judged according to
+their fittingness to the end. Now the payment of tithes is due not
+for its own sake, but for the sake of the ministers, to whose dignity
+it is unbecoming that they should demand minute things with careful
+exactitude, for this is reckoned sinful according to the Philosopher
+(Ethic. iv, 2). Hence the Old Law did not order the payment of tithes
+on such like minute things, but left it to the judgment of those who
+are willing to pay, because minute things are counted as nothing.
+Wherefore the Pharisees who claimed for themselves the perfect
+justice of the Law, paid tithes even on these minute things: nor are
+they reproved by our Lord on that account, but only because they
+despised greater, i.e. spiritual, precepts; and rather did He show
+them to be deserving of praise in this particular, when He said
+(Matt. 23:23): "These things you ought to have done," i.e. during the
+time of the Law, according to Chrysostom's [*Hom. xliv in the Opus
+Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commentary. This
+also seems to denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore
+now too men are not bound to pay tithes on such minute things, except
+perhaps by reason of the custom of one's country.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A man is not bound to pay tithes on what he has lost by
+theft or robbery, before he recovers his property: unless he has
+incurred the loss through his own fault or neglect, because the
+Church ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat
+that has not been tithed, the Church can command the tithes due to
+her, both from the buyer who has a thing due to the Church, and from
+the seller, because so far as he is concerned he has defrauded the
+Church: yet if one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on
+the fruits of the earth, in so far as these fruits are the gift of
+God. Wherefore tithes do not come under a tax, nor are they subject
+to workmen's wages. Hence it is not right to deduct one's taxes and
+the wages paid to workmen, before paying tithes: but tithes must be
+paid before anything else on one's entire produce.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Tithes Should Be Paid to the Clergy?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that tithes should not be paid to the
+clergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the Old Testament, because
+they had no portion in the people's possessions, according to Num.
+18:23, 24. But in the New Testament the clergy have possessions not
+only ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover they
+receive first-fruits, and oblations for the living and the dead.
+Therefore it is unnecessary to pay tithes to them.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it sometimes happens that a man dwells in one
+parish, and farms in another; or a shepherd may take his flock within
+the bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the
+bounds of another parish during the other part of the year; or he may
+have his sheepfold in one parish, and graze the sheep in another. Now
+in all these and similar cases it seems impossible to decide to which
+clergy the tithes ought to be paid. Therefore it would seem that no
+fixed tithe ought to be paid to the clergy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is the general custom in certain countries for
+the soldiers to hold the tithes from the Church in fee; and certain
+religious receive tithes. Therefore seemingly tithes are not due only
+to those of the clergy who have care of souls.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Num. 18:21): "I have given to the
+sons of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the
+ministry wherewith they serve Me in the Tabernacle." Now the clergy
+are the successors of the sons of Levi in the New Testament.
+Therefore tithes are due to the clergy alone.
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things have to be considered with regard to
+tithes: namely, the right to receive tithes, and the things given in
+the name of tithes. The right to receive tithes is a spiritual thing,
+for it arises from the debt in virtue of which the ministers of the
+altar have a right to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal
+things are due to those who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns
+none but the clergy who have care of souls, and so they alone are
+competent to have this right.
+
+On the other hand the things given in the name of tithes are
+material, wherefore they may come to be used by anyone, and thus it
+is that they fall into the hands of the laity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the Old Law, as stated above (A. 1, ad 4), special
+tithes were earmarked for the assistance of the poor. But in the New
+Law the tithes are given to the clergy, not only for their own
+support, but also that the clergy may use them in assisting the poor.
+Hence they are not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations and
+first-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary for this same
+purpose.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Personal tithes are due to the church in whose parish a
+man dwells, while predial tithes seem more reasonably to belong to
+the church within whose bounds the land is situated. The law,
+however, prescribes that in this matter a custom that has obtained
+for a long time must be observed [*Cap. Cum sint, and Cap. Ad
+apostolicae, de Decimis, etc.]. The shepherd who grazes his flock at
+different seasons in two parishes, should pay tithe proportionately
+to both churches. And since the fruit of the flock is derived from
+the pasture, the tithe of the flock is due to the church in whose
+lands the flock grazes, rather than to the church on whose land the
+fold is situated.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as the Church can hand over to a layman the things
+she receives under the title of tithe, so too can she allow him to
+receive tithes that are yet to be paid, the right of receiving being
+reserved to the ministers of the Church. The motive may be either the
+need of the Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers
+through being granted to them in fee by the Church, or it may be the
+succoring of the poor; thus certain tithes have been granted by way
+of alms to certain lay religious, or to those that have no care of
+souls. Some religious, however, are competent to receive tithes,
+because they have care of souls.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Clergy Also Are Bound to Pay Tithes?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that clerics also are bound to pay tithes.
+By common law [*Cap. Cum homines, de Decimis, etc.] the parish church
+should receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory.
+Now it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain lands of their
+own on the territory of some parish church, or that one church has
+ecclesiastical property on the territory of another. Therefore it
+would seem that the clergy are bound to pay predial tithes.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, some religious are clerics; and yet they are bound
+to pay tithes to churches on account of the lands which they
+cultivate even with their own hands [*Cap. Ex parte, and Cap.
+Nuper.]. Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune from
+the payment of tithes.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in the eighteenth chapter of Numbers (26, 28), it is
+prescribed not only that the Levites should receive tithes from the
+people, but also that they should themselves pay tithes to the
+high-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the
+Sovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to
+the clergy.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, tithes should serve not only for the support of the
+clergy, but also for the assistance of the poor. Therefore, if the
+clergy are exempt from paying tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the
+latter is not true. Therefore the former is false.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A decretal of Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says: "It
+is a new form of exaction when the clergy demand tithes from the
+clergy" [*Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc.].
+
+_I answer that,_ The cause of giving cannot be the cause of
+receiving, as neither can the cause of action be the cause of
+passion; yet it happens that one and the same person is giver and
+receiver, even as agent and patient, on account of different causes
+and from different points of view. Now tithes are due to the clergy
+as being ministers of the altar and sowers of spiritual things among
+the people. Wherefore those members of the clergy as such, i.e. as
+having ecclesiastical property, are not bound to pay tithes; whereas
+from some other cause through holding property in their own right,
+either by inheriting it from their kindred, or by purchase, or in any
+other similar manner, they are bound to the payment of tithes.
+
+Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, because the clergy
+like anyone else are bound to pay tithes on their own lands to the
+parish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church,
+because to possess a thing as one's private property is not the same
+as possessing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even
+though they be within the boundaries of another parish.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Religious who are clerics, if they have care of souls,
+and dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to pay
+tithes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other
+religious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the
+people; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay
+tithes, but they are somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions
+granted by the Apostolic See [*Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad
+audientiam, de Decimis, etc.].
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the priests,
+and tithes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below the
+priests, the Lord commanded that the former should pay the
+high-priest "the tenth part of the tenth" [*Num. 18:26] instead of
+first-fruits: wherefore for the same reason the clergy are bound now
+to pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For
+natural reason dictates that he who has charge of the common estate
+of a multitude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be
+able to carry out whatever is necessary for the common welfare.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Tithes should be employed for the assistance of the
+poor, through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have no
+reason for accepting tithes, but they are bound to pay them.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 88
+
+OF VOWS
+(In Twelve Articles)
+
+We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God.
+Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is a vow?
+
+(2) What is the matter of a vow?
+
+(3) Of the obligation of vows;
+
+(4) Of the use of taking vows;
+
+(5) Of what virtue is it an act?
+
+(6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than
+without a vow?
+
+(7) Of the solemnizing of a vow;
+
+(8) Whether those who are under another's power can take vows?
+
+(9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion?
+
+(10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation?
+
+(11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of
+continence?
+
+(12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a
+dispensation from a vow?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 1]
+
+Whether a Vow Consists in a Mere Purpose of the Will?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a
+purpose of the will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.
+Aur. III, xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], "a vow is
+a conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind,
+whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain
+thing." But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may
+consist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a
+mere purpose of the will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from
+_voluntas_ (will), for one is said to do a thing _proprio voto_ (by
+one's own vow) when one does it voluntarily. Now to _purpose_ is an
+act of the will, while to _promise_ is an act of the reason.
+Therefore a vow consists in a mere act of the will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, our Lord said (Luke 9:62): "No man putting his hand
+to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." Now
+from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts
+his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting
+from his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God.
+Therefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even
+without making a promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow
+consists in a mere purpose of the will.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
+anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
+promise displeaseth Him." Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow
+is a promise.
+
+_I answer that,_ A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some
+particular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a
+promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to
+direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a
+fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs
+what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between man and
+man can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs;
+whereas a promise can be made to God by the mere inward thought,
+since according to 1 Kings 16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear,
+but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Yet we express words outwardly
+sometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with
+regard to prayer (Q. 83, A. 12), or to call others to witness, so
+that one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of
+God, but also through respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome
+from a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes
+deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly
+three things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation; the
+second is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein
+is completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two other
+things are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow, namely,
+pronouncement by word of mouth, according to Ps. 65:13, "I will pay
+Thee my vows which my lips have uttered"; and the witnessing of
+others. Hence the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a vow is "the
+witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and
+about things relating to God": although the "witnessing" may strictly
+refer to the inward protestation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by
+the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a
+promise.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Man's will moves the reason to promise something
+relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from
+the will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He that puts his hand to the plough does something
+already; while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing
+so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about doing,
+although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts
+his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches
+out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 2]
+
+Whether a Vow Should Always Be About a Better Good?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a vow need not be always about a
+better good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation.
+But vows are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about
+matters of salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil
+and his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps.
+75:12, "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God"; and Jacob vowed (Gen.
+28:21) that the Lord should be his God. Now this above all is
+necessary for salvation. Therefore vows are not only about a better
+good.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Heb. 11:32).
+Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges
+11). Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better
+good, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not
+only about a better good, but also about something unlawful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or
+that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good.
+Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which
+tend to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent
+matters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not
+always about a better good.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 23:22): "If thou wilt not
+promise thou shalt be without sin."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to
+God. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for
+someone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say
+that one would do something against someone. In like manner it would
+be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore,
+as every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God
+unless it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or
+indifferent, but only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a
+vow. But as a vow denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity
+excludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to
+be or not to be, can nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would be
+foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not fly.
+
+On the other hand, if a thing be necessary, not absolutely but on the
+supposition of an end--for instance if salvation be unattainable
+without it--it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done
+voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it.
+But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the
+supposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most
+properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good
+in comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation.
+Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the faith of
+Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these things
+are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation. The
+same answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also be explained
+that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by giving
+Him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for instance
+by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the same
+passage.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Certain things are good, whatever be their result; such
+are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter
+of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as those
+things which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the
+matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and
+as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result,
+in which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of
+Jephte, who as related in Judges 11:30, 31, "made a vow to the Lord,
+saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands,
+whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and
+shall meet me when I return in peace . . . the same will I offer a
+holocaust to the Lord." For this could have an evil result if, as
+indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be
+unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome
+says [*Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii:
+Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist.
+Scholast.]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion,
+and in keeping his vow he was wicked." Yet it is premised (Judges
+11:29) that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," because his faith
+and devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy
+Ghost; and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also
+by reason of the victory which he obtained, and because it is
+probable that he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless
+foreshadowed something good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The mortification of one's own body, for instance by
+vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it
+is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due
+discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without
+overburdening nature. On this condition such things may be the matter
+of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1), "Present your
+bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," adds, "your
+reasonable service." Since, however, man is easily mistaken in
+judging of matters concerning himself, such vows as these are more
+fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a
+superior, yet so that, should a man find that without doubt he is
+seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to
+appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about
+vain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 3]
+
+Whether All Vows Are Binding?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man
+needs things that are done by another, more than God does, since He
+has no need for our goods (Ps. 15:2). Now according to the
+prescription of human laws [*Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i] a simple
+promise made to a man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed
+on account of the changeableness of the human will. Much less binding
+therefore is a simple promise made to God, which we call a vow.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now
+sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him,
+either because it depends on another's decision, as when, for
+instance, a man vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse
+to receive him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance
+when a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a
+man vows to give a sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a
+vow is not always binding.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at
+once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if it
+be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a
+vow is not always binding.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3, 4): "Whatsoever thou
+hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a
+vow not to perform the things promised."
+
+_I answer that,_ For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's
+promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [*Ep. xxxii, 2: De
+Mendac. xx] faith takes its name "from a man's deed agreeing with his
+word" [*_Fides . . . fiunt dicta._ Cicero gives the same etymology
+(De Offic. i, 7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to God above all,
+both on account of God's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he
+has received from God. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the
+vows he has made to God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes
+to God. On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of
+infidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows should be
+paid to God, because "an unfaithful . . . promise displeaseth Him"
+[*Eccles. 5:3].
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he
+makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the natural
+law. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a promise
+he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although God needs
+not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so that
+a vow made to Him is most binding.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible
+to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that
+he have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has
+vowed to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power
+to be received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself
+to enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this
+particular form of religious life, or this place, as being most
+agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received
+there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his principal
+intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious
+life, or to this particular place, because the one or the other
+pleases him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another
+religious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into this
+particular one. On the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of
+fulfilling his vow through his own fault, he is bound over and above
+to do penance for his past fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity
+and is afterwards violated, she is bound not only to observe what is
+in her power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of what
+she has lost by sinning.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The obligation of a vow is caused by our own
+will and intention, wherefore it is written (Deut. 23:23): "That which
+is once gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou
+hast promised to the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will
+and with thy own mouth." Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one's
+intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound
+to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain
+time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate
+fulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to
+bind oneself, for it is written (Deut. 23:21): "When thou hast made a
+vow to the Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the
+Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed
+to thee for a sin."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Expedient to Take Vows?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It
+is not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God
+has given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man
+is liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity
+implicated in a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to
+take vows.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But whoever
+takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before
+taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of
+danger to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence
+Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Since thou hast
+vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou
+dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have
+been hadst thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less
+great, not less good: whereas now if thou breakest faith with God
+(which God forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have
+been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow." Therefore it is not expedient
+to take vows.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of
+me, as I also am of Christ." But we do not read that either Christ or
+the Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to
+take vows.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye and pay to the
+Lord your God."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made
+to God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God
+under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own
+profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and
+that we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that
+service: whereas we make promises to God not for His but for our own
+profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "He
+is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our
+payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him." And just as
+what we give God is useful not to Him but to us, since "what is given
+Him is added to the giver," as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment.
+et Paulin.), so also a promise whereby we vow something to God, does
+not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but
+it conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills
+immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient
+to take vows.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being
+unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will firmly
+fixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God and
+the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a
+certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence,
+Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that "happy is
+the necessity that compels us to do the better things."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is
+not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering
+bridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed,
+the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient to
+mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the
+horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, that
+may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles.
+11:4): "He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that
+considereth the clouds shall never reap." Now a man incurs danger,
+not from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind
+by breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et
+Paulin.): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that
+thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy
+detriment."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It was incompetent for Christ, by His very nature, to
+take a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man, His will
+was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a _comprehensor._ By a
+kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps. 21:26):
+"I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when He is
+speaking of His body, which is the Church.
+
+The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the
+state of perfection when "they left all things and followed Christ."
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 5]
+
+Whether a Vow Is an Act of Latria or Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or
+religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem
+to pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it.
+Therefore a vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs to
+religion to offer God worship and ceremonial rites. But he who takes
+a vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it.
+Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, religious worship should be offered to none but God.
+But a vow is made not only to God, but also to the saints and to
+one's superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their
+profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 19:21): "(The Egyptians) shall
+worship Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to
+the Lord, and perform them." Now, the worship of God is properly the
+act of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or
+religion.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1), every act of
+virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as
+it is directed to the reverence of God which is the proper end of
+latria. Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to
+the commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore
+the direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the
+proper act of latria.
+
+Now, it is evident from what has been said above (AA. 1, 2) that a
+vow is a promise made to God, and that a promise is nothing else than
+a directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise
+is made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship
+or service of God. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is
+properly an act of latria or religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of another
+virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing continency;
+while sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or
+praying. But promising either of them to God belongs to religion, for
+the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some vows belong to
+religion by reason only of the promise made to God, which is the
+essence of a vow, while others belong thereto by reason also of the
+thing promised, which is the matter of the vow.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He who promises something gives it already in as far as
+he binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when
+its cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its
+cause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who
+promises to give.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise may be
+made to a man also: and this very promise of good, which is made to a
+man, may be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a virtuous
+act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow something
+to the saints or to one's superiors: so that the promise made to the
+saints or to one's superiors is the matter of the vow, in so far as
+one vows to God to fulfil what one has promised to the saints or
+one's superiors.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 6]
+
+Whether It Is More Praiseworthy and Meritorious to Do Something in
+Fulfilment of a Vow, Than Without a Vow?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and
+meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow.
+Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. ii): "We should abstain or fast
+without putting ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest that
+which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly."
+Now he who vows to fast puts himself under the necessity of fasting.
+Therefore it would be better for him to fast without taking the vow.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): "Everyone as he hath
+determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity: for God
+loveth a cheerful giver." Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have
+vowed: and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the
+vow, for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to _Metaph._ v
+[*Ed. Did. iv, 5]. Therefore, it is better to do something without a
+vow, than in fulfilment of a vow.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the
+will on that which is vowed, as stated above (A. 4). But the will
+cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that
+thing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow
+than without a vow.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words of Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye and
+pay,"    says: "Vows are counseled to the will." But a counsel is
+about none but a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed in
+fulfilment of a vow than without a vow: since he that does it without
+a vow fulfils only one counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he
+that does it with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to
+vow and the counsel to do it.
+
+_I answer that,_ For three reasons it is better and more meritorious
+to do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because
+to vow, as stated above (A. 5) is an act of religion which is the
+chief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the
+better and more meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an
+inferior virtue is the better and more meritorious for being
+commanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being
+commanded by it, just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be
+commanded by charity. Hence the works of the other moral virtues (for
+instance, fasting, which is an act of abstinence; and being
+continent, which is an act of chastity) are better and more
+meritorious, if they be done in fulfilment of a vow, since thus they
+belong to the divine worship, being like sacrifices to God. Wherefore
+Augustine says (De Virg. viii) that "not even is virginity honorable
+as such, but only when it is consecrated to God, and cherished by
+godly continence."
+
+Secondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects
+himself to God more than he that only does it; for he subjects
+himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power,
+since in future he cannot do something else. Even so he gives more
+who gives the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only,
+as Anselm [*Eadmer] observes (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we
+thank even those who promise, as stated above (A. 5, ad 2).
+
+Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do
+anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the
+perfection of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4),
+just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is
+called a sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted should be understood as referring to
+necessity of coercion which causes an act to be involuntary and
+excludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly: "Lest that which we are
+free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." On the other
+hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the immobility
+of the will, wherefore it strengthens the will and increases
+devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher, necessity of coercion, in
+so far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity
+resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in so far as it
+strengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence Augustine says
+(Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): "Repent not of thy vow: thou
+shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou
+mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment." If, however, the very
+deed, considered in itself, were to become disagreeable and
+involuntary after one has taken the vow, the will to fulfil it
+remaining withal, it is still more meritorious than if it were done
+without the vow, since the fulfilment of a vow is an act of religion
+which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is an act.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He who does something without having vowed it has an
+immovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and at
+the time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether
+fixed for the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a vow:
+for the latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did
+that particular deed, and perchance to do it many times.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 7]
+
+Whether a Vow Is Solemnized by the Reception of Holy Orders, and by
+the Profession of a Certain Rule?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not solemnized by the
+reception of holy orders and by the profession of a certain rule. As
+stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to God. Now external
+actions pertaining to solemnity seem to be directed, not to God, but
+to men. Therefore they are related to vows accidentally: and
+consequently a solemnization of this kind is not a proper
+circumstance of a vow.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever belongs to the condition of a thing, would
+seem to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now many
+things may be the subject of a vow, which have no connection either
+with holy orders, or to any particular rule: as when a man vows a
+pilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the solemnization
+that takes place in the reception of holy orders or in the profession
+of a certain rule does not belong to the condition of a vow.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a solemn vow seems to be the same as a public vow.
+Now many other vows may be made in public besides that which is
+pronounced in receiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule;
+which latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not only
+these vows are solemn.
+
+_On the contrary,_ These vows alone are an impediment to the contract
+of marriage, and annul marriage if it be contracted, which is the
+effect of a solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the Third
+Part of this work [*Suppl., Q. 53, A. 2].
+
+_I answer that,_ The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on
+its nature (_conditio_): thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes
+the fact in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and
+arms and a concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in
+another way, namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the
+gathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made to God:
+wherefore, the solemnization of a vow consists in something spiritual
+pertaining to God; i.e. in some spiritual blessing or consecration
+which, in accordance with the institution of the apostles, is given
+when a man makes profession of observing a certain rule, in the
+second degree after the reception of holy orders, as Dionysius states
+(Eccl. Hier. vi). The reason of this is that solemnization is not
+wont to be employed, save when a man gives himself up entirely to
+some particular thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only
+when the marriage is celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom
+mutually deliver the power over their bodies to one another. In like
+manner a vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself to the divine
+ministry by receiving holy orders, or embraces the state of
+perfection by renouncing the world and his own will by the profession
+of a certain rule.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This kind of solemnization regards not only men but
+also God in so far as it is accompanied by a spiritual consecration
+or blessing, of which God is the author, though man is the minister,
+according to Num. 6:27, "They shall invoke My name upon the children
+of Israel, and I will bless them." Hence a solemn vow is more binding
+with God than a simple vow, and he who breaks a solemn vow sins more
+grievously. When it is said that a simple vow is no less binding than
+a solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either
+commits a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is not customary to solemnize particular acts, but
+the embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Hence when a man
+vows particular deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast,
+such a vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as the
+vow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or
+service: and yet many particular works are included under this vow as
+under a universal.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Through being pronounced in public vows may have a
+certain human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as
+the aforesaid vows have, even when they are pronounced before a few
+persons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Those Who Are Subject to Another's Power Are Hindered from
+Taking Vows?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another's
+power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed
+by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a
+lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God.
+Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered
+from taking vows.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet
+children may make religious profession even without the consent of
+their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows,
+through being subject to another's power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are
+under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to
+say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore
+seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But
+subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this
+forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that "if a woman vow
+any thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in
+age," she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the
+same is said there (Num. 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband.
+Therefore in like manner other persons that are subject to another's
+power cannot bind themselves by vow.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to
+God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in
+another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power.
+Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is
+subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it
+depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent
+of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those
+matters wherein he is subject to another.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a
+promise made to God, as stated above (A. 2). Now it is contrary to
+virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as
+stated above (Q. 86, A. 3). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow
+are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's power
+vows that which is in that other's power, except under the condition
+that he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is
+in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance
+with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with
+regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as
+regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters
+he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his
+father.
+
+A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his
+personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since
+this would withdraw him from his master's service.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A religious is subject to his superior as to his
+actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even
+though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not
+being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there
+is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow
+of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither
+does the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his
+consent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although the vow of one who is subject to another's
+power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is
+subject, he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood to
+contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior
+approve or do not gainsay it.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 9]
+
+Whether Children Can Bind Themselves by Vow to Enter Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by
+vow to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind,
+it is fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason.
+But this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen.
+Therefore just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to
+anything by vow, so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves
+by vow to enter religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be
+annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or
+girl before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or
+guardian (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or
+girl cannot validly make a vow before the age of fourteen.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [*Ch. 58]
+and a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted to those
+who enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation of
+the vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation,
+for children to be bound by vow to enter religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ That which is not done aright is invalid without
+being annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even
+before attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled
+by her parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore
+even before attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be
+bound by a vow to enter religion.
+
+_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said above (A.
+7), vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as stated in
+the same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a spiritual
+blessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of the
+Church, it follows that it comes under the Church's dispensation. Now
+a simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind,
+whereby one intends to put oneself under an obligation. That such an
+obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through
+defect of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind
+themselves by vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or
+imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of a vow being subject to
+another's power, as stated above (A. 8). Now these two circumstances
+concur in children before the age of puberty, because in most
+instances they are lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under
+the care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents:
+wherefore in both events their vows are without force. It happens,
+however, through a natural disposition which is not subject to human
+laws, that the use of reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who
+on this account are said to be capable of guile: and yet they are
+not, for this reason, exempt in any way from the care of their
+parents; for this care is subject to human law, which takes into
+account that which is of most frequent occurrence.
+
+Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the
+years of puberty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise
+bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use
+of reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their
+own part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by
+their parents, under whose care they are still subject.
+
+Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of
+puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account
+of the Church's decree [*Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et
+transeunt. ad Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But
+after the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind
+themselves by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent
+of their parents.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of children who have
+not yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are invalid,
+as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The vows of persons subject to another's power contain
+an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the
+superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be
+fulfilled, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which
+are taken in profession.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 10]
+
+Whether Vows Admit of Dispensation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation.
+It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping
+it. But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. 27:9, 10, "A
+beast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall
+be holy, and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a
+worse for a better." Much less, therefore, do vows admit of
+dispensation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters
+concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially
+those of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of
+God, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a
+vow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine
+law, as shown above (A. 3), and belongs to the precepts of the First
+Table since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of
+dispensation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity
+which a man owes to God, as stated above (A. 3). But no man can
+dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one
+grant a dispensation from a vow.
+
+_On the contrary,_ That which proceeds from the common will of many
+has apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the
+individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its
+force from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore
+it seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.
+
+_I answer that,_ The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the
+same sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law
+because, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4), a law is
+made with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances.
+But since in certain cases this is not good, there is need for
+someone to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be
+observed. This is properly speaking to dispense in the law: for a
+dispensation would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or
+application of some common thing to those that are contained under
+it, in the same way as a person is said to dispense food to a
+household.
+
+In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it
+were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the
+majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some
+particular case this is simply evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a
+greater good: and this is essentially contrary to that which is the
+matter of a vow, as is clear from what has been said above (A. 2).
+Therefore it is necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow is
+not to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular
+vow is not to be observed, this is called a "dispensation" from that
+vow; but if some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which
+was to have been observed, the vow is said to be "commuted." Hence it
+is less to commute a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however,
+are in the power of the Church.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was deemed
+holy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow, being, as
+it were, dedicated to the worship of God: and for this reason it
+could not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange for
+something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be
+already consecrated, e.g. a chalice or a house. On the other hand, an
+animal that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful
+matter of a sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law
+requires. Even so, vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has
+intervened.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even as man is bound by natural law and Divine precept
+to fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to obey
+the law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed
+from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience to that
+human law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the
+Divine command; but it amounts to this--that what was law is not law
+in this particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a
+dispensation, that which was contained under a vow is by his
+authority no longer so contained, in so far as he decides that in
+this case such and such a thing is not fitting matter for a vow.
+Consequently when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a
+vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural
+or of the Divine law, but he pronounces a decision on a matter to
+which a man had bound himself of his own accord, and of which he was
+unable to consider every circumstance.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The fidelity we owe to God does not require that we
+fulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which would
+be an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from
+that vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow is not
+contrary to the fidelity due to God.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 11]
+
+Whether It Is Possible to Be Dispensed from a Solemn Vow of
+Continency?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a
+solemn vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a
+dispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good.
+But a vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle
+to a greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the
+good of an individual. Now one man's continency may be an obstacle to
+the good of the whole community, for instance, in the case where, if
+certain persons who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of
+their country might be procured. Therefore it seems that it is
+possible to be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, religion is a more excellent virtue than chastity.
+Now if a man vows an act of religion, e.g. to offer sacrifice to God
+he can be dispensed from that vow. Much more, therefore, can he be
+dispensed from the vow of continency which is about an act of
+chastity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may be
+a source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance of a
+vow of continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be
+dispensed from that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body.
+Therefore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow of
+continency.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, just as the vow of continency is part of the
+religious profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the
+vows of poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed
+from the vows of poverty and obedience, as in the case of those who
+are appointed bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems
+that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy
+of a continent soul."
+
+Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach.) at the end of the Decretal, _Cum
+ad Monasterium,_ it is stated that the "renouncing of property, like
+the keeping of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that
+not even the Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance."
+
+_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in a solemn vow of
+continency: first, the matter of the vow, namely, continency;
+secondly, the perpetuity of the vow, namely, when a person binds
+himself by vow to the perpetual observance of chastity: thirdly, the
+solemnity of the vow. Accordingly, some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.
+Aur. III. vii. 1, qu. 5] say that the solemn vow cannot be a matter
+of dispensation, on account of the continency itself for which no
+worthy price can be found, as is stated by the authority quoted
+above. The reason for this is assigned by some to the fact that by
+continency man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the fact that by
+continency man is perfectly conformed to Christ in respect of purity
+of both body and soul. But this reason does not seem to be cogent
+since the goods of the soul, such as contemplation and prayer, far
+surpass the goods of the body and still more conform us to God, and
+yet one may be dispensed from a vow of prayer or contemplation.
+Therefore, continency itself absolutely considered seems no reason
+why the solemn vow thereof cannot be a matter of dispensation;
+especially seeing that the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:34) exhorts us to be
+continent on account of contemplation, when he says that the
+unmarried woman . . . "thinketh on the things of God [Vulg.: 'the
+Lord']," and since the end is of more account than the means.
+
+Consequently others [*Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38] find the
+reason for this in the perpetuity and universality of this vow. For
+they assert that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by
+something altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any
+vow. But this is evidently false, because just as the practice of
+carnal intercourse is contrary to continency, so is eating flesh or
+drinking wine contrary to abstinence from such things, and yet these
+latter vows may be a matter for dispensation.
+
+For this reason others [*Innocent IV, on the above decretal] maintain
+that one may be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency, for
+the sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the
+example given above (Obj. 1), of a country being restored to peace
+through a certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the Decretal
+quoted says explicitly that "not even the Sovereign Pontiff can
+dispense a monk from keeping chastity," it follows seemingly, that we
+must maintain that, as stated above (A. 10, ad 1; cf. Lev. 27:9, 10,
+28), whatsoever has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to
+any other use. For no ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is
+sanctified to lose its consecration, not even though it be something
+inanimate, for instance a consecrated chalice to be not consecrated,
+so long as it remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a prelate
+make a man that is consecrated to God cease to be consecrated, so
+long as he lives. Now the solemnity of a vow consists in a kind of
+consecration or blessing of the person who takes the vow, as stated
+above (A. 7). Hence no prelate of the Church can make a man, who has
+pronounced a solemn vow, to be quit of that to which he was
+consecrated, e.g. one who is a priest, to be a priest no more,
+although a prelate may, for some particular reason, inhibit him from
+exercising his order. In like manner the Pope cannot make a man who
+has made his religious profession cease to be a religious, although
+certain jurists have ignorantly held the contrary.
+
+We must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up
+with the purpose for which the vow is solemnized. Because if not, the
+solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of
+continency, but not if continency is essentially bound up with that
+for which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing
+continency is connected with Holy Orders, not essentially but by the
+institution of the Church; wherefore it seems that the Church can
+grant a dispensation from the vow of continency solemnized by the
+reception of Holy Orders. On the other hand the obligation of
+observing continency is an essential condition of the religious
+state, whereby a man renounces the world and binds himself wholly to
+God's service, for this is incompatible with matrimony, in which
+state a man is under the obligation of taking to himself a wife, of
+begetting children, of looking after his household, and of procuring
+whatever is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore the Apostle says
+(1 Cor. 7:33) that "he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the
+things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided."
+Hence the "monk" takes his name from "unity" [*The Greek _monos_] in
+contrast with this division. For this reason the Church cannot
+dispense from a vow solemnized by the religious profession; and the
+reason assigned by the Decretal is because "chastity is bound up with
+the monastic rule."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Perils occasioned by human affairs should be obviated
+by human means, not by turning divine things to a human use. Now a
+professed religious is dead to the world and lives to God, and so he
+must not be called back to the human life on the pretext of any human
+contingency.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A vow of temporal continency can be a matter of
+dispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal
+abstinence. But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a
+vow of continency solemnized by profession is due, not to its being
+an act of chastity, but because through the religious profession it
+is already an act of religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the person,
+therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger to
+the person: and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of
+dispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is directly
+ordered to the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore
+to abstain from such intercourse by continency does not endanger the
+person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger to the
+person, this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance
+by abstinence, or other corporal remedies.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A religious who is made a bishop is no more absolved
+from his vow of poverty than from his vow of continency, since he
+must have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the
+dispenser of the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither
+is he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he
+is not bound to obey if he have no superior; just as the abbot of a
+monastery, who nevertheless is not dispensed from his vow of
+obedience.
+
+The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary
+sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the of
+the flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency,
+which is reckoned one of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares
+(De Sanct. Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly "of a
+continent soul," not "of a continent body."
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 12]
+
+Whether the Authority of a Prelate Is Required for the Commutation or
+the Dispensation of a Vow?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not
+required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may
+enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by
+entering religion one is absolved from the vows he made in the world,
+even from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [*Cap.
+Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.]. Therefore the commutation or
+dispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior
+prelate.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in
+deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the
+prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does
+not seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a
+dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows,
+as stated above (A. 10, ad 2; A. 11). Likewise, when anyone rightly
+determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be
+kept, he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if
+it have an evil result (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a
+prelate is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant
+dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all
+prelates, but it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow.
+Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense
+from vows.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A vow binds one to do something, even as a law
+does. Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation
+from a precept of the law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97,
+A. 4). Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made
+to God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise
+something to anyone it depends on his decision whether he accept what
+you promise. Again in the Church a prelate stands in God's place.
+Therefore a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the
+authority of a prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable
+to God, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: "For [I] . . . have pardoned . . .
+for your sakes . . . in the person of Christ." And he says
+significantly "for your sakes," since whenever we ask a prelate for a
+dispensation we should do so to honor Christ in Whose person he
+dispenses, or to promote the interests of the Church which is His
+Body.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: All other vows are about some particular works, whereas
+by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's
+service. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a
+Decretal [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.] says that "a
+man is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for
+the perpetual service of religion." And yet a man who enters religion
+is not bound to fulfil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or
+the like, which he made when in the world, because by entering
+religion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the
+religious life that each one should have his own observances, and
+because the burden of religion is onerous enough without requiring
+the addition of other burdens.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Some have held that prelates can dispense from vows at
+their will, for the reason that every vow supposes as a condition
+that the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated above (A. 8)
+that the vow of a subject, e.g. of a slave or a son, supposes this
+condition, if "the father or master consent," or "does not dissent."
+And thus a subject might break his vow without any remorse of
+conscience, whenever his superior tells him to.
+
+But this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual
+prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given
+"unto edification, not for destruction" (2 Cor. 10:8), and
+consequently, just as he cannot command that which is in itself
+displeasing to God, namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in
+itself pleasing to God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely
+speaking man can vow them. But it does belong to a prelate to decide
+what is the more virtuous and the more acceptable to God.
+Consequently in matters presenting no difficulty, the prelate's
+dispensation would not excuse one from sin: for instance, if a
+prelate were to dispense a person from a vow to enter the religious
+life, without any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his
+vow. But if some cause were to appear, giving rise, at least, to
+doubt, he could hold to the prelate's decision whether of commutation
+or of dispensation. He could not, however, follow his own judgment in
+the matter, because he does not stand in the place of God; except
+perhaps in the case when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful,
+and he is unable to have recourse to the prelate.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of Christ
+throughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of
+dispensing from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and
+inferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those
+vows that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in
+order that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are the vows
+of pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin., de Voto et Voti redempt.), fasting
+and the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the
+Sovereign Pontiff [*Cap. Ex multa].
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 89
+
+OF OATHS (TEN ARTICLES)
+
+We must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby
+something Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament or
+the Name of God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament
+will be in the Third Part of this work: of the taking of God's Name
+we shall treat now. The Name of God is taken by man in three ways.
+First, by way oath in order to confirm one's own assertion: secondly,
+by way of adjuration as an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of
+invocation for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must
+first treat of oaths: and under this head there are ten points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) What is an oath?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful?
+
+(3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath?
+
+(4) Of what virtue is it an act?
+
+(5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as
+something useful and good?
+
+(6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature?
+
+(7) Whether an oath is binding?
+
+(8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow?
+
+(9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation?
+
+(10) Who may lawfully swear, and when?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 1]
+
+Whether to Swear Is to Call God to Witness?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that to swear is not to call God to
+witness. Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to
+witness, since it is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if
+to swear is to call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of
+Holy Writ would swear. But this is false. Therefore the antecedent is
+false also.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling him
+to witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him for it is
+written (Matt. 5:33): "Thou shall pay [Douay: 'perform'] thy oaths to
+the Lord"; and Augustine says [*Serm. clxxx] that to swear (_jurare_)
+is "to pay the right (_jus reddere_) of truth to God." Therefore to
+swear is not to call God to witness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a
+witness, as shown above (QQ. 67, 70). Now sometimes a man, by
+swearing, implores the Divine judgment, according to Ps. 7:5, "If I
+have rendered to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall
+empty before my enemies." Therefore to swear is not to call God to
+witness.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (Serm.
+clxxx): "When a man says: 'By God,' what else does he mean but that
+God is his witness?"
+
+_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), oaths are taken for
+the purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive
+confirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known
+naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts
+regarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore
+propositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by
+witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such
+matters for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth,
+for many give way to lying, according to Ps. 16:10, "Their mouth hath
+spoken lies [Vulg.: 'proudly']." Secondly, on account of [his] lack
+of knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret
+thoughts, nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things,
+and our everyday life requires that we should have some certitude
+about them. Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for
+neither can God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God
+to witness is named _jurare_ (to swear) because it is established as
+though it were a principle of law (_jure_) that what a man asserts
+under the invocation of God as His witness should be accepted as
+true. Now sometimes God is called to witness when we assert present
+or past events, and this is termed a "declaratory oath"; while
+sometimes God is called to witness in confirmation of something
+future, and this is termed a "promissory oath." But oaths are not
+employed in order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as come
+under the investigation of reason; for it would seem absurd in a
+scientific discussion to wish to prove one's point by an oath.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is one thing to employ a Divine witness already
+given, as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and
+another to implore God to bear witness, as in an oath.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he
+performs what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he
+calls upon God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal
+knowledge and unerring truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A person is called to give witness, in order that he
+may make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two
+ways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or
+not. In one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward
+inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what
+was hitherto secret: in another way by punishing the lying witness,
+and then He is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the liar
+He makes known his lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple
+contestation of God, as when a man says "God is my witness," or, "I
+speak before God," or, "By God," which has the same meaning, as
+Augustine states [*See argument On the contrary]; the other is by
+cursing, and consists in a man binding himself or something of his to
+punishment if what is alleged be not true.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Swear?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing
+forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden
+(Matt. 5:34), "But I say to you not to swear at all"; and (James
+5:12), "Above all things, my brethren, swear not." Therefore swearing
+is unlawful.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful,
+because according to Matt. 7:18, "neither can an evil tree bring
+forth good fruit." Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written
+(Matt. 5:37): "But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that
+which is over and above these is of evil." Therefore swearing is
+apparently unlawful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt God,
+and this is altogether unlawful, according to Deut. 6:16, "Thou shalt
+not tempt the Lord thy God." Now he that swears seems to seek a sign
+of Divine Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this
+must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is
+altogether unlawful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the
+Lord thy God . . . and shalt swear by His name."
+
+_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and
+yet becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof
+unbecomingly: thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that
+receives it "unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself" (1
+Cor. 11:29). Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must
+be stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is
+proved from its origin and from its end. From its origin, because
+swearing owes its introduction to the faith whereby man believes that
+God possesses unerring truth and universal knowledge and foresight of
+all things: and from its end, since oaths are employed in order to
+justify men, and to put an end to controversy (Heb. 6:16).
+
+Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of
+it, that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if
+a man calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would
+seemingly prove him to have but little reverence for God, since he
+would not treat even a good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in
+danger of committing perjury, because man easily offends in words,
+according to James 3:2, "If any man offend not in word, the same is a
+perfect man." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:9): "Let not thy
+mouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Jerome, commenting on Matt. 5:34, says: "Observe that
+our Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and earth.
+For it is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of swearing
+by the elements." Yet this answer does not suffice, because James
+adds, "nor by any other oath." Wherefore we must reply that, as
+Augustine states (De Mendacio xv), "when the Apostle employs an oath
+in his epistles, he shows how we are to understand the saying, 'I say
+to you, not to swear at all'; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear
+easily and from swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from
+swearing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he
+swore only when writing, because thought brings caution and avoids
+hasty words."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i. 17):
+"If you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the
+infirmity of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an
+evil. Accordingly He did not say: 'That which is over and above is
+evil,' but 'is of evil.' For you do no evil; since you make good use
+of swearing, by persuading another to a useful purpose: yet it 'comes
+of the evil' of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to
+swear."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He who swears tempts not God, because it is not without
+usefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine assistance.
+Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be unwilling
+to bear witness there and then: for He certainly will bear witness at
+some future time, when He "will bring to light the hidden things of
+darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of hearts" (1 Cor.
+4:5). And this witness will be lacking to none who swears, neither
+for nor against him.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Three Accompanying Conditions of an Oath Are Suitably
+Assigned, Namely, Justice, Judgment, and Truth?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are
+unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things
+should not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the
+other. Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is a
+part of justice, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and
+judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (Q. 60, A. 1).
+Therefore the three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably
+assigned.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, many other things are required for an oath, namely,
+devotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all things and
+cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath are
+insufficiently enumerated.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, these three are requisite in man's every deed: since
+he ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without
+judgment, according to 1 Tim. 5:21, "Do nothing without prejudice,"
+i.e. without previous judgment [*Vulg.: 'Observe these things without
+prejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side.']. Therefore
+these three should not be associated with an oath any more than with
+other human actions.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 4:2): "Thou shalt swear: As
+the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice": which
+words Jerome expounds, saying: "Observe that an oath must be
+accompanied by these conditions, truth, judgment and justice."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), an oath is not good except
+for one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for
+the good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous,
+but for urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires
+judgment or discretion on the part of the person who swears.
+Secondly, as regards the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be
+neither false, nor unlawful, and this requires both truth, so that
+one employ an oath in order to confirm what is true, and justice, so
+that one confirm what is lawful. A rash oath lacks judgment, a false
+oath lacks truth, and a wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Judgment does not signify here the execution of
+justice, but the judgment of discretion, as stated above. Nor is
+truth here to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition
+of speech.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for the
+right manner of swearing are implied by judgment: for the other two
+regard the things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that
+justice regards the reason for swearing.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is great danger in swearing, both on account of
+the greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and on
+account of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are
+confirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an
+oath than for other human actions.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 4]
+
+Whether an Oath Is an Act of Religion, or Latria?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion, or
+latria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths
+are employed in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle
+declares (Heb. 6:16). Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or
+latria.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as
+Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). But he who swears offers
+nothing to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing
+is not an act of religion or latria.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the end of religion or latria is to show reverence
+to God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the
+confirmation of some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of
+religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the
+Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt swear by His
+name." Now he speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore
+swearing is an act of religion.
+
+_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (A. 1), he
+that swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says. Now
+nothing is confirmed save by what is more certain and more powerful.
+Therefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges
+God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth and His
+universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to God. For
+this reason the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16) that "men swear by one
+greater than themselves," and Jerome commenting on Matt. 5:34, says
+that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he
+swears." The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, 3) that "to swear
+is to give very great honor." Now to show reverence to God belongs to
+religion or latria. Wherefore it is evident that an oath is an act of
+religion or latria.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Two things may be observed in an oath. The witness
+adduced, and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or that
+which makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human.
+Accordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former, and
+not of the latter.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the very fact that a man takes God as witness by way
+of an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains to
+the reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God,
+namely, reverence and honor.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of God:
+wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man, we
+show reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in
+God's honor that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since God
+also works for His own glory and for our good.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Oaths Are Desirable and to Be Used Frequently As Something
+Useful and Good?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used
+frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of
+religion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious
+to do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated
+above (Q. 88, A. 5). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a
+thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are
+desirable as being good essentially.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Jerome, commenting on Matt. 5:34, says that "he who
+swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears." Now
+reverence and love of God are desirable as something good
+essentially. Therefore swearing is also.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming or
+assuring. But it is a good thing for a man to confirm his assertion.
+Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 23:12): "A man that
+sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity": and Augustine says (De
+Mendacio xv) that "the Lord forbade swearing, in order that for your
+own part you might not be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking
+occasions of swearing, as though it were a good thing."
+
+_I answer that,_ Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an
+infirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are
+desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary:
+this is clear in the case of medicine which is required as a remedy
+for sickness. Now an oath is required as a remedy to a defect,
+namely, some man's lack of belief in another man. Wherefore an oath
+is not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable for their
+own sake, but among those that are necessary for this life; and such
+things are used unduly whenever they are used outside the bounds of
+necessity. For this reason Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i,
+17): "He who understands that swearing is not to be held as a good
+thing," i.e. desirable for its own sake, "restrains himself as far as
+he can from uttering oaths, unless there be urgent need."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There is no parity between a vow and an oath: because
+by a vow we direct something to the honor of God, so that for this
+very reason a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an
+oath reverence for the name of God is taken in confirmation of a
+promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason,
+become an act of religion, since moral acts take their species from
+the end.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He who swears does indeed make use of his reverence or
+love for the person by whom he swears: he does not, however, direct
+his oath to the reverence or love of that person, but to something
+else that is necessary for the present life.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet, the
+stronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken unduly, so
+too an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the
+greater the reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, unless it
+be employed aright; for, as it is written (Ecclus. 23:13), "if he
+make it void," i.e. if he deceive his brother, "his sin shall be upon
+him: and if he dissemble it," by swearing falsely, and with
+dissimulation, "he offendeth double," (because, to wit, "pretended
+equity is a twofold iniquity," as Augustine [*Enarr. in Ps. lxiii, 7]
+declares): "and if he swear in vain," i.e. without due cause and
+necessity, "he shall not be justified."
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 6]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Swear by Creatures?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear by
+creatures. It is written (Matt. 5:34-36): "I say to you not to swear
+at all, neither by heaven . . . nor by the earth . . . nor by
+Jerusalem . . . nor by thy head": and Jerome, expounding these words,
+says: "Observe that the Saviour does not forbid swearing by God, but
+by heaven and earth," etc.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now a
+punishment is appointed for one who swears by creatures: for it is
+written (22, qu. i, can. Clericum): "If a cleric swears by creatures
+he must be very severely rebuked: and if he shall persist in this
+vicious habit we wish that he be excommunicated." Therefore it is
+unlawful to swear by creatures.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, an oath is an act of religion, as stated above (A.
+4). But religious worship is not due to any creature, according to
+Rom. 1:23, 25. Therefore it is not lawful to swear by a creature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Joseph swore "by the health of Pharaoh" (Gen.
+42:16). Moreover it is customary to swear by the Gospel, by relics,
+and by the saints.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), there are two kinds of
+oath. One is uttered as a simple contestation or calling God as
+witness: and this kind of oath, like faith, is based on God's truth.
+Now faith is essentially and chiefly about God Who is the very truth,
+and secondarily about creatures in which God's truth is reflected, as
+stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). In like manner an oath is chiefly referred
+to God Whose testimony is invoked; and secondarily an appeal by oath
+is made to certain creatures considered, not in themselves, but as
+reflecting the Divine truth. Thus we swear by the Gospel, i.e. by God
+Whose truth is made known in the Gospel; and by the saints who
+believed this truth and kept it.
+
+The other way of swearing is by cursing and in this kind of oath a
+creature is adduced that the judgment of God may be wrought therein.
+Thus a man is wont to swear by his head, or by his son, or by some
+other thing that he loves, even as the Apostle swore (2 Cor. 1:23),
+saying: "I call God to witness upon my soul."
+
+As to Joseph's oath by the health of Pharaoh this may be understood
+in both ways: either by way of a curse, as though he pledged Pharao's
+health to God; or by way of contestation, as though he appealed to
+the truth of God's justice which the princes of the earth are
+appointed to execute.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord forbade us to swear by creatures so as to give
+them the reverence due to God. Hence Jerome adds that "the Jews,
+through swearing by the angels and the like, worshipped creatures
+with a Divine honor."
+
+In the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the canons (22,
+qu. i, can. Clericum, Obj. 2), for swearing by a creature, for this
+savors of the blasphemy of unbelief. Hence in the next chapter, it is
+said: "If any one swears by God's hair or head, or otherwise utter
+blasphemy against God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be
+degraded."
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Religious worship is shown to one whose testimony is
+invoked by oath: hence the prohibition (Ex. 23:13): "By the name of
+strange gods you shall not swear." But religious worship is not given
+to creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned above.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 7]
+
+Whether an Oath Has a Binding Force?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath
+is employed in order to confirm the truth of an assertion. But when a
+person makes an assertion about the future his assertion is true,
+though it may not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Cor. 1:15,
+seqq.) though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1 Cor.
+16:5). Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue (Categ. viii, 22).
+Now an oath is an act of virtue, as stated above (A. 4). But it would
+sometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle thereto, if one were
+to fulfil what one has sworn to do: for instance, if one were to
+swear to commit a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action.
+Therefore an oath is not always binding.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sometimes a man is compelled against his will to
+promise something under oath. Now, "such a person is loosed by the
+Roman Pontiffs from the bond of his oath" (Extra, De Jurejur., cap.
+Verum in ea quaest., etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, no person can be under two opposite obligations. Yet
+sometimes the person who swears and the person to whom he swears have
+opposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:33): "Thou shalt perform
+thy oaths to the Lord."
+
+_I answer that,_ An obligation implies something to be done or
+omitted; so that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath
+(which is about something present or past), nor such oaths as are
+about something to be effected by some other cause (as, for example,
+if one were to swear that it would rain tomorrow), but only such as
+are about things to be done by the person who swears.
+
+Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the future or the
+present, should contain the truth, so too ought the oath which is
+about something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a
+difference: since, in the oath that is about the past or present,
+this obligation affects, not the thing that already has been or is,
+but the action of the swearer, in the point of his swearing to what
+is or was already true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is
+made about something to be done by us, the obligation falls on the
+thing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound to make true what he has
+sworn, else his oath lacks truth.
+
+Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power, his oath is
+lacking in judgment of discretion: unless perchance what was possible
+when he swore become impossible to him through some mishap, as when a
+man swore to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from him
+by force or theft. For then he would seem to be excused from
+fulfilling his oath, although he is bound to do what he can, as, in
+fact, we have already stated with regard to the obligation of a vow
+(Q. 88, A. 3, ad 2). If, on the other hand, it be something that he
+can do, but ought not to, either because it is essentially evil, or
+because it is a hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in
+justice: wherefore an oath must not be kept when it involves a sin or
+a hindrance to good. For in either case "its result is evil" [*Cf.
+Bede, Homil. xix, in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.]
+
+Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is
+bound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; provided always
+that the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely,
+judgment and justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is not the same with a simple assertion, and with an
+oath wherein God is called to witness: because it suffices for the
+truth of an assertion, that a person say what he proposes to do,
+since it is already true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the
+doer. But an oath should not be employed, save in a matter about
+which one is firmly certain: and, consequently, if a man employ an
+oath, he is bound, as far as he can, to make true what he has sworn,
+through reverence of the Divine witness invoked, unless it leads to
+an evil result, as stated.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways. First,
+because from the very outset it has an evil result, either through
+being evil of its very nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit
+adultery), or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if a
+man were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become a cleric,
+or that he would not accept a prelacy, supposing it would be
+expedient for him to accept, or in similar cases. For oaths of this
+kind are unlawful from the outset: yet with a difference: because if
+a man swear to commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and sins in
+keeping his oath: whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater
+good, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins indeed in swearing
+(through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, Who is the inspirer
+of good purposes), yet he does not sin in keeping his oath, though he
+does much better if he does not keep it.
+
+Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some new and
+unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath of Herod, who swore to
+the damsel, who danced before him, that he would give her what she
+would ask of him. For this oath could be lawful from the outset,
+supposing it to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the
+damsel asked what it was right to grant, but the fulfilment of the
+oath was unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 50): "Sometimes
+it is wrong to fulfil a promise, and to keep an oath; as Herod, who
+granted the slaying of John, rather than refuse what he had promised."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is a twofold obligation in the oath which
+a man takes under compulsion: one, whereby he is beholden to the
+person to whom he promises something; and this obligation is cancelled
+by the compulsion, because he that used force deserves that the
+promise made to him should not be kept. The other is an obligation
+whereby a man is beholden to God, in virtue of which he is bound to
+fulfil what he has promised in His name. This obligation is not
+removed in the tribunal of conscience, because that man ought rather
+to suffer temporal loss, than violate his oath. He can, however, seek
+in a court of justice to recover what he has paid, or denounce the
+matter to his superior even if he has sworn to the contrary, because
+such an oath would lead to evil results since it would be contrary to
+public justice. The Roman Pontiffs, in absolving men from oaths of
+this kind, did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed
+the obligation for some just cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: When the intention of the swearer is not the
+same as the intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due
+to the swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the
+sound understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence
+Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 31): "However artful a man may be in
+wording his oath, God Who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as
+understood by the person to whom it is made." And that this refers to
+the deceitful oath is clear from what follows: "He is doubly guilty
+who both takes God's name in vain, and tricks his neighbor by guile."
+If, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound in accordance with
+his own intention. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 7): "The human
+ear takes such like words in their natural outward sense, but the
+Divine judgment interprets them according to our inward intention."
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 8]
+
+Whether an Oath Is More Binding Than a Vow?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow. A
+vow is a simple promise: whereas an oath includes, besides a promise,
+an appeal to God as witness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a
+vow.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the weaker is wont to be confirmed by the stronger.
+Now a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath. Therefore an oath is
+stronger than a vow.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow arises from the deliberation
+of the mind, a stated above (Q. 88, A. 1); while the obligation of an
+oath results from the truth of God Whose testimony is invoked. Since
+therefore God's truth is something greater than human deliberation,
+it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that of a vow.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A vow binds one to God while an oath sometimes
+binds one to man. Now one is more bound to God than to man. Therefore
+a vow is more binding than an oath.
+
+_I answer that,_ The obligation both of vow and of an oath arises
+from something Divine; but in different ways. For the obligation of a
+vow arises from the fidelity we owe God, which binds us to fulfil our
+promises to Him. On the other hand, the obligation of an oath arises
+from the reverence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we
+promise in His name. Now every act of infidelity includes an
+irreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity of a subject
+to his lord would seem to be the greatest irreverence. Hence a vow by
+its very nature is more binding than an oath.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A vow is not any kind of promise, but a promise made to
+God; and to be unfaithful to God is most grievous.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An oath is added to a vow not because it is more
+stable, but because greater stability results from "two immutable
+things" [*Heb. 6:18].
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Deliberation of the mind gives a vow its stability, on
+the part of the person who takes the vow: but it has a greater cause
+of stability on the part of God, to Whom the vow is offered.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 9]
+
+Whether Anyone Can Dispense from an Oath?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath.
+Just as truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the
+past or the present, so too is it required for a promissory oath,
+which is about the future. Now no one can dispense a man from
+swearing to the truth about present or past things. Therefore neither
+can anyone dispense a man from making truth that which he has
+promised by oath to do in the future.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the
+person to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot
+release the other from his oath, since it would be contrary to the
+reverence of God. Much less therefore can a dispensation from this
+oath be granted by anyone.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow,
+except certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above (Q.
+88, A. 12, ad 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits of
+dispensation, any bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly
+this is to be against the law [*Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem,
+seqq.: Cap. Si vero, de Jurejurando]. Therefore it would seem that an
+oath does not admit of dispensation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated
+above (A. 8). But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath
+does also.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 10), the necessity of a
+dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact
+that something which is useful and morally good in itself and
+considered in general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of
+some particular emergency: and such a case comes under neither law
+nor vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with
+the matter of an oath: for if it be morally evil it is opposed to
+justice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to judgment. Therefore
+an oath likewise admits of dispensation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission
+to do anything against the oath: for this is impossible, since the
+keeping of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit
+of dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under an oath
+no longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath, just
+as we have said with regard to vows (Q. 88, A. 10, ad 2). Now the
+matter of a declaratory oath, which is about something past or
+present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become
+unchangeable, wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter
+but the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be
+directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the
+matter of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of
+change, so that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful
+or hurtful, and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore a
+promissory oath admits of dispensation, since such dispensation
+regards the matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine
+precept about the keeping of oaths.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: One man may promise something under oath to another in
+two ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit: for
+instance, if he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from
+such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made it:
+for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when he
+acts towards him according to his will. Secondly, one man promises
+another something pertaining to God's honor or to the benefit of
+others: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he
+will enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. In this case
+the person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made
+the promise, because it was made principally not to him but to God:
+unless perchance it included some condition, for instance, "provided
+he give his consent" or some such like condition.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory
+oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is a sin, as
+when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to
+a greater good, as when a man swears not to enter religion: and such
+an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former case a man is
+bound not to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is lawful for
+him to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2).
+Sometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong,
+useful or harmful, either in itself or under the circumstance. In
+this case any bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is
+promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of
+this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation,
+when there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in
+which case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of
+the Pope, who has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute
+relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all
+matters regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus
+it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his
+subjects in matters that come under his authority: for instance, a
+father may annul his daughter's oath, and a husband his wife's (Num.
+30:6, seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows (Q. 88, AA. 8, 9).
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 10]
+
+Whether an Oath Is Voided by a Condition of Person or Time?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition
+of person or time. An oath, according to the Apostle (Heb. 6:16), is
+employed for the purpose of confirmation. Now it is competent to
+anyone to confirm his assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would
+seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to swear by God is more than to swear by the
+Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum
+falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "If there is a reason
+for swearing, it seems a small thing to swear by God, but a great
+thing to swear by the Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be
+said: Nonsense! the Scriptures were made for God's sake, not God for
+the sake of the Scriptures." Now men of all conditions and at all
+times are wont to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to
+swear by the Gospels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the same effect does not proceed from contrary
+causes, since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some are
+debarred from swearing on account of some personal defect; children,
+for instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons who have
+already committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person
+ought not to be debarred from swearing either on account of his
+dignity, as clerics, or on account of the solemnity of the time.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, in this world no living man is equal in dignity to
+an angel: for it is written (Matt. 11:11) that "he that is the lesser
+in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he," namely than John the
+Baptist, while yet living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it
+is written (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel "swore by Him that liveth for
+ever and ever." Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing,
+on account of his dignity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter):
+"Let a priest be examined 'by his sacred consecration,' instead of
+being put on his oath": and (22, qu. v, can. Nullus): "Let no one in
+ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman."
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is
+on the part of God, whose testimony is invoked, and in this respect
+we should hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason
+children before the age of puberty are debarred from taking oaths
+[*Caus. XXII, qu. 5, can. Parvuli], and are not called upon to swear,
+because they have not yet attained the perfect use of reason, so as
+to be able to take a oath with due reverence. Perjurers also are
+debarred from taking an oath, because it is presumed from their
+antecedents that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due
+to it. For this same reason, in order that oaths might be treated
+with due reverence the law says (22, qu. v, can. Honestum): "It is
+becoming that he who ventures to swear on holy things should do so
+fasting, with all propriety and fear of God."
+
+The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose
+assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man's assertion needs no
+confirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates
+from a person's dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what
+he says, wherefore "it becomes not persons of great dignity to
+swear." For this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si quis
+presbyter) that "priests should not swear for trifling reasons."
+Nevertheless it is lawful for them to swear if there be need for it,
+or if great good may result therefrom. Especially is this the case in
+spiritual affairs, when moreover it is becoming that they should take
+oath on days of solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves
+to spiritual matters. Nor should they on such occasions take oaths
+temporal matters, except perhaps in cases grave necessity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some are unable to confirm their own assertions on
+account of their own defect: and some there are whose words should be
+so certain that they need no confirmation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and the more
+binding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states (Ad
+Public., Ep. xlvii): and accordingly it is a graver matter to swear
+by God than the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account
+of the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the Gospels might
+be taken with deliberation and solemnity, and an oath by God
+frivolously and without deliberation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out of
+contrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this
+way that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great
+authority that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others are
+of such little authority that their oaths have no standing.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The angel's oath is adduced not on account of any
+defect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word,
+but in order to show that the statement made issues from God's
+infallible disposition. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by
+Scripture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of His
+word, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:17).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 90
+
+OF THE TAKING OF GOD'S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We must now consider the taking of God's name by way of adjuration:
+under which head there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?
+
+(3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Adjure a Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man.
+Origen says (Tract. xxxv super Matth.): "I deem that a man who wishes
+to live according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For
+if, according to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to
+swear, it is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and
+consequently it is manifest that the high-priest unlawfully adjured
+Jesus by the living God."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever adjures a man, compels him after a fashion.
+But it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore
+seemingly it is also unlawful to adjure a man.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it
+belongs to man's superior to induce him to swear, for the superior
+imposes an oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure
+their superiors.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Even when we pray God we implore Him by certain
+holy things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful "by the mercy
+of God" (Rom. 12:1): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration.
+Therefore it is lawful to adjure.
+
+_I answer that,_ A man who utters a promissory oath, swearing by his
+reverence for the Divine name, which he invokes in confirmation of
+his promise, binds himself to do what he has undertaken, and so
+orders himself unchangeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man
+can order himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order others,
+by beseeching his superiors, or by commanding his inferiors, as
+stated above (Q. 83, A. 1). Accordingly when either of these
+orderings is confirmed by something Divine it is an adjuration. Yet
+there is this difference between them, that man is master of his own
+actions but not of those of others; wherefore he can put himself
+under an obligation by invoking the Divine name, whereas he cannot
+put others under such an obligation unless they be his subjects, whom
+he can compel on the strength of the oath they have taken.
+
+Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or any holy thing,
+intends by this adjuration to put one who is not his subject under an
+obligation to do a certain thing, in the same way as he would bind
+himself by oath, such an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps
+over another a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their
+inferiors by this kind of adjuration, if there be need for it.
+
+If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name
+or of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other man without
+putting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully
+employed in respect of anyone.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Origen is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man
+intends to put another under an obligation, in the same way as he
+would bind himself by oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to
+adjure our Lord Jesus Christ [*Matt. 26:63].
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the adjuration which imposes an
+obligation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to
+employ terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a
+certain thing.
+
+Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another; because when we
+adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence
+for a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of
+God Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from God through
+His eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Adjure the Demons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says
+(Tract. xxxv, super Matth.): "To adjure the demons is not accordance
+with the power given by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice."
+Now rather than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the
+power given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the
+demons.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, many make use of necromantic incantations when
+invoking the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration.
+Therefore, if it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make
+use of necromantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore
+the antecedent is false also.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whoever adjures a person, by that very fact
+associates himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship
+with the demons, according to 1 Cor. 10:20, "I would not that you
+should be made partakers with devils." Therefore it is not lawful to
+adjure the demons.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Mk. 16:17): "In My name they shall
+cast out devils." Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the
+sake of God's name is to adjure. Therefore it is lawful to adjure the
+demons.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated in the preceding article, there are two
+ways of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through
+reverence of some holy thing: the other by way of compulsion. In the
+first way it is not lawful to adjure the demons because such a way
+seems to savor of benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to
+bear towards the demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, which
+is by compulsion, we may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not
+for others. For during the course of this life the demons are our
+adversaries: and their actions are not subject to our disposal but to
+that of God and the holy angels, because, as Augustine says (De Trin.
+iii, 4), "the rebel spirit is ruled by the just spirit." Accordingly
+we may repulse the demons, as being our enemies, by adjuring them
+through the power of God's name, lest they do us harm of soul or
+body, in accord with the Divine power given by Christ, as recorded by
+Luke 10:19: "Behold, I have given you power to tread upon serpents
+and scorpions, and upon all the power of the enemy: and nothing shall
+hurt you."
+
+It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning
+something from them, or of obtaining something through them, for this
+would amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when
+certain holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make use
+of the demons' actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we
+read of the Blessed James [*the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N.T., Hist.
+Certam. Apost. vi, 19] that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to
+him, by the instrumentality of the demons.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not
+authoritatively by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly
+appeal.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in order to
+obtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as stated
+above. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord's words to the
+unclean spirit (Mk. 1:25), "Speak no more, and go out of the man,"
+says: "A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the
+demons, however much they speak the truth."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the adjuration whereby the
+demon's help is besought in doing or learning something: for this
+savors of fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the
+demons by adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 3]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Adjure an Irrational Creature?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.
+An adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak to
+one that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore
+it is vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible,
+swearing is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an
+irrational creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ
+adjuration towards one.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, there are two ways of adjuring, as explained above
+(AA. 1, 2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be employed
+towards irrational creatures, since they are not masters of their own
+actions. The other kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion: and,
+seemingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards them, because we
+have not the power to command irrational creatures, but only He of
+Whom it was said (Matt. 8:27): "For the winds and the sea obey Him."
+Therefore in no way, apparently, is it lawful to adjure irrational
+creatures.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons
+and to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert. [*From the
+apocryphal Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19.]
+
+_I answer that,_ Irrational creatures are directed to their own
+actions by some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and
+moved is also the action of the director and mover: thus the movement
+of the arrow is an operation of the archer. Wherefore the operation
+of the irrational creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and
+chiefly to God, Who disposes the movements of all things. It is also
+ascribed to the devil, who, by God's permission, makes use of
+irrational creatures in order to inflict harm on man.
+
+Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two
+kinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational
+creature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an
+irrational creature. Secondly, so that it be referred to the director
+and mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of
+this kind may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made to
+God, and this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God:
+secondly, by way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses
+the irrational creature for our harm. This is the kind of adjuration
+used in the exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons
+is expelled from an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to
+adjure the demons by beseeching them to help us.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 91
+
+OF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF
+PRAISE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of
+invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken
+(Q. 83). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there
+are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether God should be praised with the lips?
+
+(2) Whether God should be praised with song?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 91, Art. 1]
+
+Whether God Should Be Praised with the Lips?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with the
+lips. The Philosopher says (Ethic. 1, 12): "The best of men ere
+accorded not praise, but something greater." But God transcends the
+very best of all things. Therefore God ought to be given, not praise,
+but something greater than praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus.
+43:33) to be "above all praise."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, divine praise is part of divine worship, for it is
+an act of religion. Now God is worshiped with the mind rather than
+with the lips: wherefore our Lord quoted against certain ones the
+words of Isa. 29:13, "This people . . . honors [Vulg.: 'glorifies']
+Me with their lips, but their heart is far from Me." Therefore the
+praise of God lies in the heart rather than on the lips.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, men are praised with the lips that they may be
+encouraged to do better: since just as being praised makes the wicked
+proud, so does it incite the good to better things. Wherefore it is
+written (Prov. 27:21): "As silver is tried in the fining-pot . . . so
+a man is tried by the mouth of him that praiseth." But God is not
+incited to better things by man's words, both because He is
+unchangeable, and because He is supremely good, and it is not
+possible for Him to grow better. Therefore God should not be praised
+with the lips.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 62:6): "My mouth shall praise
+Thee with joyful lips."
+
+_I answer that,_ We use words, in speaking to God, for one reason,
+and in speaking to man, for another reason. For when speaking to man
+we use words in order to tell him our thoughts which are unknown to
+him. Wherefore we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or
+others may learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in
+consequence we may incite him to yet better things; and that we may
+induce others, who hear him praised, to think well of him, to
+reverence him, and to imitate him. On the other hand we employ words,
+in speaking to God, not indeed to make known our thoughts to Him Who
+is the searcher of hearts, but that we may bring ourselves and our
+hearers to reverence Him.
+
+Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His
+sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is
+aroused towards Him, according to Ps. 49:23: "The sacrifice of praise
+shall glorify Me, and there is the way by which I will show him the
+salvation of God." And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends in
+his affections to God, by so much is he withdrawn from things opposed
+to God, according to Isa. 48:9, "For My praise I will bridle thee
+lest thou shouldst perish." The praise of the lips is also profitable
+to others by inciting their affections towards God, wherefore it is
+written (Ps. 33:2): "His praise shall always be in my mouth," and
+farther on: "Let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with
+me."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We may speak of God in two ways. First, with regard to
+His essence; and thus, since He is incomprehensible and ineffable, He
+is above all praise. In this respect we owe Him reverence and the
+honor of latria; wherefore Ps. 64:2 is rendered by Jerome in his
+Psalter [*Translated from the Hebrew]: "Praise to Thee is speechless,
+O God," as regards the first, and as to the second, "A vow shall be
+paid to Thee." Secondly, we may speak of God as to His effects which
+are ordained for our good. In this respect we owe Him praise;
+wherefore it is written (Isa. 63:7): "I will remember the tender
+mercies of the Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things that
+the Lord hath bestowed upon us." Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1):
+"Thou wilt find that all the sacred hymns," i.e. divine praises "of
+the sacred writers, are directed respectively to the Blessed
+Processions of the Thearchy," i.e. of the Godhead, "showing forth and
+praising the names of God."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if one
+praise not with the heart. For the heart speaks God's praises when it
+fervently recalls "the glorious things of His works" [*Cf. Ecclus.
+17:7, 8]. Yet the outward praise of the lips avails to arouse the
+inward fervor of those who praise, and to incite others to praise
+God, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: We praise God, not for His benefit, but for ours as
+stated.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 91, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Should Be Praised with Song?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with song.
+For the Apostle says (Col. 3:16): "Teaching and admonishing one
+another in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles." Now we should
+employ nothing in the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on
+the authority of Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising
+God, we should employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Jerome in his commentary on Eph. 5:19, "Singing and
+making melody in your hearts to the Lord," says: "Listen, young men
+whose duty it is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung
+not with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like
+play-actors, ease your throat and jaws with medicaments, and make the
+church resound with theatrical measures and airs." Therefore God
+should not be praised with song.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the praise of God is competent to little and great,
+according to Apoc. 14, "Give praise to our God, all ye His servants;
+and you that fear Him, little and great." But the great, who are in
+the church, ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44):
+"I hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred altar
+must not sing" (Cf. Decret., dist. xcii., cap. In sancta Romana
+Ecclesia). Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine praises.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, in the Old Law God was praised with musical
+instruments and human song, according to Ps. 32:2, 3: "Give praise to
+the Lord on the harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument
+of ten strings. Sing to Him a new canticle." But the Church does not
+make use of musical instruments such as harps and psalteries, in the
+divine praises, for fear of seeming to imitate the Jews. Therefore in
+like manner neither should song be used in the divine praises.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the praise of the heart is more important than the
+praise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by
+singing, both because the attention of the singers is distracted from
+the consideration of what they are singing, so long as they give all
+their attention to the chant, and because others are less able to
+understand the things that are sung than if they were recited without
+chant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine praises.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church
+of Milan, as Augustine relates (Confess. ix).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the praise of the voice is
+necessary in order to arouse man's devotion towards God. Wherefore
+whatever is useful in conducing to this result is becomingly adopted
+in the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved
+in various ways according to various melodies of sound, as the
+Philosopher state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De Musica,
+prologue). Hence the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary
+institution, that the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more
+incited to devotion. Wherefore Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): "I am
+inclined to approve of the usage of singing in the church, that so by
+the delight of the ears the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of
+devotion": and he says of himself (Confess. ix, 6): "I wept in Thy
+hymns and canticles, touched to the quick by the voices of Thy
+sweet-attuned Church."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The name of spiritual canticle may be given not only to
+those that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that are
+sung outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as such like canticles arouse
+spiritual devotion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but
+reproves those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse
+devotion, but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence
+Augustine says (Confess. x, 33): "When it befalls me to be more moved
+by the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have sinned
+penally, and then had rather not hear the singer."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To arouse men to devotion by teaching and preaching is
+a more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons and prelates,
+whom it becomes to incite men's minds towards God by means of
+preaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing, lest
+thereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence Gregory says
+(Regist. iv, ep. 44): "It is a most discreditable custom for those
+who have been raised to the diaconate to serve as choristers, for it
+behooves them to give their whole time to the duty of preaching and
+to taking charge of the alms."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Polit. viii, 6), "Teaching
+should not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial instrument
+such as the harp or anything else of this kind: but only with such
+things as make good hearers." For such like musical instruments move
+the soul to pleasure rather than create a good disposition within it.
+In the Old Testament instruments of this description were employed,
+both because the people were more coarse and carnal--so that they
+needed to be aroused by such instruments as also by earthly
+promises--and because these material instruments were figures of
+something else.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The soul is distracted from that which is sung by a
+chant that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the
+singer chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what
+he says, both because he lingers more thereon, and because, as
+Augustine remarks (Confess. x, 33), "each affection of our spirit,
+according to its variety, has its own appropriate measure in the
+voice, and singing, by some hidden correspondence wherewith it is
+stirred." The same applies to the hearers, for even if some of them
+understand not what is sung, yet they understand why it is sung,
+namely, for God's glory: and this is enough to arouse their devotion.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 92
+
+OF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES)
+
+In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to
+religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in
+giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which
+are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those
+things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the
+head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly
+we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and
+afterwards irreligion and its parts.
+
+Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion?
+
+(2) Whether it has several parts or species?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 92, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Superstition Is a Vice Contrary to Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary
+to religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the
+other. But religion is included in the definition of superstition:
+for the latter is defined as being "immoderate observance of
+religion," according to a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have
+indeed a show of wisdom in superstition." Therefore superstition is
+not a vice contrary to religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): "Cicero [*De Natura Deorum
+ii, 28] states that the superstitious were so called because they
+spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children
+might survive (_superstites_) them." But this may be done even in
+accordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is not
+a vice opposed to religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But religion
+admits of no excess, since, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 5, ad 3),
+there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal
+of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to
+religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): "Thou
+strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of
+superstition hath fallen." Now the worship of one God belongs to
+religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5), religion is a moral
+virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral
+virtue; one by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again,
+the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the
+circumstance called "how much," but also with regard to other
+circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and
+magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to
+something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less,
+and yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to
+whom it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as
+regards other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,
+2, 3).
+
+Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess,
+not that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but
+because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a
+manner it ought not.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil
+things--thus we speak of a good thief--so too sometimes the names of
+the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus
+prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Luke
+16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser']
+in their generation than the children of light." It is in this way
+that superstition is described as religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For
+its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of
+signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it
+is applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ
+sometimes: for "lapis" (a stone) takes its name from hurting the foot
+(_laedere pedem_), but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it
+hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow
+that "superstition" means that from which the word is derived.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of
+absolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of
+proportionate quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done
+in divine worship that ought not to be done.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 92, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Are Various Species of Superstition?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are not various species of
+superstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), "if one
+contrary includes many kinds, so does the other." Now religion, to
+which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but
+all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has
+superstition various species.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to
+which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are
+directed to God, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Therefore
+superstition, which is opposed to religion, is not specified
+according to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances
+of certain human actions.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have . . . a
+show of wisdom in superstition," adds: "that is to say in a
+hypocritical religion." Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a
+species of superstition.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine assigns the various species of
+superstition (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above, sins against religion consist in
+going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances
+(A. 1). For as we have stated (I-II, Q. 72, A. 9), not every
+diversity of corrupt circumstances differentiates the species of a
+sin, but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse
+ends: since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified
+specifically, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 2, 6).
+
+Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on
+the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the
+divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given,
+namely, to the true God, but _in an undue mode,_ and this is the
+first species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given,
+namely, to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of
+superstition, divided into many species in respect of the various
+ends of divine worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first
+place to give reverence to God, and in this respect the first species
+of this genus is _idolatry,_ which unduly gives divine honor to a
+creature. The second end of religion is that man may be taught by God
+Whom he worships; and to this must be referred _divinatory_
+superstition, which consults the demons through compacts made with
+them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship
+is a certain direction of human acts according to the precepts of God
+the object of that worship: and to this must be referred the
+superstition of certain _observances._
+
+Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he
+says that "anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols
+is superstitious," and this refers to the first species. Then he goes
+on to say, "or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the
+purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens," which refers to
+the second species; and a little further on he adds: "To this kind
+belong all sorts of amulets and such like," and this refers to the
+third species.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from a
+cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single
+defect." Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated
+above (A. 1; Q. 10, A. 5). The saying of the Philosopher is true of
+opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Divinations and certain observances come under the head
+of superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the
+demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for
+"religion as applied to human observances," as the gloss goes on to
+explain. Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than
+worship given to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man
+were, in the time of grace, to wish to worship God according to the
+rite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the
+gloss speaks literally.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 93
+
+OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1)
+Of the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true
+God; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory
+superstition; (4) of the superstition of observances.
+
+Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the
+true God?
+
+(2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 93, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Can Be Anything Pernicious in the Worship of the True
+God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious
+in the worship of the true God. It is written (Joel 2:32): "Everyone
+that shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." Now
+whoever worships God calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of
+God is conducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just in
+any age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just
+worshiped God in whatever manner they pleased, without committing
+mortal sin: wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special
+kind of worship, as related in Genesis 28. Therefore now also no
+worship of God is pernicious.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church. Yet
+the Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore
+Gregory, replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi,
+ep. 64), who stated that there existed in the churches various
+customs in the celebration of Mass, wrote: "I wish you to choose
+carefully whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God,
+whether in the Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in
+any part of the Church." Therefore no way of worshiping God is
+pernicious.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug.) See Opp.
+August. Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted
+in a gloss on Gal. 2:14) says that "after the Gospel truth had been
+preached the legal observances became deadly," and yet these
+observances belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be
+something deadly in the divine worship.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), "a most
+pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to
+Christian religion." Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that
+which is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by
+word, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that
+the outward worship of religion consists, as shown above (Q. 81, A.
+7). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship,
+this worship will be pernicious.
+
+Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the
+part of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something
+discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law,
+the mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious
+to make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of
+Christ were foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be
+pernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In
+the second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of
+the worshiper, and especially in common worship which is offered by
+ministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be
+guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of another person, proffer
+things that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the
+guilt of falsehood who, on the part of the Church, gives worship to
+God contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine
+authority, and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose
+[*Comment. in 1 ad1 Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard]
+says: "He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than
+Christ delivered it." For this reason, too, a gloss on Col. 2:23 says
+that superstition is "the use of human observances under the name of
+religion."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship Him in
+spirit and truth, according to John 4:23. Hence a worship that
+contains falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Before the time of the Law the just were instructed by
+an inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and others
+followed them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward precepts
+about this matter, and it is wicked to disobey them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The various customs of the Church in the divine worship
+are in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe them,
+and to disregard them is unlawful.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 93, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Can Be Any Excess in the Worship of God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship
+of God. It is written (Ecclus. 43:32): "Glorify the Lord as much as
+ever you can, for He will yet far exceed." Now the divine worship is
+directed to the glorification of God. Therefore there can be no
+excess in it.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, outward worship is a profession of inward worship,
+"whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope, and charity," as
+Augustine says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in
+faith, hope, and charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the
+worship of God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what we
+have received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God.
+Therefore if we do all that we possibly can for God's honor, there
+will be no excess in the divine worship.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) "that
+the good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies from
+Holy Writ." But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there
+can be superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First,
+with regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be
+excess in the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than
+he owes God. Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity
+of proportion, through not being proportionate to its end. Now the
+end of divine worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit
+to Him in mind and body. Consequently, whatever a man may do
+conducing to God's glory, and subjecting his mind to God, and his
+body, too, by a moderate curbing of the concupiscences, is not
+excessive in the divine worship, provided it be in accordance with
+the commandments of God and of the Church, and in keeping with the
+customs of those among whom he lives.
+
+On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive
+to God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb inordinate
+concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the
+commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the
+general custom--which, according to Augustine [*Ad Casulan. Ep.
+xxxvi], "has the force of law"--all this must be reckoned excessive
+and superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals,
+it has no connection with the internal worship of God. Hence
+Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of Luke 17:21, "The
+kingdom of God is within you," against the "superstitious," those, to
+wit, who pay more attention to externals.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The glorification of God implies that what is done is
+done for God's glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by
+superstition.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God, so
+that there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with
+external acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers excess by way of absolute
+quantity.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 94
+
+OF IDOLATRY
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition?
+
+(2) Whether it is a sin?
+
+(3) Whether it is the gravest sin?
+
+(4) Of the cause of this sin.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Idolatry Is Rightly Reckoned a Species of Superstition?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a
+species of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are
+idolaters. But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above (Q.
+11, A. 1). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief and not
+of superstition.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to which
+superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally
+applied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion.
+For just as we speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and
+of the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak
+univocally of the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry,
+and of the worship of the true God, which is the latria of true
+religion. Therefore idolatry is not a species of superstition.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of any
+genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says (1
+Cor. 8:4): "We know that an idol is nothing in the world," and
+further on (1 Cor. 10:19): "What then? Do I say that what is offered
+in sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?"
+implying an answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols
+belongs properly to idolatry. Therefore since idolatry is like to
+nothing, it cannot be a species of superstition.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor to
+whom that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just
+as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are
+reproached (Rom. 1:25) for that they "worshipped and served the
+creature rather than the Creator." Therefore this species of
+superstition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be
+named "worship of creatures."
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is related (Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited
+Silas and Timothy at Athens, "his spirit was stirred within him
+seeing the whole city given to idolatry," and further on (Acts 17:22)
+he says: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too
+superstitious." Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 92, A. 2), it belongs to
+superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is
+done chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be
+given. Now it should be given to the most high uncreated God alone,
+as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1) when we were treating of religion.
+Therefore it is superstition to give worship to any creature
+whatsoever.
+
+Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by
+means of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so
+too was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or
+shape, which is called an "idol." Yet divine worship was given to
+idols in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art,
+constructed images which produced certain effects by the power of the
+demons: wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained
+something God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to
+them. This was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum,
+ad Asclep.], as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others
+gave divine worship not to the images, but to the creatures
+represented thereby. The Apostle alludes to both of these (Rom. 1:23,
+25). For, as regards the former, he says: "They changed the glory of
+the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible
+man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping
+things," and of the latter he says: "Who worshipped and served the
+creature rather than the Creator."
+
+These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain
+men to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those
+men: for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again
+deemed the whole world to be one god, not by reason of its material
+substance, but by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God,
+for they held God to be nothing else than a soul governing the world
+by movement and reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect
+not of his body but of his soul. Hence they thought that divine
+worship ought to be given to the whole world and to all its parts,
+heaven, air, water, and to all such things: and to these they
+referred the names of their gods, as Varro asserted, and Augustine
+relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others, namely, the Platonists,
+said that there is one supreme god, the cause of all things. After
+him they placed certain spiritual substances created by the supreme
+god. These they called "gods," on account of their having a share of
+the godhead; but we call them "angels." After these they placed the
+souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these the demons which they
+stated to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these
+again they placed human souls, which they believed to be taken up
+into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason of the
+merit of their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as
+Augustine relates (De Civ . . Dei xviii, 14).
+
+The last two opinions were held to belong to "natural theology" which
+the philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in
+the schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was
+said to belong to "mythical theology" which was wont to be
+represented on the stage according to the fancies of poets. The
+remaining opinion relating to images was held to belong to "civil
+theology," which was celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples [*De
+Civ. Dei vi, 5].
+
+Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry.
+Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): "Anything
+invented by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving
+Divine worship to a creature or any part of a creature, is
+superstitious."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is not faith, but a confession of
+faith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief
+by external worship. Such a confession is signified by the term
+idolatry, but not by the term heresy, which only means a false
+opinion. Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a
+species of superstition.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The term latria may be taken in two senses. In one
+sense it may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God: and
+then its signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown,
+because, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not
+included in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally,
+whether to true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax
+is univocally the same, whether it is paid to the true or to a false
+king. In another sense latria denotes the same as religion, and then,
+since it is a virtue, it is essential thereto that divine worship be
+given to whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied
+equivocally to the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as
+prudence is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and
+to that which is carnal.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The saying of the Apostle that "an idol is nothing in
+the world" means that those images which were called idols, were not
+animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as
+though they were composed of spirit and body. In the same sense we
+must understand the saying that "what is offered in sacrifice to
+idols is not anything," because by being thus sacrificed the
+sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles
+thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: It was owing to the general custom among the Gentiles
+of worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images that the
+term "idolatry" was used to signify any worship of a creature, even
+without the use of images.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Idolatry Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a
+sin that the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true
+faith employs images for the divine worship: since both in the
+Tabernacle were there images of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25,
+and in the Church are images set up which the faithful worship.
+Therefore idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But the
+angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it
+will be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the
+like.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the most high God should be honored with an inward
+worship, according to John 4:24, "God . . . they must adore . . . in
+spirit and in truth": and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that "God
+is worshipped by faith, hope and charity." Now a man may happen to
+worship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith
+inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly
+without prejudice to the divine worship.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 20:5): "Thou shalt not adore
+them," i.e. outwardly, "nor serve them," i.e. inwardly, as a gloss
+explains it: and it is a question of graven things and images.
+Therefore it is a sin to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly.
+
+_I answer that,_ There has been a twofold error in this matter. For
+some [*The School of Plato] have thought that to offer sacrifices and
+other things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the
+others aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that
+divine honor should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer
+to God. But this is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all
+superiors, yet the same reverence is not due to them all: and
+something special is due to the most high God Who excels all in a
+singular manner: and this is the worship of latria.
+
+Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that "these visible
+sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the
+most high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices,
+namely, the service of a pure mind, should be offered" [*Augustine,
+as quoted below]. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
+x, 19), "external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible
+words are signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we
+utter significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the
+things they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize
+that we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him
+Whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts."
+
+Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to
+idols, not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but
+as being in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ.
+Dei vi, 10) quotes Seneca as saying: "We shall adore," says he, "in
+such a way as to remember that our worship is in accordance with
+custom rather than with the reality": and (De Vera Relig. v)
+Augustine says that "we must not seek religion from the philosophers,
+who accepted the same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave
+utterance in the schools to various and contrary opinions about the
+nature of their gods, and the sovereign good." This error was
+embraced also by certain heretics [*The Helcesaitae], who affirmed
+that it is not wrong for one who is seized in time of persecution to
+worship idols outwardly so long as he keeps the faith in his heart.
+
+But this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of
+the inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary
+of what one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked
+falsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the
+sentiments of one's heart. Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De
+Civ. Dei vi, 10) in that "his worship of idols was so much the more
+infamous forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by
+him that the people believed him to act honestly."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old Law, nor
+again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of latria
+may be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order
+that belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be impressed
+and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the image of
+Christ, to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as we
+shall state in the Third Part (Q. 25, A. 3).
+
+The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what
+has been said above.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Idolatry Is the Gravest of Sins?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins.
+The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior
+worship, which consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than
+external worship. Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God,
+which are opposed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry,
+which is opposed to external worship.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous it
+is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by
+blaspheming, or denying the faith, than by giving God's worship to
+another, which pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial
+of the faith are more grievous sins than idolatry.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with greater
+evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin against
+nature, as stated in Rom. 1:26. Therefore the sin against nature is a
+graver sin than idolatry.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): "Neither do we
+say that you," viz. the Manichees, "are pagans, or a sect of pagans,
+but that you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many
+gods: and yet you are much worse than they are, for they worship
+things that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you
+worship things that exist not at all." Therefore the vice of
+heretical depravity is more grievous than idolatry.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9, "How turn you again
+to the weak and needy elements?" says: "The observance of the Law, to
+which they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship
+of idols, to which they had been given before their conversion."
+Therefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25, about the
+uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: "Every
+sin is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry."
+
+_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways.
+First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most
+grievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly
+commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to
+another than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he
+disturbs the whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are
+committed against God, which indeed are the greater sins, the
+greatest of all seems to be for a man to give God's honor to a
+creature, since, so far as he is concerned, he sets up another God in
+the world, and lessens the divine sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity
+of a sin may be considered on the part of the sinner. Thus the sin of
+one that sins knowingly is said to be graver than the sin of one that
+sins through ignorance: and in this way nothing hinders heretics, if
+they knowingly corrupt the faith which they have received, from
+sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin through ignorance.
+Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on account of greater
+contempt on the part of the sinner.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to this it
+adds undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without
+internal unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated
+above (A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch as it
+deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the faith
+by deeds.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since it is essential to punishment that it be against
+the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more
+manifest, in order that it may make the man more hateful to himself
+and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this
+way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry.
+But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment
+of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man abuses the
+order of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he may suffer
+confusion from the abuse of his own nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy
+is more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more
+derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in
+opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies
+about God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their
+belief in one God and worship Him alone.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The observance of the Law during the time of grace is
+not quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but almost
+equal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Cause of Idolatry Was on the Part of Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the
+part of man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or
+guilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man's
+nature, since rather does man's natural reason dictate that there is
+one God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to
+inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have its cause in
+man on the part of virtue, since "a good tree cannot bring forth evil
+fruit," according to Matt. 7:18: nor again could it be on the part of
+guilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27, "the worship of abominable
+idols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil." Therefore
+idolatry has no cause on the part of man.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, those things which have a cause in man are found
+among men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated
+[*Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated
+either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire,
+or by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped.
+Among the Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus
+was the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael
+was the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a
+great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the
+part of man.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "It was not
+possible to learn, for the first time, except from their" (i.e. the
+demons') "teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by
+what name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic
+arts and their professors": and the same observation seems to apply
+to idolatry. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 14:14): "By the vanity of men
+they," i.e. idols, "came into the world."
+
+_I answer that,_ Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive
+cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on
+account of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men
+divine honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This
+cause is assigned (Wis. 14:15): "A father being afflicted with bitter
+grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken
+away: and him who then had died as a man he began to worship as a
+god." The same passage goes on to say (Wis. 14:21) that "men serving
+either their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name
+[Vulg.: 'names']," i.e. of the Godhead, "to stones and wood."
+Secondly, because man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as
+the Philosopher observes (Poet. iv), wherefore as soon as the
+uncultured man saw human images skillfully fashioned by the diligence
+of the craftsman, he gave them divine worship; hence it is written
+(Wis. 13:11-17): "If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree,
+proper for his use, in the wood . . . and by the skill of his art
+fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man . . . and then
+maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his
+children, or his marriage." Thirdly, on account of their ignorance of
+the true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence
+men gave divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their
+beauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:1, 2): "All
+men . . . neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was
+the workman, but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the
+swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun
+and the moon, to be the gods that rule the world."
+
+The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part
+of the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by
+giving answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed
+marvelous. Hence it is written (Ps. 95:5): "All the gods of the
+Gentiles are devils."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of
+man, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect,
+or disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to
+guilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end
+of all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not
+produce at some time, either through leading expressly to that sin by
+causing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a
+beginning or as an end, in so far as certain sins were employed in
+the worship of idols; such as homicides, mutilations, and so forth.
+Nevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man
+thereto.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the
+recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still
+retained in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age
+idolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who
+triumphed over the devil.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the consummative cause of
+idolatry.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 95
+
+OF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head
+there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether divination is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a species of superstition?
+
+(3) Of the species of divination;
+
+(4) Of divination by means of demons;
+
+(5) Of divination by the stars;
+
+(6) Of divination by dreams;
+
+(7) Of divination by auguries and like observances;
+
+(8) Of divination by lots.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Divination Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination
+is derived from something _divine:_ and things that are divine
+pertain to holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that
+divination is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): "Who dares to
+say that learning is an evil?" and again: "I could nowise admit that
+intelligence can be an evil." But some arts are divinatory, as the
+Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to
+pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems
+that divination is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because
+nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek
+to foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore
+divination is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10, 11): "Neither let
+there be found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic
+spirits, or fortune tellers": and it is stated in the Decretals (26,
+qu. v, can. Qui divinationes): "Those who seek for divinations shall
+be liable to a penance of five years' duration, according to the
+fixed grades of penance."
+
+_I answer that,_ Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The
+future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, secondly in
+itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce
+their effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects
+can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their
+causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes
+produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most
+part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future
+effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of
+conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow
+and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians,
+concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in
+themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the case in the
+rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to
+the Philosopher [*Metaph. viii, 2, 5, 8]. Such like effects, as also
+those which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority
+of instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their
+causes, because these causes have no determinate inclination to
+produce these effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be
+foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now man cannot
+consider these effects in themselves except when they are present, as
+when he sees Socrates running or walking: the consideration of such
+things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in
+His eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in
+the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13; Q. 57, A. 3; Q. 86, A. 4). Hence it is
+written (Isa. 41:23): "Show the things that are to come hereafter,
+and we shall know that ye are gods." Therefore if anyone presume to
+foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever,
+except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to
+God. It is for this reason that certain men are called divines:
+wherefore Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): "They are called divines, as
+though they were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the
+Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men."
+
+Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things
+that happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the
+like can be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows
+other contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then
+he does not divine, i.e. cause something divine, but rather receives
+something divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps
+to himself, in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and
+this is manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin;
+and for this reason Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, seqq.
+that "divination is always taken in an evil sense."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered
+share of something divine, but from an undue usurpation thereof, as
+stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future
+events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not
+pertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the
+knowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of the
+devil's deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man has a natural inclination to know the future by
+human means, but not by the undue means of divination.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Divination Is a Species of Superstition?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a species of
+superstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera.
+Now divination is apparently a species of curiosity, according to
+Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxviii) [*Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23,
+24; De Divin. Daem. 3]. Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species of
+superstition.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as religion is due worship, so is superstition
+undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to undue
+worship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, superstition is opposed to religion. But in true
+religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to
+divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Origen says in his Peri Archon [*The quotation is
+from his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers]: "There is an
+operation of the demons in the administering of foreknowledge,
+comprised, seemingly, under the head of certain arts exercised by
+those who have enslaved themselves to the demons, by means of lots,
+omens, or the observance of shadows. I doubt not that all these
+things are done by the operation of the demons." Now, according to
+Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20, 23), "whatever results from
+fellowship between demons and men is superstitious." Therefore
+divination is a species of superstition.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; QQ. 92, 94), superstition
+denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of
+God in two ways: in one way, it is something offered to God; as a
+sacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it
+is something divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to
+an oath (Q. 89, A. 4, ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only
+idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the
+help of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But
+all divination results from the demons' operation, either because the
+demons are expressly invoked that the future may be made known, or
+because the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings of the
+future, in order to entangle men's minds with vain conceits. Of this
+kind of vanity it is written (Ps. 39:5): "Who hath not regard to
+vanities and lying follies." Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the
+future, when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be
+foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of
+superstition.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to the
+end in view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind
+of superstition as regards the mode of operation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This kind of divination pertains to the worship of the
+demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express with
+the demons.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the New Law man's mind is restrained from solicitude
+about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no institution
+for the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters. On the
+other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises, there
+were consultations about the future in connection with religious
+matters. Hence where it is written (Isa. 8:19): "And when they shall
+say to you: Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their
+enchantments," it is added by way of answer: "Should not the people
+seek of their God, a vision for the living and the dead? [*Vulg.:
+'seek of their God, for the living of the dead?']"
+
+In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit
+of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 3]
+
+Whether We Ought to Distinguish Several Species of Divination?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish several
+species of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there
+are not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality
+of sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering into
+compact with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore there
+are not several species of divination.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a human act takes its species from its end, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6). But all divination is
+directed to one end, namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore
+all divinations are of one species.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for whether
+one detracts by word, writing or gestures, it is the same species of
+sin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the various
+signs whence the foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore
+there are not several species of divination.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore enumerates various species of divination
+(Etym. viii, 9).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), all divinations seek to
+acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and
+help of a demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his
+help, or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell
+certain future things unknown to men, but known to him in such
+manners as have been explained in the First Part (Q. 57, A. 3). When
+demons are expressly invoked, they are wont to foretell the future in
+many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to human sight and hearing
+by mock apparitions in order to foretell the future: and this species
+is called "prestigiation" because man's eyes are blindfolded
+(_praestringuntur_). Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is
+called "divination by dreams": sometimes they employ apparitions or
+utterances of the dead, and this species is called "necromancy," for
+as Isidore observes (Etym. viii) in Greek, "_nekron_ means dead, and
+_manteia_ divination, because after certain incantations and the
+sprinkling of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine and to
+answer questions." Sometimes they foretell the future through living
+men, as in the case of those who are possessed: this is divination by
+"pythons," of whom Isidore says that "pythons are so called from
+Pythius Apollo, who was said to be the inventor of divination."
+Sometimes they foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which
+appear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear in some earthly
+body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is called "geomancy,"
+if in water "hydromancy," if in the air "aeromancy," if in fire
+"pyromancy," if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the altars
+of demons, "aruspicy."
+
+The divination which is practiced without express invocation of the
+demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain
+knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of
+certain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the
+position and movements of the stars, this belongs to "astrologers,"
+who are also called "genethliacs," because they take note of the days
+on which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of
+birds or of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden
+movements of limbs, this belongs in general to "augury," which is so
+called from the chattering of birds (_avium garritu_), just as
+"auspice" is derived from watching birds (_avium inspectione_). These
+are chiefly wont to be observed in birds, the former by the ear, the
+latter by the eye. If, however, these observations have for their
+object men's words uttered unintentionally, which someone twist so as
+to apply to the future that he wishes to foreknow, then it is called
+an "omen": and as Valerius Maximus [*De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5]
+remarks, "the observing of omens has a touch of religion mingled with
+it, for it is believed to be founded not on a chance movement, but on
+divine providence. It was thus that when the Romans were deliberating
+whether they would change their position, a centurion happened to
+exclaim at the time: 'Standard-bearer, fix the banner, we had best
+stand here': and on hearing these words they took them as an omen,
+and abandoned their intention of advancing further." If, however, the
+observation regards the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of
+figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of
+divination: for the divination that is taken from observing the lines
+of the hand is called "chiromancy," i.e. divination of the hand
+(because _cheir_ is the Greek for hand): while the divination which
+is taken from signs appearing in the shoulder-blades of an animal is
+called "spatulamancy."
+
+To this second species of divination, which is without express
+invocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced by
+observing certain things done seriously by men in the research of the
+occult, whether by drawing lots, which is called "geomancy"; or by
+observing the shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or
+by observing which of several sheets of paper, with or without
+writing upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by holding out
+several unequal sticks and noting who takes the greater or the
+lesser, or by throwing dice, and observing who throws the highest
+score; or by observing what catches the eye when one opens a book,
+all of which are named "sortilege."
+
+Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The
+first is when the demons are invoked openly, this comes under the
+head of "necromancy"; the second is merely an observation of the
+disposition or movement of some other being, and this belongs to
+"augury"; while the third consists in doing something in order to
+discover the occult; and this belongs to "sortilege." Under each of
+these many others are contained, as explained above.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In all the aforesaid there is the same general, but not
+the same special, character of sin: for it is much more grievous to
+invoke the demons than to do things that deserve the demons'
+interference.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Knowledge of the future or of the occult is the
+ultimate end whence divination takes its general formality. But the
+various species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters,
+according as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The things observed by diviners are considered by them,
+not as signs expressing what they already know, as happens in
+detraction, but as principles of knowledge. Now it is evident that
+diversity of principles diversifies the species, even in
+demonstrative sciences.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Divination Practiced by Invoking the Demons Is Unlawful?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that divination practiced by invoking the
+demons is not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to 1
+Pet. 2:22, "Who did no sin." Yet our Lord asked the demon: "What is
+thy name?" and the latter replied: "My name is Legion, for we are
+many" (Mk. 5:9). Therefore it seems lawful to question the demons
+about the occult.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the souls of the saints do not encourage those who
+ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter inquired
+of the woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue of the
+coming war (1 Kings 28:8, sqq.). Therefore the divination that
+consists in questioning demons is not unlawful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth from one who
+knows, if it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know
+what is hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in
+the discovery of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons
+is not unlawful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10, 11): "Neither let there
+there be found among you . . . anyone that consulteth soothsayers . . .
+nor . . . that consulteth pythonic spirits."
+
+_I answer that,_ All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for
+two reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination,
+which is a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of
+invoking him. This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written
+against certain persons (Isa. 28:15): "You have said: We have entered
+into a league with death, and we have made a covenant with hell." And
+still more grievous would it be if sacrifice were offered or
+reverence paid to the demon invoked. The second reason is gathered
+from the result. For the demon who intends man's perdition endeavors,
+by his answers, even though he sometimes tells the truth, to accustom
+men to believe him, and so to lead him on to something prejudicial to
+the salvation of mankind. Hence Athanasius, commenting on the words
+of Luke 4:35, "He rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace," says:
+"Although the demon confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his
+speech, lest together with the truth he should publish his wickedness
+and accustom us to care little for such things, however much he may
+seem to speak the truth. For it is wicked, while we have the divine
+Scriptures, to seek knowledge from the demons."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Bede's commentary on Luke 8:30, "Our Lord
+inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease, which
+he tolerated, being made public, the power of the Healer might shine
+forth more graciously." Now it is one thing to question a demon who
+comes to us of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times for
+the good of others, especially when he can be compelled, by the power
+of God, to tell the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to
+gain from him knowledge of things hidden from us.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (Ad Simplic. ii, 3), "there is
+nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man, being
+about to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted to
+appear to him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some
+occult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or
+else the spirit of Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest,
+but some phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the
+devil, and styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the
+images of things are wont to be called by the names of those things."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: No temporal utility can compare with the harm to
+spiritual health that results from the research of the unknown by
+invoking the demon.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Divination by the Stars Is Unlawful?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that divination by the stars is not
+unlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes:
+thus a physician foretells death from the disposition of the disease.
+Now the heavenly bodies are the cause of what takes place in the
+world, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by
+the stars is not unlawful.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, human science originates from experiments, according
+to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Now it has been discovered through
+many experiments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby
+some future events may be known beforehand. Therefore it would seem
+not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, divination is declared to be unlawful in so far as
+it is based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the
+stars contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of
+God's creatures. Therefore it would seem that this species of
+divination is not unlawful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): "Those
+astrologers whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without
+scruple; because they seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any
+spirit for their divinations which art, however, Christian and true
+piety rejects and condemns."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the operation of the
+demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false
+and vain opinions, in order that man's mind may become entangled in
+vanity and falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion
+if, by observing the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that
+cannot be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider what
+things can be foreknown by observing the stars: and it is evident
+that those things which happen of necessity can be foreknown by this
+means: even so astrologers forecast a future eclipse.
+
+However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired
+by observing the stars there have been various opinions. For some
+have stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things
+foretold by means of their observation. But this is an unreasonable
+statement: since every corporeal sign is either the effect of that
+for which it stands (thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused),
+or it proceeds from the same cause, so that by signifying the cause,
+in consequence it signifies the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a
+sign of fair weather, in so far as its cause is the cause of fair
+weather). Now it cannot be said that the dispositions and movements
+of the heavenly bodies are the effect of future events; nor again can
+they be ascribed to some common higher cause of a corporeal nature,
+although they are referable to a common higher cause, which is divine
+providence. On the contrary the appointment of the movements and
+positions of the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on a
+different principle from the appointment of the occurrence of future
+contingencies, because the former are appointed on a principle of
+necessity, so that they always occur in the same way, whereas the
+latter are appointed on a principle of contingency, so that the
+manner of their occurrence is variable. Consequently it is impossible
+to acquire foreknowledge of the future from an observation of the
+stars, except in so far as effects can be foreknown from their causes.
+
+Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In
+the first place all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human
+affairs or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in _Metaph._
+vi [*Ed. Did. v, 3], an accidental being has no cause, least of all a
+natural cause, such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what
+occurs accidentally, neither is a _being_ properly speaking, nor is
+_one_--for instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or
+that a treasure be discovered when a man digs a grave--for these and
+like occurrences are not one thing, but are simply several things.
+Whereas the operation of nature has always some one thing for its
+term, just as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form
+of a natural thing.
+
+In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of
+will and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the
+intellect or reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and
+consequently neither is the will, since it is in the reason, as the
+Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 4, 9). Now no body can make an
+impression on an incorporeal body. Wherefore it is impossible for
+heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the intellect and
+will: for this would be to deny the difference between intellect and
+sense, with which position Aristotle reproaches (De Anima iii, 3)
+those who held that "such is the will of man, as is the day which the
+father of men and of gods," i.e. the sun or the heavens, "brings on"
+[*Odyssey xviii, 135].
+
+Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the
+free-will's operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive cause
+of an inclination to those operations, in so far as they make an
+impression on the human body, and consequently on the sensitive
+powers which are acts of bodily organs having an inclination for
+human acts. Since, however, the sensitive powers obey reason, as the
+Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 11; _Ethic._ i, 13), this does not
+impose any necessity on the free-will, and man is able, by his
+reason, to act counter to the inclination of the heavenly bodies.
+
+Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to
+foreknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with
+certitude future human actions, his conduct is based on a false and
+vain opinion; and so the operation of the demon introduces itself
+therein, wherefore it will be a superstitious and unlawful
+divination. On the other hand if one were to apply the observation of
+the stars in order to foreknow those future things that are caused by
+heavenly bodies, for instance, drought or rain and so forth, it will
+be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination.
+
+Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the truth by
+observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because a
+great number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their
+actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the
+inclination of the heavenly bodies: while there are few, namely, the
+wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The
+result is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth,
+especially in public occurrences which depend on the multitude.
+Secondly, because of the interference of the demons. Hence Augustine
+says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17): "When astrologers tell the truth, it must
+be allowed that this is due to an instinct that, unknown to man, lies
+hidden in his mind. And since this happens through the action of
+unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man for they are
+permitted to know certain things about temporal affairs." Wherefore
+he concludes: "Thus a good Christian should beware of astrologers,
+and of all impious diviners, especially of those who tell the truth,
+lest his soul become the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of of
+partnership with them enmesh itself in their fellowship."
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Divination by Dreams Is Unlawful?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful.
+It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are
+instructed by God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15, 16): "By a
+dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and
+they are sleeping in their beds, then He," God to wit, "openeth the
+ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to
+learn." Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of divination by
+dreams.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make
+use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting
+dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of
+his chief baker (Gen. 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the
+king of Babylon (Dan. 2, 4). Therefore divination by dreams is not
+unlawful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of
+men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of
+the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams
+for the purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10): "Neither let there be
+found among you any one that . . . observeth dreams."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 6), divination is
+superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion.
+Wherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing
+the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future
+occurrences; for instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious
+through what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do
+something or avoid something: while sometimes dreams are signs of
+future happenings, in so far as they are referable to some common
+cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this way the
+future is frequently known from dreams. We must, then, consider what
+is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future
+occurrences, or be cognizant of them.
+
+Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is
+sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams
+is twofold: one regards the soul, in so far as those things which
+have occupied a man's thoughts and affections while awake recur to
+his imagination while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a
+cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related
+accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any time they concur it
+will be by chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards
+the body: because the inward disposition of the body leads to the
+formation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that
+disposition; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold humors
+dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this reason
+physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to
+discover internal dispositions.
+
+In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and
+spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper's imagination is
+affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a
+heavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper, in
+keeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual
+cause is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to
+men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Num.
+12:6, "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to
+him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." Sometimes,
+however, it is due to the action of the demons that certain images
+appear to persons in their sleep, and by this means they, at times,
+reveal certain future things to those who have entered into an
+unlawful compact with them.
+
+Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in
+making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as
+those dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause
+inward or outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends.
+But it will be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be
+caused by a revelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been
+made, whether explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose,
+or implicit, through the divination extending beyond its possible
+limits.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Divination by Auguries, Omens, and by Like Observations of
+External Things Is Unlawful?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by
+like observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were
+unlawful holy men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph
+that he paid attention to auguries, for it is related (Gen. 44:5)
+that Joseph's steward said: "The cup which you have stolen is that in
+which my lord drinketh and in which he is wont to divine
+(_augurari_)": and he himself afterwards said to his brethren (Gen.
+44:15): "Know you not that there is no one like me in the science of
+divining?" Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of this kind of
+divination.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, birds naturally know certain things regarding future
+occurrences of the seasons, according to Jer. 8:7, "The kite in the
+air hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have
+observed the time of their coming." Now natural knowledge is
+infallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to
+make use of the birds' knowledge in order to know the future, and
+this is divination by augury.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11:32).
+Yet Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and
+interpreting of a dream (Judges 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham's
+servant, acted in like manner (Gen. 24). Therefore it seems that this
+kind of divination is not unlawful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10): "Neither let there be
+found among you anyone . . . that observeth omens."
+
+_I answer that,_ The movements or cries of birds, and whatever
+dispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the
+cause of future events: wherefore the future cannot be known
+therefrom as from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything
+future can be known from them, it will be because the causes from
+which they proceed are also the causes of future occurrences or are
+cognizant of them. Now the cause of dumb animals' actions is a
+certain instinct whereby they are inclined by a natural movement, for
+they are not masters of their actions. This instinct may proceed from
+a twofold cause. In the first place it may be due to a bodily cause.
+For since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive soul, every power
+of which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is subject to the
+disposition of surrounding bodies, and primarily to that of the
+heavenly bodies. Hence nothing prevents some of their actions from
+being signs of the future, in so far as they are conformed to the
+dispositions of the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to
+which certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must
+observe two things: first, that such observations must not be applied
+to the foreknowledge of future things other than those which can be
+foreknown from the movements of heavenly bodies, as stated above (AA.
+5, 6): secondly, that they be not applied to other matters than those
+which in some way may have reference to these animals (since they
+acquire through the heavenly bodies a certain natural knowledge and
+instinct about things necessary for their life--such as changes
+resulting from rain and wind and so forth).
+
+In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause,
+namely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon
+Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and
+vomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use of these actions of dumb
+animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems
+to be true of all such like things; except omens, because human words
+which are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the
+stars, yet are they ordered according to divine providence and
+sometimes according to the action of the demons.
+
+Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations are
+superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set
+according to the order of nature or of divine providence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine [*QQ. in Genes., qu. cxlv], when
+Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science of
+divining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to
+the common opinion about him: in this sense also spoke his steward.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that birds
+have about things concerning them; and in order to know these things
+it is not unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus from
+the frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will rain soon.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation of a
+dream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for his
+instruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel's words,
+having previously prayed to God.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Divination by Drawing Lots Is Unlawful?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not
+unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on Ps. 30:16, "My lots are in
+Thy hands," says: "It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of
+ascertaining the divine will when a man is in doubt."
+
+Obj. 2: There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances
+which the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men. Now both
+in the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the
+casting of lots. For it is related (Jos. 7:14, sqq.) that Josue, at
+the Lord's command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had
+stolen of the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing lots, found that his
+son Jonathan had eaten honey (1 Kings 14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when
+fleeing from the face of the Lord, was discovered and thrown into the
+sea (Jonah 1:7, sqq.): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense
+(Luke 1:9): and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the
+apostleship (Acts 1:26). Therefore it would seem that divination by
+lots is not unlawful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, fighting with the fists, or "monomachy," i.e. single
+combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which are called
+"popular" trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege, because
+something unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices seem
+to be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single
+combat with the Philistine (1 Kings 17:32, sqq.). Therefore it would
+seem that divination by lot is not unlawful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, can.
+Sortes): "We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make
+up your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have
+condemned, is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason
+we wish them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be
+mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under
+pain of anathema."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), sortilege consists, properly
+speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one may
+come to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one
+seeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a
+possession, an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or
+other, it is called "sortilege of allotment"; if one seeks to know
+what ought to be done, it is called "sortilege of consultation"; if
+one seeks to know what is going to happen, it is called "sortilege of
+divination." Now the actions of man that are required for sortilege
+and their results are not subject to the dispositions of the stars.
+Wherefore if anyone practicing sortilege is so minded as though the
+human acts requisite for sortilege depended for their result on the
+dispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and false, and
+consequently is not free from the interference of the demons, so that
+a divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful.
+
+Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must
+needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual cause. If
+we ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in "sortilege
+of allotment," it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity,
+as in the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the
+division of something or other, are willing to draw lots for its
+division, thus leaving to chance what portion each is to receive.
+
+If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual
+cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read (Ezech.
+21:21) that "the king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of
+two ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired of the
+idols, and consulted entrails": sortilege of this kind is unlawful,
+and forbidden by the canons.
+
+Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Prov.
+16:33, "Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the
+Lord": sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine
+declares [*Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2; cf. Obj.[1]].
+
+Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have
+recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount
+to tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Luke 1:8,
+says: "He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men."
+Secondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to have recourse to
+lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Bede says
+(Super Act. Apost. i): "But if anyone, compelled by necessity, thinks
+that he ought, after the apostles' example, to consult God by casting
+lots, let him take note that the apostles themselves did not do so,
+except after calling together the assembly of the brethren and
+pouring forth prayer to God." Thirdly, if the Divine oracles be
+misapplied to earthly business. Hence Augustine says (ad inquisit.
+Januar. ii; Ep. lv): "Those who tell fortunes from the Gospel pages,
+though it is to be hoped that they do so rather than have recourse to
+consulting the demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that
+anyone should wish to apply the Divine oracles to worldly matters and
+to the vain things of this life." Fourthly, if anyone resort to the
+drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried
+out by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says
+(Super Act. Apost. i): "Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias
+was decided by lot," because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost was
+not yet poured forth into the Church: "whereas the same deacons were
+ordained not by lot but by the choice of the disciples." It is
+different with earthly honors, which are directed to the disposal of
+earthly things: in elections of this kind men frequently have
+recourse to lots, even as in the distribution of earthly possessions.
+
+If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the
+divine judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed.
+Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), "If, at a time of
+persecution, the ministers of God do not agree as to which of them is
+to remain at his post lest all should flee, and which of them is to
+flee, lest all die and the Church be forsaken, should there be no
+other means of coming to an agreement, so far as I can see, they must
+be chosen by lot." Again he says (De Doctr. Christ. xxviii): "If thou
+aboundest in that which it behooves thee to give to him who hath not,
+and which cannot be given to two; should two come to you, neither of
+whom surpasses the other either in need or in some claim on thee,
+thou couldst not act more justly than in choosing by lot to whom thou
+shalt give that which thou canst not give to both."
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Objections.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The trial by hot iron or boiling water is directed to
+the investigation of someone's hidden sin, by means of something done
+by a man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of lots. But in so
+far as a miraculous result is expected from God, it surpasses the
+common generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered
+unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of the occult,
+which is reserved to the divine judgment, and because such like
+trials are not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a
+decree of Pope Stephen V [*II, qu. v., can. Consuluist i]: "The
+sacred canons do not approve of extorting a confession from anyone by
+means of the trial by hot iron or boiling water, and no one must
+presume, by a superstitious innovation, to practice what is not
+sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers. For it is allowable
+that public crimes should be judged by our authority, after the
+culprit has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have been
+approved, with due regard to the fear of God; but hidden and unknown
+crimes must be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children
+of men." The same would seem to apply to the law concerning duels,
+save that it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since
+no miraculous effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be
+very unequal in strength or skill.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 96
+
+OF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head
+there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by
+the magic art;
+
+(2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies;
+
+(3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling;
+
+(4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Be Unlawful to Practice the Observances of the Magic Art?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to practice the
+observances of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two
+ways. First, by reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft:
+secondly, through being directed to an evil end, as when a person
+gives an alms for the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the
+magic art are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist
+in certain fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are directed to a
+good end, namely, the acquisition of science. Therefore it is not
+unlawful to practice these observances.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who
+abstained, "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book, and
+wisdom." Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain
+fasts and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its
+results through God: and consequently it is not unlawful to practice
+it.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, seemingly, as stated above (A. 1), the reason why it
+is wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future is because
+they have no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet
+the demons know scientific truths: because sciences are about things
+necessary and invariable, and such things are subject to human
+knowledge, and much more to the knowledge of demons, who are of
+keener intellect, as Augustine says [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin.
+Daemon. 3, 4]. Therefore it seems to be no sin to practice the magic
+art, even though it achieve its result through the demons.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10, 11): "Neither let
+there be found among you . . . anyone . . . that seeketh the truth
+from the dead": which search relies on the demons' help. Now through
+the observances of the magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought
+"by means of certain signs agreed upon by compact with the demons"
+[*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above Q. 92, A. 2].
+Therefore it is unlawful to practice the notary art.
+
+_I answer that,_ The magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is
+unlawful, because the means it employs for acquiring knowledge have
+not in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do
+in gazing certain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, and so
+forth. Wherefore this art does not make use of these things as
+causes, but as signs; not however as signs instituted by God, as are
+the sacramental signs. It follows, therefore, that they are empty
+signs, and consequently a kind of "agreement or covenant made with
+the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens"
+[*Ibid.]. Wherefore the magic art is to be absolutely repudiated and
+avoided by Christians, even as other arts of vain and noxious
+superstition, as Augustine declares (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23). This
+art is also useless for the acquisition of science. For since it is
+not intended by means of this art to acquire science in a manner
+connatural to man, namely, by discovery and instruction, the
+consequence is that this effect is expected either from God or from
+the demons. Now it is certain that some have received wisdom and
+science infused into them by God, as related of Solomon (3 Kings 3
+and 2 Paralip. 1). Moreover, our Lord said to His disciples (Luke
+21:15): "I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your
+adversaries shall not be able to resist and gainsay." However, this
+gift is not granted to all, or in connection with any particular
+observance, but according to the will of the Holy Ghost, as stated in
+1 Cor. 12:8, "To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of
+wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, according to the same
+Spirit," and afterwards it is said (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things
+one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as He
+will." On the other hand it does not belong to the demons to
+enlighten the intellect, as stated in the First Part (Q. 109, A. 3).
+Now the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom is effected by the
+enlightening of the intellect, wherefore never did anyone acquire
+knowledge by means of the demons. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
+x, 9): "Porphyry confesses that the intellectual soul is in no way
+cleansed by theurgic inventions," i.e. the operations "of the demons,
+so as to be fitted to see its God, and discern what is true," such as
+are all scientific conclusions. The demons may, however, be able by
+speaking to men to express in words certain teachings of the
+sciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it
+is not good to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that
+the magic art tends.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The abstinence of these children was not in
+accordance with a vain observance of the notary art, but according to
+the authority of the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the
+meat of Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience they received
+knowledge from God, according to Ps. 118:100, "I have had
+understanding above the ancients, because I have sought Thy
+commandments."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To seek knowledge of the future from the demons
+is a sin not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also on
+account of the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies
+to the case in point.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Observances Directed to the Alteration of Bodies, As for the
+Purpose of Acquiring Health or the Like, Are Unlawful?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the
+alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the
+like, are lawful. It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of
+bodies in order to produce their proper effects. Now in the physical
+order things have certain occult forces, the reason of which man is
+unable to assign; for instance that the magnet attracts iron, and
+many like instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Dei
+xxi, 5, 7). Therefore it would seem lawful to employ such like forces
+for the alteration of bodies.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly
+bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire
+certain occult forces resulting from their species through the
+influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g.
+images, also acquire from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force
+for the production of certain effects. Therefore it is not unlawful
+to make use of them and of such like things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the demons too are able to alter bodies in many
+ways, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 8, 9). But their power is
+from God. Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the
+purpose of producing these alterations.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "to
+superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and
+nostrums condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of
+incantations or of certain cyphers which they call characters, or of
+any kind of thing worn or fastened on."
+
+_I answer that,_ In things done for the purpose of producing some
+bodily effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that
+effect naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since
+it is lawful to employ natural causes in order to produce their
+proper effects. But, if they seem unable to produce those effects
+naturally, it follows that they are employed for the purpose of
+producing those effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that
+they come under the head of "compact by tokens entered into with the
+demons" [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ.; see above Q. 92, A. 2].
+Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "The demons are
+allured by means of creatures, which were made, not by them, but by
+God. They are enticed by various objects differing according to the
+various things in which they delight, not as animals by meat, but as
+spirits by signs, such as are to each one's liking, by means of
+various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in employing
+natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain effects such
+as they are thought to have the natural power of producing. But if in
+addition there be employed certain characters, words, or any other
+vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, it will be
+superstitious and unlawful.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The natural forces of natural bodies result from their
+substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of
+heavenly bodies; wherefore through this same influence they acquire
+certain active forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial
+bodies result from the conception of the craftsman; and since they
+are nothing else but composition, order and shape, as stated in
+_Phys._ i, 5, they cannot have a natural active force. Consequently,
+no force accrues to them from the influence of heavenly bodies, in so
+far as they are artificial, but only in respect of their natural
+matter. Hence it is false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine
+(De Civ. Dei x, 11), that "by herbs, stones, animals, certain
+particular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again by certain
+movements of the stars observed in the course of the heavens it is
+possible for men to fashion on earth forces capable of carrying into
+effect the various dispositions of the stars," as though the results
+of the magic arts were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly
+bodies. In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ. Dei x, 11), "all these
+things are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the souls that
+are subject to them."
+
+Wherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy
+from the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that it is
+requisite to inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce
+to any effect naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural
+action. Yet astronomical images differ from necromantic images in
+this, that the latter include certain explicit invocations and
+trickery, wherefore they come under the head of explicit agreements
+made with the demons: whereas in the other images there are tacit
+agreements by means of tokens in certain shapes or characters.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty, to Whom
+the demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever
+purpose He will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the
+demons, to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the
+contrary, it is appointed that he should wage war against the demons.
+Hence in no way is it lawful for man to make use of the demons' help
+by compacts either tacit or express.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Observances Directed to the Purpose of Fortune-telling Are
+Unlawful?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the purpose
+of fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the
+misfortunes that occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by
+certain symptoms, which the physician observes. Therefore it seems
+not unlawful to observe such like signs.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is unreasonable to deny that which nearly
+everybody experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain
+times, or places, hearing of certain words meetings of men or
+animals, uncanny or ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to
+come. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, human actions and occurrences are disposed by divine
+providence in a certain order: and this order seems to require that
+precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences:
+wherefore, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:6), the things that
+happened to the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in
+our time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds
+from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to
+observe these presages.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "a
+thousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts
+entered into with the demons: for instance, the twitching of a limb;
+a stone, a dog, or a boy coming between friends walking together;
+kicking the door-post when anyone passes in front of one's house; to
+go back to bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on your shoes;
+to return home if you trip when going forth; when the rats have
+gnawed a hole in your clothes, to fear superstitiously a future evil
+rather than to regret the actual damage."
+
+_I answer that,_ Men attend to all these observances, not as causes
+but as signs of future events, good or evil. Nor do they observe them
+as signs given by God, since these signs are brought forward, not on
+divine authority, but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of
+the malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men's minds with
+such like trifles. Accordingly it is evident that all these
+observances are superstitious and unlawful: they are apparently
+remains of idolatry, which authorized the observance of auguries, of
+lucky and unlucky days which is allied to divination by the stars, in
+respect of which one day is differentiated from another: except that
+these observances are devoid of reason and art, wherefore they are
+yet more vain and superstitious.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The causes of sickness are seated in us, and they
+produce certain signs of sickness to come, which physicians lawfully
+observe. Wherefore it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future
+events as proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a flogging
+when he sees his master's anger. Possibly the same might be said if
+one were to fear for child lest it take harm from the evil eye, of
+which we have spoken in the First Part (Q. 117, A. 3, ad 2). But this
+does not apply to this kind of observances.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That men have at first experienced a certain degree of
+truth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards when a
+man begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind, many
+things occur in connection with them through the trickery of the
+demons, "so that men, through being entangled in these observances,
+become yet more curious, and more and more embroiled in the manifold
+snares of a pernicious error," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
+ii, 23).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be born,
+not only words but also deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states
+(Contra Faust. iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply
+those deeds to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all
+things, however, that occur through divine providence are ordered so
+as to be signs of the future. Hence the argument does not prove.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Unlawful to Wear Divine Words at the Neck?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to wear divine
+words at the neck. Divine words are no less efficacious when written
+than when uttered. But it is lawful to utter sacred words for the
+purpose of producing certain effects; (for instance, in order to heal
+the sick), such as the "Our Father" or the "Hail Mary," or in any way
+whatever to call on the Lord's name, according to Mk. 16:17, 18, "In
+My name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new
+tongues, they shall take up serpents." Therefore it seems to be
+lawful to wear sacred words at one's neck, as a remedy for sickness
+or for any kind of distress.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sacred words are no less efficacious on the human
+body than on the bodies of serpents and other animals. Now certain
+incantations are efficacious in checking serpents, or in healing
+certain other animals: wherefore it is written (Ps. 57:5): "Their
+madness is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp
+that stoppeth her ears, which will not hear the voice of the
+charmers, nor of the wizard that charmeth wisely." Therefore it is
+lawful to wear sacred words as a remedy for men.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God's word is no less holy than the relics of the
+saints; wherefore Augustine says (Lib. L. Hom. xxvi) that "God's word
+is of no less account than the Body of Christ." Now it is lawful for
+one to wear the relics of the saints at one's neck, or to carry them
+about one in any way for the purpose of self-protection. Therefore it
+is equally lawful to have recourse to the words of Holy Writ, whether
+uttered or written, for one's protection.
+
+Obj. 4: On the other hand, Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii in Matth.)
+[*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's
+works, and falsely ascribed to him]: "Some wear round their necks a
+passage in writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel read in
+church and heard by all every day? How then, if it does a man no good
+to have the Gospels in his ears, will he find salvation by wearing
+them round his neck? Moreover, where is the power of the Gospel? In
+the shapes of the letters or in the understanding of the sense? If in
+the shapes, you do well to wear them round your neck; if in the
+understanding, you will then do better to bear them in your heart
+than to wear them round your neck."
+
+_I answer that,_ In every incantation or wearing of written words,
+two points seem to demand caution. The first is the thing said or
+written, because if it is connected with invocation of the demons it
+is clearly superstitious and unlawful. In like manner it seems that
+one should beware lest it contain strange words, for fear that they
+conceal something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says [*Cf. the Opus
+Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works, falsely
+ascribed to him] that "many now after the example of the Pharisees
+who enlarged their fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels,
+and fasten them to their persons. Such things seem fearsome to those
+who do not understand them." Again, one should take care lest it
+contain anything false, because in that case also the effect could
+not be ascribed to God, Who does not bear witness to a falsehood.
+
+In the second place, one should beware lest besides the sacred words
+it contain something vain, for instance certain written characters,
+except the sign of the Cross; or if hope be placed in the manner of
+writing or fastening, or in any like vanity, having no connection
+with reverence for God, because this would be pronounced
+superstitious: otherwise, however, it is lawful. Hence it is written
+in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, cap. Non liceat Christianis): "In
+blending together medicinal herbs, it is not lawful to make use of
+observances or incantations, other than the divine symbol, or the
+Lord's Prayer, so as to give honor to none but God the Creator of
+all."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is indeed lawful to pronounce divine words, or to
+invoke the divine name, if one do so with a mind to honor God alone,
+from Whom the result is expected: but it is unlawful if it be done in
+connection with any vain observance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even in the case of incantations of serpents or any
+animals whatever, if the mind attend exclusively to the sacred words
+and to the divine power, it will not be unlawful. Such like
+incantations, however, often include unlawful observances, and rely
+on the demons for their result, especially in the case of serpents,
+because the serpent was the first instrument employed by the devil in
+order to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage quoted says: "Note
+that Scripture does not commend everything whence it draws its
+comparisons, as in the case of the unjust judge who scarcely heard
+the widow's request."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The same applies to the wearing of relics, for if they
+be worn out of confidence in God, and in the saints whose relics they
+are, it will not be unlawful. But if account were taken in this
+matter of some vain circumstance (for instance that the casket be
+three-cornered, or the like, having no bearing on the reverence due
+to God and the saints), it would be superstitious and unlawful.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Chrysostom is speaking of the case in which more
+attention is paid the written characters than to the understanding of
+the words.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 97
+
+OF THE TEMPTATION OF GOD
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through
+lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that
+they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which
+pertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things.
+Accordingly we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to
+irreverence for God; (2) Vices pertaining to irreverence for holy
+things. With regard to the first we shall consider the temptation
+whereby God is tempted, and perjury, whereby God's name is taken with
+irreverence. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) In what the temptation of God consists;
+
+(2) Whether it is a sin?
+
+(3) To what virtue it is opposed;
+
+(4) Of its comparison with other vices.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Temptation of God Consists in Certain Deeds, Wherein the
+Expected Result Is Ascribed to the Power of God Alone?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God does not
+consist in certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the
+power of God alone. Just as God is tempted by man so is man tempted
+by God, man, and demons. But when man is tempted the result is not
+always expected from his power. Therefore neither is God tempted when
+the result is expected from His power alone.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all those who work miracles by invoking the divine
+name look for an effect due to God's power alone. Therefore, if the
+temptation of God consisted in such like deeds, all who work miracles
+would tempt God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to man's perfection that he
+should put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence
+Ambrose, commenting on Luke 9:3, "Take nothing for your journey,"
+etc. says: "The Gospel precept points out what is required of him
+that announces the kingdom of God, namely, that he should not depend
+on worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance from his faith, he
+should hold himself to be the more able to provide for himself, the
+less he seeks these things." And the Blessed Agatha said: "I have
+never treated my body with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus
+Christ, Who restores all things by His mere word." [*Office of St.
+Agatha, eighth Responsory (Dominican Breviary).] But the temptation
+of God does not consist in anything pertaining to perfection.
+Therefore the temptation of God does not consist in such like deeds,
+wherein the help of God alone is expected.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 36): "Christ
+who gave proof of God's power by teaching and reproving openly, yet
+not allowing the rage of His enemies to prevail against Him,
+nevertheless by fleeing and hiding, instructed human weakness, lest
+it should dare to tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that
+which it needs to avoid." From this it would seem that the temptation
+of God consists in omitting to do what one can in order to escape
+from danger, and relying on the assistance of God alone.
+
+_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, to tempt is to test the person
+tempted. Now we put a person to the test by words or by deeds. By
+words, that we may find out whether he knows what we ask, or whether
+he can and will grant it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe
+another's prudence, will or power. Either of these may happen in two
+ways. First, openly, as when one declares oneself a tempter: thus
+Samson (Judges 14:12) proposed a riddle to the Philistines in order
+to tempt them. In the second place it may be done with cunning and by
+stealth, as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Matt. 22:15,
+sqq. Again this is sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends,
+by word or deed, to put some person to the test; and sometimes
+implicitly, when, to wit, though he does not intend to test a person,
+yet that which he does or says can seemingly have no other purpose
+than putting him to a test.
+
+Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds.
+Now we speak with God in words when we pray. Hence a man tempts God
+explicitly in his prayers when he asks something of God with the
+intention of probing God's knowledge, power or will. He tempts God
+explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to
+experiment on God's power, good will or wisdom. But He will tempt God
+implicitly, if, though he does not intend to make an experiment on
+God, yet he asks for or does something which has no other use than to
+prove God's power, goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man wishes his
+horse to gallop in order to escape from the enemy, this is not giving
+the horse a trial: but if he make the horse gallop with out any
+useful purpose, it seems to be nothing else than a trial of the
+horse's speed; and the same applies to all other things. Accordingly
+when a man in his prayers or deeds entrusts himself to the divine
+assistance for some urgent or useful motive, this is not to tempt
+God: for it is written (2 Paralip 20:12): "As we know not what to do,
+we can only turn our eyes to Thee." But if this be done without any
+useful or urgent motive, this is to tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a
+gloss on Deut. 6:16, "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God," says:
+"A man tempts God, if having the means at hand, without reason he
+chooses a dangerous course, trying whether he can be delivered by
+God."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds, to
+test his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same
+deeds.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When saints work miracles by their prayers, they are
+moved by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which is
+an effect of the divine power.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The preachers of God's kingdom dispense with temporal
+aids, so as to be freer to give their time to the word of God:
+wherefore if they depend on God alone, it does not follow that they
+tempt God. But if they were to neglect human assistance without any
+useful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine
+(Contra Faust. xxii, 36) says that "Paul fled, not through ceasing to
+believe in God, but lest he should tempt God, were he not to flee
+when he had the means of flight." The Blessed Agatha had experience
+of God's kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such
+sickness as required bodily medicine, or else she felt herself
+suddenly cured by God.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is a Sin to Tempt God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God
+has not commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is the
+same as to tempt, Him: for it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring all
+the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house;
+and try Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the
+flood-gates of heaven." Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt
+God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a man is tempted not only in order to test his
+knowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will.
+Now it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is
+written (Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see that the Lord is sweet," and
+(Rom. 12:2): "That you may prove what is the good, and the
+acceptable, and the perfect will of God." Therefore it is not a sin
+to tempt God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from sin,
+but rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because when the
+Lord said: "Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God," he replied: "I will
+not ask, and I will not tempt the Lord," and then it was said to him:
+"Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are
+grievous to my God also?" (Isa. 7:11-13). And we read of Abraham
+(Gen. 15:8) that he said to the Lord: "Whereby may I know that I
+shall possess it?" namely, the land which God had promised him. Again
+Gedeon asked God for a sign of the victory promised to him (Judges
+6:36, sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is
+not a sin to tempt God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is forbidden in God's Law, for it is written
+(Deut. 6:10): "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), to tempt a person is to put
+him to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain.
+Wherefore all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt,
+either in the tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its
+qualities), or in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove
+it to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it
+is a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which pertains to God's
+perfection. Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in
+order that the tempter himself may know God's power.
+
+On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the
+divine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it
+to others: this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of
+urgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite
+conditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might
+be wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in
+order, to wit, that Christ's power might be made manifest to
+unbelievers.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law, as
+stated above (Q. 87, A. 1). Hence there was a motive of urgency to
+pay it, through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive of
+usefulness, as stated in the text quoted--"that there may be meat in
+God's house": wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The
+words that follow, "and try Me," are not to be understood causally,
+as though they had to pay tithes in order to try if "God would open
+the flood-gates of heaven," but consecutively, because, to wit, if
+they paid tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which
+God would shower upon them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There is a twofold knowledge of God's goodness or will.
+One is speculative and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to
+prove whether God's will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other
+knowledge of God's will or goodness is effective or experimental and
+thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God's sweetness,
+and complacency in God's will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (Div.
+Nom. ii) that "he learnt divine things through experience of them."
+It is in this way that we are told to prove God's will, and to taste
+His sweetness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him alone,
+but for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was reproved
+because, by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common
+welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both because he
+would have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it
+was a matter relating to the common good. Abraham asked for a sign
+through the divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to
+have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to
+be excused from sin, as a gloss observes: just as Zachary sinned in
+saying to the angel (Luke 1:18): "Whereby shall I know this?" so that
+he was punished for his unbelief.
+
+It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God
+for a sign: first in order to test God's power or the truth of His
+word, and this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God.
+Secondly, in order to be instructed as to what is God's pleasure in
+some particular matter; and this nowise comes under the head of
+temptation of God.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Temptation of God Is Opposed to the Virtue of Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed
+to the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a
+man doubts God, as stated above (A. 2). Now doubt about God comes
+under the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore
+temptation of God is opposed to faith rather than to religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 18:23): "Before prayer
+prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man,"
+that is, who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, "prays for what
+God taught him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him
+to do." Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to hope.
+Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 77:18, "And they tempted God in their
+hearts," says that "to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully, with
+simplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts." Now deceit is
+opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is
+opposed, not to religion, but to truth.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to the gloss quoted above "to tempt God
+is to pray to Him inordinately." Now to pray to God becomingly is an
+act of religion as stated above (Q. 83, A. 15). Therefore to tempt
+God is a sin opposed to religion.
+
+_I answer that,_ As clearly shown above (Q. 81, A. 5), the end of
+religion is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains
+directly to irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is
+evident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since
+no one presumes to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it
+is manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 81, A. 7), it belongs to religion
+to declare one's faith by certain signs indicative of reverence
+towards God. Consequently it belongs to irreligion that, through
+doubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence towards
+God. To tempt God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of
+irreligion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He that prepares not his soul before prayer by
+forgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way
+disposing himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by
+God, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this
+implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or
+indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and
+without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence
+towards Him. For it is written (1 Pet. 5:6): "Be you humbled . . .
+under the mighty hand of God," and (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study to
+present thyself approved unto God." Therefore also this kind of
+temptation is a species of irreligion.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in relation to
+God, Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to man.
+Wherefore deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and
+consequently it does not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed
+to the truth.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Temptation of God Is a Graver Sin Than Superstition?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin
+than superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment.
+Now the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews
+than was the sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of
+superstition: since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of
+their number were slain, as related in Ex. 32:28 [*Septuagint
+version. The Vulgate has "twenty-three thousand."], whereas for the
+sin of temptation they all without exception perished in the desert,
+and entered not into the land of promise, according to Ps. 94:9,
+"Your fathers tempted Me," and further on, "so I swore in My wrath
+that they should not enter into My rest." Therefore to tempt God is a
+graver sin than superstition.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it
+would seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God is a
+species, is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition
+which bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a
+graver sin than superstition.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems to be a greater sin to behave
+disrespectfully to one's parents, than to pay others the respect we
+owe to our parents. Now God should be honored by us as the Father of
+all (Malach. 1:6). Therefore, temptation of God whereby we behave
+irreverently to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby
+we give to a creature the honor we owe to God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Deut. 17:2, "When there shall be found
+among you," etc. says: "The Law detests error and idolatry above all:
+for it is a very great sin to give to a creature the honor that
+belongs to the Creator."
+
+_I answer that,_ Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is
+that which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is
+less opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine
+excellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For
+just as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his
+error, than if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts more
+against the reverence due to God, if by his deeds he professes an
+error contrary to the divine excellence, than if he expresses a
+doubt. Now the superstitious man professes an error, as shown above
+(Q. 94, A. 1, ad 1), whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds
+expresses a doubt of the divine excellence, as stated above (A. 2).
+Therefore the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting
+God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above
+manner, as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more
+severe punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is
+written (Ex. 32:34): "And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this
+sin also of theirs."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as regards
+the material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as regards
+the end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of God,
+since it implies greater irreverence for God, as stated.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It belongs essentially to the divine excellence that it
+is singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine reverence
+to another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine
+excellence. There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents,
+which can without sin be given to others.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 98
+
+OF PERJURY
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury?
+
+(2) Whether perjury is always a sin?
+
+(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
+
+(4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is Necessary for Perjury That the Statement Confirmed on
+Oath Be False?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that
+the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above (Q. 89, A.
+3), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less
+than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of
+truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one
+swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears
+to something unjust.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the thing
+confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty
+than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is confirmed by
+calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in
+swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human
+statement which is confirmed on oath.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm.
+clxxx): "Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are
+deceived themselves"; and he gives three examples. The first is:
+"Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true,
+whereas it is false"; the second is: "Take the instance of another
+who knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it
+were true"; and the third is: "Take another, who thinks his statement
+false, and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true," of
+whom he says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a
+perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not
+necessary for perjury.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Perjury is defined "a falsehood confirmed by oath"
+[*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5].
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 92, A. 2), moral acts take their
+species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of
+a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed: since
+an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this
+cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls
+the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing,
+which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood.
+Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, "whichever of these three
+be lacking, there is perjury," but in different order. For first and
+chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in
+the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for
+in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very
+reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to
+do the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking,
+since by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the
+danger of lapsing into falsehood.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since
+they are in the position of active principle, as stated in _Phys._
+ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than
+the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man
+swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from
+that kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its
+end, by swearing what is false.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the
+apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it
+will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will.
+If something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both
+materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as
+false, it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each
+of these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in
+some way, on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however,
+that which is formal in anything is of greater importance than that
+which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is
+not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it
+false. For Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "It
+depends how the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is
+not guilty except the mind be guilty."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 2]
+
+Whether All Perjury Is Sinful?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever
+does not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a
+perjurer. Yet sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful
+(adultery, for instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a
+sin. If therefore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it
+would follow that he is perplexed.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes by
+committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not
+to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore
+not all perjury is sinful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, he that swears to do another's will would seem to be
+guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that
+he sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter
+order him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore
+seemingly not all perjury is sinful.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a
+declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the
+obligation of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus
+a state may swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other
+citizens come on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may
+swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new
+statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does
+not sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm.
+cxxx), in speaking of perjury: "See how you should detest this
+horrible beast and exterminate it from all human business."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 89, A. 1), to swear is to call
+God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to
+witness to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that
+God ignores the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a
+falsehood. Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion,
+to which it belongs to show reverence to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty
+of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep his
+oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which
+he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to
+give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of
+judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of
+perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is
+doing could not be a matter of an oath.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When one man swears or promises to do another's will,
+there is to be understood this requisite condition--that the thing
+commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: An oath is a personal act, and so when a man becomes a
+citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever
+the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the
+nature of which obligation is that he should take his share of the
+state's burdens if he takes a share of its goods.
+
+The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some
+particular "college" is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be
+made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all,
+past and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of
+the statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force,
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 4).
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 3]
+
+Whether All Perjury Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It
+is laid down (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. Verum): "Referring to the
+question whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in
+order to safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind
+than that which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have
+had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations of their
+oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to
+avoid occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to
+keep their oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for
+this reason to be punished as for a mortal sin." Therefore not all
+perjury is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2. Further, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on
+St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, "it is a
+greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels." Now it is not
+always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance,
+if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue
+in the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it
+always a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on
+the Gospels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through
+committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem that
+infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is
+prescribed in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury
+[*Cap. Cum dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.]. Therefore, seemingly, not all
+perjury is a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is
+a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is
+written (Lev. 19:12): "Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name."
+Therefore it is a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the teaching of the Philosopher
+(Poster. i, 2), "that which causes a thing to be such is yet more
+so." Now we know that an action which is, by reason of its very
+nature, a venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be
+done out of contempt of God. Wherefore any action that of its nature,
+implies contempt of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very
+nature implies contempt of God, since, as stated above (A. 2), the
+reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence
+towards God. Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of its very
+nature, is a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 89, A. 7, ad 3), coercion does not
+deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as regards that which
+can be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfil an oath which
+he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally.
+Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a
+man from an obligation even of an oath, especially if the latter
+should have been coerced into taking the oath through such fear as
+may overcome a high-principled man.
+
+When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished
+as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of
+mortal sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless irreverent
+to God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not
+excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue,
+if he adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that he is
+swearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as
+neither is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not
+advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and
+consequently is excused from the sin of perjury.
+
+It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels,
+than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of
+scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we
+consider them equally in comparison with one another, it is more
+grievous to commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the
+Gospels.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the
+law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath
+be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so
+declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he
+has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy
+rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he
+still has it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his
+oath, which is not the case in a declaratory oath.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 4]
+
+Whether He Sins Who Demands an Oath of a Perjurer?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer
+commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that
+he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for
+him to demand an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for
+his own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should
+one enjoin an oath on another person.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to
+impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath
+from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then
+seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful
+to impose an oath on one who swears falsely.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Lev. 5:1): "If anyone sin, and hear
+the voice of one swearing falsely [*'Falsely' is not in the Vulgate],
+and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to
+it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity." Hence it
+would seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he
+is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an
+oath of such a man.
+
+Obj. 4: On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so is
+it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an
+oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad
+Public. Ep. xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one
+who swears falsely.
+
+_I answer that,_ As regards a person who demands an oath from
+another, a distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he
+demands the oath on his own account and of his own accord, or he
+demands it on account of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If
+a man demands an oath on his own account as a private individual, we
+must make a distinction, as does Augustine (de Perjuriis. serm.
+clxxx): "For if he knows not that the man will swear falsely, and
+says to him accordingly: 'Swear to me' in order that he may be
+credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human temptation" (because, to
+wit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the man will
+speak the truth). "This is the evil whereof Our Lord says (Matt.
+5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But if he
+knows the man to have done so," i.e. the contrary of what he swears
+to, "and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the other
+destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand of
+the slayer."
+
+If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in
+accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a
+third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath
+of a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly,
+because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at
+whose instance he demands it.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of one who demands an
+oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other
+will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the
+fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an
+oath in order that he may be more certain.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), "though we
+are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the
+Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others." Hence he
+that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own
+accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the
+passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce
+another's perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter
+had to be denounced "to those who would do the perjurer good rather
+than harm." Again, neither did he state in what order the
+denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order
+should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden,
+especially when it does not tend to another person's injury: because
+if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated
+above (Q. 33, A. 7; Q. 68, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of
+good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil.
+Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to
+swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by
+false gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who
+swears falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks
+the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who
+swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii).
+Hence when a man swears falsely by the true God his oath seems to
+lack any good that one may use lawfully.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 99
+
+OF SACRILEGE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion,
+whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall
+consider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is sacrilege?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special sin?
+
+(3) Of the species of sacrilege;
+
+(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Sacrilege Is the Violation of a Sacred Thing?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a
+sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can.
+Si quis suadente]): "They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about
+the sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the
+sovereign be worthy of honor." Now this seems to have no connection
+with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the
+violation of something sacred.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on can.
+Constituit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public
+offices, "he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege."
+Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore
+it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred
+thing.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred things
+receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot be
+violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the
+violation of a sacred thing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a man is said to be
+sacrilegious because he selects," i.e. steals, "sacred things."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5; I-II, Q. 101, A. 4), a
+thing is called "sacred" through being deputed to the divine worship.
+Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed
+to a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through
+being deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is
+due to it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever
+pertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and
+comes under the head of sacrilege.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common
+good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the
+rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers
+of divine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, "Being ministers of His
+kingdom, you have not judged rightly." Hence by an extension of the
+term, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as
+disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow
+it, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments
+of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "But you are washed, but you are
+sanctified." Wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:9): "You are a chosen
+generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people."
+Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance
+that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an
+irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Violation here means any kind of irreverence or
+dishonor. Now as "honor is in the person who honors and not in the
+one who is honored" (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the
+person who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the
+object of his irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates
+the sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Sacrilege Is a Special Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not a special sin. It is
+stated (XVII, qu. iv) "They are guilty of sacrilege who through
+ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it
+by their negligence." But this is done in every sin, because sin is
+"a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God," according to
+Augustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general
+sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of
+sin. Now sacrilege is comprised under different kinds of sin, for
+instance under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the
+violation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place
+under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not
+a special sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins
+as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. v,
+11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other
+sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as
+stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ That which is opposed to a special virtue is a
+special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely
+religion, to which it belongs to reverence God and divine things.
+Therefore sacrilege is a special sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity,
+there must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is
+derived chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or
+subject. Now in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity,
+namely, the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently.
+Hence it is a special sin.
+
+Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De
+Fide Orth. iv, 3), "When the purple has been made into a royal robe,
+we pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned
+to death," as acting against the king: and in the same way if a man
+violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the
+reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the
+divine law who assail God's law, as heretics and blasphemers do.
+These are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of
+sacrilege, through perverting the words of the divine law.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found
+in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are
+directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of
+virtues commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin
+a man acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a
+sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin
+materially.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins,
+through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a
+sacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a
+sacred place, for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Species of Sacrilege Are Distinguished According to the
+Sacred Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not
+distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does
+not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now
+there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all
+violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of
+matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished
+thereby.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to
+the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now
+murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of
+sin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of
+sacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege
+are distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, and
+not according to the various sacred things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If,
+therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a
+sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred
+person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the
+sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according
+to the sacred things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Acts and habits are distinguished by their
+objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated
+above (A. 1). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished
+according to the sacred things.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the sin of sacrilege
+consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence
+is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently
+the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the
+different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated
+irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred
+thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege.
+
+Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those
+who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places
+and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is
+directed to the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place.
+For it is written (2 Macc. 5:19): "God did not choose the people for
+the place's sake, but the place for the people's sake." Hence
+sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that
+which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species
+there are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of
+sacred persons and places.
+
+In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed
+against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the
+differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs
+to the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the
+sacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore
+the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest
+of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the
+vessels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also
+sacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons
+of the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these
+come things connected with the apparel of the Church and its
+ministers; and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are
+deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any
+one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the
+aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a
+material, but also a formal difference.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one
+species in one respect, and to different species in another respect.
+Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, "animal," but
+differ in the species "colored thing," if one be white and the other
+black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ
+specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the same
+species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance,
+the violation of a nun by blows or by copulation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege
+materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The quotation
+is from St. Bernard, De Consideration. ii, 13] says that "a trifle on
+a priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy." But formally and
+properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege
+only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a
+virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is
+to be said of other instances.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Punishment of Sacrilege Should Be Pecuniary?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should
+not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted
+for a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it
+is punished by capital sentence according to civil law [*Dig. xlviii,
+13; Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.]. Therefore sacrilege should not
+be awarded a pecuniary punishment.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment,
+according to Nahum 1:9, "There shall not rise a double affliction."
+But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major
+excommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or
+destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges.
+Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:5): "Neither have we
+taken an occasion of covetousness." But it seems to involve an
+occasion of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be
+exacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not
+seem to be a fitting punishment of sacrilege.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written [*XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis
+contumax]: "If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force
+an escaped slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine
+hundred soldi": and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis
+inventus, can. 21): "Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay
+thirty pounds of tried purest silver."
+
+_I answer that,_ In the award of punishments two points must be
+considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just,
+and that "by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be
+tormented" (Wis. 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of
+one guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred
+thing, is excommunication [*Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis
+contumax, quoted above] whereby sacred things are withheld from him.
+The second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are
+inflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist
+from sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences
+not sacred things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by
+sacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them.
+Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced to capital
+punishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does
+not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is
+inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from sacrilege, at least
+by temporal punishments.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but
+excommunication in its stead.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man
+from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was
+necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to
+the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who
+despise spiritual things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this
+would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is
+exacted for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest
+utility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 100
+
+ON SIMONY
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) What is simony?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments?
+
+(3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions?
+
+(4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals?
+
+(5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or
+also oral remuneration or remuneration by service?
+
+(6) Of the punishment of simony.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Simony Is an Intentional Will to Buy or Sell Something
+Spiritual or Connected with a Spiritual Thing?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that simony is not "an express will to buy
+or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing."
+Simony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Eos qui per
+pecunias]): "The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with
+him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who
+are guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained
+that the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of
+God, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own
+slave. For every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether
+it be his slave or any other of his possessions." But unbelief, like
+faith, is an act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above
+(Q. 10, A. 2). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of
+the will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and
+this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is an
+intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin
+against the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of
+heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory
+says in a homily (v, in Ev.): "The kingdom of heaven is worth as much
+as you possess." Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy
+something spiritual.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of
+whom we read (Acts 8:18, 19) that "he offered the apostles money"
+that he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, "that on
+whomsoever he imposed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost."
+But we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony
+is not the will to sell a spiritual thing.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, there are many other voluntary commutations besides
+buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction [*A kind of
+legal compromise--Oxford Dictionary]. Therefore it would seem that
+simony is defined insufficiently.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, anything connected with spiritual things is itself
+spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add "or connected with
+spiritual things."
+
+Obj. 7: Further, according to some, the Pope cannot commit simony:
+yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not
+the will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a
+spiritual thing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory VII says (Regist. [*Caus. I, qu. i, can.
+Presbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare]): "None of the faithful is ignorant
+that buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the
+heresy of simony."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2) an act is evil
+generically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is
+undue matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because
+a spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as
+it is said concerning wisdom (Prov. 3:15), "she is more precious than
+all riches, and all things that are desired, are not to be compared
+with her": and for this reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of
+Simon in its very source, said (Acts 8:20): "Keep thy money to
+thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift
+of God may be purchased with money."
+
+Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor
+is not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted (Obj.
+1). Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of
+spiritual things, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of
+us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers
+of God."
+
+Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things,
+since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore Our Lord
+said (Matt. 10:8): "Freely have you received, freely give."
+
+Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God
+and divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of
+irreligion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of
+faith, without, sometimes, faith being in one's heart, so too the
+vices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief
+without, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is
+said to be a "heresy," as regards the outward protestation, since by
+selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares, in a way, that he is
+the owner of a spiritual gift; and this is heretical. It must,
+however, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles
+to sell him a grace of the Holy Ghost for money, said that the world
+was not created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore states
+(Etym. viii, 5): and so for this reason simoniacs are reckoned with
+other heretics, as appears from Augustine's book on heretics.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 58, A. 4), justice, with all its
+parts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its
+subject. Hence simony is fittingly defined from its relation to the
+will. This act is furthermore described as "express," in order to
+signify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part
+in virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Ghost that
+sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin through contempt of
+those things whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from sin, as stated
+above (Q. 14, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man
+gives what he has for God's sake. But this is to employ the term
+"buying" in a wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it
+reach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither
+"the sufferings of this time," nor any gift or deed of ours, "are
+worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed
+in us" (Rom. 8:18), and because merit consists chiefly, not in an
+outward gift, action or passion, but in an inward affection.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in
+order that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I, qu. iii
+[*Can. Salvator]), that "Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of
+the Holy Ghost, in order that he might make money by selling the
+signs to be wrought by him." Hence those who sell spiritual things
+are likened in intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish
+to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate,
+in act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read (4 Kings
+5:20-24) that he received money from the leper who was healed:
+wherefore the sellers of spiritual things may be called not only
+"simoniacs" but also "giezites."
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The terms "buying" and "selling" cover all kinds of
+non-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the exchange
+or agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by
+authority of the parties concerned without danger of committing
+simony, as laid down by law [*Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.;
+cap. Super, de Transact.]. Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of
+his office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or
+necessary reasons.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives
+through being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are
+spiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while
+others are called spiritual, through adhering to those others. Hence
+(I, qu. iii, cap. Siquis objecerit) it is stated that "spiritual
+things do not progress without corporal things, even as the soul has
+no bodily life without the body."
+
+Reply Obj. 7: The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony, like any
+other man, since the higher a man's position the more grievous is his
+sin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as
+dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore,
+were he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for
+a spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of
+simony. In like manner he might commit simony by accepting from a
+layman moneys not belonging to the goods of the Church.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Always Unlawful to Give Money for the Sacraments?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give
+money for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as
+we shall state in the Third Part (Q. 68, A. 6; Q. 73, A. 3). But
+seemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for Baptism,
+for instance if a priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child
+without being paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or
+sell the sacraments.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist,
+which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend
+or money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy
+or sell the other sacraments.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament
+consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money
+when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always
+unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be
+not sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that "it was
+no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom." Now it
+is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration of
+bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange
+for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that
+it is not unlawful.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously
+hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But
+it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is
+lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a
+like ecclesiastical dignity.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is
+given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]):
+"Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from
+the priesthood."
+
+_I answer that,_ The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most
+spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on
+which no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with
+a non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the
+ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support,
+according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), "Know you not,
+that they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the
+holy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar?"
+
+Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual
+grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be
+excused by any custom whatever, since "custom does not prevail over
+natural or divine law" [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; cf. I-II, Q.
+97, A. 3]. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a
+pecuniary value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the
+other hand, to receive anything for the support of those who
+administer the sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the
+Church and approved customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it
+is received not as a price of goods, but as a payment for their need.
+Hence a gloss of Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the priests that rule
+well," says: "They should look to the people for a supply to their
+need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And since
+nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize
+without being paid, one must act as though there were no priest
+available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the
+child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be
+baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water
+from the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it
+were an adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the
+priest were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if
+possible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have
+recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and
+should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism
+of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The priest receives money, not as the price for
+consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would
+be simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The money exacted of the person absolved is not the
+price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a
+punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As stated above, "custom does not prevail over natural
+or divine law" whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if
+such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual
+thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly
+simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling
+to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend recognized
+by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no intention of
+buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary, and
+especially if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all these
+cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of
+simony or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess.
+5:22), "From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves."
+
+Reply Obj. 5: It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition of
+one's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any
+dignity or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since
+this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing.
+But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust
+opposition, after one has already acquired that right.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia]
+say that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no grace is
+conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state
+in the Third Part of the work [* Supp., Q. 42, A. 3]. Wherefore we
+must reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, but
+also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give money for
+Matrimony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if it be
+considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the law
+[*Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand
+anything for the Nuptial Blessing.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 3]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Give and Receive Money for Spiritual Actions?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for
+spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But
+something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears
+from 1 Kings 9:7, 8, and 3 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that
+it is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most spiritual
+actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain the
+assistance of their prayers, according to Luke 16:9, "Make unto you
+friends of the mammon of iniquity." To preachers also, who sow
+spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1
+Cor. 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the
+divine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions:
+and sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is
+lawful to receive something for spiritual actions.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is
+lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may
+sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a
+master the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it
+would seem lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of
+his spiritual power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and
+so forth.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now
+in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are
+received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for
+spiritual things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can. Quidquid
+invisibilis]): "It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what
+is acquired by the consolation of invisible grace, whether by
+demanding a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever." Now all
+these spiritual things are acquired through an invisible grace.
+Therefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return for them.
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because
+they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are
+called spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose
+thereto. And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of
+men, according to 1 Cor. 9:7, "Who serveth as a soldier at any time
+at his own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk
+of the flock?" Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is
+spiritual in such like actions; but to receive or give something for
+the support of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with
+the statutes of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in
+such wise that there be no intention of buying or selling, and that
+no pressure be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by
+withholding spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then
+there would be an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual
+things have been freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary
+offerings and other dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling
+but able to pay, if the superior authorize this to be done.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, certain
+gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their livelihood,
+but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked
+prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from
+them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent of
+buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the
+poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity.
+Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not
+as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 5:11,
+"Let the priests that rule well," says: "Their need allows them to
+receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this should be
+given to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood
+the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they
+sell a great thing for a contemptible price." In like manner temporal
+things are given to those who praise God by celebrating the divine
+office whether for the living or for the dead, not as a price but as
+a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled when alms
+are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal
+to do such things by contract, or with the intention of buying or
+selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were decreed
+in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral unless
+a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance would
+preclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The
+ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed
+that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms,
+because this would not preclude its being granted to others.
+Moreover, the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction,
+whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is
+bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him
+in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory
+payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood.
+Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his
+spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor (which
+he is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has
+accepted), but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this
+reason it is unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing
+whatever, or for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for
+correcting his subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the
+other hand it is lawful for him to receive "procurations," when he
+visits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them, but as a
+means of livelihood. He that is possessed of science, without having
+taken upon himself the obligation of using it for the benefit of
+others can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since
+this is not a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on
+the other hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would
+amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would sin
+grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches are appointed
+to instruct the clerics of that church and other poor persons, and
+are in receipt of an ecclesiastical benefice for so doing, are not
+allowed to receive anything in return, either for teaching, or for
+celebrating or omitting any feasts.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price
+for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries, that
+are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance
+to the monastery is free, to accept something for the support of
+those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its
+revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier
+in admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for
+that monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other
+hand, it is lawful to incite a person's regard for a monastery by
+means of temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced
+to enter the monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or
+receive something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam
+pio).
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Receive Money for Things Annexed to Spiritual
+Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed
+to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to
+spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the
+sake of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what
+is annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything
+temporal, and this is clearly false.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual
+things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a chalice
+for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28).
+Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right of
+burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right
+of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised
+the priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham
+bought from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gen. 23:8,
+sqq.), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gen.
+25:31, sqq.). Again the right of patronage is transferred with the
+property sold, and is granted "in fee." Tithes are granted to certain
+soldiers, and can be redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for
+themselves the revenues of prebends of which they have the
+presentation, although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual
+thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual
+things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii,
+cap. Si quis objecerit): "Whoever sells one of two such things, that
+the one is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold.
+Wherefore let no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything
+ecclesiastical."
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two
+ways. First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have
+ecclesiastical benefices is said to be annexed to spiritual things,
+because it is not competent save to those who hold a clerical office.
+Hence such things can by no means exist apart from spiritual things.
+Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such things, because
+the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual. Other things
+are annexed to spiritual things through being directed thereto, for
+instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the
+presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred
+vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore
+such things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede
+them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not
+as annexed to spiritual things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things, as
+to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but
+their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful
+sale.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual things as
+to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their
+material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the poor
+provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over them,
+since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sacred
+vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to be made out
+of the same material they would have to be consecrated again.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: We have no authority for supposing that the double cave
+which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that
+purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used
+for burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be
+lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even
+a church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places
+are looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price
+as payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham
+did not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary
+plot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell
+or buy land on which there has previously been a church, as we have
+also said with regard to sacred vessels (Reply Obj. 2). Or again,
+Abraham is to be excused because he thus freed himself of a
+grievance. For although Ephron offered him the burial place for
+nothing, Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without
+prejudice to himself.
+
+The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God's
+choice, according to Malach. 1:2, 3, "I have loved Jacob, but have
+hated Esau." Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet
+Jacob sinned not in buying, because he is understood to have freed
+himself of his grievance.
+
+The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can
+it be granted "in fee," but is transferred with the property sold or
+granted.
+
+The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk,
+but merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of
+tithe, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 3).
+
+With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be
+observed, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a
+person to a benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of
+the revenues of the benefice in question, and to spend it on some
+pious object. But, on the other hand, if he were to require part of
+the revenues of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary,
+it would be the same as though he demanded payment from him, and he
+would not escape the guilt of simony.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 5]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Grant Spiritual Things in Return for an
+Equivalent of Service, or for an Oral Remuneration?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual
+things in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral
+remuneration. Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): "It is right that
+those who serve the interests of the Church should be rewarded." Now
+an equivalent of service denotes serving the interests of the Church.
+Therefore it seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for
+services received.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service
+received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so
+on account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal
+since it implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the
+former simoniacal.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which is done only at another's request would
+seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve
+simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration
+denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person's
+request. Therefore this is not simoniacal.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that
+they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral
+remuneration: and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony.
+Therefore oral remuneration does not entail simony.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says:
+"Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the
+purpose for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in
+consideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service
+rendered or money received, is guilty of simony."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the term "money" denotes
+"anything that can have a pecuniary value." Now it is evident that a
+man's service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a
+pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage.
+Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be
+rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or
+promised, at which that service could be valued. Likewise, to grant a
+person's request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to
+some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just
+as a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any
+external thing which comes under the head of "real remuneration," so
+too does he contract it, by receiving "oral remuneration" or an
+"equivalent in service rendered."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service,
+directed to spiritual things (e.g. to the good of the Church, or
+benefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical
+benefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the
+service, as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is
+not a case of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has
+in mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things
+(e.g. a service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his
+kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a
+case of remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by
+reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal,
+but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it
+does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which simony is
+based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice with the
+understanding or intention that he provide for one's kindred from the
+revenue is manifest simony.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Oral remuneration denotes either praise that
+pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby
+man's favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend
+this chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an
+unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention
+wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made
+for a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is
+based on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is
+granted to the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there
+may be simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of
+the person, but to human favor. If, however, a person asks for
+himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption
+renders him unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy
+person. But, if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an
+ecclesiastical benefice without the cure of souls.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for
+the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false
+pretenses stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that
+seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Those Who Are Guilty of Simony Are Fittingly Punished by
+Being Deprived of What They Have Acquired by Simony?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are
+not fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired
+by simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in
+return for a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be
+lost when once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by
+a consecration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person
+to be deprived of what he has acquired simoniacally.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained the
+episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders from
+him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church
+tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the
+power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power,
+if he has acquired it by simony.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no one should be punished for what was done without
+his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which is
+voluntary, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2; Q. 77, A. 7).
+Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual,
+which others have procured for him without his knowledge and consent.
+Therefore he should not be punished by being deprived of what has
+been bestowed on him.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a
+person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to
+restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit
+of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate
+and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that
+which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery
+by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But no one
+should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he
+has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the monastic
+state which he has acquired by simony.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, in this world external punishment is not inflicted
+for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is the
+judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will,
+wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above (A.
+1, ad 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what he
+has acquired by simony.
+
+Obj. 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less than
+to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those
+who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater
+dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they
+have received.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus):
+"He that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination
+or promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit
+the dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money."
+
+_I answer that,_ No one can lawfully retain that which he has
+acquired against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to
+give some of his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will
+and orders, the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received.
+Now Our Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of
+churches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis, according to
+Matt. 10:8, "Freely have you received, freely give." Wherefore
+whosoever acquires spiritual things in return for a remuneration
+cannot lawfully retain them. Moreover, those who are guilty of
+simony, by either selling or buying spiritual things, as well as
+those who act as go-between, are sentenced to other punishments,
+namely, infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and
+excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap. Si quis
+Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas].
+
+Reply Obj. 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally,
+receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the
+sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the
+Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were,
+and against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended,
+by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should
+not busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others,
+namely, that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his
+Order, whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the
+money which he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains
+it.
+
+Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders
+simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a
+benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal
+transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of
+the law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in
+secret he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself
+alone, and not as regards others.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one knows
+to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his command
+or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders from
+him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they are
+ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a
+dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive
+Orders in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be
+guilty of simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order
+without a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement,
+because no one should obey a man to the extent of communicating with
+him in an unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law,
+suspended as regards both himself and others, confers Orders
+unlawfully: wherefore no one should communicate with him, by
+receiving Orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be
+not certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to another's
+sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to receive Orders from
+him. And if the bishop has been guilty of simony otherwise than by a
+simoniacal promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive
+Orders from him because he is not suspended as regards others, but
+only as regards himself, as stated above (ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not only the
+punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of acquiring
+unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it.
+Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Orders or
+an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he deprived of
+what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his order, and
+resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom, but also in
+addition to this he is punished by being marked with infamy.
+Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually
+acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful
+possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits,
+allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits),
+excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the
+Church.
+
+On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by
+others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise
+of his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together
+with fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits
+which he has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith.
+Exception must be made in the case when his promotion has been
+deceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes
+the transaction, for then he is not bound to resign, unless
+subsequently he agree to the transaction, by paying what was promised.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received, must
+be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their transfer,
+notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter
+of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers
+by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the
+guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire
+chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of
+superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: If there are any persons who have been simoniacally
+admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the simony was
+committed with their knowledge since the holding of the General
+Council [*Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent III],
+they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of return,
+and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some house of
+the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however, this
+took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses of
+the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into
+monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they
+wander about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former
+rank, and must be assigned a lower place.
+
+On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their
+knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting
+they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty of
+simony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is
+not punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound
+to repent of his evil intention.
+
+Reply Obj. 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one who has
+knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases the
+bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all
+renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive
+either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the
+laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to
+retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater
+dispensation, allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor
+orders; or a full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the
+major orders in the same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 101
+
+OF PIETY
+(In Four Articles)
+
+After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which
+will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of
+inquiry arise with regard to piety:
+
+(1) To whom does piety extend?
+
+(2) What does piety make one offer a person?
+
+(3) Whether piety is a special virtue?
+
+(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of
+religion?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Piety Extends to Particular Human Individuals?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human
+individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes,
+properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by
+the term _eusebeia_. But the worship of God does not denote relation
+to man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely
+to certain human individuals.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): "Piety, on her day,
+provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the
+heart with works of mercy." Now the works of mercy are to be done to
+all, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety
+does not extend definitely to certain special persons.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual
+relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the
+Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11, 12), and on each of them is
+founded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of
+piety, according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance
+indeed of piety [Douay: 'godliness']." Therefore piety extends not
+only to one's kindred and fellow-citizens.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by
+piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our
+country and render them faithful service."
+
+_I answer that,_ Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways,
+according to their various excellence and the various benefits
+received from them. On both counts God holds first place, for He is
+supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and
+government. In the second place, the principles of our being and
+government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth
+and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents
+and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion
+to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second
+place, to give worship to one's parents and one's country.
+
+The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our
+kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same
+parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship
+given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and
+to all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to
+these.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the worship
+due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a particular.
+Hence it is written (Malach. 1:6): "If I be a father, where is My
+honor?" Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine
+worship.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "the term piety is
+often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language of the
+common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact that
+God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him
+than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word
+'pious' to God Himself."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and
+fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being
+than other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to
+them.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Piety Provides Support for Our Parents?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our
+parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, "Honor thy
+father and mother," belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the
+giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide
+support for one's parents.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound
+to support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), "neither
+ought the children to lay up for the parents." Therefore piety does
+not oblige them to support their parents.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, piety extends not only to one's parents, but also to
+other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above (A. 1).
+But one is not bound to support all one's kindred and
+fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one's
+parents.
+
+_On the contrary,_ our Lord (Matt. 15:3-6) reproved the Pharisees for
+hindering children from supporting their parents.
+
+_I answer that,_ We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is
+to say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially
+that which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's
+superior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes
+him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father,
+which it befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to
+him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children
+should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting
+that they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of
+which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says (De
+Invent. Rhet. ii) that "piety gives both duty and homage": "duty"
+referring to service, and "homage" to reverence or honor, because, as
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "we are said to give homage to those
+whose memory or presence we honor."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to our Lord's interpretation (Matt. 15:3-6)
+the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them;
+and the reason for this is that support is given to one's father
+because it is due to him as to one greater.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and
+his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is
+essentially fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently
+he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life,
+and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow
+something on his father is accidental, arising from some momentary
+necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as
+for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the
+successors of their children, but children of their parents.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), "we offer homage
+and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country";
+not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to
+others according to our means and their personal claims.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Piety Is a Special Virtue Distinct from Other Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct
+from other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone
+proceeds from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a
+distinct virtue from charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God. But
+piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei
+x). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and duty,
+seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common
+good. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1, 2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as
+a part of justice.
+
+_I answer that,_ A special virtue is one that regards an object under
+a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in
+rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect
+of something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing
+is indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural
+principle of being and government. And piety regards this principle,
+inasmuch as it pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and
+to those who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope and
+charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety is
+a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and country.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God is the principle of our being and government in a
+far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence
+religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from
+piety, which pays homage to our parents and country. But things
+relating to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of
+excellence and causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore,
+by way of excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as
+God, by way of excellence, is called "Our Father."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Piety extends to our country in so far as the latter is
+for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the good of
+our country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal justice
+has more of the character of a general virtue than piety has.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Duties of Piety Towards One's Parents Should Be Omitted
+for the Sake of Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents
+should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Luke
+14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother,
+and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own
+life also, he cannot be My disciple." Hence it is said in praise of
+James and John (Matt. 4:22) that they left "their nets and father,
+and followed" Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites
+(Deut. 33:9): "Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do
+not know you; and to his brethren: I know you not; and their own
+children they have not known. These have kept Thy word." Now a man
+who knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even hates them,
+must needs omit the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of piety
+should be omitted for the sake of religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Luke 9:59, 60) that in answer to him
+who said: "Suffer me first to go and bury my father," Our Lord
+replied: "Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the
+kingdom of God." Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a
+duty of piety to bury one's father. Therefore a duty of piety should
+be omitted for the sake of religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God is called "Our Father" by excellence. Now just
+as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety so do we
+worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be
+omitted for the sake of the worship of religion.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not
+break to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with
+those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents,
+both on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own,
+and on the score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister
+without the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of
+piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of
+religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord reproved the Pharisees (Matt. 15:3-6) who
+taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying
+one's parents the honor we owe them.
+
+_I answer that,_ Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is
+opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his
+book on the Categories (Cap. De oppos.), "good is not opposed to
+good." Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually
+hinder one another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of
+the other. Now, as stated above (I-II, Q. 7, A. 2; Q. 18, A. 3), the
+act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and
+if it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of
+vice. Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's
+parents according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that
+man should tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as
+Ambrose says on Luke 12:52, "the piety of divine religion takes
+precedence of the claims of kindred."
+
+Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the
+worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship
+to one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad
+Heliod.): "Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy
+mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of
+the cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this
+matter." Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's
+parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives
+to God. If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we
+are not withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of
+piety, and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of
+religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says (Hom.
+xxxvii in Ev.) that "when we find our parents to be a hindrance in
+our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them."
+For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the service
+of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is
+in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their
+kindred, because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not the
+idolaters (Ex. 32). James and John are praised for leaving their
+parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to
+evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another
+means of livelihood, if they followed Christ.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father
+because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth.), "Our Lord
+by so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and
+worries and other things that one anticipates under these
+circumstances. For after the burial the will had to be read, the
+estate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly, because there
+were others who could see to the funeral." Or, according to Cyril's
+commentary on Luke 9, "this disciple's request was, not that he might
+bury a dead father, but that he might support a yet living father in
+the latter's old age, until at length he should bury him. This is
+what Our Lord did not grant, because there were others, bound by the
+duties of kindred, to take care of him."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Whatever we give our parents out of piety is referred
+by us to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform with
+regard to any of our neighbors are offered to God, according to Matt.
+25:40: "As long as you did it to one of . . . My least . . . you did
+it to Me." Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of our
+assistance, so that they have no other means of support, provided
+they incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for
+the sake of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves to their
+service without sin, or if they can be supported without our
+assistance, it is lawful to forego their service, so as to give more
+time to religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: We must speak differently of one who is yet in the
+world, and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he
+that is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support
+without him, he must not leave them and enter religion, because he
+would be breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of
+parents. Some say, however, that even then he might abandon them, and
+leave them in God's care. But this, considered aright, would be to
+tempt God: since, while having human means at hand, he would be
+exposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God's assistance. On
+the other hand, if the parents can find means of livelihood without
+him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter religion, because
+children are not bound to support their parents except in cases of
+necessity, as stated above. He that has already made his profession
+in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world: wherefore he
+ought not, under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave the
+cloister where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once more
+with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound, saving his obedience
+to his superiors, and his religious state withal, to make points
+efforts for his parents' support.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 102
+
+OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of
+which will manifest the contrary vices.
+
+Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other
+virtues?
+
+(2) What does observance offer?
+
+(3) Of its comparison with piety.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Observance Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Other Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that observance is not a special virtue,
+distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their
+objects. But the object of observance is not distinct from the object
+of piety: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by
+observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some
+kind of dignity." But worship and honor are paid also by piety to our
+parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct
+virtue from piety.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that are
+in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in
+science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay
+honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore
+observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in
+dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a
+position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law,
+according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute
+to whom tribute is due," etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements
+of the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice.
+Therefore observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from
+other virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance
+along with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ As explained above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 3; Q. 80),
+according to the various excellences of those persons to whom
+something is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of
+virtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes
+of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is
+found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way,
+exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of
+father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of
+generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the
+perfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of
+dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain
+things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the
+commander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of
+learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are
+designated as "fathers," on account of their being charged with like
+cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him (4 Kings 5:13):
+"Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing," etc.
+
+Therefore, just as, in a manner, beneath religion, whereby worship is
+given to God, we find piety, whereby we worship our parents; so under
+piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to
+persons in positions of dignity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 101, A. 3, ad 2), religion goes by
+the name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety properly so
+called is distinct from religion; and in the same way piety can be
+called observance by way of excellence, although observance properly
+speaking is distinct from piety.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a
+man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain
+power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should
+be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of
+others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of
+science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in
+relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself.
+Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship
+and honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as
+science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of
+dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any
+excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to
+pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot
+be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their
+position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our
+parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and
+not to special justice, which is a principal virtue.
+
+Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above
+(Q. 58, A. 6).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Belongs to Observance to Pay Worship and Honor to Those
+Who Are in Positions of Dignity?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay
+worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according
+to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons
+whom we hold in honor, so that worship and honor would seem to be the
+same. Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying
+worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe:
+wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of
+justice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in
+positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us.
+Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and
+honor to all.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity who
+are placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of
+remuneration, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their
+dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to
+whom fear; honor to whom honor." Moreover, we owe them reverence and
+subjection, according to Heb. 13:17, "Obey your prelates, and be
+subject to them." Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as
+paying worship and honor.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by
+observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some
+kind of dignity."
+
+_I answer that,_ It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to
+govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due
+end: thus a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every
+mover has a certain excellence and power over that which is moved.
+Wherefore, a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold
+consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position,
+together with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the
+exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there is due
+to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of excellence;
+and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him
+worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying his
+commands, and by repaying him, according to one's faculty, for the
+benefits we received from him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Worship includes not only honor, but also whatever
+other suitable actions are connected with the relations between man
+and man.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 80), debt is twofold. One is legal
+debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honor
+and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed
+over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a
+certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honor to
+persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions
+of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to
+them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise
+of their government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are
+moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a
+repayment of their labor.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Observance Is a Greater Virtue Than Piety?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety.
+For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a
+father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular
+governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the
+state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is
+greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance
+is a greater virtue than piety.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the
+common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we
+ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy
+to expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common
+good. Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in
+positions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays
+worship to one's kindred.
+
+Obj. 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the
+first place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the
+virtuous by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3).
+Therefore observance takes the first place after religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue.
+Now, immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the
+first table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers
+to piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the
+order of excellence.
+
+_I answer that,_ Something may be paid to persons in positions of
+dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when
+one serves them in the administration of the affairs of the state.
+This no longer belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays
+worship not only to one's father but also to one's fatherland.
+Secondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity
+refers specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this
+belongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety. Therefore in
+comparing observance with piety we must needs take into consideration
+the different relations in which other persons stand to ourselves,
+which relations both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the
+persons of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin
+to us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and
+education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's
+substance than external government, the principle of which is seated
+in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety takes
+precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons more
+akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The prince is compared to the father as a universal to
+a particular power, as regards external government, but not as
+regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this way
+the father should be compared with the divine power from which all
+things derive their being.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In so far as persons in positions of dignity are
+related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to
+observance, but to piety, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The rendering of honor or worship should be
+proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered
+in himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore,
+though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of
+honor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a
+greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received
+from their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay
+worship and honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are
+not of their kindred.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 103
+
+OF DULIA
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider
+(1) dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto
+to those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey
+their commands.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?
+
+(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?
+
+(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are
+above us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?
+
+(4) Whether it contains several species?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Honor Denotes Something Corporal?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that honor does not denote something corporal.
+For honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may be
+gathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is
+something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated
+above (Q. 81, A. 2, ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "honor
+is the reward of virtue." Now, since virtue consists chiefly of
+spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the
+reward is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not
+consist of corporal things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from glory.
+Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor
+consists of things internal and spiritual.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3, "Honor
+widows that are widows indeed," and (1 Tim. 5:17), "let the priests
+that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor" etc. says (Ep. ad
+Ageruch.): "Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for
+remuneration." Now both of these pertain to [corporal] things.
+Therefore honor consists of corporal things.
+
+_I answer that,_ Honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence.
+Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their
+excellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now
+witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is
+the searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices.
+wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere
+internal movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges
+either God's excellence or another man's excellence before God. But,
+as regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs,
+either by words, as when one proclaims another's excellence by word
+of mouth, or by deeds, for instance by bowing, saluting, and so
+forth, or by external things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues,
+and the like. Accordingly honor consists of signs, external and
+corporal.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the one hand
+it is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one man
+honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other
+hand, it is the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in
+order that he may be held in reverence by others.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), honor is
+not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and corporal
+things can be greater than honor, since these corporal things
+themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling
+virtue. It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they
+may be made known, according to Matt. 5:15, "Neither do men light a
+candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it
+may shine to all that are in the house." In this sense honor is said
+to be the reward of virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways.
+First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor
+consists of any external signs, so that praise is included in honor.
+Secondly, because by paying honor to a person we bear witness to a
+person's excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we
+bear witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise
+one that works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even
+to the best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived
+at the end, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5).
+
+Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our
+bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes
+clear to the knowledge of many. The word "glory" signifies this, for
+"glory" is the same as _kleria_, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on
+Rom. 16:27 observes that glory is "clear knowledge together with
+praise."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Honor Is Properly Due to Those Who Are Above Us?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are
+above us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to
+Matt. 11:11, "He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater
+than John the Baptist." Yet an angel forbade John when the latter
+wished to honor him (Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to
+those who are above us.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his
+virtue, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 63, A. 3). But sometimes those who
+are above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them, as
+neither is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the
+order of nature.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 12:10): "With honor
+preventing one another," and we read (1 Pet. 2:17): "Honor all men."
+But this would not be so if honor were due to those alone who are
+above us. Therefore honor is not due properly to those who are above
+us.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that Tobias "had ten
+talents of silver of that which he had been honored by the king": and
+we read (Esther 6:11) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered
+it to be proclaimed in his presence: "This honor is he worthy of whom
+the king hath a mind to honor." Therefore honor is paid to those also
+who are beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor is not
+due properly to those who are above us.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that "honor is
+due to the best."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), honor is nothing but an
+acknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness. Now a person's
+excellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honor
+him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in
+itself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is
+always due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority.
+
+For the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those
+who honor him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent than some
+others, or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in
+some respect and not simply.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind of
+honor, but the honor of adoration and latria, which is due to God. Or
+again, he forbade him to pay the honor of dulia, in order to indicate
+the dignity of John himself, for which Christ equaled him to the
+angels "according to the hope of glory of the children of God":
+wherefore he refused to be honored by him as though he were superior
+to him.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A wicked superior is honored for the excellence, not of
+his virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister, and because
+the honor paid to him is paid to the whole community over which he
+presides. As for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and
+should be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In every man is to be found something that makes it
+possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3,
+"In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves," and
+thus, too, we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Private individuals are sometimes honored by kings, not
+that they are above them in the order of dignity but on account of
+some excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and
+Mardochaeus were honored by kings.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Dulia Is a Special Virtue Distinct from Latria?
+
+Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct
+from latria. For a gloss on Ps. 7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I
+put my trust," says: "Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due;
+God by creation, to Whom we owe latria." Now the virtue directed to
+God as Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as
+God. Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8), "to
+be loved is like being honored." Now the charity with which we love
+God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia
+whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria
+with which we honor God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an image
+is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the thing
+represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made
+to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. 2:22, 23)
+that "they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God created man
+incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him."
+Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God is
+honored.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage
+due to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to
+obey their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct
+from latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of
+God."
+
+_I answer that,_ According to what has been stated above (Q. 101, A.
+3), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there
+must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude
+is due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is
+competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has
+absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly,
+which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a
+certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a
+particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which
+pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria,
+which pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a
+species of observance, because by observance we honor all those who
+excel in dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of
+servants for their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence,
+inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so again latria
+is called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by
+way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power to
+create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this gloss
+drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of
+creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in
+respect of lordship, which is communicated to a creature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since that
+which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone. Wherefore
+the charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we
+love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from
+charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In
+like manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another
+for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, latria and
+dulia are not the same virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to the
+thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an
+image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes
+the movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to
+the thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of
+dulia regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in
+respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God,
+yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this
+to God actually.
+
+Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a
+fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need
+not be towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the
+image of God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the
+reverence that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to
+His image.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Dulia Has Various Species?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we
+show honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under
+different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the
+Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in
+the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia
+is divided into specifically different virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes, as
+pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a
+mean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures
+having a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin
+as being the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are
+different species of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other
+hyperdulia.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the image
+of God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational
+creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted
+by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we
+must distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the
+more since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for
+instance, to the wood of the Holy Cross.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not
+divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia.
+
+_I answer that,_ Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be
+taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account
+of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and
+observance, and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards
+a man. Taken in this sense it will have parts differing specifically
+from one another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as
+denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies
+servitude, as stated above (A. 3). Taken in this sense it is not
+divided into different species, but is one of the species of
+observance, mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason
+that a servant reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his
+commanding officer under another, the disciple his master under
+another, and so on in similar cases.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken in a
+wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a
+man by reason of his having an affinity to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational
+creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are
+naturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay
+to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king's
+robe receives the same honor as the king himself, according to
+Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 104
+
+OF OBEDIENCE
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?
+
+(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?
+
+(3) Of its comparison with other virtues;
+
+(4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things?
+
+(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
+
+(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 1]
+
+Whether One Man Is Bound to Obey Another?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For
+nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has
+so ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus.
+15:14, "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of
+his own counsel." Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would have
+to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his rule
+of conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule of
+human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it
+acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous.
+Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good
+deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less
+acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is
+not bound to obey another.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): "Obey your prelates
+and be subject to them."
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as the actions of natural things proceed from
+natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In
+natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their
+actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by
+God: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by
+their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move
+by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the
+divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to
+be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in
+virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to
+obey their superiors.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as
+though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because,
+unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity
+to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding
+from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own
+counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying
+his superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), "When we humbly give
+way to another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational
+wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than
+another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of
+the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will
+of this other man who obeys him.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one
+way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound
+to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it
+of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy
+and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will.
+Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt
+will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially
+before God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward
+will.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q, 104, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Obedience Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For
+disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general
+sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to disobey
+the divine law." Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral.
+But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised
+under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does
+not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more
+obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a
+special virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
+more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own." But
+every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its
+own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as
+stated in _Ethic._ ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their
+objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of
+a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there
+are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue,
+comprising many special virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of
+justice, as stated above (Q. 80).
+
+_I answer that,_ A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that
+have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to
+render a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance
+with the divinely established order of things, as shown above (A. 1),
+and therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and
+order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. First Part, Q.
+5, A. 5]. Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by
+reason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations
+towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their
+commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience
+is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or
+express, because the superior's will, however it become known, is a
+tacit precept, and a man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt,
+forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as
+he understands his superior's will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object from
+admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues
+correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils
+both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good
+end, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord.
+Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs
+in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all
+acts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96,
+A. 3). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept,
+and pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not
+evil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be
+taken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally
+the aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience
+a special sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that
+one perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the
+intention of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one
+treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if
+obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action
+that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of
+that action through any intention whatever, then obedience will be a
+general virtue, and disobedience a general sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its direct
+object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether expressed
+or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his
+will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to
+Titus 3:1, "Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a
+word," etc.
+
+It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it
+observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is
+measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in
+so far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein
+he ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (Q.
+92, A. 2). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the
+person who retains another's property, and deficiency in the person
+who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v,
+4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of
+him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds
+in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the
+superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way
+obedience will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was
+stated above concerning justice (Q. 58, A. 10).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Obedience, like every virtue, requires the will to be
+prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is
+repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and
+this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience makes a man's
+will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of
+the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for
+its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable
+matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to
+comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own
+will. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own
+sake, but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as
+happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is
+not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says
+(Moral. xxxv) that "obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds
+its own in agreeable matters," because, to wit, one's own will seems
+to tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to
+the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that "it increases in
+disagreeable or difficult matters," because there one's own will
+tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as
+regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the
+judgment of God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in
+agreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless
+praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less
+devotedly [*Cf. Q. 82, A. 2] to the fulfilment of the precept.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Reverence regards directly the person that excels:
+wherefore it admits a various species according to the various
+aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the
+precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one
+aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account
+of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one
+species, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Obedience Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues.
+For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): "Obedience is better than
+sacrifices." Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion,
+which is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above (Q. 81, A.
+6). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
+only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when
+ingrafted." Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore
+obedience is greater than all the virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "evil should never
+be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we
+should lay aside the good we are doing." Now one does not lay aside a
+thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose
+sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other
+virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from
+charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience should be
+practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not
+through fear of punishment, but through love of justice." Therefore
+charity is a greater virtue than obedience.
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as sin consists in man contemning God and
+adhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists
+in man contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now
+the end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore
+if a man contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God,
+his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from
+his contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological,
+virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the
+moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in
+order to adhere to God.
+
+Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns
+that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are
+three kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God's sake. The
+lowest of these are external goods, the goods of the body take the
+middle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among
+these the chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will,
+man makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the
+virtue of obedience, whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake,
+is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn
+other goods for the sake of God.
+
+Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is rightly preferred
+to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas
+by obedience we slay our own will." Wherefore even any other acts of
+virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of
+obedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to
+give all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to
+the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to
+obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if
+they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from
+obedience. For it is written (1 John 2:4, 5): "He who saith that he
+knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he
+that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is
+perfected": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship
+and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under
+different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding the
+aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far
+as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a
+way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence
+for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it
+proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and
+pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion.
+Wherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God
+than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, "in a sacrifice we slay
+another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will," as
+Gregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel
+spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God than to offer
+in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the
+commandment of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a
+precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue
+act causally or dispositively towards their generation and
+preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues.
+And yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all
+virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of
+virtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of
+virtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if
+there be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept,
+that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue
+is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine
+authority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to
+God. Secondly, because infusion of grace and virtues may precede,
+even in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience
+is not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to
+which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so
+forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of
+obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of
+necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake
+of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to
+do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), "he
+who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many
+others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from
+starvation, through being deprived of every good." Thus the loss of
+one good may be compensated by obedience and other goods.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 4]
+
+Whether God Ought to Be Obeyed in All Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For
+it is written (Matt. 9:30, 31) that our Lord after healing the two
+blind men commanded them, saying: "See that no man know this. But
+they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country." Yet they
+are not blamed for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound
+to obey God in all things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue.
+Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to virtue:
+thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen. 22); and the
+Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which things
+are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who was
+an adulteress (Osee 3), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore
+God is not to be obeyed in all things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine
+will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things
+to conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 19, A. 10). Therefore man is not bound to obey
+God in all things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 24:7): "All things that the
+Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), he who obeys is moved by the
+command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by
+their motive causes. Now just a God is the first mover of all things
+that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills,
+as shown above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 6). Therefore just as all natural
+things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too
+all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the
+divine command.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the
+miracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine
+precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), "gave an example to His
+servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and
+yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that
+others might profit by their example."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even as God does nothing contrary to nature (since "the
+nature of a thing is what God does therein," according to a gloss on
+Rom. 11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course
+of nature; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue since
+virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with
+God's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to
+the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to
+Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since
+God is the author of life and death. Nor again was it contrary to
+justice that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the
+Egyptians, because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He
+will. Nor was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take
+an adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of human
+generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that
+which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the persons aforesaid did
+not sin, either by obeying God or by willing to obey Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Though man is not always bound to will what God wills,
+yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes
+to man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man is
+bound to obey God's commands in all things.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Subjects Are Bound to Obey Their Superiors in All Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors
+in all things. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:20): "Children, obey your
+parents in all things," and farther on (Col. 3:22): "Servants, obey
+in all things your masters according to the flesh." Therefore in like
+manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects,
+according to Deut. 5:5, "I was the mediator and stood between the
+Lord and you at that time, to show you His words." Now there is no
+going from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands
+between. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the
+commands of God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 4:14): "You . . .
+received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus" and (1 Thess.
+2:13): "When you had received of us the word of the hearing of God,
+you received it, not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the
+word of God." Therefore as man is bound to obey God in all things, so
+is he bound to obey his superiors.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as religious in making their profession take
+vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a
+religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things.
+Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 5:29): "We ought to obey God
+rather than men." Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior
+are against God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all
+things.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 4), he who obeys is moved at
+the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity of
+justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its
+mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by
+its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance
+arising from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not
+burnt by fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly,
+through lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since,
+though it is subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is
+not subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes
+subject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as
+regards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there are two
+reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in
+all things. First on account of the command of a higher power. For as
+a gloss says on Rom. 13:2, "They that resist [Vulg.: 'He that
+resisteth'] the power, resist the ordinance of God" (cf. St.
+Augustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). "If a commissioner issue an order,
+are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul?
+Again if the proconsul command one thing, and the emperor another,
+will you hesitate to disregard the former and serve the latter?
+Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God another, you must
+disregard the former and obey God." Secondly, a subject is not bound
+to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something
+wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis
+iii): "It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man:
+for the better part of him is excepted." His body is subjected and
+assigned to his master but his soul is his own. Consequently in
+matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound
+to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.
+
+Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have
+to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature
+all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters
+touching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to
+the support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore
+servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their
+parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in
+the state of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the
+disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his
+superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier
+must obey his general in matters relating to war, a servant his
+master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his
+service, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his
+life and the care of the household; and so forth.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When the Apostle says "in all things," he refers to
+matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Man is subject to God simply as regards all things,
+both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all
+things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their
+superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a
+particular way, in respect of which the superior stands between God
+and his subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is
+immediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or
+by the written law.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of
+life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors:
+wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may
+belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for
+salvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this
+will belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however,
+such things be not contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for
+obedience in this case would be unlawful.
+
+Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient
+for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey:
+secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful:
+thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Christians Are Bound to Obey the Secular Powers?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the
+secular power. For a gloss on Matt. 17:25, "Then the children are
+free," says: "If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds
+sway over that kingdom are free, then the children of that King,
+under Whose sway are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom."
+Now Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of God,
+according to John 1:12: "He gave them power to be made the sons of
+God, to them that believe in His name." Therefore they are not bound
+to obey the secular power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 7:4): "You . . . are become dead
+to the law by the body of Christ," and the law mentioned here is the
+divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are
+subject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law
+of the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become
+members of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection,
+whereby they were under the power of secular princes.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress them
+with violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): "Without
+justice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?" Since therefore
+the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with
+injustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems
+that Christians ought not to obey secular princes.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Titus 3:1): "Admonish them to be
+subject to princes and powers," and (1 Pet. 2:13, 14): "Be ye subject
+. . . to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the
+king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him."
+
+_I answer that,_ Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice,
+according to Rom. 3:22, "The justice of God by faith of Jesus
+Christ:" wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of
+justice, but strengthens it. Now the order of justice requires that
+subjects obey their superiors, else the stability of human affairs
+would cease. Hence faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from
+the obligation of obeying secular princes.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 5), subjection whereby one man is
+bound to another regards the body; not the soul, which retains its
+liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the grace of
+Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as
+the Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. 7:23) that in his
+mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin.
+Wherefore those that are made children of God by grace are free from
+the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage,
+whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes
+on 1 Tim. 6:1, "Whosoever are servants under the yoke," etc.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament, and
+therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the comparison
+with human law does not stand because thereby one man is subject to
+another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this
+is required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority
+is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his
+subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in
+order to avoid scandal or danger.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 105
+
+OF DISOBEDIENCE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 105, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Disobedience Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For
+every sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition
+given above (Q. 104, A. 2, Obj. 1). Therefore if disobedience were a
+mortal sin, every sin would be mortal.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is born
+of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore is
+disobedience.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does not
+fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many
+commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them.
+Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man
+cannot avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is
+not a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned
+(Rom. 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal sins.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5;
+I-II, Q. 88, A. 1), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity
+which is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and
+our neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey His
+commandments, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 12). Therefore to be
+disobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is
+contrary to the love of God.
+
+Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to
+superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior
+is a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to
+Rom. 13:2, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of
+God." It is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it
+withdraws from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is
+his due.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin,
+which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not
+disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it.
+Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially,
+but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their
+species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept,
+not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is
+not a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to
+another species of sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Vainglory desires display of excellence. And since it
+seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject to
+another's command, it follows that disobedience arises from
+vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out
+of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore if a
+superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so
+that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin.
+Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude of
+precepts.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 105, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Disobedience Is the Most Grievous of Sins?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
+For it is written (1 Kings 15:23): "It is like the sin of witchcraft
+to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey." But
+idolatry is the most grievous of sins, as stated above (Q. 94, A. 3).
+Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that removes
+the obstacles of sin, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2). Now disobedience
+makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything, prevents a
+man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy
+Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the
+disobedience of one man, many were made sinners." Now the cause is
+seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be
+a more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin
+than contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very
+person of the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore
+disobedience is not the most grievous of sins.
+
+_I answer that,_ Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one
+disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the
+part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take
+every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a
+higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a
+lower authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a
+higher authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands,
+the more grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous
+to disobey God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things
+commanded. For the person commanding does not equally desire the
+fulfilment of all his commands: since every such person desires above
+all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Wherefore
+disobedience is the more grievous, according as the unfulfilled
+commandment is more in the intention of the person commanding. As to
+the commandments of God, it is evident that the greater the good
+commanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that commandment,
+because since God's will is essentially directed to the good, the
+greater the good the more does God wish it to be fulfilled.
+Consequently he that disobeys the commandment of the love of God sins
+more grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of
+our neighbor. On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to
+the greater good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man,
+a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a greater good, but
+through setting aside that which is more in the intention of the
+person commanding.
+
+Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with
+the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which
+there is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of
+disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man,
+apart from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this
+because whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God's
+commandment. And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver
+matter, the sin is still more grievous. The disobedience that
+contains contempt of a man's precept is less grievous than the sin
+which contemns the man who made the precept, because reverence for
+the person commanding should give rise to reverence for his command.
+In like manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such as
+blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we mentally
+separate the disobedience from the sin) than would be a sin involving
+contempt of God's commandment alone.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality but
+of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God
+just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy Ghost,
+but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the contempt of
+any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else
+the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since
+any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the
+Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which lead
+directly to repentance and the remission of sins.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was
+transmitted to all men, was not disobedience considered as a special
+sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the
+Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to
+every sin.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 106
+
+OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude.
+Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other
+virtues?
+
+(2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent?
+
+(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?
+
+(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?
+
+(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor
+received or the disposition of the giver?
+
+(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Thankfulness Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Other
+Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue,
+distinct from other virtues. For we have received the greatest
+benefits from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay
+to God in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor
+with which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety.
+Therefore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other
+virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative
+justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose
+of giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5, 4). Therefore thanksgiving,
+which belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude
+is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for
+the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
+viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues,
+since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore
+thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors
+received, is not a special virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of
+justice (De Invent. Rhet. ii).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 3), the nature of
+the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes
+giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the
+lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God,
+in that He is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is
+found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our
+begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that
+excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is
+found in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and
+private favors, on account of which we are under particular
+obligation to him.
+
+Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person
+excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor
+from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that
+after religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we
+worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons
+excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we
+give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing
+virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that
+precedes, as falling short thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it
+excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God
+was reckoned above (Q. 83, A. 17) among things pertaining to religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice,
+when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted
+that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to
+the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt,
+and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when
+compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever
+there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship,
+and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In
+this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, although
+repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Innocent Is More Bound to Give Thanks to God Than the
+Penitent?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks
+to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received
+from God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of
+innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it
+seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the
+penitent.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes
+him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): "What man, weighing
+his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to
+his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had
+less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn
+to Thee?" And farther on he says: "And for this let him love Thee as
+much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered
+from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been
+from the like torpor of sin preserved." Therefore the innocent is
+also more bound to give thanks than the penitent.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the
+greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is
+more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine
+says (Confess. iii): "To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy,
+that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I
+ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not
+have done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both
+what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance
+committed not." Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks
+than the penitent.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 7:43): "To whom more is
+forgiven, he loveth more [*Vulg.: 'To whom less is forgiven, he
+loveth less' Luke 7:47]." Therefore for the same reason he is bound
+to greater thanksgiving.
+
+_I answer that,_ Thanksgiving (_gratiarum actio_) in the recipient
+corresponds to the favor (_gratia_) of the giver: so that when there
+is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on
+the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed
+_gratis:_ wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater
+on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and
+in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he
+receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more
+continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be
+said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in
+this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the
+innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously
+given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received
+grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is,
+considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent
+is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a
+poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And
+since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to
+take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such
+absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of
+the voluntary and the involuntary.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 3]
+
+Whether a Man Is Bound to Give Thanks to Every Benefactor?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that a man is not bound to give thanks to every
+benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm
+himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to
+whom will he be good?" But a man cannot thank himself, since
+thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore
+thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But
+some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and
+grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a
+benefactor.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own
+profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit.
+Therefore thanks are not due to them.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is
+belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his
+master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably
+and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is
+very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid
+for a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the
+benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would
+not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be
+a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man
+is not always bound to repayment for favors received.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is
+inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that
+repayment of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person
+repaid. Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): "In all things give
+thanks."
+
+_I answer that,_ Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "God turns all things to Himself
+because He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs always be
+directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a
+benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural
+order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying
+the favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And,
+as stated above with regard to a father (Q. 31, A. 3; Q. 101, A. 2),
+a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the
+latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally
+he owes him assistance or support, if he need it.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), "just as a man is
+liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who
+forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by
+his own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favor
+on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves
+him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable."
+Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for
+gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing
+except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken
+of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to
+oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11),
+in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as
+though they were various persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good
+rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as
+he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that
+reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the
+favor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for,
+as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) "promptness enhances, delay
+discounts a favor."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), "it matters much
+whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours,
+or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and
+benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a
+man who seeks fodder for his cattle." And farther on: "If he has done
+it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am
+ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was
+profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of
+malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has
+been the loser thereby."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when a slave does
+what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service:
+when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as
+soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that
+be his motive, it is no longer called service." Wherefore gratitude
+is due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what
+he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the
+deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says
+(De Benef. ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun
+to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should
+be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but
+everywhere." From this it is evident that however well off a man may
+be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him
+reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
+14): "He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want
+should be repaid with money": and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi):
+"There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we
+happen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable
+and pleasant conversation without flattery." Therefore there is no
+need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor
+before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi),
+"it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no
+favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made
+you his debtor!"
+
+If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he
+should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue
+if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart
+has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as
+heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness
+he has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+ix, 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor
+depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment
+should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If,
+however, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental
+to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca
+observes (De Benef. vii): "It is my duty to repay, and not to keep
+back and safeguard my repayment."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 4]
+
+Whether a Man Is Bound to Repay a Favor at Once?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once.
+For we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be
+fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors,
+and yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore a
+man is bound to repay a favor at once.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more
+praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now
+earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay.
+Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that "it is proper to a
+benefactor to act freely and quickly." Now repayment ought to equal
+the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Benef. iv): "He that hastens to
+repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of
+indebtedness."
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be
+considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also
+must these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the
+affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore
+Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it
+graciously." As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time
+as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of
+choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for
+favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained
+repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), "he that wishes to
+repay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is
+ungrateful."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of
+justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's property
+without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the
+debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as
+the rectitude of virtue demands.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be
+regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall
+the proper time through earnestness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time
+and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and
+the same is to be observed in repaying favors.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 5]
+
+Whether in Giving Thanks We Should Look at the Benefactor's
+Disposition or at the Deed?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at
+the benefactor's disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to
+beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself
+denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of
+justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking.
+Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather
+than the disposition of the benefactor.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now God
+alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to
+repay a favor according to the benefactor's disposition.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Benef. i): "We are sometimes under
+a greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart,
+and has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly."
+
+_I answer that,_ The repayment of a favor may belong to three
+virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to
+justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a
+loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according
+to the quantity received.
+
+On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different
+ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it
+has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship
+we have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the
+friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made
+according to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in
+the friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard
+for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief
+requisite of virtue, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 13. And likewise,
+since gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis,
+and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that
+repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver
+than on the effect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly
+action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of
+gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and
+chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): "A kindly
+action consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the
+giver or doer."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species
+is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of
+justice, as stated above (Q. 80). Hence it does not follow that we
+shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God alone sees man's disposition in itself: but in so
+far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus
+that a benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he does
+the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and
+readily.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Repayment of Gratitude Should Surpass the Favor Received?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of
+gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to
+make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as
+the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt
+the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to
+something yet greater.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has
+received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his
+turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor
+which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that
+first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and
+so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite,
+since "the indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text.
+8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor
+received.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is excess
+of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it
+seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and
+opposed to justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should
+repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them
+return," and this is done by repaying more than we have received.
+Therefore gratitude should incline to do something greater.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), gratitude regards the favor
+received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be
+deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis
+without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a
+moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does
+not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity
+of the favor received: because so long as he repays less or an
+equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return
+what he has received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as
+possible, to pay back something more.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 3, ad 5; A. 5), in repaying favors
+we must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly,
+if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from
+his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal
+repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we
+consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is
+possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as
+Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do
+so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the
+more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. 13:8, "Owe no
+man anything, but to love one another." Wherefore it is not
+unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we
+consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of
+wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will
+gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the
+beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 107
+
+OF INGRATITUDE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin?
+
+(2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin?
+
+(3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin?
+
+(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Ingratitude Is Always a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For
+Seneca says (De Benef. iii) that "he who does not repay a favor is
+ungrateful." But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without
+sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin.
+Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems
+that ingratitude is not always a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who commits
+it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i),
+"no man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now sometimes it is not in the
+power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has
+not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power,
+and yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that "to forget a kindness is
+the height of ingratitude." Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being
+unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), "Owe
+no man anything." Yet "an unwilling debtor is ungrateful," as Seneca
+declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim.
+3:2), where it is written: "Disobedient to parents, ungrateful,
+wicked." etc.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 106, A. 4, ad 1, A. 6) a debt of
+gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin
+from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is
+evident that every ingratitude is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that helps
+another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and so no
+thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good will,
+supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help him
+in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the
+repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin,
+because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is
+contrary to gratitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to
+repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the
+repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6, ad
+1).
+
+Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed
+the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not
+subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as
+Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when forgetfulness of favors lays
+hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their
+repayment."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love, and
+from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that anyone
+should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for
+his benefactor.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Ingratitude Is a Special Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For
+whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this
+pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds of
+sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin,
+for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed
+against a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): "It is ungrateful to
+take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but
+it is the height of ingratitude to forget it." Now these do not seem
+to belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a
+special sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or
+thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special
+sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of
+virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus
+illiberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a
+vice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for
+instance if one were to show gratitude for things for which gratitude
+is not due, or sooner than it is due, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 4).
+But still more opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency
+of gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above (Q.
+106, A. 6), inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude
+is properly denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now
+every deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite
+habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference
+of sight and hearing. Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is
+one special virtue, so also is ingratitude one special sin.
+
+It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the
+things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the
+favor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks,
+and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time
+according to one's means. And since what is last in the order of
+generation is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the
+first degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the
+second when he declines to notice or indicate that he has received a
+favor, while the third and supreme degree is when a man fails to
+recognize the reception of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in
+any other way. Moreover, since opposite affirmation includes
+negation, it follows that it belongs to the first degree of
+ingratitude to return evil for good, to the second to find fault with
+a favor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though it
+were unkindness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In every sin there is material ingratitude to God,
+inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude. But
+formal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this is
+a special sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special sin
+from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this way
+the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These three are not different species but different
+degrees of one special sin.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Ingratitude Is Always a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For
+one ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful
+to God by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of
+ingratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity,
+as stated above (Q. 24, A. 12). But ingratitude is contrary to
+charity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that virtue, as
+stated above (Q. 106, A. 1, ad 3; A. 6, ad 2). Therefore ingratitude
+is always a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Between the giver and
+the receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should
+forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget
+having received." Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should
+forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should
+the latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that
+if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a
+mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ No one should be put in the way of
+committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii),
+"sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives
+assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he
+has received." But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of
+ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As appears from what we have said above (A. 2), a
+man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for
+instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express
+his appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not
+always a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6), the
+debt of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which,
+however, he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he
+does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it
+arises either from some kind of negligence or from some
+disinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may
+happen to be a mortal sin, by reason either of inward contempt, or of
+the kind of thing withheld, this being needful to the benefactor,
+either simply, or in some case of necessity.
+
+Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay
+the debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes
+a mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing
+that is done.
+
+It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a
+mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it
+arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful to God
+to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but
+there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, in so far as it
+removes a virtuous act of obedience to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not contrary to,
+but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of charity,
+but excludes some act thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): "When we say that a
+man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a mistake
+to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing
+so very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we mean
+that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is not
+ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do so
+if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object
+of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid
+vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly,
+wishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the
+greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on
+whom he is conferring the favor.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Favors Should Be Withheld from the Ungrateful?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the
+ungrateful. For it is written (Wis. 16:29): "The hope of the
+unthankful shall melt away as the winter's ice." But this hope would
+not melt away unless favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors
+should be withheld from the ungrateful.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of
+committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an
+occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on
+the ungrateful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he
+is tormented" (Wis. 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he
+receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be
+deprived of the favor.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 6:35) that "the Highest . . .
+is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil." Now we should prove
+ourselves His children by imitating Him (Luke 6:36). Therefore we
+should not withhold favors from the ungrateful.
+
+_I answer that,_ There are two points to be considered with regard to
+an ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and
+thus it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The
+second is, what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he
+should not easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca
+remarks (De Benef. iii), "a man is often grateful although he repays
+not," because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of
+repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness
+into gratitude, and if he does not achieve this by being kind to him
+once, he may by being so a second time. If, however, the more he
+repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes,
+he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man
+deserves to suffer.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords
+him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the
+recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to
+be imputed to the bestower.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the part
+of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly physician,
+by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 108
+
+OF VENGEANCE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether vengeance is lawful?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
+
+(3) Of the manner of taking vengeance;
+
+(4) On whom should vengeance be taken?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Vengeance Is Lawful?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever
+usurps what is God's sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is
+written (Deut. 32:35, Rom. 12:19): "Revenge to Me, and I will repay."
+Therefore all vengeance is unlawful.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear with
+him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant. 2:2,
+"As the lily among the thorns," says: "He is not a good man that
+cannot bear with a wicked one." Therefore we should not take
+vengeance on the wicked.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which
+is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of fear,
+but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at
+least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes
+revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is
+unlawful even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for
+Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed
+to St. Chrysostom] says: "Let us learn after Christ's example to bear
+our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's wrongs, not
+even by listening to them." Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the sin
+of only one: for it is written (Ecclus. 26:5-7): "Of three things my
+heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the
+gathering together of the people, and a false calumny." But vengeance
+should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Matt.
+13:29, 30, "Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer
+both to grow," says that "a multitude should not be excommunicated,
+nor should the sovereign." Neither therefore is any other vengeance
+lawful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ We should look to God for nothing save what is
+good and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His
+enemies: for it is written (Luke 18:7): "Will not God revenge His
+elect who cry to Him day and night?" as if to say: "He will indeed."
+Therefore vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful.
+
+_I answer that,_ Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil
+on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we
+must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is
+directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance
+and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because
+to take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is
+contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is
+it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly
+inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one
+that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because
+the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be
+overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom.
+12:21): "Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good."
+
+If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some
+good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has
+sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he
+may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be
+upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided
+other due circumstances be observed.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with
+his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes
+use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of
+the earthly prince that "he is God's minister, an avenger to execute
+wrath upon him that doeth evil." If, however, a man takes vengeance
+outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and
+therefore sins.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently,
+and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but
+they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on
+God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v
+in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: "It is
+praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook
+God's wrongs is most wicked."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and therefore
+those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong to the
+Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only
+those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they
+belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and
+the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the
+wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to
+seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked
+him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him
+into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the
+wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it
+patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to
+be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine
+states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i).
+
+Reply Obj. 5: When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be taken
+on them, either in respect of the whole multitude--thus the Egyptians
+were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of
+Israel (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed
+(Gen. 19)--or as regards part of the multitude, as may be seen in the
+punishment of those who worshipped the calf.
+
+Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the
+severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the
+principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord
+(Num. 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the
+sin of the multitude.
+
+On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the
+multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from
+the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however,
+that this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude
+should be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the
+sovereign, whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne
+with, if it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude:
+unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm to the
+multitude, either spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal
+that was feared to arise from his punishment.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Vengeance Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct
+virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so
+are the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of
+the good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of
+commutative justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not
+be accounted a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for an
+act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. Now
+man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to
+avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special
+virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special
+virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance.
+Therefore it is not a special virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
+justice.
+
+_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude
+to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us
+through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that
+virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural
+inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every
+definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now
+there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which
+reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the
+concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs,
+lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already
+been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of
+removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says
+(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "vengeance we resist force, or wrong,
+and in general whatever is obscure" [*_Obscurum._ Cicero wrote
+_obfuturum_ but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the
+parenthesis] "(i.e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by
+avenging it." Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to
+commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from
+the bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of
+gratitude, so too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern
+of public justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as
+it is concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a
+wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an obstacle
+thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the
+fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far as
+a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because charity
+makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue proceeds
+from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom. xxvii in
+Ev.), "there are no green leaves on the bough of good works, unless
+charity be the root."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of
+excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the
+measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency
+and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written
+(Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son." But the
+virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of
+vengeance with regard to all the circumstances.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Vengeance Should Be Wrought by Means of Punishments Customary
+Among Men?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means
+of punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to
+uproot him. But our Lord forbade (Matt. 13:29) the uprooting of the
+cockle, whereby the children of the wicked one are signified.
+Therefore sinners should not be put to death.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the
+same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with
+death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death:
+and this is evidently false.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to
+publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the
+multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion
+for sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not
+be inflicted for a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ These punishments are fixed by the divine law as
+appears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 105, A. 2).
+
+_I answer that,_ Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends
+to the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive
+of virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing
+those things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning,
+else fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for
+sin should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the
+things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom,
+and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name.
+Wherefore, according to Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi),
+"Tully writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment":
+namely, "death," whereby man is deprived of life; "stripes,"
+"retaliation," or the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his
+bodily safety; "slavery," and "imprisonment," whereby he is deprived
+of freedom; "exile" whereby he is banished from his country; "fines,"
+whereby he is mulcted in his riches; "ignominy," whereby he loses
+his good name.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle, when
+there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But
+sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without
+danger, but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a
+case the punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as
+regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the truth of
+the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more of a
+medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is inflicted
+on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The very fact that the punishment, whether of death or
+of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same time
+as the sin, makes man's will avers to sin: because the fear of
+punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Vengeance Should Be Taken on Those Who Have Sinned
+Involuntarily?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who
+have sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow
+from the will of another. Yet one man is punished for another,
+according to Ex. 20:5, "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the
+iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth
+generation." Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was cursed
+(Gen. 9:25) and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck
+with leprosy (4 Kings 5). Again the blood of Christ lays the
+descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, for they said
+(Matt. 27:25): "His blood be upon us and upon our children." Moreover
+we read (Josue 7) that the people of Israel were delivered into the
+hands of their enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people
+were overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the sons
+of Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person is to be punished without
+having deserved it voluntarily.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's
+power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power;
+thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on
+account of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an
+episcopal see on account of the depravity or evil of the people.
+Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance is
+sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of
+Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their
+parents (Gen. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their
+children were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover,
+dumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain
+on account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore
+vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it
+involuntarily.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But a
+man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by
+fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those
+who have deserved it involuntarily.
+
+Obj. 5: Further Ambrose says on Luke 5 that "the ship in which Judas
+was, was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm in the security
+of his own merits, was in distress about those of others." But Peter
+did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes
+punished without having voluntarily deserved it.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is
+voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i).
+Therefore vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved
+it voluntarily.
+
+_I answer that,_ Punishment may be considered in two ways. First,
+under the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due
+save for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice
+is restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following
+his own will suffers something that is contrary to this will.
+Wherefore, since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin,
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 81, A. 1), it follows that no one is
+punished in this way, except for something done voluntarily.
+Secondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not only
+healing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin, or
+conducing to some good, and in this way a person is sometimes
+punished without any fault of his own, yet not without cause.
+
+It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater
+good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body
+never blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it
+is harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of
+greater consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest
+consequence, while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a
+person is punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his
+own. Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this
+present life for our humiliation or probation. But no one is punished
+in spiritual goods without any fault on his part, neither in this nor
+in the future life, because in the latter punishment is not
+medicinal, but a result of spiritual condemnation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual punishment for
+another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects the soul, in
+respect of which each man is master of himself. But sometimes a man
+is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the sin of
+another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may be
+the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in
+punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a
+belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their
+master. Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another,
+either by _imitation,_ as children copy the sins of their parents,
+and slaves the sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater
+daring; or by way of _merit,_ as the sinful subjects merit a sinful
+superior, according to Job 34:30, "Who maketh a man that is a
+hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people?" Hence the people of
+Israel were punished for David's sin in numbering the people (2 Kings
+24). This may also happen through some kind of _consent_ or
+_connivance:_ thus sometimes even the good are punished in temporal
+matters together with the wicked, for not having condemned their
+sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Thirdly, in order to mark
+the unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is bound to be
+solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to inculcate horror
+of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all, as though all
+were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ.
+sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, "Visiting the iniquity of
+the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation,"
+seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He does not
+take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in order
+that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the
+wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary
+to take vengeance on them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human
+judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is
+manifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But
+human judgment cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby
+He punishes certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of
+theirs, since man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments
+so as to know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore
+according to human judgment a man should never be condemned without
+fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death,
+mutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even according to
+human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault
+on his part, but not without cause: and this in three ways.
+
+First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his,
+disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being
+infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the
+Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man
+is hindered from receiving sacred orders.
+
+Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own
+but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a
+certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to
+the good of the clerics.
+
+Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of
+another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his
+inheritance through the sin of his parent.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in
+temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a
+possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also
+in their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they
+be spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus
+deserve to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on
+dumb animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way
+their owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not
+involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 6, AA. 5, 6).
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin of
+Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of
+one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply Obj. 1, 2).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 109
+
+OF TRUTH
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning
+truth there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether truth is a virtue?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
+
+(3) Whether it is a part of justice?
+
+(4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Truth Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of
+virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object
+precedes the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue,
+but something prior to virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it
+belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to
+be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always
+praiseworthy--neither in good things, since according to Prov. 27:2,
+"Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth"--nor even in evil
+things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Isa.
+3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have
+not hid it." Therefore truth is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual,
+or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because its object
+is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii)
+that by "truth we faithfully represent things as they are, were, or
+will be." Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues, but
+their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean
+between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the
+better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher both in the Second and in the
+Fourth Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by
+reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a
+virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this
+way, truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but
+a certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing
+understood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as
+stated in the First Part (Q. 16, A. 1; Q. 21, A. 2). Secondly, truth
+may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which
+sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must
+needs be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and
+virtue is "that which makes its possessor good, and renders his
+action good."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes truth in the first sense.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To state that which concerns oneself, in so far as it
+is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this does
+not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite for
+that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due
+circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful.
+Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for
+that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one's sin, by
+praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it
+uselessly.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A person who says what is true, utters certain
+signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either
+words, or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of
+things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the
+latter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far
+as this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore
+truth is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral
+virtue. And it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways.
+First, on the part of the object, secondly, on the part of the act. On
+the part of the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of
+equality, and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the
+very reason that a man says what is true about himself, he observes
+the mean between one that says more than the truth about himself, and
+one that says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe
+the mean is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought.
+Excess consists in making known one's own affairs out of season, and
+deficiency in hiding them when one ought to make them known.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Truth Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the
+true and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special
+virtue, in fact every virtue is goodness, because "it makes its
+possessor good." Therefore truth is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an act of
+truth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue,
+since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore
+truth is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives
+aright, and of which it is written (Isa. 38:3): "I beseech Thee . . .
+remember how I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect
+heart." Now one lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the
+definition of virtue given above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore truth
+is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since
+hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue,
+since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every
+virtue. Therefore neither is truth a special virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is numbered together with other virtues (Ethic.
+ii, 7).
+
+_I answer that,_ The nature of human virtue consists in making a
+man's deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of
+goodness in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto
+by a special virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni
+iii) good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good
+will be found where there is a special order. Now there is a special
+order whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered
+in relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto
+man is perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that
+truth is a special virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The true and the good are convertible as to subject,
+since every true thing is good, and every good thing is true. But
+considered logically, they exceed one another, even as the intellect
+and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands the will
+and many things besides, and the will desires things pertaining to
+the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the _true_ considered in
+its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a particular
+good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner the _good_
+considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is
+something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since
+virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to
+be a special virtue, just as the _true_ is a special good; yet it is
+not possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather,
+considered logically, it is the genus of virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The habits of virtue and vice take their species from
+what is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental and
+beside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns
+himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly
+intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and
+beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act
+bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a
+consequence beside his principal intention.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true,
+not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is
+said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure,
+namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity
+to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to
+duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while
+having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this
+virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since
+this belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a
+man pretends one thing and intends another.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Truth Is a Part of Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it
+seems proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling
+the truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the
+case in all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a
+part of justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice is
+in the will, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4). Therefore truth is not a
+part of justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely,
+"truth of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of doctrine." But
+none of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all
+virtues, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3): truth of justice is the same
+as justice, so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine
+belongs rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise
+a part of justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among
+the parts of justice.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 80), a virtue is annexed to
+justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something
+in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue
+thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with
+justice. In the first place it is directed to another, since the
+manifestation, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is
+directed to another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another the
+things that concern himself. In the second place, justice sets up a
+certain equality between things, and this the virtue of truth does
+also, for it equals signs to the things which concern man himself.
+Nevertheless it falls short of the proper aspect of justice, as to
+the notion of debt: for this virtue does not regard legal debt, which
+justice considers, but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of
+equity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore
+truth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary
+virtue to its principal.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes
+another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society.
+Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they
+believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence
+the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But man, by
+his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters
+external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the
+manifestation of the truth is an act of the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs from the
+truth of life, as stated in the preceding A. 2, ad 3.
+
+We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to
+the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated
+according to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of
+justice differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life
+a man lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man
+observes the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to
+another man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do
+with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of
+life. In another way the truth of justice may be understood as
+referring to the fact that, out of justice, a man manifests the
+truth, as for instance when a man confesses the truth, or gives true
+evidence in a court of justice. This truth is a particular act of
+justice, and does not pertain directly to this truth of which we are
+now speaking, because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a
+man's chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue: "We are
+not speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this
+apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned."
+
+The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths
+relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain
+to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in
+speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern
+him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are.
+Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something
+concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of
+doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of
+truth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Virtue of Truth Inclines Rather to That Which Is Less?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to
+that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so
+does one by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five,
+than that four are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil, and
+to be avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore
+the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather
+than to that which is greater.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather
+than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is
+nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer
+to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to
+one extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of
+equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more
+incline to that which is less.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems to
+amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract therefrom;
+and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to amount to
+an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant to truth
+than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible with the
+denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition. Therefore it
+seems that truth should incline to that which is greater rather than
+to that which is less.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by this
+virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is
+less."
+
+_I answer that,_ There are two ways of declining from the truth to
+that which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show
+the whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so
+forth. This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is
+contained in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to
+what is less. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), "this
+seems to be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance." For
+those who represent themselves as being greater than they are, are a
+source of annoyance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass
+others: whereas those who make less account of themselves are a
+source of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by their
+moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:6): "Though I should
+have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the
+truth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that
+which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me."
+
+Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say
+that what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this
+virtue to incline to what is less, because this would imply
+falsehood. And yet this would be less repugnant to the truth, not
+indeed as regards the proper aspect of truth, but as regards the
+aspect of prudence, which should be safeguarded in all the virtues.
+For since it is fraught with greater danger and is more annoying to
+others, it is more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one
+has what one has not, than to think or say that one has not what one
+has.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 110
+
+OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying:
+(2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice.
+Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to
+truth?
+
+(2) Of the species of lying;
+
+(3) Whether lying is always a sin?
+
+(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Lying Is Always Opposed to Truth?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For
+opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible
+with truth, since he that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false,
+lies, according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying
+is not opposed to truth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but
+also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by
+this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's
+life. But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra
+Mend. xii) that "a lie is a false signification by words."
+Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed to the
+virtue of truth.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the
+"liar's sin is the desire to deceive." But this is not opposed to
+truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not
+opposed to truth.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt
+that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a
+false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie."
+But this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.
+
+_I answer that,_ A moral act takes its species from two things, its
+object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is
+the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has
+its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act,
+and stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material
+to formal, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7).
+
+Now it has been said above (Q. 109, A. 1, ad 3) that the virtue of
+truth--and consequently the opposite vices--regards a manifestation
+made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act
+of reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every
+representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the
+reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do
+not intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural
+instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this
+manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be
+voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper
+object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And
+the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is
+that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of
+a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.
+
+Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what
+is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to
+deceive, then there is falsehood--materially, since what is said is
+false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and
+effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.
+
+However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal
+falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is
+false; wherefore also the word _mendacium_ (lie) is derived from its
+being in opposition to the _mind._ Consequently if one says what is
+false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not
+formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the
+speaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the
+speaker's intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a
+specific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters falsehood
+formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says
+be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it
+contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains
+the specific nature of a lie.
+
+That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by
+deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to
+perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires
+its species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be
+lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force,
+lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form.
+Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to
+the virtue of truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally
+and essentially rather than according to what is in it materially and
+accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as
+a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a
+falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the
+truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold
+the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a lie
+is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every
+kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something
+false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of
+lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to
+the species of its cause.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Lies Are Sufficiently Divided into Officious, Jocose, and
+Mischievous Lies?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into
+"officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should
+be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its
+nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part.
+Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting
+from a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of
+that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one
+act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the
+effect: for a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, an
+"officious" lie for some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in
+order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in
+this way.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of
+lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie that
+profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party so
+as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying
+and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the
+sixth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving his money"; the
+seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from
+death"; the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him
+from defilement of the body." Therefore it seems that the first
+division of lies is insufficient.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into
+"boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which
+falls short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are
+not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore
+it seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that
+speak a lie," says "that there are three kinds of lies; for some are
+told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is
+another kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is
+told out of malice." The first of these is called an officious lie,
+the second a jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies
+are divided into these three kinds.
+
+_I answer that,_ Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with
+respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential
+division of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
+iv, 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the
+truth, and this belongs to "boasting," and the lie which stops short
+of the truth, and this belongs to "irony." This division is an
+essential division of lying itself, because lying as such is opposed
+to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of
+equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition.
+
+Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins,
+and with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of
+lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is
+aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this
+is called a "mischievous" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished
+if it be directed to some good--either of pleasure and then it is a
+"jocose" lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the "officious" lie,
+whereby it is intended to help another person, or to save him from
+being injured. In this way lies are divided into the three kinds
+aforesaid.
+
+Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to
+their relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish
+their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as
+stated in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are
+contained under "mischievous" lies, which are either against God, and
+then we have the lie "in religious doctrine," or against man, and
+this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is
+the second kind of lie, which "profits no one, and injures someone";
+or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting
+another, and this is the third kind of lie, "which profits one, and
+injures another." Of these the first is the most grievous, because
+sins against God are always more grievous, as stated above (I-II, Q.
+73, A. 3): and the second is more grievous than the third, since the
+latter's gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting another.
+
+After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a
+fourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition or
+diminution; and this is the lie which is told "out of mere lust of
+lying and deceiving." This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "the liar, when he lies from
+habit, delights in lying."
+
+The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying.
+For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told "with a desire to
+please": and the remaining three are comprised under the officious
+lie, wherein something useful to another person is intended. This
+usefulness regards either external things, and then we have the sixth
+kind of lie, which "profits someone in saving his money"; or his
+body, and this is the seventh kind, which "saves a man from death";
+or the morality of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which
+"saves him from unlawful defilement of his body."
+
+Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the
+sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration
+of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are
+enumerated in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better
+than the pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and
+virtue than the life of the body.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Every Lie Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident
+that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet
+they seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the
+words of Christ and of others often differ from one another:
+wherefore seemingly one of them must have given an untrue account.
+Therefore not every lie is a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives
+of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that "God
+built them houses" (Ex. 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ
+that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very
+holy men that they lied. Thus (Gen. 12 and 20) we are told that
+Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied
+when he said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gen.
+27:27-29). Again, Judith is commended (Judith 15:10, 11) although she
+lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to
+avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the
+whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion
+in a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore
+a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or
+another from being killed.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised.
+Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says
+(Synonym. ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill."
+Therefore not every lie is a sin.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive
+our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): "Whoever
+thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives
+himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he
+deceives others." Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no
+one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are
+told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the
+sake of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions
+in Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): "Be not willing to
+make any manner of lie."
+
+_I answer that,_ An action that is naturally evil in respect of its
+genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an
+action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good
+results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single
+defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in
+respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter.
+For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is
+unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is
+not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that
+"lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is
+good and worthy of praise." Therefore every lie is a sin, as also
+Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is
+contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that
+the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be
+deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy
+Writ. That the words of certain people are variously reported in the
+Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence
+Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): "He that has the wit to
+understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at
+the sense, will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no
+matter by what words that sense is expressed." Hence it is evident,
+as he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that "we must not judge that
+someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way
+and in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or
+heard."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for
+their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them to
+tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): "And because the
+midwives feared God, He built them houses." But the subsequent lie
+was not meritorious.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De Mend. v),
+the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect
+virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If,
+however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must
+understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic.
+Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): "We must believe that
+whatever is related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned
+as being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically."
+As to Abraham "when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to
+hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since
+she was the daughter of his father," Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen.
+xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself
+said (Gen. 20:12): "She is truly my sister, the daughter of my
+father, and not the daughter of my mother," being related to him on
+his father's side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's
+first-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the
+latter's birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of this
+mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to
+signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the
+Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.
+
+Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of
+perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that
+it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to
+do certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for
+lying to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which
+end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that
+her words contain truth in some mystical sense.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's
+neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above
+in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything
+inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as
+neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except
+perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore
+it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any
+danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth
+prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).
+
+Reply Obj. 5: A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what
+he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in
+mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without
+faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two
+reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful,
+because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind.
+Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and
+the business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man
+to be bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to
+remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising--since he
+promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for
+granted--nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because
+circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he
+did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor. 1), did
+not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: An action may be considered in two ways. First, in
+itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie,
+from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive;
+although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive,
+nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any
+similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions,
+with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De
+Mend. v), "it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because
+every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a
+thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it
+is tendered understand it to signify."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Every Lie Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is
+written (Ps. 6:7): "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," and
+(Wis. 1:11): "The mouth that belieth killeth the soul." Now mortal
+sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every
+lie is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is a
+mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: "Thou
+shalt not bear false witness." Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): "Every
+liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person
+to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith
+with him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty
+of iniquity." Now no one is said to break his faith or "to be guilty
+of iniquity," for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal
+sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for
+a temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that "we learn from
+the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the
+reward which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might
+have received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on
+account of the lie of which they were guilty." Therefore even an
+officious lie, such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is
+the least of lies, is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that "it is a
+precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to
+wish to lie." Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept.
+Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently
+so also is a lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be
+worse off than others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy,"
+etc.: "There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet
+are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake
+of our neighbor's good." But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore
+jocose and officious lies are not mortal sins.
+
+_I answer that,_ A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is
+contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as
+stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; Q. 35, A. 3). Now a lie may be contrary
+to charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of
+the evil intended; thirdly, accidentally.
+
+A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false
+signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to
+the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie;
+so that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of
+charity, but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it
+is a most grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false
+signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a
+man's good, for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science
+or to moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on
+one's neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion,
+wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our
+neighbor, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the
+false opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the
+knowledge of which is of no consequence, then the lie in question
+does no harm to one's neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived
+as to some contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore
+a lie of this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.
+
+As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through
+being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a
+mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure
+one's neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and
+this also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's
+neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of
+committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to
+charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a
+mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little
+pleasure is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of
+one's neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to
+charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom:
+and thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were
+not deterred through scandal from lying publicly.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a
+gloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that
+speak a lie."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to
+the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 44, A. 1, ad 3;
+I-II, Q. 100, A. 5, ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the
+decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our
+neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness
+against our neighbor.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even a venial sin can be called "iniquity" in a broad
+sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore it
+is written (1 John 3:4): "Every sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'And sin is
+iniquity.']." It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways.
+First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews, and
+their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition
+is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in
+his exposition of Isa. 65:21, 'And they shall build houses') explains
+that God "built them spiritual houses." Secondly, it may be
+considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they
+could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal
+meed, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity
+of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an
+eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words
+of Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal
+reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding
+kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal
+sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a
+sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another
+species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to
+another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to
+that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot
+apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a
+jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps
+accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in this sense the
+saying of Augustine that "it is a precept of perfection not only not
+to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie": although Augustine says
+this not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: "Unless
+perhaps it is a precept," etc. Nor does it matter that they are
+placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are bound
+to safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or
+teaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal
+sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in
+other matters.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 111
+
+OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY
+(In Four Articles)
+
+In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under
+this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation?
+
+(3) Whether it is opposed to truth?
+
+(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 1]
+
+Whether All Dissimulation Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is
+written (Luke 24:28) that our Lord "pretended [Douay: 'made as
+though'] he would go farther"; and Ambrose in his book on the
+Patriarchs (De Abraham i) says of Abraham that he "spoke craftily to
+his servants, when he said" (Gen. 22:5): "I and the boy will go with
+speed as far as yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return to
+you." Now to pretend and to speak craftily savor of dissimulation:
+and yet it is not to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abraham.
+Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in
+his commentary on Gal. 2:11, "When Peter [Vulg.: 'Cephas'] was come
+to Antioch:--The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest
+of Baal, pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach us
+that dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed"; and David
+"changed his countenance before" Achis, king of Geth (1 Kings 21:13).
+Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil to
+simulate good, it is good to simulate evil.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is written in condemnation of certain people
+(Isa. 3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they
+have not hid it." Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one's sin.
+Therefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is
+never reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not a
+sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Isa. 16:14, "In three years," etc.,
+says: "Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate
+holiness." But to sin openly is always a sin. Therefore dissimulation
+is always a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 109, A. 3; Q. 110, A. 1), it
+belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by outward
+signs to be such as one is. Now outward signs are not only words, but
+also deeds. Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by
+words something different from that which is in one's mind, so also
+is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify
+the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is properly
+denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is properly a
+lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not whether
+one lie in word or in any other way, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 1,
+Obj. 2). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as stated above (Q.
+110, A. 3), it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), "To pretend is
+not always a lie: but only when the pretense has no signification,
+then it is a lie. When, however, our pretense refers to some
+signification, there is no lie, but a representation of the truth."
+And he cites figures of speech as an example, where a thing is
+"pretended," for we do not mean it to be taken literally but as a
+figure of something else that we wish to say. In this way our Lord
+"pretended He would go farther," because He acted as if wishing to go
+farther; in order to signify something figuratively either because He
+was far from their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev.);
+or, as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, "as He was about
+to go farther away from them by ascending into heaven, He was, so to
+speak, held back on earth by their hospitality."
+
+Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (De Abraham i)
+says that Abraham "foretold what he knew not": for he intended to
+return alone after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord
+expressed what He was about to do. It is evident therefore that
+neither dissembled.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Jerome employs the term "simulation" in a broad sense
+for any kind of pretense. David's change of countenance was a
+figurative pretense, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title
+of Ps. 33, "I will bless the Lord at all times." There is no need to
+excuse Jehu's dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked
+man, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kings
+10:29, 31). And yet he is praised withal and received an earthly
+reward from God, not for his dissimulation, but for his zeal in
+destroying the worship of Baal.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked, because
+no one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do evil
+deeds, he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man
+might pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but has
+some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil,
+both because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although
+he is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the
+wickedness he simulates. And because dissimulation is evil in itself,
+its sinfulness is not derived from the thing simulated, whether this
+be good or evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that which
+he is not, yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is, for
+this is sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by
+outward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not,
+yet he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one
+may hide one's sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus
+that we must understand the saying of Jerome on the words of Isa.
+3:9, that the "second remedy after shipwreck is to hide one's sin,"
+lest, to wit, others be scandalized thereby.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Hypocrisy Is the Same As Dissimulation?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as
+dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But
+there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly,
+according to Matt. 6:2, "When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a
+trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do." Therefore hypocrisy is
+not the same as dissimulation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): "Some there are who
+wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of
+perfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks
+of the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and
+another to sin from malice." Now those who wear the habit of
+holiness, without attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers,
+since the outward habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore
+dissimulation is not the same as hypocrisy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our
+Lord says of hypocrites (Matt. 23:5) that "all their works they do
+for to be seen of men": and Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that "they
+never consider what it is that they do, but how by their every action
+they may please men." But dissimulation consists, not in the mere
+intention, but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job 36:13,
+"Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God," says that "the
+dissembler simulates one thing and does another: he pretends
+chastity, and delights in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and
+fills his purse." Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as
+dissimulation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Hypocrite' is a Greek
+word corresponding to the Latin 'simulator,' for whereas he is evil
+within," he "shows himself outwardly as being good; _hypo_ denoting
+falsehood, and _krisis_, judgment."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x), "the word hypocrite is
+derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a
+disguised face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to
+imitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under
+the guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to
+deceive the people in their acting." Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
+Dom. ii) that "just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the
+parts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon
+is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and
+in every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is
+not is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just without being so in
+reality."
+
+We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not,
+however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person
+simulates another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just
+man.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The outward deed is a natural sign of the intention.
+Accordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their genus to
+the service of God, and seeks by their means to please, not God but
+man, he simulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore
+Gregory says (Moral.) that "hypocrites make God's interests
+subservient to worldly purposes, since by making a show of saintly
+conduct they seek, not to turn men to God, but to draw to themselves
+the applause of their approval:" and so they make a lying pretense of
+having a good intention, which they have not, although they do not
+pretend to do a good deed without doing it.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The habit of holiness, for instance the religious or
+the clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one is bound to perform
+works of perfection. And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness,
+with the intention of entering the state of perfection, if he fail
+through weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he
+is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of
+holiness. If, however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in
+order to make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a
+dissembler.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two things:
+one by way of sign, the other by way of thing signified. Accordingly
+the evil intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified,
+which does not tally with the sign: and the outward words, or deeds,
+or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie
+as a sign.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Hypocrisy Is Contrary to the Virtue of Truth?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of
+truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing
+signified. Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be
+opposed to any special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates any virtue,
+and by means of any virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms
+deeds, as stated in Matt. 6:1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not
+specially opposed to the virtue of truth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all dissimulation seems to proceed from guile,
+wherefore it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to
+prudence as above stated (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore, hypocrisy which is
+dissimulation is not opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or
+simplicity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the species of moral acts is taken from their end.
+Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vainglory:
+wherefore a gloss on Job 27:8, "What is the hope of the hypocrite, if
+through covetousness he take by violence," says: "A hypocrite or, as
+the Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: for through
+desire of being honored for holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he
+steals praise for a life which is not his." [*The quotation is from
+St. Gregory's _Moralia,_ Bk XVIII.] Therefore since covetousness or
+vainglory is not directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is
+hypocrisy or dissimulation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above (A.
+1). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore dissimulation
+or hypocrisy is also.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. text. 13, 24,
+x), "contrariety is opposition as regards form," i.e. the specific
+form. Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may
+be opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another
+way indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be
+considered with regard to the very species of the act, and this
+species depends on that act's proper object. Wherefore since
+hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a
+character which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it
+follows that it is directly opposed to truth whereby a man shows
+himself in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in _Ethic._
+iv, 7.
+
+The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered
+in relation to any accident, for instance a remote end, or an
+instrument of action, or anything else of that kind.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it as his
+end, not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to have it,
+but in respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it.
+Hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth,
+inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And
+he performs acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own
+sake, but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his
+hypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to that
+virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4, 5), the vice directly
+opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it belongs to discover ways
+of achieving a purpose, that are apparent and not real: while it
+accomplishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds:
+and it stands in relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to
+simplicity. Now guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception,
+and sometimes secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly to
+simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this way the
+virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated
+above (Q. 109, A. 2, ad 4). There is, however, a mere logical
+difference between them, because by truth we mean the concordance
+between sign and thing signified, while simplicity indicates that one
+does not tend to different things, by intending one thing inwardly,
+and pretending another outwardly.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Gain or glory is the remote end of the dissembler as
+also of the liar. Hence it does not take its species from this end,
+but from the proximate end, which is to show oneself other than one
+is. Wherefore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things
+of himself, for no further purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy,
+as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and as also we have said
+above with regard to lying (Q. 110, A. 2).
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Hypocrisy Is Always a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. For
+Jerome says on Isa. 16:14: "Of the two evils it is less to sin openly
+than to simulate holiness": and a gloss on Job 1:21 [*St. Augustine,
+on Ps. 63:7], "As it hath pleased the Lord," etc., says that
+"pretended justice is no justice, but a twofold sin": and again a
+gloss on Lam. 4:6, "The iniquity . . . of my people is made greater
+than the sin of Sodom," says: "He deplores the sins of the soul that
+falls into hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of
+Sodom." Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is
+always a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 8) that hypocrites sin
+out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin
+against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion from
+seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is
+deserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, "Dissemblers and
+crafty men prove the wrath of God": and the hypocrite is excluded
+from seeing God, according to Job 13:16, "No hypocrite shall come
+before His presence." Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of
+dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed.
+Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.
+
+Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But
+this is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself
+a mortal sin.
+
+Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral.
+xxxi, 17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither
+therefore is hypocrisy.
+
+_I answer that,_ There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness,
+and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a
+person whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely,
+who cares not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred
+Scripture is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a
+mortal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through
+mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate
+holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in
+mortal sin, whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the
+dissimulation itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a
+venial sin. This will depend on the end in view; for if this be
+contrary to the love of God or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal
+sin: for instance if he were to simulate holiness in order to
+disseminate false doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical
+preferment, though unworthy, or that he may obtain any temporal good
+in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be not
+contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance when a
+man takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of such a man it is said
+in _Ethic._ iv, 7 that "he would seem to be vain rather than evil";
+for the same applies to simulation as to a lie.
+
+It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of
+holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of
+this kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated
+with mortal sin.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 112
+
+OF BOASTING
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the first head,
+namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) To which virtue is it opposed?
+
+(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 112, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Boasting Is Opposed to the Virtue of Truth?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of
+truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast
+even without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence.
+Thus it is written (Esther 1:3, 4) that Assuerus "made a great feast
+. . . that he might show the riches of the glory" and "of his
+kingdom, and the greatness and boasting of his power." Therefore
+boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4) to
+be one of the four species of pride, "when," to wit, "a man boasts of
+having what he has not." Hence it is written (Jer. 48:29, 30): "We
+have heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness,
+and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I
+know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is
+not according to it." Moreover, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that
+boasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed
+to the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to
+truth, but to humility.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches; wherefore
+it is written (Wis. 5:8): "What hath pride profited us? or what
+advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us?" Now excess of
+riches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed
+to justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 7), that
+boasting is opposed to truth.
+
+_I answer that,_ _Jactantia_ (boasting) seems properly to denote the
+uplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw
+(_jactare_) a thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift
+oneself, properly speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself [*Or
+'tall-talking' as we should say in English]. This happens in two
+ways. For sometimes a man speaks of himself, not above what he is in
+himself, but above that which he is esteemed by men to be: and this
+the Apostle declines to do when he says (2 Cor. 12:6): "I forbear
+lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me, or
+anything he heareth of me." In another way a man uplifts himself in
+words, by speaking of himself above that which he is in reality. And
+since we should judge of things as they are in themselves, rather
+than as others deem them to be, it follows that boasting denotes more
+properly the uplifting of self above what one is in oneself, than the
+uplifting of self above what others think of one: although in either
+case it may be called boasting. Hence boasting properly so called is
+opposed to truth by way of excess.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes boasting as exceeding men's opinion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The sin of boasting may be considered in two ways.
+First, with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is opposed
+to truth; as stated (in the body of the article and Q. 110, A. 2).
+Secondly, with regard to its cause, from which more frequently though
+not always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride as its inwardly
+moving and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly by
+arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of great things
+about himself; though sometimes a man takes to boasting, not from
+arrogance, but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein,
+because he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is an
+uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it is not
+the same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For this reason
+Gregory reckons boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the
+boaster frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, and
+so, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its
+end.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. First, as an
+occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches.
+Hence (Prov. 8:18) "riches" are significantly described as "proud"
+[Douay: 'glorious']. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since
+according to _Ethic._ iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake of
+glory, but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent stories
+about themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for instance, they
+pretend to be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 112, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Boasting Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is
+written (Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth, and puffeth himself,
+stirreth up quarrels." Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels,
+since God hates those that sow discord, according to Prov. 6:19.
+Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is forbidden in God's law is a mortal sin.
+Now a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, "Extol not thyself in the thoughts of thy
+soul," says: "This is a prohibition of boasting and pride." Therefore
+boasting is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an
+officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying;
+for according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), "the boaster
+pretends to something greater than he is, sometimes for no further
+purpose, sometimes for the sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the
+sake of money." Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious
+nor a jocose lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie.
+Therefore seemingly it is always a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Boasting arises from vainglory, according to
+Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin,
+but is sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid. For
+Gregory says (Moral. viii, 30) that "it belongs to the very perfect,
+by outward deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are
+not inwardly uplifted by the praise awarded them." Therefore boasting
+is not always a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, A. 4), a mortal sin is one
+that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered
+in two ways. First, in itself, as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a
+mortal, and sometimes a venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a
+man boasts of that which is contrary to God's glory--thus it is said
+in the person of the king of Tyre (Ezech. 28:2): "Thy heart is lifted
+up, and thou hast said: I am God"--or contrary to the love of our
+neighbor, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out into
+invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee who said (Luke
+18:11): "I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust,
+adulterers, as also is this publican." Sometimes it is a venial sin,
+when, to wit, a man boasts of things that are against neither God nor
+his neighbor. Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its
+cause, namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and then
+if it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin,
+then the boasting will also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a
+venial sin. Sometimes, however, a man breaks out into boasting
+through desire of gain, and for this very reason he would seem to be
+aiming at the deception and injury of his neighbor: wherefore
+boasting of this kind is more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "a man who boasts for the sake
+of gain, is viler than one who boasts for the sake of glory or
+honor." Yet it is not always a mortal sin because the gain may be
+such as not to injure another man.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal sin. But
+it happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels, not
+intentionally but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not be
+a mortal sin on that account.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from pride
+that is a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Boasting does not always involve a mischievous lie, but
+only where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbor, either
+in itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere pleasure in
+boasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic.
+iv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he
+were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn God's
+commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it would be against
+the charity of God, in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its
+last end.
+
+To boast for the sake of glory or gain seems to involve an officious
+lie: provided it be done without injury to others, for then it would
+at once become a mischievous lie.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 113
+
+IRONY*
+(In Two Articles)
+[*Irony here must be given the signification of the Greek _eironia_,
+whence it is derived: dissimulation of one's own good points.]
+
+We must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether irony is a sin?
+
+(2) Of its comparison with boasting.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 113, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Irony Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that irony, which consists in belittling
+oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's being
+strengthened by God: and yet this leads one to belittle oneself,
+according to Prov. 30:1, 2: "The vision which the man spoke, with
+whom is God, and who being strengthened by God, abiding with him,
+said, I am the most foolish of men." Also it is written (Amos 7:14):
+"Amos answered . . . I am not a prophet." Therefore irony, whereby a
+man belittles himself in words, is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of the
+English (Regist. xii): "It is the mark of a well-disposed mind to
+acknowledge one's fault when one is not guilty." But all sin is
+inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But "some belittle
+themselves in words, so as to avoid pride," according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm. xxix): "If
+thou liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before
+lying, thou hast become one by lying."
+
+_I answer that,_ To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two
+ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the
+greater things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of
+himself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle
+oneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in
+respect of its genus, except through corruption of one of its
+circumstances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the
+truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the
+existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying
+something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself
+to possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly. For
+there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly folly
+annexed to it, according to 1 Cor. 3:18, "If any man among you seem
+to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise."
+But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text
+goes on to say, "is foolishness with God." Accordingly, he that is
+strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the
+estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which
+human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, "and the wisdom
+of men is not with me," and farther on, "and I have known the science
+of the saints" [*Vulg.: 'and I have not known the science of the
+saints'].
+
+It may also be replied that "the wisdom of men" is that which is
+acquired by human reason, while the "wisdom of the saints" is that
+which is received by divine inspiration.
+
+Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not
+of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, "nor am I the son of
+a prophet."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man tend to
+perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty, not only
+if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but
+also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which sometimes is
+not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does not
+acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid
+another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to
+avoid pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): "Shun not
+arrogance so as to forsake truth": and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3)
+that "it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 113, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Irony Is a Less Grievous Sin Than Boasting?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than
+boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is
+a kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it
+any more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less
+grievous sin than boasting.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), irony
+sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony is
+not a less grievous sin than boasting.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25): "When he shall speak
+low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart."
+Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a
+manifold wickedness.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): "Those who
+speak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious,
+seemingly, in their manners."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, AA. 2, 4), one lie is more
+grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is
+about--thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most
+grievous--and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a
+mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now
+irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by
+any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person:
+so that in this respect they are equal.
+
+But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely,
+the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man's
+averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by
+uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+iv, 7) that "boasting is a more grievous sin than irony."
+
+Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some
+other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then
+irony is more grievous.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting, according
+as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its
+matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the other in
+spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by outward
+words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for
+instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the
+kind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some
+spiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Matt. 6:16)
+that "they disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to
+fast." Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and
+boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason they
+sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that
+it is "the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of themselves,
+and to make very little of themselves": and for the same reason it is
+related of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess clothes that
+were either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men seek
+glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, "There is one
+that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit,"
+and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through
+deceitful humility, "speaks low" wickedly.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 114
+
+OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and
+the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning
+friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is a special virtue?
+
+(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 114, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Friendliness Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For
+the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect friendship is
+that which is on account of virtue." Now any virtue is the cause of
+friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as Dionysius states
+(Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a
+consequence of every virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind of
+friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both from those he
+loves and from those who are not his friends." Now it seems to
+pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship
+to those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue.
+Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a wise man
+decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): "The heart
+of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where
+there is mirth": wherefore "it belongs to a virtuous man to be most
+wary of pleasure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship,
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), "is essentially desirous
+of sharing pleasures, but fears to give pain." Therefore this kind of
+friendliness is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue.
+Now it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): "Make thyself affable to the
+congregation of the poor." Therefore affability, which is what we
+mean by friendship, is a special virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; I-II, Q. 55, A. 3),
+since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of
+good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists
+in order, as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2). And it behooves man to be
+maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their
+mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words,
+so that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence
+the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this
+order: and this virtue is called friendliness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his
+_Ethics._ One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves
+another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in
+treating of charity (Q. 23, A. 1, A. 3, ad 1; QQ. 25, 26), what
+things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another
+friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this
+has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain
+likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner
+towards those with whom he is in contact.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a certain
+general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that "every beast
+loveth its like." This love is signified by signs of friendship,
+which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are
+strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this:
+because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do
+not treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to
+us by special friendship.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that "the heart of the wise is where
+there is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his
+neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy
+meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to
+charity": but that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful,
+according to Ecclus. 7:38, "Be not wanting in comforting them that
+weep, and walk with them that mourn." Again, "the heart of fools is
+where there is mirth," not that they may gladden others, but that
+they may enjoy others' gladness. Accordingly, it belongs to the wise
+man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not
+lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures,
+according to Ps. 132:1, "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for
+brethren to dwell together in unity."
+
+Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of
+some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the
+virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those
+among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): "Although I
+made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent," and further on (2
+Cor. 7:9), "I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but
+because you were made sorrowful unto repentance." For this reason we
+should not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in
+order that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin,
+and in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written
+(Ecclus. 7:26): "Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and
+show not thy countenance gay towards them."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 114, Art. 2]
+
+Whether This Kind of Friendship Is a Part of Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of
+justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this
+virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably
+towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part
+of justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this
+virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in
+fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest
+pleasures, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5; Q. 61, A. 3).
+Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is
+contrary to justice, as stated above (Q. 59, AA. 1, 2). Now,
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in
+like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers." Therefore
+this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a
+part of justice.
+
+_I answer that,_ This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to
+it as to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is
+directed to another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of
+the notion of justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt,
+whereby one man is bound to another, either by legal debt, which the
+law binds him to pay, or by some debt arising out of a favor
+received. For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely,
+that we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless at
+times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them for some
+good purpose.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 109, A. 3, ad 1), because man
+is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the
+manifestation of truth without which human society could not last.
+Now as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not
+without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one
+could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a
+certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his
+fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for
+their good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the
+senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which
+have their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves
+becomingly towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as
+though they were noisome.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that one
+ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and
+strangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), "it is not fitting to
+please and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way."
+This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all
+in a fitting manner.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 115
+
+OF FLATTERY
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue:
+(1) Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether flattery is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 115, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Flattery Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery
+consists in words of praise offered to another in order to please
+him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov.
+31:28, "Her children rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and
+he praised her." Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please
+others, according to 1 Cor. 10:33, "I . . . in all things please all
+men." Therefore flattery is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise. But
+it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise
+good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a
+sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore
+Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against
+flattery. "It must be observed," says he, "that by the wonderful
+moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by
+detractions but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the
+voice of the flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may
+humble." But detraction is an evil, as stated above (Q. 73, AA. 2,
+3). Therefore flattery is a good.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, "Woe to them that sew
+cushions under every elbow," says, "that is to say, sweet flattery."
+Therefore flattery is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 114, A. 1, ad 3), although the
+friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends
+chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not
+fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good,
+or of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish
+always to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of
+pleasing, and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the
+mere intention of pleasing he is said to be "complaisant," according
+to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the
+intention of making some gain out of it, he is called a "flatterer"
+or "adulator." As a rule, however, the term "flattery" is wont to be
+applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing
+others by words or deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their
+fellows.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: One may praise a person both well and ill, according as
+one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while observing
+other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person by
+praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive
+to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of
+friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise
+a person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since
+perhaps they are evil, according to Ps. 9:24, "The sinner is praised
+in the desires of his soul"; or they may be uncertain, according to
+Ecclus. 27:8, "Praise not a man before he speaketh," and again
+(Ecclus. 11:2), "Praise not a man for his beauty"; or because there
+may be fear lest human praise should incite him to vainglory,
+wherefore it is written, (Ecclus. 11:30), "Praise not any man before
+death." Again, in like manner it is right to wish to please a man in
+order to foster charity, so that he may make spiritual progress
+therein. But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of
+vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil, according to
+Ps. 52:6, "God hath scattered the bones of them that please men," and
+according to the words of the Apostle (Gal. 1:10), "If I yet pleased
+men, I should not be the servant of Christ."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circumstances be
+not observed; and so too is it to praise good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one
+another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which
+is contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as
+regards the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person
+flattered, whereas the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the
+person defamed, since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks
+rather his defamation.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 115, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Flattery Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according
+to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is
+harmful." But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, "For
+the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man
+is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the Lord." Wherefore Jerome says
+(Ep. ad Celant): "Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as
+flattery": and a gloss on Ps. 69:4, "Let them be presently turned
+away blushing for shame that say to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well," says:
+"The tongue of the flatterer harms more than the sword of the
+persecutor." Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less
+than others: wherefore it is written (Ps. 36:15): "Let their sword
+enter into their own hearts." Now he that flatters another induces
+him to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, "Let not the oil of
+the sinner fatten my head," says: "The false praise of the flatterer
+softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders
+it susceptive of vice." Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin
+in himself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3):
+"The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and
+treachery shall be degraded from his office." Now such a punishment
+as this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a
+mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de
+Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any
+person of higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of
+necessity."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 112, A. 2), a mortal sin is one
+that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to
+charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways.
+First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises
+another's sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose
+justice he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he
+encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Isa.
+5:20. "Woe to you that call evil good." Secondly, by reason of the
+intention, as when one man flatters another, so that by deceiving him
+he may injure him in body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and
+of this it is written (Prov. 27:6): "Better are the wounds of a
+friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy." Thirdly, by way of
+occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his
+intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In this case it
+is necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or taken,
+and how grievous the consequent downfall, as may be understood from
+what has been said above concerning scandal (Q. 43, AA. 3, 4). If,
+however, one man flatters another from the mere craving to please
+others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something
+in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently
+it is not a mortal but a venial sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises
+another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than the
+sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of
+greater consequence, namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so
+efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively,
+being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can
+be a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (Q.
+43, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 8, ad 3; I-II, Q. 80, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument applies to one that flatters with the
+intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than
+others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning,
+whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters
+another treacherously, in order to deceive him.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 116
+
+OF QUARRELING
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship?
+
+(2) Of its comparison with flattery?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 116, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Quarreling Is Opposed to the Virtue of Friendship or
+Affability?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of
+friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord,
+just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated
+above (Q. 37, A. 1). Therefore quarreling is also.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): "An angry man stirreth
+up strife." Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife or
+quarreling is also.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (James 4:1): "From whence are wars and
+quarrels [Douay: 'contentions'] among you? Are they not hence, from
+your concupiscences which war in your members?" Now it would seem
+contrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it
+seems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship
+(Ethic. iv, 6).
+
+_I answer that,_ Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely,
+one person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be
+observed in this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on
+account of the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to
+consent with him from lack of that love which unites minds together,
+and this seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity.
+Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being
+a person to whom someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence
+arises quarreling, which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or
+affability, to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards those
+among whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that
+"those who are opposed to everything with the intent of being
+disagreeable, and care for nobody, are said to be peevish and
+quarrelsome."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Contention pertains rather to the contradiction of
+discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the
+intention of displeasing.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The direct opposition of virtues to vices depends, not
+on their causes, since one vice may arise from many causes, but on
+the species of their acts. And although quarreling arises at times
+from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence it does not
+follow that it is directly opposed to meekness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: James speaks there of concupiscence considered as a
+general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says:
+"The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all
+evil."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 116, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Quarreling Is a More Grievous Sin Than Flattery?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the
+contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin
+does the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm
+than quarreling, for it is written (Isa. 3:12): "O My people, they
+that call thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of
+thy steps." Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in
+flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another:
+whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts
+openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous
+sin than quarreling.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a
+flatterer than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous
+sin than flattery.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual
+state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be
+more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Tim.
+3:2, 3) that it "behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome"; and
+(2 Tim. 3:24): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle." Therefore
+quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.
+
+_I answer that,_ We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In
+one way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more
+a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it
+is. Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please
+than to displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving
+displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who
+exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as
+regards certain external motives, and thus flattery is sometimes more
+grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue
+honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for
+instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up
+the speaker to contempt.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving
+secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly.
+Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person
+openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a
+more grievous sin than theft, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 9).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In human acts, the more grievous is not always the more
+vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason:
+wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the
+reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since
+they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are
+committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem to arise
+from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason,
+although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a
+greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by
+deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding
+from greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the objection, shame regards the vileness
+of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more
+grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more
+ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more
+grievous.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 117
+
+OF LIBERALITY
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely,
+covetousness and prodigality.
+
+Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether liberality is a virtue?
+
+(2) What is its matter?
+
+(3) Of its act;
+
+(4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take?
+
+(5) Whether liberality is a part of justice?
+
+(6) Of its comparison with other virtues.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Liberality Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue
+is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination
+for one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it
+pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to
+the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), "it is the mark of a liberal man not
+to look to himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things."
+Therefore liberality is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth
+contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8.
+Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the
+liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic.
+iv, 1) that "he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but
+to give it away."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But
+liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues:
+since many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing
+to give; and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous
+otherwise. Therefore liberality is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "the Gospel
+contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated."
+Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue.
+Therefore liberality is a virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), "it belongs
+to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill." Now we may use
+both well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as
+the powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are
+without, such as the things of this world that are granted us for our
+livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these
+things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp.) and Basil
+(Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to some, in
+order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it
+suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal man
+commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we
+are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in
+which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And
+yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to
+attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those
+belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "It is a
+commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them
+to be in want."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his
+riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal
+to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence
+the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the liberal man does not
+neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people"; and
+Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "Our Lord does not wish a man to pour
+out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he do as
+Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be
+bound by any household cares." For this belongs to the state of
+perfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Q. 184; Q. 186, A. 3).
+
+It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's
+possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is
+directed to happiness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "those who
+spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal"; and
+likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence
+Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "If you assist to rob others of their
+possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your
+liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than
+of pity." Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend
+much on certain evil works, are not liberal.
+
+Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good
+uses, without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform
+works of other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not
+in the same way as virtuous people, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A.
+1). In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being
+liberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
+1): "Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance," i.e. his
+means, "for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit
+of the giver": and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "it is the heart
+that makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Liberality Is About Money?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not about money. For every
+moral virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to
+justice to be about operations, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1.
+Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is
+about passions and not about money.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any kind
+of wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial riches,
+according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5, 6). Therefore liberality
+is not chiefly about money.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, different virtues have different matter, since
+habits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are
+the matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they
+are not the matter of liberality.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that
+"liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money."
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it
+belongs to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is
+also called open-handedness (_largitas_), because that which is open
+does not withhold things but parts with them. The term "liberality"
+seems also to allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing
+he frees it (_liberat_), so to speak, from his keeping and ownership,
+and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things
+which are the subject of a man's free-handedness towards others are
+the goods he possesses, which are denoted by the term "money."
+Therefore the proper matter of liberality is money.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), liberality depends not on
+the quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart of
+the giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire,
+and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things
+given. Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of
+liberality, while exterior money is the object of those same passions.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in his book _De Disciplina Christi_
+(Tract. de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth, and
+whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of _pecunia_ (money), because
+in olden times men's possessions consisted entirely of _pecora_
+(flocks). And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "We give the name
+of money to anything that can be valued in currency."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Justice establishes equality in external things, but
+has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of internal
+passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of liberality, and
+in another way of justice.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Using Money Is the Act of Liberality?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality.
+For different virtues have different acts. But using money is
+becoming to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence.
+Therefore it is not the proper act of liberality.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but
+also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be
+connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be
+unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it but
+also in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the spender,
+and consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says (De
+Benef. v): "A man is not liberal by giving to himself." Therefore not
+every use of money belongs to liberality.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "In whatever
+matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter:
+Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the
+best use of riches." Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good
+use of money is the act of liberality.
+
+_I answer that,_ The species of an act is taken from its object, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Now the object or matter of
+liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the
+foregoing Article (ad 2). And since every virtue is consistent with
+its object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is
+consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful
+goods, since all external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the
+proper act of liberality is making use of money or riches.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to liberality to make good use of
+riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On
+the other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under
+another aspect, namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing
+is due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of
+riches under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed
+for the fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in
+relation to liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall
+explain farther on (Q. 134).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make
+good use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide
+opportunities for that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier's
+fortitude not only to wield his sword against the foe, but also to
+sharpen his sword and keep it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to
+liberality not only to use money, but also to keep it in preparation
+and safety in order to make fitting use of it.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated (A. 2, ad 1), the internal passions
+whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of
+liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man
+should not be prevented from making any due use of money through an
+inordinate affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one
+consists in applying it to one's own use, and would seem to come under
+the designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in
+devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts.
+Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an
+immoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from
+making suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with giving
+and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). The saying
+of Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving: for a man is not
+said to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to himself.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Belongs to a Liberal Man Chiefly to Give?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to a liberal man
+chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral virtues, is
+regulated by prudence. Now it seems to belong very much to prudence
+that a man should keep his riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. iv, 1) that "those who have not earned money, but have
+received the money earned by others, spend it more liberally, because
+they have not experienced the want of it." Therefore it seems that
+giving does not chiefly belong to the liberal man.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to do,
+nor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal man is sometimes sorry
+for what he has given, nor does he give to all, as stated in _Ethic._
+iv, 1. Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in order to accomplish what he intends chiefly, a
+man employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal man is not a beggar,
+as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he
+might provide himself with the means of giving to others. Therefore
+it seems that he does not chiefly aim at giving.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, man is bound to look after himself rather than
+others. But by spending he looks after himself, whereas by giving he
+looks after others. Therefore it belongs to a liberal man to spend
+rather than to give.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "it
+belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is proper to a liberal man to use money. Now the
+use of money consists in parting with it. For the acquisition of
+money is like generation rather than use: while the keeping of money,
+in so far as it is directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a
+habit. Now in parting with a thing--for instance, when we throw
+something--the farther we put it away the greater the force
+(_virtus_) employed. Hence parting with money by giving it to others
+proceeds from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves.
+But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more perfect,
+since "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 17, 18).
+Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest it be stolen
+or spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is not less but more
+prudent than to keep it usefully: since more things have to be
+considered in money's use, which is likened to movement, than in its
+keeping, which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received
+money that others have earned, spend it more liberally, through not
+having experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the sole
+cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue of
+liberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely removes the
+impediment to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to
+act liberally, because, not unfrequently, the fear of want that
+results from the experience of want hinders those who have acquired
+money from using it up by acting with liberality; as does likewise
+the love they have for it as being their own effect, according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated in this and the preceding Article, it belongs
+to liberality to make fitting use of money, and consequently to give
+it in a fitting manner, since this is a use of money. Again, every
+virtue is grieved by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids
+whatever hinders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable
+giving; namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given, and
+giving something unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at
+both: but especially at the former, since it is more opposed to his
+proper act. For this reason, too, he does not give to all: since his
+act would be hindered were he to give to everyone: for he would not
+have the means of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him to
+give.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Giving and receiving are related to one another as
+action and passion. Now the same thing is not the principle of both
+action and passion. Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving,
+it does not belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and
+still less to beg. Hence the verse:
+
+In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many Should give
+often, take seldom, ask never.
+
+But he makes provision in order to give certain things according as
+liberality requires; such are the fruits of his own possessions, for
+he is careful about realizing them that he may make a liberal use
+thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: To spend on oneself is an inclination of nature; hence
+to spend money on others belongs properly to a virtue.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Liberality Is a Part of Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a part of justice. For
+justice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing is due the
+less liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is not a part of
+justice, but is incompatible with it.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, justice is about operation as stated above (Q. 58,
+A. 9; I-II, Q. 60, AA. 2, 3): whereas liberality is chiefly about the
+love and desire of money, which are passions. Therefore liberality
+seems to belong to temperance rather than to justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to give becomingly,
+as stated (A. 4). But giving becomingly belongs to beneficence and
+mercy, which pertain to charity, as state above (QQ. 30, 31).
+Therefore liberality is a part of charity rather than of justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Justice has to do
+with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is
+divided into two parts, justice and beneficence, also called
+liberality or kind-heartedness." Therefore liberality pertains to
+justice.
+
+_I answer that,_ Liberality is not a species of justice, since
+justice pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another
+what is one's own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees
+with justice: first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as
+justice is; secondly, that it is concerned with external things, and
+so is justice, albeit under a different aspect, a stated in this
+Article and above (A. 2, ad 3). Hence it is that liberality is
+reckoned by some to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to
+a principal virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although liberality does not consider the legal due
+that justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due is
+based on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it
+answers to the idea of due in the lowest degree.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the
+body. But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to
+the body but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly
+pertain to temperance.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the
+fact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom he
+gives: wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But
+the giving of liberality arises from a person being affected in a
+certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so
+that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his friends but also
+to those whom he knows not. Hence it belong not to charity, but to
+justice, which is about external things.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Liberality Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues.
+For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now man
+is likened chiefly by liberality to God, "Who giveth to all men
+abundantly, and upbraideth not" (James 1:5). Therefore liberality is
+the greatest of the virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "in things
+that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best." Now
+the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since
+"the good is self-communicative," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom.
+iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice reclines to
+severity, liberality to goodness." Therefore liberality is the
+greatest of virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, men are honored and loved on account of virtue. Now
+Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "bounty above all makes a man
+famous": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "among the
+virtuous the liberal are the most beloved." Therefore liberality is
+the greatest of virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice seems to
+be more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more
+pleasing." The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that "brave and
+just men are honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal."
+
+_I answer that,_ Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the
+greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now
+liberality tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily
+and of its own nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of
+its very nature it tends to set in order one's own affection towards
+the possession and use of money. In this way temperance, which
+moderates desires and pleasures relating to one's own body, takes
+precedence of liberality: and so do fortitude and justice, which, in
+a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time of peace, the
+other in time of war: while all these are preceded by those virtues
+which are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses
+all manner of human good; and among human goods the public good
+surpasses the good of the individual; and of the last named the good
+of the body surpasses those goods that consist of external things.
+Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way
+it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not
+being a lover of money, it follows that a man readily makes use of
+it, whether for himself, or for the good of others, or for God's
+glory. Thus it derives a certain excellence from being useful in many
+ways. Since, however, we should judge of things according to that
+which is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature,
+rather than according to that which pertains to them. Consequently,
+it remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God's giving proceeds from His love for those to whom
+He gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives,
+wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues,
+rather than to liberality.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by giving
+forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are better
+than money which liberality gives forth.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved is not
+that which is based on virtue, as though he were better than others,
+but that which is based on utility, because he is more useful in
+external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. For the
+same reason he becomes famous.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 118
+
+OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF
+COVETOUSNESS
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and
+(1) covetousness; (2) prodigality.
+
+Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether covetousness is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special sin?
+
+(3) To which virtue it is opposed;
+
+(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
+
+(6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin?
+
+(7) Whether it is a capital vice?
+
+(8) Of its daughters.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Covetousness Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a sin. For
+covetousness (_avaritia_) denotes a certain greed for gold (_aeris
+aviditas_),* because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money,
+under which all external goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for
+covetousness _avaritia_ is derived from _aveo_ to desire; but the
+Greek _philargyria_ signifies literally "love of money": and it is to
+this that St. Thomas is alluding (cf. A. 2, Obj. 2)]. Now it is not a
+sin to desire external goods: since man desires them naturally, both
+because they are naturally subject to man, and because by their means
+man's life is sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his
+substance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every sin is against either God, or one's neighbor,
+or oneself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 4). But covetousness is
+not, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is opposed
+neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which man is
+directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this
+pertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1
+Cor. 6:18): "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own
+body." In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's
+neighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own.
+Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now
+covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect,
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness
+is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 13:5): "Let your manners be
+without covetousness, contented with such things as you have."
+
+_I answer that,_ In whatever things good consists in a due measure,
+evil must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that
+measure. Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in
+a certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be
+commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate
+with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External
+goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated
+above (Q. 117, A. 3; I-II, Q. 2, A. 1). Hence it must needs be that
+man's good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other
+words, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have
+external riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in
+keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for
+him to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them
+immoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined
+as "immoderate love of possessing." It is therefore evident that
+covetousness is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to desire external things as means
+to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as it is
+held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But
+covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Covetousness may signify immoderation about external
+things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the
+acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires
+or keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly
+against one's neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external
+riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot
+be possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify
+immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches
+when, for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in
+them, immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against
+himself, because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in
+his body as do the sins of the flesh.
+
+As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all
+mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of
+temporal things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Natural inclinations should be regulated according to
+reason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though
+old people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as
+everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are
+not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with
+regard to riches.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Covetousness Is a Special Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For
+Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Covetousness, which in Greek is
+called _philargyria_, applies not only to silver or money, but also
+to anything that is desired immoderately." Now in every sin there is
+immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away
+from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6, Obj. 3). Therefore covetousness is a
+general sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "the covetous
+(_avarus_) man" is so called because he is "greedy for brass (_avidus
+aeris_)," i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called
+_philargyria_, i.e. "love of silver." Now silver, which stands for
+money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be
+measured by money, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore
+covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently
+seems to be a general sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, "For I had not known
+concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding
+concupiscence, it forbids all evil." Now the law seems to forbid
+especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written
+(Ex. 20:17): "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods." Therefore
+the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is
+a general sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Covetousness is numbered together with other
+special sins (Rom. 1:29), where it is written: "Being filled with all
+iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness" [Douay: 'avarice'], etc.
+
+_I answer that,_ Sins take their species from their objects, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1). Now the object of a sin is the good
+towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a
+special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind
+of sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful
+good. And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since
+they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man.
+Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an
+immoderate love of having possessions, which are comprised under the
+name of money, whence covetousness (_avaritia_) is denominated.
+
+Since, however, the verb "to have," which seems to have been
+originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are
+absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said
+to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in _De
+Praedicamentis_), consequently the term "covetousness" has been
+amplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything
+whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that
+"covetousness is a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge
+and high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after." In
+this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense
+Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First
+Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First
+Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All those external things that are subject to the uses
+of human life are comprised under the term "money," inasmuch as they
+have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods
+that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so
+forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire
+for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it
+is a special vice.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for
+anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is
+forbidden to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to
+covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Covetousness Is Opposed to Liberality?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
+For Chrysostom, commenting on Matt. 5:6, "Blessed are they that
+hunger and thirst after justice," says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that
+there are two kinds of justice, one general, and the other special,
+to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same
+(Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's
+exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is
+appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to
+justice and not to liberality.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean
+between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7;
+iv, 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according
+to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1, 2). Therefore covetousness is not
+opposed to liberality.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:9): "A covetous man shall
+not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no
+fruits from them." Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it
+inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in
+the desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.
+
+_I answer that,_ Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to
+riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition
+and keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his
+due, by stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to
+justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. 22:27):
+"Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to
+shed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness."
+Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for
+riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or
+takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In
+this way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these
+affections, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 3; A. 3, ad 3; A. 6).
+In this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor. 9:5): "That they
+would . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as
+a blessing, not as covetousness," where a gloss observes: "Lest they
+should regret what they had given, and give but little."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of
+covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is
+called illiberality [*_aneleutheria_] by the Philosopher.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure
+in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of
+legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's
+property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally
+in the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking
+and keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as
+these proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from
+the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which
+latter depends on the rule of reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite
+vice: since it consists in having more than one ought according to
+justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one ought, and
+this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to
+liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Covetousness Is Always a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For
+no one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy
+of death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying
+(Rom. 1:29): "Being filled with all iniquity . . . fornication,
+covetousness [Douay: 'avarice']," etc. adds (Rom. 1:32): "They who do
+such things are worthy of death." Therefore covetousness is a mortal
+sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to one's
+own inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil says
+(Serm. super. Luc. xii, 18): "It is the hungry man's bread that thou
+keepest back, the naked man's cloak that thou hoardest, the needy
+man's money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as
+thou mightest succor."
+
+Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is
+contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore is all
+covetousness a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save
+through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace.
+But, according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum,
+falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom], "Lust for money brings darkness
+on the soul." Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a
+mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on 1 Cor. 3:12, "If any man build upon
+this foundation," says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that
+"he builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world,
+how he may please the world," which pertains to the sin of
+covetousness. Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not
+mortally but venially, for it is said of him that "he shall be saved,
+yet so as by fire." Therefore covetousness is some times a venial sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3) covetousness is twofold. In
+one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in
+respect of its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the
+unjust taking or retaining of another's property, and this belongs to
+theft or robbery, which are mortal sins, as stated above (Q. 66, AA.
+6, 8). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by
+reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 6, ad
+3), when we were treating of theft.
+
+In another way covetousness may be taken as opposed to liberality: in
+which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly if the
+love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in
+such wise that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter
+to the love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a
+mortal sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love
+stops short of this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he
+does not prefer the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling
+for the sake of riches to do anything in opposition to God or his
+neighbor, then covetousness is a venial sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Covetousness is numbered together with mortal sins, by
+reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is bound by a
+legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through fear of
+their want or on account of his having too much.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings darkness on
+the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by preferring the
+love of riches to the love of God.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Covetousness Is the Greatest of Sins?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For
+it is written (Ecclus. 10:9): "Nothing is more wicked than a covetous
+man," and the text continues: "There is not a more wicked thing than
+to love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale."
+Tully also says (De Offic. i, under the heading, 'True magnanimity is
+based chiefly on two things'): "Nothing is so narrow or little minded
+as to love money." But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore
+covetousness is the most grievous of sins.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more
+grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for
+Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36) that "greed is the bane of charity."
+Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being
+incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be
+most grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an
+incurable sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "old
+age and helplessness of any kind make men illiberal." Therefore
+covetousness is the most grievous of sins.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:5) that covetousness is "a
+serving of idols." Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous
+sins. Therefore covetousness is also.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft,
+according to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness.
+Therefore covetousness is not the most grievous of sins.
+
+_I answer that,_ Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil,
+consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so
+far as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good.
+Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First,
+on the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and
+then the greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view
+a sin that is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin
+that is committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin
+against external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this
+seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be
+considered on the part of the good to which the human appetite is
+inordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more
+deformed is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower
+than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the lowest
+of human goods: since it is less than the good of the body, and this
+is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine
+good. From this point of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the
+human appetite is subjected even to external things, has in a way a
+greater deformity. Since, however, corruption or privation of good is
+the formal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the
+material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the
+point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from that of the
+good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence we must assert that
+covetousness is not simply the most grievous of sins.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of
+the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Ecclus. 10:10) it
+is given as a reason that the covetous man "setteth his own soul to
+sale"; because, to wit, he exposes his soul--that is, his life--to
+danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues: "Because
+while he liveth he hath cast away"--that is, despised--"his bowels,"
+in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of a
+"narrow mind," namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to
+any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness:
+because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch
+as a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a
+temporal good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way,
+covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is
+incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns
+God's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby
+man's sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to
+the greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is
+incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature
+ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one
+seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one
+gives way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an
+indication not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being
+somewhat more dangerous.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a
+certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man, like
+the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in
+the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external
+creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects
+himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use,
+not for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as
+grievous a sin as idolatry.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Covetousness Is a Spiritual Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For
+spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of
+covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore
+covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh.
+Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from
+the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through
+corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore
+covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is
+disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "He
+that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." Now
+covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom
+(Hom. xxix in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who was
+possessed by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore
+covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among
+spiritual vices.
+
+_I answer that,_ Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all
+the affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure
+and sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some
+pleasures are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those
+which are consummated in the carnal senses--for instance, the
+pleasures of the table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual
+pleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of
+the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are
+consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are consummated
+in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the flesh. Such is
+covetousness: for the covetous man takes pleasure in the
+consideration of himself as a possessor of riches. Therefore
+covetousness is a spiritual sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the
+pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man
+takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is
+not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a
+mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in
+respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and
+purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of
+a bodily object.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Movement takes its species from the term _whereto_ and
+not from the term _wherefrom._ Hence a vice of the flesh is so called
+from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its
+originating in some defect of the flesh.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was
+possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh
+in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while
+the possessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself, the
+covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Covetousness Is a Capital Vice?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For
+covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality
+as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor
+prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be
+reckoned a capital vice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), those vices
+are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends of
+other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness:
+since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something
+directed to an end, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 5. Therefore
+covetousness is not a capital vice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that "covetousness arises
+sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who,
+when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow
+the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who,
+wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other
+people's property." Therefore covetousness arises from other vices
+instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among
+the capital vices.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is
+one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because
+when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire
+thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the
+most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of
+human life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, AA. 4, 7, 8): wherefore the
+more a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more
+desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it
+be self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appetite at rest, as
+the last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency,
+as Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to
+the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we "use money in token of
+taking possession of something," and again it is written (Eccles.
+10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore covetousness, which is
+desire for money, is a capital vice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice
+is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive
+appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to
+the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal
+vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality
+is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the principal
+good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, because it
+regards money, which occupies a principal place among sensible goods,
+for the reason given in the Article.
+
+On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is
+desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack
+of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a prodigal
+man is a fool rather than a knave."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is true that money is directed to something else as
+its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible
+things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a
+certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising
+sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 4, ad 1;
+I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), provided that itself be frequently the source
+of others.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Treachery, Fraud, Falsehood, Perjury, Restlessness, Violence,
+and Insensibility to Mercy Are Daughters of Covetousness?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as
+commonly stated, namely, "treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury,
+restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy." For covetousness
+is opposed to liberality, as stated above (A. 3). Now treachery,
+fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion,
+restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved
+object, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these
+vices have no connection with covetousness.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to
+the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore
+they should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine
+daughters of covetousness; which are "lying, fraud, theft, perjury,
+greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity,
+rapacity." Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is
+insufficient.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many kinds
+of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality,
+for he speaks of those who are "sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints
+[*_kyminopristes_], misers [*_kimbikes_], who do illiberal deeds,"
+and of those who "batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers
+of the dead, and robbers." Therefore it seems that the aforesaid
+enumeration is insufficient.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects.
+But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "tyrants who destroy
+cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal,"
+i.e. covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter
+of covetousness.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the
+daughters mentioned above.
+
+_I answer that,_ The daughters of covetousness are the vices which
+arise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now
+since covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds
+in two things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in
+this respect covetousness gives rise to _insensibility to mercy,_
+because, to wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the
+needy with his riches [*See Q. 30, A. 1]. In the second place it
+belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect
+covetousness may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought
+(_affectu_). In this way it gives rise to _restlessness,_ by
+hindering man with excessive anxiety and care, for "a covetous man
+shall not be satisfied with money" (Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be
+considered in the execution (_effectu_). In this way the covetous
+man, in acquiring other people's goods, sometimes employs force,
+which pertains to _violence,_ sometimes deceit, and then if he has
+recourse to words, it is _falsehood,_ if it be mere words, _perjury_
+if he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and
+the deceit affects things, we have _fraud_; if persons, then we have
+_treachery,_ as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through
+covetousness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to
+belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of
+sins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that
+it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to
+have species.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the Article.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For
+lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false
+witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind
+of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy
+lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence,
+since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as
+insensibility to mercy.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather
+than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said
+to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives
+but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is
+"tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be
+_kyminopristes_ ("skinflint"), a cumin-seller, as it were, because he
+makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is
+said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and
+this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful
+means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of
+illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such
+as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to
+have given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to
+make little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means,
+whether by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by
+despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums of money, so
+is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by violence,
+are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 119
+
+OF PRODIGALITY
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
+
+(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?
+
+(3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 119, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Prodigality Is Opposite to Covetousness?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to
+covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject.
+But some are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore
+prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But
+covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions
+whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not
+seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected
+towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality
+is not opposite to covetousness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now prodigality seems always to be
+directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal
+squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures,
+wherefore it is stated (Luke 15:13) of the prodigal son that he
+"wasted his substance living riotously." Therefore it seems that
+prodigality is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to
+covetousness and liberality.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that
+prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we
+give here the name of covetousness.
+
+_I answer that,_ In morals vices are opposed to one another and to
+virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and
+prodigality differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency.
+Thus, as regards affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by
+loving them more than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by
+being less careful of them than he ought: and as regards external
+action, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in
+retaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, denotes
+deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and retaining. Hence it
+is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same
+subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from
+what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes
+the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and
+retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality
+regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said
+to be "prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be
+"covetous." Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in
+giving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes
+(Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man
+exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same
+time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of
+necessity, since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of
+his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to
+covetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he
+gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares
+not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous
+in different respects.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money, not
+as exceeding, but as deficient in them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the
+sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes
+through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes
+on account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines
+to intemperance, both because through spending too much on other
+things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to
+which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because
+through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself
+pleasures of the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1)
+"that many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 119, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Prodigality Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle
+says (1 Tim. 6:10): "Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the
+root of all evils." But it is not the root of prodigality, since this
+is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17, 18): "Charge the rich
+of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others." Now
+this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is
+not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and
+to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming
+to the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord (Matt. 6:34), "Be
+not . . . solicitous for tomorrow," and (Matt. 19:21), "Sell all
+[Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor." Therefore
+prodigality is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The prodigal son is held to blame for his
+prodigality.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the opposition between
+prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either
+of which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and
+sinful through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that
+prodigality is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some expound this saying of the Apostle as referring,
+not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual covetousness,
+which is the concupiscence of the _fomes_ [*Cf. I-II, Q. 81, A. 3, ad
+2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking of a
+general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and in this
+sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from covetousness;
+since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good inordinately,
+namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to satisfy his own
+will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage correctly, it is
+evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of
+riches, for he had said previously (1 Tim. 6:9): "They that will
+become rich," etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be "the root
+of all evils," not that all evils always arise from covetousness, but
+because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from
+covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of
+covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in
+order to curry favor with certain persons from whom he may receive
+riches.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and
+communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does
+not do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), "his
+giving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought
+to be. For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor,
+namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give
+nothing."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not in the
+total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought to be
+given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal
+man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those who
+give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ,
+and banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are
+not prodigal but perfectly liberal.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 119, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Prodigality Is a More Grievous Sin Than Covetousness?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than
+covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not
+communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures
+himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the
+wasting of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an
+undoing of his very being." Now he that injures himself sins more
+grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself,
+to whom will he be good?" Therefore prodigality is a more grievous
+sin than covetousness.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable
+circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is
+sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of
+those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to
+accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is
+accompanied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we
+ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher
+observes (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin
+than covetousness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated
+above (Q. 56, A. 1, ad 1; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2, ad 1). Now prodigality
+is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written
+(Prov. 21:20): "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the
+dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it": and the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "it is the mark of a fool to
+give too much and receive nothing." Therefore prodigality is a more
+grievous sin than covetousness.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "the
+prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man."
+
+_I answer that,_ Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous
+sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because
+covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving,
+wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than
+receiving or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly,
+because the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives,
+while the covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as
+stated in _Ethic._ iv, 6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily
+cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is
+opposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want,
+since much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to
+exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue
+on account of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous
+man is not easily cured, for the reason given above (Q. 118, A. 5, ad
+3).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The difference between the prodigal and the covetous
+man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter
+against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending
+that which is his, and his means of support, and against others by
+spending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the
+clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to
+the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like
+manner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in
+giving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency in spending:
+wherefore it is written (Eccles. 6:2): "A man to whom God hath given
+riches . . . yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof."
+Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he injures both
+himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man
+profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his
+own goods for his own profit.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them
+according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to
+prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with
+regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend
+too much for the sake of intemperance points already to several
+additional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as
+stated in _Ethic._ iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain
+from taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself
+to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so
+it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest
+he be forced to give to others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues
+are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence
+alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 120
+
+OF "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider "epikeia," under which head there are two points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether "epikeia" is a virtue?
+
+(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 120, Art. 1]
+
+Whether "Epikeia" [*_Epieikeia_] Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that _epikeia_ is not a virtue. For no virtue
+does away with another virtue. Yet _epikeia_ does away with another
+virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and
+seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore _epikeia_ is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "With regard
+to these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when they
+make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge
+must pronounce judgment not on them but according to them." But
+seemingly _epikeia_ pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems
+that the law should not be observed in some particular case.
+Therefore _epikeia_ is a vice rather than a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, apparently it belongs to _epikeia_ to consider the
+intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10).
+But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of
+the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the _Codex of Laws and
+Constitutions,_ under _Law_ i: "It is fitting and lawful that We
+alone should interpret between equity and law." Therefore the act of
+_epikeia_ is unlawful: and consequently _epikeia_ is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a
+virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6), when we were
+treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned,
+are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their
+diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would
+apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to
+what commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain
+cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to
+the common good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires
+deposits to be restored, because in the majority of cases this is
+just. Yet it happens sometimes to be injurious--for instance, if a
+madman were to put his sword in deposit, and demand its delivery
+while in a state of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of
+his deposit in order to fight against his country. In these and like
+cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the
+letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the
+common good. This is the object of _epikeia_ which we call equity.
+Therefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: _Epikeia_ does not set aside that which is just in
+itself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it
+opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it
+ought to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought
+not to be followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the _Codex of
+Laws and Constitutions_ under _Law_ v: "Without doubt he transgresses
+the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat
+the intention of the lawgiver."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It would be passing judgment on a law to say that it
+was not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to be
+observed in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law,
+but on some particular contingency.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases where it
+is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the
+interpretation of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there
+is need, not of interpretation, but of execution.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 120, Art. 2]
+
+Whether _Epikeia_ Is a Part of Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that _epikeia_ is not a part of justice. For,
+as stated above (Q. 58, A. 7), justice is twofold, particular and
+legal. Now _epikeia_ is not a part of particular justice, since it
+extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner,
+neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside
+that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that _epikeia_
+is not a part of justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part
+of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as
+being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now
+_epikeia_ seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as
+implied by its name: for it is derived from _epi_, i.e. "above," and
+_dikaion_, i.e. "just." Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems that _epikeia_ is the same as modesty. For
+where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to all
+men," the Greek has _epieikeia_ [*_to epieikes_]. Now, according to
+Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance.
+Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "_epikeia_
+is a kind of justice."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue has three kinds of
+parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one
+of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the
+whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is
+predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox:
+and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority
+and posteriority, as _being_ of substance and accident.
+
+Accordingly, _epikeia_ is a part of justice taken in a general sense,
+for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v,
+10). Wherefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a subjective part of
+justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being
+predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the
+direction of _epikeia._ Hence _epikeia_ is by way of being a higher
+rule of human actions.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: _Epikeia_ corresponds properly to legal justice, and in
+one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if
+legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as
+regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the
+lawgiver, which is of more account, then _epikeia_ is the more
+important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely
+that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then
+_epikeia_ is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its
+general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as
+exceeding it.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), "_epikeia_ is
+better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which observes the
+letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is
+not better than all justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to _epikeia_ to moderate something, namely,
+the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is
+reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life--for
+instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the
+term _epieikeia_ is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of
+moderation.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 121
+
+OF PIETY
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely,
+piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
+
+(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 121, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Piety Is a Gift?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ
+from the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1). But piety is a
+virtue, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 3). Therefore piety is not a gift.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above
+all the moral virtues, as above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Now among the
+parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any
+part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion
+should be a gift rather than piety.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6). But the act of piety cannot remain in
+heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the inmost
+recesses of the heart with works of mercy": and so there will be no
+piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q. 30, A.
+1]. Therefore piety is not a gift.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh
+chapter of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: "godliness"] [*_Pietas,_ whence
+our English word "pity," which is the same as mercy.]
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1; Q. 69, AA. 1,
+3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the
+soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
+Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial
+affection towards God, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the
+spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)." And since
+it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father,
+it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we
+pay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy
+Ghost.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the
+flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as
+Father.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is
+more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the flesh, as
+the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father
+is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and Lord.
+Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the
+gift of piety is greater than religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not
+only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on
+account of their being related to his father, so by the gift of piety
+he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on
+account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to
+honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one
+understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii).
+Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness.
+And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the
+Day of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is
+to revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that
+this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, "Behold how they
+are numbered among the children of God." The saints will also
+mutually honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day,
+the saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy
+state.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 121, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Second Beatitude, "Blessed Are the Meek," Corresponds to
+the Gift of Piety?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the second beatitude, "Blessed are the
+meek," does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the
+gift corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth
+beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,"
+or the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," since as stated
+above (A. 1, Obj. 3), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore
+the second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of
+knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts
+(Isa. 11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter.
+Since, then, the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn,"
+corresponds to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second
+beatitude corresponds to piety.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and gifts,
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 2). Now among the fruits, goodness
+and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which
+pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not
+correspond to the gift of piety.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Piety
+is becoming to the meek."
+
+_I answer that,_ In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold
+congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which
+they are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore
+he assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and
+the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," to piety, and so on.
+Another congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature
+of each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes
+to the gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth
+and fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the
+second. Yet the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety,
+inasmuch as meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to their
+proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to knowledge
+and piety: but taking them according to their order, different
+beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity may be
+observed, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be directly
+ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it removes
+obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 122
+
+OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there
+are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
+
+(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;
+
+(3) Of the second;
+
+(4) Of the third;
+
+(5) Of the fourth;
+
+(6) Of the other six.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Precepts of Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not
+precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the
+citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in _Ethic._
+ii, 1. Wherefore, according to _Ethic._ v, 1, "the law prescribes
+about all acts of all virtues." Now the precepts of the decalogue are
+the first principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts
+of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially the
+judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 4). But the precepts of the decalogue
+are moral precepts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3). Therefore
+the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of
+justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers
+and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the
+decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do
+not properly belong to justice.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into two
+tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our
+neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the
+precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we
+are directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the
+precepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of
+them. Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.
+
+_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue are the first
+principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at
+once, as to principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether
+evident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a precept,
+appears in justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those
+matters that relate to himself it would seem at a glance that man is
+master of himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters
+that refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under
+obligation to render to another that which is his due. Hence the
+precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice. Wherefore
+the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the
+chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety,
+which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining are about
+justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous,
+but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts
+about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as
+stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral
+precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just as
+the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in
+so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are
+contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the
+precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be
+administered in different ways according to the difference of men.
+Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the
+decalogue, but among the judicial precepts.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as
+their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, "The end of the commandment is
+charity": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer
+immediately to acts of justice.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the First Precept of the Decalogue Is Fittingly Expressed?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is
+unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his
+father in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, "How much more shall we
+[Vulg.: 'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and
+live?" Now the precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is
+expressed affirmatively in these words: "Honor thy father and thy
+mother." Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion,
+whereby all honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as
+affirmation is naturally prior to negation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to
+religion, as stated above (A. 1). Now religion, since it is one
+virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are
+forbidden: since we read first: "Thou shalt not have strange gods
+before Me"; secondly, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven
+thing"; and thirdly, "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them."
+Therefore the first precept is unfittingly expressed.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that "the first
+precept forbids the sin of superstition." But there are many wicked
+superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 2).
+Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.
+
+_I answer that,_ It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it
+behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the
+order of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now
+two things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is
+that the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the
+generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart,
+and in building a home the first thing to be set up is the
+foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first part is
+goodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes good
+use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on
+its object, which is its end. Wherefore since man was to be directed
+to virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it
+were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly directed
+to God, Who is the last end of man's will.
+
+The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in
+the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the
+farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed,
+according to Jer. 4:3, "Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not
+upon thorns." Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in
+religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the
+chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god,
+according to Matt. 6:24, "You cannot serve God and mammon." Therefore
+in the first precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In point of fact there is one affirmative precept about
+religion, namely: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day."
+Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their
+means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though
+affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of
+generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as
+stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning
+God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our
+insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For some
+served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images.
+Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped
+gods without using images: and this worship is first forbidden by the
+words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods." Among others the worship
+of false gods was observed by using certain images: and so the very
+making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt
+not make to thyself any graven thing," as also the worship of those
+same images, by the words, "Thou shalt not adore them," etc.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All other kinds of superstition proceed from some
+compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood
+to be forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Second Precept of the Decalogue Is Fittingly Expressed?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is
+unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the
+name of thy God in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7:
+"Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature," so that it
+forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Deut.
+5:11, "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," adds,
+i.e. "by giving the name of God to wood or stone," as though they
+forbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of
+unbelief. Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes
+religion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the first,
+whereby superstition is forbidden.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes--for
+instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally
+speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col.
+3:17, "All whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the
+name of the Lord." Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of
+God's name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept
+forbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded it.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, "Thou
+shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, by
+swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless
+swearing, that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false
+swearing, which is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is
+without justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept
+should rather have forbidden them.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult to
+God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and other
+like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not have
+been said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy
+God in vain."
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.
+
+_I answer that,_ In one who is being instructed in virtue it is
+necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing
+him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two
+ways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion
+is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to
+superstition. Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to
+wit, God is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion,
+as stated above (Q. 97, in the preamble, and in the Article that
+follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing man from
+acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is
+engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time give due
+worship to God, according to Isa. 28:20, "The bed is straitened, so
+that one must fall out," i.e. either the true God or a false god must
+fall out from man's heart, "and a short covering cannot cover both."
+On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from
+honoring God after he has acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all
+acknowledge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him we have
+acknowledged.
+
+For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before
+the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal
+explanation is that which is given Deut. 5:11: "Thou shalt not take
+the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, "by swearing on that
+which is not [*Vulg.: 'for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His
+name upon a vain thing']."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of
+God, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a man's
+word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name more
+frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in
+consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by
+this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the
+explanation quoted in the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is
+not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called
+perjury, as stated above (Q. 98, A. 1, ad 3). For when a man swears
+to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is
+not supported by the truth. On the other hand, when a man swears
+without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is
+no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the
+swearer.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we
+begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law,
+which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the
+decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by
+prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common
+occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the
+decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more
+frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often
+into the latter sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the
+thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying
+words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: "Thou
+shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain": since it matters
+not in which of God's names perjury is committed.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Third Precept of the Decalogue, Concerning the Hallowing
+of the Sabbath, Is Fittingly Expressed?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the third precept of the decalogue,
+concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed.
+For this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in
+commenting on Luke 13:14, "The ruler of the synagogue being angry
+that He had healed on the Sabbath," says (Comment. iv): "The Law
+forbids, not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works,"
+i.e. "to burden oneself with sin." Taken literally it is a ceremonial
+precept, for it is written (Ex. 31:13): "See that you keep My
+Sabbath: because it is a sign between Me and you in your
+generations." Now the precepts of the decalogue are both spiritual
+and moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of
+the decalogue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain "sacred
+things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances," as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 101, A. 4). Now sacred things comprised not only sacred
+days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover,
+there were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was
+unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention
+only that of the Sabbath.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins. But
+in the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did not
+sin--for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth
+day, and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also
+Elias (3 Kings 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of
+God, Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who
+carried the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Josue 7,
+must be understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is
+written (Luke 13:15): "Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day
+loose his ox or his ass . . . and lead them to water?" Therefore it
+is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be observed
+also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not
+observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the
+Lord's day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many
+like things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath
+is unfittingly expressed.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.
+
+_I answer that,_ The obstacles to true religion being removed by the
+first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above (AA. 2,
+3), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby man is
+established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give
+worship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior
+worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is
+external worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And
+since for the most part man is induced to pay interior worship,
+consisting in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the
+Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law as necessary respecting the exterior
+worship that consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the
+decalogue are, so to speak, first and common principles of the Law,
+and consequently the third precept of the decalogue describes the
+exterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns
+all. This universal boon was the work of the Creation of the world,
+from which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh day: and
+sign of this we are commanded to keep holy seventh day--that is, to
+set it aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after the precept
+about the hallowing of the Sabbath the reason for it is given: "For
+in six days the Lord made heaven and earth . . . and rested on the
+seventh day."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, understood
+literally, is partly moral and partly ceremonial. It is a moral
+precept in the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to be
+given to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to
+set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as
+refreshment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the
+dictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual
+refreshment, by which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to
+have a certain time set aside for occupying oneself with Divine
+things is the matter of a moral precept. But, in so far as this
+precept specializes the time as a sign representing the Creation of
+the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial
+precept in its allegorical signification, as representative of
+Christ's rest in the tomb on the seventh day: also in its moral
+signification, as representing cessation from all sinful acts, and
+the mind's rest in God, in which sense, too, it is a general precept.
+Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its analogical signification, as
+foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about
+hallowing the Sabbath is placed among the precepts of the decalogue,
+as a moral, but not as a ceremonial precept.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of certain
+particular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is
+representative of a general boon, namely, the production of all
+creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the
+general precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial
+precept of the Law.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of the
+Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy himself
+with Divine things, and is signified in the words: "Remember that
+thou keep holy the Sabbath day." For in the Law those things are said
+to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other thing
+is cessation from work, and is signified in the words (Ex. 20:11),
+"On the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work." The kind of work
+meant appears from Lev. 23:3, "You shall do no servile work on that
+day [*Vulg.: 'You shall do no work on that day']." Now servile work
+is so called from servitude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby
+man is the servant of sin, according to John 8:34, "Whosoever
+committeth sin is the servant of sin," and in this sense all sinful
+acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves
+another. Now one man serves another not with his mind but with his
+body, as stated above (Q. 104, AA. 5, 6, ad 1). Wherefore in this
+respect those works are called servile whereby one man serves
+another. The third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work
+of worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called a
+servile work. In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the
+Sabbath day, because that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath
+observance: since man abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in
+order that he may occupy himself with works connected with God's
+service. For this reason, according to John 7:23, "a man [*Vulg.: 'If
+a man,' etc.] receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law
+of Moses may not be broken": and for this reason too we read (Matt.
+12:5), that "on the Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the
+Sabbath," i.e. do corporal works on the Sabbath, "and are without
+blame." Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath
+did not break the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner
+it is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any
+spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss
+on Num 28 says that "smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath
+day, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does not cease from
+his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the
+temple break the Sabbath, and are without blame." On the other hand,
+those works that are called servile in the first or second way are
+contrary to the observance of the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder
+man from applying himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered
+from applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by
+lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast day
+is more against this precept than to do some other but lawful bodily
+work. Hence Augustine says (De decem chord. iii): "It would be better
+if the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent his time
+seditiously in the theatre: and their womenfolk would do better to be
+making linen on the Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in
+their feasts of the new moon." It is not, however, against this
+precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not
+destroy holiness.
+
+Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of
+God, are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly to
+servants; while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they
+are common to those who serve and those who are free. Moreover,
+everyone, be he servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries both
+for himself and for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things
+pertaining to the well-being of the body, according to Prov. 24:11,
+"Deliver them that are led to death": secondarily as regards avoiding
+damage to one's property, according to Deut. 22:1, "Thou shalt not
+pass by if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but
+thou shalt bring them back to thy brother." Hence a corporal work
+pertaining to the preservation of one's own bodily well-being does
+not profane the Sabbath: for it is not against the observance of the
+Sabbath to eat and do such things as preserve the health of the body.
+For this reason the Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they
+fought in self-defense on the Sabbath day (1 Macc. 2), nor Elias when
+he fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For this same reason
+our Lord (Matt. 12:3) excused His disciples for plucking the ears of
+corn on account of the need which they suffered. In like manner a
+bodily work that is directed to the bodily well-being of another is
+not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is
+written (John 7:23): "Are you angry at Me because I have healed the
+whole man on the Sabbath day?" And again, a bodily work that is done
+to avoid an imminent damage to some external thing does not profane
+the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says (Matt. 12:11): "What man shall
+there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a
+pit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up?"
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In the New Law the observance of the Lord's day took
+the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the
+precept but by the institution of the Church and the custom of
+Christian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the
+observance of the Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to
+work on the Lord's day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and
+certain works are permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on
+the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again in
+the New Law, dispensation is more easily granted than in the Old, in
+the matter of certain forbidden works, on account of their necessity,
+because the figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is
+unlawful to omit even in small things; while works, considered in
+themselves, are changeable in point of place and time.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Fourth Precept, About Honoring One's Parents, Is
+Fittingly Expressed?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one's
+parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining
+to piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance,
+gratitude, and others of which we have spoken (QQ. 101, 102, seq.).
+Therefore it seems that there should not have been given a special
+precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, piety pays worship not only to one's parents, but
+also to one's country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the
+well-wishers of our country, as stated above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 2).
+Therefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the
+honoring of one's father and mother.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also
+support. Therefore the mere honoring of one's parents is unfittingly
+prescribed.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die young,
+and on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time.
+Therefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the
+promise, "That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth."
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.
+
+_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the
+love of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our
+neighbors, we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately
+after the precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the
+precept directing us to our parents, who are the particular principle
+of our being, just as God is the universal principle: so that this
+precept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the First Table.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 101, A. 2), piety directs us to pay
+the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common to all. Hence,
+since the precepts of the decalogue are general precepts, they ought
+to contain some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of
+justice, which regard some special debt.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The debt to one's parents precedes the debt to one's
+kindred and country since it is because we are born of our parents
+that our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts
+of the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct man
+to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred.
+Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is understood to
+command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as
+secondary matter included in the principal matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Reverential honor is due to one's parents as such,
+whereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for
+instance, because they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as
+stated above (Q. 101, A. 2). And since that which belongs to a thing
+by nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among
+the first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of the
+decalogue, there is a special precept of honoring our parents: and
+this honor, as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support
+and whatever else is due to our parents.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A long life is promised to those who honor their
+parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present
+life, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety
+[Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of
+the life that now is and of that which is to come." And with reason.
+Because the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain
+congruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and he who is
+ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of
+bodily life to our parents after God: wherefore he that honors his
+parents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful
+for that favor: while he that honors not his parents deserves to be
+deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. However,
+present goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except
+in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 114, A. 12). Wherefore sometimes in accordance with the
+hidden design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the
+future reward, some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner
+deprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their parents,
+live longer.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Other Six Precepts of the Decalogue Are Fittingly
+Expressed?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue
+are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation
+that one refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required
+that one pay one's debts, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to
+all men their dues." Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to
+injure one's neighbor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly
+expressed.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing and
+bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on
+one's neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above
+(QQ. 72, seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are
+unfittingly expressed.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as
+denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. 6:21, "The desire
+(_concupiscentia_) of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom":
+secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 4:1,
+"From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . .
+from your concupiscences which war in your members?" Now the
+concupiscence of the sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the
+decalogue, otherwise first movements would be mortal sins, as they
+would be against a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence
+of the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore
+it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include some
+that forbid concupiscence.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or
+theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder.
+Therefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the
+desire of theft and of adultery.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that
+which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for
+some special reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays
+that which is due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts
+pertaining to religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after
+the fourth precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due
+to his parents--which duty includes the paying of all that is due for
+any special reason--it was necessary in due sequence to give certain
+precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all
+indifferently what is due to them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man is bound towards all persons in general to inflict
+injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the doing
+of those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor, had to be
+given a place, as general precepts, among the precepts of the
+decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are
+paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not behoove
+to include affirmative precepts about those duties among the precepts
+of the decalogue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All other injuries that are inflicted on our neighbor
+are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts, as
+taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance.
+For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are
+understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the
+principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with
+one's neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be
+forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of
+damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with
+theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as
+detractions, insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden
+together with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly
+opposed to justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include
+the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do not go
+farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their
+prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or
+pleasure.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Murder in itself is an object not of concupiscence but
+of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of good. On the
+other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e.
+of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e. of
+something useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of
+something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft and
+adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the
+concupiscence of murder.
+_______________________
+
+TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ. 123-170)
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 123
+
+OF FORTITUDE
+(In Twelve Articles)
+
+After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude.
+We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts;
+(3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to
+it.
+
+Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered:
+(1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom;
+(3) the vices opposed to fortitude.
+
+Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
+
+(3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring?
+
+(4) Whether it is only about fear of death?
+
+(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?
+
+(6) Whether endurance is its chief act?
+
+(7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?
+
+(8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?
+
+(9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?
+
+(10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?
+
+(11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?
+
+(12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Fortitude Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle
+says (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue is perfected in infirmity." But fortitude
+is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological,
+intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the
+theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be
+gathered from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 2; Q. 62, A.
+3). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues,
+since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7, 8): "Some seem to
+be brave through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers," both
+of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue,
+"and some are called brave on account of certain passions"; for
+instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on
+account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from
+passion but from choice, as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4).
+Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it
+is a "good quality of the mind," as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7, 8).
+But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results
+from the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems that fortitude
+is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers
+fortitude among the virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "virtue
+is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good."
+Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes
+a man good, and renders his work good. Now man's good is to be in
+accordance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22).
+Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his
+work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by
+rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual
+virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude of reason in human
+affairs, and this belongs to justice; thirdly, by removing the
+obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs.
+Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the
+rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some object of
+pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason
+requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance.
+Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is
+in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that
+presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the
+mind is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as
+a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.
+
+Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as it
+conforms man to reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the
+infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the
+Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear
+bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue
+of patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity,
+and this belongs to the perfection that is called humility.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a
+virtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than
+virtue. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in
+which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through
+performing acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This may be
+done in three ways. First, because they tend to that which is
+difficult as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in
+three ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not
+perceiving the greatness of the danger; sometimes it is owing to the
+fact that one is hopeful of overcoming dangers--when, for instance,
+one has often experienced escape from danger; and sometimes this is
+owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who,
+through skill and practice in the use of arms, think little of the
+dangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending
+themselves against them; thus Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), "No man
+fears to do what he is confident of having learned to do well."
+Secondly, a man performs an act of fortitude without having the
+virtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sorrow that he
+wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Thirdly, through choice, not
+indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained,
+such as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be
+avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue,
+as explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called from
+its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with
+the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to
+virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above (I-II,
+Q. 63, A. 1).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Fortitude Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it
+is written (Wis. 7:7): "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and
+justice, and fortitude," where the text has "virtue" for "fortitude."
+Since then the term "virtue" is common to all virtues, it seems that
+fortitude is a general virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is not
+lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues
+and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on
+all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled
+against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a
+deformity that weakens virtue"; and he says the same further on in
+connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special
+virtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from
+firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in
+_Ethic._ ii. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other
+virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the term
+"fortitude" can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a
+certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue,
+or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher
+states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly
+and immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness
+only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most
+difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore
+Tully says (Rhet. ii), that "fortitude is deliberate facing of
+dangers and bearing of toils." In this sense fortitude is reckoned a
+special virtue, because it has a special matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 116) the word
+virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power
+is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another
+sense is a principle of action, as stated in _Metaph._ v, 17. And
+since this latter meaning is the more common, the term "virtue," as
+denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for
+virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby
+one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the
+first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special
+virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against
+all kinds of assaults.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as denoting
+firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. Nevertheless even
+as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the
+assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are
+most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those
+which are less difficult.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This objection takes fortitude in the first sense.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Fortitude Is About Fear and Daring?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring.
+For Gregory says (Moral. vii): "The fortitude of the just man is to
+overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the lusts
+of the present life." Therefore fortitude seems to be about pleasures
+rather than about fear and daring.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs to
+fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has
+nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a
+man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not
+about fear and daring.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear,
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1, ad 2) in the treatise on
+passions. Therefore fortitude should not be about daring any more
+than about hope.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that
+fortitude is about fear and daring.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of
+fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from
+following the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult
+belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil
+that entails difficulty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, AA. 3, 5) in
+the treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of
+difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the
+reason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the assault of
+these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to
+withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them
+altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the future, which
+seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is
+about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude of the just
+man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all
+mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted,
+and then adds that which pertains properly to fortitude as a special
+virtue, by saying: "To love the trials of this life for the sake of
+an eternal reward."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the
+course of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear.
+Hence fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but
+mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those
+passions.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for
+hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same
+object, and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1). And since fortitude properly
+regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as
+appears from Tully's definition quoted in the Second Objection, it
+follows that fortitude properly is about fear and daring and not
+about hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2).
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Fortitude Is Only About Dangers of Death?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of
+death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude is
+love bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved":
+and (Music. vi) he says that fortitude is "the love which dreads no
+hardship, not even death." Therefore fortitude is not only about
+danger of death, but also about other afflictions.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all the passions of the soul need to be reduced to a
+mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears to a
+mean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear of death, but also
+about other fears.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is
+about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in
+_Ethic._ iii. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of
+death.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Andronicus says that "fortitude is a virtue of the
+irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to the virtue of
+fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of
+reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold
+firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no
+bodily good is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude
+of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of
+reason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm
+against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less
+things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of
+virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful
+of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods.
+Wherefore Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that "the soul is
+shaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body
+be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done away and
+destroyed." Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of
+dangers of death.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of
+adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any
+kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest
+evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a
+restricted sense.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates
+the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of
+contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money,
+as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is
+the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own
+life is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue
+modifying the fear of death.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right
+reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with
+reason is not contrary to virtue.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Fortitude Is Properly About Dangers of Death in Battle?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of
+death in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their
+fortitude. But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle.
+Therefore fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fortitude is
+applicable both to warlike and to civil matters": and Tully (De
+Offic. i), under the heading, "That it pertains to fortitude to excel
+in battle rather than in civil life," says: "Although not a few think
+that the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of
+civil life, this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge
+the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more
+important and more glorious than those connected with war." Now
+greater fortitude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude is not
+properly concerned with death in battle.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, war is directed to the preservation of a country's
+temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that "wars are
+waged in order to insure peace." Now it does not seem that one ought
+to expose oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of
+one's country, since this same peace is the occasion of much license
+in morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude is not
+about the danger of death in battle.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fortitude
+is chiefly about death in battle.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), fortitude strengthens a
+man's mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now
+fortitude is a virtue; and it is essential to virtue ever to tend to
+good; wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not
+fly from the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out of
+sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not
+seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good. On the other
+hand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly
+on account of some good, because, to wit, he is defending the common
+good by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there
+is the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle;
+secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even
+private individual does not refrain from giving a just judgment
+through fear of the impending sword, or any other danger though it
+threaten death. Hence it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the mind
+against dangers of death, not only such as arise in a general battle,
+but also such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by the
+general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted that fortitude
+is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle.
+
+Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other
+kind of death; especially since man may be in danger of any kind of
+death on account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a
+sick friend through fear of deadly infection, or not refuse to
+undertake a journey with some godly object in view through fear of
+shipwreck or robbers.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own
+person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is God;
+wherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the
+genus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason
+they are said to have been valiant in battle. [*Office of Martyrs,
+ex. Heb. xi. 34.]
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Personal and civil business is differentiated from the
+business of war that regards general wars. However, personal and
+civil affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain
+conflicts which are private wars, and so with regard to these also
+there may be fortitude properly so called.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it
+become evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For there
+are many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented by
+it, such as murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those which
+are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the
+flesh.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Endurance Is the Chief Act of Fortitude?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that endurance is not the chief act of
+fortitude. For virtue "is about the difficult and the good" (Ethic.
+ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore
+endurance is not the chief act of fortitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue greater
+power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to act on
+another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then
+fortitude denotes perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to
+fortitude to attack rather than to endure.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than its
+mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas to attack
+denotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies
+pursuit. Since then fortitude above all withdraws the mind from fear,
+it seems that it regards attack rather than endurance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "certain
+persons are" said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), and according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), "fortitude is more concerned to allay
+fear, than to moderate daring." For it is more difficult to allay
+fear than to moderate daring, since the danger which is the object of
+daring and fear, tends by its very nature to check daring, but to
+increase fear. Now to attack belongs to fortitude in so far as the
+latter moderates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of
+fear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is
+to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for three
+reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being
+attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is
+attacking as though one were the stronger party; and it is more
+difficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly,
+because he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas
+the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; and it is more
+difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly,
+because endurance implies length of time, whereas aggression is
+consistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain
+unmoved for a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something
+arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some hurry
+to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the
+behavior of a brave man."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the body, but an
+action of the soul cleaving most resolutely (_fortissime_) to good,
+the result being that it does not yield to the threatening passion of
+the body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with
+the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Brave Man Acts for the Sake of the Good of His Habit?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of
+the good of his habit. For in matters of action the end, though first
+in intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fortitude, in the
+order of execution, follows the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is
+impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his
+habit.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "We love virtues for
+the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be
+virtuous," namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own
+sake, "without loving happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor,
+we shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer
+love that for the sake of which alone we love virtue." But fortitude
+is a virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not to
+fortitude but to happiness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude
+is love ready to bear all things for God's sake." Now God is not the
+habit of fortitude, but something better, since the end must needs be
+better than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man does
+not act for the sake of the good of his habit.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "to the
+brave man fortitude itself is a good": and such is his end.
+
+_I answer that,_ An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the
+proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that
+agent's form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is
+to introduce the likeness of its heat into some passive matter, and
+the end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of
+his art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be
+called the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made,
+external matter is fashioned by art, so in things done, human deeds
+are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the
+brave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a
+likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his
+habit: but his remote end is happiness or God.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First
+Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were its
+end, instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The
+other two objections consider the ultimate end.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Brave Man Delights in His Act?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For
+"delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit" (Ethic. x,
+4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after
+the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his
+act.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, "But the fruit of
+the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," says that deeds of virtue are
+called "fruits because they refresh man's mind with a holy and pure
+delight." Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he
+takes pleasure in his act.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the
+brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own
+body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight
+in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently
+the brave man does all things with pleasure.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "the
+brave man seems to have no delight in his act."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 31, AA. 3, 4, 5) where we
+were treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily,
+resulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from
+an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results
+from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason.
+Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain
+things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul--for instance,
+the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a
+natural good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and
+things connected with them--but also to endure things unpleasant in
+respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave
+man, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as
+regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end
+thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual
+sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence
+we read (2 Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: "I suffer grievous pains in
+body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I
+fear Thee."
+
+Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the
+spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God's
+grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things
+in which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the
+Blessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said
+that he felt as though he were walking on roses.
+
+Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely
+overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes
+spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the
+life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that "it is not necessary for
+a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices
+for him not to be sad."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The vehemence of the action or passion of one power
+hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses
+hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper
+operation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of
+their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is
+principally the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. iii, 9) that "to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen
+in all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the
+delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the
+sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that
+spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in
+the presence of great bodily pain.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 9]
+
+Whether Fortitude Deals Chiefly with Sudden Occurrences?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with
+sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when
+they are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that
+"fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil."
+Therefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "The brave man is not
+unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures
+beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so
+as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say
+afterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could possibly
+happen." But it is not possible to be prepared for the future in the
+case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is
+not concerned with sudden happenings.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that the "brave
+man is of good hope." But hope looks forward to the future, which is
+inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of
+fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that
+"fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death."
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things must be considered in the operation of
+fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not
+about sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think
+beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to
+withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to
+Gregory (Hom. xxv in Evang.), "the blow that is foreseen strikes with
+less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we
+are forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge." The other thing to
+be considered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of
+the virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden
+occurrences, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the
+habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a
+habit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a person without
+forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges
+on account of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that
+habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.
+
+Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fortitude,
+to prepare his mind against danger by long forethought: in the same
+way as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for
+the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 10]
+
+Whether the Brave Man Makes Use of Anger in His Action?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his
+action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that
+which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as
+to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher
+says (De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does
+not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not
+employ anger for his action.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he
+should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more
+imperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of
+fortitude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira
+i): "Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for
+action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than
+for reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid,
+the trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?"
+Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of
+fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or
+desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild
+beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and
+adulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now
+fortitude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore
+in like manner it should not employ anger.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "anger
+helps the brave."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), concerning
+anger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion
+between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded
+anger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or
+good man: whereas the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief,
+ascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the
+soul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed not in
+reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), gave the name of passions to all the
+movements of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport
+themselves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the command
+of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt,
+they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the
+other passions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of
+reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to
+certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite, wherefore they
+called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them
+altogether from virtue.
+
+Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but
+not immoderate anger.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is
+subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will,
+which would not be the case were it immoderate.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its
+assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an
+instrument, just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it
+unbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the principal
+agent, even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover,
+Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed
+by him directly at Aristotle.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Whereas fortitude, as stated above (A. 6), has two
+acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the
+act of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act, but
+for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the
+other passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of
+sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking.
+On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to the thing
+that hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as
+being the cause of anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 47, A. 3), or as
+making a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from
+sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to a
+pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand
+danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, in so far
+as one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "Of all the cases in which
+fortitude arises from a passion, the most natural is when a man is
+brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose,"
+i.e. for a due end; "this is true fortitude."
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 11]
+
+Whether Fortitude Is a Cardinal Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. For,
+as stated above (A. 10), anger is closely allied with fortitude. Now
+anger is not accounted a principal passion; nor is daring which
+belongs to fortitude. Therefore neither should fortitude be reckoned
+a cardinal virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct object
+of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil and
+toil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii). Therefore fortitude is not
+a cardinal virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the cardinal virtues are about those things upon
+which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon a
+hinge (_cardine_). But fortitude is about dangers of death which are
+of rare occurrence in human life. Therefore fortitude should not be
+reckoned a cardinal or principal virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in his commentary
+on Luke 6:20, and Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), number fortitude
+among the four cardinal or principal virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), those
+virtues are said to be cardinal or principal which have a foremost
+claim to that which belongs to the virtues in common. And among other
+conditions of virtue in general one is that it is stated to "act
+steadfastly," according to _Ethic._ ii, 4. Now fortitude above all
+lays claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm
+is so much the more praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall
+or recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in
+accordance with reason, both by the pleasing good and the displeasing
+evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For
+Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is none that does not shun
+pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the
+most untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the
+fear of pain." And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are
+mostly feared which lead to death, and it is against them that the
+brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Daring and anger do not cooperate with fortitude in its
+act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended: for
+it is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal
+passion, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it
+behooves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fortitude
+is directed to evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands,
+and to the good of reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the
+occasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account of
+justice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds,
+man encounters mortal adversaries.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 12]
+
+Whether Fortitude Excels Among All Other Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues.
+For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is higher, so to speak,
+than the rest."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good.
+But fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is the
+greatest of the virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his
+possessions. But fortitude is about a man's person, for it is this
+that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue:
+whereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other and
+external things. Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral
+virtues.
+
+Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i): "Justice is the
+most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man."
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): "Those virtues
+must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others." Now
+liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is a
+greater virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), "In things that are
+great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good": wherefore the
+better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is man's good,
+according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a
+perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects
+this good, since it belongs to justice to establish the order of
+reason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this
+good, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they lead man away
+from reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude holds
+the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest
+power to make man recede from the good of reason: and after fortitude
+comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in
+hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing essentially ranks
+before effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by
+removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues,
+prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance
+fourth, and after these the other virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Ambrose places fortitude before the other virtues, in
+respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both
+in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he
+begins by saying (De Offic. i): "Now we come to treat of fortitude,
+which being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to
+warlike and to civil matters."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the
+difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to
+its goodness rather than its difficulty.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A man does not expose his person to dangers of death
+except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to
+fortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic.
+i) that "fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since
+the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker."
+
+The Fourth argument is granted.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular
+favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude,
+since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the Philosopher
+says (Rhet. i, 9) that "just and brave men are most beloved, because
+they are most useful in war and peace."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 124
+
+OF MARTYRDOM
+(In Five Articles)
+
+We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?
+
+(2) Of what virtue is it the act?
+
+(3) Concerning the perfection of this act;
+
+(4) The pain of martyrdom;
+
+(5) Its cause.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Martyrdom Is an Act of Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all
+acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not
+voluntary, as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for
+Christ's sake, and of whom Hilary says (Super Matth. i) that "they
+attained the ripe age of eternity through the glory of martyrdom."
+Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is
+unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above (Q. 64, A. 5), and yet
+martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i)
+that "during persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from
+those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river,
+and so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is honored in the
+Catholic Church with most solemn veneration." Therefore martyrdom is
+not an act of virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act of
+virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather would
+it seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an
+act of virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of
+virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (Matt. 5:10):
+"Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for
+theirs is the kingdom of heaven." Therefore martyrdom is an act of
+virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 1, 3), it belongs to
+virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason
+consists in the truth as its proper object, and in justice as its
+proper effect, as shown above (Q. 109, AA. 1, 2; Q. 123, A. 12). And
+martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and
+justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident that
+martyrdom is an act of virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some have said that in the case of the Innocents the
+use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they
+suffered martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture
+contains no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in
+being slain obtained by God's grace the glory of martyrdom which
+others acquire by their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for
+Christ's sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the
+case of baptized children the merit of Christ is conducive to the
+acquisition of glory through the baptismal grace, so in those who
+were slain for Christ's sake the merit of Christ's martyrdom is
+conducive to the acquisition of the martyr's palm. Hence Augustine
+says in a sermon on the Epiphany (De Diversis lxvi), as though he
+were addressing them: "A man that does not believe that children are
+benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being crowned
+in suffering for Christ. You were not old enough to believe in
+Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein you could
+endure suffering of Christ Who was to suffer."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "possibly the
+Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority
+thus to honor the memory of those holy women [*Cf. Q. 64, A. 1, ad
+2]."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now
+it has been stated (I-II, Q. 108, A. 1, ad 4) that some of the
+precepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the
+preparation of the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared
+to do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way
+certain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the preparation
+of the mind, so that in such and such a case a man should act
+according to reason. And this observation would seem very much to the
+point in the case of martyrdom, which consists in the right endurance
+of sufferings unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an
+occasion of acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to
+endure it in moderation.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Martyrdom Is an Act of Fortitude?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For
+the Greek _martyr_ signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the
+faith of Christ. according to Acts 1:8, "You shall be witnesses unto
+Me," etc. and Maximus says in a sermon: "The mother of martyrs is the
+Catholic faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their
+blood." Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of
+fortitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue
+which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the
+act avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom:
+Thus Maximus says in a sermon: "The charity of Christ is victorious
+in His martyrs." Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act
+of martyrdom, according to John 15:13, "Greater love than this no man
+hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Moreover without
+charity martyrdom avails nothing, according to 1 Cor. 13:3, "If I
+should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it
+profiteth me nothing." Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity
+rather than of fortitude.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: "It is
+easy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great
+thing to imitate his faith and patience." Now that which calls
+chiefly for praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which it is
+the act. Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of
+fortitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "Blessed
+martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors,
+how shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage?" Now
+a person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs.
+Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 1, seqq.), it belongs to
+fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against
+dangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all
+against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in
+martyrdom man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he
+cleaves to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger
+of death, the imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of
+particular contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a
+sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "The crowd of onlookers wondered
+to see an unearthly battle, and Christ's servants fighting erect,
+undaunted in speech, with souls unmoved, and strength divine."
+Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for
+which reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs: They "became
+valiant in battle" [*Heb. 11:34].
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Two things must be considered in the act of fortitude.
+One is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and this is
+the end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby a man
+does not yield to the contraries that hinder him from achieving that
+good, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as
+civic fortitude strengthens a man's mind in human justice, for the
+safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous
+fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good of Divine justice, which
+is "through faith in Christ Jesus," according to Rom. 3:22. Thus
+martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is
+strengthened, but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as its
+first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it, whereas
+fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause, being
+the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as
+commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it
+manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious,
+like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails not
+without charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 123, A. 6), the chief act of
+fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act, which
+is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves fortitude
+on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that
+martyrs are also praised for their patience.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Martyrdom Is an Act of the Greatest Perfection?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest
+perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not
+of precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not
+necessary for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is
+necessary for salvation, since the Apostle says (Rom. 10:10), "With
+the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is
+made unto salvation," and it is written (1 John 3:16), that "we ought
+to lay down our lives for the brethren." Therefore martyrdom does not
+pertain to perfection.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a man
+give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give
+God his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says
+(Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is preferable to all sacrifices."
+Therefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to
+maintain oneself in good, since the "good of the nation is better
+than the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher
+(Ethic. i, 2). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone,
+whereas he that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of
+teaching and guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of
+martyrdom.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers
+martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore
+martyrdom seems to belong to perfection in the highest degree.
+
+_I answer that,_ We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First,
+with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue
+proximately eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in
+the due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous
+acts, because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but
+only in so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of
+virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue
+being the end is better.
+
+A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with
+its first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in
+this respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life,
+since, as the Apostle says (Col. 3:14), that "charity . . . is the
+bond of perfection." Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the
+greatest proof of the perfection of charity: since a man's love for a
+thing is proved to be so much the greater, according as that which he
+despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses
+to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all
+the goods of the present life man loves life itself most, and on the
+other hand he hates death more than anything, especially when it is
+accompanied by the pains of bodily torment, "from fear of which even
+dumb animals refrain from the greatest pleasures," as Augustine
+observes (QQ. 83, qu. 36). And from this point of view it is clear
+that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its
+genus, as being the sign of the greatest charity, according to John
+15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his
+life for his friends."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There is no act of perfection, which is a matter of
+counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being
+necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug.
+xiii) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency,
+through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary
+to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary
+for salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for
+salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who
+through zeal for the faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to
+martyrdom of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be
+understood as referring to the preparation of the mind.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of
+obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (Phil.
+2:8) that He became "obedient unto death." Hence it is evident that
+martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered
+absolutely.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers martyrdom according to the
+proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all
+other virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than
+all virtues.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Death Is Essential to Martyrdom?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For
+Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et
+Eustoch.): "I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both
+virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace": and Gregory
+says (Hom. iii in Evang.): "Although persecution has ceased to offer
+the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom,
+since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword,
+yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the
+spirit." Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, we read of certain women as commended for despising
+life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh:
+wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the
+life of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been
+forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian
+faith, as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the
+name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the
+integrity of the flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if
+she were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also Lucy
+said: "If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity
+will gain me a twofold crown."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs to
+fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as
+Augustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships
+besides death, which one may suffer for Christ's faith, namely
+imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in
+Heb. 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint
+Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is
+not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above (A.
+2, ad 1; A. 3). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death.
+Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential
+to martyrdom.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that "in
+dying for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in
+living without faith."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a martyr is so called as
+being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise
+things visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb.
+11. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to
+the faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in
+order to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains
+the life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all
+things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their
+kindred and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather
+than lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): "Skin
+for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul" [Douay:
+'life'] i.e. for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion
+of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet
+with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is
+condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it is
+not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian
+faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight
+of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently
+this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of God,
+however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a
+reward, as Lucy said.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5), fortitude regards
+danger of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a
+person is not called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or
+exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these result
+in death.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the
+voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person
+willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however,
+that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for
+Christ's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other
+kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death
+ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this
+state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Faith Alone Is the Cause of Martyrdom?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For
+it is written (1 Pet. 4:15, 16): "Let none of you suffer as a
+murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's
+things. But if as a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him
+glorify God in this name." Now a man is said to be a Christian
+because he holds the faith of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ
+gives the glory of martyrdom to those who suffer.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is borne
+to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing
+witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth,
+otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a
+truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems
+ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most
+account which are directed to the common good, since "the good of the
+nation is better than the good of the individual," according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause
+of martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs
+who die for the defense of their country. Yet this is not consistent
+with Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of
+those who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of
+martyrdom.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:10): "Blessed are they that
+suffer persecution for justice' sake," which pertains to martyrdom,
+according to a gloss, as well as Jerome's commentary on this passage.
+Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice.
+Therefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), martyrs are so called as
+being witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear
+witness to the truth; not indeed to any truth, but to the truth which
+is in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ:
+wherefore Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the
+truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of
+faith.
+
+But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also
+outward profession, which is expressed not only by words, whereby one
+confesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that
+he has faith, according to James 2:18, "I will show thee, by works,
+my faith." Hence it is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): "They
+profess that they know God but in their works they deny Him." Thus
+all virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are
+professions of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires
+these works of us, and rewards us for them: and in this way they can
+be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the
+martyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for
+refusing to deny the faith, but for reproving adultery.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person is
+said to be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but
+also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of
+Christ, according to Rom. 8:9, "If any man have not the Spirit of
+Christ, he is none of His"; and again because in imitation of Christ
+he is dead to sins, according to Gal. 5:24, "They that are Christ's
+have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences." Hence
+to suffer as a Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the
+faith, which is done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good
+work, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all
+comes under the head of witnessing to the faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The truth of other sciences has no connection with the
+worship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according to
+godliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to
+be the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as
+stated above (Q. 110, AA. 3, 4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever
+truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a
+lie is a sin against the Divine Law.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The good of one's country is paramount among human
+goods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of martyrdom,
+is of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since human good
+may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God, it
+follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may
+be the cause of martyrdom.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 125
+
+OF FEAR*
+(In Four Articles)
+[* St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently 'fear' or 'timidity.' The
+translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account of the
+connection with the passion of fear. Otherwise 'cowardice' would be a
+better rendering.]
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2)
+Fearlessness; (3) Daring.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether fear is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
+
+(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Fear Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion,
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 42). Now we are neither
+praised nor blamed for passions, as stated in _Ethic._ ii. Since then
+every sin is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a
+sin: since the "law of the Lord is unspotted" (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is
+commanded in God's law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): "Servants, be
+obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with
+fear and trembling." Therefore fear is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin
+is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii). Now
+fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
+7) that "a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not
+even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear." Therefore fear
+is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Matt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them
+that kill the body," and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): "Fear not,
+neither be thou afraid of their words."
+
+_I answer that,_ A human act is said to be a sin on account of its
+being inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order,
+as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 114, A. 1). Now this due order
+requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And
+reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some sought
+after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be
+shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that
+some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a
+good is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be
+shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to
+be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided.
+Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we
+should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek
+for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other hand, when the
+appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the
+appetite is neither inordinate nor sinful.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in
+general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or
+evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the
+Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame,
+because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or
+afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate
+manner.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance
+with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking in
+the service they owe their masters.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we
+cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing.
+Hence there is no sin in fearing them.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Sin of Fear Is Contrary to Fortitude?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to
+fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated
+above (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5). But the sin of fear is not always connected
+with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, "Blessed are all
+they that fear the Lord," says that "it is human fear whereby we
+dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods." Again a
+gloss on Matt. 27:44, "He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame
+word," says that "evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of
+pain, and fear of contempt." Therefore the sin of fear is not
+contrary to fortitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for
+fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now
+sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or
+shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not
+to be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of
+fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed
+thereto.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed
+not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1; I-II, Q.
+40, A. 4). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that
+timidity is opposed to fortitude.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q. 43, A. 1),
+all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary
+to something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular
+kind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every
+virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue;
+while inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate
+love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate
+fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss
+of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But
+the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for
+its object, as we find proved in _Ethic._ iii, 6. Wherefore the
+inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards
+dangers of death. For this reason timidity is said to be
+antonomastically* opposed to fortitude. [*Antonomasia is the figure
+of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term;
+e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is
+inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of
+the danger of death.]
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its
+generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the
+end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6): and it belongs
+to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a
+good. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to
+escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is
+contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7),
+that "to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or something
+disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun
+hardships is a mark of effeminacy."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2), fear is the
+beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring.
+Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation
+presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some
+kind of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair
+results from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same
+kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another
+kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to
+fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Fear Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1), fear is in the irascible faculty which is
+a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the
+sensuality, as stated above (I-II, Q. 74, A. 4). Therefore fear is
+not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God.
+But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, "Whosoever is
+fearful," etc., says that "a man is fearful when he trembles at the
+very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart,
+but that he can rally and take courage." Therefore fear is not a
+mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but
+also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a precept,
+but only from perfection; for a gloss on Deut. 20:8, "What man is
+there that is fearful and fainthearted?" says: "We learn from this
+that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual
+warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches."
+Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and
+yet this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. 21:8, "But the
+fearful and unbelieving and the abominable," etc., "shall have their
+portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the
+second death." Therefore fear is a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), fear is a sin through being
+inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be
+shunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of
+fear is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of
+the rational appetite's consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but
+only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches
+to the rational appetite which is called the will, which deliberately
+shuns something against the dictate of reason: and this
+inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin.
+For if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other
+temporal evil is so disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit
+what is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin:
+otherwise it is a venial sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers fear as confined to the
+sensuality.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This gloss also can be understood as referring to the
+fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may
+reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes
+his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may
+happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one
+cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins
+mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from
+accomplishing what he purposed doing.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from
+a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but
+for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin,
+but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance
+when one has a reasonable cause for fear.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Fear Excuses from Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is
+a sin, as stated above (A. 1). But sin does not excuse from sin,
+rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this
+be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a
+courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse,
+because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to
+be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual.
+Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead of
+inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal
+evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the Philosopher
+(Ethic. iii, 6), "one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor
+anything that is not a result of one's own wickedness." Therefore it
+seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q. 1, Cap.
+Constat.): "A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by
+heretics, has an ostensible excuse."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), fear is sinful in so far as
+it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain
+evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to
+shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges
+to be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than
+the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if
+through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a
+robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners,
+rather than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the
+other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according
+to reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according
+to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from
+sin, because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the
+soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body, and evils of
+the body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to
+incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the
+body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as
+loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to
+avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet
+one's sin would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear
+is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a
+certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher
+(Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through fear are
+not simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but
+in the point of its involuntariness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the
+shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of
+fear.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal
+goods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that temporal
+evils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be
+feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these temporal
+things are goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion
+of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be feared;
+but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that which
+is good according to virtue.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 126
+
+OF FEARLESSNESS
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there
+are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless?
+
+(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 126, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Fearlessness Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which
+is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is
+written in praise of the just man (Prov. 28:1): "The just, bold as a
+lion, shall be without dread." Therefore it is not a sin to be
+without fear.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death,
+according to Matt. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body,"
+etc., nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Isa.
+51:12, "Who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?"
+Therefore it is not a sin to be fearless.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, fear is born of love, as stated above (Q. 125, A.
+2). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing
+earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "the love of
+God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city."
+Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said of the unjust judge (Luke 18:2) that
+"he feared not God nor regarded man."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge
+alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear
+whereby one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of
+temporal goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to
+love his own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in
+due measure, that is, to love these things not as placing his end
+therein, but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence
+it is contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to
+fall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never
+lapses entirely from this love: since what is natural cannot be
+wholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says (Eph. 5:29): "No man
+ever hated his own flesh." Wherefore even those that slay themselves
+do so from love of their own flesh, which they desire to free from
+present stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and other
+temporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that he loves them*
+less than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect 'se'
+instead of 'ea.' We should then read: For the reason that he loves
+himself less than he ought.] But that he fear none of these things
+cannot result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact
+that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils
+contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride
+of soul presuming on self and despising others, according to the
+saying of Job 41:24, 25: "He [Vulg.: 'who'] was made to fear no one,
+he beholdeth every high thing": and sometimes it happens through a
+defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that
+the "Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing." [*"A man
+would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing
+that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as is said
+to be the case with the Celts."] It is therefore evident that
+fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of
+soul, or dullness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from
+sin if it be invincible.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The just man is praised for being without fear that
+withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it
+is written (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be
+justified."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man
+are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they
+are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as
+regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others.
+Hence it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and declineth
+from evil."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from
+loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be
+feared; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 34:16): "He that feareth the
+Lord shall tremble at nothing." But temporal goods are not to be
+despised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain
+those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 126, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Fearlessness Is Opposed to Fortitude?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.
+For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is
+hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is
+both brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is
+not opposed to fortitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due
+love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of due
+love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly
+to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not
+opposed to fortitude.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the
+mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then
+fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the
+other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness
+to be opposed to fortitude.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 3), fortitude is
+concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the
+rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Hence it
+belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to
+reason, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when he ought,
+and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by
+excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is opposed to
+fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man fears what he ought
+not, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by
+deficiency of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to
+fear.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The act of fortitude is to endure death without fear,
+and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the
+fearless man does not do.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean
+of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But in
+respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other
+virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of
+daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude imposes the
+mean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its
+having different extremes in different respects.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 127
+
+OF DARING*
+[*Excessive daring or foolhardiness]
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether daring is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Daring Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written
+(Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory
+(Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that "he goeth forth
+boldly to meet armed men [*Vulg.: 'he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth
+to meet armed men']." But no vice redounds to a man's praise.
+Therefore it is not a sin to be daring.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), "one
+should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been
+counseled." But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore
+daring is not sinful but praiseworthy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 45, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. But hope
+is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring
+be accounted a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not on the way
+with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils." Now no man's
+fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring
+is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Daring, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 55),
+is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to
+reason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by
+deficiency, and on this account the passion is sinful. Again, the
+names of the passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess,
+thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which
+case it is sinful, and in the same way daring as implying excess is
+accounted a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated
+by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel,
+which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking
+counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act
+rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above (Q. 58,
+A. 3). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far
+praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues,
+as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4, 5, 6). Hence the
+names of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and
+virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially the
+names of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the
+case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good
+for this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Daring Is Opposed to Fortitude?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For
+excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But
+presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore
+daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so
+far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts
+himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with
+daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to
+injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to
+fortitude but to justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as
+stated above (Q. 123, A. 3). Now since timidity is opposed to
+fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice
+opposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is
+opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will
+likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring.
+But there is no such vice. Therefore neither should daring be
+accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books
+of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 126, A. 2), it belongs to a
+moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which
+it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation
+in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as
+immoderate to moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice,
+implies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of
+daring. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of
+fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above
+(Q. 122, A. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend
+chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species.
+Wherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same
+virtue as presumption which is its cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend
+on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm
+done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition
+of daring depend on this.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The movement of daring consists in a man taking the
+offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature
+inclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is
+hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the
+vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only
+timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of
+timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), "the daring
+are precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is
+present," namely through fear.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 128
+
+OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE
+
+We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider
+what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each
+part.
+_______________________
+
+ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 128, Art.]
+
+Whether the Parts of Fortitude Are Suitably Assigned?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably
+assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to
+fortitude, namely _magnificence, confidence, patience,_ and
+_perseverance._ Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality;
+since both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must
+needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But
+liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 5).
+Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope
+does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by
+itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of
+fortitude.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of
+danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any
+relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts
+of fortitude.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience
+denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to
+fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part
+thereof.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not
+be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required
+in every virtue: for it is written (Matt. 24:13): "He that shall
+persevere to the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance
+should not be accounted a part of fortitude.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of
+fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence,
+constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven
+virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, "courage, strength of
+will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore
+it seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is
+incomplete.
+
+Obj. 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of
+fortitude. The first is _civic_ fortitude, which produces brave deeds
+through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is _military_
+fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or
+experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds
+resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude
+which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome;
+the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through
+being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not
+comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these
+enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue can have three
+kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude,
+taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is
+not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is
+about a very special matter.
+
+However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it:
+integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which
+is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because
+what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely
+dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of
+certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as
+secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Q. 123,
+AA. 3, 6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance.
+Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first
+regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind
+ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions _confidence,_ of
+which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "with this the mind is much
+assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings." The
+second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not
+failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect
+Tully mentions _magnificence,_ which he describes as being "the
+discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and
+lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind,"
+so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if
+these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to
+dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because
+without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred
+to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues
+specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as
+secondary virtues to principal: thus _magnificence_ is referred by
+the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and _magnanimity,_
+which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two
+things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance.
+The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away
+from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In
+this respect he mentions _patience,_ which he describes as "the
+voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for
+the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that by the prolonged
+suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage,
+according to Heb. 12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in your
+minds." In this respect he mentions _perseverance,_ which accordingly
+he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well
+considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter of
+fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be
+referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from
+fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain
+greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is
+the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by
+fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a
+theological virtue, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 5; I-II, Q. 62, A. 3).
+But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man
+hopes in himself, yet under God withal.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve danger,
+since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although
+magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or
+venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection
+with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which
+fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other
+hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue
+annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an
+integral part thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed
+unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is
+reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the
+Article.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by
+Tully, namely _confidence, magnificence, forbearance,_ which he puts
+in the place of patience, and _firmness,_ which he substitutes for
+perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely _magnanimity_
+and _security,_ are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence.
+But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence
+denotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything
+presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire,
+and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above (I-II,
+Q. 40, A. 2) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped
+for.
+
+A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of
+hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped
+for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for
+sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope
+is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat
+contrary to hope, as stated above, (I-II, Q. 40, A. 4, ad 1). Hence
+Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely
+constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in
+performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind.
+For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in
+accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in
+the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may
+be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and
+constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles.
+
+Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as
+the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions _perseverance_
+and _magnificence,_ and with Macrobius, _magnanimity. Strength of
+will_ is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that
+"strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what
+ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be
+endured"--i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he
+defines it as "strength of soul in the accomplishment of its
+purpose." Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says
+that "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue."
+Besides magnificence he mentions _andragathia_, i.e. manly goodness
+which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence consists not
+only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which
+belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence
+and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to
+_andragathia_, strenuousness: wherefore he says that _andragathia_ is
+the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.
+
+Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the
+four principal parts mentioned by Tully.
+
+Reply Obj. 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true
+notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude,
+they differ as to motive, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 1, ad 2);
+wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 129
+
+OF MAGNANIMITY*
+[*Not in the ordinary restricted sense but as explained by the author]
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including,
+however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the
+exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity,
+of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider
+(1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance.
+As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its
+contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?
+
+(2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors?
+
+(3) Whether it is a virtue?
+
+(4) Whether it is a special virtue?
+
+(5) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
+
+(6) Of its relation to confidence;
+
+(7) Of its relation to assurance;
+
+(8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Magnanimity Is About Honors?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For
+magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows,
+since "magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes
+the irascible part, as appears from _De Anima_ iii, 42, where the
+Philosopher says that "in the sensitive appetite are desire and
+mind," i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a
+concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it
+seems that magnanimity is not about honors.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs
+be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about
+operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows
+that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore
+magnanimity is not about honors.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit
+rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he
+tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring
+honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about
+honors.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that
+"magnanimity is about honor and dishonor."
+
+_I answer that,_ Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching
+forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to
+two things, first to the matter about which is the field of its
+activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use
+of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly
+from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is
+minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two
+ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may
+be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of
+some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good
+use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists
+in the best use of the greatest thing.
+
+The things which come into man's use are external things, and among
+these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin
+to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated
+above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2); and because it is offered to God and to the
+best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid
+shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be
+magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and
+simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that
+are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about
+honors.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard the
+concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is
+added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity
+regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something
+great or difficult.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation,
+yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a
+difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the
+passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope:
+even so, we have stated (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5) with regard to fortitude
+that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of
+fear and daring.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a
+way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too
+great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so
+as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving
+of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a
+man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think
+much of the honor accorded by man.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Magnanimity Is Essentially About Great Honors?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great
+honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated
+above (A. 1). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore
+it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness
+about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either
+great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to
+magnanimity to be about great honor.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is
+dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor,
+and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is
+not only about great honors.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that
+magnanimity is about great honors.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18),
+virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the
+perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that
+power, as stated in _De Coelo_ i, 116. Now the perfection of a power
+is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such
+operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however
+imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it
+is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as
+stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3.
+
+Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act
+of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the
+point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and
+establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this
+difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also
+of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which
+may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which
+moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards
+chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions,
+because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv,
+4).
+
+Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness
+of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases
+from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are
+the objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great
+power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive
+appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to
+reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions
+regard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is
+about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence
+of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest
+anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of
+resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that
+are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of
+money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not
+only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also
+about that which is ordinary or little: because things external,
+though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for
+human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two
+virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely
+liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely
+"magnificence."
+
+In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary
+honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes,
+which are _philotimia_, i.e. love of honor, and _aphilotimia_, i.e.
+without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving
+honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as
+both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great
+honors there is _magnanimity._ Wherefore we must conclude that the
+proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous
+man tends to such things as are deserving of honor.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Great and little are accidental to honor considered in
+itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason,
+the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is
+much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest
+presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any
+need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are
+things existing outside the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more
+able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous
+man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even
+little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot
+sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence
+he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them
+above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are
+ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor,
+but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Magnanimity Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every
+moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean
+but the greater extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself
+worthy of the greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity
+is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But one may have a virtue without having
+magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that
+"whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of
+them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity
+is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). But magnanimity implies certain
+dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of
+"a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his
+utterance calm." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But
+magnanimity is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems
+himself worthy of great things, and despises others," according to
+_Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But
+magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the
+first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is
+remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [*Cf. Q. 113]
+towards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others;
+fifthly, because he holds to the barren things rather than to those
+that are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc.
+15:18): "Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the
+greatness of courage (_animi magnitudinem_) with which they fought
+for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now,
+only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity
+which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding
+the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good.
+Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others,
+as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 11, A. 2, Obj. 3). Therefore
+magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a
+virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "the
+magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes," in so far as he
+tends to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he
+follows the mean," because he tends to the greatest things according
+to reason, for "he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth"
+(Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to
+their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts
+of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming
+to every virtuous man, but only to great men. On the other hand, as
+regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all
+virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in
+the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto.
+Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not
+competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed
+to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his
+state.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The movements of the body are differentiated according
+to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it
+happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by
+way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man
+being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish,
+whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few
+and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement.
+Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who
+are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the
+magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these
+dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man
+according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are
+naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found
+naturally.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: There is in man something great which he possesses
+through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him
+through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man
+deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he
+holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue,
+magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same
+is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or
+external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think
+little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and
+magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from
+God's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do
+anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and
+esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's
+gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. 14:4): "In
+his sight a vile person is contemned [*Douay: 'The malignant is
+brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the
+contempt of magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear the Lord,"
+which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore
+evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one
+another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because
+they proceed according to different considerations.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: These properties in so far as they belong to a
+magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in
+the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful
+of those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact
+that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he
+repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of
+gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the
+acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he
+is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what
+becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of
+works, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is
+also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to
+truth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not
+true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he
+does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number
+of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. iv, 3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards
+persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle
+class." In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with
+others: this means that he is not at home with others than his
+friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which
+belong to littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great
+and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also
+said, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any,
+but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to
+the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to
+supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Magnanimity Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For
+no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher
+states (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs
+to the magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to
+any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to
+the magnanimous man. For it is stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3 that "it
+belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which is an act of
+prudence), "nor to act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that
+he is ready to do favors" (which is an act of charity), "that he
+gives his services readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he
+is truthful" (which is an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not
+given to complaining" (which is an act of patience). Therefore
+magnanimity is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul,
+according to the saying of Isa. 61:10, "He hath clothed me with the
+garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride
+adorned with her jewels." But magnanimity is the ornament of all the
+virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general
+virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it
+from the other virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2), it belongs to a
+special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate
+matter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a
+determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above (AA. 1, 2): and
+honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly
+magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue.
+
+Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above
+(Q. 103, A. 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it
+regards all the virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great
+honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a
+great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on
+doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to
+what is worthy of great honors.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows
+that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence,
+and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a
+man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself
+ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other
+virtues. On the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man
+thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their
+sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again,
+all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be
+the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes
+a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external
+evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids
+under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his
+excellence or greatness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster
+or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment
+results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through
+magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in _Ethic._
+iv, 3.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Magnanimity Is a Part of Fortitude?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.
+For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be
+the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If
+magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou
+shalt live in great assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a
+man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far
+removed from deception." Therefore magnanimity is not a part of
+fortitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a
+magnanimous man is not _philokindynos_, that is, a lover of danger.
+But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore
+magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a
+part thereof.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped
+for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or
+dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is
+a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part
+thereof.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon
+magnanimity as a part of fortitude.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 3), a principal
+virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of
+virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue
+is firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every
+virtue," according to _Ethic._ ii. And this is chiefly commended in
+those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most
+difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to
+stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the
+virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.
+
+Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein
+fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the
+greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as
+man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of
+death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity
+agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult
+matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind
+about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity
+is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as
+secondary to principal.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1, 3), "to lack evil
+is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous
+evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were
+the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and
+the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity
+may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference
+as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it
+follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to
+all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks
+"many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a
+magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for
+the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that
+are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to
+danger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even
+as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not _mikrokindynos_, i.e.
+endangering himself for small things, but _megalokindynos_, i.e.
+endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De Quat.
+Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers
+like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes
+the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to
+withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer
+an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be
+desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to
+wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires
+it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than
+that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things
+is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good
+things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue
+of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil,
+evil is of more import in this particular respect.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Confidence Belongs to Magnanimity?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity.
+For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in
+another, according to 2 Cor. 3:4, 5, "Such confidence we have,
+through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think
+anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." But this seems inconsistent
+with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to
+magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to
+Isa. 12:2, "I will deal confidently and will not fear." But to be
+without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also
+belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is
+due to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we
+are the house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of
+hope unto the end." Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from
+magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius
+enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute
+confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question
+(ad 6) and in the prologue to this.
+
+_I answer that,_ Confidence takes its name from "fides" (faith): and
+it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But
+confidence belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, "Thou shalt have
+confidence, hope being set before thee." Wherefore confidence
+apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing
+the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith
+signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come to have a
+strong opinion about something, not only on account of another's
+statement, but also on account of something we observe in another, it
+follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something,
+which hope we conceive through observing something either in
+oneself--for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is
+confident that he will live long. Or in another, for instance,
+through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man
+is confident that he will receive help from him.
+
+Now it has been stated above (A. 1, ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly
+about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence
+denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation
+which gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good,
+it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to
+the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the
+deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a
+man, hence he adds "or scarcely anything." For it surpasses man to
+need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine
+assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a
+social animal, for he is [not] sufficient by himself to provide for
+his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs
+to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a
+point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who
+are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own ability
+goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 4),
+when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to
+despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely good.
+But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because
+the latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain
+strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is.
+Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of
+evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it
+follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than
+to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to
+fortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to
+fortitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of
+hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now
+the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the
+act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it
+to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking,
+confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the
+conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the
+parts of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified
+with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral
+part, as stated in the preceding Question.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Security Belongs to Magnanimity?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity.
+For security, as stated above (Q. 128, ad 6), denotes freedom from
+the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively.
+Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude
+does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case.
+Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be
+secure because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary to
+virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim.
+2:15, "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God."
+Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great
+things in all the virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is
+accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14, 18, "If thou
+wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being
+buried thou shalt sleep secure." Therefore security does not belong
+to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading:
+"Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity
+to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune."
+But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to
+magnanimity.
+
+_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a
+man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he
+fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of
+which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom
+of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope.
+Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly
+regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to
+magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.
+
+It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so
+is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating
+of the passion (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2). Wherefore as confidence belongs
+indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so
+security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes
+despair.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes
+fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of
+mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same
+as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one
+puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not
+fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and
+participation of, future happiness, as stated above (I-II, Q. 5, AA.
+3, 7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a
+condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's
+reward.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Goods of Fortune Conduce to Magnanimity?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to
+magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi):
+"virtue suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue
+great, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do
+not conduce to magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But
+the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune:
+for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists
+of two things," that "a great soul is commended for despising
+external things." Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods
+of fortune.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a great
+soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his
+natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle
+says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at
+misfortune." Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of
+fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him.
+Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good
+fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), magnanimity regards two
+things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something
+great as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things.
+For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise,
+but also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the
+highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those
+who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful
+organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily
+accomplish things by means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is
+evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it
+can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order
+to act more expeditiously.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch
+as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything
+unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he
+esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither
+very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it.
+Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external
+goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them
+if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 130
+
+OF PRESUMPTION
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the
+first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are
+three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we
+shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of
+deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether presumption is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 130, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Presumption Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle
+says: "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg.:
+'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before." But it
+seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above
+oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) "we should not
+listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because
+we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should
+relish those that make us immortal": and (Metaph. i) "that man should
+pursue divine things as far as possible." Now divine and immortal
+things are seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists
+essentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that
+presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): "Not that we are
+sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." If then
+presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not
+sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of
+anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 37:3): "O wicked
+presumption, whence camest thou?" and a gloss answers: "From a
+creature's evil will." Now all that comes of the root of an evil will
+is a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by
+the Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is
+done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order
+established in general throughout natural things is vicious and
+sinful. Now it is established throughout all natural things, that
+every action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does
+any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is
+vicious and sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that any
+one should assume to do what is above his power: and this is what is
+meant by presumption, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident
+that presumption is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: [A thing may be] above the active power of a natural
+thing, and yet not above the passive power of that same thing: thus
+the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be
+so changed as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which
+surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and
+presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue to
+attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect
+virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to
+advance towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched
+himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually
+advancing forward.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the
+order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely the
+intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. In
+this respect the Philosopher says that "man ought to pursue immortal
+and divine things," not that he should do what it becomes God to do,
+but that he should be united to Him in intellect and will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "what we can
+do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense." Hence
+since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not
+altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man
+to attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be
+presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in
+God's assistance.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 130, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Presumption Is Opposed to Magnanimity by Excess?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity
+by excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against
+the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 21, A. 1). But the
+sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to
+charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem
+oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous
+even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his
+ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as
+little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "on
+account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong
+others, because they deem external goods as something great."
+Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but
+only by deficiency.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that
+the "vain man," i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a
+presumptuous man, "is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1), magnanimity
+observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it
+tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to
+anything greater than is becoming to us.
+
+Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not
+exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he
+does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous
+man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is
+opposed to magnanimity by excess.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin
+against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine
+justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter
+kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it
+implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or
+rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in
+so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability,
+it can be opposed to magnanimity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to
+something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man
+presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If,
+however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption
+is not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about
+ordinary honor, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so
+far as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may err
+in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he
+has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly,
+as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and
+worthy of great things, by reason of something that does not make him
+so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For, as the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things without
+virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor
+are rightly called magnanimous."
+
+Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his
+ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the
+case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has
+exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not
+simply, but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly
+clothes, despising and wronging others. This savors of an excess of
+magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca
+says (De Quat. Virtut.) that "when magnanimity exceeds its measure,
+it makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on
+excelling in all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any
+considerations of virtue." Thus it is evident that the presumptuous
+man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although in
+appearance he surpasses him.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 131
+
+OF AMBITION
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 131, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Ambition Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition
+denotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and
+the greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for
+honor are reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it
+something deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably
+desired.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him
+as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher
+states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor
+is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which heartens a man to do good and disheartens
+him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men to do good
+and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that
+"with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave in
+honor": and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "honor fosters the
+arts." Therefore ambition is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 13:5) that "charity is not
+ambitious, seeketh not her own." Now nothing is contrary to charity,
+except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2), honor denotes
+reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two
+things have to be considered with regard to man's honor. The first is
+that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for
+this is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count
+honor is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point
+that calls for observation is that the thing in which man excels is
+given to him by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a
+man ought so far to be pleased that others bear witness to his
+excellence, as this enables him to profit others.
+
+Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when
+a man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is
+to desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires
+honor for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's
+appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of
+others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is
+evident that it is always a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The desire for good should be regulated according to
+reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it
+is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now
+those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason's
+dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the
+virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward:
+since the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue.
+But it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have
+nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which
+honor derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to
+virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as
+stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened
+from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be desired in due
+measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an
+occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man cares not by what
+means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that "the
+good as well as the wicked covet honors for themselves, but the one,"
+i.e. the good, "go about it in the right way," whereas "the other,"
+i.e. the wicked, "through lack of the good arts, make use of deceit
+and falsehood." Yet they who, merely for the sake of honor, either do
+good or avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher
+(Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they who do brave things for the
+sake of honor are not truly brave.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 131, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Ambition Is Opposed to Magnanimity by Excess?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by
+excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one
+side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated
+above (Q. 130, A. 2). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by
+excess.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition seems
+to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Macc. 4:7) that
+"Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood." Therefore ambition is
+not opposed to magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is
+written (Acts 25:27) that "Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great
+pomp (_ambitione_) . . . had entered into the hall of audience"
+[*'Praetorium.' The Vulgate has 'auditorium,' but the meaning is
+the same], and (2 Para. 16:14) that when Asa died they "burned spices
+and . . . ointments over his body" with very great pomp (_ambitione_).
+But magnanimity is not about outward show. Therefore ambition is not
+opposed to magnanimity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) that "the more a man
+exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate
+others." But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an
+excess of magnanimity.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), ambition signifies
+inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes
+use of them in a becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that
+ambition is opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is
+well ordered.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its
+end, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man
+attempts in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is
+opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man
+attempts great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that
+magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes
+right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by
+excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various
+respects.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Honor is due to those who are in a position of dignity,
+on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and accordingly
+inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition. For
+if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity,
+not for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a
+dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious but
+presumptuous.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of
+honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is
+signified by the words of James 2:2, 3: "If there shall come into
+your assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and
+you . . . shall say to him: Sit thou here well," etc. Wherefore
+ambition does not regard outward worship, except in so far as this
+is a kind of honor.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 132
+
+OF VAINGLORY
+(In Five Articles)
+
+We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether desire of glory is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity?
+
+(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(4) Whether it is a capital vice?
+
+(5) Of its daughters.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Desire of Glory Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no
+one sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (Eph.
+5:1): "Be ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children." Now by
+seeking glory man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men:
+wherefore it is written (Isa. 43:6, 7): "Bring My sons from afar, and
+My daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth
+on My name, I have created him for My glory." Therefore the desire
+for glory is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which incites a man to do good is apparently
+not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully
+says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "glory inflames every man to strive
+his utmost": and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works,
+according to Rom. 2:7: "To them, indeed, who according to patience in
+good work . . . glory and honor" [*Vulg.: 'Who will render to every
+man according to his works, to them indeed who . . . seek glory and
+honor and incorruption, eternal life.']. Therefore the desire for
+glory is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is
+"consistent good report about a person, together with praise": and
+this comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii),
+viz. that glory is, "as it were, clear knowledge with praise." Now it
+is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to
+call for praise, according to Ecclus. 41:15, "Take care of a good
+name," and Rom. 12:17, "Providing good things not only in the sight
+of God, but also in the sight of all men." Therefore the desire of
+vainglory is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): "He is better
+advised who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful."
+
+_I answer that,_ Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore
+Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that to be
+"glorified is the same as to be clarified." Now clarity and
+comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word glory properly
+denotes the display of something as regards its seeming comely in the
+sight of men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since,
+however, that which is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those
+who are far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes
+that somebody's good is known and approved by many, according to the
+saying of Sallust (Catilin.) [*The quotation is from Livy: Hist.,
+Lib. XXII C, 39]: "I must not boast while I am addressing one man."
+
+But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only
+consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few,
+or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good
+as being worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve
+one's own good: for it is written (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have
+received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God
+that we may know the things that are given us from God." Likewise it
+is not a sin to be willing to approve one's own good works: for it is
+written (Matt. 5:16): "Let your light shine before men." Hence the
+desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin: but the desire
+for empty or vain glory denotes a sin: for it is sinful to desire
+anything vain, according to Ps. 4:3, "Why do you love vanity, and
+seek after lying?"
+
+Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the
+thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that
+which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for
+something frail and perishable: secondly, on the part of him from
+whom he seeks glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain:
+thirdly, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he
+does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as
+God's honor, or the spiritual welfare of his neighbor.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says on John 13:13, "You call Me Master
+and Lord; and you say well" (Tract. lviii in Joan.):
+"Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of
+pride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself,
+does not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not His:
+nor does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows." It
+is therefore evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but
+for ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the
+good of others, according to Matt. 5:16, "That they may see your good
+works, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That which we receive from God is not vain but true
+glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works,
+and of which it is written (2 Cor. 10:17, 18): "He that glorieth let
+him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved,
+but he whom God commendeth." It is true that some are heartened to do
+works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the
+desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does
+virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (De
+Civ. Dei v).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is requisite for man's perfection that he should
+know himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it
+is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being
+useful for something, either in order that God may be glorified by
+men, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to
+be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testimony of
+others' praise the good which is in him, may himself strive to
+persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is
+praiseworthy that a man should "take care of his good name," and that
+he should "provide good things in the sight of God and men": but not
+that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Vainglory Is Opposed to Magnanimity?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
+For, as stated above (A. 1), vainglory consists in glorying in things
+that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and
+perishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the
+testimony of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to
+imprudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanimity.
+Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to
+magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with
+vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way
+presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above
+(Q. 130, A. 2; Q. 131, A. 2): and these differ from vainglory.
+Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, "Let nothing be done through
+contention, neither by vainglory," says: "Some among them were given
+to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for the
+sake of vainglory." But contention [*Cf. Q. 38] is not opposed to
+magnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading,
+"Magnanimity consists in two things": "We should beware of the desire
+for glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should
+ever strive to keep untrammeled." Therefore it is opposed to
+magnanimity.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), glory is an
+effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is
+praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the
+knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated
+above (Q. 129, AA. 1, 2), it follows that it also is about glory:
+seeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory
+in moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly
+opposed to magnanimity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To think so much of little things as to glory in them
+is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the
+magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him.
+In like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for
+honor's sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent
+with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is
+said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth
+than for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man
+to glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this
+something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic.
+iv), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon
+little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from
+being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth fall
+short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the
+magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply.
+But if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man
+by way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great
+in his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 127, A. 2, ad 2), the opposition of
+vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless contention, if
+done intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no one contends
+save for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+iv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not contentious, because nothing
+is great in his estimation.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Vainglory Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing
+precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory
+precludes the eternal reward: for it is written (Matt. 6:1): "Take
+heed, that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them:
+otherwise you shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in
+heaven." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper
+to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man appropriates
+to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written (Isa.
+42:8): "I will not give My glory to another," and (1 Tim. 1:17): "To
+. . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore vainglory is a
+mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous
+and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a gloss of
+Augustine on 1 Thess. 2:4, "God, Who proveth our hearts," says:
+"Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not
+perceive its baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to
+desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to
+take pleasure in it, when it is given." Chrysostom also says (Hom.
+xix in Matth.) that "vainglory enters secretly, and robs us
+insensibly of all our inward possessions." Therefore vainglory is a
+mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus
+Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "while
+other vices find their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory
+finds a place even in the servants of Christ." Yet in the latter
+there is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; Q. 110, A. 4; Q. 112,
+A. 2), a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin
+of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be contrary to
+charity as regards the love of one's neighbor: yet as regards the
+love of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by
+reason of the matter about which one glories: for instance when one
+glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe
+God, according to Ezech. 28:2, "Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast
+said: I am God," and 1 Cor. 4:7, "What hast thou that thou hast not
+received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou
+hadst not received it?" Or again when a man prefers to God the
+temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jer. 9:23,
+24): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the
+strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in
+his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he
+understandeth and knoweth Me." Or again when a man prefers the
+testimony of man to God's; thus it is written in reproval of certain
+people (John 12:43): "For they loved the glory of men more than the
+glory of God."
+
+In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of
+the one who glories, in that he refers his intention to glory as his
+last end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in
+order to obtain it, forbears not from doing even that which is
+against God. In this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says
+(De Civ. Dei v, 14) that "this vice," namely the love of human
+praise, "is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory
+more than it fears or loves God, that our Lord said (John 5:44): How
+can you believe, who receive glory one from another, and the glory
+which is from God alone, you do not seek?"
+
+If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not
+inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter gloried in,
+nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal
+but a venial sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: wherefore a
+virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it be done
+for the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal
+sin. On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply
+through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is
+a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, desires
+the excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to God
+alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not only on
+account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to grave
+sins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too
+self-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward
+goods.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Vainglory Is a Capital Vice?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a
+vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital.
+But vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a
+capital vice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for
+this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor
+is not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But
+vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it
+is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good,
+since human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something
+outside man himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the
+seven capital vices.
+
+_I answer that,_ The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For
+some reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place
+vainglory among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi),
+reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which
+is the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice:
+and not without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on (Q.
+152, AA. 1, 2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever
+good one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence
+therefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of
+pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over
+the other vices, and ought not to be reckoned among the special
+sources of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that
+are the means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most
+conducive to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of
+a man's goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all.
+Wherefore, just as by the glory which is in God's sight man acquires
+honor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of
+man he acquires excellence in human things. Hence on account of its
+close connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it
+follows that it is most desirable. And since many vices arise from
+the inordinate desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital
+vice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from
+pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and I-II, Q.
+84, A. 2) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Praise and honor, as stated above (A. 2), stand in
+relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory
+is compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man loves to
+be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain
+renown in the knowledge of others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of
+desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to
+be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital
+vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin,
+inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Daughters of Vainglory Are Suitably Reckoned to Be
+Disobedience, Boastfulness, Hypocrisy, Contention, Obstinacy,
+Discord, and Love of Novelties?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably
+reckoned to be "disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention,
+obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [*_Praesumptio novitatum,_
+literally 'presumption of novelties']." For according to Gregory
+(Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride.
+Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way
+about, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should
+not be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome
+chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with
+vainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of
+vainglory.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory
+is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet
+this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men.
+Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter
+of vainglory.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who
+there assigns the above daughters to vainglory.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 34, A. 5; Q. 35, A. 4; I-II, Q.
+84, AA. 3, 4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be
+directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its
+daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own
+excellence, as stated above (AA. 1, 4): and to this end a man may
+tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is
+boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for
+astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at
+most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a man
+strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not
+inferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the
+intellect, and thus we have _obstinacy,_ by which a man is too much
+attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is
+better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have _discord,_
+whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with
+others. Thirdly, as regards _speech,_ and then we have _contention,_
+whereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards
+deeds, and this is _disobedience,_ whereby a man refuses to carry out
+the command of his superiors.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 112, A. 1, ad 2), boasting is
+reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is
+arrogance: but outward boasting, according to _Ethic._ iv, is
+directed sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and
+thus it is the result of vainglory.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Anger is not the cause of discord and contention,
+except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a
+glorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory is reproved in connection with almsdeeds on
+account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory
+to the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the
+sake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to give
+alms as though this were something novel.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 133
+
+OF PUSILLANIMITY
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin?
+
+(2) To what virtue is it opposed?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 133, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Pusillanimity Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin
+makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a
+fainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
+Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a
+fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet
+does not deem himself worthy of them." Now no one is worthy of great
+goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says
+(Ethic. iv, 3), "none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor."
+Therefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently
+pusillanimity is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (Ecclus. 10:15).
+But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man
+sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws
+from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he who
+deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted."
+Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for
+instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose
+them for, which they both humbly declined (Ex. 3:11; Jer. 1:6).
+Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save
+sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Col.
+3:21): "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they
+be discouraged." Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a
+sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a
+natural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with
+its power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or
+inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is
+proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so
+pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his
+power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto.
+Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is
+that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received
+from his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear,
+was punished by his master (Matt. 25; Luke 19).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their
+neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil,
+because he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what
+might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if
+"they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged
+strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they
+might have done had they been less retiring."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from
+sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with
+loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a
+man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing
+certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through
+not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially,
+sometimes mortally.
+
+Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great
+things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he
+derives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or
+from external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for
+virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of
+pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion,
+whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he
+is competent. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:16): "The sluggard is
+wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences." For
+nothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and
+having a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says
+(Pastoral. i) of Moses that "perchance he would have been proud, had
+he undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without misgiving:
+and again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the
+command of his Creator."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which
+they were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine grace:
+yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness,
+demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 133, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Pusillanimity Is Opposed to Magnanimity?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to
+magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that "the
+fainthearted man knows not himself: for he would desire the good
+things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself." Now ignorance of
+self seems opposed to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to
+prudence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who
+through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be
+slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of
+prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore pusillanimity is
+not opposed to magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear:
+hence it is written (Isa. 35:4): "Say to the fainthearted: Take
+courage and fear not." It also seems to proceed from inordinate
+anger, according to Col. 3:21, "Fathers, provoke not your children to
+indignation, lest they be discouraged." Now inordinate fear is
+opposed to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore
+pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular
+virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that
+virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption
+is. Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows
+that it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary
+to the saying of Ecclus. 37:3, "O wicked presumption, whence camest
+thou?" Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness
+and littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and
+little are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to
+magnanimity.
+
+_I answer that,_ Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways.
+First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it
+is opposed to magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little
+differ in connection with the same subject. For just as the
+magnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so
+the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of
+soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which
+on the part of the intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification,
+and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one
+falsely deems to exceed one's ability. Thirdly, it may be considered
+in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from the great things
+of which one is worthy. But, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 2, ad 3),
+opposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective
+species than on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is
+directly opposed to magnanimity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding
+from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it
+is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because
+ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but from
+laziness in considering one's own ability, according to _Ethic._ iv,
+3, or in accomplishing what is within one's power.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of
+view of its effect.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor
+is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers of
+death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that
+pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we
+consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is
+roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which
+disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however,
+we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby
+the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to
+pusillanimity.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: According to its proper species pusillanimity is a
+graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good
+things, which is a very great evil according to _Ethic._ iv.
+Presumption, however, is stated to be "wicked" on account of pride
+whence it proceeds.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 134
+
+OF MAGNIFICENCE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With
+regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
+
+(3) What is its matter?
+
+(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Magnificence Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever
+has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A.
+1). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence:
+because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "not every liberal
+man is magnificent." Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to
+_Ethic._ ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean,
+for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now "great" and "little" are
+opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is "equal," as
+stated in _Metaph._ x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but
+the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but
+on the contrary perfects it, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 2; Q. 117,
+A. 1, Obj. 1). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the
+"magnificent man is not lavish towards himself": and this is opposed
+to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore
+magnificence is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) "act is
+right reason about things to be made." Now magnificence is about
+things to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence = _magna
+facere_--i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an act rather
+than a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Human virtue is a participation of Divine power.
+But magnificence (_virtutis_) belongs to Divine power, according to
+Ps. 47:35: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds."
+Therefore magnificence is a virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to _De Coelo_ i, 16, "we speak of virtue
+in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards
+the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very
+nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something
+great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the
+very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his
+actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent
+deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence,
+either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as
+explained above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), as also (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1)
+when we were treating of the connection of virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if
+we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean,
+if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of
+nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But
+that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that
+which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at
+large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to
+be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good,
+but because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything
+regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man
+accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done
+once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting
+nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with
+a suitable dwelling, as stated in _Ethic._ iv.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there must
+needs be a virtue of act," i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appetite
+is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what
+magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Magnificence Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For
+magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it
+may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be
+great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance,
+for he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is
+not a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as
+that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to
+something great, as stated above (Q. 129, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it
+belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore
+magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is
+written (Ex. 15:11): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness,"
+and (Ps. 95:6): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His
+sanctuary." Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above (Q.
+81, A. 8). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion.
+Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons it with other special
+virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).
+
+_I answer that,_ It belongs to magnificence to do (_facere_)
+something great, as its name implies [* magnificence = _magna
+facere_--i.e. to make great things]. Now _facere_ may be taken in two
+ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly _facere_
+means to work something in external matter, for instance to make a
+house, or something of the kind; in a broad sense _facere_ is
+employed to denote any action, whether it passes into external
+matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand
+or will.
+
+Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something
+great, the doing (_factio_) being understood in the strict sense, it
+is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in
+the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of
+goodness, namely that the work produced (_factum_) by the act is
+something great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is
+what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.
+
+If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing
+something great, the doing (_facere_) being understood in a broad
+sense, it is not a special virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something
+great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" (_facere_) be taken in
+the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper
+to magnificence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something
+great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by
+making (_faciendo_), or by any kind of action, as stated in _Ethic._
+iv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole
+aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect,
+do something great, direct their principal intention, not to
+something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the
+greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the
+greatness of the virtue.
+
+On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do
+something great, "doing" (_facere_) being taken in the strict sense,
+but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence
+Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing
+and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain
+broad and noble purpose of mind," "discussion" referring to the
+inward intention, and "administration" to the outward accomplishment.
+Wherefore just as magnanimity intends something great in every
+matter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that
+can be produced in external matter (_factibili_).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The intention of magnificence is the production
+of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no
+end of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore
+magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine
+honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most
+commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine
+sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this
+reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect
+is directed to religion or holiness.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Matter of Magnificence Is Great Expenditure?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great
+expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But
+liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2).
+Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv, 2).
+But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.
+Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but
+about gifts.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external
+work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing
+an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending
+presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of
+magnificence.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But
+the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues do
+not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for
+themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore
+magnificence is not about great expenditure.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that
+"magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions
+in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality
+in scale." Therefore it is only about great expenditure.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it belongs to magnificence
+to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work,
+proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be
+produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence
+to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in
+becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that
+"a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal,"
+i.e. proportionate, "expenditure." Now expenditure is the outlay of a
+sum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he
+love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to
+be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to
+produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in
+going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love
+the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 129, A. 2), those virtues that are
+about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from
+the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned,
+and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that
+same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and
+its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in
+general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the
+use of money.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and
+the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man,
+inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of
+money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and
+expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love
+of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the
+magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be
+produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as
+stated in _Ethic._ iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but
+rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of
+some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do
+something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he
+brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a
+virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man
+may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments
+to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot
+accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great
+simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are
+great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in
+itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its
+genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher
+says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Magnificence Is a Part of Fortitude?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude.
+For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above
+(A. 3). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice.
+Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But
+magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with
+expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems
+to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to
+fortitude.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the
+magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more in
+common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence
+should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De
+Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of
+fortitude.
+
+_I answer that,_ Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue,
+cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not
+agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a
+part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.
+
+In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things
+are necessary, as stated above (Q. 80). The one is that the secondary
+virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some
+respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with
+fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous
+and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is
+seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls
+short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude
+tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person,
+whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its
+difficulty from the dispossession of one's property, which is of much
+less account than danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is
+accounted a part of fortitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed
+under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence
+regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul,
+albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in
+reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the
+concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving
+and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the
+other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by
+attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in
+a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence,
+like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in
+matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it
+tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as
+fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something great,
+as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the
+reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason
+by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand.
+This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both
+those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would
+incur the risk of a great loss.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 135
+
+OF MEANNESS*
+(In Two Articles)
+[*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just as "magnificentia" is
+doing great things.]
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which
+head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether meanness is a vice?
+
+(2) Of the vice opposed to it.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 135, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Meanness Is a Vice?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice
+moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore
+both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But
+magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue
+rather than a vice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful
+reckoning is mean." But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy,
+since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius
+states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean man
+is loth to spend money." But this belongs to covetousness or
+illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the
+others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a
+special vice opposed to magnificence.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6),
+moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases
+they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be
+mean (_parvificus_) because he intends to do something little
+(_parvum_). Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad
+aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a
+mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in
+relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in
+two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in
+another as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man
+intends principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he
+intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so
+that he may produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. iv, 4) that "the magnificent man with equal expenditure will
+produce a more magnificent result." On the other hand, the mean man
+intends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. iv, 2) that "he seeks how he may spend least." As a result of
+this he intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink
+from producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore
+the Philosopher says that "the mean man after going to great expense
+forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he
+is unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man
+fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between
+expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in
+failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest
+that meanness is a vice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule
+of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the
+Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but
+for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little
+things: hence meanness is a vice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes us
+take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings,
+because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in
+things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but
+sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his
+affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of
+his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the
+liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure, so
+too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth
+and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards
+ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which
+is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore meanness is less sinful
+than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that
+"although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not
+bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm one's neighbor, nor
+are they very disgraceful."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 135, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Is a Vice Opposed to Meanness?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For
+great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a
+virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated
+above (A. 1), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it
+would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much,
+where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to
+spend much, according to _Ethic._ iv, 2, and thus they have something
+of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as
+stated above (A. 1). Now those who spend excessively, do so in order
+to make a show of their wealth, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 2. But this
+belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated
+above (Q. 131, A. 2). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of the Philosopher who
+(Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two
+opposite vices.
+
+_I answer that,_ Great is opposed to little. Also little and great
+are relative terms, as stated above (A. 1). Now just as expenditure
+may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in
+comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which
+reason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is
+manifest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend
+less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion
+between his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it,
+whereby a man exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is
+proportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek _banausia_,
+so called from the Greek _baunos_, because, like the fire in the
+furnace, it consumes everything. It is also called _apyrokalia_, i.e.
+lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but not for a
+good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called _consumptio_ (waste).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but
+not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this
+belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which
+observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice
+of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the
+value of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend
+little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great
+work, which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far as
+when it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species
+of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas meanness
+falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being directed to
+the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 136
+
+OF PATIENCE
+(In Five Articles)
+
+We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether patience is a virtue?
+
+(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?
+
+(3) Whether it can be had without grace?
+
+(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
+
+(5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Patience Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues
+are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet
+patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there,
+according to Isa. 49:10 and Apoc. 7:16, "They shall not hunger nor
+thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them." Therefore
+patience is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue
+it is "that makes its possessor good." Yet patience is sometimes
+found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many
+evils patiently that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16,
+"All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares,
+and in misery and in sorrow." Therefore patience is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 70, A. 1, ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits
+(Gal. 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Patientia i): "The virtue of
+the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we
+even preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 1), the moral virtues
+are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of
+reason against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions
+sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor.
+7:10, "The sorrow of the world worketh death," and Ecclus. 30:25,
+"Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it." Hence the
+necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against
+sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does.
+Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia ii): "A man's patience it is
+whereby he bears evil with an equal mind," i.e. without being
+disturbed by sorrow, "lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods
+whereby he may advance to better things." It is therefore evident
+that patience is a virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards
+the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the
+goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they
+will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven.
+Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling
+and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain
+in the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of
+patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in
+enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that "patience itself will not be in
+heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils have to be
+borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) "properly
+speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without
+inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those
+who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither
+marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may
+marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them
+patient."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 11, A. 1), the very notion of
+fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in
+themselves, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8. Now the names of the virtues
+are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit
+is a virtue, but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is
+reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the
+mind from being overcome by sorrow.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Patience Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues.
+For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now
+"patience hath a perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the
+greatest of the virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the
+soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written
+(Luke 21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls."
+Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of
+other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom.
+xxxv in Evang.) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the
+virtues." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is not reckoned among the four virtues which
+Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call
+principal.
+
+_I answer that,_ Virtues by their very nature are directed to good.
+For it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the
+latter's work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's
+superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater
+according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly.
+Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more
+directly to good than those which are a check on the things which
+lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective
+of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good
+(thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than prudence and
+justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw
+man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a
+greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is
+fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is
+concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship,
+which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the
+greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological
+virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in
+good, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from
+greater obstacles to good.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing
+hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by
+patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness;
+thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust
+injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle
+is the most perfect.
+
+Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect,
+that it is more perfect simply.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man
+is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by
+the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the
+soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all
+the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but
+merely because it removes their obstacles.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 3]
+
+Whether It Is Possible to Have Patience Without Grace?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without
+grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it
+possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more
+reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of
+evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and
+without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that
+"men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they
+love sinfully." Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without
+the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to
+be truly patient.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more
+abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some
+heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than
+betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be
+truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have
+patience without the help of grace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much
+trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the
+health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health.
+Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure
+many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly
+patient.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i.e. from
+God, "is my patience."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength
+of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly
+undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which
+gives pleasure." The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of
+themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose
+to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end.
+Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing
+to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the
+privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the
+fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the
+loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which
+loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a
+virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is
+patient."
+
+But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through
+grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in
+our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is
+clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature
+in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of
+concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is
+more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the
+concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the
+sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason:
+and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. I-II, Q. 61, A. 5] is
+commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can
+tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without
+the help of God's grace [*Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 2]. On the other hand,
+the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto
+by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man
+bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man
+naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between
+this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Patience Is a Part of Fortitude?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a
+thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as
+fortitude: because, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 6), the proper act of
+fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is
+stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from St.
+Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that "patience consists in enduring
+evils inflicted by others." Therefore patience is not a part of
+fortitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above
+(Q. 123, A. 3), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems
+to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the
+concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of
+temperance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if
+patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without
+patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently,
+but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience
+is not a part of fortitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
+fortitude.
+
+_I answer that,_ Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude,
+because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For
+it belongs to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils
+inflicted by others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.).
+Now of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most
+difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of
+death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is
+clear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that
+it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore
+patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue,
+for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed,
+but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death:
+whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast
+to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing
+through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the
+latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is
+chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude
+avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to
+be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a
+praiseworthy manner by suffering (_patiendo_) things which hurt him
+here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by
+them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is
+in the concupiscible faculty.
+
+Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because
+the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the
+matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a
+part of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because
+temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures
+of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and
+sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other
+persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows
+besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that
+a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows,
+however great they be.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is
+an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may
+patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from
+this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent
+with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the
+man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily v. in the Opus
+Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Matt.
+4:10, "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient under
+our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked":
+and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that
+"the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the
+commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our
+enemies." But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is
+annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Patience Is the Same As Longanimity?* [*Longsuffering. It is
+necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison
+with magnanimity.]
+
+Objection 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For
+Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God,
+not as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the
+wicked, that they may be converted." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus.
+5:4): "The Most High is a patient rewarder." Therefore it seems that
+patience is the same as longanimity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But
+impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay:
+for one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils.
+Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so
+is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of
+place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of
+time, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct
+from patience.
+
+Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom.
+ii] on Rom. 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and
+patience, and longsuffering?" says: "It seems that longanimity
+differs from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather
+than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while
+those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be
+borne patiently."
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to
+great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something
+a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to
+good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their
+object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in
+common with magnanimity than with patience.
+
+Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two
+reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain
+evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly,
+endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more
+difficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for,
+is of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, "Hope that
+is deferred afflicteth the soul." Hence there may be patience in
+bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly
+longanimity and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so
+far as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards
+longanimity) and the toil which man endures in persistently
+accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered
+under the one aspect of grievous evil.
+
+For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience,
+says that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of
+arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." By
+saying "arduous" he refers to constancy in good; when he says
+"difficult" he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the
+proper object of patience; and by adding "continued" or "long
+lasting," he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in
+common with patience.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though
+distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that
+which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails.
+Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the
+point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time
+coming to us.
+
+We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the
+reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard
+to bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they
+persist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne
+with longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride
+seems to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride
+are stated to be borne with patience.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 137
+
+OF PERSEVERANCE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under
+the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?
+
+(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
+
+(3) Of its relation to constancy;
+
+(4) Whether it needs the help of grace?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Perseverance Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For,
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater
+than perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in
+_Ethic._ iv, 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to Augustine
+(De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority (De
+Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living,
+unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a
+virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should
+persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in
+_Ethic._ ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for
+Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed and
+continued persistence in a well-considered purpose." Therefore
+perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that
+"perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand,
+and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are
+indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to
+omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue
+is about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special
+kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a
+virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts.
+First, from the act's very species, which is considered in respect of
+the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length of time,
+since to persist long in something difficult involves a special
+difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is
+accomplished belongs to a special virtue.
+
+Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for
+the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of
+itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring
+in connection with dangers of death (which also is something
+difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it
+consists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so
+far as necessity requires.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is
+found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to
+endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And
+evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured
+for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is
+not on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise.
+Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures
+of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life:
+such are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long
+endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long
+time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the
+contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these
+passions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one
+who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect
+virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be
+taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something
+imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take
+perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult
+good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even
+if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the
+more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue,
+because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than
+from the aspect of difficulty.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name:
+thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe
+without seeing." Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without
+performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence
+without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the
+habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for
+instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it.
+Accordingly we must reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes
+used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes
+for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of
+perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice
+by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not
+persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the
+work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it
+belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work,
+for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and
+the magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are,
+however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of
+life, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last
+end of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are
+the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished
+until the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of
+perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two
+ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that
+virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end,
+belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this
+as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit
+to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon
+every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to change."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Perseverance Is a Part of Fortitude?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude.
+For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance is
+about pains of touch." But these belong to temperance. Therefore
+perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain
+passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply
+moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the
+more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason.
+Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue,
+but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose
+perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore
+perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal
+virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part
+of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance
+as a part of fortitude.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3,
+4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed
+something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it
+practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most
+difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been
+stated (Q. 123, A. 2) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because
+it observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand
+firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity
+that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance
+of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to
+principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay
+in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise:
+nor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore
+perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal
+virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends
+not only on the matter [*Cf. Q. 136, A. 4, ad 2], but also on the
+mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter.
+Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in
+common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more
+in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the
+difficulty arising from length of time.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks
+(Ethic. vii, 4, 7) does not moderate any passions, but consists
+merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance,
+considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of
+weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like
+fortitude, is in the irascible.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting,
+not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end,
+according to Matt. 24:13, "He that shall persevere to the end, he
+shall be saved." Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance
+for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137. Art. 3]
+
+Whether Constancy Pertains to Perseverance?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to
+perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q.
+137, A. 5): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore
+constancy does not pertain to perseverance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "virtue is about the difficult and the good." Now it
+does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in
+great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy
+pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would
+seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of
+unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i)
+condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates
+perseverance, as stated above (Q. 128, A. 6). Therefore constancy
+does not pertain to perseverance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ One is said to be constant because one stands to a
+thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as
+appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy
+belongs to perseverance.
+
+_I answer that,_ Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it
+belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to
+those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the
+virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good,
+against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the
+act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against
+difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence
+perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude,
+because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more
+intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external
+obstacles.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are
+especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as
+stated above (Q. 136, A. 1). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance
+as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which
+occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: wherefore
+constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in
+little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length
+of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which
+magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which
+perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has
+something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the
+point of their difference, as stated in the Article.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Perseverance Needs the Help of Grace?
+[*Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 10]
+
+Objection 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of
+grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Now
+according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner
+of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for
+perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the harm
+brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now "before
+sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had
+received," as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more
+therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ,
+persevere without the help of a further grace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds
+of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis. 5:7):
+"We . . . have walked through hard ways." Now some persevere in
+sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also
+persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Persev. i): "We hold that
+perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in
+Christ."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2; A. 2, ad 3),
+perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit
+of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the
+gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly,
+it may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until
+death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also
+the gratuitous help of God sustaining man in good until the end of
+life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 109, A. 10), when we were treating of
+grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature,
+which changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace
+bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the
+free-will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good,
+though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our
+power to choose yet not to accomplish.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned,
+inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is a
+thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the
+habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), "it was
+given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere
+of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to
+make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ,
+the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but
+perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no man threatened,
+of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited
+so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas
+these, although the world rage against their constancy, have
+persevered in faith."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot
+by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling
+into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be
+persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the
+other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering
+in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs
+the help of grace for that end.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 138
+
+OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which
+head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Of effeminacy;
+
+(2) Of pertinacity.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 138, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Effeminacy* Is Opposed to Perseverance?
+[* _Mollities,_ literally "softness"]
+
+Objection 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.
+For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, "Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate,
+nor liers with mankind," expounds the text thus: "Effeminate--i.e.
+obscene, given to unnatural vice." But this is opposed to chastity.
+Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "delicacy
+is a kind of effeminacy." But to be delicate seems akin to
+intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but
+to temperance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the man
+who is fond of amusement is effeminate." Now immoderate fondness of
+amusement is opposed to _eutrapelia_, which is the virtue about
+pleasures of play, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy
+is not opposed to perseverance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the
+persevering man is opposed to the effeminate."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, AA. 1, 2), perseverance is
+deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on
+account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is
+directly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake
+a good on account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is
+what we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be
+"soft" if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared
+to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the
+battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he
+yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7)
+that "it is no wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and
+overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he
+struggles against them." Now it is evident that fear of danger is
+more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De
+Offic. i) under the heading "True magnanimity consists of two
+things": "It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to
+be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to
+yield to pleasure." Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive of
+attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of
+withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore,
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an
+effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on account of sorrow
+caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by
+custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more
+difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by
+natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering
+through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are
+compared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore
+those who are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being
+womanish themselves, as it were.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it
+is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the
+delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that
+diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Deut. 28:56): "The tender and
+delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her
+foot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness']." Thus delicacy is a kind
+of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of
+pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for
+instance toil or the like.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In play two things may be considered. In the
+first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of
+play is opposed to _eutrapelia_. Secondly, we may consider the
+relaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it
+belongs to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too
+it belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation
+inordinately.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 138, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Pertinacity Is Opposed to Perseverance?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to
+perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises
+from vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to
+magnanimity, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 2). Therefore pertinacity is
+not opposed to perseverance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either
+by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess: because
+the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they rejoice when they
+prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected." And if it be
+opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is
+clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to
+perseverance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists in good against
+sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures,
+the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity
+is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is not
+opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity
+is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition
+is opposed to religion, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 1). Therefore
+pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be
+pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious."
+"Pervicacious" has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man
+"perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients
+called 'vicia' what we call victory." These the Philosopher (Ethic.
+vii, 9) calls _ischyrognomones_, that is "head-strong," or
+_idiognomones_, that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by
+their opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does
+so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it
+is clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while
+pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for
+falling short of it.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own
+opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own
+excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause.
+Now it has been stated above (Q. 127, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 133, A. 2), that
+opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on
+their species.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately
+in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain
+pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man.
+Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it
+too much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or
+effeminate man.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although the other virtues persist against the
+onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in
+the same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to
+praise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity
+is directly opposed to perseverance.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 139
+
+OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this
+is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether fortitude is a gift?
+
+(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 139, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Fortitude Is a Gift?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues
+differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should
+not be reckoned a gift.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the acts of the gifts remain in heaven, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6). But the act of fortitude does not remain
+in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the
+fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from
+heaven." Therefore fortitude is not a gift.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is a
+sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures
+of the passing show." Now noisome pleasures and delights are the
+concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems
+that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of
+fortitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the
+Holy Ghost (Isa. 11:2).
+
+_I answer that,_ Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as
+stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, A. 3): and this firmness of
+mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially
+with regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according
+to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in
+both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of
+difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in
+enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or
+general virtue, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 2).
+
+Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that
+he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils
+may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in
+a man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or
+dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the
+Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life,
+which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils.
+A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy
+Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that
+fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been
+stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2) that the gifts regard the motion
+of the mind by the Holy Ghost.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the
+endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to
+give confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the
+fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the
+way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the
+end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from
+toil and evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude
+not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch
+as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the
+gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to
+be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 139, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Fourth Beatitude: "Blessed Are They That Hunger and
+Thirst After Justice," Corresponds to the Gift of Fortitude?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they
+that hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the
+gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of
+fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and
+thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this
+beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of
+fortitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for
+good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of
+wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above
+(Q. 45). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of
+fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since
+delight is essential to beatitude, according to _Ethic._ i, 8. Now
+the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude.
+Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i):
+"Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to
+enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material
+things, must toil."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 121, A. 2), Augustine makes the
+beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which
+they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness
+between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning
+the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely
+fortitude.
+
+Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A.
+1), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult,
+not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation
+of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable
+desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may
+understand here not only particular, but also universal justice,
+which is related to all virtuous deeds according to _Ethic._ v, 1,
+wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a
+gift.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as
+stated above (Q. 23, A. 8, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 4, ad 3). Hence
+whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond
+sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which
+regards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard
+the long delay and accomplishment of goods.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 140
+
+OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must next consider the precepts of fortitude:
+
+(1) The precepts of fortitude itself;
+
+(2) The precepts of its parts.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 140, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Precepts of Fortitude Are Suitably Given in the Divine
+Law?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably
+given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old
+Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Deut. 20).
+Therefore precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law
+also.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than
+negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but
+not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to
+contain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated
+above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2). Now the precepts are
+directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be
+proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should
+have been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the
+chief precepts of the Law.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.
+
+_I answer that,_ Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by
+the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in
+various ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so
+that even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of
+kingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of
+the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine
+Law contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues,
+with a view to directing the mind to God. For this reason it is
+written (Deut. 20:3, 4): "Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God
+is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies."
+
+As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and
+among them we find precepts of fortitude according to the
+requirements of those goods.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while
+the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal,
+according to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there
+was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily
+contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New
+Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of
+eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Matt. 11:12, "The
+kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away."
+Hence Peter commands (1 Pet. 5:8, 9): "Your adversary the devil, as a
+roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist
+ye, strong in faith," as also James 4:7: "Resist the devil, and he
+will fly from you." Since, however, men while tending to spiritual
+goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of
+fortitude had to be given even in the New Law, that they might
+bravely endure temporal evils, according to Matt. 10:28, "Fear ye not
+them that kill the body."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts. But
+the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the
+things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the
+precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 122, A. 1), the precepts of the
+decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to
+be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts of the
+decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the
+notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because
+it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear
+dangers of death.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 140, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Precepts of the Parts of Fortitude Are Suitably Given in
+the Divine Law?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are
+unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and
+perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence,
+magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above (Q. 128). Now we find
+precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance.
+Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and
+magnanimity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the
+guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxv).
+Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience
+should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De Serm.
+Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, as
+stated above (Q. 128; Q. 136, A. 4; Q. 137, A. 2). Now the precepts
+of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above
+(A. 1, ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance
+should have been negative and not affirmative.
+
+The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given
+by Holy Writ.
+
+_I answer that,_ The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such
+things as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright
+man needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and
+annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only
+about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of
+the secondary and annexed virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus
+of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness
+which they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining
+to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than under
+precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather
+than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity. On the other
+hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain to patience
+and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them,
+but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of
+precepts of patience and perseverance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 3, A. 2), although affirmative
+precepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but
+according to place and time. Wherefore just as the affirmative
+precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the
+preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil
+them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be
+understood in the same way.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance,
+is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution;
+nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On
+the other hand, patience and perseverance are about minor hardships
+and toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially
+in general, what is to be done in such cases.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 141
+
+OF TEMPERANCE
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself;
+(2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must
+consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.
+
+Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
+
+(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?
+
+(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?
+
+(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a
+kind of touch?
+
+(6) What is the rule of temperance?
+
+(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?
+
+(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Temperance Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue
+goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a
+natural aptitude for virtue," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1. Now
+temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines,
+according to _Ethic._ ii, 3, 8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But some people have temperance without
+having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet
+covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as
+appears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4). But
+seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have
+been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ. 8, 9, 19, 45, 52, 71,
+139). Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the
+name of a virtue."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3), it is essential
+to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in
+accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence
+human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance
+with reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its
+very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes.
+Therefore temperance is a virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to
+it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to
+him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that
+those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with
+reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but
+from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that
+temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is
+in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the
+animal nature that is not subject to reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect
+virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are
+in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to
+the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though
+they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so
+far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 63, A. 1), or acquired by habituation, which virtues,
+through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear,
+whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to
+Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The gift of fear
+has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in
+this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above
+(Q. 19, A. 9, ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object
+whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now man stands
+in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things
+which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance:
+wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Temperance Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue.
+For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to
+temperance to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption
+for God's sake." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore
+temperance is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we observe
+and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this is
+common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot
+separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just
+is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to
+temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27).
+Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it
+a special virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is customary in human speech to employ a common
+term in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things
+to which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used
+antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of
+speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term;
+e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word
+"temperance" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its
+common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a
+general virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain
+temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human
+operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue.
+Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude,
+even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance
+withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying
+reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those
+things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.
+
+On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as
+withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive
+to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a
+special matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things
+which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law.
+Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can,
+like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and
+secondly in a sense of excellence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a
+most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are
+natural to man, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5). Hence
+tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence,
+although it is a common property of all the virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is
+ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First,
+in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a
+certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we
+understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
+Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold
+the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his
+animal nature, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5; Q. 142, A. 4),
+wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In
+consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above
+all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty
+must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral
+goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute
+of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who
+has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is
+most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring
+most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q. 142, A. 4).
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
+and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that
+"temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other
+wanton emotions of the mind." Now all the passions of the soul are
+called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is
+not only about desires and pleasures.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good"
+[*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear,
+especially with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires
+and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and
+dangers, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore it seems
+that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and
+pleasures.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace of
+moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27)
+that "it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the
+mind and to enforce moderation." Now moderation is needed, not only
+in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever
+pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about
+desires and pleasures.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not
+occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii,
+and De Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby lust and
+desire are kept under control."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 136, A. 1), it
+belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the
+passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's
+passions is twofold, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2), when we
+were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive
+appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it
+flies from sensible and bodily evils.
+
+The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against
+reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily
+goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason,
+but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to
+attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing
+to the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in
+accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral
+virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.
+
+On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying
+from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through
+being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when
+a man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany
+the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of
+reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying
+from evil to remain firm in the good of reason.
+
+Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very
+nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz.
+fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with
+daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining
+some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation,
+is chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible
+goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows
+that arise from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring
+presupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the
+absence of the aforesaid pleasures.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 25, A.
+1), when we were treating of the passions, those passions which
+pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions pertaining to
+the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the
+passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance directly
+moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards good,
+as a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch as
+moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the
+passions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is
+moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the
+things he desires.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards the
+object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to
+temperance. On the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind
+from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which
+fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and
+fortitude about fears.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions of the
+soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the
+internal passions.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures of Touch?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
+and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that
+"the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which
+draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from
+the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it
+is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular
+praise." Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire
+for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the
+other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and
+again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is
+written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire [*_Cupiditas,_ which the Douay version
+following the Greek _philargyria_ renders 'desire of money'] is the
+root of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires of
+pleasures of touch.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who is
+worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate,
+but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or great, of
+which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch,
+but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only
+about desires for pleasures of touch.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to
+pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect.
+Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus.
+Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures
+of the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5) in the treatise on
+the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of
+virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through
+curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man
+knowledge, saying (Gen. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and
+evil." Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of
+temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of
+touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur
+in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of
+temperance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
+"temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), temperance is about desires
+and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring.
+Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest
+evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of
+death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about
+desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a
+natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results
+from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural
+operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by
+means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union
+of the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat
+and drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the
+sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about
+pleasures of touch.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes
+temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but
+as concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever:
+and this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also
+reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can
+he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to
+temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and
+secondarily other pleasures.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation
+in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is
+proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's
+emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a different part
+in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not
+result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch:
+thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in
+relation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the
+other senses, not only for this reason, but also on account of the
+becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about
+the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch,
+not principally but consequently: while in so far as the sensible
+objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their
+becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound,
+this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature.
+Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can
+be referred to them antonomastically.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature
+greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the
+senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive
+appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by
+moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly
+speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no
+control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a
+hindrance to another greater and more binding.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of
+nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about
+all pleasures of touch.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Temperance Is About the Pleasures Proper to the Taste?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper
+to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink,
+which are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which
+regard the touch. But according to what has been said (A. 4),
+temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human
+life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste
+rather than about those proper to the touch.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than about
+things themselves. Now, according to _De Anima_ ii, 3, "the touch is
+the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food,
+whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the
+pleasing quality of the food." Therefore temperance is about the
+taste rather than about the touch.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vii, 4, 7: "temperance and
+intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and
+incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy
+pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors
+which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about
+pleasures proper to the taste.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
+"seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do
+with the taste."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), temperance is about the
+greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human
+life either in the species or in the individual. In these matters
+certain things are to be considered as principal and others as
+secondary. The principal thing is the use itself of the necessary
+means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the
+species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the
+preservation of the individual: while the very use of these
+necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.
+
+In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the
+use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a
+pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly
+about the pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of
+these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the
+touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about
+pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible
+objects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the
+necessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste
+is more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that
+temperance is more about the taste than about the other senses.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially
+results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says
+(De Anima ii, 3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or
+cold, wet or dry." To the taste belongs the discernment of savors,
+which make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of
+its being suitable for nourishment.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to
+speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use
+of food and drink.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food,
+but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in which
+it is served.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Rule of Temperance Depends on the Need of the Present
+Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not
+depend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not
+regulated according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the
+soul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of
+temperance does not depend on the needs of the body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs
+of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against
+temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by
+nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem
+unreasonable.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the
+need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin
+in using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for
+the sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need
+of the body is not the rule of temperance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both
+Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule
+forbidding him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of
+them desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself
+of those things with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a
+lover, in so far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and
+of his station."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 123, A. 12),
+the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason:
+because "man's good is to be in accord with reason," as Dionysius
+asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by
+which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good of
+reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of
+end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now
+all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed
+to some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance
+takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects
+of which it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of
+this life requires.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, the need of this life is regarded
+as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that
+sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work,
+thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas
+sometimes the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and
+rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the
+thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is
+useful for life is subordinate.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First,
+it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term "necessary"
+to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is
+necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something
+without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards
+not only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore
+the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires
+pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound
+condition of body." Other things that are not necessary for this
+purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to
+health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not
+use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But
+others are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses
+moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in
+keeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher
+(Ethic. iii, 11) says that the "temperate man also desires other
+pleasant things," those namely that are not necessary for health or a
+sound condition of body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to
+these things."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according
+to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the
+requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external
+things, such as riches and station, and more still on the
+requirements of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii,
+11) that "the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided
+that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily
+condition, but also that they be not inconsistent with good," i.e.
+good conduct, nor "beyond his substance," i.e. his means. And
+Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man
+considers the need" not only "of this life" but also "of his station."
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Temperance Is a Cardinal Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue.
+For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is
+about those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely
+about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in
+_Ethic._ iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal
+virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to
+control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be more
+impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is
+written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh
+forth; and who can bear the violence (_impetum_) of one provoked?"
+Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of
+desire and concupiscence, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4). But
+humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore,
+seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance
+which controls concupiscence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory reckons temperance among the principal
+virtues (Moral. ii, 49).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 11; Q. 61, A. 3), a
+principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost
+claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite
+for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is
+requisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures
+of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both because these
+pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to
+abstain from them, and to control the desire for them, and because
+their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above
+(A. 4). For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or
+cardinal virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The longer the range of its operation, the greater is
+the agent's power (_virtus_) shown to be: wherefore the very fact
+that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are
+furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power.
+This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident,
+for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its
+impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire
+for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is
+more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a
+more principal virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of desire,
+wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible.
+But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite
+with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore
+temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal
+virtue.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Temperance Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the
+virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and
+seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and
+the regard for what is beautiful." Now virtue deserves praise for
+being honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest
+of the virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue.
+Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch
+than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to
+temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a
+greater virtue than justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more
+necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of
+death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these
+occur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than
+fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than
+fortitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the
+"greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for
+which reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just."
+
+_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good
+of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual,"
+wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better
+it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more
+than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one
+man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are
+endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the
+desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident
+that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than
+temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more
+excellent still.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance,
+not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance,
+but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it
+withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower
+animals.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the
+excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good,
+wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein
+temperance excels.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That which is general because it regards the many
+conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is
+general because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former
+way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply,
+although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not
+only than fortitude but also than justice.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 142
+
+OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head
+there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether insensibility is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
+
+(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;
+
+(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Insensibility Is a Vice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For
+those are called insensible who are deficient with regard to
+pleasures of touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to
+be altogether deficient in such matters: for it is written (Dan.
+10:2, 3): "In those days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I
+ate no desirable bread, and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth,
+neither was I anointed with ointment." Therefore insensibility is not
+a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "man's good is to be in accord with reason,"
+according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all
+pleasures of touch is most conducive to man's progress in the good of
+reason: for it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who took
+pulse for their food (Dan. 1:12), "God gave knowledge, and
+understanding in every book and wisdom." Therefore insensibility,
+which rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding sin
+would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in
+avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to
+insensibility. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that "if we
+deny ourselves pleasures we are less liable to sin." Therefore there
+is nothing vicious in insensibility.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now
+insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a
+vice.
+
+_I answer that,_ Whatever is contrary to the natural order is
+vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that
+are necessary for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires
+that man should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are
+necessary for man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of
+the individual or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to
+reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary
+for nature's preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the
+order of nature. And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.
+
+It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and
+even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures
+as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's
+health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and
+sex; as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes
+and soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to
+fulfil their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to
+recover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures,
+as a kind of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up
+to contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal
+things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of
+insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any
+horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some
+praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights
+of contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the
+text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately
+afterwards.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive
+powers, which need a bodily organ, as stated in the First Part (Q.
+84, AA. 7, 8), man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use
+his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that
+afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if
+he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of
+the body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less
+the powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore
+it is commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving
+themselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual
+good, by a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from
+many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily
+occupations and carnal procreation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not
+altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Intemperance Is a Childish Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin.
+For Jerome in commenting on Matt. 18:3, "Unless you be converted, and
+become as little children," says that "a child persists not in anger,
+is unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful
+woman," all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore
+intemperance is not a childish sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now "in
+respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a
+childish sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished: whereas
+concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is concerned,
+are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col. 3:5,
+"Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . .
+concupiscence" [*Vulg.: 'your members which are upon the earth,
+fornication . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a
+childish sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "we
+apply the term intemperance* to childish faults." [*_Akolasia_ which
+Aristotle refers to _kolazo_ to punish, so that its original sense
+would be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint.']
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be childish for two reasons.
+First, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does
+not mean that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense.
+Secondly. by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of
+intemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is
+one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three
+ways. First, as regards that which they both desire, for like a child
+concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human
+affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason.
+Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading "Comeliness
+is twofold," that "the beautiful is that which is in keeping with
+man's excellence in so far as his nature differs from other animals."
+Now a child does not attend to the order of reason; and in like
+manner "concupiscence does not listen to reason," according to
+_Ethic._ vii, 6. Secondly, they are alike as to the result. For a
+child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed: hence it is
+written (Ecclus. 30:8): "A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a
+child left to himself will become headstrong." So, too,
+concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine
+says (Confess. viii, 5): "Lust served became a custom, and custom not
+resisted became necessity." Thirdly, as to the remedy which is
+applied to both. For a child is corrected by being restrained; hence
+it is written (Prov. 23:13, 14): "Withhold not correction from a
+child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from
+Hell." In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it
+according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he
+says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual
+things, and remain fixed "thereon, the impulse of custom," i.e.
+carnal concupiscence, "is broken, and being suppressed is gradually
+weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not
+wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it." Hence
+the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child ought to live
+according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible
+to accord with reason."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the term "childish" as denoting
+what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of
+intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as
+stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First,
+with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are
+about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex,
+which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a desire
+may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that
+nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does not
+happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for
+nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no
+sin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to
+quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to
+natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).
+
+There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and
+these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity
+[*Cf. Q. 167], such as the nice (_curiosa_) preparation of food, or
+the adornment of women. And though children do not affect these
+things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason
+given above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and
+fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason
+in them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Cowardice* Is a Greater Vice Than Intemperance?
+[*Cf. Q. 125]
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than
+intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to
+the good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a
+more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 141,
+A. 8). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the
+less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher
+says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable,
+if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains."
+Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other
+passions; hence it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, that "it is more
+difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would
+seem to be stronger than fear." Therefore intemperance, which is
+overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is
+overcome by fear.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now
+cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires
+to be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death,
+which pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous
+sin than intemperance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that
+"intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice."
+Therefore it is more sinful.
+
+_I answer that,_ one may be compared with another in two ways. First,
+with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man
+who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than
+cowardice.
+
+First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death,
+to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving
+life. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire
+of which is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because,
+as stated above (A. 2, ad 2), intemperance is more about certain
+annexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures.
+Now the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin.
+Wherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the
+part of the object or motive matter.
+
+In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for
+three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the
+more grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who
+are demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of
+death, stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive
+of intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the
+graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than
+cowardice has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions
+done through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external
+agent, so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in
+_Ethic._ iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are
+simply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an
+intemperate man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary
+generically. For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is
+enticed by individual pleasures which make of him an intemperate man.
+Hence the most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell
+on the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in
+matters relating to cowardice: because the particular action that
+imposes itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside
+his shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more
+voluntary, for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is
+more voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes
+place, is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply
+more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it
+is easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since
+pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are
+of everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by
+frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas
+dangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for
+man to encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with
+temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard
+to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is
+directed to the common good more than temperance is. And from this
+point of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance,
+since by cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common
+good. Secondly, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more
+difficult to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any
+pleasures whatever: and from this point of view there is no need for
+cowardice to take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a
+greater strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on the
+other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof of a lesser
+vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the proof of a greater
+vice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one
+shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures
+whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of
+life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of
+death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex:
+although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow,
+and fear, occasioned by certain other evils.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a
+general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases
+we have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Intemperance Is the Most Disgraceful of Sins?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most
+disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to
+sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance
+murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the
+most disgraceful of sins.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are seemingly
+less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins of
+intemperance are most common, because they are about things connected
+with the common use of human life, and in which many happen to sin.
+Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most disgraceful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance and
+intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain
+desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and
+pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as
+the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not
+the most disgraceful of sins.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
+"intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices."
+
+_I answer that,_ Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory.
+Now honor is due to excellence, as stated above (Q. 103, A. 1), and
+glory denotes clarity (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3). Accordingly intemperance
+is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most
+repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common to
+us and the lower animals, as stated above (Q. 141, AA. 2, 3).
+Wherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): "Man, when he was in honor, did
+not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made
+like to them." Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's
+clarity or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of
+intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and
+beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as
+being most slavish.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12] "the sins of the
+flesh," which are comprised under the head of intemperance, although
+less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that culpability
+is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while disgrace
+regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of
+the sin in respect of the sinner.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the shamefulness and
+disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as regards the
+nature of the vices themselves.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we
+mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are
+connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in
+conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode
+of human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices
+are apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of
+excess: for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in
+committing the unnatural vice.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 143
+
+OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL
+
+We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these
+same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.
+_______________________
+
+ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 143, Art.]
+
+Whether the Parts of Temperance Are Rightly Assigned?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
+unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to
+be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to
+be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is
+comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of
+temperance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But
+temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch,
+as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4). Therefore mildness is not a part of
+temperance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the
+Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now
+external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Q. 58,
+A. 8). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of
+temperance.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more
+parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty,
+shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness,
+sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the
+companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility,
+simplicity, refinement, method, contentment." [*_Per-se-sufficientiam_
+which could be rendered "self-sufficiency," but for the fact that
+this is taken in a bad sense. See Q. 169, A. 1.] Therefore it seems
+that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (QQ. 48, 128), a cardinal virtue may
+have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and
+potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the
+concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect
+there are two integral parts of temperance, _shamefacedness,_ whereby
+one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and
+_honesty,_ whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated
+above (Q. 141, A. 2, ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue
+lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance
+excel others in disgrace.
+
+The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of
+a virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of
+matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which
+are of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these
+as regards meat, there is _abstinence,_ and as regards drink properly
+there is _sobriety._ Other pleasures are directed to the power of
+procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the
+act itself of procreation, there is _chastity,_ and as to the
+pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from
+kissing, touching, or fondling, we have _purity._
+
+The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary
+virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some
+principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein
+moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to
+moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate.
+Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter
+or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards
+something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed
+thereto.
+
+This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the
+soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body;
+thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of
+concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in
+the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first
+place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse
+of passion: and this movement is restrained by _continence,_ the
+effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate
+concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward
+movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the
+resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by _humility._
+The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and
+this is restrained by _meekness_ or _mildness._
+
+With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint
+is the effect of _modesty,_ which, according to Andronicus, has three
+parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what
+not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what
+we do: this he assigns to _method._ The second is that a man observe
+decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to _refinement._ The
+third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse
+between a man and his friends, and this is called _gravity._
+
+With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be
+observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius
+assigns _lowliness,_ and Andronicus _contentment_; secondly, we must
+not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes
+_moderation,_ Andronicus _simplicity._
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as
+imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (Q. 165,
+A. 1); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has
+something in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is
+about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of
+restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance
+not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the
+mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the matter of external action justice considers what
+is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain
+moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of
+temperance.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the
+moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the
+moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 144
+
+OF SHAMEFACEDNESS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in
+the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and
+honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
+
+(2) What is its object?
+
+(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?
+
+(4) What kind of people are ashamed?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Shamefacedness Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is
+proper to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is
+clear from the definition of virtue given in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now
+shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher
+observes (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or
+something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy.
+But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence,
+since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part
+of justice. Since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas
+justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of
+fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and
+aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from
+something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is
+about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as
+the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth.
+ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible
+according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of
+honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is
+the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness,
+a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the
+support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful." Therefore
+shamefacedness is a virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices
+are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate
+prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to _Ethic._
+ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from
+many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is
+a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore
+shamefacedness is a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that
+shamefacedness is not a virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and
+in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in
+_Phys._    vii, 17, 18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with
+perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue.
+Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the
+fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence
+Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of
+a base action." Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult
+good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 40, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3), when we were treating
+of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does
+not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as
+being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to
+avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of
+disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a
+virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.
+
+Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and
+praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way
+shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a
+praiseworthy passion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of
+virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue's
+definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be "an
+elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice. Now
+shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its
+movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it
+falls short of the notion of virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and
+disgrace. Now it has been stated (Q. 142, A. 4) that the vice of
+intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness
+pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of
+its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the
+species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the
+vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful,
+shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which
+is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of
+honesty.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is
+sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow
+that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every
+vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence
+shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of
+disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an
+acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the
+object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their
+regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man
+would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of
+shamefacedness.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Shamefacedness Is About a Disgraceful Action?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a
+disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that
+"shamefacedness is fear of disgrace." Now sometimes those who do
+nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, "For thy sake I
+have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face." Therefore
+shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is
+sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance
+when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that
+shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most
+beautiful according to _Ethic._ i, 8. Yet sometimes people are
+ashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Luke 9:26, "He that shall
+be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be
+ashamed," etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful
+action.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful
+action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more
+ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser
+sins, while he glories in those which are most grievous, according to
+Ps. 51:3, "Why dost thou glory in malice?" Therefore shamefacedness
+is not properly about a disgraceful action.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of
+Nyssa [*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that "shamefacedness is fear
+of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3),
+when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an
+arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace
+is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in
+the deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has
+not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the
+will alone does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability:
+wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the
+Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of
+fear.
+
+The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in
+the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory
+consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the
+character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an
+arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards
+first and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is
+properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that
+shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the
+Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those
+defects which are not the result of any fault of his own."
+
+Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man
+refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a
+man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear
+of reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa
+(Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person "blushing," in the
+latter we say that he is "ashamed." Hence he says that "the man who
+is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin
+which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6)
+that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the
+cause." Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is
+subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the
+Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it
+said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that "they (the apostles) went from
+the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted
+worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus." It is owing to
+imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the
+reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more
+virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good
+or evil. Wherefore it is written (Isa. 51:7): "Fear ye not the
+reproach of men."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 63, A. 3), though honor is not
+really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence:
+and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly due to
+sin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind of
+defect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and
+the like.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such.
+Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either
+because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or
+because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical
+for doing virtuous deeds.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either
+because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison
+with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance
+of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than
+of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of
+power. The same applies to other sins.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Man Is More Shamefaced of Those Who Are More Closely
+Connected with Him?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those
+who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in _Rhet._
+ii, 6 that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire
+approbation." Now men desire this especially from people of the
+better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man
+is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with
+him.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who
+perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those
+whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to
+_Rhet._ ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does
+himself." Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most
+closely connected with him.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men take
+more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as
+jokers and fable-tellers." But those who are more closely connected
+with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take
+shame chiefly from them.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
+most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done
+nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first
+time; by those whose friends they wish to become." Now these are less
+closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by
+those who are more closely united to him.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made most
+ashamed by those who are to be continually with him."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor
+denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the
+excellence which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of
+which is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect,
+especially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a
+person's attestation is considered to be, the more does he make
+another person ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered
+as being more weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or
+because of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's
+attestations for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of
+his judgement, as in the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man
+is more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a
+greater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower animals inspire
+no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on
+account of his knowledge of the matter attested, because "everyone
+judges well of what is known to him" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we
+are more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us,
+since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers
+and persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do,
+inspire us with no shame at all.
+
+An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some
+advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more
+desirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are
+more liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some
+harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons
+connected with us make us more ashamed, since we are to be
+continually in their society, as though this entailed a continual
+harm to us: whereas the harm that comes from strangers and passersby
+ceases almost at once.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same
+reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just
+as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they
+have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments
+hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom
+we live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in
+detail.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are connected
+with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they
+look upon our defect as disgraceful.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm
+they do by making many think ill of us.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us
+more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to
+wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again
+because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition
+seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in
+one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more
+disgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom
+we ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be,
+is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our
+request, or by failing to become their friends.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Even Virtuous Men Can Be Ashamed?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For
+contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness
+are not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, "Thou hadst a harlot's
+forehead, thou wouldst not blush." Therefore those who are virtuous
+are more inclined to be ashamed.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
+ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this
+happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, shamefacedness is "fear of disgrace" [*Ethic. iv,
+9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if
+they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly.
+Therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated
+above (Q. 143). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since
+then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is
+also.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a
+"virtuous man is not shamefaced."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2) shamefacedness is fear of
+some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not
+feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because
+one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult
+to avoid.
+
+Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First,
+because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him
+to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are
+without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast
+of them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to
+themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous
+are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were
+anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore
+the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shame is in the virtuous
+hypothetically."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men
+through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average
+men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and
+yet are not altogether free from evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice,
+but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1 Thess.
+5:22, "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." The
+Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should
+avoid "not only what is really evil, but also those things that are
+regarded as evil."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 1, ad 1) the virtuous man despises
+ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore
+he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent,
+shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though
+it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore
+Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness lays the first
+foundation of temperance," by inspiring man with the horror of
+whatever is disgraceful.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 145
+
+OF HONESTY*
+(In Four Articles)
+[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with
+moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum.]
+
+We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous;
+
+(2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral
+goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty];
+
+(3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant;
+
+(4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Honesty Is the Same As Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue.
+For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is
+desired for its own sake." Now virtue is desired, not for its own
+sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+i, 9) that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue." Therefore
+honesty is not the same as virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) "honesty means an
+honorable state." Now honor is due to many things besides virtue,
+since "it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. i, 12).
+Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior
+choice," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems
+to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40,
+"Let all things be done decently (_honeste_) and according to order"
+among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth.
+According to Ecclus. 11:14, "good things and evil, life and death
+[poverty and riches] are from God" [*The words in brackets are
+omitted in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has
+_honestas_]. But virtue does not consist in external wealth.
+Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides
+honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also
+divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x) "honesty means an
+honorable state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through
+being worthy of honor. Now honor, as stated above (Q. 144, A. 2, ad
+2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged
+chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in _Phys._ vii, 17.
+Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as
+virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those
+things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for
+their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such
+as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only
+for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in
+themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but
+also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive
+to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable
+for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52)
+that "some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by
+their own worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge." And this suffices
+to give a thing the character of honest.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are
+more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like
+things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we
+practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of
+honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in so far
+as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank, power,
+and riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3)
+that these things "are honored by some people, but in truth it is
+only the good man who is worthy of honor." Now a man is good in
+respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the
+latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is
+due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the
+character of honesty.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is
+due. Now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence, as stated
+above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2). But one attests only to what one knows; and
+the internal choice is not made known save by external actions.
+Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as
+it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists
+radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the
+external conduct.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly
+regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes the name
+of honesty is given to external prosperity.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Honest Is the Same As the Beautiful?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the honest is not the same as the
+beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite,
+since the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" [*Cicero, De
+Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty
+of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the
+same as the honest.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is
+characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then
+honor and glory differ, as stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), it
+seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above (A.
+1). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it is
+written (Ezech. 16:15): "Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the
+harlot because of thy renown." Therefore the honest is not the same
+as the beautiful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:23, 24): "Those that
+are our uncomely (_inhonesta_) parts, have more abundant comeliness
+(_honestatem_), but our comely (_honesta_) parts have no need." Now
+by uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the
+beautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are
+apparently the same.
+
+_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div.
+Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of
+clarity and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be
+beautiful, as being "the cause of the harmony and clarity of the
+universe." Hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his
+bodily limbs well proportioned, together with a certain clarity of
+color. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or
+actions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity
+of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which we have stated
+(A. 1) to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates
+according to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore
+"honesty is the same as spiritual beauty." Hence Augustine says (QQ.
+83, qu. 30): "By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, which we
+properly designate as spiritual," and further on he adds that "many
+things are beautiful to the eye, which it would be hardly proper to
+call honest."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended
+good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is
+apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good. Hence
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the beautiful and the good are
+beloved by all." Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies
+spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully
+says (De Offic. i, 5): "Thou perceivest the form and the features, so
+to speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as
+Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), glory is the
+effect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a person
+acquires clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the same
+thing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest
+and beautiful.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument applies to the beauty of the body:
+although it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to
+play the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to
+Ezech. 28:17, "Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast
+lost thy wisdom in thy beauty."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Honest Differs from the Useful and the Pleasant?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the
+useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for its
+own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired
+for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes
+to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore
+the honest does not differ from the pleasant.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good:
+for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is a thing that
+attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very
+nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility": and "that is
+money." Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written
+(Ecclus. 11:14): "Poverty and riches (_honestas_) are from God," and
+(Ecclus. 13:2): "He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship
+with one more honorable," i.e. richer, "than himself." Therefore the
+honest differs not from the useful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be
+useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De
+Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Q. 83, qu. 30): "The honest is
+that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies
+reference to something else."
+
+_I answer that,_ The honest concurs in the same subject with the
+useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as
+stated above (A. 2), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it
+has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever
+is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man.
+Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is
+becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to
+man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue
+(Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing
+may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason.
+A pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which perfects
+his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is
+referred to something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly
+the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.
+
+Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest
+as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its
+spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest
+to desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant,
+however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since
+whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas
+the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its
+own sake by the rational appetite, which tends to that which is in
+accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is
+desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion
+of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be the
+instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible
+with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it
+is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in accordance with
+reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with
+regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every
+useful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Honesty Should Be Reckoned a Part of Temperance?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part
+of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and
+whole in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of
+honesty,"    according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore
+honesty is not a part of temperance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that "wine . . . makes
+all thoughts honest." But the use of wine, especially in excess, in
+which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to
+intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a
+part of temperance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now
+"it is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according to
+the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to
+temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar
+said as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: "I suffer an honorable (_honesta_)
+death, for the most venerable and most holy laws."
+
+_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a
+part of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as
+pertaining especially to temperance.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), honesty is a kind of
+spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful:
+and opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly
+honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels
+that which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal
+lusts. Hence by its very name temperance is most significative of the
+good of reason to which it belongs to moderate and temper evil
+desires. Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason
+to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective
+part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition
+attaching thereto.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty
+taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a
+part of temperance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When a man is intoxicated, "the wine makes his thoughts
+honest" according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great
+and deserving of honor [*Cf. Q. 148, A. 6].
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to
+temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet
+greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds
+in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus
+honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule
+given by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he says that "our uncomely
+parts have more abundant comeliness," which, namely, destroys
+whatever is uncomely.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 146
+
+OF ABSTINENCE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those
+which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about
+pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence,
+which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically
+about drink.
+
+With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered:
+(1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite
+vice which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 146, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Abstinence Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the
+Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech but
+in power (_virtute_)." Now the kingdom of God does not consist in
+abstinence, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:17): "The kingdom of God is
+not meat and drink," where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang.
+ii, qu. 11] observes that "justice consists neither in abstaining nor
+in eating." Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself
+to God: "This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take
+food as physic." Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art
+to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one's
+food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every virtue "observes the mean," as stated in
+_Ethic._ ii, 6, 7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean
+but to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore
+abstinence is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence
+excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that
+"impatience not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its
+peaceful seclusion." Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that
+"sometimes the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer,"
+so that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a
+virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 1:5, 6): "Join with your
+faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge
+abstinence"; where abstinence is numbered among other virtues.
+Therefore abstinence is a virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of
+food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as
+denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it
+signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something
+indifferent. Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and
+then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is
+the meaning of Peter's words quoted above, where he says that we
+ought "to join abstinence with knowledge," namely that in abstaining
+from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he
+lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of health.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The use of and abstinence from food, considered in
+themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle
+says (1 Cor. 8:8): "Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if
+we eat not [*Vulg.: 'Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not'],
+shall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more," i.e.
+spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, in
+so far as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The regulation of food, in the point of quantity and
+quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the
+body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good
+of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ. Evang.
+ii, qu. 11): "It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how
+much food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for the
+people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the
+requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and
+uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity
+to abstain."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which
+are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to
+strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of
+reason. Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a
+certain excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their
+name, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which
+all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part
+of temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the
+mean, in so far as it is in accord with right reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is
+not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain
+as one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e.
+for God's glory and not one's own.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 146, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Abstinence Is a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue.
+For every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not
+praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "the
+virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other
+virtues." Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii)
+that "the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature
+of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body." Now this
+belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore abstinence
+is not a special virtue distinct from chastity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so
+should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Tim.
+6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should
+be [Vulg.: 'are'] content." Now there is no special virtue in being
+content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in
+abstinence which moderates food.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons
+abstinence as a special part of temperance.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 136, A. 1; Q. 141, A. 3) moral
+virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the
+passions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion
+departs from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue.
+Now pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the
+good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is
+necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he
+desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special
+virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Wherefore one virtue receives help and
+commendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in
+this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of
+the other virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only
+against the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony:
+since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the
+onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to
+them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue
+through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps another.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use
+of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special
+virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 147
+
+OF FASTING
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?
+
+(2) Of what virtue is it the act?
+
+(3) Whether it is a matter of precept?
+
+(4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept?
+
+(5) The time of fasting;
+
+(6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once?
+
+(7) The hour of eating for those who fast;
+
+(8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Fasting Is an Act of Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For
+every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always
+acceptable to God, according to Isa. 58:3, "Why have we fasted and
+Thou hast not regarded?" Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now
+fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of
+abstinence takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of
+nature, whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else
+those who do not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence.
+Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which is competent to all, both good and evil,
+is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one is
+fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts
+(2 Cor. 6:5, 6) where the Apostle says: "In fasting, in knowledge, in
+chastity, etc. [Vulg.: 'in chastity, in knowledge']."
+
+_I answer that,_ An act is virtuous through being directed by reason
+to some virtuous (_honestum_) [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1] good. Now this is
+consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold
+purpose. First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore
+the Apostle says (2 Cor. 6:5, 6): "In fasting, in chastity," since
+fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome
+[*Contra Jov. ii.] "Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not
+there," that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and
+drink. Secondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind
+may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence
+it is related (Dan. 10) of Daniel that he received a revelation from
+God after fasting for three weeks. Thirdly, in order to satisfy for
+sins: wherefore it is written (Joel 2:12): "Be converted to Me with
+all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning." The same
+is declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [*Serm.
+lxxii] (ccxxx, de Tempore)): "Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the
+mind, subjects one's flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite
+and humble, scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire
+of lust, kindles the true light of chastity."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered
+vicious by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence the text
+goes on to say: "Behold in the day of your fast your own will is
+founded," and a little further on (Isa. 58:4): "You fast for debates
+and strife and strike with the fist wickedly." These words are
+expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii, 19) as follows: "The will
+indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the flesh
+restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be
+wrecked by vice." And Augustine says (in the same sermon) that
+"fasting loves not many words, deems wealth superfluous, scorns
+pride, commends humility, helps man to perceive what is frail and
+paltry."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The mean of virtue is measured not according to
+quantity but according to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6.
+Now reason judges it expedient, on account of some special motive,
+for a man to take less food than would be becoming to him under
+ordinary circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or
+in order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and much
+more does reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and
+the pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much
+from one's food as to refuse nature its necessary support: thus
+Jerome says:* "It matters not whether thou art a long or a short time
+in destroying thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately,
+whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping
+too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen goods." [*The quotation
+is from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De
+Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there ascribes the quotation to
+St. Jerome, but it is not to be found in the saint's works.] In like
+manner right reason does not retrench so much from a man's food as to
+render him incapable of fulfilling his duty. Hence Jerome says (in
+the same reference) "Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets
+fasting before chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of
+his senses."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is
+said to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure
+negation, wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is
+only the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for a
+reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting
+(_jejunium jejunii_) [*Literally the 'fast of fasting']: while the
+latter is called the faster's fast, because he fasts for a purpose.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Fasting Is an Act of Abstinence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence.
+For Jerome [*The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the
+reference is lacking] commenting on Matt. 17:20, "This kind of devil"
+says: "To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all
+manner of lusts." Now this belongs to every virtue. Therefore fasting
+is not exclusively an act of abstinence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang.) that
+"the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year." Now paying tithes is
+an act of religion, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 1). Therefore fasting
+is an act of religion and not of abstinence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated above
+(QQ. 143, 146, A. 1, ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with
+fortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems
+very applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of
+abstinence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "fasting is
+frugality of fare and abstinence from food."
+
+_I answer that,_ Habit and act have the same matter. Wherefore every
+virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that
+appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food,
+wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident
+that fasting is an act of abstinence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining from
+food, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from anything
+harmful, and such especially is sin.
+
+We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence
+from all manner of lust, since, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1), an act
+ceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging to
+another virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that
+virtue, as explained above (Q. 32, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 85, A. 3).
+Accordingly there is no reason why fasting should not be an act of
+religion, or of chastity, or of any other virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to endure,
+not any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the danger of
+death. To endure hardships resulting from privation of pleasure of
+touch, belongs to temperance and its parts: and such are the
+hardships of fasting.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Fasting Is a Matter of Precept?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept.
+For precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are a
+matter of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it
+would have to be equally observed at all places and times. Therefore
+fasting is not a matter of precept.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin.
+Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not fast
+would sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that "the Wisdom
+of God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of
+freedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the
+community of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude,
+should be bound together in subjection to one God." Now the liberty
+of the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number of
+observances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For
+Augustine says (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv) that "whereas God in His
+mercy wished our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the
+evidence and small number of its solemn sacraments, some people
+render it oppressive with slavish burdens." Therefore it seems that
+the Church should not have made fasting a matter of precept.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting
+says: "Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the
+commands of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles."
+Therefore fasting is a matter of precept.
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make
+legal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal
+in temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to
+prescribe by statute those things that concern the common weal of the
+faithful in spiritual goods.
+
+Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that fasting is useful as atoning
+for and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual things.
+And everyone is bound by the natural dictate of reason to practice
+fasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore
+fasting in general is a matter of precept of the natural law, while
+the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and
+profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept of
+positive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is
+the Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed by nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Fasting considered in itself denotes something not
+eligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is useful
+to some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding under
+precept, but it is binding under precept to each one that stands in
+need of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this
+remedy, both because "in many things we all offend" (James 3:2), and
+because "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal. 5:17), it was
+fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by
+all in common. In doing this the Church does not make a precept of a
+matter of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is
+of general obligation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those commandments which are given under the form of a
+general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but subject
+to the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver. It will be a
+mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt of the
+lawgiver's authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate
+the end intended by him: but it is not a mortal sin if one fails to
+keep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and especially
+if the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were
+present. Hence it is that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the
+Church, sin mortally.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Augustine is speaking there of those things "that are
+neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found
+among the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the
+custom of the universal Church." On the other hand, the fasts that
+are of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are
+sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. Nor are they
+opposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in
+hindering the slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom,
+of which it is written (Gal. 5:13): "You, brethren, have been called
+unto liberty; only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 4]
+
+Whether All Are Bound to Keep the Fasts of the Church?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of
+the Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as
+the commandments of God, according to Luke 10:16, "He that heareth
+you heareth Me." Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God.
+Therefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts appointed by
+the Church.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, children especially are seemingly not exempt from
+fasting, on account of their age: for it is written (Joel 2:15):
+"Sanctify a fast," and further on (Joel 2:16): "Gather together the
+little ones, and them that suck the breasts." Much more therefore are
+all others bound to keep the fasts.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal,
+and necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily
+works are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed
+to spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since
+fasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary
+thing by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts of
+the Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or
+bodily works.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than through
+necessity, as stated in 2 Cor. 9:7. Now the poor are wont to fast
+through necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought
+they to fast willingly.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast.
+For the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to
+Christ's teaching. But our Lord said (Luke 5:34) that "the children
+of the bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them
+[*Vulg.: 'Can you make the children of the bridegroom fast, whilst
+the bridegroom is with them?']." Now He is with all the righteous by
+dwelling in them in a special manner [*Cf. I, Q. 8, A. 3], wherefore
+our Lord said (Matt. 28:20): "Behold I am with you . . . even to the
+consummation of the world." Therefore the righteous are not bound by
+the commandment of the Church to fast.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 98, AA. 2,
+6), general precepts are framed according to the requirements of the
+many. Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver considers what
+happens generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the
+precept to be binding on a person in whom for some special reason
+there is something incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet
+discretion must be brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be
+evident, it is lawful for a man to use his own judgment in omitting
+to fulfil the precept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it
+be difficult for him to have recourse to superior authority. On the
+other hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to
+the superior who has power to grant a dispensation in such cases. And
+this must be done in the fasts appointed by the Church, to which all
+are bound in general, unless there be some special obstacle to this
+observance.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The commandments of God are precepts of the natural
+law, which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the
+commandments of the Church are about matters which are necessary for
+salvation, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of the
+Church. Hence there may be certain obstacles on account of which
+certain persons are not bound to keep the fasts in question.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In children there is a most evident reason for not
+fasting, both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which
+they need to take food frequently, and not much at a time, and
+because they need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth,
+which results from the residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as
+the stage of growth lasts, which as a rule lasts until they have
+completed the third period of seven years, they are not bound to keep
+the Church fasts: and yet it is fitting that even during that time
+they should exercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in
+accordance with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity
+threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of more
+severe penance, according to Jonah 3:7, "Let neither men nor
+beasts . . . taste anything . . . nor drink water."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Apparently a distinction should be made with regard to
+pilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work
+can be conveniently deferred or lessened without detriment to the
+bodily health and such external conditions as are necessary for the
+upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no reason for omitting
+the fasts of the Church. But if one be under the necessity of
+starting on the pilgrimage at once, and of making long stages, or of
+doing much work, either for one's bodily livelihood, or for some need
+of the spiritual life, and it be impossible at the same time to keep
+the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because in
+ordering fasts the Church would not seem to have intended to prevent
+other pious and more necessary undertakings. Nevertheless, in such
+cases one ought seemingly, to seek the superior's dispensation;
+except perhaps when the above course is recognized by custom, since
+when superiors are silent they would seem to consent.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Those poor who can provide themselves with sufficient
+for one meal are not excused, on account of poverty, from keeping the
+fasts of the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to be exempt
+who beg their food piecemeal, since they are unable at any one time
+to have a sufficiency of food.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: This saying of our Lord may be expounded in three ways.
+First, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says that
+"the disciples, who are called children of the bridegroom, were as
+yet of a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared to an old
+garment." Hence while Christ was with them in body they were to be
+fostered with kindness rather than drilled with the harshness of
+fasting. According to this interpretation, it is fitting that
+dispensations should be granted to the imperfect and to beginners,
+rather than to the elders and the perfect, according to a gloss on
+Ps. 130:2, "As a child that is weaned is towards his mother."
+Secondly, we may say with Jerome [*Bede, Comment. in Luc. v] that our
+Lord is speaking here of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law.
+Wherefore our Lord means to say that the apostles were not to be held
+back by the old observances, since they were to be filled with the
+newness of grace. Thirdly, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang.
+ii, 27), who states that fasting is of two kinds. One pertains to
+those who are humbled by disquietude, and this is not befitting
+perfect men, for they are called "children of the bridegroom"; hence
+when we read in Luke: "The children of the bridegroom cannot fast
+[*Hom. xiii, in Matth.]," we read in Matt. 9:15: "The children of the
+bridegroom cannot mourn [*Vulg.: 'Can the children of the bridegroom
+mourn?']." The other pertains to the mind that rejoices in adhering
+to spiritual things: and this fasting is befitting the perfect.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Times for the Church Fast Are Fittingly Ascribed?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the times for the Church fast are
+unfittingly appointed. For we read (Matt. 4) that Christ began to
+fast immediately after being baptized. Now we ought to imitate
+Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16, "Be ye followers of me, as I also
+am of Christ." Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the
+Epiphany when Christ's baptism is celebrated.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to observe the
+ceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to the solemnities of the
+Old Law to fast in certain particular months: for it is written
+(Zech. 8:19): "The fast of the fourth month and the fast of the
+fifth, and the fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall
+be to the house of Judah, joy and gladness and great solemnities."
+Therefore the fast of certain months, which are called Ember days,
+are unfittingly kept in the Church.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27),
+just as there is a fast "of sorrow," so is there a fast "of joy." Now
+it is most becoming that the faithful should rejoice spiritually in
+Christ's Resurrection. Therefore during the five weeks which the
+Church solemnizes on account of Christ's Resurrection, and on Sundays
+which commemorate the Resurrection, fasts ought to be appointed.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the general custom of the Church.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3), fasting is directed to
+two things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of the mind to
+heavenly things. Wherefore fasting ought to be appointed specially
+for those times, when it behooves man to be cleansed from sin, and
+the minds of the faithful to be raised to God by devotion: and these
+things are particularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when
+sins are loosed by baptism, which is solemnly conferred on
+Easter-eve, on which day our Lord's burial is commemorated, because
+"we are buried together with Christ by baptism unto death" (Rom.
+6:4). Moreover at the Easter festival the mind of man ought to be
+devoutly raised to the glory of eternity, which Christ restored by
+rising from the dead, and so the Church ordered a fast to be observed
+immediately before the Paschal feast; and for the same reason, on the
+eve of the chief festivals, because it is then that one ought to make
+ready to keep the coming feast devoutly. Again it is the custom in
+the Church for Holy Orders to be conferred every quarter of the year
+(in sign whereof our Lord fed four thousand men with seven loaves,
+which signify the New Testament year as Jerome says [*Comment. in
+Marc. viii]): and then both the ordainer, and the candidates for
+ordination, and even the whole people, for whose good they are
+ordained, need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the
+ordination. Hence it is related (Luke 6:12) that before choosing His
+disciples our Lord "went out into a mountain to pray": and Ambrose
+[*Exposit. in Luc.] commenting on these words says: "What shouldst
+thou do, when thou desirest to undertake some pious work, since
+Christ prayed before sending His apostles?"
+
+With regard to the forty day's fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi
+in Evang.) there are three reasons for the number. First, "because
+the power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the
+Holy Gospels: since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four."
+Or "because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body
+through whose lusts we transgress the Lord's commandments which are
+delivered to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should
+punish that same body forty times. Or, because, just as under the Law
+it was commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive
+to pay God a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three
+hundred and sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves for thirty-six
+days" (namely, the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) "we pay
+God a tithe of our year." According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ.
+ii, 16) a fourth reason may be added. For the Creator is the
+_Trinity,_ Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: while the number _three_
+refers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded to love God,
+with our whole heart, with our whole soul, and with our whole mind:
+and the number _four_ refers to the visible creature, by reason of
+heat, cold, wet and dry. Thus the number _ten_ [*Ten is the sum of
+three, three, and four] signifies all things, and if this be
+multiplied by four which refers to the body whereby we make use of
+things, we have the number forty.
+
+Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of
+the number of months in each season: or on account of the number of
+Holy orders which are conferred at these times.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but in
+order to commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him to
+fast, not before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to
+fast before our baptism.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the very
+same time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted in
+July, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the
+first), because it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai
+broke the tables of the Law (Ex. 32), and that, according to Jer.
+39:2, "the walls of the city were first broken through." In the fifth
+month, which we call August, they fasted because they were commanded
+not to go up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on
+account of the spies (Num. 14): also in this month the temple of
+Jerusalem was burnt down by Nabuchodonosor (Jer. 52) and afterwards
+by Titus. In the seventh month which we call October, Godolias was
+slain, and the remnants of the people were dispersed (Jer. 51). In
+the tenth month, which we call January, the people who were with
+Ezechiel in captivity heard of the destruction of the temple (Ezech.
+4).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The "fasting of joy" proceeds from the instigation of
+the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore this fasting
+should not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by
+the commandment of the Church are rather "fasts of sorrow" which are
+inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not ordered
+by the Church during the whole of the Paschal season, nor on Sundays:
+and if anyone were to fast at these times in contradiction to the
+custom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi)
+"is to be considered as law," or even through some erroneous opinion
+(thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of
+obligation)--he would not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting
+considered in itself is commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote
+(Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi): "Would that we might fast always."
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 6]
+
+Whether It Is Requisite for Fasting That One Eat but Once?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that
+one eat but once. For, as stated above (A. 2), fasting is an act of
+the virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not
+less than the number of meals. Now the quantity of food is not
+limited for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of
+meals be limited.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by drink:
+wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot
+receive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to
+drink at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should
+not be forbidden to eat several times.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take
+them on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential to
+fasting to take only one meal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the common custom of the Christian people.
+
+_I answer that,_ Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to
+bridle concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one
+meal is seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is
+able to satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from
+concupiscence by minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is
+appointed by the Church, in her moderation, that those who fast
+should take one meal in the day.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It was not possible to fix the same quantity of food
+for all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result
+being that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for
+the most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Fasting is of two kinds [*Cf. A. 1, ad 3]. One is the
+natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This is
+broken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not
+lawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church is another
+kind and is called the "fasting of the faster," and this is not
+broken save by such things as the Church intended to forbid in
+instituting the fast. Now the Church does not intend to command
+abstinence from drink, for this is taken more for bodily refreshment,
+and digestion of the food consumed, although it nourishes somewhat.
+It is, however, possible to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by
+partaking of too much drink: as also by eating immoderately at one
+meal.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not taken
+chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not break
+one's fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were to
+take digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity and
+by way of food.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Ninth Hour Is Suitably Fixed for the Faster's Meal?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed
+for the faster's meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect
+than the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted
+until evening, for it is written (Lev. 23:32): "It is a sabbath . . .
+you shall afflict your souls," and then the text continues: "From
+evening until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths." Much more
+therefore under the New Testament should the fast be ordered until
+the evening.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all.
+But all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore it
+seems that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the
+commandment to fast.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as
+stated above (A. 2). Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply in
+the same way to all, since what is much for one is little for
+another, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should
+not be fixed for those who fast.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Council of Chalons [*The quotation is from the
+Capitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and
+is said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De
+Consecratione] says: "During Lent those are by no means to be
+credited with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of
+Vespers," which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth hour.
+Therefore we ought to fast until the ninth hour.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3, 5), fasting is directed
+to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add
+something to the common custom, yet so as not to be a heavy burden to
+nature. Now the right and common custom is for men to eat about the
+sixth hour: both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natural
+heat being withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the
+surrounding cold of the night), and the humor spread about through
+the limbs (to which result the heat of the day conduces until the sun
+has reached its zenith), and again because it is then chiefly that
+the nature of the human body needs assistance against the external
+heat that is in the air, lest the humors be parched within. Hence, in
+order that those who fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for
+their sins, the ninth hour is suitably fixed for their meal.
+
+Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ's Passion,
+which was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when "bowing His
+head, He gave up the ghost" (John 19:30): because those who fast by
+punishing their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ,
+according to Gal. 5:24, "They that are Christ's, have crucified their
+flesh with the vices and concupiscences."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The state of the Old Testament is compared to the
+night, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day,
+according to Rom. 13:12, "The night is passed and the day is at
+hand." Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but
+not in the New Testament.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a strict
+calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be
+about the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A little more or a little less cannot do much harm. Now
+it is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which men for
+the most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is fixed
+for those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do
+much harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however
+this were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of sickness,
+age, or some similar reason, he should be dispensed from fasting, or
+be allowed to forestall the hour by a little.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 8]
+
+Whether It Is Fitting That Those Who Fast Should Be Bidden to Abstain
+from Flesh Meat, Eggs, and Milk Foods?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be
+bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has
+been stated above (A. 6) that fasting was instituted as a curb on the
+concupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking
+wine more than by eating flesh; according to Prov. 20:1, "Wine is a
+luxurious thing," and Eph. 5:18, "Be not drunk with wine, wherein is
+luxury." Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine,
+it seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh meat.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh of
+certain animals. Now "concupiscence is desire of the delectable," as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 30, A. 1). Therefore since fasting which was
+instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the
+eating of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs and
+cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the Lenten
+fast.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the common custom of the faithful.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), fasting was instituted by
+the Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which
+regard pleasures of touch in connection with food and sex. Wherefore
+the Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which
+both afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great
+incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest
+on the earth, and of those that breathe the air and their products,
+such as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds.
+For, since such like animals are more like man in body, they afford
+greater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body,
+so that from their consumption there results a greater surplus
+available for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great
+incentive to lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to
+abstain especially from these foods.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Three things concur in the act of procreation, namely,
+heat, spirit [*Cf. P. I., Q. 118, A. 1, ad 3], and humor. Wine and
+other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat: flatulent
+foods seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital spirit: but
+it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most productive of
+nourishment, that conduces to the production of humor. Now the
+alteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital spirits are
+of short duration, whereas the substance of the humor remains a long
+time. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of flesh meat rather
+than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the institution of fasting, the Church takes account
+of the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating flesh
+meat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not
+always the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh
+meat, rather than to eat fish.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who fast,
+for as much as they originate from animals that provide us with
+flesh: wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of
+the prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the
+most solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of Christ,
+and because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the mysteries of our
+redemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is forbidden in
+every fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on
+eggs and milk foods. As to the use of the latter things in other
+fasts the custom varies among different people, and each person is
+bound to conform to that custom which is in vogue with those among
+whom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says [*Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii,
+18; cf. De Nat. et Grat. lxvii]: "Let each province keep to its own
+practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they
+were the laws of the apostles."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 148
+
+OF GLUTTONY
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether gluttony is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
+
+(4) Its species;
+
+(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
+
+(6) Its daughters.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Gluttony Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord
+said (Matt. 15:11): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a
+man." Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore,
+since every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid" [*Ep. lxxi, ad
+Lucin.]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid
+this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "Since in eating pleasure
+and necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of
+necessity and the seduction of pleasure," and Augustine says
+(Confess. x, 31): "Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more
+than necessary?" Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin.
+But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and
+thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that "unless we
+first tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous
+appetite, we have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual
+combat." But man's inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and
+drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be
+inordinate through leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of
+moral virtue consists: and a thing is said to be a sin through being
+contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: That which goes into man by way of food, by reason of
+its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually. But the
+Jews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed
+certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their
+signification, but by reason of their nature [*Cf. I-II, Q. 102, A.
+6, ad 1]. It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man
+spiritually.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not regard
+the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being regulated
+by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from
+desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this
+pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a
+case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in
+eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The appetite is twofold. There is the natural appetite,
+which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these powers
+virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to
+reason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from the
+powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and
+thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the
+sensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite
+that the vice of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of
+gluttony denotes inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and this
+is not without sin.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Gluttony Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For
+every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this,
+apparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a
+mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated
+above (Q. 132, A. 3). But gluttony is not opposed to charity, neither
+as regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of one's
+neighbor. Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Cf.
+Append. to St. Augustine's works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)]:
+"Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he
+should know that this is one of the lesser sins." But this pertains
+to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that
+is to say venial, sins.
+
+Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "As long as
+the vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done
+valiantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is
+unrestrained, all virtue comes to naught." But virtue is not done
+away save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the vice of gluttony
+properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of
+reason in regulating the concupiscence may be considered from two
+points of view. First, with regard to things directed to the end,
+inasmuch as they may be incommensurate and consequently
+improportionate to the end; secondly, with regard to the end itself,
+inasmuch as concupiscence turns man away from his due end.
+Accordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in gluttony be found to
+turn man away from the last end, gluttony will be a mortal sin. This
+is the case when he adheres to the pleasure of gluttony as his end,
+for the sake of which he contemns God, being ready to disobey God's
+commandments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other hand,
+if the inordinate concupiscence in the vice of gluttony be found to
+affect only such things as are directed to the end, for instance when
+a man has too great a desire for the pleasures of the palate, yet
+would not for their sake do anything contrary to God's law, it is a
+venial sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by turning
+man away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of reduction,
+it is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands
+us to rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not all directly
+opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which
+contain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain
+specially to justice and its parts, as stated above (Q. 122, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In so far as it turns man away from his last end,
+gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our
+last end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a
+mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as denoting
+inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed to the
+end.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not so much
+on its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from it.
+For Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): "When the belly is distended by
+gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Gluttony Is the Greatest of Sins?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For
+the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the
+punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for
+Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in Matth.]: "Gluttony turned Adam out of
+Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of
+Noah." According to Ezech. 16:49, "This was the iniquity of Sodom,
+thy sister . . . fulness of bread," etc. Therefore the sin of
+gluttony is the greatest of all.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful. Now
+gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on Ps.
+135:10, "Who smote Egypt with their first-born," says: "Lust,
+concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony." Therefore
+gluttony is the greatest of sins.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man should love himself in the first place after
+God, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 4). Now man, by the vice of gluttony,
+inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (Ecclus. 37:34): "By
+surfeiting many have perished." Therefore gluttony is the greatest of
+sins, at least excepting those that are against God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is
+reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii).
+
+_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways.
+First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is
+committed: and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine
+things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the
+greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment
+of the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person who
+sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished
+rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking
+food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and
+moderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the point of view of the
+result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity,
+inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These punishments are to be referred to the vices that
+resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang,
+rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from
+Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to an act of
+gluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom
+were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This objection argues from the standpoint of the sins
+that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more powerful,
+unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but
+the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other vices.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The glutton intends, not the harm to his body, but the
+pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is
+accidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of
+gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man
+incur some bodily injury through taking too much food.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Species of Gluttony Are Fittingly Distinguished?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly
+distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): "The vice of
+gluttony tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of
+need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food
+to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of
+refreshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of
+an immoderate appetite"--which are contained in the following verse:
+"Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily."
+
+For the above are distinguished according to diversity of
+circumstance. Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do
+not differentiate its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are
+not distinguished according to the aforesaid.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then
+gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that
+there should likewise be others in respect of place and other
+circumstances.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so do
+the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the
+other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various
+circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony
+distinguished thus.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), gluttony denotes inordinate
+concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in
+eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly,
+the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First,
+with regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance
+or species of food a man seeks "sumptuous"--i.e. costly food; as
+regards its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely--i.e.
+"daintily"; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating "too much."
+
+Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the
+consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time
+for eating, which is to eat "hastily," or one fails to observe the
+due manner of eating, by eating "greedily."
+
+Isidore [*De Summo Bon. ii, 42] comprises the first and second under
+one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in "what" he eats,
+or in "how much," "how" or "when he eats."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The corruption of various circumstances causes the
+various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by
+reason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For
+in him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the
+very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time
+concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Place and other circumstances include no special motive
+connected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In all other vices, whenever different circumstances
+correspond to different motives, the difference of circumstances
+argues a specific difference of vice: but this does not apply to all
+circumstances, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 9).
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Gluttony Is a Capital Vice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For
+capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause,
+other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has
+not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but
+for the body's nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain
+pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony,
+which, in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins,
+seeing that it is most akin to what is [according to nature].
+Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sin results from a man forsaking the [good] of
+virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or
+pleasing to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of
+utility, there is but one capital vice, namely covetousness.
+Therefore, seemingly, there would be but one capital vice in respect
+of pleasures: and this is lust, which is a greater vice than
+gluttony, and is about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a
+capital vice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among
+the capital vices.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3), a capital vice
+denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e. as having a
+most desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring
+that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered
+most desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness
+which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to
+happiness, according to _Ethic._ i, 8; x, 3, 7, 8. Therefore the vice
+of gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost
+among other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is true that food itself is directed to something as
+its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most
+desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it
+follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil
+of man's life is directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7, "All the
+labor of man is for his mouth." Yet gluttony seems to be about
+pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as
+Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), "with such food as is good for
+the worthless body, men desire to be fed," wherein namely the
+pleasure consists, "rather than to be filled: since the whole end of
+that desire is this--not to thirst and not to hunger."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the
+conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the
+aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has
+the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and
+consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital
+vices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is
+useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something
+else: wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of
+desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such
+things.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 6]
+
+Whether [Five] Daughters Are Fittingly Assigned to Gluttony?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that [five] daughters are unfittingly
+assigned to gluttony, to wit, "unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness,
+loquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding."
+For unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14,
+"Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked
+things." Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin,
+according to Prov. 14:22, "They err that work evil." Therefore they
+are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of
+gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Isa.
+28:8, "All tables were full of vomit and filth." But this seems to be
+not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter
+of counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, "If thou hast been forced to
+eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee."
+Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as a
+daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the
+daughters of gluttony.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters
+to gluttony.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), gluttony consists
+properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore
+those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are
+the results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be
+accounted for either on the part of the soul or on the part of the
+body. On the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First,
+as regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat
+and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony,
+"dullness of sense in the understanding," on account of the fumes of
+food disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence
+conduces to the penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles.
+2:3, "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I
+might turn my mind in wisdom." Secondly, as regards the appetite,
+which is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating and
+drinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm, and in this
+respect "unseemly joy" is reckoned, because all the other inordinate
+passions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5.
+To this we must refer the saying of 3 Esdr. 3:20, that "wine . . .
+gives every one a confident and joyful mind." Thirdly, as regards
+inordinate words, and thus we have "loquaciousness," because as
+Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), "unless gluttons were carried away by
+immoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted
+sumptuously every day would not have been so tortured in his tongue."
+Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we have
+"scurrility," i.e. a kind of levity resulting from lack of reason,
+which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also to restrain
+outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:4, "Or foolish talking or
+scurrility," says that "fools call this geniality--i.e. jocularity,
+because it is wont to raise a laugh." Both of these, however, may be
+referred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason
+of excess which belongs to "loquaciousness," or by reason of
+unbecomingness, which belongs to "scurrility."
+
+On the part of the body, mention is made of "uncleanness," which may
+refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities,
+or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph.
+5:3, "But fornication and all uncleanness," says: "That is, any kind
+of incontinence that has reference to lust."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin,
+especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous
+joy which is described as "unseemly" arises chiefly from immoderate
+partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that dullness of
+sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas
+dullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from
+gluttony, for the reason given above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although it does one good to vomit after eating too
+much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by
+immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting
+as a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not
+from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be
+referred to either vice.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 149
+
+OF SOBRIETY
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely
+drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is the matter of sobriety?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
+
+(3) Whether the use of wine is lawful?
+
+(4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Drink Is the Matter of Sobriety?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to
+sobriety. For it is written (Rom. 12:3): "Not to be more wise than it
+behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." Therefore
+sobriety is also about wisdom, and not only about drink.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wis.
+8:7) that "she teacheth sobriety [Douay: 'temperance'], and prudence,
+and justice, and fortitude," where sobriety stands for temperance.
+Now temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and
+sexual matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from "measure"
+[*_Bria,_ a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's
+_Lexicon_]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things
+appertaining to us: for it is written (Titus 2:12): "We should live
+soberly and justly and godly," where a gloss remarks: "Soberly, in
+ourselves"; and (1 Tim. 2:9): "Women . . . in decent apparel,
+adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety." Consequently it would
+seem that sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things
+appertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter
+proper to sobriety.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): "Wine taken with
+sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou
+shalt be sober."
+
+_I answer that,_ When a virtue is denominated from some condition
+common to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that
+in which it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that
+condition of virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and
+temperance about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from
+"measure," for a man is said to be sober because he observes the
+_bria,_ i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to
+that matter wherein the observance of the measure is most deserving
+of praise. Such matter is the drinking of intoxicants, because the
+measured use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess
+therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of reason even more
+than excessive eating. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 31:37, 38):
+"Sober drinking is health to soul and body; wine drunken with excess
+raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins." For this reason sobriety
+is especially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but that
+which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the brain,
+such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may be
+employed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter, as stated
+above (Q. 123, A. 2; Q. 141, A. 2) with regard to fortitude and
+temperance.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his
+body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is
+said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its
+delight, according to Ps. 22:5, "My chalice which inebriateth me, how
+goodly is it!" Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in
+speaking of the contemplation of wisdom.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All the things that belong properly to temperance are
+necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore
+it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the
+business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to
+designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than
+in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with
+drink.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety
+is not properly employed in connection with all things, but only in
+those wherein there is most need for a measure.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Sobriety Is by Itself a Special Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special
+virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now
+there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety,
+which is about drink, a special virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch
+as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make
+food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment.
+Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink
+is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats and
+of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue,
+seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each
+different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it
+would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons sobriety
+to be a special part of temperance.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 146, A. 2), it belongs to moral
+virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may
+hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason,
+there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating
+drink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch
+as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove
+this hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is sobriety, is
+requisite.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good
+of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and in
+this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But
+intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above,
+wherefore it requires a special virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink,
+considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does
+not follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds
+of food.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of
+hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks
+bears an accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does
+not call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the
+difference of meats.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Use of Wine Is Altogether Unlawful?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the use of wine is altogether
+unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of
+salvation: since it is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him
+that dwelleth with wisdom," and further on (Wis. 9:19): "By wisdom
+they were healed, whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the
+beginning." Now the use of wine is a hindrance to wisdom, for it is
+written (Eccles. 2:3): "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh
+from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom." Therefore
+wine-drinking is altogether unlawful.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): "It is good not to
+eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is
+offended or scandalized, or made weak." Now it is sinful to forsake
+the good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one's brethren.
+Therefore it is unlawful to make use of wine.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i] that "after the
+deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last of
+the ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning."
+Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian law.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:23): "Do not still
+drink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thy
+frequent infirmities"; and it is written (Ecclus. 31:36): "Wine
+drunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart."
+
+_I answer that,_ No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful,
+according to Matt. 15:11, "Not that which goeth into the mouth
+defileth a man." Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such.
+Yet it may become unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a
+circumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily
+the worse for taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to
+drink wine: sometimes it results from the mode of drinking, because
+to wit he exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on
+account of others who would be scandalized thereby.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a general
+way, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way it
+is required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain
+altogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use.
+Secondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in
+this way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly, it is requisite for
+certain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this
+depends on circumstances of certain persons and places.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to
+abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would
+give scandal to certain people.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Christ withdraws us from some things as being
+altogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to
+perfection. It is in the latter way that he withdraws some from the
+use of wine, that they may aim at perfection, even as from riches and
+the like.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Sobriety Is More Requisite in Persons of Greater Standing?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons
+of greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing;
+wherefore honor and reverence are due to the old, according to Lev.
+19:32, "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the
+aged man." Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should be
+exhorted to sobriety, according to Titus 2:2, "That the aged man be
+sober." Therefore sobriety is most requisite in persons of standing.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and
+the Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 1 Tim. 3:2, "It
+behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife,
+sober, prudent," etc. Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in
+persons of high standing.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is
+forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs:
+while it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction,
+according to Prov. 31:4, "Give not wine to kings," and further on
+(Prov. 31:6), "Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to
+them that are grieved in mind." Therefore sobriety is more requisite
+in persons of standing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:11): "The women in like
+manner, chaste . . . sober," etc., and (Titus 2:6) "Young men in like
+manner exhort that they be sober."
+
+_I answer that,_ Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the
+contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads.
+Accordingly a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons
+for two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the
+concupiscences which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the
+vices which are removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most
+requisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence of
+pleasure thrives in the young on account of the heat of youth, while
+in women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist
+concupiscence. Hence, according to Valerius Maximus [*Dict. Fact.
+Memor. ii, 1] among the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Secondly,
+sobriety is more requisite in certain persons, as being more
+necessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of
+wine is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety
+is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should be vigorous
+in instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church,
+who should fulfil their spiritual duties with a devout mind; and to
+kings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 150
+
+OF DRUNKENNESS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether drunkenness is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(3) Whether it is the most grievous sin?
+
+(4) Whether it excuses from sin?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Drunkenness Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a sin. For every
+sin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to
+daring, and presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to
+drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every sin is voluntary [*Augustine, De Vera Relig.
+xiv]. But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be
+deprived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whoever causes another to sin, sins himself.
+Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a
+sin to ask a man to drink that which makes him drunk, which would
+seem very hard.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, every sin calls for correction. But correction is
+not applied to drunkards: for Gregory [*Cf. Canon Denique, dist. 4
+where Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of
+Canterbury] says that "we must forbear with their ways, lest they
+become worse if they be compelled to give up the habit." Therefore
+drunkenness is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:13): "Not in rioting and
+drunkenness."
+
+_I answer that,_ Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it
+may signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking
+much wine, the consequence being that he loses the use of reason. In
+this sense drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect
+resulting from a fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by
+which a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunkenness in two
+ways. In one way, through the wine being too strong, without the
+drinker being cognizant of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may
+occur without sin, especially if it is not through his negligence,
+and thus we believe that Noah was made drunk as related in Gen. 9. In
+another way drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and
+use of wine: in this way it is accounted a sin, and is comprised
+under gluttony as a species under its genus. For gluttony is divided
+into "surfeiting [Douay: 'rioting'] and drunkenness," which are
+forbidden by the Apostle (Rom. 13:13).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11), insensibility
+which is opposed to temperance "is not very common," so that like its
+species which are opposed to the species of intemperance it has no
+name. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and yet if a
+man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting
+nature grievously, he would not be free from sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This objection regards the resulting defect which is
+involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is
+in this that the sin consists.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows not the
+strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to drink
+excused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind of
+person to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be
+lacking neither is excused from sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be
+foregone, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 6). Hence Augustine says in
+a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), "Meseems, such things are cured
+not by bitterness, severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than
+commanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be
+followed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should
+be treated with severity."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Drunkenness Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For
+Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the Appendix
+to St. Augustine's works] that "drunkenness if indulged in
+assiduously, is a mortal sin." Now assiduity denotes a circumstance
+which does not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot
+aggravate a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as
+shown above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 5). Therefore if drunkenness is not a
+mortal sin for some other reason, neither is it for this.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St.
+Augustine's works]: "Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is
+necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins." Now
+the lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is
+caused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of
+medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician,
+that they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink
+drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli,
+xlii): "A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or
+gambling, or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed;
+a subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either
+give them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity."
+Now such punishments are not inflicted save for mortal sins.
+Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing
+Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine.
+Now this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows
+not the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness
+may be without sin, as stated above (A. 1). Secondly, so that he
+perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be
+intoxicating, and then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Thirdly,
+it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate
+and intoxicating, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from
+drink. Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals
+take their species not from things that occur accidentally and beside
+the intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way
+drunkenness is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and
+knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs
+virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running
+the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De
+Abraham i.]): "We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which
+prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For the things we avoid when
+sober, we unknowingly commit through drunkenness." Therefore
+drunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on
+account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is
+impossible for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing
+himself to drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many
+times experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to
+drunkenness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To take more meat or drink than is necessary belongs to
+the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but knowingly
+to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin.
+Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Drunkenness is far from me:
+Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full feeding
+sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 141, A. 6), meat and drink should
+be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body's health.
+Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink which
+are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so too
+it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man is
+moderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or
+drinks much at the physician's advice in order to provoke vomiting,
+he is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There
+is, however, no need for intoxicating drink in order to procure
+vomiting, since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore
+this is no sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 3]
+
+Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins.
+For Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that "nothing gains the
+devil's favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the
+vices." And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante
+omnia): "Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by
+the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the vices."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good of
+reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of
+drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its
+punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely; for
+Ambrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that "there would be no
+slavery, were there no drunkards." Therefore drunkenness is the
+greatest of sins.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12),
+spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one
+of the carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be evil because it removes a
+good. Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver
+the evil. Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a
+human good. Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are
+graver than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the
+good of human reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because such
+like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this
+reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not
+for being graver than other sins, but because they occur more
+frequently among men.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way
+by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes
+away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more
+the character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of
+reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by
+drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue,
+which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason, are
+always good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery, in so
+far as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants, for
+having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But
+slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Drunkenness Excuses from Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin.
+For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "the drunkard deserves
+double punishment." Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of
+excusing from it.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases it.
+Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as
+man's reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence. But
+concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is
+drunkenness.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43),
+Lot was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as
+stated above (A. 1), namely the resulting defect and the preceding
+act. On the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is
+fettered, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it
+causes an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of
+the preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if
+the drunkenness that results from that act be without sin, the
+subsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case
+of Lot. If, however, the preceding act was sinful, the person is not
+altogether excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is
+rendered voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding act,
+inasmuch as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into
+the subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished,
+even as the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore
+Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that "Lot's guilt is to be
+measured, not by the incest, but by his drunkenness."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard deserves
+more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment for
+his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the
+law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered
+"those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished
+than if they had been sober, because they do wrong in more ways than
+one." In this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), "he seems to
+have considered the advantage," namely of the prevention of wrong,
+"rather than the leniency which one should have for drunkards,"
+seeing that they are not in possession of their faculties.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the point
+of its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that
+results from it, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the reason, as
+drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to make a man
+insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it
+is less grievous to sin through weakness than through malice.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 151
+
+OF CHASTITY
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity:
+(2) virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the
+contrary vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether chastity is a virtue?
+
+(2) Whether it is a general virtue?
+
+(3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence?
+
+(4) Of its relation to purity.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Chastity Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we
+are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs
+to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in
+a certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body.
+Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, virtue is "a voluntary habit," as stated in _Ethic._
+ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can be
+taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore
+it seems that chastity is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some
+unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But
+chastity is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore chastity
+is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de
+Tempore]): "Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since
+chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust,
+while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious."
+
+_I answer that,_ Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason
+"chastises" concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the
+Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue
+consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above
+(I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a
+virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject,
+though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that a
+man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the
+judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), "so long as her
+mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even in
+body, not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her body of
+its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering continency." He
+also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "in the mind there is a virtue
+which is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved to suffer
+any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "it is
+impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is
+it possible to be just unless one live by faith." Whence he argues
+that in unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other
+virtue, because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as
+he adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) "virtues are distinguished from vices
+not by their functions," i.e. their acts, "but by their ends."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in
+accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it
+is reckoned among the fruits.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Chastity Is a General Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For
+Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that "chastity of the mind is the
+well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to
+the greater things." But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore
+chastity is a general virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "Chastity" takes its name from "chastisement" [*Cf.
+A. 1]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be chastised
+by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the
+appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But fornication
+seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (Ps. 72:27):
+"Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.: 'hast destroyed'] all them that go
+awhoring from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee." Therefore chastity is
+a general virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be
+a part of temperance.
+
+_I answer that,_ The word "chastity" is employed in two ways. First,
+properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter,
+namely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly,
+the word "chastity" is employed metaphorically: for just as a
+mingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper
+matter of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the
+spiritual union of the mind with certain things conduces to a
+pleasure which is the matter of a spiritual chastity metaphorically
+speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication likewise
+metaphorically so called. For if the human mind delight in the
+spiritual union with that to which it behooves it to be united,
+namely God, and refrains from delighting in union with other things
+against the requirements of the order established by God, this may be
+called a spiritual chastity, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have
+espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste
+virgin to Christ." If, on the other hand, the mind be united to any
+other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the Divine
+order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to Jer.
+3:1, "But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers." Taking
+chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue
+withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful
+things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists
+principally in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the
+human mind is united to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical sense.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 1; Q. 142, A. 2), the concupiscence
+of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child,
+because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of
+pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature.
+Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered
+by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a
+child left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these
+pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and
+consequently chastity is applied antonomastically to such like
+concupiscences, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we
+stand in the greatest need of strength of mind.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers spiritual fornication
+metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity,
+as stated.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Chastity Is a Distinct Virtue from Abstinence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue
+from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same,
+one virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the
+same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate
+which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are
+the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity
+is not a distinct virtue from abstinence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of
+intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now "chastity"
+takes its name from "chastisement" of the contrary vices. Since then
+certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is
+chastity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of
+temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are
+the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the
+matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are
+the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand.
+Cf. Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on Titus 1:7, "Not given to
+wine, no striker," etc.: "The belly and the organs of generation are
+neighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their
+complicity in vice." Therefore abstinence and chastity are not
+distinct virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5, 6) reckons "chastity"
+together with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4), temperance is
+properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that
+where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different
+virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate
+to the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in _Ethic._ ix,
+4, 5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food
+whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically
+from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the
+nature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is
+about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which
+is about pleasures of the palate.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as
+regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch, which
+judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as
+regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in _Ethic._ iii,
+10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in
+character. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though
+they regard the one sense.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more
+oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and
+therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint,
+since if one consent to them this increases the force of
+concupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine
+says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the
+manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those
+bodily contacts which belong to the married state."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the
+maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are directed to
+pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there
+is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of
+the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are
+essentially directed to the preservation of man's life: wherefore by
+their very nature they have a special virtue, although this virtue
+which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Purity Belongs Especially to Chastity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that purity does not belong especially to
+chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity is a
+virtue of the soul." Therefore it is not something belonging to
+chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, _pudicitia_ (purity) is derived from _pudor,_ which
+is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De Fide
+Orth. ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all
+sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to the
+other virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "every
+kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach." Now it would
+seem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach.
+Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not
+especially to chastity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): "We must
+give praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none
+but a lawful use the organs intended for procreation." Now the use of
+these organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity
+belongs properly to chastity.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Obj. 2), _pudicitia_ (purity) takes
+its name from _pudor,_ which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs
+be properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men
+are most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei
+xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by
+the honesty [*Cf. Q. 145] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and
+this because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject
+to the command of reason, as are the movements of the other external
+members. Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of
+all the signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6).
+Consequently purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially
+the signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And
+since the latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather
+these external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union.
+Therefore purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct
+therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless
+the one is sometimes used to designate the other.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is here speaking of purity as designating
+chastity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the vices
+of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above (Q. 142,
+A. 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins are most
+deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination of the
+genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason is
+absorbed.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 152
+
+OF VIRGINITY
+(In Five Articles)
+
+We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) In what does virginity consist?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful?
+
+(3) Whether it is a virtue?
+
+(4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage;
+
+(5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Virginity Consists in Integrity of the Flesh?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that virginity does not consist in
+integrity of the flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.) [*The
+quotation is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii] that "virginity is the
+continual meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh." But
+meditation does not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not
+situated in the flesh.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine
+says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity dwells in the soul." Therefore
+virginity is not incorruption of the flesh.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in
+the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken without
+loss of virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "those
+organs may be injured through being wounded by mischance. Physicians,
+too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder
+to see: and a midwife has been known to destroy by touch the proof of
+virginity that she sought." And he adds: "Nobody, I think, would be
+so foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily
+sanctity, though she lost the integrity of that organ." Therefore
+virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in
+resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation,
+whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost
+without copulation: for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that
+"virginal integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual
+intercourse is the portion of angels." Therefore virginity does not
+consist in incorruption of the flesh.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "virginity
+is continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated
+and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh."
+
+_I answer that,_ Virginity takes its name apparently from _viror_
+(freshness), and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining
+its freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so
+too, virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared
+by the heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the
+greatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence,
+Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 5) that "virginal chastity is integrity
+free of pollution."
+
+Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The
+first is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of
+virginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the
+soul and that which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of
+the semen, causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the
+part of the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of
+these three the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such
+must be considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the
+relation of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions are
+the matters of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of
+form and complement, because the essence of morality is perfected in
+that which concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists in
+freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity
+of the bodily organ is accidental to virginity; while freedom from
+pleasure in resolution of the semen is related thereto materially;
+and the purpose of perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the
+formal and completive element in virginity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This definition of Augustine's expresses directly that
+which is formal in virginity. For "meditation" denotes reason's
+purpose; and the addition "perpetual" does not imply that a virgin
+must always retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear
+in mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material
+element is expressed indirectly by the words "on incorruption in a
+corruptible body." This is added to show the difficulty of virginity:
+for if the flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to
+maintain a perpetual meditation on incorruption.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in the
+soul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same
+with virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that
+"although virginity resides in the flesh," and for this reason is a
+bodily quality, "yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency
+fosters and preserves."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ is
+accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely
+abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily
+organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other
+way, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of
+a hand or foot.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise
+in two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it destroys
+virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine, however,
+mentions copulation, because such like resolution is the ordinary and
+natural result thereof. In another way this may happen beside the
+purpose of the mind, either during sleep, or through violence and
+without the mind's consent, although the flesh derives pleasure from
+it, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case of those who
+are subject to a flow of semen. In such cases virginity is not
+forfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity
+which excludes virginity.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Virginity Is Unlawful?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever
+is contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as
+the words of Gen. 2:16, "Of every tree" that is in "paradise, thou
+shalt eat," indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to
+the preservation of the individual, so also the words of Gen. 1:28,
+"Increase and multiply, and fill the earth," express a precept of the
+natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species.
+Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this
+would be to act counter to the good of the individual, so too it is a
+sin to abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to
+act against the good of the species.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is
+apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue,
+since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher
+says (Ethic. ii, 2), that "he who revels in every pleasure, and
+abstains from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from
+all is loutish and insensible." Therefore virginity is something
+sinful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden
+times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius
+Maximus asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to
+Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato "is said to have sacrificed to
+nature, in order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as
+though it were a sin." Therefore virginity is a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But
+virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor.
+7:25): "Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I
+give counsel." Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing.
+
+_I answer that,_ In human acts, those are sinful which are against
+right reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an
+end should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again,
+man's good is threefold as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8; one consisting in
+external things, for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily
+goods; the third, consisting in the goods of the soul among which the
+goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the
+active life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord
+declared (Luke 10:42), "Mary hath chosen the better part." Of these
+goods those that are external are directed to those which belong to
+the body, and those which belong to the body are directed to those
+which belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to the
+active life are directed to those which belong to the life of
+contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use
+external goods in a measure proportionate to the body, and in like
+manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from
+possessing certain things (which otherwise it were good for him to
+possess), for the sake of his body's good, or of the contemplation of
+truth, this is not sinful, but in accord with right reason. In like
+manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely
+to give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance
+with the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains from all
+venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine
+contemplation: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34): "The unmarried
+woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may
+be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that is married thinketh
+on the things of the world, how she may please her husband."
+Therefore it follows that virginity instead of being sinful is worthy
+of praise.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above (Q. 122, A.
+1). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be
+fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside
+without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and
+the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the
+multitude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be
+discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one person doing
+this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law
+which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual,
+otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the
+precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which
+needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually.
+Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if
+some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while others abstaining
+from this betake themselves to the contemplation of Divine things,
+for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus too in an
+army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and others
+fight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the
+multitude, although they cannot be done by one person.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right reason,
+abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for
+pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does
+not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is
+venereal: and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated
+above. Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to
+quantity but to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6: wherefore
+it is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that "in point of
+quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point of becomingness he
+follows the mean."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more
+frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone
+refrained from all venereal pleasure through love of the
+contemplation of truth: as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence
+it was not through thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice,
+but "because he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow
+countrymen," as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii).
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Virginity Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For "no
+virtue is in us by nature," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1).
+Now virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born.
+Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Yet some have other virtues without having
+virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without
+virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would involve
+the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But virginity
+is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii ad
+Eustoch.]: "Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin
+after her downfall." Therefore seemingly virginity is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost
+without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal
+purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity is not
+a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of virginity
+moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we
+should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the formal and completive
+element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal
+pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so
+far, to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine
+things: while the material element in virginity is integrity of the
+flesh free of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest
+that where a good action has a special matter through having a
+special excellence, there is a special kind of virtue: for example,
+magnificence which is about great expenditure is for this reason a
+special virtue distinct from liberality, which is about all uses of
+money in general. Now to keep oneself free from the experience of
+venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own deserving of greater
+praise than keeping oneself free from inordinate venereal pleasure.
+Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related to chastity as
+magnificence to liberality.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Men have from their birth that which is material in
+virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal
+experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity,
+namely the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake,
+which purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence
+Augustine says (De Virgin. xi): "Nor do we praise virgins for being
+virgins, but, because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy
+continency."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that which
+is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as
+stated above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), but not by reason of that which is
+material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing
+the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus
+a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of
+magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues
+lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the
+flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity,
+his mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding
+this same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do
+so: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the
+purpose of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a
+position to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in
+mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which
+preparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that
+which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material
+therein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he
+does not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a
+person who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the
+matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity.
+
+As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be
+miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ,
+which we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something
+else which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who
+has experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that
+experience. For God cannot make that which is done not to have been
+done, as stated in the First Part (Q. 25, A. 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by
+vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin.
+viii) that "by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed,
+consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and
+flesh." Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because
+it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to
+it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds
+something to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that
+which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from
+venereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity
+alone is accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is
+reckoned above liberality.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Virginity Is More Excellent Than Marriage?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than
+marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): "Continence was
+equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who
+begot children." Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore
+virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his
+virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence,
+it would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than
+any married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not
+preferable to marriage.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the common good takes precedence of the private
+good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is
+directed to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.
+xvi): "What food is to a man's wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse
+to the welfare of the human race." On the other hand, virginity is
+ordered to the individual good, namely in order to avoid what the
+Apostle calls the "tribulation of the flesh," to which married people
+are subject (1 Cor. 7:28). Therefore virginity is not greater than
+conjugal continence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): "Both solid
+reason and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage
+sinful, nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or
+even to that of widowhood."
+
+_I answer that,_ According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of
+Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to
+marriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ
+Who both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a
+virgin, and by the teaching of the Apostle who (1 Cor. 7) counsels
+virginity as the greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both
+because a Divine good takes precedence of a human good, and because
+the good of the soul is preferable to the good of the body, and again
+because the good of the contemplative life is better than that of the
+active life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in
+respect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking "on the
+things of God" [Vulg.: 'the Lord'], whereas marriage is directed to
+the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the human race,
+and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace
+the married life have to think "on the things of the world," as the
+Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is
+preferable to conjugal continence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but
+still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so
+disposed, that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in
+keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal
+continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of
+John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards the
+accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that
+both "the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought
+Christ's battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but John
+was continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in
+habit."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a
+married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First, on
+the part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married person is more
+prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be expedient,
+than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono
+Conjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: "I am no better than
+Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the
+chastity of marriage." Further on he gives the reason for this: "For
+what I do now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him
+to do it then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved
+me now to do it." Secondly, because perhaps the person who is not a
+virgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De
+Virgin. xliv): "Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to
+the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on
+account of some mental fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom,
+whereas this woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is
+already able to drink the chalice of the Lord?"
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The common good takes precedence of the private good,
+if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is
+better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated
+to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (De
+Virgin. ix): "It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the
+flesh, even of those women who in these times seek naught else from
+marriage but children in order to make them servants of Christ,
+cannot compensate for lost virginity."
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Virginity Is the Greatest of Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues.
+For Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg.]): "We address
+ourselves now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less
+exalted is their vocation. They are a flower of the Church's sowing,
+the pride and ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion
+of Christ's flock."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue. Now
+the greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold
+fruit, according to a gloss on Matt. 13:23. Therefore virginity is
+the greatest of the virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the greater
+it is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is
+declared in the Apocalypse (14:4) that virgins "follow the Lamb
+whithersoever He goeth," and (Apoc. 14:3) that they sing "a new
+canticle," which "no" other "man" could say. Therefore virginity is
+the greatest of the virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): "No one,
+methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom," and (De Virgin.
+xlv): "The authority of the Church informs the faithful in no
+uncertain manner, so that they know in what place the martyrs and the
+holy virgins who have departed this life are commemorated in the
+Sacrament of the Altar." By this we are given to understand that
+martyrdom, and also the monastic state, are preferable to virginity.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in
+some particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely
+in the genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of
+widowhood and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to
+chastity antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is
+ascribed to chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 7): "Can
+anyone esteem any beauty greater than a virgin's, since she is
+beloved of her King, approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord,
+consecrated to her God?" Secondly, a thing may be most excellent
+simply, and in this way virginity is not the most excellent of the
+virtues. Because the end always excels that which is directed to the
+end; and the more effectively a thing is directed to the end, the
+better it is. Now the end which renders virginity praiseworthy is
+that one may have leisure for Divine things, as stated above (A. 4).
+Wherefore the theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion,
+the acts of which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are
+preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in
+order to cleave to God--since for this end they hold their own life
+in contempt; and those who dwell in monasteries--since for this end
+they give up their own will and all that they may possess--than
+virgins who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose.
+Therefore virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Virgins are "the more honored portion of Christ's
+flock," and "their glory more sublime" in comparison with widows and
+married women.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity,
+according to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.], on account of its
+superiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed,
+and to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But
+according to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), "the hundredfold fruit
+is given to martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to
+married persons." Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is
+simply the greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other
+degrees of chastity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,"
+because they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but
+also of the flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore
+they follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they
+follow more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more
+closely by imitation of the mind. The "new hymn" which virgins alone
+sing, is their joy at having preserved integrity of the flesh.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 153
+
+OF LUST
+(In Five Articles)
+
+We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity:
+(1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are
+five points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is the matter of lust?
+
+(2) Whether all copulation is unlawful?
+
+(3) Whether lust is a mortal sin?
+
+(4) Whether lust is a capital vice?
+
+(5) Concerning its daughters.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Matter of Lust Is Only Venereal Desires and Pleasures?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of lust is not only
+venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6)
+that "lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance." But surfeit
+regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore
+lust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:1): "Wine is a lustful
+[Douay: 'luxurious'] thing." Now wine is connected with pleasure of
+meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, lust is defined "as the desire of wanton pleasure"
+[*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure
+regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore
+lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.
+
+_On the contrary,_ To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii
+[*Written by St. Augustine]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the
+flesh shall reap corruption." Now the sowing of the flesh refers to
+venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x), "a lustful man is one who
+is debauched with pleasures." Now venereal pleasures above all
+debauch a man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with
+such like pleasures.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to
+pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is
+referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal
+pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a
+man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters
+pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says "lust is any
+kind of surfeit."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense
+in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the
+use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the
+name of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to
+which also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks
+(De Civ. xiv, 15, 16).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 2]
+
+Whether No Venereal Act Can Be Without Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin.
+For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal
+act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i,
+10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its
+height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts."
+Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason
+is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and "deficiency"
+as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is
+excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is
+incompatible with the act of understanding," as the Philosopher
+observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.;
+Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of
+the prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy.
+Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now
+original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without
+which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et
+Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a
+sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no
+sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals,
+nor a commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse
+between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not
+every venereal act is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the
+order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering
+everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if
+one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a
+fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted,
+provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the
+preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good,
+so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a
+very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the
+preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal
+acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence
+Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's well
+being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human
+race." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be
+taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the
+body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided
+they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of
+human procreation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways.
+First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this
+nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the
+perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by
+that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual
+intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height,
+i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.
+viii): "Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about
+serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the
+word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna's conjugal
+chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more
+that of the Virgin Mary."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 152, A. 2, ad 2; I-II, Q. 64, A.
+2), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with
+right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a
+venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean
+of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of
+pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the
+disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior
+appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the
+act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free
+act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with
+the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act
+of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in
+accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person
+to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are
+not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the
+punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling
+against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the child,
+shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which
+is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin."
+Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that
+it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Lust That Is About Venereal Acts Can Be a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a
+sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is
+the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim.
+i, 18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other
+superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal
+acts.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of
+what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own,
+except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in
+venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no
+vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now
+wine is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the
+Apostle (Eph. 5:18), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay:
+'luxury']." Therefore lust is forbidden.
+
+Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19
+[Douay: 'luxury'].
+
+_I answer that,_ The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves
+one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more
+sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of
+venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary
+for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race.
+Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for observing the order of
+reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection
+against the dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust
+consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the
+matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener.
+Anim. i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed." For it is said
+to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the
+nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative
+power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not
+to be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided
+one observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the
+emission of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting
+the end for which it is needed.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:20) in speaking against
+lust, "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in
+your body." Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a
+man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine
+says (De Decem. Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): "God Who thus
+governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and
+commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which
+thou hast begun to be."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The opposite of lust is not found in many, since men
+are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised
+under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for
+sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Lust Is a Capital Vice?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is
+apparently the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on Eph.
+5:3 (Cf. 2 Cor. 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony,
+according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a
+capital vice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as pride
+of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind
+safeguard the chastity of the flesh." Now it is seemingly contrary to
+the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore
+lust is not a capital vice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Eph. 4:19,
+"Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness." But
+despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of
+sloth, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4, ad 2). Much less, therefore, is
+lust a capital vice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the
+capital vices.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 148, A. 5; I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3,
+4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that
+through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all
+of which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice.
+Now the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great.
+Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive
+appetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and
+because such like concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is
+evident that lust is a capital vice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 148, A. 6), according to some, the
+uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain
+uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point.
+If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it
+is caused by gluttony materially--in so far as gluttony provides the
+bodily matter of lust--and not under the aspect of final cause, in
+which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the cause of
+others.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 132, A. 4, ad 1), when we were
+treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all
+sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly
+through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair,
+so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle
+thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary
+for a capital vice.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Daughters of Lust Are Fittingly Described?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly
+reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy,
+rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence
+or despair of a future world." For mental blindness, thoughtlessness
+and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every
+sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not
+be reckoned especially as daughters of lust.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated
+above (Q. 128, ad 6; Q. 137, A. 3). But lust is contrary, not to
+fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter
+of lust.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the
+origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).
+Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four,
+namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking."
+There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
+
+_I answer that,_ When the lower powers are strongly moved towards
+their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and
+disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that
+the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently
+intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of
+the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely
+the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.
+
+Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is
+simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act
+is hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived
+thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart." In this respect we have
+"blindness of mind." The second act is counsel about what is to be
+done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the
+concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1),
+speaking of lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor
+moderation, thou canst not control it by counseling." In this respect
+there is "rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated
+above (Q. 53, A. 3). The third act is judgment about the things to be
+done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the
+lustful old men (Dan. 13:9): "They perverted their own mind . . .
+that they might not . . . remember just judgments." In this respect
+there is "thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's command
+about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so
+far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered
+from doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy"
+must be referred.] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the
+Leonine edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man
+who declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear
+will undo those words."
+
+On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One
+is the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which
+regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the
+other hand there is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the
+desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed
+to the end. With regard to this there is "love of this world," whose
+pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is
+"despair of a future world," because through being held back by
+carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since
+they are distasteful to him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5),
+intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices
+opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal
+species of intemperance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards
+hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from
+pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as
+stated above (Q. 143). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto
+is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first
+named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles
+a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee 4:11,
+"Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay:
+'understanding']." Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the
+less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death."
+Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the
+daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. Q. 35, A.
+4, ad 2; Q. 118, A. 8, ad 1; Q. 148, A. 6).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires
+for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special
+point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a
+daughter of lust.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external
+acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold
+inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer
+"obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart the
+mouth speaketh" (Matt. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full
+of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly,
+on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and
+rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or
+giving a thought to his words, which are described as "scurrilous."
+Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks
+pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to
+"wanton words." Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by
+his words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a
+man's sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for
+instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to
+anything else.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 154
+
+OF THE PARTS OF LUST
+(In Twelve Articles)
+
+We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are
+twelve points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Into what parts is lust divided?
+
+(2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?
+
+(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
+
+(4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like
+seduction?
+
+(5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?
+
+(6) Of seduction;
+
+(7) Of rape;
+
+(8) Of adultery;
+
+(9) Of incest;
+
+(10) Of sacrilege;
+
+(11) Of the sin against nature;
+
+(12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Six Species Are Fittingly Assigned to Lust?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned
+to lust, namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction,
+rape, and the unnatural vice." For diversity of matter does not
+diversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard
+to diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has
+intercourse is married or a virgin, or of some other condition.
+Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified in this
+way.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not
+differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery
+does not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man
+having intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an
+injustice. Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a
+species of lust.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a
+woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that
+a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow.
+Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as
+adultery is.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another
+woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter
+sin is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among
+the species thereof.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): "Lest again, when I
+come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them that sinned
+before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication
+and lasciviousness that they have committed." Therefore it seems that
+also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of
+lust, as well as fornication.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among
+its parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is
+written (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are
+fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']."
+Therefore it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species
+of lust.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals
+36, qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 153, A. 3), the sin of lust
+consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right
+reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter
+wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due
+matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a
+circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is
+derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the
+species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.
+
+Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways.
+First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act.
+In this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the
+_vice against nature,_ which attaches to every venereal act from
+which generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing
+and advancement of the child when born, there is _simple
+fornication,_ which is the union of an unmarried man with an
+unmarried woman. Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is
+consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other
+persons; and this in two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with
+whom a man has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to
+her; and thus there is _incest,_ which consists in the misuse of a
+woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with
+regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed: and
+if she be under the authority of a husband, it is _adultery,_ if
+under the authority of her father, it is _seduction,_ in the absence
+of violence, and _rape_ if violence be employed.
+
+These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than
+of the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is
+by way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been
+stated above (Obj. 1) that the aforesaid species are assigned with
+regard to a difference of matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a
+formal difference of object, which difference results from different
+modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 7), nothing hinders
+the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in
+this way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this
+deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust
+that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby
+shown to be more grievous.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a
+spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the
+violation of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner,
+the other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced
+to other species of lust.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected
+with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not
+constitute the species of a moral act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18,
+A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 5: As a gloss says on this passage, "uncleanness" stands
+for lust against nature, while "lasciviousness" is a man's abuse of
+boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also
+reply that "lasciviousness" relates to certain acts circumstantial to
+the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: According to a gloss on this passage "lust" there
+signifies any kind of excess.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Simple Fornication Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal
+sin. For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a
+par with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as
+things that are not mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29):
+"That you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood,
+and from things strangled, and from fornication." But there is not
+mortal sin in these observances, according to 1 Tim. 4:4, "Nothing is
+rejected that is received with thanksgiving." Therefore fornication
+is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But
+the Lord commanded (Osee 1:2): "Go take thee a wife of fornications,
+and have of her children of fornications." Therefore fornication is
+not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without
+disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without
+disapprobation by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus
+we read (Gen. 16:4) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and
+further on (Gen. 30:5, 9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the
+handmaids of his wives; and again (Gen. 38:18) that Juda was with
+Thamar whom he thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication
+is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple
+fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love
+of God, since it is not a sin directly against God, nor as regards
+the love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore
+simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But
+simple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose
+[*The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to
+St. Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8,
+"Godliness is profitable to all things," says: "The whole of
+Christian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man
+conforms to this, even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the
+flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish."
+Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that "what food
+is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to the
+welfare of the human race." But inordinate use of food is not always
+a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse;
+and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which
+is the least grievous of the aforesaid species.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:13): "Take heed to keep
+thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure
+to know a crime." Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore
+fornication and all intercourse with other than one's wife is a
+mortal sin.
+
+Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom. But
+fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Gal.
+5:21), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices,
+adds: "They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God."
+Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
+
+Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can.
+Praedicandum): "They should know that the same penance is to be
+enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder
+and other criminal offenses." Therefore simple fornication is a
+criminal or mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to
+be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in
+Deut., qu. 37] on Deut. 23:17, says: "This is a prohibition against
+going with whores, whose vileness is venial." For instead of "venial"
+it should be "venal," since such is the wanton's trade. In order to
+make this evident, we must take note that every sin committed
+directly against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication
+implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the
+offspring to be born of this union. For we find in all animals where
+the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female,
+that these come together not indeterminately, but the male with a
+certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all
+birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where the
+female alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing, the union is
+indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is
+evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the
+mother's care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his
+father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods
+both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an
+indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be
+united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time
+or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human race the
+male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because
+on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and this certainly would
+cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate.
+
+This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which
+for the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since,
+however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the
+whole human race, and common goods depend on the law for their
+determination, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2), it follows that
+this union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, is determined
+by some law. What this determination is for us will be stated in the
+Third Part of this work (Suppl., Q. 50, seqq.), where we shall treat
+of the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an
+indeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with
+matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child's upbringing, and
+consequently it is a mortal sin.
+
+Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by
+fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the
+child: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law
+is judged according to what happens in general, and not according to
+what may happen in a particular case.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these
+things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because
+the matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute
+between Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing
+unanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed
+unlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason: whereas
+the Jews, taught by the Divine law, considered it to be unlawful.
+The other things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom
+introduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles
+forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were
+unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the Jews,
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 4, ad 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary
+to right reason. Now man's reason is right, in so far as it is ruled
+by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which
+a man does by God's will and in obedience to His command, is not
+contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general
+order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously by the
+Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the
+usual course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in
+being willing to slay his innocent son, because he obeyed God,
+although considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason
+in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by
+God's command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called
+fornication, though it be so called in reference to the general
+course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "When God
+commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any
+people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be
+done"; and afterwards he adds: "For as among the powers of human
+society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser,
+so must God in preference to all."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no
+purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of
+matrimony (Suppl., Q. 65, A. 5, ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to
+excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our
+neighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born,
+as we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a
+manner disadvantageous to the future child.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to
+the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far
+as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and
+because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy;
+but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal
+inconstancy impenitent until death.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: One copulation may result in the begetting of a man,
+wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future
+child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only
+as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one
+meal does not hinder the good of a man's whole life, wherefore the
+act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would,
+however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a
+food which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the
+case with Adam.
+
+Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised
+under lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous
+pleasure is a lesser sin.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Fornication Is the Most Grievous of Sins?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of
+sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it
+proceeds from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous
+pleasure is in fornication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the
+"flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust." Therefore it
+seems that fornication is the gravest of sins.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against
+a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more
+grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger.
+Now according to 1 Cor. 6:18, "He that committeth fornication sinneth
+against his own body," which is most intimately connected with a man.
+Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be
+the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly
+opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was
+said in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according
+to 1 Cor. 6:15, "Shall I . . . take the members of Christ, and make
+them the members of a harlot?" Therefore fornication is the most
+grievous of sins.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of
+the flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.
+
+_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways,
+first with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some
+accident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin
+itself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to
+the good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to
+the good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to
+its species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods,
+such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those
+which are directly against God, and sins that are injurious to the
+life of one already born, such as murder.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that
+which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure
+that is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the
+less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a
+greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure
+is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano [*Serm.
+ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine's works]) that of
+all a Christian's conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of
+chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and
+Isidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "mankind is subjected to
+the devil by carnal lust more than by anything else," because, to
+wit, the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not
+merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the
+flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts
+against the good of his own body by an undue resolution and
+defilement thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does
+it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin,
+because in man reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if
+there be a sin more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the
+human race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual
+begetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an
+actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of the
+species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point
+of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind
+of lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human species.
+Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and
+therefore those sins also that are against God are more grievous.
+Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though
+the fornicator intended to offend God, but consequently, in the same
+way as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are
+Christ's members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, according to
+1 Cor. 6:17, "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." Wherefore
+also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 4]
+
+Whether There Can Be Mortal Sin in Touches and Kisses?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and
+kisses. For the Apostle says (Eph. 5:3): "Fornication and all
+uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among
+you, as becometh saints," then he adds: "Or obscenity" (which a gloss
+refers to "kissing and fondling"), "or foolish talking" (as "soft
+speeches"), "or scurrility" (which "fools call geniality--i.e.
+jocularity"), and afterwards he continues (Eph. 5:5): "For know ye
+this and understand that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous
+person (which is the serving of idols), hath inheritance in the
+kingdom of Christ and of God," thus making no further mention of
+obscenity, as neither of foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore
+these are not mortal sins.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being
+prejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and
+upbringing. But these are not affected by kisses and touches or
+blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never
+be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done
+sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in
+themselves.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a
+kiss. But according to Matt. 5:28, "Whosoever shall look on a woman
+to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his
+heart." Much more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things
+mortal sins.
+
+Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), "By their
+very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their
+embraces, those who are associated in a sleep that knows neither
+honor nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime." Therefore by
+doing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be a mortal sin in two ways.
+First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or
+touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is
+possible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being
+the custom of one's country, or on account of some obligation or
+reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by
+reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead
+someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt
+intention. Now it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 74, A. 8), that it
+is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the
+delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a mortal
+sin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in
+such like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the
+pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and
+caresses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are
+mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lustful.
+Therefore in so far as they are lustful, they are mortal sins.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle makes no further mention of these three
+because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had
+mentioned before.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature
+hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which
+is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are
+mortally sinful.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that such things are not mortal
+sins in their species.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Nocturnal Pollution Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the
+same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit
+while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep
+obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord (3 Kings 3:2, Par. 1).
+Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal
+pollution would seem to be a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has
+the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently
+discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one
+thing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep,
+so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a
+sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot
+act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is
+instructed and reproved by God, according to Job 33:15, 16, "By a
+dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of
+men [*Vulg.: 'When deep sleep falleth upon men.' St. Thomas is
+apparently quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly
+above, Q. 95, A. 6, Obj. 1.] . . . Then He openeth the ears of men,
+and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore a
+man, while asleep, can act according to or against his reason, and
+this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that
+nocturnal pollution is a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): "When the
+same image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to
+the mind of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish
+the imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once
+moved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet
+there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore
+thinking about such things while one is awake."
+
+_I answer that,_ Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways.
+First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For
+every sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first
+movement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far
+as it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of
+reason's judgment, there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has
+not a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not
+regard some of the images formed by his imagination as though they
+were real, as stated above in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 8, ad 2).
+Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's
+judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as neither are the actions
+of a maniac or an imbecile.
+
+Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its
+cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there
+is excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is
+disintegrated either through overheating of the body or some other
+disturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the
+discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing
+happens when nature is cumbered with other superfluities, so that
+phantasms relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed
+in the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a
+sinful cause (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal
+pollution has the character of sin from its cause: whereas if the
+excess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a
+sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in itself
+nor in its cause.
+
+A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and
+the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account
+of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was
+awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks
+about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while
+sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of
+concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt
+to arise from thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such
+pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul,
+so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent
+to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as certain movements in some degree
+pass" from the waking state to the state of sleep, "the dreams of
+good men are better than those of any other people": and Augustine
+says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that "even during sleep, the soul may
+have conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition." Thus it
+is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its
+cause. On the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution
+ensues after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were
+speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful,
+neither in itself nor in its cause.
+
+The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the
+work of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce
+the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous
+sin, namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil.
+Hence the words of the hymn at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our
+bodies no uncleanness know" [*Translation W. K. Blount].
+
+On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part,
+and through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the
+_Collationes Patrum_ (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to
+suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil
+brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy
+Communion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a
+sin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while
+he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It is
+for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to
+God (3 Kings 3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep,
+according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by
+sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations.
+Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to
+elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the First Part (Q.
+84, A. 8, ad 2). Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as
+a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Reason's apprehension is not hindered during sleep to
+the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason
+turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human
+thought. Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep from
+apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his
+previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or again through
+Divine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Seduction Should Be Reckoned a Species of Lust?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a
+species of lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a
+virgin, according to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) [*Append. Grat. ad
+can. Lex illa]. But this may occur between an unmarried man and an
+unmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction
+should not be reckoned a species of lust, distinct from fornication.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 4]):
+"Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery." Now
+a species is not contained under another that is differentiated in
+opposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species of lust, it
+seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to
+injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury to
+another, namely the violated maiden's father, who "can take the
+injury as personal to himself" [*Gratian, ad can. Lex illa], and sue
+the seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a
+species of lust.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Seduction consists properly in the venereal act
+whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about
+venereal actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust.
+
+_I answer that,_ When the matter of a vice has a special deformity,
+we must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust
+is a sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above (Q. 153, A.
+1). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who
+is under her father's care: both on the part of the maid, who through
+being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both
+hindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to
+a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the
+seal of virginity: and on the part of the father, who is her
+guardian, according to Ecclus. 42:11, "Keep a sure watch over a
+shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a
+laughing-stock to thy enemies." Therefore it is evident that
+seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, while
+still under the guardianship of her parents, is a determinate species
+of lust.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage,
+she is not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal of
+virginity is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in
+that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not
+simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots,
+women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2
+Cor. 12: "And have not done penance for the uncleanness and
+fornication," etc.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as
+applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction,
+in the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man
+and any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding:
+"Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not." In
+this sense, too, we are to understand the words of Num. 5:13: "If
+[Vulg.: 'But'] the adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by
+witnesses, because she was not found in adultery (_stupro_)."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity
+through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a
+greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the
+concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it
+refrains not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an
+injustice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the
+part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, is
+nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is bound to compensation.
+Hence it is written (Ex. 22:16, 17): "If a man seduce a virgin not
+yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to
+wife. If the maid's father will not give her to him, he shall give
+money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive." The
+other injury is done to the maid's father: wherefore the seducer is
+bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written (Deut.
+22:28, 29): "If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not
+espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to
+judgment: he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid
+fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he
+hath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of his life":
+and this, lest he should prove to have married her in mockery, as
+Augustine observes. [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xxxiv.]
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Rape Is a Species of Lust, Distinct from Seduction?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that rape is not a species of lust,
+distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that
+"seduction (_stuprum_), or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful
+intercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption:
+wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer." Therefore it seems
+that rape should not be reckoned a species of lust distinct from
+seduction.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated
+in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that
+"rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her
+father's house that after being violated she may be taken to wife."
+But the employment of force is accidental to lust, for this
+essentially regards the pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems
+that rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is
+written (1 Cor. 7:2): "For fear of fornication, let every man have
+his own wife." Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it
+was enacted in the council of Meaux: "We decree that those who are
+guilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not have
+those women in marriage, although they should have subsequently
+married them with the consent of their parents." Therefore rape is
+not a determinate species of lust distinct from seduction.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife
+without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he take
+her away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal knowledge
+of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species
+of lust.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore
+states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore
+rape is a species of lust.
+
+_I answer that,_ Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a
+species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes
+there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.
+
+They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate
+a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin
+and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to
+the virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by
+force from her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape
+differs in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by
+force from her parents' house, and is forcibly violated: while
+sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated,
+but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act
+of marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is
+employed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or
+one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says [*Ep. v ad
+Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2], "We abhor abductors
+whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of
+their crime."
+
+There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force,
+violates a virgin unlawfully.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one
+is sometimes used to signify the other.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The employment of force would seem to arise from the
+greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear
+to endanger himself by offering violence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to
+be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For
+one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed,
+who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that
+is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her
+father's care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her
+parents' consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever
+steals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not
+dissolve a marriage already contracted, although it is an impediment
+to its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question,
+it was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abrogated.
+Wherefore Jerome [*The quotation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2]
+declares the contrary: "Three kinds of lawful marriage," says he,
+"are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden
+given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a
+man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal knowledge of
+her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her according to
+the father's estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity [*Cf.
+Deut. 22:23-29]. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from
+such a man, and is given to another at the father's will."
+
+We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to
+others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words
+in the present tense.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The man who is just married has, in virtue of the
+betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by
+using violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope
+Gelasius says [*Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: "This law
+of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with
+regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken
+away by force."
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Adultery Is Determinate Species of Lust, Distinct from the
+Other Species?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species
+of lust, distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its name
+from a man having intercourse "with a woman who is not his own [ad
+alteram]," according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de
+Divers. lxiii] on Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not one's own may be
+of various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father's
+care, or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems
+that adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not for
+what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the
+Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is
+an adulterer," and in like manner one who is over enamored of any
+woman. Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore
+adultery is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be
+reckoned a species of lust.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there
+would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is
+the same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either
+case a woman is violated who is under another person's authority.
+Therefore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct
+from the others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf.
+Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that "adultery
+is sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of
+the marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own lust,
+or with the consent of the other party." Now this implies a special
+deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of
+lust.
+
+_I answer that,_ Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to
+another's marriage-bed (_ad alienum torum_)" [*Cf. Append. Gratian,
+ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a
+twofold offense against chastity and the good of human procreation.
+First, by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage,
+which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his own children.
+Secondly, by accession to a woman who is united to another in
+marriage, and thus he hinders the good of another's children. The
+same applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery.
+Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:32, 33): "Every woman . . . that
+leaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath
+been unfaithful to the law of the Most High" (since there it is
+commanded: "Thou shalt not commit adultery"); "and secondly, she hath
+offended against her husband," by making it uncertain that the
+children are his: "thirdly, she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath
+gotten children of another man," which is contrary to the good of her
+offspring. The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins,
+while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery.
+Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust,
+through having a special deformity in venereal acts.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If a married man has intercourse with another woman,
+his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is
+always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of
+marriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse;
+and thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has
+intercourse with another's wife; and sometimes it has the character
+of seduction, or of some other sin, according to various conditions
+affecting the woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been
+stated above (A. 1) that the species of lust correspond to the
+various conditions of women.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human
+offspring, as stated above (A. 2). But adultery is specially opposed
+to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is
+due between husband and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a
+lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her
+indecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be
+called an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a
+lover of another woman.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to
+him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's authority, as
+one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery
+is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin of
+seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ
+specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in
+the Third Part [* Cf. Suppl., Q. 59, A. 3; QQ. 60, 62], when we treat
+of matrimony.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 9]
+
+Whether Incest Is a Determinate Species of Lust?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that incest is not a determinate species
+of lust. For incest [* _Incestus_ is equivalent to _in-castus_ =
+"unchaste"] takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But
+all kinds of lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that
+incest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself in general.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf.
+Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is intercourse between
+a man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity." Now affinity
+differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several
+species of lust.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity,
+does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse
+between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not,
+of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have been
+lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The species of lust are distinguished according to
+the various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful
+intercourse. Now incest implies a special condition on the part of
+the woman, because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by
+consanguinity or affinity as stated (Obj. 2). Therefore incest is a
+determinate species of lust.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 6) wherever we find
+something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there
+must needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse
+with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to
+venereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a
+certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood
+relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so
+much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates
+[*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was not deemed right for a son to
+bathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now
+from what has been said (Q. 142, A. 4; Q. 151, A. 4), it is evident
+that in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent
+with respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is
+unseemly that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse.
+This reason seems to be indicated (Lev. 18:7) where we read: "She is
+thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness," and the same is
+expressed further on with regard to others.
+
+The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close
+touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from
+venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very
+frequent and thus men's minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in
+the Old Law [*Lev. 18] the prohibition was apparently directed
+specially to those persons who must needs live together.
+
+The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many
+friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his
+wife's relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship,
+as though they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine
+says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most perfectly
+satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties
+of friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and
+becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one,
+but each should have one."
+
+Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural
+that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to
+this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse,
+his love would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive
+to lust: and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that
+incest is a determinate species of lust.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one
+another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the
+opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love,
+as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between
+such persons is called "incest" antonomastically.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Persons are related by affinity through one who is
+related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the
+other, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of
+unbecomingness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary
+to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by
+blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and
+immediately related to one another, since children naturally owe
+their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De
+Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and threw
+itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done,
+because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have
+begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness
+attaching to other persons who are related to one another not
+directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or
+unbecomingness varies according to custom, and human or Divine law:
+because, as stated above (A. 2), sexual intercourse, being directed
+to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says
+(De Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes
+back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation
+when religion forbade it.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Sacrilege Can Be a Species of Lust?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of
+lust. For the same species is not contained under different genera
+that are not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species
+of irreligion, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 2). Therefore sacrilege
+cannot be reckoned a species of lust.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can.
+Lex illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are
+reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species
+of lust.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done
+by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is not
+reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice.
+Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that "if it is
+wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how
+much more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds
+of morals!" Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters
+is a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to
+overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred
+matters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is
+a species of lust.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7), the act of
+a virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or
+vice, assumes the latter's species: thus, theft committed for the
+sake of adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is
+evident that as Augustine states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of
+chastity, by being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of
+religion, as in the case of those who vow and keep chastity.
+Wherefore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something
+pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the species of
+sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a species of
+lust.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end,
+becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also
+a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The enumeration referred to, includes those sins which
+are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a
+species of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its
+end, and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful
+intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual
+relationship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse
+with a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of
+Christ, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her
+father's authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and if force be
+employed it will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil
+law punishes more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian
+says [*Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: "If any man dare, I will
+not say to rape, but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view
+to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a
+consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for
+sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired
+for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may
+also come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an
+injury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a
+sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless,
+sacrilege is ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to
+chastity for the observance of which certain persons are specially
+consecrated.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 11]
+
+Whether the Unnatural Vice Is a Species of Lust?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species
+of lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the
+enumeration given above (A. 1, Obj. 1). Therefore it is not a species
+of lust.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised
+under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice, but
+under bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5).
+Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation, as
+stated above (Q. 153, A. 2): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts
+from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is
+not a species of lust.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned together with the other species of
+lust (2 Cor. 12:21) where we read: "And have not done penance for the
+uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a gloss
+says: "Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 6, 9) wherever there occurs a
+special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered
+unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in
+two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is
+common to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is
+contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the
+human race: and this is called "the unnatural vice." This may happen
+in several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any
+copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the
+sin of "uncleanness" which some call "effeminacy." Secondly, by
+copulation with a thing of undue species, and this is called
+"bestiality." Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with
+male, or female with female, as the Apostle states (Rom. 1:27): and
+this is called the "vice of sodomy." Fourthly, by not observing the
+natural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to
+other monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There we enumerated the species of lust that are not
+contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed
+to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue,
+and therefore is reducible to the same genus.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The lustful man intends not human generation but
+venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts
+from which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought
+in the unnatural vice.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12]
+
+Whether the Unnatural Vice Is the Greatest Sin Among the Species of
+Lust?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the
+greatest sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is
+contrary to charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and
+rape which are injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary
+to the love of our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other
+person is injured. Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest
+among the species of lust.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the most
+grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since it
+is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver
+sin than the unnatural vice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according
+as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin is
+committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more
+those persons who are united to him--and such are those whom he
+defiles by incest--than persons who are not connected with him, and
+whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore
+incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it
+is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin of
+uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature,
+since it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and
+patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow
+that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not
+true. Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins
+of lust.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [*The quotation
+is from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono
+Conjugali, viii.]) that "of all these," namely the sins belonging to
+lust, "that which is against nature is the worst."
+
+_I answer that,_ In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of
+the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason
+are those things that are according to nature, because reason
+presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of other
+things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in
+speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in
+speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that
+which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on
+man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act
+against things as determined by nature. Therefore, since by the
+unnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by
+nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in
+this matter this sin is gravest of all. After it comes incest, which,
+as stated above (A. 9), is contrary to the natural respect which we
+owe persons related to us.
+
+With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression
+merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the
+presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more
+against reason to make use of the venereal act not only with
+prejudice to the future offspring, but also so as to injure another
+person besides. Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed
+without injustice to another person, is the least grave among the
+species of lust. Then, it is a greater injustice to have intercourse
+with a woman who is subject to another's authority as regards the act
+of generation, than as regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore
+adultery is more grievous than seduction. And both of these are
+aggravated by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver
+than seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery. And all these are
+aggravated by coming under the head of sacrilege, as stated above (A.
+10, ad 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man,
+so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins
+contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an
+injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says
+(Confess. iii, 8): "Those foul offenses that are against nature
+should be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as
+were those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit,
+they should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God
+which hath not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For
+even that very intercourse which should be between God and us is
+violated, when that same nature, of which He is the Author, is
+polluted by the perversity of lust."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Vices against nature are also against God, as stated
+above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of
+sacrilege, as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and
+more firm than any subsequently established order.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The nature of the species is more intimately united to
+each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against
+the specific nature are more grievous.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing
+than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against
+nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which
+consists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While the
+most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due
+species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gen. 37:2, "He accused his
+brethren of a most wicked crime," says that "they copulated with
+cattle." After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right
+sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right
+manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the
+"vas" than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other
+circumstances.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 155
+
+OF CONTINENCE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must next consider the potential parts of temperance:
+(1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we
+must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence
+there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether continence is a virtue?
+
+(2) What is its matter?
+
+(3) What is its subject?
+
+(4) Of its comparison with temperance.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Continence Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For
+species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division.
+But continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1, 9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to
+Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19), "a virtue is a thing that no one
+makes ill use of." Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for
+instance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing
+it. Therefore continence is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful,
+but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23, "Faith,
+modesty," etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from
+things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a
+virtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus]
+that "continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure." Therefore
+continence is a virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ The word "continence" is taken by various people in
+two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from
+all venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity
+(Gal. 5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the
+first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies
+to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated
+above (Q. 152, A. 3) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand
+continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires,
+which in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes
+continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the
+Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii, 10, 11). In this way
+continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to
+wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, lest it
+be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature
+of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to
+reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in
+the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9)
+that "continence is not a virtue but a mixture," inasmuch as it has
+something of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.
+
+If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of
+commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the same
+division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is according to
+reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds (_tenet se_) to
+that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself.
+Now whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to
+reason. Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to
+that which is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is
+in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right
+reason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason.
+Wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds to right
+reason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to
+perverse reason, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter
+should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense,
+as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful
+goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in
+order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Desires for Pleasures of Touch Are the Matter of Continence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are
+not the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46):
+"General decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is
+virtuous is restrained* in its every action." [*"Continentem"
+according to St. Thomas' reading; St. Ambrose wrote "concinentem =
+harmonious"].
+
+Obj. 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for
+the good of right reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Now other
+passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence
+than the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of
+mortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him
+behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore
+continence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of
+touch.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): "It is
+continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel."
+Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather
+than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10,
+"Cupidity [Douay: 'The desire of money'] (_philargyria_), is the root
+of all evils." Therefore continence is not properly about the desires
+for pleasures of touch.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal
+matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only
+to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of
+touch is not its proper matter.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but
+bestial, both as regards food--for instance, the pleasure of eating
+human flesh; and as regards venereal matters--for instance the abuse
+of animals or boys. But continence is not about such like things, as
+stated in _Ethic._ vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch
+are not the proper matter of continence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that
+"continence and incontinence are about the same things as temperance
+and intemperance." Now temperance and intemperance are about the
+desires for pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4).
+Therefore continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.
+
+_I answer that,_ Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain
+curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from following his
+passions. Hence continence is properly said in reference to those
+passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein
+it is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing:
+whereas it is not properly about those passions, such as fear and the
+like, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in these it is
+praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates, as
+stated above (Q. 123, AA. 3, 4). Now it is to be observed that
+natural inclinations are the principles of all supervening
+inclinations, as stated above (I, Q. 60, A. 2). Wherefore the more
+they follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the
+passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines
+chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the
+maintenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance
+of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain
+to the touch. Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to
+desires for pleasures of touch.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in
+connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter
+wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly
+speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to
+contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a
+general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and
+in this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in
+relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude
+implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the
+pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the
+soul--in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured
+him--rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be
+said to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as
+the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in
+themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of
+nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak of a person as
+being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding
+that they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth, or honor
+and so forth. Hence Tully either understood continence in a general
+sense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a
+restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of
+the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and
+incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in
+reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are
+applicable to both.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it
+regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that "if a man were to lay hold of a
+child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion
+whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent
+[*See A. 4], not absolutely, but relatively."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Subject of Continence Is the Concupiscible Power?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of continence is the
+concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be
+proportionate to the virtue's matter. Now the matter of continence,
+as stated (A. 2), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which
+pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the
+concupiscible power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "Opposites are referred to one same thing" [*Categ.
+viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions
+overcome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that
+"incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by
+following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to
+reason." Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the reason,
+or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the
+concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason,
+for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will,
+since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor
+again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the
+passions of the irascible, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore it
+follows that it is in the concupiscible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Every virtue residing in a certain power removes
+the evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil
+act of the concupiscible: since "the continent man has evil desires,"
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is
+not in the concupiscible power.
+
+_I answer that,_ Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that
+subject have a different disposition from that which it has while
+subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same
+disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent,
+since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires.
+Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible
+as its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both,
+since both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and
+each of them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow
+his unlawful desires. Now the primary difference between them is to
+be found in their choice: since the continent man, though subject to
+vehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason;
+whereas the incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his
+reason forbids. Hence continence must needs reside in that power of
+the soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated
+above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures
+of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which is
+in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them.
+For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of
+one thing against another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The will stands between reason and the concupiscible,
+and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the
+reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible.
+Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover,
+and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong
+immediately to the will as their proper subject.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although the passions are not in the will as their
+subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it
+is that the will of the continent man resists desires.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Continence Is Better Than Temperance?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that continence is better than temperance.
+For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of a continent
+soul." Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater
+the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward; for
+it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned, except he
+strive lawfully," and the continent man, since he is subject to
+vehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom
+these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater
+virtue than temperance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the will is a more excellent power than the
+concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is
+in the concupiscible, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore continence is
+a greater virtue than temperance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus
+[*De Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to
+a principal virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), continence has a twofold
+signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal
+pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater
+than temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what
+we said above (Q. 152, A. 5) concerning the preeminence of virginity
+over chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be
+taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when
+they are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far
+greater than continence, because the good of a virtue derives its
+praise from that which is in accord with reason. Now the good of
+reason flourishes more in the temperate man than in the continent
+man, because in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient to
+reason, being tamed by reason so to speak, whereas in the continent
+man the sensitive appetite strongly resists reason by its evil
+desires. Hence continence is compared to temperance, as the imperfect
+to the perfect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted may be understood in two ways. First
+in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence from
+all things venereal: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of a
+continent soul," in the genus of chastity; since not even the
+fruitfulness of the flesh which is the purpose of marriage is
+equalled to the continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated
+above (Q. 152, AA. 4, 5). Secondly it may be understood in reference
+to the general sense in which continence denotes any abstinence from
+things unlawful: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of a
+continent soul," because its value is not measured with gold or
+silver, which are appreciable according to weight.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed
+from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause: because
+some people by their natural temperament are more prone to
+concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure which
+inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for
+others. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas
+strength of concupiscence increases it. On the other hand, weakness
+or strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual
+cause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or the strength of
+reason, as in the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of
+concupiscence, by reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas
+strength of concupiscence diminishes it.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The will is more akin to the reason than the
+concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason--on account of
+which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to
+the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the
+temperate man--is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the
+will, as in the case of one who is continent.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 156
+
+OF INCONTINENCE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?
+
+(2) Whether incontinence is a sin?
+
+(3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance;
+
+(4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in
+desire?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Incontinence Pertains to the Soul or to the Body?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul
+but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but
+from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence:
+for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described
+either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence
+pertains not to the soul but to the body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from
+the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily
+temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is
+especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose
+incontinence is one of unbridled desire." Therefore incontinence
+regards the body.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the
+vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because "the flesh
+lusteth against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence
+pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the
+soul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for
+we ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the
+Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly
+on the part of the soul.
+
+_I answer that,_ Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather
+than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the
+part of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since
+it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise
+in the sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet
+these passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient
+cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so
+long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his
+passions. If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take
+away the use of reason altogether--as in the case of those who become
+insane through the vehemence of their passions--the essential
+conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people
+do not retain the judgment of reason, which the continent man follows
+and the incontinent forsakes. From this it follows that the direct
+cause of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which fails to
+resist a passion by the reason. This happens in two ways, according
+to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to
+the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is
+called "unbridled incontinence" or "impetuosity": secondly, when a
+man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding
+weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is
+called "weakness." Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains
+chiefly to the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain
+powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these
+organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are
+accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the
+intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from
+the senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive
+appetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak
+temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds
+to, she holds to it weakly; although in rare cases the opposite
+occurs, according to Prov. 31:10, "Who shall find a valiant woman?"
+And since small and weak things "are accounted as though they were
+not" [*Aristotle, _Phys._ ii, 5] the Philosopher speaks of women as
+though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the
+contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that "we do not
+describe women as being continent, because they are vacillating"
+through being unstable of reason, and "are easily led" so that they
+follow their passions readily.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at
+once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the
+impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious
+persons [*Cf. I-II, Q. 46, A. 5], or from its vehemence, as in the
+melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most
+vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand
+to that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion
+by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with
+regard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic
+temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are
+due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not
+a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh
+overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain
+negligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Incontinence Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as
+Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot
+avoid." Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to
+Wis. 8:21, "I know [Vulg.: 'knew'] that I could not . . . be
+continent, except God gave it." Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But
+the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore
+incontinence is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man
+becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of
+divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I" (Gal. 2:20). Therefore
+incontinence is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim.
+3:3) where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc.
+Therefore incontinence is a sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two
+ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus
+incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as
+intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (Q. 155,
+A. 2). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first,
+because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord
+with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures.
+Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "incontinence is
+censurable not only because it is wrong"--that is, by straying from
+reason--"but also because it is wicked"--that is, by following evil
+desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is considered,
+properly--inasmuch as it is a straying from reason--but not simply;
+for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his
+desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in
+themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but
+relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence (Q.
+155, A. 2, ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the
+fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to
+observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of
+themselves desirable.
+
+Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but
+metaphorically, for instance about the desires for things of which
+one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may
+be said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because
+just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even
+so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with
+reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the
+perfection of virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God's
+help, according to John 15:5: "Without Me you can do nothing."
+Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be
+continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in
+_Ethic._ iii, 3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a
+way, ourselves."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent
+man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a
+certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting
+the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not
+properly.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Incontinent Man Sins More Gravely Than the Intemperate?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely
+than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his
+conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Luke 12:47, "That
+servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall
+be beaten with many stripes." Now the incontinent man would seem to
+act against his conscience more than the intemperate because,
+according to _Ethic._ vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how
+wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion,
+whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good.
+Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable
+it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave,
+are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would
+appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a
+person's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly
+are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong,
+and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate
+man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be
+admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins
+more gravely than the intemperate.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his
+sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate,
+since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which
+the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent
+man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore
+Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12, 13) that "impenitence is
+a sin against the Holy Ghost." Now according to the Philosopher
+(Ethic. vii, 8) "the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent,
+for he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined
+to repentance." Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than
+the incontinent.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin
+is chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live
+aright" [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater
+inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the
+intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own
+choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas
+in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a
+passion. And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a
+disposition difficult to remove," the result is that the incontinent
+man repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so
+the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because
+the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit.
+Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14)
+that "they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most
+wicked things." Hence it follows that "the intemperate man is much
+worse than the incontinent," as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
+vii, 7).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the
+inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the
+ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in
+so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in
+the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and
+then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin,
+because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be
+greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man,
+ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something,
+either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the
+intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the
+intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards
+duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only
+while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever
+lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the
+intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance
+of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic
+disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect
+the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing
+ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some
+particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must
+choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's
+ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing
+good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed.
+Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7, 8) that "the incontinent
+man is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best
+principle [*_To beltiston, e arche_, 'the best thing, i.e. the
+principle']," to wit, the right estimate of the end.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent
+man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches
+concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of
+admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his
+desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (Q. 142,
+A. 2). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his
+curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part
+of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end,
+which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now
+it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to
+the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who
+errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the
+inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds
+from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination
+of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily
+suppressed.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is
+greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained
+above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite
+is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin
+except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man
+sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it.
+Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the
+intemperate man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or
+with calm," i.e. slight desire. "For what would he have done if he
+had desired it with passion?"
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Incontinent in Anger Is Worse Than the Incontinent in Desire?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse
+than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to
+resist the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence:
+wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful,
+indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and
+overwhelming pleasures or pains." Now, "as Heraclitus says, it is
+more difficult to resist desire than anger" [*Ethic. ii. 3].
+Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence
+of anger.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be
+so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the
+case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is
+incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one
+who is incontinent in desire: since "anger listens to reason
+somewhat, but desire does not" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii,
+6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent
+in desire.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is.
+Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it
+leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more
+grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads.
+Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
+"incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of
+desire."
+
+_I answer that,_ The sin of incontinence may be considered in two
+ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall
+of reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than
+incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more
+inordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for
+this, and the Philosopher indicates them, _Ethic._ vii, 6: First,
+because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the
+angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates
+this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly,
+because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. On the other
+hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and
+nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of anger
+results more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of
+the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by
+bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than
+one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent:
+wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who
+are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the
+children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed
+to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition
+of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because
+anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise
+itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject
+to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as
+though forced by a certain previous displeasure.
+
+Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to
+the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus
+incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because
+it leads to things that are harmful to one's neighbor.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly
+than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it
+is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as
+though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because
+nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it
+is more disgraceful.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard to its
+result.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 157
+
+OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices.
+Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?
+
+(2) Whether each of them is a virtue?
+
+(3) Whether each is a part of temperance?
+
+(4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Clemency and Meekness Are Absolutely the Same?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely
+the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher
+(Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet.
+ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency "is leniency of a superior in
+inflicting punishment on an inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia
+ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem
+that clemency and meekness are the same.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "clemency
+is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when
+unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently
+clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi],
+hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and
+clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely
+the same.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues.
+But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and
+clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are
+absolutely the same.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca
+(Obj. 1) "clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior":
+whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each
+to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the
+same.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, a moral virtue is
+"about passions and actions." Now internal passions are principles of
+external actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore
+virtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards
+the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they
+differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain
+man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire
+of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality
+concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from
+theft. This applies to the case in point; because through the passion
+of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment, while
+it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this
+might be prevented by excessive anger.
+
+Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of
+anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ
+from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment,
+while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of
+vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is
+applied externally for the purpose of vengeance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Man's affections incline to the moderation of things
+that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man
+loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's punishment
+in itself, but only as directed to something else, for instance
+justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes
+one quick to mitigate punishment--and this pertains to
+clemency--while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this
+reason Tully says that "the mind provoked to hatred" that is to
+punish too severely, "is restrained by clemency," from inflicting too
+severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred
+but punishment.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the
+passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly
+concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in
+punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are
+called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in
+punishing." Those who delight in a man's punishment for its own sake
+may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling
+that leads one man to love another.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Both Clemency and Meekness Are Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a
+virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these
+are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore
+neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect" [*Ethic.
+ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease;
+for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger.
+Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Matt. 5:4) among
+the beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues
+differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not
+comprised under virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): "Every good man
+is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness." Now it is virtue
+properly that belongs to a good man, since "virtue it is that makes
+its possessor good, and renders his works good also" (Ethic. ii, 6).
+Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ The nature of moral virtue consists in the
+subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
+i, 13). Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For
+clemency, in mitigating punishment, "is guided by reason," according
+to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates
+anger according to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 5.
+Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for
+meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the
+external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem
+rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external
+punishing, as stated above (A. 1). Yet they are not really opposed to
+one another, since they are both according to right reason. For
+severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right
+reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also
+according to right reason, when and where this is requisite.
+Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about
+the same thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), "the habit
+that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is
+denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the
+name of meekness." For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to
+excess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for
+injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since
+"scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself," as Sallust
+observes [*Cf. Q. 120]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not
+in respect of that which is according to right reason, but as regards
+that which is according to common law, which is the object of legal
+justice: yet on account of some particular consideration, it
+mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to
+be punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1):
+"Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets
+free are declared immune from all further punishment; and remission
+of punishment due amounts to a pardon." Wherefore it is clear that
+clemency is related to severity as equity [the Greek _epieikeia_
+[*Cf. Q. 120]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as
+regards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet
+clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A. 3, ad
+1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are
+delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being
+reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Aforesaid Virtues Are Parts of Temperance?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts
+of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above (A.
+2). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which
+pertains to justice, as stated above (Q. 120, A. 2). Therefore
+seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas
+meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and
+vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): "A man may be said
+to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty." Now this is
+opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is
+opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of
+prudence rather than of temperance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is
+temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge."
+Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of
+temperance.
+
+_I answer that,_ Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so
+far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode
+whence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the
+mode and name of justice consist in a certain _equality,_ those of
+fortitude in a certain _strength of mind,_ those of temperance in a
+certain _restraint,_ inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement
+concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness
+likewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates
+punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above (AA. 1,
+2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as
+principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation of
+punishment. One is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance
+with the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter
+of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other
+point is a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that
+he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs
+properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that
+"it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking
+revenge." This moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of
+disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful
+to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency
+is a certain smoothness of the soul"; for, on the other hand, there
+would seem to be a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to
+pain others.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The annexation of secondary to principal virtues
+depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form
+of the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency
+agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not
+in matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: _Unsoundness_ is corruption of _soundness._ Now just as
+soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition
+due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind
+lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs
+both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason,
+and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses that
+humane feeling whereby "every man is naturally friendly towards all
+other men" (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes
+the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes
+pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind,
+is because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane
+feeling which gives rise to clemency.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Clemency and Meekness Are the Greatest Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the
+greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because
+it directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God.
+Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is
+written (James 1:21): "With meekness receive the ingrafted word," and
+(Ecclus. 5:13): "Be meek to hear the word" of God. Again, Dionysius
+says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) that "Moses was deemed worthy of the
+Divine apparition on account of his great meekness." Therefore
+meekness is the greatest of virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as
+it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to be
+most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34, 35): "That
+which is agreeable" to God is "faith and meekness"; wherefore Christ
+expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Matt. 11:29),
+where He says: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart";
+and Hilary declares [*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that "Christ dwells
+in us by our meekness of soul." Again, it is most acceptable to men;
+wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): "My son, do thy works in
+meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men": for
+which reason it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King's
+"throne is strengthened by clemency." Therefore meekness and clemency
+are the greatest of virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that
+"the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but
+overcome evil by good." Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety
+which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of
+Ambrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Piety [Douay:
+'Godliness'] is profitable to all things," observes that "piety is
+the sum total of the Christian religion." Therefore meekness and
+clemency are the greatest virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but
+are annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.
+
+_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain virtues from being
+greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a
+particular genus. It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be
+absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the
+fact that they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or
+punishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil.
+Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise
+prudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely
+greater virtues than clemency and meekness.
+
+Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain
+restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil
+inclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on
+account of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's free
+judgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man
+self-possessed. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 10:31): "My son, keep
+thy soul in meekness." Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of
+touch are more shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which
+reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as
+stated above (Q. 141, A. 7, ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it
+mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity,
+the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our
+neighbor, and hinder his evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by
+removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes
+man self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above;
+secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not
+contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed
+by anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To be
+meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it
+condemn our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know
+better and have a clearer insight of the truth."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and
+men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the
+virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
+neighbor's evils.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency
+by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
+neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety
+relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior, for
+instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil,
+because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon
+it as affecting oneself, as stated above (Q. 30, A. 2): and this
+results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for
+the same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to
+vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far
+as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 158
+
+OF ANGER
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed
+to meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning
+anger there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?
+
+(2) Whether anger is a sin?
+
+(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
+
+(5) Of its species;
+
+(6) Whether anger is a capital vice?
+
+(7) Of its daughters;
+
+(8) Whether it has a contrary vice?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Be Angry?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For
+Jerome in his exposition on Matt. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his
+brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without cause.' However, in
+the genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is
+forbidden altogether." Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's
+evil is to be without reason." Now anger is always without reason:
+for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen
+perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "when
+anger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends
+it by its riot"; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): "From
+whatever cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the
+eye of the mind." Therefore it is always evil to be angry.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet.
+ii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, "Thou shalt not hate thy
+brother in thy heart." Now it would seem unlawful to desire
+vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Deut.
+32:35, "Revenge is Mine." Therefore it would seem that to be angry is
+always an evil.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is
+evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since
+God judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be
+angry is always an evil.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum,
+falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry
+without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause,
+shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless,
+judgments unstable, crimes unchecked." Therefore to be angry is not
+always an evil.
+
+_I answer that,_ Properly speaking anger is a passion of the
+sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 46, A. 1) when we were treating of the
+passions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be
+observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason
+of the passion's very species, which is derived from the passion's
+object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since
+it is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in
+itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks
+(Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention of envy denotes something evil."
+Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge,
+since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is
+found in a passion in respect of the passion's quantity, that is in
+respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in
+anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason
+demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's
+anger is deserving of praise.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions
+as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they
+deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above
+(I-II, Q. 24, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. It is in
+this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger
+whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing
+him a wrong.--But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion
+Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions
+of the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be
+moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not
+always evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First,
+antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and
+has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch
+as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice
+and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called
+"zealous anger." Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "We must
+beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it
+overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of
+following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey."
+This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason
+in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of
+reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger
+troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it." Nor is
+it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be
+interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since
+art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about
+what has to be done, while having to act.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil
+to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire
+vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to
+this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved
+thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with
+the order of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to
+punish "is God's minister," as stated in Rom. 13:4.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for
+good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our
+desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the
+movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.
+v, 45) that "anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it
+bows to the command of reason."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Anger Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by
+sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do
+we incur blame thereby," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5. Consequently no
+passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above (I-II, Q.
+46, A. 1) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a
+sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable
+good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to
+a person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine
+asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger, for a
+gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "The movement of
+anger is not in our power." Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic.
+vii, 6) that "the angry man acts with displeasure." Now displeasure
+is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene
+[*De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature to
+be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible;
+wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach.] that
+"to be angry is the property of man." Therefore it is not a sin to be
+angry.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): "Let all indignation
+and anger [*Vulg.: 'Anger and indignation'] . . . be put away from
+you."
+
+_I answer that,_ Anger, as stated above (A. 1), is properly the name
+of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far
+as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order
+of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be
+considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the
+appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore
+if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of
+reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called "zealous
+anger" [*Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire
+the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of
+reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not
+deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order
+prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of
+justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will
+be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.
+
+Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in
+relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of
+anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor
+externally; and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack
+sin, even though just vengeance be desired.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated
+by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not
+include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as
+regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of
+praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may
+be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. ii, 5) that "it is he who is angry in a certain way, that is
+praised or blamed."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its
+own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite
+turns as to a mutable good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment of
+his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that
+judgment, it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e.
+so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each
+one, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger
+is not in man's power, to the extent namely that no such movement
+arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not
+entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the
+Philosopher that "the angry man acts with displeasure," means that he
+is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he
+deems done to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to
+seek vengeance.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his
+reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in
+accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is
+contrary to man's nature.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 3]
+
+Whether All Anger Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is
+written (Job 5:2): "Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg.: 'Anger
+indeed killeth the foolish']," and he speaks of the spiritual killing,
+whence mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal
+condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord
+said (Matt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in
+danger of the judgment": and a gloss on this passage says that "the
+three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and
+hell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state
+of eternal damnation corresponding to various sins." Therefore anger
+is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal sin.
+Now anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares in his
+commentary on Matt. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his brother," etc.
+where he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor.
+Therefore anger is a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not,"
+says: "Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action."
+
+_I answer that,_ The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful
+in two ways, as stated above (A. 2). First, on the part of the
+appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger
+is a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to
+charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a
+venial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This
+imperfection is considered either in relation to the subject desirous
+of vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment
+of his reason; or in relation to the desired object, as when one
+desires to be avenged in a trifling matter, which should be deemed of
+no account, so that even if one proceeded to action, it would not be
+a mortal sin, for instance by pulling a child slightly by the hair,
+or by some other like action. Secondly, the movement of anger may be
+inordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if one be too
+fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the outward signs of
+anger. In this way anger is not a mortal sin in the point of its
+genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin, for instance if through
+the fierceness of his anger a man fall away from the love of God and
+his neighbor.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It does not follow from the passage quoted that all
+anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually by
+anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their
+reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God
+or by doing injury to their neighbor.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition to the
+words of the Law: "Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the
+judgment" (Matt. 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the
+movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave
+injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to
+this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a
+mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we have
+said.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Anger Is the Most Grievous Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For
+Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that "nothing is more
+repulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a
+ruthless* face, and most of all than a cruel soul." [*_Severo_. The
+correct text is _Si vero._ The translation would then run thus . . .
+"and nothing uglier." And if his "face is ugly, how much uglier is
+his soul!"]. Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem
+to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is
+said to be evil because it hurts." Now anger is most hurtful, because
+it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for
+Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that "anger differs in no way
+from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome
+than one harassed by a demon." Therefore anger is the most grievous
+sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their
+outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most
+grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the
+beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger grow
+into hatred and a mote become a beam." Therefore anger is not the
+most grievous sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the inordinateness of
+anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an
+undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to
+the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the
+least of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some
+person, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the
+part of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those
+sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred;
+but while hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such, and the
+envious man desires another's evil through desire of his own glory,
+the angry man desires another's evil under the aspect of just
+revenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than
+envy, and envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an
+evil, than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such as
+honor or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On
+the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man desires
+an evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a
+good. In this respect again, absolutely speaking, the sin of anger is
+apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the
+good of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the
+pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of
+concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that
+"the incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent
+in anger."
+
+On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of
+being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on
+account of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to
+Prov. 27:4, "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth:
+and who can bear the violence of one provoked?" Hence Gregory says
+(Moral. v, 45): "The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is
+convulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles itself, the face
+is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those
+whom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no sense
+in its utterance."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the
+outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement of
+anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from
+anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the
+aspect of justice, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Philosopher Suitably Assigns the Species of Anger?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably
+assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some
+angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered"
+or "stern." According to him, a person is said to be "sullen" whose
+anger "is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time." But this
+apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems
+that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the
+other circumstances.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or
+"stern" persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without
+revenge, or punishment." Now this also pertains to the
+unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is
+the same as bitterness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He
+says (Matt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in
+danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca,
+shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his
+brother, "Thou fool." But these degrees are not referable to the
+aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of
+anger is not fitting.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi]
+says "there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger
+which is called wrath [*_Fellea,_ i.e. like gall. But in I-II, Q.
+46, A. 8, St. Thomas quoting the same authority has _Cholos_ which we
+render 'wrath']," and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind, and
+"rancour." Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid.
+For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning and movement," and the
+Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to "choleric" persons:
+"ill-will" he describes as "an anger that endures and grows old," and
+this the Philosopher ascribes to "sullenness"; while he describes
+"rancour" as "reckoning the time for vengeance," which tallies with
+the Philosopher's description of the "ill-tempered." The same
+division is given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the
+aforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.
+
+_I answer that,_ The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to
+the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated
+when treating of the passions (I-II, Q. 46, A. 8) how it is to be
+applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is
+chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here,
+however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its
+application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.
+
+For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two
+things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards
+"choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight
+cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger
+endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way,
+because the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too
+long in a man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a
+lasting displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to
+himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a
+man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or
+"stern" people, who do not put aside their anger until they have
+inflicted punishment.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger, or his
+pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the
+aforesaid species.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a
+long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person
+has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he
+holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the
+outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does
+he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear
+away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger
+of "ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense
+desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can
+be quelled only by revenge.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer
+to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of
+the human act [*Cf. I-II, Q. 46, A. 8, Obj. 3]. For the first degree
+is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever
+is angry with his brother." The second degree is when the anger is
+manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect;
+and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his
+brother, Raca!" which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is
+when the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the
+effect of anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and
+the least of hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in
+reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou
+fool!" Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first,
+and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal
+sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A. 3, ad
+2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation
+is assigned as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case
+"judgment" is assigned, and this is the least severe, for as
+Augustine says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be
+delivered, there is an opportunity for defense": in the second case
+"council" is assigned, "whereby the judges deliberate together on the
+punishment to be inflicted": to the third case is assigned
+"hell-fire," i.e. "decisive condemnation."
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Anger Should Be Reckoned Among the Capital Vices?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among
+the capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice
+known by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a
+capital vice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it
+should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, "An angry [Douay:
+'passionate'] man provoketh quarrels," says: "Anger is the door to
+all vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the
+virtues; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime." Now no
+capital vice is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite
+ones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the
+capital vices.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3, 4), a capital
+vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two
+reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on
+the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability,
+in so far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*,
+which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above (A. 4).
+[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with
+moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q. 145, A. 1.]
+The second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates
+the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident
+that anger is a capital vice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most
+part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results
+from an injury inflicted.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 118, A. 7; Q. 148, A. 5; Q. 153, A.
+4; I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to
+have a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through
+the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of
+good, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter
+desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a
+capital vice than hatred is.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices
+accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the
+judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is,
+however, directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called
+its daughters.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Six Daughters Are Fittingly Assigned to Anger?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly
+assigned to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind,
+contumely, clamor, indignation and blasphemy." For blasphemy is
+reckoned by Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of
+pride. Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his
+rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of
+anger.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as pride.
+Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of all
+vices," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of
+the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters
+to anger.
+
+_I answer that,_ Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as
+consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. One is on
+the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems
+unworthy (_indignum_) of acting thus towards him, and this is called
+"indignation." The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in
+so far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like
+thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, "Will a wise
+man . . . fill his stomach with burning heat?" And thus we have
+"swelling of the mind."
+
+Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a
+twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his
+anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A. 5, ad 3) of the
+man who says to his brother, "Raca": and this refers to "clamor,"
+which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is
+when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against
+God, it is "blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely."
+
+Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus
+anger gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand all
+manner of injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately
+proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God:
+since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride of man
+is to fall off from God," i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is
+the first part of pride [*Cf. Q. 162, A. 7, ad 2]; and this gives
+rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out
+through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a
+previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely
+displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure.
+Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes
+to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from
+sloth rather than from anger.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical
+with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take
+vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 8]
+
+Whether There Is a Vice Opposed to Anger Resulting from Lack of Anger?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a vice opposed to anger,
+resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now
+by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who
+judges "with tranquillity" (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is
+not a vice to be altogether without anger.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless.
+But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca proves
+in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it
+seems that lack of anger is not a vice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "man's evil
+is to be without reason." Now the judgment of reason remains
+unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack
+of anger amounts to a vice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus
+Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who
+is not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable
+patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and
+incites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong."
+
+_I answer that,_ Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as
+a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not
+through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus
+without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which
+anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in
+Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John
+Chrysostom): "Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment.
+For anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion": and
+when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion:
+wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger
+is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with
+passion resulting from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a
+necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, since the
+lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher
+appetite, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in
+the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the
+movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack
+of the passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement
+in the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be
+angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's
+punishing by judgment.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of the
+sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt
+execution [*Cf. I-II, Q. 24, A. 3] of reason's dictate: else, the
+sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas "nature
+does nothing without purpose" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his
+reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also
+of the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore
+just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is
+removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason
+is lacking.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 159
+
+OF CRUELTY
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
+
+(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 159, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Cruelty Is Opposed to Clemency?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
+For Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel
+who exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency
+is reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore
+apparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): "They are cruel, and will
+have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now
+mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above (Q. 157, A. 4, ad
+3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of
+punishment, as stated above (Q. 157, A. 1): whereas cruelty applies
+to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17, "But he
+that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred." Therefore cruelty is
+not opposed to clemency.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the
+opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness
+of heart in exacting punishment."
+
+_I answer that,_ Cruelty apparently takes its name from _cruditas_
+(rawness). Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to
+have an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a
+disagreeable and bitter taste. Now it has been stated above (Q. 157,
+A. 3, ad 1; A. 4, ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or
+sweetness of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment.
+Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment
+according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one
+to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards
+the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the
+hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment,
+belongs to cruelty.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both
+shun and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For
+it belongs to mercy [*Cf. Q. 30, A. 1] to relieve another's
+unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to
+mitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And
+since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more
+directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the
+mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for
+mercilessness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which
+is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of
+beneficence is in itself a punishment.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 159, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Cruelty Differs from Savagery or Brutality?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or
+brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one
+virtue. Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way
+of excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the
+same.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it were
+savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending
+to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of
+punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety. Now
+this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A. 1, ad 1). Therefore
+cruelty is the same as savagery.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way
+of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency,
+which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to
+the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to
+deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission
+or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there be love, but
+not that which enervates, let there be severity, but without fury,
+let there be zeal without unseemly savagery, let there be piety
+without undue clemency." Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who
+is angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is
+not said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage."
+
+_I answer that,_ "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a
+likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For
+animals of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and
+not for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to
+reason alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery
+applies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a
+default of the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive
+from a man's torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised
+under bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial,
+and resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt
+nature, as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not
+only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the
+mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or
+brutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in
+_Ethic._ vii, 5.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed
+to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But savagery or
+brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly
+opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the
+Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which
+according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy
+Ghost. Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to
+the gift of piety.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because
+this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards the
+truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined
+to mitigate punishment.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it
+disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished
+on account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other
+hand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission
+of punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 160
+
+OF MODESTY
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of
+its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?
+
+(2) What is the matter of modesty?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 160, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Modesty Is a Part of Temperance?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance.
+For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every
+virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to
+Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order."
+Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be
+reckoned a part of temperance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise
+chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its
+name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its
+parts.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our
+neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24, 25, "The servant of the Lord must
+not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty
+admonishing them that resist the truth." Now admonishing wrong-doers
+is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 1).
+Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of
+temperance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as
+a part of temperance.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4; Q. 157, A. 3),
+temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most
+difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of
+touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of
+very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters
+of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by
+the virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above (Q.
+134, A. 3, ad 1), that while magnificence is about great expenditure,
+there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned with
+ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate
+other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This
+virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its
+principal.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes
+appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of
+angel is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way,
+mode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially
+appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest
+things.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Some things need tempering on account of their
+strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in
+all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong
+passions, and modesty about weaker passions.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation
+which is necessary in all virtues.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 160, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Modesty Is Only About Outward Actions?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward
+actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to
+other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty
+be known to all men." Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are
+distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is
+seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it
+will not be concerned with inward passions.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining
+to the appetite--which is proper to the moral virtues--and about
+things pertaining to knowledge--which is proper to the intellectual
+virtues--and again about things pertaining to the irascible and
+concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it
+cannot be about all these things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In all these things it is necessary to observe the
+"mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all
+of them.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), modesty differs from
+temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where
+restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that
+present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various
+opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of
+good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the
+province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is
+clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a
+special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from
+modesty.
+
+In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
+considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of
+punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held
+modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require
+moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. One is the movement of
+the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by
+_humility._ The second is the desire of things pertaining to
+knowledge, and this is moderated by _studiousness_ which is opposed
+to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which
+require to be done becomingly and honestly [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1],
+whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show,
+for instance in dress and the like.
+
+To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed
+certain special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions
+"meekness, simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which
+we have spoken above (Q. 143); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7)
+assigned _eutrapelia_ to pleasures in games, as stated above (I-II,
+Q. 60, A. 5). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by
+Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also
+inward actions.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals.
+Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain
+outward signs.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities are
+comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from
+regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not
+so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there
+is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which
+is about passions, because in actions and passions that present no
+great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of
+moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of
+moderation.
+
+Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 161
+
+OF HUMILITY
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride
+which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite,
+Curiosity; (3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as
+affecting outward attire.
+
+Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether humility is a virtue?
+
+(2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason?
+
+(3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?
+
+(4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?
+
+(5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;
+
+(6) Of the degrees of humility.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Humility Is a Virtue?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue
+conveys the notion of a good. But humility conveys the notion of a
+penal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, "They humbled his feet in
+fetters." Therefore humility is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility
+seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23): "There
+is one that humbleth himself wickedly." Therefore humility is not a
+virtue.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility
+is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims at
+great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem
+that humility is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is perfect"
+(Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the
+imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be
+subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions,
+according to _Ethic._ ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the
+Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it
+comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would
+seem not to be a virtue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Origen commenting on Luke 1:48, "He hath regarded
+the humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in Luc.): "One of the
+virtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our
+Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.'"
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2) when we were
+treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive
+to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something
+repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In
+respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in
+respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been
+stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 2) that for those appetitive movements
+which are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a
+moderating and restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a
+kind of recoil, there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a
+moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold
+virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper
+and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and
+this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the
+mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things
+according to right reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is
+evident that humility is a virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a humble man is so
+called because he is, as it were, _humo acclinis"_ [*Literally, "bent
+to the ground"], i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen
+in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance when
+one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment.
+Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done
+sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own
+failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus
+Abraham said to the Lord (Gen. 18:27), "I will speak to my Lord,
+whereas I am dust and ashes." In this way humility is a virtue.
+Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for instance when man, "not
+understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts, and
+becomes like to them" (Ps. 48:13).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a
+virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the
+lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs
+and pretense: wherefore this is "false humility," of which Augustine
+says in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous pride," since to
+wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however,
+this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way,
+properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does
+not consist in externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the
+mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great
+things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to
+great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that
+magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this,
+that each is according to right reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First
+absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature
+nor in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To
+Him humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only
+as regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be
+perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature
+or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in
+comparison with God his perfection is found wanting, according to the
+word of Isa. 40:17, "All nations are before Him as if they had no
+being at all." In this way humility may be competent to every man.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as
+directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another
+is defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is
+a matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special
+virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake
+he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Humility Has to Do with the Appetite?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite
+but the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now
+pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says
+(Moral. xxxiv, 22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly to the
+body, is first of all shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written
+(Ps. 130:1), "Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty."
+Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem
+that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks
+little of oneself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "almost the
+whole of Christian teaching is humility." Consequently nothing
+contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now
+Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according
+to 1 Cor. 12:31, "Be zealous for the better gifts." Therefore it
+belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things
+but the estimate thereof.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain
+excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive
+withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul
+against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against
+the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore
+if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow
+that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is
+evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire
+but with the estimate of great things.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to
+outward show; for he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding
+excessive expenditure and parade." Therefore it is not concerned with
+the movement of the appetite.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that
+"the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of
+the Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners." But choice
+concerns the appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite
+rather than with the estimative power.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs properly to
+humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that
+which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion
+to that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own
+deficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite.
+Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and
+consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking,
+moderates the movement of the appetite.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes
+respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially
+wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves
+with others. But it does not follow from this that humility is
+essentially concerned with knowledge.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things
+through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater things
+through confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility;
+especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is
+one exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi):
+"It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to raise
+oneself up against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He
+raiseth up; he that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth
+down."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining
+daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason
+in both cases is that man should set the good of reason before
+dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope
+which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for
+strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for
+strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's
+proper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good
+which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing
+presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man
+ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him
+according to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore
+humility would seem to denote in the first place man's subjection to
+God; and for this reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4)
+ascribes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the
+gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows that the
+relation of fortitude to daring differs from that of humility to
+hope. Because fortitude uses daring more than it suppresses it: so
+that excess of daring is more like fortitude than lack of daring is.
+On the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self
+more than it uses it; wherefore excessive self-confidence is more
+opposed to humility than lack of confidence is.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be
+done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility.
+Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals,
+as signs of the inward movement of the appetite.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 3]
+
+Whether One Ought, by Humility, to Subject Oneself to All Men?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to
+subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3),
+humility consists chiefly in man's subjection to God. Now one ought
+not to offer to a man that which is due to God, as is the case with
+all acts of religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not
+to subject oneself to man.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv): "Humility
+should take the part of truth, not of falsehood." Now some men are of
+the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves
+to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject
+oneself to all men.
+
+Obj. 3: Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the
+detriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject
+himself to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to
+whom he subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise
+the other. Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest through
+excessive humility the superior lose his authority." Therefore a man
+ought not, by humility, to subject himself to all.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:3): "In humility, let each
+esteem others better than themselves."
+
+_I answer that,_ We may consider two things in man, namely that which
+is God's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is
+man's: but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is
+God's, according to the saying of Osee 13:9, "Destruction is thy own,
+O Israel; thy help is only in Me." Now humility, as stated above (A.
+1, ad 5; A. 2, ad 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is
+subject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his
+own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that
+which the latter has of God's: but humility does not require a man to
+subject what he has of God's to that which may seem to be God's in
+another. For those who have a share of God's gifts know that they
+have them, according to 1 Cor. 2:12: "That we may know the things
+that are given us from God." Wherefore without prejudice to humility
+they may set the gifts they have received from God above those that
+others appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (Eph.
+3:5): "(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it
+is now revealed to His holy apostles." In like manner, humility does
+not require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that
+which his neighbor has of man's: otherwise each one would have to
+esteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle
+says without prejudice to humility (Gal. 2:15): "We by nature are
+Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners." Nevertheless a man may
+esteem his neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself, or
+himself to have some evil which another has not: by reason of which,
+he may subject himself to him with humility.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that
+which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of
+reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves
+with humility to all our neighbors for God's sake, according to 1
+Pet. 2:13, "Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's
+sake"; but to God alone do we owe the worship of latria.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If we set what our neighbor has of God's above that
+which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a
+gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on Phil. 2:3, "Esteem
+others better than themselves," says: "We must not esteem by
+pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for
+another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he
+is better than we are, although our own good whereby we are
+apparently better than he, be not hidden."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly
+in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may
+subject himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion
+of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means
+in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "With fear, the superior should prostrate
+himself at your feet in the sight of God." On the other hand, due
+moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as
+of other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If,
+however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an
+occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with
+humility; since he does not give scandal, although others take it.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Humility Is a Part of Modesty or Temperance?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or
+temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is
+subject to God, as stated above (A. 3). Now it belongs to a
+theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility
+should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of
+temperance or modesty.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility
+would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to
+it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently
+humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object,
+as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not
+of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 5).
+Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or
+modesty.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): "If thou wilt
+hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the
+philosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as
+what they called _metriotes_, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this
+evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a
+part of modesty or temperance.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3,
+ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the
+likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of
+temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or
+suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues
+restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity
+of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as
+meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress
+the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at
+great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part
+of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says
+that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not
+magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble.
+Moreover, for the reason given above (Q. 160, A. 2), among the
+various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is
+comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
+54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of
+spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 3:4): "In the
+incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last end,
+which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes
+of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by
+reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or
+temperance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a
+sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated
+above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3, ad 2). Consequently,
+although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned
+as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter,
+they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a
+part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Humility Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the
+virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the
+publican (Luke 18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.] that "if
+humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it
+overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it
+not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the
+angels by the judgment seat of God." Hence it is clear that humility
+is set above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all
+the virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher
+(Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. [*S. 10, C.
+1]): "Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality?
+Attend first of all to the foundation of humility." Now this would
+seem to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue.
+Therefore apparently it is greater than the other virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now
+the greatest reward is due to humility, since "he that humbleth
+himself shall be exalted" (Luke 14:11). Therefore humility is the
+greatest of virtues.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16),
+"Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through
+the human nature which He assumed." Now He especially proposed His
+humility for our example, saying (Matt. 11:29): "Learn of Me, because
+I am meek and humble of heart." Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii,
+1) that the "lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption
+is the humility of God." Therefore humility would seem to be the
+greatest of virtues.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Charity is set above all the virtues, according to
+Col. 3:14, "Above all . . . things have charity." Therefore humility
+is not the greatest of virtues.
+
+_I answer that,_ The good of human virtue pertains to the order of
+reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end:
+wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have
+the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered
+in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance,
+as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but
+by participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and
+this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice.
+Now humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and
+in all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some
+special matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the
+intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after
+justice, especially legal justice, humility stands before all others.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Humility is not set before justice, but before that
+justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue; even
+so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is
+said of the publican (Luke 18:14) that through the merit of his
+humility "he went down into his house justified." Hence Chrysostom
+says [*De incompr. Nat. Dei, Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse
+chariots: in the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin
+with humility: and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not
+by its own strength, but by that of humility: while you will see the
+other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but by the weight
+and size of pride."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by reason
+of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that which is
+the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the
+foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now
+the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in
+the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way
+of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place,
+inasmuch as it expels pride, which "God resisteth," and makes man
+submissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence
+it is written (James 4:6): "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace
+to the humble." In this sense humility is said to be the foundation
+of the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues
+directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first
+step towards God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh
+to God must believe." In this sense faith is the foundation in a more
+excellent way than humility.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things
+are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who
+despise earthly riches, according to Matt. 6:19, 20, "Lay not up to
+yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves
+treasures in heaven." Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to
+those who despise worldly joys, according to Matt. 4:5, "Blessed are
+they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." In the same way
+spiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone
+merits it, but because it is proper to it to despise earthly
+uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]):
+"Think not that he who humbles himself remains for ever abased, for
+it is written: 'He shall be exalted.' And do not imagine that his
+exaltation in men's eyes is effected by bodily uplifting."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us,
+was because it especially removes the obstacle to man's spiritual
+welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual things,
+in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly
+things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our
+spiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that
+outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were,
+a disposition to man's untrammeled access to spiritual and divine
+goods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition, so
+charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are
+greater than humility.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Twelve Degrees of Humility Are Fittingly Distinguished in the
+Rule of the Blessed Benedict?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that
+are set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict [*St. Thomas gives
+these degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict]
+are unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be "humble not only in
+heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on
+the ground"; the second is "to speak few and sensible words, and not
+to be loud of voice"; the third is "not to be easily moved, and
+disposed to laughter"; the fourth is "to maintain silence until one
+is asked"; the fifth is "to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by
+the common rule of the monastery"; the sixth is "to believe and
+acknowledge oneself viler than all"; the seventh is "to think oneself
+worthless and unprofitable for all purposes"; the eighth is "to
+confess one's sin"; the ninth is "to embrace patience by obeying
+under difficult and contrary circumstances"; the tenth is "to subject
+oneself to a superior"; the eleventh is "not to delight in fulfilling
+one's own desires"; the twelfth is "to fear God and to be always
+mindful of everything that God has commanded." For among these there
+are some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience
+and patience. Again there are some that seem to involve a false
+opinion--and this is inconsistent with any virtue--namely to declare
+oneself more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe
+oneself to be in all ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these
+are unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do
+other virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which
+concern outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which
+pertain to inward actions.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) gives seven degrees of
+humility, the first of which is "to acknowledge oneself
+contemptible"; the second, "to grieve for this"; the third, "to
+confess it"; the fourth, "to convince others of this, that is to wish
+them to believe it"; the fifth, "to bear patiently that this be said
+of us"; the sixth, "to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt";
+the seventh, "to love being thus treated." Therefore the aforesaid
+degrees would seem to be too numerous.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Matt. 3:15 says: "Perfect humility has
+three degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are
+above us, and not to set ourselves above our equals: this is
+sufficient. The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set
+ourselves before our inferiors; this is called abundant humility. The
+third degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is
+perfect righteousness." Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to
+be too numerous.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "The measure of
+humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It is
+imperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to
+be entrapped." Now the measure of a man's greatness cannot be fixed
+according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem
+that it is not possible to assign the aforesaid degrees to humility.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2) humility has essentially to
+do with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of
+his soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is
+in the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be
+above what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these
+things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of
+humility leads to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and
+gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as happens also
+with the other virtues. For "a man is known by his look, and a wise
+man, when thou meetest him, by his countenance" (Ecclus. 19:26).
+Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility include something
+regarding the root of humility, namely the twelfth degree, "that a
+man fear God and bear all His commandments in mind."
+
+Again, they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest
+one aim inordinately at one's own excellence. This is done in three
+ways. First, by not following one's own will, and this pertains to
+the eleventh degree; secondly, by regulating it according to one's
+superior judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by
+not being deterred from this on account of the difficulties and
+hardships that come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree.
+
+Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man
+forms in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three ways.
+First by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs
+to the eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great
+things, and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in
+this respect one should put others before oneself, and this belongs
+to the sixth degree.
+
+Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of
+these regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should not depart
+from the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others
+have reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to
+speak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not
+immoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The others have to
+do with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks,
+which regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other
+signs of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow
+oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults
+which we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which
+others have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): "Bethink you
+that some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although
+outwardly you are better than they." Again, without falsehood one may
+avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in
+respect of one's own capability, so as to refer all one's sufficiency
+to God, according to 2 Cor. 3:5, "Not that we are sufficient to think
+anything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from
+God." And there is nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those
+things that pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises
+from another, so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue
+proceeds from the act of another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and chiefly
+by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the
+outward man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of
+all restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking
+out the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees
+of humility are here enumerated.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to
+knowledge, avowal, and desire of one's own abasement. For the first
+degree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency; but since it
+would be wrong for one to love one's own failings, this is excluded
+by the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal
+of one's own deficiency; namely that not merely one simply assert
+one's failing, but that one convince another of it. The other three
+degrees have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward
+excellence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity,
+whether it consist of words or deeds. For as Gregory says (Regist.
+ii, 10, Ep. 36), "there is nothing great in being humble towards
+those who treat us with regard, for even worldly people do this: but
+we should especially be humble towards those who make us suffer," and
+this belongs to the fifth and sixth degrees: or the appetite may even
+go so far as lovingly to embrace external abasement, and this
+pertains to the seventh degree; so that all these degrees are
+comprised under the sixth and seventh mentioned above.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: These degrees refer, not to the thing itself, namely
+the nature of humility, but to the degrees among men, who are either
+of higher or lower or of equal degree.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: This argument also considers the degrees of humility
+not according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which the
+aforesaid degrees are assigned, but according to the various
+conditions of men.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 162
+
+OF PRIDE
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first
+man's sin, which we hold to have been pride. Under the first head
+there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether pride is a sin?
+
+(2) Whether it is a special vice?
+
+(3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject?
+
+(4) Of its species;
+
+(5) Whether it is a mortal sin?
+
+(6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins?
+
+(7) Of its relation to other sins;
+
+(8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Pride Is a Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the
+object of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what He will do;
+and He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the
+Divine promises: for it is written (Isa. 60:15): "I will make thee to
+be an everlasting pride [Douay: 'glory'], a joy unto generation and
+generation." Therefore pride is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for
+every creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does
+this become the rational creature which is made to God's image and
+likeness. Now it is said in Prosper's Lib. Sent. 294, that "pride is
+love of one's own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is
+supremely excellent." Hence Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Pride
+imitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all."
+Therefore pride is not a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to a
+contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice
+is found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:14): "Never suffer pride to
+reign in thy mind or in thy words."
+
+_I answer that,_ Pride (_superbia_) is so called because a man
+thereby aims higher (_supra_) than he is; wherefore Isidore says
+(Etym. x): "A man is said to be proud, because he wishes to appear
+above (super) what he really is"; for he who wishes to overstep
+beyond what he is, is proud. Now right reason requires that every
+man's will should tend to that which is proportionate to him.
+Therefore it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to right
+reason, and this shows it to have the character of sin, because
+according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), "the soul's evil is to be
+opposed to reason." Therefore it is evident that pride is a sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Pride (_superbia_) may be understood in two ways.
+First, as overpassing (_supergreditur_) the rule of reason, and in
+this sense we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply
+denominate "super-abundance"; in which sense any super-abundant thing
+may be called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as
+significant of super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on the
+same passage (Isa. 61:6) says that "there is a good and an evil
+pride"; or "a sinful pride which God resists, and a pride that
+denotes the glory which He bestows."
+
+It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those
+things in which men may take pride.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Reason has the direction of those things for which man
+has a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from the rule
+of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is
+the case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now
+pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason.
+Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that pride is the
+"desire for inordinate exaltation": and hence it is that, as he
+asserts (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), "pride imitates God
+inordinately: for it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and
+wishes to usurp His dominion over our fellow-creatures."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility,
+which, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as magnanimity,
+as stated above (Q. 161, A. 1, ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride
+by default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by
+default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge
+the mind to great things against despair, so it belongs to humility
+to withdraw the mind from the inordinate desire of great things
+against presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for a
+deficiency in pursuing great things, is properly opposed to
+magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind's attachment
+to things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to
+humility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In
+the same way, on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both
+to magnanimity and humility, from different points of view: to
+humility, inasmuch as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch
+as it tends to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride
+implies a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility,
+even as pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul in tending
+towards great things, is more directly opposed to magnanimity.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Pride Is a Special Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For
+Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "you will find no sin
+that is not labelled pride"; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii,
+2) that "without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible."
+Therefore pride is a general sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, "That He may withdraw man from
+wickedness [*Vulg.: 'From the things that he is doing, and may
+deliver him from pride']," says that "a man prides himself when he
+transgresses His commandments by sin." Now according to Ambrose [*De
+Parad. viii], "every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a
+disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin is
+pride.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue.
+But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral.
+xxxiv, 23): "Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one
+virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and
+like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body";
+and Isidore says (Etym. [*De Summo Bono ii, 38]) that it is "the
+downfall of all virtues." Therefore pride is not a special sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride
+has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "one
+man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by
+mean and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues."
+Therefore pride is not a special but a general sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): "If he
+look into the question carefully, he will find that, according to
+God's law, pride is a very different sin from other vices." Now the
+genus is not different from its species. Therefore pride is not a
+general but a special sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ The sin of pride may be considered in two ways.
+First with regard to its proper species, which it has under the
+aspect of its proper object. In this way pride is a special sin,
+because it has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's
+own excellence, as stated (A. 1, ad 2). Secondly, it may be
+considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In this
+way it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may
+arise from pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins
+being directed to the end of pride which is one's own excellence, to
+which may be directed anything that is inordinately desired.
+Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, that is by removing
+an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which
+hinders him from sinning, according to Jer. 2:20, "Thou hast broken
+My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve."
+
+It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride
+admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes,
+but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For
+though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin,
+through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always
+break the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through
+ignorance, and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason
+Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "many things are done
+amiss which are not done through pride."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These words are introduced by Augustine into his book
+_De Nat. et Grat.,_ not as being his own, but as those of someone
+with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the
+assertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride.
+We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as
+referring to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the
+commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act
+of pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed,
+not always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance,
+sometimes through weakness, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not
+affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a
+parricide effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend
+it. Accordingly he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride
+himself against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one way by
+direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every
+virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the
+special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another
+way a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and
+thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an occasion
+of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to
+excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which
+aspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love of
+one's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Subject of Pride Is the Irascible Faculty?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of pride is not the
+irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): "A swollen
+mind is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light."
+Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the
+rational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that "the proud
+observe other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath
+them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with
+pride": wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue
+observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the
+rational faculty.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible
+things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it
+consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus.
+10:14, "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God."
+Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite,
+cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot
+be in the irascible.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, as stated in Prosper's _Liber Sententiarum,_ sent.
+294, "Pride is love of one's own excellence." But love is not in the
+irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the
+irascible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift
+of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the
+irascible.
+
+_I answer that,_ The subject of any virtue or vice is to be
+ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act
+cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of
+both. Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for
+pride is the desire of one's own excellence, as stated above (AA. 1,
+2). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible
+faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a
+strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even
+as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
+Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to
+belong also to the intellective appetite, to which also anger is
+sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the
+angels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice
+pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this
+broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated
+above in the First Part (Q. 59, A. 4; I-II, Q. 82, A. 5, ad 1 and 2).
+
+Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride,
+were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite
+might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of
+the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has
+in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must
+needs say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only
+strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in
+its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite.
+Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely
+speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause.
+For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may
+receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Matt. 11:25,
+"Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent," i.e. from
+the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, "and hast
+revealed them to little ones," i.e. to the humble.
+
+Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written
+(Ecclus. 6:34): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive
+instruction." The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is
+directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in
+their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory
+says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden
+truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their
+sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them." Hence
+it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 161, AA. 2, 6), humility observes
+the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now
+pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems
+himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate
+desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe what
+he desires very much, the result being that his appetite is borne
+towards things higher than what become him. Consequently whatsoever
+things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and
+one of those is the observing of other people's failings, just as, on
+the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), "holy
+men, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others
+above themselves." Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in
+the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the
+sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification,
+as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), "love
+precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause,"
+wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It
+is in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own
+excellence," inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his
+superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Four Species of Pride Are Fittingly Assigned by Gregory?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly
+assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four
+marks by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself;
+either when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they
+believe it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their
+own merits; or when they boast of having what they have not, or
+despise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what
+they have." For pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as
+humility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to
+unbelief, if a man deem that he has not received his good from God,
+or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore
+this should not be reckoned a species of pride.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species of
+different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as
+stated above (Q. 110, A. 2; Q. 112). Therefore it should not be
+accounted a species of pride.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride, which
+are not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says that
+"nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful":
+and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it belongs to pride to
+excuse oneself of a sin one has committed." Again, presumption
+whereby one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much
+to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not
+sufficiently account for the different species of pride.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm
+[*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq.] divides the uplifting of pride,
+saying that there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of
+deed." Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.] also reckons
+twelve degrees of pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind,
+senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption,
+defense of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license,
+sinful habit." Now these apparently are not comprised under the
+species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be
+assigned unfittingly.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The authority of Gregory suffices.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), pride denotes
+immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is
+not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all
+excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be
+considered in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that
+the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that
+one derives from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good
+greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his
+own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency: and thus we
+have the third species of pride, namely "boasting of having what one
+has not."
+
+Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as
+to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of
+another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another
+as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is
+borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of
+one's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus
+we have the first two species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he
+has from himself that which he has from God," or "when he believes
+that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits."
+
+Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it,
+in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some
+good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his
+appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus
+we have the fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises
+others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First,
+universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is
+destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice,
+and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication,
+judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit
+fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to
+say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question
+in point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that
+there is a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men
+for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and
+not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one's own excellence,
+to boast of one's goods as though one had them of oneself, or of
+one's own merits.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the
+outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has
+not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned
+by Gregory to be a species of pride.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from
+another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to
+ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to
+the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the
+good of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is
+above one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which
+consists in wishing to be preferred to others.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the
+progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in
+thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.
+
+The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of
+opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken
+above (Q. 161, A. 6). For the first degree of humility is to "be
+humble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes
+fixed on the ground": and to this is opposed "curiosity," which
+consists in looking around in all directions curiously and
+inordinately. The second degree of humility is "to speak few and
+sensible words, and not to be loud of voice": to this is opposed
+"frivolity of mind," by which a man is proud of speech. The third
+degree of humility is "not to be easily moved and disposed to
+laughter," to which is opposed "senseless mirth." The fourth degree
+of humility is "to maintain silence until one is asked," to which is
+opposed "boasting". The fifth degree of humility is "to do nothing
+but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery," to
+which is opposed "singularity," whereby a man wishes to seem more
+holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is "to believe and
+acknowledge oneself viler than all," to which is opposed "arrogance,"
+whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of
+humility is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all
+purposes," to which is opposed "presumption," whereby a man thinks
+himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of
+humility is "to confess one's sins," to which is opposed "defense of
+one's sins." The ninth degree is "to embrace patience by obeying
+under difficult and contrary circumstances," to which is opposed
+"deceitful confession," whereby a man being unwilling to be punished
+for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility
+is "obedience," to which is opposed "rebelliousness." The eleventh
+degree of humility is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own
+desires"; to this is opposed "license," whereby a man delights in
+doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is "fear
+of God": to this is opposed "the habit of sinning," which implies
+contempt of God.
+
+In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated,
+but also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have
+stated above with regard to humility (Q. 161, A. 6).
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Pride Is a Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a
+gloss on Ps. 7:4, "O Lord my God, if I have done this thing," says:
+"Namely, the universal sin which is pride." Therefore if pride were a
+mortal sin, so would every sin be.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride
+is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of God,
+nor as to the love of one's neighbor, because the excellence which,
+by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to God's
+honor, or our neighbor's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is
+not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as
+Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), "sometimes a man is elated by
+sublime and heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "pride is a
+most evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the
+elect." But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins.
+Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly
+regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above (Q. 161, A. 1,
+ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so
+far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him
+according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the
+Apostle (2 Cor. 10:13), "But we will not glory beyond our measure;
+but according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to
+us." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the
+pride of man is to fall off from God" because, to wit, the root of
+pride is found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to
+God and His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is
+of its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away
+from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin.
+Nevertheless just as in other sins which are mortal by their genus
+(for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain motions
+that are venial by reason of their imperfection (through forestalling
+the judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so too in the
+matter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial
+sins, when reason does not consent to them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 2) pride is a general sin, not by
+its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all sins may
+have their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all sins
+are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have
+stated to be a mortal sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Pride is always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch
+as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he
+ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor;
+when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and
+this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has
+established order among men, so that one ought to be subject to
+another.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct
+cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a
+virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from
+being the accidental cause of another, as stated in _Phys._ viii, 1.
+Hence some are even proud of their humility.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Pride Is the Most Grievous of Sins?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of
+sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it
+would seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine
+says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "Other sins find their vent in the
+accomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good
+deeds to destroy them." Therefore pride is not the most grievous of
+sins.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater good,"
+as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to which
+pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (Q.
+61, A. 5). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues,
+such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are
+more grievous sins than pride.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil.
+But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rom. 1:28,
+where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men of
+science were delivered "to a reprobate sense, to do those things
+which are not convenient." Therefore pride is not the most grievous
+of sins.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 118:51, "The proud did
+iniquitously,"    says: "The greatest sin in man is pride."
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to
+a mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion
+from the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and
+complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for
+pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride
+covets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the
+good of virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme
+gravity, because in other sins man turns away from God, either
+through ignorance or through weakness, or through desire for any
+other good whatever; whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply
+through being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence
+Boethius [*Cf. Cassian, de Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says that "while all
+vices flee from God, pride alone withstands God"; for which reason it
+is specially stated (James 4:6) that "God resisteth the proud."
+Wherefore aversion from God and His commandments, which is a
+consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very
+nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And since that which
+belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than
+that which belongs to it through something else, it follows that
+pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds
+in aversion which is the formal complement of sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First, on
+account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in
+its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and "still more
+difficult is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its
+connaturality," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, 9. A difficulty of this
+kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man
+sins the more grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous
+temptation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12, 15).
+
+Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being
+hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes
+occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A. 5, ad 3). Hence
+Augustine says pointedly that it "lies in wait for good deeds"; and
+it is written (Ps. 141:4): "In the way wherein I walked, the proud
+[*Cf. Ps. 139:6, 'The proud have hidden a net for me.'] [Vulg.:
+'they'] have hidden a snare for me." Hence no very great gravity
+attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and
+before it is discovered by the judgment of reason: but once
+discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, both by considering one's
+own infirmity, according to Ecclus. 10:9, "Why is earth and ashes
+proud?" and by considering God's greatness, according to Job 15:13,
+"Why doth thy spirit swell against God?" as well as by considering
+the imperfection of the goods on which man prides himself, according
+to Isa. 40:6, "All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the
+flower of the field"; and farther on (Isa. 64:6), "all our justices"
+are become "like the rag of a menstruous woman."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from
+the object, which is considered on the part of conversion. In this
+way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has
+humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the
+part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For
+unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud contempt, is
+rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance or
+weakness. The same applies to despair and the like.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible
+conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more
+evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God
+punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh,
+which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence
+Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that "pride is the worst of all
+vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest
+and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous
+deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. On the other hand,
+carnal lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a
+shameful nature: and yet, under God's dispensation, it is less
+grievous than pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels
+it not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he
+may rise from his abasement."
+
+From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a
+wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient
+to contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown
+to be more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows
+men to fall into other sins.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Pride Is the First Sin of All?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all.
+For the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not
+accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says
+(De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done "amiss which are not
+done with pride." Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that the "beginning of
+. . . pride is to fall off from God." Therefore falling away from God
+precedes pride.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the
+order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all
+virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13): "Evil men and seducers
+shall grow worse and worse"; so that apparently man's beginning of
+wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of
+sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the
+first sin.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now
+the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "pride apes fortitude and
+daring." Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the
+beginning of all sin."
+
+_I answer that,_ The first thing in every genus is that which is
+essential. Now it has been stated above (A. 6) that aversion from
+God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride
+essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride
+fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is "the beginning of all
+sins," as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 2), when we were treating of
+the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part
+of sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Pride is said to be "the beginning of all sin," not as
+though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin
+is naturally liable to arise from pride.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of
+pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being
+the first part of pride. For it has been said above (A. 5) that pride
+regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence
+it scorns to be subject to a creature for God's sake.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is no need for the order of virtues to be the
+same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that
+which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore
+as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to
+which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. 136:7,
+"Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof," says that "by
+heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief," and the
+Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:19) that "some rejecting a good conscience
+have made shipwreck concerning the faith."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because
+that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride
+is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride
+there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed through
+ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is
+pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous.
+And as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the
+withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13, "I shall be cleansed from
+the greatest sin," says: "Namely from the sin of pride, which is the
+last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw
+from God."
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher associates pride with feigned
+fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man
+thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be
+daring or brave.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Pride Should Be Reckoned a Capital Vice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital
+vice, since Isidore [*Comment. in Deut. xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst.
+Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since
+both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice.
+Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "pride
+begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion." Now envy is
+reckoned a capital vice, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 4). Much more
+therefore is pride a capital vice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride
+among the capital vices.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 5, ad 1) pride may be
+considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin;
+secondly, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the
+capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many
+kinds of sin arise. Wherefore some, considering pride in the light of
+a special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But
+Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all
+vices, as explained above (A. 2, Obj. 3), did not place it among the
+capital vices, but held it to be the "queen and mother of all the
+vices." Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): "Pride, the queen of vices,
+when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it
+into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that
+they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds."
+
+This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause
+thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory
+covets the outward show of excellence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises
+from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it
+is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 163
+
+OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his
+sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin?
+
+(2) What the first man coveted by sinning?
+
+(3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins?
+
+(4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Pride Was the First Man's First Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that pride was not the first man's first
+sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the disobedience of
+one man many were made sinners." Now the first man's first sin is the
+one by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin.
+Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Luke 4:3, "And the devil
+said to Him," that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same
+order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to
+gluttony, as appears from Matt. 4:3, where it was said to Him: "If
+thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread."
+Therefore the first man's first sin was not pride but gluttony.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man sinned at the devil's suggestion. Now the devil
+in tempting man promised him knowledge (Gen. 3:5). Therefore
+inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which
+pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the
+first sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 1 Tim.
+2:14, "The woman being seduced was in the transgression," says: "The
+Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to
+accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them
+to touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they
+would be like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them
+the godhead . . ." Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a
+thing. Therefore man's first sin was unbelief and not pride.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the
+beginning of all sin." Now man's first sin is the beginning of all
+sin, according to Rom. 5:12, "By one man sin entered into this
+world." Therefore man's first sin was pride.
+
+_I answer that,_ Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the
+character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is
+first found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward
+movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the body;
+since, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the
+body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains.
+Also, among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the
+end before being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of
+the end; and consequently man's first sin was where it was possible
+for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so
+appointed in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of
+the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the
+first inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his
+coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh
+tends against the order of reason. It remains therefore that the
+first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting
+inordinately some spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it
+inordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established
+by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man's first sin consisted
+in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this
+pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man's first sin was
+pride.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not willed
+by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one
+presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he
+willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he
+coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his
+disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the
+statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4])
+that "man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and
+scorned God's commands."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first
+parents. For it is written (Gen. 3:6): "The woman saw that the tree
+was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and
+she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat." Yet the very goodness
+and beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but
+the persuasive words of the serpent, who said (Gen. 3:5): "Your eyes
+shall be opened and you shall be as Gods": and it was by coveting
+this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony
+resulted from the sin of pride.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents
+from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began
+by saying: "You shall be as Gods," and added: "Knowing good and evil."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30), "the
+woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were
+debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not
+already filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud
+self-presumption." This does not mean that pride preceded the
+promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken
+his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being
+that she believed the demon to have spoken truly.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the First Man's Pride Consisted in His Coveting God's Likeness?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist
+in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that
+which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness
+is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gen.
+1:26): "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Therefore he did
+not sin by coveting God's likeness.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in
+order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was
+the serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and
+evil." Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to
+the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i,
+1: "All men naturally desire knowledge." Therefore he did not sin by
+coveting God's likeness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first
+man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, "He filled
+them with the knowledge of understanding." Since then every sin
+consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would
+seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible.
+But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying
+of Ex. 15:11, "Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?"
+Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 [*Enarr. in Ps.
+68], "Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away,"
+says: "Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost
+happiness."
+
+_I answer that,_ likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute
+equality [*Cf. I, Q. 93, A. 1]: and such a likeness to God our first
+parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not
+conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.
+
+The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a
+creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates
+somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius
+says (Div. Nom. ix): "The same things are like and unlike to God;
+like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated;
+unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause." Now every
+good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first
+good.
+
+Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above
+his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he
+coveted God's likeness inordinately.
+
+It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite
+is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the
+rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be
+considered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being:
+and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their
+creation, both on man--of whom it is written (Gen. 1:26) that God
+made man "to His image and likeness"--and on the angel, of whom it is
+written (Ezech. 28:12): "Thou wast the seal of resemblance."
+Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the
+angel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just
+quoted, "Thou wast the seal of resemblance," we read: "Full of
+wisdom." But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received
+this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the
+power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness
+actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there
+remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness.
+
+Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted
+God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a
+likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting
+God's likeness as regards "knowledge of good and evil," according to
+the serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he
+might decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again
+that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would
+befall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as
+regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural
+power he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says
+(Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman's mind was filled with love of
+her own power." On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's
+likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
+13) that "he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God's."
+Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as
+each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine
+rule.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man
+did not sin by coveting this, as stated.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to
+knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that
+is, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on
+Ps. 70:18, "O God, who is like Thee?" says: "He who desires to be of
+himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God.
+Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man
+who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Sin of Our First Parents Was More Grievous Than Other Sins?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more
+grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15):
+"Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid
+sin." Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin,
+because they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore
+the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin of
+our first parents was most severely punished, since by it "death
+entered into this world," as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12). Therefore
+that sin was more grievous than other sins.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest
+(Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first parents
+was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: "I think that a
+man who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall
+suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little." Now
+our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade.
+Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.
+
+_I answer that,_ There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin.
+one results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that
+adultery is a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity
+of sin results from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The
+former gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment:
+hence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather
+than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first man's sin
+was not graver than all other sins of men, as regards the species of
+the sin. For though pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence
+over other sins, yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God
+is greater than the pride whereby one covets God's likeness
+inordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as stated (A.
+2).
+
+But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that
+sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We
+must accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively
+but not simply.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting
+from the person of the sinner.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The severity of the punishment awarded to that first
+sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its
+species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed
+the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence
+brought disorder upon the whole human nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Where things are directly subordinate, the first must
+needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one
+follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that
+the first sin is the greatest.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Adam's Sin Was More Grievous Than Eve's?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than
+Eve's. For it is written (1 Tim. 2:14): "Adam was not seduced, but
+the woman being seduced was in the transgression": and so it would
+seem that the woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through
+assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to
+Luke 12:47, 48, "That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and
+did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: but
+he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten
+with few stripes." Therefore Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3 [*Serm. ix; xcvi
+de Temp.]): "If the man is the head, he should live better, and give
+an example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him." Now
+he who ought to do better, sins more grievously, if he commit a sin.
+Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be the
+most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy Ghost,
+because while sinning he relied on God's mercy [*Cf. Q. 21, A. 2,
+Obj. 3. St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter
+Lombard quoted there], and this pertains to the sin of presumption.
+Therefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was
+more grievously punished than the man, as appears from Gen. 3.
+Therefore she sinned more grievously than the man.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated (A. 3), the gravity of a sin depends on
+the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we
+must assert that, if we consider the condition attaching to these
+persons, the man's sin is the more grievous, because he was more
+perfect than the woman.
+
+As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered
+to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad
+lit. xi, 35): "Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex,
+though parity of pride."
+
+But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more
+grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up
+than the man. For the woman believed in the serpent's persuasive
+words, namely that God had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest
+they should become like to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God's
+likeness by eating of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the
+height of desiring to obtain something against God's will. On the
+other hand, the man did not believe this to be true; wherefore he did
+not wish to attain to God's likeness against God's will: but his
+pride consisted in wishing to attain thereto by his own power.
+Secondly, the woman not only herself sinned, but suggested sin to the
+man; wherefore she sinned against both God and her neighbor. Thirdly,
+the man's sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augustine says
+(Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), "he consented to the sin out of a certain
+friendly good-will, on account of which a man sometimes will offend
+God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to
+have done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine sentence."
+
+It is therefore evident that the woman's sin was more grievous than
+the man's.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The woman was deceived because she was first of all
+puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but
+aggravated her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed
+up with still greater pride.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the circumstance of personal
+condition, on account of which the man's sin was more grievous than
+the woman's.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The man's reliance on God's mercy did not reach to
+contempt of God's justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy
+Ghost, but as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi [*De Civ. Dei xiv,
+11]), it was due to the fact that, "having had no experience of God's
+severity, he thought the sin to be venial," i.e. easily forgiven
+[*Cf. I-II, Q. 89, A. 3, ad 1].
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 164
+
+OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this
+head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common
+punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 164, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Death Is the Punishment of Our First Parents' Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that death is not the punishment of our
+first parents' sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called
+a punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates
+it. Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the
+fact that his body is composed of contraries, and because "mortal" is
+included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a
+punishment of our first parents' sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly found
+in man as well as in other animals, according to Eccles. 3:19, "The
+death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both
+equal." But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin.
+Therefore neither is it so in men.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of
+particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human
+nature. Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our
+first parents' sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, all are equally descended from our first parents.
+Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents' sin, it
+would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But
+this is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more
+painfully, than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the
+first sin.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated above
+(I, Q. 48, A. 6; Q. 49, A. 2). But death, apparently, is not from
+God: for it is written (Wis. 1:13): "God made not death." Therefore
+death is not the punishment of the first sin.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since
+merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now death
+is sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death.
+Therefore it would seem that death is not a punishment.
+
+Obj. 7: Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death
+apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he is
+dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is
+not a punishment of sin.
+
+Obj. 8: Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have
+followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents
+lived a long time after their sin (Gen. 5:5). Therefore, seemingly,
+death is not a punishment of sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin
+entered into this world, and by sin death."
+
+_I answer that,_ If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of
+a favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment
+of that fault. Now as we stated in the First Part (Q. 95, A. 1; Q.
+97, A. 1), God bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state,
+that as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his
+soul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul.
+But inasmuch as through sin man's mind withdrew from subjection to
+God, the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject
+to his reason, whence there followed so great a rebellion of the
+carnal appetite against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject
+to the soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life
+and soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul,
+as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the
+other hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the body are due to
+the lack of the body's subjection to the soul.
+
+It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite
+against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents' sin, so also
+are death and all defects of the body.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the
+principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form
+and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of
+itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part
+of his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of
+contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and
+in this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached
+to the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity,
+since it was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch,
+and consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was
+impossible, were it not composed of contraries, as the Philosopher
+states (De Anima ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not
+attached to the adaptability of matter to form because, if it were
+possible, since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather
+be incorruptible. In the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this
+being suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make
+it fit for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary
+result of such a matter and is not according to the agent's choice;
+for, if the craftsman were able, of the iron he would make a saw that
+would not rust. Now God Who is the author of man is all-powerful,
+wherefore when He first made man, He conferred on him the favor of
+being exempt from the necessity resulting from such a matter: which
+favor, however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents.
+Accordingly death is both natural on account of a condition attaching
+to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the Divine favor
+preserving man from death [*Cf. I-II, Q. 85, A. 6].
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This likeness of man to other animals regards a
+condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of
+contraries. But it does not regard the form, for man's soul is
+immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Our first parents were made by God not only as
+particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human
+nature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with
+the Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their sin
+the entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their
+posterity, incurred death.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a
+punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal in
+those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that
+which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that
+one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed,
+should fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to
+the sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot
+foresee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for
+the first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was the
+withdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of
+human nature was maintained. But the defects resulting from this
+withdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life.
+Wherefore these punishments need not be equal in those to whom the
+first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all
+future events, Divine providence has so disposed that these penalties
+are apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on
+account of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen
+held [*Peri Archon ii, 9]: for this is contrary to the words of Rom.
+9:11, "When they . . . had not done any good or evil"; and also
+contrary to statements made in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 4; Q. 118,
+A. 3), namely that the soul is not created before the body: but
+either in punishment of their parents' sins, inasmuch as the child is
+something belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often
+punished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended for
+the spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these penalties, to
+wit that he may thus be turned away from his sins, or lest he take
+pride in his virtues, and that he may be crowned for his patience.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an evil
+of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect befalling
+man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely
+as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore
+Augustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death,
+except in so far as it is a punishment.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), "just as the
+wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous
+make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is
+that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is good,
+while good men die well, although death is an evil." Wherefore
+inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them
+meritorious.
+
+Reply Obj. 7: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the
+privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the
+privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of
+sense but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting
+the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may
+speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as
+being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which
+life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has
+no pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken as including
+the previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in
+motion towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered, while
+in motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death
+may be painful.
+
+Reply Obj. 8: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. [*De Pecc. Mer. et
+Rem. i, 16. Cf. Gen. ad lit. ii. 32]), "although our first parents
+lived thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when they
+heard the death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 164, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Particular Punishments of Our First Parents Are Suitably
+Appointed in Scripture?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the particular punishments of our
+first parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which
+would have occurred even without sin should not be described as a
+punishment for sin. Now seemingly there would have been "pain in
+child-bearing," even had there been no sin: for the disposition of
+the female sex is such that offspring cannot be born without pain to
+the bearer. Likewise the "subjection of woman to man" results from
+the perfection of the male, and the imperfection of the female sex.
+Again it belongs to the nature of the earth "to bring forth thorns
+and thistles," and this would have occurred even had there been no
+sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of the first sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to a person's dignity does not,
+seemingly, pertain to his punishment. But the "multiplying of
+conceptions" pertains to a woman's dignity. Therefore it should not
+be described as the woman's punishment.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the punishment of our first parents' sin is
+transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard to death (A. 1).
+But all "women's conceptions" are not "multiplied," nor does "every
+man eat bread in the sweat of his face." Therefore these are not
+suitable punishments of the first sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the place of paradise was made for man. Now nothing
+in the order of things should be without purpose. Therefore it would
+seem that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable
+punishment of man.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, this place of the earthly paradise is said to be
+naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other
+obstacles in the way lest man should return thither, to wit the
+cherubim, and the "flaming sword turning every way."
+
+Obj. 6: Further, immediately after his sin man was subject to the
+necessity of dying, so that he could not be restored to immortality
+by the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid
+him to eat of the tree of life, as instanced by the words of Gen.
+3:22: "See, lest perhaps he . . . take . . . of the tree of
+life . . . and live for ever."
+
+Obj. 7: Further, to mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy
+and clemency, which are most of all ascribed to God in Scripture,
+according to Ps. 144:9, "His tender mercies are over all His works."
+Therefore God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents,
+already reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of Gen.
+3:22, "Behold Adam is become as one of Us, knowing good and evil."
+
+Obj. 8: Further, clothes are necessary to man, like food, according
+to 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these
+we are content." Therefore just as food was appointed to our first
+parents before their sin, so also should clothing have been ascribed
+to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable to say that God
+made for them garments of skin.
+
+Objection 9: Further, the punishment inflicted for a sin should
+outweigh in evil the gain realized through the sin: else the
+punishment would not deter one from sinning. Now through sin our
+first parents gained in this, that their eyes were opened, according
+to Gen. 3:7. But this outweighs in good all the penal evils which are
+stated to have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting
+from our first parents' sin are unsuitably described.
+
+_On the contrary,_ These punishments were appointed by God, Who does
+all things, "in number, weight, and measure [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast
+ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.']" (Wis.
+11:21).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated in the foregoing Article, on account of
+their sin, our first parents were deprived of the Divine favor,
+whereby the integrity of human nature was maintained in them, and by
+the withdrawal of this favor human nature incurred penal defects.
+Hence they were punished in two ways. In the first place by being
+deprived of that which was befitting the state of integrity, namely
+the place of the earthly paradise: and this is indicated (Gen. 3:23)
+where it is stated that "God sent him out of the paradise of
+pleasure." And since he was unable, of himself, to return to that
+state of original innocence, it was fitting that obstacles should be
+placed against his recovering those things that were befitting his
+original state, namely food (lest he should take of the tree of life)
+and place; for "God placed before . . . paradise . . . Cherubim, and
+a flaming sword." Secondly, they were punished by having appointed to
+them things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid favor: and
+this as regards both the body and the soul. With regard to the body,
+to which pertains the distinction of sex, one punishment was
+appointed to the woman and another to the man. To the woman
+punishment was appointed in respect of two things on account of which
+she is united to the man; and these are the begetting of children,
+and community of works pertaining to family life. As regards the
+begetting of children, she was punished in two ways: first in the
+weariness to which she is subject while carrying the child after
+conception, and this is indicated in the words (Gen. 3:16), "I will
+multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions"; secondly, in the pain
+which she suffers in giving birth, and this is indicated by the words
+(Gen. 3:16), "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth." As regards family
+life she was punished by being subjected to her husband's authority,
+and this is conveyed in the words (Gen. 3:16), "Thou shalt be under
+thy husband's power."
+
+Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in
+matters relating to the family life, so it belongs to the husband to
+provide the necessaries of that life. In this respect he was punished
+in three ways. First, by the barrenness of the earth, in the words
+(Gen. 3:17), "Cursed is the earth in thy work." Secondly, by the
+cares of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the
+earth; hence the words (Gen. 3:17), "With labor and toil shalt thou
+eat thereof all the days of thy life." Thirdly, by the obstacles
+encountered by the tillers of the soil, wherefore it is written (Gen.
+3:18), "Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee."
+
+Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the
+soul. First, by reason of the confusion they experienced at the
+rebellion of the flesh against the spirit; hence it is written (Gen.
+3:7): "The eyes of them both were opened; and . . . they perceived
+themselves to be naked." Secondly, by the reproach for their sin,
+indicated by the words (Gen. 3:22), "Behold Adam is become as one of
+Us." Thirdly, by the reminder of their coming death, when it was said
+to him (Gen. 3:19): "Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return."
+To this also pertains that God made them garments of skin, as a sign
+of their mortality.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the state of innocence child-bearing would have been
+painless: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Just as, in
+giving birth, the mother would then be relieved not by groans of
+pain, but by the instigations of maturity, so in bearing and
+conceiving the union of both sexes would be one not of lustful desire
+but of deliberate action" [*Cf. I, Q. 98, A. 2].
+
+The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as
+inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship (since
+even before sin the man was the "head" and governor "of the woman"),
+but as to her having now to obey her husband's will even against her
+own.
+
+If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and
+thistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish man, because
+their growth would bring no labor or punishment for the tiller of the
+soil, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 18). Alcuin [*Interrog. et
+Resp. in Gen. lxxix], however, holds that, before sin, the earth
+brought forth no thorns and thistles, whatever: but the former
+opinion is the better.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed as a
+punishment to the woman, not on account of the begetting of children,
+for this would have been the same even before sin, but on account of
+the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject, through
+carrying her offspring after conception. Hence it is expressly
+stated: "I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These punishments affect all somewhat. For any woman
+who conceives must needs suffer sorrows and bring forth her child
+with pain: except the Blessed Virgin, who "conceived without
+corruption, and bore without pain" [*St. Bernard, Serm. in Dom. inf.
+oct. Assum. B. V. M.], because her conceiving was not according to
+the law of nature, transmitted from our first parents. And if a woman
+neither conceives nor bears, she suffers from the defect of
+barrenness, which outweighs the aforesaid punishments. Likewise
+whoever tills the soil must needs eat his bread in the sweat of his
+brow: while those who do not themselves work on the land, are busied
+with other labors, for "man is born to labor" (Job 5:7): and thus
+they eat the bread for which others have labored in the sweat of
+their brow.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although the place of the earthly paradise avails not
+man for his use, it avails him for a lesson; because he knows himself
+deprived of that place on account of sin, and because by the things
+that have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed in
+things pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to which is
+prepared for man by Christ.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual
+interpretation, this place would seem to be inaccessible, chiefly on
+account of the extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the
+nighness of the sun. This is denoted by the "flaming sword," which is
+described as "turning every way," as being appropriate to the
+circular movement that causes this heat. And since the movements of
+corporal creatures are set in order through the ministry of the
+angels, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4), it was fitting
+that, besides the sword turning every way, there should be cherubim
+"to keep the way of the tree of life." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad
+lit. xi, 40): "It is to be believed that even in the visible paradise
+this was done by heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery
+guard set there by the ministry of angels."
+
+Reply Obj. 6: After sin, if man had [eaten] of the tree of life, he
+would not thereby have recovered immortality, but by means of that
+beneficial food he might have prolonged his life. Hence in the words
+"And live for ever," "for ever" signifies "for a long time." For it
+was not expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of this
+life.
+
+Reply Obj. 7: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 39), "these
+words of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a
+deterrent to others, for whose benefit these things are written, lest
+they be proud likewise, because Adam not only failed to become that
+which he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he was made."
+
+Reply Obj. 8: Clothing is necessary to man in his present state of
+unhappiness for two reasons. First, to supply a deficiency in respect
+of external harm caused by, for instance, extreme heat or cold.
+Secondly, to hide his ignominy and to cover the shame of those
+members wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most
+manifest. Now these two motives do not apply to the primitive state.
+because then man's body could not be hurt by any outward thing, as
+stated in the First Part (Q. 97, A. 2), nor was there in man's body
+anything shameful that would bring confusion on him. Hence it is
+written (Gen. 2:23): "And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his
+wife, and were not ashamed." The same cannot be said of food, which
+is necessary to entertain the natural heat, and to sustain the body.
+
+Reply Obj. 9: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 31), "We must not
+imagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed,
+especially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was
+fair, and good to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were opened so
+that they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their
+minds before, this was a mutual concupiscence such as they had not
+hitherto."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 165
+
+OF OUR FIRST PARENTS' TEMPTATION
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider our first parents' temptation, concerning which
+there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?
+
+(2) Of the manner and order of that temptation.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 165, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Was Fitting for Man to Be Tempted by the Devil?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for man to be
+tempted by the devil. For the same final punishment is appointed to
+the angels' sin and to man's, according to Matt. 25:41, "Go [Vulg.:
+'Depart from Me'] you cursed into everlasting fire, which was
+prepared for the devil and his angels." Now the angels' first sin did
+not follow a temptation from without. Therefore neither should man's
+first sin have resulted from an outward temptation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God, Who foreknows the future, knew that through the
+demon's temptation man would fall into sin, and thus He knew full
+well that it was not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it
+would seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems to savor of punishment that anyone should
+have an assailant, just as on the other hand the cessation of an
+assault is akin to a reward. Now punishment should not precede fault.
+Therefore it was unfitting for man to be tempted before he sinned.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 34:11): "He that hath not
+been tempted [Douay: 'tried'], what manner of things doth he know?"
+
+_I answer that,_ God's wisdom "orders all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1),
+inasmuch as His providence appoints to each one that which is
+befitting it according to its nature. For as Dionysius says (Div.
+Nom. iv), "it belongs to providence not to destroy, but to maintain,
+nature." Now it is a condition attaching to human nature that one
+creature can be helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it was
+fitting that God should both allow man in the state of innocence to
+be tempted by evil angels, and should cause him to be helped by good
+angels. And by a special favor of grace, it was granted him that no
+creature outside himself could harm him against his own will, whereby
+he was able even to resist the temptation of the demon.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Above the human nature there is another that
+admits of the possibility of the evil of fault: but there is not above
+the angelic nature. Now only one that is already become evil through
+sin can tempt by leading another into evil. Hence it was fitting that
+by an evil angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according to
+the order of nature he is moved forward to perfection by means of a
+good angel. An angel could be perfected in good by something above
+him, namely by God, but he could not thus be led into sin, because
+according to James 1:13, "God is not a tempter of evils."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as God knew that man, through being
+tempted, would fall into sin, so too He knew that man was able, by his
+free will, to resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to man's
+nature required that he should be left to his own will, according to
+Ecclus. 15:14, "God left" man "in the hand of his own counsel." Hence
+Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 4): "It seems to me that man would
+have had no prospect of any special praise, if he were able to lead a
+good life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an
+evil life; since both by nature he had the power, and in his power he
+had the will, not to consent to the persuader."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist
+it: but, in the state of innocence, man was able, without any
+difficulty, to resist temptation. Consequently the tempter's assault
+was not a punishment to man.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 165, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Manner and Order of the First Temptation Was Fitting?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the manner and order of the first
+temptation was not fitting. For just as in the order of nature the
+angel was above man, so was the man above the woman. Now sin came
+upon man through an angel: therefore in like manner it should have
+come upon the woman through the man; in other words the woman should
+have been tempted by the man, and not the other way about.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the temptation of our first parents was by
+suggestion. Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without
+making use of an outward sensible creature. Since then our first
+parents were endowed with a spiritual mind, and adhered less to
+sensible than to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting
+for man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead of an outward,
+temptation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an evil except through
+some apparent good. But many other animals have a greater appearance
+of good than the serpent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted
+by the devil through a serpent.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the serpent is an irrational animal. Now wisdom,
+speech, and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal.
+Therefore the serpent is unfittingly described (Gen. 3:1) as "more
+subtle than any of the beasts of the earth," or as "the most prudent
+of all beasts" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: and
+likewise is unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman, and to
+have been punished by God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ That which is first in any genus should be
+proportionate to all that follow it in that genus. Now in every kind
+of sin we find the same order as in the first temptation. For,
+according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12), it begins with the
+concupiscence of sin in the sensuality, signified by the serpent;
+extends to the lower reason, by pleasure, signified by the woman; and
+reaches to the higher reason by consent in the sin, signified by the
+man. Therefore the order of the first temptation was fitting.
+
+_I answer that,_ Man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective
+and sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempting man, made use of a
+twofold incentive to sin: one on the part of the intellect, by
+promising the Divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge
+which man naturally desires to have; the other on the part of sense.
+This he did by having recourse to those sensible things, which are
+most akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the woman who
+was akin to him in the same species; partly by tempting the woman
+through the serpent, who was akin to them in the same genus; partly
+by suggesting to them to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin
+to them in the proximate genus.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the act of tempting the devil was by way of
+principal agent; whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of
+temptation in bringing about the downfall of the man, both because
+the woman was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable to be
+deceived, and because, on account of her union with man, the devil
+was able to deceive the man especially through her. Now there is no
+parity between principal agent and instrument, because the principal
+agent must exceed in power, which is not requisite in the
+instrumental agent.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to
+man spiritually, shows the devil to have more power against man than
+outward suggestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least,
+man's imagination is changed by the devil [*Cf. First Part, Q. 91, A.
+3]; whereas by an outward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on
+an outward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power against man
+before sin, wherefore he was unable to tempt him by inward
+suggestion, but only by outward suggestion.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 3), "we are
+not to suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of
+temptation; but as he was possessed of the lust of deceit, he could
+only do so by the animal he was allowed to use for that purpose."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29), "the
+serpent is described as most prudent or subtle, on account of the
+cunning of the devil, who wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of
+a prudent or cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of a
+prudent or cunning man in advising something prudently or cunningly.
+Nor indeed (Gen. ad lit. xi, 28) did the serpent understand the
+sounds which were conveyed through it to the woman; nor again are we
+to believe that its soul was changed into a rational nature, since
+not even men, who are rational by nature, know what they say when a
+demon speaks in them. Accordingly (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29) the serpent
+spoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat spoke to him,
+except that the former was the work of a devil, whereas the latter
+was the work of an angel. Hence (Gen. ad lit. xi, 36) the serpent was
+not asked why it had done this, because it had not done this in its
+own nature, but the devil in it, who was already condemned to
+everlasting fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed to
+the serpent were directed to him who wrought through the serpent."
+
+Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. contra Manich. ii, 17,
+18), "his, that is, the devil's, punishment mentioned here is that
+for which we must be on our guard against him, not that which is
+reserved till the last judgment. For when it was said to him: 'Thou
+art cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth,' the cattle are
+set above him, not in power, but in the preservation of their nature,
+since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had
+it, but they continue to live in the nature which they received." It
+is also said to him: "'Upon thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,'"
+according to another version [*The Septuagint] "Here the breast
+signifies pride, because it is there that the impulse of the soul
+dominates, while the belly denotes carnal desire, because this part
+of the body is softest to the touch: and on these he creeps to those
+whom he wishes to deceive." The words, "'Earth shalt thou eat all the
+days of thy life' may be understood in two ways. Either 'Those shall
+belong to thee, whom thou shalt deceive by earthly lust,' namely
+sinners who are signified under the name of earth, or a third kind of
+temptation, namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat
+earth is to look into things deep and dark." The putting of enmities
+between him and the woman "means that we cannot be tempted by the
+devil, except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects
+the likeness of a woman. The seed of the devil is the temptation to
+evil, the seed of the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the
+temptation to evil is resisted. Wherefore the serpent lies in wait
+for the woman's heel, that if at any time she fall away towards what
+is unlawful, pleasure may seize hold of her: and she watches his head
+that she may shut him out at the very outset of the evil temptation."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 166
+
+OF STUDIOUSNESS
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity.
+Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is the matter of studiousness?
+
+(2) Whether it is a part of temperance?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 166, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Proper Matter of Studiousness Is Knowledge?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of
+studiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies
+study to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every
+matter, in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore
+seemingly knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now curiosity,
+which is derived from _cura_ (care), may also refer to elegance of
+apparel and other such things, which regard the body; wherefore the
+Apostle says (Rom. 13:14): "Make not provision (_curam_) for the
+flesh in its concupiscences."
+
+Obj. 3: Further it is written (Jer. 6:13): "From the least of them
+even to the greatest, all study [Douay: 'are given to']
+covetousness." Now covetousness is not properly about knowledge, but
+rather about the possession of wealth, as stated above (Q. 118, A.
+2). Therefore studiousness, which is derived from "study," is not
+properly about knowledge.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 27:11): "Study wisdom, my
+son, and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him
+that reproacheth." Now study, which is commended as a virtue, is the
+same as that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is
+properly about _knowledge._
+
+_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of
+the mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except
+by knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind's application to knowledge
+precedes its application to those things to which man is directed by
+his knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and
+as a result it regards any other things the working of which requires
+to be directed by knowledge. Now the virtues lay claim to that matter
+about which they are first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned
+about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch.
+Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Nothing can be done aright as regards other matters,
+except in so far as is previously directed by the knowing reason.
+Hence studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior
+regard for knowledge.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Man's mind is drawn, on account of his affections,
+towards the things for which he has an affection, according to Matt.
+6:21, "Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also." And since man
+has special affection for those things which foster the flesh, it
+follows that man's thoughts are concerned about things that foster
+his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best sustain his
+body. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be about things
+pertaining to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and for
+this it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things.
+Accordingly studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to
+covetousness.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 166, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Studiousness Is a Part of Temperance?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that studiousness is not a part of
+temperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his
+studiousness. Now all virtuous persons without exception are called
+studious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the
+term "studious" (_spoudaios_) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4, 8, 9).
+[*In the same sense Aristotle says in _Ethic._ iii, 2, that "every
+vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do."] Therefore
+studiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of temperance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, studiousness, as stated (A. 1), pertains to
+knowledge. But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues
+which are in the appetitive part of the soul, and pertains rather to
+the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore
+solicitude is an act of prudence as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9).
+Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a principal
+virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not
+resemble temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name
+from being a kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the
+vice that is in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from
+being the application of the mind to something, so that it would seem
+to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of
+study, rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity.
+wherefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore says
+(Etym. x) that "a studious man is one who is curious to study."
+Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "We are
+forbidden to be curious: and this is a great gift that temperance
+bestows." Now curiosity is prevented by moderate studiousness.
+Therefore studiousness is a part of temperance.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, AA. 3, 4, 5), it belongs to
+temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it tend
+excessively to that which is desired naturally. Now just as in
+respect of his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures
+of food and sex, so, in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to
+know something; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his
+_Metaphysics_ (i, 1): "All men have a natural desire for knowledge."
+
+The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness;
+wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of
+temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue.
+Moreover, it is comprised under modesty for the reason given above
+(Q. 160, A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as
+stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Consequently, in so far as the knowledge
+of prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term "studiousness,"
+which properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the
+appetitive power, which moves all the powers, as stated above (I-II,
+Q. 9, A. 1). Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is
+connected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to
+the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate
+about each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the
+appetitive power, and consists in man's appetite being directed
+aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or
+that thing. And this belongs to the virtue of seriousness. Wherefore
+it is reckoned among the moral virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in order to be
+virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally
+inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us chiefly to fear
+dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is
+chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such
+dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the
+flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. For
+on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of
+things; and so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint
+on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the
+part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of
+seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination
+studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it
+is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination,
+this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in
+seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The
+former is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the
+desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is
+directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to
+knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by
+that which removes an obstacle.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 167
+
+OF CURIOSITY
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge?
+
+(2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 167, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Curiosity Can Be About Intellective Knowledge?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about
+intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
+ii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are
+essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good:
+because man's perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being
+reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge
+of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the good of the
+human soul is to be in accordance with reason," whose perfection
+consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot
+be about intellective knowledge.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he
+receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge
+is from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, "All wisdom is from the Lord
+God," and Wis. 7:17, "He hath given me the true knowledge of things
+that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues
+of the elements," etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to
+God, since "all things are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb. 4:13),
+and "the Lord is a God of all knowledge" (1 Kings 2:3). Therefore
+however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good.
+Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity
+cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of
+intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical
+sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them:
+for Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): "Those who refused to partake of
+the king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had
+considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful,
+would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful": and
+Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that "if the philosophers
+made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from
+unjust possessors." Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge
+cannot be sinful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says:
+"Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the
+dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the
+heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?" Now
+vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore
+curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 166, A. 2, ad 2) studiousness is
+directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study
+in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the
+knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit
+of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly
+speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some
+result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth,
+according to 1 Cor. 8:1, "Knowledge puffeth up," or because one uses
+the knowledge of truth in order to sin.
+
+On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of
+truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to
+the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for
+instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride
+in their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "Some
+there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of
+the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they
+are doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness
+they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So
+great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in
+the very heavens about which they argue." In like manner, those who
+study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful
+study, according to the saying of Jer. 9:5, "They have taught their
+tongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity."
+
+Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study
+directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this
+in four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable
+study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence
+Jerome says [*Epist. xxi ad Damas]: "We see priests forsaking the
+gospels and the prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love
+songs of pastoral idylls." Secondly, when a man studies to learn of
+one, by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who
+seek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious
+curiosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): "Maybe, the
+philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity
+in seeking knowledge from the demons."
+
+Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures,
+without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge
+of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that "in studying
+creatures, we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity;
+but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things."
+
+Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of
+his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error:
+wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:22): "Seek not the things that are
+too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . .
+and in many of His works be not curious," and further on (Ecclus.
+3:26), "For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath
+detained their minds in vanity."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet
+man's sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but
+in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher
+states (Ethic. x, 7, 8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of
+certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not
+directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth,
+wherein supreme happiness consists.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although this argument shows that the knowledge of
+truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing
+the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the
+knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good
+should be regulated in due manner.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and
+commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired
+through God revealing it to them, as stated in Rom. 1:19. Since,
+however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the
+faith, the Apostle says (Col. 2:8): "Beware lest any man cheat you by
+philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . .
+and not according to Christ": and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad
+Polycarp.) of certain philosophers that "they make an unholy use of
+divine things against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom
+strive to destroy the worship of God."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 167, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Vice of Curiosity Is About Sensitive Knowledge?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about
+sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense
+of sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and
+taste. Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not
+curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the
+vice of curiosity about things known by the sight.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games;
+wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when "a fall occurred
+in the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly,
+and overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes." But it does not
+seem to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on
+account of the representation, wherein man takes a natural delight,
+as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity
+is not about the knowledge of sensible objects.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire
+into our neighbor's actions, as Bede observes [*Comment. in 1 John
+2:16]. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of
+others, because according to Ecclus. 17:12, God "gave to every one of
+them commandment concerning his neighbor." Therefore the vice of
+curiosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular
+sensible objects.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that
+"concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious." Now according to Bede
+(Comment. in 1 John 2:16) "concupiscence of the eyes refers not only
+to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the
+discovery and dispraise of our neighbor's faults," and all these are
+particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the
+eves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life,
+which are members of the same division (1 John 2:16), it seems that
+the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things.
+
+_I answer that,_ The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two
+things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it
+is directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this
+kind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek
+those things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. In the
+second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to
+intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly
+to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be
+sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not
+directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful
+consideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), "I go no more
+to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open country,
+if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract me from
+some weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and unless Thou,
+having made me see my weakness, didst speedily admonish me, I become
+foolishly dull." Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is
+directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to
+lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people's actions is
+directed to detraction. On the other hand, if one be ordinately
+intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity
+of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible
+truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is
+virtuous.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the
+use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising
+from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to
+Augustine (Confess. x, 35) "it is called concupiscence of the eyes"
+because "the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge,
+so that all sensible things are said to be seen," and as he says
+further on: "By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein
+pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for
+pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory,
+soft; but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of
+these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust
+of experiment and knowledge."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man
+prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees
+represented. Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.] that such
+sights make men adulterers and shameless.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: One may watch other people's actions or inquire into
+them, with a good intent, either for one's own good--that is in order
+to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor--or for
+our neighbor's good--that is in order to correct him, if he do
+anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of
+one's position. This is praiseworthy, according to Heb. 10:24,
+"Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works." But
+to observe our neighbor's faults with the intention of looking down
+upon them, or of detracting them, or even with no further purpose
+than that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written (Prov.
+24:15), "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of
+the just, nor spoil his rest."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 168
+
+OF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements
+of the body, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of
+the body that are done seriously?
+
+(2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions?
+
+(3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play;
+
+(4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Any Virtue Regards the Outward Movements of the Body?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no virtue regards the outward
+movements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual
+beauty of the soul, according to Ps. 44:14, "All the glory of the
+king's daughter is within," and a gloss adds, "namely, in the
+conscience." Now the movements of the body are not within, but
+without. Therefore there can be no virtue about them.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "Virtues are not in us by nature," as the
+Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are
+in man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some
+slow of movement, and the same applies to other differences of
+outward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of
+this kind.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is either about actions directed
+to another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance and
+fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another
+person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is connected with
+them.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue, as
+stated above (Q. 166, A. 1, Obj. 1; A. 2, ad 1). Now it is censurable
+to apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements: for
+Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "A becoming gait is one that reflects
+the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the
+foot-print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor
+affectation, but natural and artless movement." Therefore seemingly
+there is no virtue about the style of outward movements.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The beauty of honesty [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1] pertains
+to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty
+of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "The sound of the
+voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether they
+be unduly soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be
+our model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of
+honesty." Therefore there is a virtue about the style of outward
+movement.
+
+_I answer that,_ Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to
+man being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward
+movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members
+are set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that
+there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these
+movements.
+
+Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold
+standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly,
+in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or
+place. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Beauty of conduct
+consists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex
+and person," and this regards the first. As to the second, he adds:
+"This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish
+becoming to every action."
+
+Hence Andronicus [*De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these
+outward movements: namely "taste" (_ornatus_) which regards what is
+becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of
+what is becoming in movement and behavior; and "methodicalness"
+(_bona ordinatio_) which regards what is becoming to the business in
+hand, and to one's surroundings, wherefore he calls it "the practical
+knowledge of separation," i.e. of the distinction of "acts."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition,
+according to Ecclus. 19:27, "The attire of the body, and the laughter
+of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is"; and Ambrose
+says (De Offic. i, 18) that "the habit of mind is seen in the gesture
+of the body," and that "the body's movement is an index of the soul."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although it is from natural disposition that a man is
+inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what
+is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence
+Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let nature guide the movement: and
+if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated (ad 1) outward movements are indications of
+the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the
+soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that "from these
+things," i.e. the outward movements, "the man that lies hidden in our
+hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or
+on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from blemish." It is
+moreover from our outward movements that other men form their
+judgment about us, according to Ecclus. 19:26, "A man is known by his
+look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his
+countenance." Hence moderation of outward movements is directed
+somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in
+his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "In all your movements, let nothing be done to
+offend the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the
+holiness of your state." Wherefore the moderation of outward
+movements may be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher
+mentions in _Ethic._ iv, 6, 7. For, in so far as by outward movements
+we are directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward
+movements belongs to "friendliness or affability" [*Cf. Q. 114, A.
+1]. This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds
+in reference to others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so
+far as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition, their
+moderation belongs to the virtue of truthfulness [*Cf. Q. 9], whereby
+a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: It is censurable to study the style of one's outward
+movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they do
+not agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one
+to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may be
+corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let them be without
+artifice, but not without correction."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Can Be a Virtue About Games?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games.
+For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord said: 'Woe to you who
+laugh, for you shall weep.' Wherefore I consider that all, and not
+only excessive, games should be avoided." Now that which can be done
+virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be
+a virtue about games.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us,"
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in
+Matth.]: "It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun.
+Listen to what happened to those who played: 'The people sat down to
+eat and drink, and they rose up to play.'" Therefore there can be no
+virtue about games.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that "playful
+actions are not directed to something else." But it is a requisite of
+virtue that the agent in choosing should "direct his action to
+something else," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore
+there can be no virtue about games.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I pray thee,
+spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax
+the high pressure of his attention to work." Now this relaxation of
+the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it
+becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at
+times. Moreover the Philosopher [*Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8] assigns to
+games the virtue of _eutrapelia_, which we may call "pleasantness."
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's
+refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is
+finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it
+with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount
+of work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain
+work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when
+the soul works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the
+intellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs.
+Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the
+soul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations
+of reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of soul,
+whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the
+practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater
+if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby
+it is raised higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain
+outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor.
+In either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than another,
+according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now
+just as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so
+weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and
+the soul's rest is pleasure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2;
+I-II, Q. 31, A. 1, ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of
+soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by
+slackening the tension of the reason's study. Thus in the
+_Conferences of the Fathers_ (xxiv, 21), it is related of Blessed
+John the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized on
+finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have
+told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the
+latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do
+it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it,
+the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that
+in like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never
+relaxed.
+
+Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than
+the soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is
+necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it
+were, to the soul. This is in agreement with the statement of the
+Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life
+there is a kind of rest that is associated with games": and
+consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things.
+
+Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points
+which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the
+pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious
+deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that "one kind
+of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene." Another
+thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind
+altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We should beware
+lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony
+which is the concord of good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i,
+29), that, "just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute
+freedom in their games, but only that which is consistent with good
+behavior, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright
+mind." Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other human actions, to
+conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take due account
+of other circumstances, so that our fun "befit the hour and the man,"
+as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).
+
+Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a
+habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there
+can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of
+wittiness (_eutrapelia_), and a man is said to be pleasant through
+having a happy turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a
+cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from
+immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. [*_Eutrapelia_ is
+derived from _trepein_ = "to turn"].
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, fun should fit with business and
+persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that "when the
+audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something
+novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the
+gravity of the subject." Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with
+things of the greatest moment, according to Prov. 8:6, "Hear, for I
+will speak of great things." Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether
+exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he
+begins by saying: "Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant,
+nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule;
+since how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in
+Holy Writ?"
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use
+of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end;
+of whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): "They have accounted our life a
+pastime." Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "We are so
+begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun,
+but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and
+moment."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Playful actions themselves considered in their species
+are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such
+actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and
+accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use
+of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed lawful to
+make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to
+sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty
+by grave and serious matters."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 3]
+
+Whether There Can Be Sin in the Excess of Play?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the excess of
+play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful.
+Now play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be
+grave sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they be done in
+fun, are either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems
+that there is no sin in excessive play.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven capital
+vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play does
+not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would
+seem not to be a sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in play,
+since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if excess of
+play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover all
+those who employ them, as well as those who make them any payment,
+would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue;
+for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; viii. 63) that
+is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain jester would
+be with him in the life to come.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Prov. 14:13, "Laughter shall be mingled
+with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy," remarks: "A
+mourning that will last for ever." Now there is inordinate laughter
+and inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin
+therein, since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.
+
+_I answer that,_ In all things dirigible according to reason, the
+excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which
+falls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated (A. 2) that
+playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason.
+Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of
+reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very
+species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of
+jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be
+"discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene," when to wit a man,
+for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such
+as are injurious to his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal
+sins. And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.
+
+Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due
+circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue
+times or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or
+persons. This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong
+attachment to play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives
+therefrom to the love of God, so as to be willing to disobey a
+commandment of God or of the Church rather than forego, such like
+amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for instance
+where a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its
+sake to do anything in disobedience to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Certain things are sinful on account of the intention
+alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such an
+intention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of
+which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from
+sin, or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to
+their species, such as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is
+no excuse for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and obscene.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which
+Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it
+is written (Ex. 32:6): "The people sat down to eat and drink, and
+they rose up to play."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated (A. 2), play is necessary for the intercourse
+of human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse may have a
+lawful employment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of
+play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is not
+unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that
+their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words or
+deeds in order to amuse, and that they do not introduce play into
+undue matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have
+no other occupation in reference to other men, nevertheless in
+reference to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both
+serious and virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation of their own
+passions and operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor.
+Wherefore those who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act
+justly, by rewarding them for their services. On the other hand, if a
+man spends too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians who
+practice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging them in their sin.
+Hence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that "to give one's
+property to comedians is a great sin, not a virtue"; unless by chance
+some play-actor were in extreme need, in which case one would have to
+assist him, for Ambrose says (De Offic. [*Quoted in Canon Pasce,
+dist. 86]): "Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst
+save a man by feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain
+him."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 4]
+
+Whether There Is a Sin in Lack of Mirth?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For
+no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a
+penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [*Spurious]: "Let him
+refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to
+obtain the grace of a full pardon." Therefore there is no sin in lack
+of mirth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy men.
+But some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth; for it
+is written (Jer. 15:17): "I sat not in the assembly of jesters," and
+(Tobias 3:17): "Never have I joined myself with them that play;
+neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in
+lightness." Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the
+virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives
+nor receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the
+lack of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than
+sinful.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the
+lack of mirth to be a vice.
+
+_I answer that,_ In human affairs whatever is against reason is a
+sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others,
+by offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment.
+Wherefore Seneca [*Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De
+Continentia] says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): "Let your
+conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude, or
+despise you as a cad." Now a man who is without mirth, not only is
+lacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he
+is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are
+vicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher
+states (Ethic. iv, 8).
+
+Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and
+pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are
+not in quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as
+stated in _Ethic._ x, 6, it follows that "lack of mirth is less
+sinful than excess thereof." Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix,
+10): "We should make few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but
+little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt
+suffices for our meat."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called
+upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in default,
+because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with
+reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the times, the
+state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he adds: "I
+sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats." The words of
+Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his
+adding: "Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in
+lightness."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures,
+but only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore it would
+seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6)
+calls "friendliness," or _eutrapelia_, otherwise wittiness.
+Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement
+with temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 169
+
+OF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel,
+and under this head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward
+apparel?
+
+(2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 169, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Can Be Virtue and Vice in Connection with Outward
+Apparel?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be virtue and vice in
+connection with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not
+belong to us by nature, wherefore it varies according to different
+times and places. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12)
+that "among the ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a
+cloak with sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is
+scandalous for anyone hailing from a reputable place to be without
+them." Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1) there is in us
+a natural aptitude for the virtues. Therefore there is no virtue or
+vice about such things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if there were virtue and vice in connection with
+outward attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess in
+outward attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of
+the altar use most precious vestments in the sacred ministry.
+Likewise it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it
+is said in praise of certain people (Heb. 11:37): "They wandered
+about in sheepskins and in goatskins." Therefore it seems that there
+cannot be virtue and vice in this matter.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or moral, or
+intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is not conversant with
+matter of this kind, since it is a perfection regarding the knowledge
+of truth. Nor is there a theological virtue connected therewith,
+since that has God for its object; nor are any of the moral virtues
+enumerated by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), connected with it.
+Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection
+with this kind of attire.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Honesty [*Cf. Q. 145] pertains to virtue. Now a
+certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says
+(De Offic. i, 19): "The body should be bedecked naturally and without
+affectation, with simplicity, with negligence rather than nicety, not
+with costly and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that
+nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity, yet nothing be added to
+increase its beauty." Therefore there can be virtue and vice in the
+outward attire.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is not in the outward things themselves which man
+uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them
+immoderately. This lack of moderation occurs in two ways. First, in
+comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore
+Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "Those offenses which are contrary
+to the customs of men, are to be avoided according to the customs
+generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by
+custom or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the
+lawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner. For any part,
+which harmonizeth not with its whole, is offensive." Secondly, the
+lack of moderation in the use of these things may arise from the
+inordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a man
+sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, either in accordance
+with the custom of those among whom he dwells or contrary to such
+custom. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "We must
+avoid excessive pleasure in the use of things, for it leads not only
+wickedly to abuse the customs of those among whom we dwell, but
+frequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay hidden,
+while under the restraint of established morality, it displays its
+deformity in a most lawless outbreak."
+
+In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways.
+First when a man seeks glory from excessive attention to dress; in so
+far as dress and such like things are a kind of ornament. Hence
+Gregory says (Hom. xl in Ev.): "There are some who think that
+attention to finery and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were
+no fault, the word of God would not say so expressly that the rich
+man who was tortured in hell had been clothed in purple and fine
+linen. No one, forsooth, seeks costly apparel" (such, namely, as
+exceeds his estate) "save for vainglory." Secondly, when a man seeks
+sensuous pleasure from excessive attention to dress, in so far as
+dress is directed to the body's comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too
+solicitous [*Cf. Q. 55, A. 6] in his attention to outward apparel.
+
+Accordingly Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons three virtues in
+connection with outward attire; namely "humility," which excludes the
+seeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is "the habit of
+avoiding excessive expenditure and parade"; "contentment" [*Cf. Q.
+143, Obj. 4], which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure,
+wherefore he says that "contentedness is the habit that makes a man
+satisfied with what is suitable, and enables him to determine what is
+becoming in his manner of life" (according to the saying of the
+Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:8): "Having food and wherewith to be covered, with
+these let us be content;"--and "simplicity," which excludes excessive
+solicitude about such things, wherefore he says that "simplicity is a
+habit that makes a man contented with what he has."
+
+In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate attachment in two
+ways. First, through a man's neglect to give the requisite study or
+trouble to the use of outward apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is a mark of effeminacy to let one's cloak
+trail on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up." Secondly,
+by seeking glory from the very lack of attention to outward attire.
+Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "not only
+the glare and pomp of outward things, but even dirt and the weeds of
+mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as
+being a decoy under the guise of God's service"; and the Philosopher
+says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "both excess and inordinate defect are a
+subject of ostentation."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although outward attire does not come from nature, it
+belongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are naturally
+inclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates outward
+raiment.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those who are placed in a position of dignity, or again
+the ministers of the altar, are attired in more costly apparel than
+others, not for the sake of their own glory, but to indicate the
+excellence of their office or of the Divine worship: wherefore this
+is not sinful in them. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii,
+12): "Whoever uses outward things in such a way as to exceed the
+bounds observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either
+signifies something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he
+uses these things for sensual pleasure or ostentation."
+
+Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: although it is
+not always a sin to wear coarser clothes than other people. For, if
+this be done through ostentation or pride, in order to set oneself
+above others, it is a sin of superstition; whereas, if this be done
+to tame the flesh, or to humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue
+of temperance. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12):
+"Whoever uses transitory things with greater restraint than is
+customary with those among whom he dwells, is either temperate or
+superstitious." Especially, however, is the use of coarse raiment
+befitting to those who by word and example urge others to repentance,
+as did the prophets of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage
+quoted. Wherefore a gloss on Matt. 3:4, says: "He who preaches
+penance, wears the garb of penance."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This outward apparel is an indication of man's estate;
+wherefore excess, deficiency, and mean therein, are referable to the
+virtue of truthfulness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) assigns
+to deeds and words, which are indications of something connected with
+man's estate.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 169, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Adornment of Women Is Devoid of Mortal Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the adornment of women is not devoid
+of mortal sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine
+law is a mortal sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a
+precept of the Divine law; for it is written (1 Pet. 3:3): "Whose,"
+namely women's, "adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of the
+hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel."
+Wherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: "Those who are clothed in silk and
+purple cannot sincerely put on Christ: those who are bedecked with
+gold and pearls and trinkets have forfeited the adornments of mind
+and body." Now this is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the
+adornment of women cannot be devoid of mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.): "I hold that not
+only virgins and widows, but also wives and all women without
+exception, should be admonished that nowise should they deface God's
+work and fabric, the clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of
+yellow pigments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye that
+alters the natural features." And afterwards he adds: "They lay hands
+on God, when they strive to reform what He has formed. This is an
+assault on the Divine handiwork, a distortion of the truth. Thou
+shalt not be able to see God, having no longer the eyes that God
+made, but those the devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on
+whose account thou art bedecked." But this is not due except to
+mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal
+sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear man's
+clothes, so is it unbecoming for her to adorn herself inordinately.
+Now the former is a sin, for it is written (Deut. 22:5): "A woman
+shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use
+woman's apparel." Therefore it seems that also the excessive
+adornment of women is a mortal sin.
+
+Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ If this were true it would seem that the
+makers of these means of adornment sin mortally.
+
+_I answer that,_ As regards the adornment of women, we must bear in
+mind the general statements made above (A. 1) concerning outward
+apparel, and also something special, namely that a woman's apparel
+may incite men to lust, according to Prov. 7:10, "Behold a woman
+meeteth him in harlot's attire, prepared to deceive souls."
+
+Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her husband, lest
+through despising her he fall into adultery. Hence it is written (1
+Cor. 7:34) that the woman "that is married thinketh on the things of
+the world, how she may please her husband." Wherefore if a married
+woman adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do this
+without sin.
+
+But those women who have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are
+in a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot without sin
+desire to give lustful pleasure to those men who see them, because
+this is to incite them to sin. And if indeed they adorn themselves
+with this intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally;
+whereas if they do so from frivolity, or from vanity for the sake of
+ostentation, it is not always mortal, but sometimes venial. And the
+same applies to men in this respect. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv
+ad Possid.): "I do not wish you to be hasty in forbidding the wearing
+of gold or costly attire except in the case of those who being
+neither married nor wishful to marry, should think how they may
+please God: whereas the others think on the things of the world,
+either husbands how they may please their wives, or wives how they
+may please their husbands, except that it is unbecoming for women
+though married to uncover their hair, since the Apostle commands them
+to cover the head." Yet in this case some might be excused from sin,
+when they do this not through vanity but on account of some contrary
+custom: although such a custom is not to be commended.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As a gloss says on this passage, "The wives of those
+who were in distress despised their husbands, and decked themselves
+that they might please other men": and the Apostle forbids this.
+Cyprian is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid married
+women to adorn themselves in order to please their husbands, lest the
+latter be afforded an occasion of sin with other women. Hence the
+Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:9): "Women . . . in ornate [Douay: 'decent']
+apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with
+plaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire": whence we are
+given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn themselves
+soberly and moderately but to do so excessively, shamelessly, and
+immodestly.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Cyprian is speaking of women painting themselves: this
+is a kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin. Wherefore
+Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "To dye oneself with paints in
+order to have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying counterfeit.
+I doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be deceived by it,
+by whom alone" (i.e. the husbands) "are they to be permitted, but not
+ordered, to adorn themselves." However, such painting does not always
+involve a mortal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of
+sensuous pleasure or in contempt of God, and it is to like cases that
+Cyprian refers.
+
+It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to counterfeit a
+beauty one has not, and another to hide a disfigurement arising from
+some cause such as sickness or the like. For this is lawful, since
+according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23), "such as we think to be the
+less honorable members of the body, about these we put more abundant
+honor."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the foregoing Article, outward apparel
+should be consistent with the estate of the person, according to the
+general custom. Hence it is in itself sinful for a woman to wear
+man's clothes, or vice versa; especially since this may be a cause of
+sensuous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (Deut.
+22) because the Gentiles used to practice this change of attire for
+the purpose of idolatrous superstition. Nevertheless this may be done
+sometimes without sin on account of some necessity, either in order
+to hide oneself from enemies, or through lack of other clothes, or
+for some similar motive.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In the case of an art directed to the production of
+goods which men cannot use without sin, it follows that the workmen
+sin in making such things, as directly affording others an occasion
+of sin; for instance, if a man were to make idols or anything
+pertaining to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the
+products of which may be employed by man either for a good or for an
+evil use, such as swords, arrows, and the like, the practice of such
+an art is not sinful. These alone should be called arts; wherefore
+Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlix super Matth.]: "The name of art should be
+applied to those only which contribute towards and produce
+necessaries and mainstays of life." In the case of an art that
+produces things which for the most part some people put to an evil
+use, although such arts are not unlawful in themselves, nevertheless,
+according to the teaching of Plato, they should be extirpated from
+the State by the governing authority. Accordingly, since women may
+lawfully adorn themselves, whether to maintain the fitness of their
+estate, or even by adding something thereto, in order to please their
+husbands, it follows that those who make such means of adornment do
+not sin in the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing
+means that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysostom says
+(Super Matth.) that "even the shoemakers' and clothiers' arts stand
+in need of restraint, for they have lent their art to lust, by
+abusing its needs, and debasing art by art."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 170
+
+OF THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must next consider the precepts of temperance:
+
+(1) The precepts of temperance itself;
+
+(2) The precepts of its parts.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 170, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Precepts of Temperance Are Suitably Given in the Divine
+Law?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of temperance are
+unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater
+virtue than temperance, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 141, A. 8;
+I-II, Q. 66, A. 4). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the
+precepts of the decalogue, which are the most important among the
+precepts of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include among the
+precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of adultery, which is
+contrary to temperance, as stated above (Q. 154, AA. 1, 8).
+
+Obj. 2: Further, temperance is not only about venereal matters, but
+also about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the
+decalogue include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of
+meat and drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore,
+should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to
+venereal pleasure.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in the lawgiver's intention inducement to virtue
+precedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in order
+that obstacles to virtue may be removed. Now the precepts of the
+decalogue are the most important in the Divine law. Therefore the
+precepts of the decalogue should have included an affirmative precept
+directly prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather than a negative
+precept forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue
+(Ex. 20:14, 17).
+
+_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the
+commandment is charity," which is enjoined upon us in the two
+precepts concerning the love of God and of our neighbor. Wherefore
+the decalogue contains those precepts which tend more directly to the
+love of God and of our neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to
+temperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to the love of
+our neighbor, since thereby a man lays hold of another's property for
+his own use, by abusing his neighbor's wife. Wherefore the precepts
+of the decalogue include a special prohibition of adultery, not only
+as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude there
+is not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our neighbor as
+adultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to temperance.
+And yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude, is wont to
+be sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one of the
+precepts of the decalogue: for it is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not
+on the way with a bold man lest he burden thee with his evils."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our
+neighbor, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust,
+for a father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over
+whom he has no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of
+his wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her body [*1
+Cor. 7:4].
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 122, AA. 1, 4) the precepts of the
+decalogue are universal principles of the Divine law; hence they need
+to be common precepts. Now it was not possible to give any common
+affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of
+temperance varies according to different times, as Augustine remarks
+(De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according to different human laws and
+customs.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 170, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Precepts of the Virtues Annexed to Temperance Are
+Suitably Given in the Divine Law?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the virtues annexed
+to temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. For the
+precepts of the Decalogue, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), are certain
+universal principles of the whole Divine law. Now "pride is the
+beginning of all sin," according to Ecclus. 10:15. Therefore among
+the precepts of the Decalogue there should have been one forbidding
+pride.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a place before all should have been given in the
+decalogue to those precepts by which men are especially induced to
+fulfil the Law, because these would seem to be the most important.
+Now since humility subjects man to God, it would seem most of all to
+dispose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore obedience
+is accounted one of the degrees of humility, as stated above (Q. 161,
+A. 6); and the same apparently applies to meekness, the effect of
+which is that a man does not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as
+Augustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7). Therefore it seems that
+the Decalogue should have contained precepts of humility and meekness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it was stated in the foregoing Article that adultery
+is forbidden in the decalogue, because it is contrary to the love of
+our neighbor. But inordinateness of outward movements, which is
+contrary to modesty, is opposed to neighborly love: wherefore
+Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxii): "In all your movements let
+nothing be done to offend the eye of any person whatever." Therefore
+it seems that this kind of inordinateness should also have been
+forbidden by a precept of the Decalogue.
+
+_On the contrary,_ suffices the authority of Scripture.
+
+_I answer that,_ The virtues annexed to temperance may be considered
+in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, in their effects.
+Considered in themselves they have no direct connection with the love
+of God or of our neighbor; rather do they regard a certain moderation
+of things pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects,
+they may regard the love of God or of our neighbor: and in this
+respect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to the
+prohibition of the effects of the vices opposed to the parts of
+temperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is opposed to meekness,
+is sometimes that a man goes on to commit murder (and this is
+forbidden in the Decalogue), and sometimes that he refuses due honor
+to his parents, which may also be the result of pride, which leads
+many to transgress the precepts of the first table.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Pride is the beginning of sin, but it lies hidden in
+the heart; and its inordinateness is not perceived by all in common.
+Hence there was no place for its prohibition among the precepts of
+the Decalogue, which are like first self-evident principles.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those precepts which are essentially an inducement to
+the observance of the Law presuppose the Law to be already given,
+wherefore they cannot be first precepts of the Law so as to have a
+place in the Decalogue.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Inordinate outward movement is not injurious to one's
+neighbor, if we consider the species of the act, as are murder,
+adultery, and theft, which are forbidden in the decalogue; but only
+as being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above (Q. 168,
+A. 1, ad 1, 3).
+_______________________
+
+TREATISE ON GRATUITOUS GRACES (QQ. 171-182)
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 171
+
+OF PROPHECY
+(In Six Articles)
+
+After treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain
+to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those
+things which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple
+difference between men as regards things connected with the soul's
+habits and acts. First, in reference to the various gratuitous
+graces, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, 7: "There are diversities of graces
+. . . and to one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to
+another the word of knowledge," etc. Another difference arises from
+the diversities of life, namely the active and the contemplative
+life, which correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it
+is stated (1 Cor. 12:4, 7) that "there are diversities of
+operations." For the purpose of operation in Martha, who "was busy
+about much serving," which pertains to the active life, differed from
+the purpose of operation in Mary, "who sitting . . . at the Lord's
+feet, heard His word" (Luke 10:39, 40), which pertains to the
+contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various
+duties and states of life, as expressed in Eph. 4:11, "And He gave
+some apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and
+other some pastors and doctors": and this pertains to diversity of
+ministries, of which it is written (1 Cor. 12:5): "There are
+diversities of ministries."
+
+With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be
+considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to
+knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things
+pertaining to knowledge may be comprised under _prophecy,_ since
+prophetic revelation extends not only to future events relating to
+man, but also to things relating to God, both as to those which are
+to be believed by all and are matters of _faith,_ and as to yet
+higher mysteries, which concern the perfect and belong to _wisdom._
+Again, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to spiritual
+substances, by whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to
+the _discernment of spirits._ Moreover it extends to the direction of
+human acts, and this pertains to _knowledge,_ as we shall explain
+further on (Q. 177). Accordingly we must first of all consider
+prophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy.
+
+Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence;
+(2) its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4) the division
+of prophecy.
+
+Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?
+
+(2) Whether it is a habit?
+
+(3) Whether it is only about future contingencies?
+
+(4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy?
+
+(5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the
+gift of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit?
+
+(6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Prophecy Pertains to Knowledge?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy does not pertain to
+knowledge. For it is written (Ecclus. 48:14) that after death the
+body of Eliseus prophesied, and further on (Ecclus. 49:18) it is said
+of Joseph that "his bones were visited, and after death they
+prophesied." Now no knowledge remains in the body or in the bones
+after death. Therefore prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 14:3): "He that prophesieth,
+speaketh to men unto edification." Now speech is not knowledge
+itself, but its effect. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does
+not pertain to knowledge.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every cognitive perfection excludes folly and
+madness. Yet both of these are consistent with prophecy; for it is
+written (Osee 9:7): "Know ye, O Israel, that the prophet was foolish
+and mad [*Vulg.: 'the spiritual man was mad']." Therefore prophecy is
+not a cognitive perfection.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, just as revelation regards the intellect, so
+inspiration regards, apparently, the affections, since it denotes a
+kind of motion. Now prophecy is described as "inspiration" or
+"revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prolog. super Psalt. i].
+Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to the
+intellect more than to the affections.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Kings 9:9): "For he that is now
+called a prophet, in time past was called a seer." Now sight pertains
+to knowledge. Therefore prophecy pertains to knowledge.
+
+_I answer that,_ Prophecy first and chiefly consists in knowledge,
+because, to wit, prophets know things that are far (_procul_) removed
+from man's knowledge. Wherefore they may be said to take their name
+from _phanos_, "apparition," because things appear to them from afar.
+Wherefore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), "in the Old Testament,
+they were called Seers, because they saw what others saw not, and
+surveyed things hidden in mystery." Hence among heathen nations they
+were known as _vates,_ "on account of their power of mind (_vi
+mentis_),"    [*The Latin _vates_ is from the Greek _phates_, and may
+be rendered "soothsayer"] (ibid. viii, 7).
+
+Since, however, it is written (1 Cor. 12:7): "The manifestation of
+the Spirit is given to every man unto profit," and further on (1 Cor.
+14:12): "Seek to abound unto the edification of the Church," it
+follows that prophecy consists secondarily in speech, in so far as
+the prophets declare for the instruction of others, the things they
+know through being taught of God, according to the saying of Isa.
+21:10, "That which I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of
+Israel, I have declared unto you." Accordingly, as Isidore says
+(Etym. viii, 7), "prophets" may be described as _praefatores_
+(foretellers), "because they tell from afar (_porro fantur_)," that
+is, speak from a distance, "and foretell the truth about things to
+come."
+
+Now those things above human ken which are revealed by God cannot be
+confirmed by human reason, which they surpass as regards the
+operation of the Divine power, according to Mk. 16:20, "They . . .
+preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word
+with signs that followed." Hence, thirdly, prophecy is concerned with
+the working of miracles, as a kind of confirmation of the prophetic
+utterances. Wherefore it is written (Deut. 34:10, 11): "There arose
+no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face
+to face, in all the signs and wonders."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These passages speak of prophecy in reference to the
+third point just mentioned, which regards the proof of prophecy.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the prophetic
+utterances.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Those prophets who are described as foolish and mad are
+not true but false prophets, of whom it is said (Jer. 3:16): "Hearken
+not to the words of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive
+you; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth
+of the Lord," and (Ezech. 13:3): "Woe to the foolish prophets, that
+follow their own spirit, and see nothing."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of the
+mind be raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is
+written (Ezech. 2:1): "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will
+speak to thee." This raising of the intention is brought about by the
+motion of the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: "And the
+Spirit entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet." After the
+mind's intention has been raised to heavenly things, it perceives the
+things of God; hence the text continues: "And I heard Him speaking to
+me." Accordingly inspiration is requisite for prophecy, as regards
+the raising of the mind, according to Job 32:8, "The inspiration of
+the Almighty giveth understanding": while revelation is necessary, as
+regards the very perception of Divine things, whereby prophecy is
+completed; by its means the veil of darkness and ignorance is
+removed, according to Job 12:22, "He discovereth great things out of
+darkness."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Prophecy Is a Habit?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is a habit. For according to
+_Ethic._ ii, 5, "there are three things in the soul, power, passion,
+and habit." Now prophecy is not a power, for then it would be in all
+men, since the powers of the soul are common to them. Again it is not
+a passion, since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 22, A. 2); whereas prophecy pertains
+principally to knowledge, as stated in the foregoing Article.
+Therefore prophecy is a habit.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every perfection of the soul, which is not always in
+act, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection of the soul; and it is
+not always in act, else a prophet could not be described as asleep.
+Therefore seemingly prophecy is a habit.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces.
+Now grace is something in the soul, after the manner of a habit, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 110, A. 2). Therefore prophecy is a habit.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A habit is something "whereby we act when we
+will," as the Commentator [*Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198] says
+(De Anima iii). But a man cannot make use of prophecy when he will,
+as appears in the case of Eliseus (4 Kings 3:15), "who on Josaphat
+inquiring of him concerning the future, and the spirit of prophecy
+failing him, caused a minstrel to be brought to him, that the spirit
+of prophecy might come down upon him through the praise of psalmody,
+and fill his mind with things to come," as Gregory observes (Hom. i
+super Ezech.). Therefore prophecy is not a habit.
+
+_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13), "all that is made
+manifest is light," because, to wit, just as the manifestation of the
+material sight takes place through material light, so too the
+manifestation of intellectual sight takes place through intellectual
+light. Accordingly manifestation must be proportionate to the light
+by means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate
+to its cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowledge that
+surpasses natural reason, as stated above (A. 1), it follows that
+prophecy requires an intellectual light surpassing the light of
+natural reason. Hence the saying of Micah 7:8: "When I sit in
+darkness, the Lord is my light." Now light may be in a subject in two
+ways: first, by way of an abiding form, as material light is in the
+sun, and in fire; secondly, by way of a passion, or passing
+impression, as light is in the air. Now the prophetic light is not in
+the prophet's intellect by way of an abiding form, else a prophet
+would always be able to prophesy, which is clearly false. For Gregory
+says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is
+lacking to the prophet, nor is it always within the call of his mind,
+yet so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due to a
+gift." Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4 Kings 4:27): "Her
+soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not
+told me." The reason for this is that the intellectual light that is
+in a subject by way of an abiding and complete form, perfects the
+intellect chiefly to the effect of knowing the principle of the
+things manifested by that light; thus by the light of the active
+intellect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all
+things known naturally. Now the principle of things pertaining to
+supernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God
+Himself, Whom the prophets do not see in His essence, although He is
+seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by way of an
+abiding and complete form, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we
+shall see light."
+
+It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet's
+soul by way of a passion or transitory impression. This is indicated
+Ex. 33:22: "When my glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of
+the rock," etc., and 3 Kings 19:11: "Go forth and stand upon the
+mount before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth," etc. Hence it is
+that even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too
+the prophet's mind is always in need of a fresh revelation; thus a
+disciple who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to
+have every detail explained to him. Wherefore it is written (Isa.
+1:4): "In the morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a
+master." This is also indicated by the very manner in which
+prophecies are uttered: thus it is stated that "the Lord spake to
+such and such a prophet," or that "the word of the Lord," or "the
+hand of the Lord was made upon him."
+
+But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that,
+properly speaking, prophecy is not a habit.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This division of the Philosopher's does not comprise
+absolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be
+principles of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion,
+sometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of
+those who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before
+having the habit of that action.
+
+However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand
+passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense the
+Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is, in a way,
+to be passive." For just as, in natural knowledge, the possible
+intellect is passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in
+prophetic knowledge the human intellect is passive to the
+enlightening of the Divine light.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as in corporeal things, when a passion ceases,
+there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the passion--thus
+wood once ignited is more easily ignited again, so too in the
+prophet's intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased, there
+remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew--thus when the mind has
+once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its
+former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9)
+that our prayers need to be frequent, "lest devotion be extinguished
+as soon as it is kindled."
+
+We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even
+while his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of
+his being deputed by God, according to Jer. 1:5, "And I made thee a
+prophet unto the nations."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every gift of grace raises man to something above human
+nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the substance
+of the act--for instance, the working of miracles, and the knowledge
+of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom--and for such
+acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a thing
+is above human nature as to the mode but not the substance of the
+act--for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror of His
+creatures--and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Prophecy Is Only About Future Contingencies?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is only about future
+contingencies. For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super Psalt. i] that
+"prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue
+of things with unchangeable truth." Now issues pertain to future
+contingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future
+contingencies alone.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the grace of prophecy is
+differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things;
+and from the discernment of spirits, which is about created spirits;
+and from knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts
+are differentiated by their objects, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A.
+2). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected
+with any of the above. Therefore it follows that it is about future
+contingencies alone.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, difference of object causes difference of species,
+as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Therefore, if one prophecy is
+about future contingencies, and another about other things, it would
+seem to follow that these are different species of prophecy.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that some
+prophecies are "about the future, for instance (Isa. 7:14), 'Behold a
+virgin shall conceive, and bear a son'"; some are "about the past, as
+(Gen. 1:1), 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth'"; some
+are "about the present," as (1 Cor. 14:24, 25), "If all prophesy, and
+there come in one that believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart
+are made manifest." Therefore prophecy is not about future
+contingencies alone.
+
+_I answer that,_ A manifestation made by means of a certain light can
+extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the
+body's sight extends to all colors, and the soul's natural knowledge
+extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active intellect.
+Now prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is
+possible to know all things both Divine and human, both spiritual and
+corporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to them
+all. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation
+concerning the perfections of God and the angels was made to Isa.
+6:1, where it is written, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high
+and elevated." Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring to
+natural bodies, according to the words of Isa. 40:12, "Who hath
+measured the waters in the hollow of His hand," etc. It also contains
+matters relating to human conduct, according to Isa. 58:1, "Deal thy
+bread to the hungry," etc.; and besides this it contains things
+pertaining to future events, according to Isa. 47:9, "Two things
+shall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness and widowhood."
+
+Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge,
+it must be observed that the more remote things are from our
+knowledge the more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things
+there are three degrees. One degree comprises things remote from the
+knowledge, either sensitive or intellective, of some particular man,
+but not from the knowledge of all men; thus a particular man knows by
+sense things present to him locally, which another man does not know
+by human sense, since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew
+prophetically what his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4
+Kings 5:26), and in like manner the secret thoughts of one man are
+manifested prophetically to another, according to 1 Cor. 14:25; and
+again in this way what one man knows by demonstration may be revealed
+to another prophetically.
+
+The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge
+of all men without exception, not that they are in themselves
+unknowable, but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such as
+the mystery of the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim
+saying: "Holy, Holy, Holy," etc. (Isa. 6:3).
+
+The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all
+men, through being in themselves unknowable; such are future
+contingencies, the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that
+which is predicated universally and by its very nature, takes
+precedence of that which is predicated in a limited and relative
+sense, it follows that revelation of future events belongs most
+properly to prophecy, and from this prophecy apparently takes its
+name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "And since a prophet
+is so called because he foretells the future, his name loses its
+significance when he speaks of the past or present."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Prophecy is there defined according to its proper
+signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from
+the other gratuitous graces.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This is evident from what has just been said. We might
+also reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy have
+the common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine
+revelation; whereas those that are the matter of _wisdom, knowledge,_
+and the _interpretation of speeches,_ can be known by man through
+natural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through the
+enlightening of the Divine light. As to _faith,_ although it is about
+things invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of
+the things believed, but with a man's certitude of assent to things
+known by others.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the Divine
+light, which being one, gives unity of species to prophecy, although
+the things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 4]
+
+Whether by the Divine Revelation a Prophet Knows All That Can Be
+Known Prophetically?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet
+knows all that can be known prophetically. For it is written (Amos
+3:7): "The Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His
+servants the prophets." Now whatever is revealed prophetically is
+something done by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is
+revealed to the prophet.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "God's works are perfect" (Deut. 32:4). Now prophecy
+is a "Divine revelation," as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it is
+perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible matters of
+prophecy were revealed prophetically, since "the perfect is that
+which lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters
+of prophecy are revealed to the prophet.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy is more
+powerful than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human
+science. Now a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains
+to that science; thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar.
+Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that "sometimes
+the spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet's mind
+and nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but
+to the future." Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of
+prophecy.
+
+_I answer that,_ Things which differ from one another need not exist
+simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are
+connected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above
+(I-II, Q. 65, AA. 1, 2) that all the virtues must needs exist
+simultaneously on account of prudence and charity. Now all the things
+that are known through some principle are connected in that principle
+and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as
+regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all
+that can be known through that principle; whereas if the common
+principle is unknown, or known only in a general way, it does not
+follow that one knows all those things at the same time, but each of
+them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of
+them may be known, and some not.
+
+Now the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested
+by the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets do not see
+in itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible
+matters of prophecy; but each one knows some of them according to the
+special revelation of this or that matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that are
+necessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every
+one, but some to one, and some to another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect in the
+genus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (1 Cor. 13:8) that
+"prophecies shall be made void," and that "we prophesy in part," i.e.
+imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its perfection
+in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 Cor. 113:10): "When
+that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done
+away." Consequently it does not follow that nothing is lacking to
+prophetic revelation, but that it lacks none of those things to which
+prophecy is directed.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He who has a science knows the principles of that
+science, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends;
+wherefore to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know
+whatever is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle
+of prophetic knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy;
+wherefore the comparison fails.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Prophet Always Distinguishes What He Says by His Own
+Spirit from What He Says by the Prophetic Spirit?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the prophet always distinguishes what
+he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit.
+For Augustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said "she
+could, through a certain feeling, which in words she could not
+express, discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her
+own soul." Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated above (A.
+3). Therefore the prophet always distinguishes what he says by the
+spirit of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome
+[*Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]
+says. Now the prophets were commanded (Jer. 23:28): "The prophet that
+hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him
+speak My word with truth." Therefore the prophet can distinguish what
+he has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is
+greater than that which results from the light of natural reason. Now
+he that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain
+that he has it. Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is
+much more certain that he has it.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "It must be
+observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter
+certain things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to
+prophesying, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit."
+
+_I answer that,_ The prophet's mind is instructed by God in two ways:
+in one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most
+mysterious instinct to "which the human mind is subjected without
+knowing it," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the
+prophet has the greatest certitude about those things which he knows
+by an express revelation, and he has it for certain that they are
+revealed to him by God; wherefore it is written (Jer. 26:15): "In
+truth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all these words in your
+hearing." Else, were he not certain about this, the faith which
+relies on the utterances of the prophet would not be certain. A sign
+of the prophet's certitude may be gathered from the fact that Abraham
+being admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his
+only-begotten son, which he nowise would have done had he not been
+most certain of the Divine revelation.
+
+On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by
+instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully
+whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own
+spirit. And those things which we know by Divine instinct are not all
+manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something
+imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are to
+understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to
+error, "they are very soon set aright by the Holy Ghost [*For
+instance, cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq.], and from Him they hear the truth,
+so that they reproach themselves for having said what was untrue," as
+Gregory adds (Hom. i super Ezech.).
+
+The arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation
+that is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the
+objections is clear.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Things Known or Declared Prophetically Can Be False?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that things known or declared
+prophetically can be false. For prophecy is about future
+contingencies, as stated above (A. 3). Now future contingencies may
+possibly not happen; else they would happen of necessity. Therefore
+the matter of prophecy can be false.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (Isa. 38:1):
+"Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not
+live," and yet fifteen years were added to his life (4 Kings 20:6).
+Again the Lord said (Jer. 18:7, 8): "I will suddenly speak against a
+nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to
+destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent
+of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to
+do them." This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites,
+according to John 3:10: "The Lord [Vulg.: 'God'] had mercy with
+regard to the evil which He had said that He would do to them, and He
+did it not." Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the
+antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely
+necessary, because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands
+in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the
+premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary
+always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in I
+Poster. 6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the
+following conditional proposition must needs be true: "If a thing has
+been prophesied, it will be." Now the antecedent of this conditional
+proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past.
+Therefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet this is
+unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies.
+Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that
+"prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue
+of things with invariable truth." Now the truth of prophecy would not
+be invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing false
+can come under prophecy.
+
+_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said (AA. 1,
+3, 5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the form of
+teaching on the prophet's intellect, by Divine revelation. Now the
+truth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the
+knowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the
+teacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is
+a likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense
+when he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that "prophecy is the seal
+of the Divine foreknowledge." Consequently the same truth must needs
+be in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge,
+under which nothing false can possibly come, as stated in the First
+Part (Q. 16, A. 8). Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13) the
+certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the
+contingency of future singular events, because that knowledge regards
+the future as present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore
+prophecy also, which is an "impressed likeness" or "seal of the
+Divine foreknowledge," does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the
+contingency of future things.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two
+ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it sees
+them in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch
+as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects. And
+though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are
+determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, they
+are not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again,
+though this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine
+intellect, it is not always united in the prophetic revelation,
+because an imprint made by an active cause is not always on a par
+with the virtue of that cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic
+revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in
+so far as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves: and
+such things happen in the same way as foretold, for example this
+saying of Isa. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive." Sometimes,
+however, the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the
+Divine foreknowledge as knowing the order of causes to effects; and
+then at times the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy
+does not cover a falsehood, for the meaning of the prophecy is that
+inferior causes, whether they be natural causes or human acts, are so
+disposed as to lead to such a result. In this way we are to
+understand the saying of Isa. 38:1: "Thou shalt die, and not live";
+in other words, "The disposition of thy body has a tendency to
+death": and the saying of Jonah 3:4, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh
+shall be destroyed," that is to say, "Its merits demand that it
+should be destroyed." God is said "to repent," metaphorically,
+inasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by
+"changing His sentence, although He changes not His counsel" [*Cf. I,
+Q. 19, A. 7, ad 2].
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as
+the truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional
+proposition: "If this was prophesied, it will be," is true in the same
+way as the proposition: "If this was foreknown, it will be": for in
+both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the
+consequent is necessary, considered, not as something future in our
+regard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in
+the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13, ad 2).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 172
+
+OF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are
+six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether prophecy is natural?
+
+(2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels?
+
+(3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?
+
+(4) Whether a good life is requisite?
+
+(5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons?
+
+(6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Prophecy Can Be Natural?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory
+says (Dial. iv, 26) that "sometimes the mere strength of the soul is
+sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things": and Augustine says
+(Gen. ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according as it is
+withdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future
+[*Cf. I, Q. 86, A. 4, ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy. Therefore
+the soul can acquire prophecy naturally.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the human soul's knowledge is more alert while one
+wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally
+foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil.
+[*De Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work quoted]).
+Much more therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb
+animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things
+that concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is
+evident from their gathering grain into their nest before the rain
+commences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be
+gathered from their movements in avoiding places exposed to storm.
+Much more therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns
+themselves, and of such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes
+from nature.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18): "When prophecy shall
+fail, the people shall be scattered abroad"; wherefore it is evident
+that prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now
+"nature does not fail in necessaries" [*Aristotle, _De Anima_ iii,
+9]. Therefore it seems that prophecy is from nature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 1:21): "For prophecy came
+not by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke,
+inspired by the Holy Ghost." Therefore prophecy comes not from
+nature, but through the gift of the Holy Ghost.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 171, A. 6, ad 2) prophetic
+foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as
+they are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes.
+Now, to foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper
+to the Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as
+stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13). Wherefore such like
+foreknowledge of the future cannot come from nature, but from Divine
+revelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be foreknown
+in their causes with a natural knowledge even by man: thus a
+physician foreknows future health or death in certain causes, through
+previous experimental knowledge of the order of those causes to such
+effects. Such like knowledge of the future may be understood to be in
+a man by nature in two ways. In one way that the soul, from that
+which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus Augustine
+says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "Some have deemed the human soul to
+contain a certain power of divination." This seems to be in accord
+with the opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit. vi], who held that
+our souls have knowledge of all things by participating in the ideas;
+but that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with the body;
+yet in some more, in others less, according to a difference in bodily
+purity. According to this it might be said that men, whose souls are
+not much obscured through union with the body, are able to foreknow
+such like future things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion
+Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "How is it that the soul
+cannot always have this power of divination, since it always wishes
+to have it?"
+
+Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of
+Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as stated
+in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 6), it is better to have recourse to
+another explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge
+of the future, but that they can acquire it by means of experience,
+wherein they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends
+on the perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of
+his understanding.
+
+Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two
+ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First,
+because the former can be about any events whatever, and this
+infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can be had
+naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may
+extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is "according to the
+unchangeable truth" [*Q. 171, A. 3, Obj. 1], while the latter is not,
+and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not the
+latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above (Q.
+171, A. 3), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally surpass
+human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy strictly so
+called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine revelation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things, it
+becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual substances
+[*Cf. I, Q. 88, A. 4, ad 2], and also is more inclined to receive the
+subtle motions which take place in the human imagination through the
+impression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving
+them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial.
+iv, 26) that "the soul, at the approach of death, foresees certain
+future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature," inasmuch as
+it is receptive even of slight impressions. Or again, it knows future
+things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own power,
+because according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), "if this were
+so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed,"
+which is clearly false.
+
+Obj. 2: Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either from
+the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause, as
+stated above (Q. 95, A. 6), when we were treating of divination. Now
+both these causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than
+while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied with external
+sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle impressions
+either of spiritual substances, or even of natural causes; although
+as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more alert in
+waking than in sleeping.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future
+events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their
+imagination is moved more than man's, because man's imagination,
+especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than
+according to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects
+much more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes
+effects in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy
+assists man still more.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The prophetic light extends even to the direction of
+human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government
+of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this
+nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Prophetic Revelation Comes Through the Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prophetic revelation does not come
+through the angels. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine wisdom
+"conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God,
+and the prophets." Now wisdom makes the friends of God immediately.
+Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the
+medium of the angels.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces.
+But the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1
+Cor. 12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit."
+Therefore the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i] says that prophecy
+is a "Divine revelation": whereas if it were conveyed by the angels,
+it would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is not
+bestowed by means of the angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "Our glorious
+fathers received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers"; and
+he is speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic
+revelation is conveyed by means of the angels.
+
+_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), "Things that are of
+God are well ordered [*Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of
+God.']." Now the Divine ordering, according to Dionysius [*Coel.
+Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v], is such that the lowest things are directed
+by middle things. Now the angels hold a middle position between God
+and men, in that they have a greater share in the perfection of the
+Divine goodness than men have. Wherefore the Divine enlightenments
+and revelations are conveyed from God to men by the angels. Now
+prophetic knowledge is bestowed by Divine enlightenment and
+revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is conveyed by the angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a
+perfection of the will, in which God alone can form an impression;
+whereas prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel
+also can form an impression, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, A.
+1), wherefore the comparison fails between the two.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as
+their first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men by
+means of the angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The work of the instrument is ascribed to the principal
+agent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a minister is
+like an instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the
+ministry of the angels, is said to be Divine.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 3]
+
+Whether a Natural Disposition Is Requisite for Prophecy?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite
+for prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to
+the disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos
+1:2, "The Lord will roar from Sion," says: "Anyone who wishes to make
+a comparison naturally turns to those things of which he has
+experience, and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors
+compare their enemies to the winds, and their losses to a shipwreck.
+In like manner Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to
+that which is inspired by the lion's roar." Now that which is
+received by a thing according to the mode of the recipient requires a
+natural disposition. Therefore prophecy requires a natural
+disposition.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty than
+those of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders the
+considerations of acquired science, since many are prevented by
+natural indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculations of
+science. Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for
+the contemplation of prophecy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle
+than an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy are
+hindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his
+commentary on Matthew [*The quotation is from Origen, Hom. vi in
+Num.] that "at the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy
+Ghost will not be vouchsafed, even though it be a prophet that
+fulfils the duty of procreation." Much more therefore does a natural
+indisposition hinder prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good
+natural disposition is requisite for prophecy.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in
+Ev.): "He," namely the Holy Ghost, "fills the boy harpist and makes
+him a Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes
+him a prophet." Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition,
+but depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is
+written (1 Cor. 12:2): "All these things, one and the same Spirit
+worketh, dividing to every one according as He will."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), prophecy in its true and
+exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes
+from a natural cause is not called prophecy except in a relative
+sense. Now we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient
+cause requires neither previous matter nor previous disposition of
+matter in His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant
+to bring into being matter and disposition and form, so neither does
+He require a previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is
+able to produce both the spiritual effect and at the same time the
+fitting disposition as requisite according to the order of nature.
+More than this, He is able at the same time, by creation, to produce
+the subject, so as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the
+prophetic grace, at the very instant of its creation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons the
+thing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no
+change in a prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him
+incompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The considerations of science proceed from a natural
+cause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in
+matter. This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be an
+obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were
+altogether deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man
+might be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong
+passion, whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by
+any other passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is
+removed by the Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 4]
+
+Whether a Good Life Is Requisite for Prophecy?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a good life is requisite for
+prophecy. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that the wisdom of God
+"through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the
+friends of God, and prophets." Now there can be no holiness without a
+good life and sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without
+a good life and sanctifying grace.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend, according
+to John 15:15, "But I have called you friends, because all things
+whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you." Now
+God reveals His secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore it
+would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is
+impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly prophecy cannot be
+without charity; and charity is impossible without sanctifying grace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 7:15): "Beware of false
+prophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they
+are ravening wolves." Now all who are without grace are likened
+inwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false
+prophets. Therefore no man is a true prophet except he be good by
+grace.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*Cf. De
+Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted]) that "if
+interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be
+bestowed on any but the best." Now it is evident that the gift of
+prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed
+only to the best men.
+
+_On the contrary,_ To those who had said, "Lord, have we not
+prophesied in Thy name?" this reply is made: "I never knew you"
+(Matt. 7:22, 23). Now "the Lord knoweth who are His" (2 Tim. 2:19).
+Therefore prophecy can be in those who are not God's by grace.
+
+_I answer that,_ A good life may be considered from two points of
+view. First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying
+grace. Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and
+the outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order
+that man's soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine
+says (De Trin. xv, 18): "A man is not transferred from the left side
+to the right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a
+lover of God and of his neighbor." Hence whatever can be without
+charity can be without sanctifying grace, and consequently without
+goodness of life. Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is
+clear on two counts. First, on account of their respective acts: for
+prophecy pertains to the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the
+will, which power is perfected by charity. For this reason the
+Apostle (1 Cor. 13) reckons prophecy with other things pertinent to
+the intellect, that can be had without charity. Secondly, on account
+of their respective ends. For prophecy like other gratuitous graces
+is given for the good of the Church, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, "The
+manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and
+is not directly intended to unite man's affections to God, which is
+the purpose of charity. Therefore prophecy can be without a good
+life, as regards the first root of this goodness.
+
+If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of
+the soul, and external actions, from this point of view an evil life
+is an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be
+raised very high in order to contemplate spiritual things, and this
+is hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of
+external things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kings
+4:38) that they "dwelt together with [Vulg.: 'before']" Eliseus,
+leading a solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should
+be a hindrance to the gift of prophecy.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man both
+for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind; and
+such are those whom Divine wisdom, "conveying itself" by sanctifying
+grace to their minds, "maketh the friends of God, and prophets."
+Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the good of
+others. Hence Jerome commenting on Matt. 7:22, says: "Sometimes
+prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons
+are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but
+either to the invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of
+those who invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Gregory [*Hom. xxvii in Ev.] expounding this passage
+[*John 15:15] says: "Since we love the lofty things of heaven as soon
+as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love is
+to know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because
+having renounced earthly desires they were kindled by the torches of
+perfect love." In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed
+to prophets.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, but only those
+whose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf.
+in Matth., Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom, and
+falsely ascribed to him] that "Catholic teachers, though they be
+sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves,
+because they do not purpose the destruction of Christians." And since
+prophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest that such
+are false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: God's gifts are not always bestowed on those who are
+simply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best
+as regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants
+the gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Any Prophecy Comes from the Demons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons.
+For prophecy is "a Divine revelation," according to Cassiodorus
+[*Prol. in Psalt. i]. But that which is done by a demon is not
+Divine. Therefore no prophecy can be from a demon.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, some kind of enlightenment is requisite for
+prophetic knowledge, as stated above (Q. 171, AA. 2, 3). Now the
+demons do not enlighten the human intellect, as stated above in the
+First Part (Q. 119, A. 3). Therefore no prophecy can come from the
+demons.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a sign is worthless if it betokens contraries. Now
+prophecy is a sign in confirmation of faith; wherefore a gloss on
+Rom. 12:6, "Either prophecy to be used according to the rule of
+faith," says: "Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with
+prophecy, which is the first proof of the reasonableness of our
+faith; since believers, after receiving the Spirit, prophesied."
+Therefore prophecy cannot be bestowed by the demons.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (3 Kings 18:19): "Gather unto me all
+Israel unto mount Carmel, and the prophets of Baal four hundred and
+fifty, and the prophets of the grove four hundred, who eat at
+Jezebel's table." Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it
+would seem that there is also a prophecy from the demons.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 171, A. 1), prophecy denotes
+knowledge far removed from human knowledge. Now it is evident that an
+intellect of a higher order can know some things that are far removed
+from the knowledge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human
+intellect there is not only the Divine intellect, but also the
+intellects of good and bad angels according to the order of nature.
+Hence the demons, even by their natural knowledge, know certain
+things remote from men's knowledge, which they can reveal to men:
+although those things which God alone knows are remote simply and
+most of all.
+
+Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by Divine
+revelations alone; yet the revelation which is made by the demons may
+be called prophecy in a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom
+something is revealed by the demons are styled in the Scriptures as
+prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance as "false
+prophets," or "prophets of idols." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
+xii, 19): "When the evil spirit lays hold of a man for such purposes
+as these," namely visions, "he makes him either devilish, or
+possessed, or a false prophet."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Cassiodorus is here defining prophecy in its proper and
+simple acceptation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The demons reveal what they know to men, not by
+enlightening the intellect, but by an imaginary vision, or even by
+audible speech; and in this way this prophecy differs from true
+prophecy.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The prophecy of the demons can be distinguished from
+Divine prophecy by certain, and even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom
+says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John
+Chrysostom] that "some prophesy by the spirit of the devil, such as
+diviners, but they may be discerned by the fact that the devil
+sometimes utters what is false, the Holy Ghost never." Wherefore it
+is written (Deut. 18:21, 22): "If in silent thought thou answer: How
+shall I know the word that the Lord hath spoken? Thou shalt have this
+sign: Whatsoever that same prophet foretelleth in the name of the
+Lord, and it come not to pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken."
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Prophets of the Demons Ever Foretell the Truth?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets of the demons never
+foretell the truth. For Ambrose [*Hilary the Deacon (Ambrosiaster) on
+1 Cor. 12:3] says that "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from
+the Holy Ghost." Now the prophets of the demons do not speak from the
+Holy Ghost, because "there is no concord between Christ and Belial
+[*'What concord hath Christ with Belial?']" (2 Cor. 6:15). Therefore
+it would seem that they never foretell the truth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as true prophets are inspired by the Spirit of
+truth, so the prophets of the demons are inspired by the spirit of
+untruth, according to 3 Kings 22:22, "I will go forth, and be a lying
+spirit in the mouth of all his prophets." Now the prophets inspired
+by the Holy Ghost never speak false, as stated above (Q. 111, A. 6).
+Therefore the prophets of the demons never speak truth.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is said of the devil (John 8:44) that "when he
+speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for the devil is a liar, and
+the father thereof," i.e. of lying. Now by inspiring his prophets,
+the devil speaks only of his own, for he is not appointed God's
+minister to declare the truth, since "light hath no fellowship with
+darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath light with darkness?']" (2
+Cor. 6:14). Therefore the prophets of the demons never foretell the
+truth.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Num. 22:14, says that "Balaam was a
+diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons
+and the magic art." Now he foretold many true things, for instance
+that which is to be found in Num. 24:17: "A star shall rise out of
+Jacob, and a scepter shall spring up from Israel." Therefore even the
+prophets of the demons foretell the truth.
+
+_I answer that,_ As the good is in relation to things, so is the true
+in relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one
+that is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for
+any knowledge to be wholly false, without some mixture of truth.
+Hence Bede says [*Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12; Cf. Augustine, QQ.
+Evang. ii, 40] that "no teaching is so false that it never mingles
+truth with falsehood." Hence the teaching of the demons, with which
+they instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is
+rendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to falsehood by
+the semblance of truth, even as the will is seduced to evil by the
+semblance of goodness. Wherefore Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in
+Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "The
+devil is allowed sometimes to speak true things, in order that his
+unwonted truthfulness may gain credit for his lie."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The prophets of the demons do not always speak from the
+demons' revelation, but sometimes by Divine inspiration. This was
+evidently the case with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke
+to him (Num. 22:12), though he was a prophet of the demons, because
+God makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good. Hence He
+foretells certain truths even by the demons' prophets, both that the
+truth may be rendered more credible, since even its foes bear witness
+to it, and also in order that men, by believing such men, may be more
+easily led on to truth. Wherefore also the Sibyls foretold many true
+things about Christ.
+
+Yet even when the demons' prophets are instructed by the demons, they
+foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of their own nature, the
+author of which is the Holy Ghost, and sometimes by revelation of the
+good spirits, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): so that
+even then this truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit of
+truth, in Whom there is no falsehood, wherefore He never says what is
+not true; whereas a false prophet is not always instructed by the
+spirit of untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth. Even
+the very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things, sometimes
+false, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Those things are called the demons' own, which they
+have of themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of
+themselves but of God, those things which belong to them by nature:
+and it is by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell
+the truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes use of them to
+make known the truth which is to be accomplished through them, by
+revealing Divine mysteries to them through the angels, as already
+stated (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19; I, Q. 109, A. 4, ad 1).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 173
+
+OF THE MANNER IN WHICH PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE IS CONVEYED
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the manner in which prophetic knowledge is
+conveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the prophets see God's very essence?
+
+(2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the infusion of
+certain species, or by the infusion of Divine light alone?
+
+(3) Whether prophetic revelation is always accompanied by abstraction
+from the sense?
+
+(4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by knowledge of the things
+prophesied?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Prophets See the Very Essence of God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets see the very essence of
+God, for a gloss on Isa. 38:1, "Take order with thy house, for thou
+shalt die and not live," says: "Prophets can read in the book of
+God's foreknowledge in which all things are written." Now God's
+foreknowledge is His very essence. Therefore prophets see God's very
+essence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 7) that "in that
+eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we see with
+the mind's eye the type both of our being and of our actions." Now,
+of all men, prophets have the highest knowledge of Divine things.
+Therefore they, especially, see the Divine essence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, future contingencies are foreknown by the prophets
+"with unchangeable truth." Now future contingencies exist thus in God
+alone. Therefore the prophets see God Himself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The vision of the Divine essence is not made void
+in heaven; whereas "prophecy is made void" (1 Cor. 13:8). Therefore
+prophecy is not conveyed by a vision of the Divine essence.
+
+_I answer that,_ Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge as existing afar
+off. Wherefore it is said of the prophets (Heb. 11:13) that "they
+were beholding . . . afar off." But those who are in heaven and in
+the state of bliss see, not as from afar off, but rather, as it were,
+from near at hand, according to Ps. 139:14, "The upright shall dwell
+with Thy countenance." Hence it is evident that prophetic knowledge
+differs from the perfect knowledge, which we shall have in heaven, so
+that it is distinguished therefrom as the imperfect from the perfect,
+and when the latter comes the former is made void, as appears from
+the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 13:10).
+
+Some, however, wishing to discriminate between prophetic knowledge
+and the knowledge of the blessed, have maintained that the prophets
+see the very essence of God (which they call the "mirror of
+eternity") [*Cf. De Veritate, xii, 6; Sent. II, D, XI, part 2, art.
+2, ad 4], not, however, in the way in which it is the object of the
+blessed, but as containing the types [*Cf. I, Q. 15] of future
+events. But this is altogether impossible. For God is the object of
+bliss in His very essence, according to the saying of Augustine
+(Confess. v, 4): "Happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not
+these," i.e. creatures. Now it is not possible to see the types of
+creatures in the very essence of God without seeing It, both because
+the Divine essence is Itself the type of all things that are
+made--the ideal type adding nothing to the Divine essence save only a
+relationship to the creature--and because knowledge of a thing in
+itself--and such is the knowledge of God as the object of heavenly
+bliss--precedes knowledge of that thing in its relation to something
+else--and such is the knowledge of God as containing the types of
+things. Consequently it is impossible for prophets to see God as
+containing the types of creatures, and yet not as the object of
+bliss. Therefore we must conclude that the prophetic vision is not
+the vision of the very essence of God, and that the prophets do not
+see in the Divine essence Itself the things they do see, but that
+they see them in certain images, according as they are enlightened by
+the Divine light.
+
+Wherefore Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), in speaking of prophetic
+visions, says that "the wise theologian calls that vision divine
+which is effected by images of things lacking a bodily form through
+the seer being rapt in divine things." And these images illumined by
+the Divine light have more of the nature of a mirror than the Divine
+essence: since in a mirror images are formed from other things, and
+this cannot be said of God. Yet the prophet's mind thus enlightened
+may be called a mirror, in so far as a likeness of the truth of the
+Divine foreknowledge is formed therein, for which reason it is called
+the "mirror of eternity," as representing God's foreknowledge, for
+God in His eternity sees all things as present before Him, as stated
+above (Q. 172, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The prophets are said to read the book of God's
+foreknowledge, inasmuch as the truth is reflected from God's
+foreknowledge on the prophet's mind.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Man is said to see in the First Truth the type of his
+existence, in so far as the image of the First Truth shines forth on
+man's mind, so that he is able to know himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: From the very fact that future contingencies are in God
+according to unalterable truth, it follows that God can impress a
+like knowledge on the prophet's mind without the prophet seeing God
+in His essence.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 2]
+
+Whether, in Prophetic Revelation, New Species of Things Are Impressed
+on the Prophet's Mind, or Merely a New Light?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in prophetic revelation no new
+species of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, but only a new
+light. For a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2 says that "prophets draw
+comparisons from things with which they are conversant." But if
+prophetic vision were effected by means of species newly impressed,
+the prophet's previous experience of things would be inoperative.
+Therefore no new species are impressed on the prophet's soul, but
+only the prophetic light.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "it is
+not imaginative but intellective vision that makes the prophet";
+wherefore it is declared (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of
+understanding in a vision." Now intellective vision, as stated in the
+same book (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6) is not effected by means of images,
+but by the very truth of things. Therefore it would seem that
+prophetic revelation is not effected by impressing species on the
+soul.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, by the gift of prophecy the Holy Ghost endows man
+with something that surpasses the faculty of nature. Now man can by
+his natural faculties form all kinds of species of things. Therefore
+it would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species of things
+are impressed, but merely an intellectual light.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied"
+their "visions, and I have used similitudes, by the ministry of the
+prophets." Now multiplicity of visions results, not from a diversity
+of intellectual light, which is common to every prophetic vision, but
+from a diversity of species, whence similitudes also result.
+Therefore it seems that in prophetic revelation new species of things
+are impressed, and not merely an intellectual light.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "prophetic
+knowledge pertains most of all to the intellect." Now two things have
+to be considered in connection with the knowledge possessed by the
+human mind, namely the acceptance or representation of things, and
+the judgment of the things represented. Now things are represented to
+the human mind under the form of species: and according to the order
+of nature, they must be represented first to the senses, secondly to
+the imagination, thirdly to the passive intellect, and these are
+changed by the species derived from the phantasms, which change
+results from the enlightening action of the active intellect. Now in
+the imagination there are the forms of sensible things not only as
+received from the senses, but also transformed in various ways,
+either on account of some bodily transformation (as in the case of
+people who are asleep or out of their senses), or through the
+coordination of the phantasms, at the command of reason, for the
+purpose of understanding something. For just as the various
+arrangements of the letters of the alphabet convey various ideas to
+the understanding, so the various coordinations of the phantasms
+produce various intelligible species of the intellect.
+
+As to the judgment formed by the human mind, it depends on the power
+of the intellectual light.
+
+Now the gift of prophecy confers on the human mind something which
+surpasses the natural faculty in both these respects, namely as to
+the judgment which depends on the inflow of intellectual light, and
+as to the acceptance or representation of things, which is effected
+by means of certain species. Human teaching may be likened to
+prophetic revelation in the second of these respects, but not in the
+first. For a man represents certain things to his disciple by signs
+of speech, but he cannot enlighten him inwardly as God does.
+
+But it is the first of these two that holds the chief place in
+prophecy, since judgment is the complement of knowledge. Wherefore if
+certain things are divinely represented to any man by means of
+imaginary likenesses, as happened to Pharaoh (Gen. 41:1-7) and to
+Nabuchodonosor (Dan. 4:1-2), or even by bodily likenesses, as
+happened to Balthasar (Dan. 5:5), such a man is not to be considered
+a prophet, unless his mind be enlightened for the purpose of
+judgment; and such an apparition is something imperfect in the genus
+of prophecy. Wherefore some [*Rabbi Moyses, Doct. Perplex. II, xxxvi]
+have called this "prophetic ecstasy," and such is divination by
+dreams. And yet a man will be a prophet, if his intellect be
+enlightened merely for the purpose of judging of things seen in
+imagination by others, as in the case of Joseph who interpreted
+Pharaoh's dream. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9),
+"especially is he a prophet who excels in both respects, so," to wit,
+"as to see in spirit likenesses significant of things corporeal, and
+understand them by the quickness of his intellect."
+
+Now sensible forms are divinely presented to the prophet's mind,
+sometimes externally by means of the senses--thus Daniel saw the
+writing on the wall (Dan. 5:25)--sometimes by means of imaginary
+forms, either of exclusively Divine origin and not received through
+the senses (for instance, if images of colors were imprinted on the
+imagination of one blind from birth), or divinely coordinated from
+those derived from the senses--thus Jeremiah saw the "boiling caldron
+. . . from the face of the north" (Jer. 1:13)--or by the direct
+impression of intelligible species on the mind, as in the case of
+those who receive infused scientific knowledge or wisdom, such as
+Solomon or the apostles.
+
+But intellectual light is divinely imprinted on the human
+mind--sometimes for the purpose of judging of things seen by others,
+as in the case of Joseph, quoted above, and of the apostles whose
+understanding our Lord opened "that they might understand the
+scriptures" (Luke 24:45); and to this pertains the "interpretation of
+speeches"--sometimes for the purpose of judging according to Divine
+truth, of the things which a man apprehends in the ordinary course of
+nature--sometimes for the purpose of discerning truthfully and
+efficaciously what is to be done, according to Isa. 63:14, "The
+Spirit of the Lord was their leader."
+
+Hence it is evident that prophetic revelation is conveyed sometimes
+by the mere infusion of light, sometimes by imprinting species anew,
+or by a new coordination of species.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, sometimes in prophetic revelation
+imaginary species previously derived from the senses are divinely
+coordinated so as to accord with the truth to be revealed, and then
+previous experience is operative in the production of the images, but
+not when they are impressed on the mind wholly from without.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Intellectual vision is not effected by means of bodily
+and individual images, but by an intelligible image. Hence Augustine
+says (De Trin. ix, 11) that "the soul possesses a certain likeness of
+the species known to it." Sometimes this intelligible image is, in
+prophetic revelation, imprinted immediately by God, sometimes it
+results from pictures in the imagination, by the aid of the prophetic
+light, since a deeper truth is gathered from these pictures in the
+imagination by means of the enlightenment of the higher light.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is true that man is able by his natural powers to
+form all kinds of pictures in the imagination, by simply considering
+these pictures, but not so that they be directed to the
+representation of intelligible truths that surpass his intellect,
+since for this purpose he needs the assistance of a supernatural
+light.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Prophetic Vision Is Always Accompanied by Abstraction
+from the Senses?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the prophetic vision is always
+accompanied by abstraction from the senses. For it is written (Num.
+12:6): "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to
+him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." Now a gloss says
+at the beginning of the Psalter, "a vision that takes place by dreams
+and apparitions consists of things which seem to be said or done."
+But when things seem to be said or done, which are neither said nor
+done, there is abstraction from the senses. Therefore prophecy is
+always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, when one power is very intent on its own operation,
+other powers are drawn away from theirs; thus men who are very intent
+on hearing something fail to see what takes place before them. Now in
+the prophetic vision the intellect is very much uplifted, and intent
+on its act. Therefore it seems that the prophetic vision is always
+accompanied by abstraction from the senses.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the same thing cannot, at the same time, tend in
+opposite directions. Now in the prophetic vision the mind tends to
+the acceptance of things from above, and consequently it cannot at
+the same time tend to sensible objects. Therefore it would seem
+necessary for prophetic revelation to be always accompanied by
+abstraction from the senses.
+
+Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 14:32): "The spirits
+of the prophets are subject to the prophets." Now this were
+impossible if the prophet were not in possession of his faculties,
+but abstracted from his senses. Therefore it would seem that
+prophetic vision is not accompanied by abstraction from the senses.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated in the foregoing Article, the prophetic
+revelation takes place in four ways: namely, by the infusion of an
+intelligible light, by the infusion of intelligible species, by
+impression or coordination of pictures in the imagination, and by the
+outward presentation of sensible images. Now it is evident that there
+is no abstraction from the senses, when something is presented to the
+prophet's mind by means of sensible species--whether these be
+divinely formed for this special purpose, as the bush shown to Moses
+(Ex. 3:2), and the writing shown to Daniel (Dan. 5:)--or whether they
+be produced by other causes; yet so that they are ordained by Divine
+providence to be prophetically significant of something, as, for
+instance, the Church was signified by the ark of Noah.
+
+Again, abstraction from the external senses is not rendered necessary
+when the prophet's mind is enlightened by an intellectual light, or
+impressed with intelligible species, since in us the perfect judgment
+of the intellect is effected by its turning to sensible objects,
+which are the first principles of our knowledge, as stated in the
+First Part (Q. 84, A. 6).
+
+When, however, prophetic revelation is conveyed by images in the
+imagination, abstraction from the senses is necessary lest the things
+thus seen in imagination be taken for objects of external sensation.
+Yet this abstraction from the senses is sometimes complete, so that a
+man perceives nothing with his senses; and sometimes it is
+incomplete, so that he perceives something with his senses, yet does
+not fully discern the things he perceives outwardly from those he
+sees in imagination. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12):
+"Those images of bodies which are formed in the soul are seen just as
+bodily things themselves are seen by the body, so that we see with
+our eyes one who is present, and at the same time we see with the
+soul one who is absent, as though we saw him with our eyes."
+
+Yet this abstraction from the senses takes place in the prophets
+without subverting the order of nature, as is the case with those who
+are possessed or out of their senses; but is due to some well-ordered
+cause. This cause may be natural--for instance, sleep--or
+spiritual--for instance, the intenseness of the prophets'
+contemplation; thus we read of Peter (Acts 10:9) that while he was
+praying in the supper-room [*Vulg.: 'the house-top' or
+'upper-chamber'] "he fell into an ecstasy"--or he may be carried away
+by the Divine power, according to the saying of Ezechiel 1:3: "The
+hand of the Lord was upon him."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted refers to prophets in whom imaginary
+pictures were formed or coordinated, either while asleep, which is
+denoted by the word "dream," or while awake, which is signified by
+the word "vision."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When the mind is intent, in its act, upon distant
+things which are far removed from the senses, the intensity of its
+application leads to abstraction from the senses; but when it is
+intent, in its act, upon the coordination of or judgment concerning
+objects of sense, there is no need for abstraction from the senses.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The movement of the prophetic mind results not from its
+own power, but from a power acting on it from above. Hence there is
+no abstraction from the senses when the prophet's mind is led to
+judge or coordinate matters relating to objects of sense, but only
+when the mind is raised to the contemplation of certain more lofty
+things.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The spirit of the prophets is said to be subject to the
+prophets as regards the prophetic utterances to which the Apostle
+refers in the words quoted; because, to wit, the prophets in
+declaring what they have seen speak their own mind, and are not
+thrown off their mental balance, like persons who are possessed, as
+Priscilla and Montanus maintained. But as regards the prophetic
+revelation itself, it would be more correct to say that the prophets
+are subject to the spirit of prophecy, i.e. to the prophetic gift.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Prophets Always Know the Things Which They Prophesy?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets always know the things
+which they prophesy. For, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9),
+"those to whom signs were shown in spirit by means of the likenesses
+of bodily things, had not the gift of prophecy, unless the mind was
+brought into action, so that those signs were also understood by
+them." Now what is understood cannot be unknown. Therefore the
+prophet is not ignorant of what he prophesies.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the light of prophecy surpasses the light of natural
+reason. Now one who possesses a science by his natural light, is not
+ignorant of his scientific acquirements. Therefore he who utters
+things by the prophetic light cannot ignore them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prophecy is directed for man's enlightenment;
+wherefore it is written (2 Pet. 1:19): "We have the more firm
+prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that
+shineth in a dark place." Now nothing can enlighten others unless it
+be lightsome in itself. Therefore it would seem that the prophet is
+first enlightened so as to know what he declares to others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 11:51): "And this he"
+(Caiphas) "spoke, not of himself, but being the High Priest of that
+year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation," etc. Now
+Caiphas knew this not. Therefore not every prophet knows what he
+prophesies.
+
+_I answer that,_ In prophetic revelation the prophet's mind is moved
+by the Holy Ghost, as an instrument that is deficient in regard to
+the principal agent. Now the prophet's mind is moved not only to
+apprehend something, but also to speak or to do something; sometimes
+indeed to all these three together, sometimes to two, sometimes to
+one only, and in each case there may be a defect in the prophet's
+knowledge. For when the prophet's mind is moved to think or apprehend
+a thing, sometimes he is led merely to apprehend that thing, and
+sometimes he is further led to know that it is divinely revealed to
+him.
+
+Again, sometimes the prophet's mind is moved to speak something, so
+that he understands what the Holy Ghost means by the words he utters;
+like David who said (2 Kings 23:2): "The Spirit of the Lord hath
+spoken by me"; while, on the other hand, sometimes the person whose
+mind is moved to utter certain words knows not what the Holy Ghost
+means by them, as was the case with Caiphas (John 11:51).
+
+Again, when the Holy Ghost moves a man's mind to do something,
+sometimes the latter understands the meaning of it, like Jeremias who
+hid his loin-cloth in the Euphrates (Jer. 13:1-11); while sometimes
+he does not understand it--thus the soldiers, who divided Christ's
+garments, understood not the meaning of what they did.
+
+Accordingly, when a man knows that he is being moved by the Holy
+Ghost to think something, or signify something by word or deed, this
+belongs properly to prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his
+knowing it, this is not perfect prophecy, but a prophetic instinct.
+Nevertheless it must be observed that since the prophet's mind is a
+defective instrument, as stated above, even true prophets know not
+all that the Holy Ghost means by the things they see, or speak, or
+even do.
+
+And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections, since the
+arguments given at the beginning refer to true prophets whose minds
+are perfectly enlightened from above.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 174
+
+OF THE DIVISION OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)
+
+We must now consider the division of prophecy, and under this head
+there are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) The division of prophecy into its species;
+
+(2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which is without
+imaginative vision?
+
+(3) The various degrees of prophecy;
+
+(4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?
+
+(5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet?
+
+(6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time went on?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Prophecy Is Fittingly Divided into the Prophecy of Divine
+Predestination, of Foreknowledge, and of Denunciation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is unfittingly divided
+according to a gloss on Matt. 1:23, "Behold a virgin shall be with
+child," where it is stated that "one kind of prophecy proceeds from
+the Divine predestination, and must in all respects be accomplished
+so that its fulfillment is independent of our will, for instance the
+one in question. Another prophecy proceeds from God's foreknowledge:
+and into this our will enters. And another prophecy is called
+denunciation, which is significative of God's disapproval." For that
+which results from every prophecy should not be reckoned a part of
+prophecy. Now all prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge,
+since the prophets "read in the book of foreknowledge," as a gloss
+says on Isa. 38:1. Therefore it would seem that prophecy according to
+foreknowledge should not be reckoned a species of prophecy.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as something is foretold in denunciation, so is
+something foretold in promise, and both of these are subject to
+alteration. For it is written (Jer. 18:7, 8): "I will suddenly speak
+against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull
+down, and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken
+shall repent of their evil, I also will repent"--and this pertains to
+the prophecy of denunciation, and afterwards the text continues in
+reference to the prophecy of promise (Jer. 18:9, 10): "I will
+suddenly speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build up and plant
+it. If it shall do evil in My sight . . . I will repent of the good
+that I have spoken to do unto it." Therefore as there is reckoned to
+be a prophecy of denunciation, so should there be a prophecy of
+promise.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8): "There are seven kinds
+of prophecy. The first is an ecstasy, which is the transport of the
+mind: thus Peter saw a vessel descending from heaven with all manner
+of beasts therein. The second kind is a vision, as we read in Isaias,
+who says (Isa. 6:1): 'I saw the Lord sitting,' etc. The third kind is
+a dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder. The fourth kind is from
+the midst of a cloud: thus God spake to Moses. The fifth kind is a
+voice from heaven, as that which called to Abraham saying (Gen.
+22:11): 'Lay not thy hand upon the boy.' The sixth kind is taking up
+a parable, as in the example of Balaam (Num. 23:7; 24:15). The
+seventh kind is the fullness of the Holy Ghost, as in the case of
+nearly all the prophets." Further, he mentions three kinds of vision;
+"one by the eyes of the body, another by the soul's imagination, a
+third by the eyes of the mind." Now these are not included in the
+aforesaid division. Therefore it is insufficient.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Jerome to whom the gloss
+above quoted is ascribed.
+
+_I answer that,_ The species of moral habits and acts are
+distinguished according to their objects. Now the object of prophecy
+is something known by God and surpassing the faculty of man.
+Wherefore, according to the difference of such things, prophecy is
+divided into various species, as assigned above. Now it has been
+stated above (Q. 71, A. 6, ad 2) that the future is contained in the
+Divine knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we
+have the prophecy of _denunciation,_ which is not always fulfilled.
+but it foretells the relation of cause to effect, which is sometimes
+hindered by some other occurrence supervening. Secondly, God
+foreknows certain things in themselves--either as to be accomplished
+by Himself, and of such things is the prophecy of _predestination,_
+since, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30), "God
+predestines things which are not in our power"--or as to be
+accomplished through man's free-will, and of such is the prophecy of
+_foreknowledge._ This may regard either good or evil, which does not
+apply to the prophecy of predestination, since the latter regards
+good alone. And since predestination is comprised under
+foreknowledge, the gloss in the beginning of the Psalter assigns only
+two species to prophecy, namely of _foreknowledge,_ and of
+_denunciation._
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Foreknowledge, properly speaking, denotes precognition
+of future events in themselves, and in this sense it is reckoned a
+species of prophecy. But in so far as it is used in connection with
+future events, whether as in themselves, or as in their causes, it is
+common to every species of prophecy.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The prophecy of promise is included in the prophecy of
+denunciation, because the aspect of truth is the same in both. But it
+is denominated in preference from denunciation, because God is more
+inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised blessings.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Isidore divides prophecy according to the manner of
+prophesying. Now we may distinguish the manner of prophesying--either
+according to man's cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination,
+and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision mentioned
+both by him and by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7)--or according
+to the different ways in which the prophetic current is received.
+Thus as regards the enlightening of the intellect there is the
+"fullness of the Holy Ghost" which he mentions in the seventh place.
+As to the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he mentions
+three, namely "dreams," to which he gives the third place; "vision,"
+which occurs to the prophet while awake and regards any kind of
+ordinary object, and this he puts in the second place; and "ecstasy,"
+which results from the mind being uplifted to certain lofty things,
+and to this he assigns the first place. As regards sensible signs he
+reckons three kinds of prophecy, because a sensible sign is--either a
+corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as "a cloud,"
+which he mentions in the fourth place--or a "voice" sounding from
+without and conveyed to man's hearing--this he puts in the fifth
+place--or a voice proceeding from a man, conveying something under a
+similitude, and this pertains to the "parable" to which he assigns
+the sixth place.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Prophecy Which Is Accompanied by Intellective and
+Imaginative Vision Is More Excellent Than That Which Is Accompanied
+by Intellective Vision Alone?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the prophecy which has intellective
+and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is
+accompanied by intellective vision alone. For Augustine says (Gen. ad
+lit. xii, 9): "He is less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing but
+the signs representative of things, by means of the images of things
+corporeal: he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed with the
+understanding of these signs; but most of all is he a prophet, who
+excels in both ways," and this refers to the prophet who has
+intellective together with imaginative vision. Therefore this kind of
+prophecy is more excellent.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the greater a thing's power is, the greater the
+distance to which it extends. Now the prophetic light pertains
+chiefly to the mind, as stated above (Q. 173, A. 2). Therefore
+apparently the prophecy that extends to the imagination is greater
+than that which is confined to the intellect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Jerome (Prol. in Lib. Reg.) distinguishes the
+"prophets" from the "sacred writers." Now all those whom he calls
+prophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias, and the like) had intellective
+together with imaginative vision: but not those whom he calls sacred
+writers, as writing by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost (such as
+Job, David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore it would seem more
+proper to call prophets those who had intellective together with
+imaginative vision, than those who had intellective vision alone.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is
+impossible for the Divine ray to shine on us, except as screened
+round about by the many-colored sacred veils." Now the prophetic
+revelation is conveyed by the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore
+it seems that it cannot be without the veils of phantasms.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter that
+"the most excellent manner of prophecy is when a man prophesies by
+the mere inspiration of the Holy Ghost, apart from any outward
+assistance of deed, word, vision, or dream."
+
+_I answer that,_ The excellence of the means is measured chiefly by
+the end. Now the end of prophecy is the manifestation of a truth that
+surpasses the faculty of man. Wherefore the more effective this
+manifestation is, the more excellent the prophecy. But it is evident
+that the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare
+contemplation of the truth itself, is more effective than that which
+is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it
+approaches nearer to the heavenly vision whereby the truth is seen in
+God's essence. Hence it follows that the prophecy whereby a
+supernatural truth is seen by intellectual vision, is more excellent
+than that in which a supernatural truth is manifested by means of the
+similitudes of corporeal things in the vision of the imagination.
+
+Moreover the prophet's mind is shown thereby to be more lofty: even
+as in human teaching the hearer, who is able to grasp the bare
+intelligible truth the master propounds, is shown to have a better
+understanding than one who needs to be taken by the hand and helped
+by means of examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in
+commendation of David's prophecy (2 Kings 23:3): "The strong one of
+Israel spoke to me," and further on (2 Kings 23:4): "As the light of
+the morning, when the sun riseth, shineth in the morning without
+clouds."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When a particular supernatural truth has to be revealed
+by means of corporeal images, he that has both, namely the
+intellectual light and the imaginary vision, is more a prophet than
+he that has only one, because his prophecy is more perfect; and it is
+in this sense that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the
+prophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is revealed is greater
+than all.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The same judgment does not apply to things that are
+sought for their own sake, as to things sought for the sake of
+something else. For in things sought for their own sake, the agent's
+power is the more effective according as it extends to more numerous
+and more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more of, if
+he is able to heal more people, and those who are further removed
+from health. On the other hand, in things sought only for the sake of
+something else, that agent would seem to have greater power, who is
+able to achieve his purpose with fewer means and those nearest to
+hand: thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to heal a
+sick person by means of fewer and more gentle remedies. Now, in the
+prophetic knowledge, imaginary vision is required, not for its own
+sake, but on account of the manifestation of the intelligible truth.
+Wherefore prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it
+less.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The fact that a particular predicate is applicable to
+one thing and less properly to another, does not prevent this latter
+from being simply better than the former: thus the knowledge of the
+blessed is more excellent than the knowledge of the wayfarer,
+although faith is more properly predicated of the latter knowledge,
+because faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In like manner
+prophecy implies a certain obscurity, and remoteness from the
+intelligible truth; wherefore the name of prophet is more properly
+applied to those who see by imaginary vision. And yet the more
+excellent prophecy is that which is conveyed by intellectual vision,
+provided the same truth be revealed in either case. If, however, the
+intellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he may
+know some supernatural things, but that he may be able to judge, with
+the certitude of divine truth, of things that can be known by human
+reason, such intellectual prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed
+by an imaginary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this
+kind of prophecy that all those had who are included in the ranks of
+the prophets, who moreover were called prophets for the special
+reason that they exercised the prophetic calling officially. Hence
+they spoke as God's representatives, saying to the people: "Thus
+saith the Lord": but not so the authors of the _sacred writings,_
+several of whom treated more frequently of things that can be known
+by human reason, not in God's name, but in their own, yet with the
+assistance of the Divine light withal.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In the present life the enlightenment by the divine ray
+is not altogether without any veil of phantasms, because according to
+his present state of life it is unnatural to man not to understand
+without a phantasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to have
+phantasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses without any
+imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus prophetic vision is
+said to be without imaginary vision.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Degrees of Prophecy Can Be Distinguished According to the
+Imaginary Vision?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy cannot be
+distinguished according to the imaginary vision. For the degrees of a
+thing bear relation to something that is on its own account, not on
+account of something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual vision is
+sought on its own account, and imaginary vision on account of
+something else, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore it would seem
+that the degrees of prophecy are distinguished not according to
+imaginary, but only according to intellectual, vision.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, seemingly for one prophet there is one degree of
+prophecy. Now one prophet receives revelation through various
+imaginary visions. Therefore a difference of imaginary visions does
+not entail a difference of prophecy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to a gloss [*Cassiodorus, super Prolog.
+Hieron. in Psalt.], prophecy consists of words, deeds, dreams, and
+visions. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should not be
+distinguished according to imaginary vision, to which vision and
+dreams pertain, rather than according to words and deeds.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The medium differentiates the degrees of
+knowledge: thus science based on direct [*_Propter quid_] proofs is
+more excellent than science based on indirect [*_Quia_] premises or
+than opinion, because it comes through a more excellent medium. Now
+imaginary vision is a kind of medium in prophetic knowledge.
+Therefore the degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according
+to imaginary vision.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 173, A. 2), the prophecy
+wherein, by the intelligible light, a supernatural truth is revealed
+through an imaginary vision, holds the mean between the prophecy
+wherein a supernatural truth is revealed without imaginary vision,
+and that wherein through the intelligible light and without an
+imaginary vision, man is directed to know or do things pertaining to
+human conduct. Now knowledge is more proper to prophecy than is
+action; wherefore the lowest degree of prophecy is when a man, by an
+inward instinct, is moved to perform some outward action. Thus it is
+related of Samson (Judges 15:14) that "the Spirit of the Lord came
+strongly upon him, and as the flax [*_Lina._ St. Thomas apparently
+read _ligna_ ('wood')] is wont to be consumed at the approach of
+fire, so the bands with which he was bound were broken and loosed."
+The second degree of prophecy is when a man is enlightened by an
+inward light so as to know certain things, which, however, do not go
+beyond the bounds of natural knowledge: thus it is related of Solomon
+(3 Kings 4:32, 33) that "he spoke . . . parables . . . and he treated
+about trees from the cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that
+cometh out of the wall, and he discoursed of beasts and of fowls, and
+of creeping things and of fishes": and all of this came from divine
+inspiration, for it was stated previously (3 Kings 4:29): "God gave
+to Solomon wisdom and understanding exceeding much."
+
+Nevertheless these two degrees are beneath prophecy properly so
+called, because they do not attain to supernatural truth. The
+prophecy wherein supernatural truth is manifested through imaginary
+vision is differentiated first according to the difference between
+dreams which occur during sleep, and vision which occurs while one is
+awake. The latter belongs to a higher degree of prophecy, since the
+prophetic light that draws the soul away to supernatural things while
+it is awake and occupied with sensible things would seem to be
+stronger than that which finds a man's soul asleep and withdrawn from
+objects of sense. Secondly the degrees of this prophecy are
+differentiated according to the expressiveness of the imaginary signs
+whereby the intelligible truth is conveyed. And since words are the
+most expressive signs of intelligible truth, it would seem to be a
+higher degree of prophecy when the prophet, whether awake or asleep,
+hears words expressive of an intelligible truth, than when he sees
+things significative of truth, for instance "the seven full ears of
+corn" signified "seven years of plenty" (Gen. 41:22, 26). In such
+like signs prophecy would seem to be the more excellent, according as
+the signs are more expressive, for instance when Jeremias saw the
+burning of the city under the figure of a boiling cauldron (Jer.
+1:13). Thirdly, it is evidently a still higher degree of prophecy
+when a prophet not only sees signs of words or deeds, but also,
+either awake or asleep, sees someone speaking or showing something to
+him, since this proves the prophet's mind to have approached nearer
+to the cause of the revelation. Fourthly, the height of a degree of
+prophecy may be measured according to the appearance of the person
+seen: for it is a higher degree of prophecy, if he who speaks or
+shows something to the waking or sleeping prophet be seen by him
+under the form of an angel, than if he be seen by him under the form
+of man: and higher still is it, if he be seen by the prophet whether
+asleep or awake, under the appearance of God, according to Isa. 6:1,
+"I saw the Lord sitting."
+
+But above all these degrees there is a third kind of prophecy, wherein
+an intelligible and supernatural truth is shown without any imaginary
+vision. However, this goes beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so
+called, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3); and consequently the degrees of
+prophecy are properly distinguished according to imaginary vision.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We are unable to know how to distinguish the
+intellectual light, except by means of imaginary or sensible signs.
+Hence the difference in the intellectual light is gathered from the
+difference in the things presented to the imagination.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 171, A. 2), prophecy is by way, not
+of an abiding habit, but of a transitory passion; wherefore there is
+nothing inconsistent if one and the same prophet, at different times,
+receive various degrees of prophetic revelation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The words and deeds mentioned there do not pertain to
+the prophetic revelation, but to the announcement, which is made
+according to the disposition of those to whom that which is revealed
+to the prophet is announced; and this is done sometimes by words,
+sometimes by deeds. Now this announcement, and the working of
+miracles, are something consequent upon prophecy, as stated above (Q.
+171, A. 1).
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Moses Was the Greatest of the Prophets?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that Moses was not the greatest of the
+prophets. For a gloss at the beginning of the Psalter says that
+"David is called the prophet by way of excellence." Therefore Moses
+was not the greatest of all.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, greater miracles were wrought by Josue, who made the
+sun and moon to stand still (Josh. 10:12-14), and by Isaias, who made
+the sun to turn back (Isa. 38:8), than by Moses, who divided the Red
+Sea (Ex. 14:21). In like manner greater miracles were wrought by
+Elias, of whom it is written (Ecclus. 48:4, 5): "Who can glory like
+to thee? Who raisedst up a dead man from below." Therefore Moses was
+not the greatest of the prophets.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 11:11) that "there hath not
+risen, among them that are born of women, a greater than John the
+Baptist." Therefore Moses was not greater than all the prophets.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 34:10): "There arose no more
+a prophet in Israel like unto Moses."
+
+_I answer that,_ Although in some respect one or other of the
+prophets was greater than Moses, yet Moses was simply the greatest
+of all. For, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 171, A. 1), in prophecy we
+may consider not only the knowledge, whether by intellectual or by
+imaginary vision, but also the announcement and the confirmation by
+miracles. Accordingly Moses was greater than the other prophets.
+First, as regards the intellectual vision, since he saw God's very
+essence, even as Paul in his rapture did, according to Augustine
+(Gen. ad lit. xii, 27). Hence it is written (Num. 12:8) that he saw
+God "plainly and not by riddles." Secondly, as regards the imaginary
+vision, which he had at his call, as it were, for not only did he
+hear words, but also saw one speaking to him under the form of God,
+and this not only while asleep, but even when he was awake. Hence it
+is written (Ex. 33:11) that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as
+a man is wont to speak to his friend." Thirdly, as regards the
+working of miracles which he wrought on a whole nation of
+unbelievers. Wherefore it is written (Deut. 34:10, 11): "There arose
+no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face
+to face: in all the signs and wonders, which He sent by him, to do in
+the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants, and to his
+whole land."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The prophecy of David approaches near to the vision of
+Moses, as regards the intellectual vision, because both received a
+revelation of intelligible and supernatural truth, without any
+imaginary vision. Yet the vision of Moses was more excellent as
+regards the knowledge of the Godhead; while David more fully knew and
+expressed the mysteries of Christ's incarnation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: These signs of the prophets mentioned were greater as
+to the substance of the thing done; yet the miracles of Moses were
+greater as regards the way in which they were done, since they were
+wrought on a whole people.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: John belongs to the New Testament, whose ministers take
+precedence even of Moses, since they are spectators of a fuller
+revelation, as stated in 2 Cor. 3.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 6]
+
+Whether There Is a Degree of Prophecy in the Blessed?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is a degree of prophecy in the
+blessed. For, as stated above (A. 4), Moses saw the Divine essence,
+and yet he is called a prophet. Therefore in like manner the blessed
+can be called prophets.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prophecy is a "divine revelation." Now divine
+revelations are made even to the blessed angels. Therefore even
+blessed angels can be prophets.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Christ was a comprehensor from the moment of His
+conception; and yet He calls Himself a prophet (Matt. 13:57), when He
+says: "A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country."
+Therefore even comprehensors and the blessed can be called prophets.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is written of Samuel (Ecclus. 46:23): "He lifted
+up his voice from the earth in prophecy to blot out the wickedness of
+the nation." Therefore other saints can likewise be called prophets
+after they have died.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The prophetic word is compared (2 Pet. 1:19) to a
+"light that shineth in a dark place." Now there is no darkness in the
+blessed. Therefore they cannot be called prophets.
+
+_I answer that,_ Prophecy denotes vision of some supernatural truth
+as being far remote from us. This happens in two ways. First, on the
+part of the knowledge itself, because, to wit, the supernatural truth
+is not known in itself, but in some of its effects; and this truth
+will be more remote if it be known by means of images of corporeal
+things, than if it be known in its intelligible effects; and such
+most of all is the prophetic vision, which is conveyed by images and
+likenesses of corporeal things. Secondly, vision is remote on the
+part of the seer, because, to wit, he has not yet attained completely
+to his ultimate perfection, according to 2 Cor. 5:6, "While we are in
+the body, we are absent from the Lord."
+
+Now in neither of these ways are the blessed remote; wherefore they
+cannot be called prophets.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This vision of Moses was interrupted after the manner
+of a passion, and was not permanent like the beatific vision,
+wherefore he was as yet a seer from afar. For this reason his vision
+did not entirely lose the character of prophecy.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The divine revelation is made to the angels, not as
+being far distant, but as already wholly united to God; wherefore
+their revelation has not the character of prophecy.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Christ was at the same time comprehensor and wayfarer
+[*Cf. III, QQ. 9, seqq.]. Consequently the notion of prophecy is not
+applicable to Him as a comprehensor, but only as a wayfarer.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Samuel had not yet attained to the state of
+blessedness. Wherefore although by God's will the soul itself of
+Samuel foretold to Saul the issue of the war as revealed to him by
+God, this pertains to the nature of prophecy. It is not the same with
+the saints who are now in heaven. Nor does it make any difference
+that this is stated to have been brought about by the demons' art,
+because although the demons are unable to evoke the soul of a saint,
+or to force it to do any particular thing, this can be done by the
+power of God, so that when the demon is consulted, God Himself
+declares the truth by His messenger: even as He gave a true answer by
+Elias to the King's messengers who were sent to consult the god of
+Accaron (4 Kings 1).
+
+It might also be replied [*The Book of Ecclesiasticus was not as yet
+declared by the Church to be Canonical Scripture; Cf. I, Q. 89, A. 8,
+ad 2] that it was not the soul of Samuel, but a demon impersonating
+him; and that the wise man calls him Samuel, and describes his
+prediction as prophetic, in accordance with the thoughts of Saul and
+the bystanders who were of this opinion.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Degrees of Prophecy Change As Time Goes On?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy change as
+time goes on. For prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine
+things, as stated above (A. 2). Now according to Gregory (Hom. in
+Ezech.), "knowledge of God went on increasing as time went on."
+Therefore degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to
+the process of time.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, prophetic revelation is conveyed by God speaking to
+man; while the prophets declared both in words and in writing the
+things revealed to them. Now it is written (1 Kings 3:1) that before
+the time of Samuel "the word of the Lord was precious," i.e. rare;
+and yet afterwards it was delivered to many. In like manner the books
+of the prophets do not appear to have been written before the time of
+Isaias, to whom it was said (Isa. 8:1): "Take thee a great book and
+write in it with a man's pen," after which many prophets wrote their
+prophecies. Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree
+of prophecy made progress.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, our Lord said (Matt. 11:13): "The prophets and the
+law prophesied until John"; and afterwards the gift of prophecy was
+in Christ's disciples in a much more excellent manner than in the
+prophets of old, according to Eph. 3:5, "In other generations" the
+mystery of Christ "was not known to the sons of men, as it is now
+revealed to His holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit." Therefore
+it would seem that in course of time the degree of prophecy advanced.
+
+_On the contrary,_ As stated above (A. 4), Moses was the greatest of
+the prophets, and yet he preceded the other prophets. Therefore
+prophecy did not advance in degree as time went on.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), prophecy is directed to the
+knowledge of Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not
+only instructed in faith, but also guided in our actions, according
+to Ps. 42:3, "Send forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted
+me." Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the true
+knowledge of God, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh to God must
+believe that He is"; secondly, in the mystery of Christ's
+incarnation, according to John 14:1, "You believe in God, believe
+also in Me." Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy as directed to the
+Godhead as its end, it progressed according to three divisions of
+time, namely before the law, under the law, and under grace. For
+before the law, Abraham and the other patriarchs were prophetically
+taught things pertinent to faith in the Godhead. Hence they are
+called prophets, according to Ps. 104:15, "Do no evil to My
+prophets," which words are said especially on behalf of Abraham and
+Isaac. Under the Law prophetic revelation of things pertinent to
+faith in the Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than
+hitherto, because then not only certain special persons or families
+but the whole people had to be instructed in these matters. Hence the
+Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2, 3): "I am the Lord that appeared to
+Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God almighty, and My
+name Adonai I did not show to them"; because previously the
+patriarchs had been taught to believe in a general way in God, one
+and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the simplicity
+of the Divine essence, when it was said to him (Ex. 3:14): "I am Who
+am"; and this name is signified by Jews in the word "Adonai" on
+account of their veneration for that unspeakable name. Afterwards in
+the time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by the Son
+of God Himself, according to Matt. 28:19: "Going . . . teach ye all
+nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son,
+and of the Holy Ghost."
+
+In each state, however, the most excellent revelation was that which
+was given first. Now the first revelation, before the Law, was given
+to Abraham, for it was at that time that men began to stray from
+faith in one God by turning aside to idolatry, whereas hitherto no
+such revelation was necessary while all persevered in the worship of
+one God. A less excellent revelation was made to Isaac, being founded
+on that which was made to Abraham. Wherefore it was said to him (Gen.
+26:24): "I am the God of Abraham thy father," and in like manner to
+Jacob (Gen. 28:13): "I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the God
+of Isaac." Again in the state of the Law the first revelation which
+was given to Moses was more excellent, and on this revelation all the
+other revelations to the prophets were founded. And so, too, in the
+time of grace the entire faith of the Church is founded on the
+revelation vouchsafed to the apostles, concerning the faith in one
+God and three Persons, according to Matt. 16:18, "On this rock," i.e.
+of thy confession, "I will build My Church."
+
+As to the faith in Christ's incarnation, it is evident that the
+nearer men were to Christ, whether before or after Him, the more
+fully, for the most part, were they instructed on this point, and
+after Him more fully than before, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 3:5).
+
+As regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic revelation
+varied not according to the course of time, but according as
+circumstances required, because as it is written (Prov. 29:18), "When
+prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad." Wherefore
+at all times men were divinely instructed about what they were to do,
+according as it was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the elect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The saying of Gregory is to be referred to the time
+before Christ's incarnation, as regards the knowledge of this mystery.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 27), "just as in
+the early days of the Assyrian kingdom promises were made most
+explicitly to Abraham, so at the outset of the western Babylon,"
+which is Rome, "and under its sway Christ was to come, in Whom were
+to be fulfilled the promises made through the prophetic oracles
+testifying in word and writing to that great event to come," the
+promises, namely, which were made to Abraham. "For while prophets
+were scarcely ever lacking to the people of Israel from the time that
+they began to have kings, it was exclusively for their benefit, not
+for that of the nations. But when those prophetic writings were being
+set up with greater publicity, which at some future time were to
+benefit the nations, it was fitting to begin when this city," Rome to
+wit, "was being built, which was to govern the nations."
+
+The reason why it behooved that nation to have a number of prophets
+especially at the time of the kings, was that then it was not
+over-ridden by other nations, but had its own king; wherefore it
+behooved the people, as enjoying liberty, to have prophets to teach
+them what to do.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The prophets who foretold the coming of Christ could
+not continue further than John, who with his finger pointed to Christ
+actually present. Nevertheless as Jerome says on this passage, "This
+does not mean that there were no more prophets after John. For we
+read in the Acts of the apostles that Agabus and the four maidens,
+daughters of Philip, prophesied." John, too, wrote a prophetic book
+about the end of the Church; and at all times there have not been
+lacking persons having the spirit of prophecy, not indeed for the
+declaration of any new doctrine of faith, but for the direction of
+human acts. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 26) that "the emperor
+Theodosius sent to John who dwelt in the Egyptian desert, and whom he
+knew by his ever-increasing fame to be endowed with the prophetic
+spirit: and from him he received a message assuring him of victory."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 175
+
+OF RAPTURE
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider rapture. Under this head there are six points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?
+
+(2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the appetitive
+power?
+
+(3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God?
+
+(4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses?
+
+(5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separated from
+his body?
+
+(6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Soul of Man Is Carried Away to Things Divine?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of man is not carried away
+to things divine. For some define rapture as "an uplifting by the
+power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to
+that which is above nature" [*Reference unknown; Cf. De Veritate
+xiii, 1]. Now it is in accordance with man's nature that he be
+uplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the beginning of his
+Confessions: "Thou madest us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is
+restless, till it rest in Thee." Therefore man's soul is not carried
+away to things divine.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) that "God's justice
+is seen in this that He treats all things according to their mode and
+dignity." But it is not in accordance with man's mode and worth that
+he be raised above what he is according to nature. Therefore it would
+seem that man's soul is not carried away to things divine.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, rapture denotes violence of some kind. But God rules
+us not by violence or force, as Damascene says [*De Fide Orth. ii,
+30]. Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:2): "I know a man in
+Christ . . . rapt even to the third heaven." On which words a gloss
+says: "Rapt, that is to say, uplifted contrary to nature."
+
+_I answer that,_ Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above
+(Obj. 3); and "the violent is that which has its principle without,
+and in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all" (Ethic.
+iii, 1). Now everything concurs in that to which it tends in
+accordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural.
+Wherefore he who is carried away by some external agent, must be
+carried to something different from that to which his inclination
+tends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way from the end of
+the inclination--for instance a stone, which is naturally inclined to
+be borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in another way from the
+manner of tending--for instance a stone may be thrown downwards with
+greater velocity than consistent with its natural movement.
+
+Accordingly man's soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold
+manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in one way, as
+regards the term of transport--as when it is carried away to
+punishment, according to Ps. 49:22, "Lest He snatch you away, and
+there be none to deliver you"; in another way, as regards the manner
+connatural to man, which is that he should understand the truth
+through sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the
+apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though
+he be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally: provided
+this be not done intentionally, as when a man betakes himself to
+sleep which is in accordance with nature, wherefore sleep cannot be
+called rapture, properly speaking.
+
+This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold
+cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those who suffer
+abstraction from the senses through weakness: secondly, by the power
+of the demons, as in those who are possessed: thirdly, by the power
+of God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a
+man is uplifted by the spirit of God to things supernatural, and
+withdrawn from his senses, according to Ezech. 8:3, "The spirit
+lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the
+vision of God into Jerusalem."
+
+It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be
+carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his senses, but
+also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was
+attending, as when a person's mind wanders contrary to his purpose.
+But this is to use the expression in a less proper signification.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to tend to divine things through
+the apprehension of things sensible, according to Rom. 1:20, "The
+invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by
+the things that are made." But the mode, whereby a man is uplifted to
+divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to man's mode and dignity that he be
+uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to
+God's image. And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the faculty
+of man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine assistance
+which is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not
+contrary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that man's mind
+be thus uplifted in rapture by God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The saying of Damascene refers to those things which a
+man does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond the
+scope of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger
+operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we
+consider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to
+which man is directed both by nature and by his intention.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Rapture Pertains to the Cognitive Rather Than to the
+Appetitive Power?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that rapture pertains to the appetitive
+rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
+iv): "The Divine love causes ecstasy." Now love pertains to the
+appetitive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that "he who fed the
+swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life;
+whereas Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into
+ecstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself." Now the prodigal
+son sank into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who
+are carried up into the heights it is the appetite that is affected.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 30:1, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped,
+let me never be confounded," says in explaining the title [*Unto the
+end, a psalm for David, in an ecstasy]: "_Ekstasis_ in Greek
+signifies in Latin _excessus mentis,_ an aberration of the mind. This
+happens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things or
+through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this
+lower world." Now dread of earthly things pertains to the appetite.
+Therefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in
+opposition to this dread, also pertains to the appetite.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 115:2, "I said in my excess: Every
+man is a liar," says: "We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders
+through fear, but when it is carried aloft on the wings of
+revelation." Now revelation pertains to the intellective power.
+Therefore ecstasy or rapture does also.
+
+_I answer that,_ We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with
+regard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture
+cannot pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power.
+For it was stated (A. 1) that rapture is outside the inclination of
+the person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appetitive power
+is an inclination to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking,
+in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved by himself.
+
+Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and
+thus it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive power. For
+from the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards
+something, it may happen, owing to the violence of his affection,
+that a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an
+effect on the appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in
+the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was
+rapt, not only "to the third heaven"--which pertains to the
+contemplation of the intellect--but also into "paradise," which
+pertains to the appetite.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means
+simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one's proper
+order [*Cf. I-II, Q. 28, A. 3]; while rapture denotes a certain
+violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the
+appetitive power, as when a man's appetite tends to something outside
+him, and in this sense Dionysius says that "the Divine love causes
+ecstasy," inasmuch as it makes man's appetite tend to the object
+loved. Hence he says afterwards that "even God Himself, the cause of
+all things, through the overflow of His loving goodness, goes outside
+Himself in His providence for all beings." But even if this were said
+expressly of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause
+of rapture.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the
+intellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive
+appetite known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his
+lower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher
+move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the
+appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man's intellective appetite
+tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things
+whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus Dionysius says
+(Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of
+Divine love" exclaimed: "I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me."
+
+In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the
+lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is
+thus that "he who fed the swine debased himself"; and this latter
+kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin
+than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite
+is more proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower
+appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite,
+it is more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to
+him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will is
+able to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of
+rapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that it takes away
+entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with
+anger or love.
+
+It must be observed, however, that both these excesses affecting the
+appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power, either because
+the mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through
+being drawn away from objects of sense, or because it is caught up
+into some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as love is a movement of the appetite with regard
+to good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to evil.
+Wherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and
+all the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (De Civ.
+Dei xiv, 7, 9).
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Paul, When in Rapture, Saw the Essence of God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, did not see
+the essence of God. For just as we read of Paul that he was rapt to
+the third heaven, so we read of Peter (Acts 10:10) that "there came
+upon him an ecstasy of mind." Now Peter, in his ecstasy, saw not
+God's essence but an imaginary vision. Therefore it would seem that
+neither did Paul see the essence of God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the vision of God is beatific. But Paul, in his
+rapture, was not beatified; else he would never have returned to the
+unhappiness of this life, but his body would have been glorified by
+the overflow from his soul, as will happen to the saints after the
+resurrection, and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when
+in rapture saw not the essence of God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to 1 Cor. 13:10-12, faith and hope are
+incompatible with the vision of the Divine essence. But Paul when in
+this state had faith and hope. Therefore he saw not the essence of
+God.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7),
+"pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary vision." Now Paul is
+stated (2 Cor. 12:2, 4) to have seen certain pictures in his rapture,
+for instance of the "third heaven" and of "paradise." Therefore he
+would seem to have been rapt to an imaginary vision rather than to
+the vision of the Divine essence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Ep. CXLVII, 13; ad Paulin., de videndo
+Deum) concludes that "possibly God's very substance was seen by some
+while yet in this life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in
+rapture heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto man to
+utter."
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have said that Paul, when in rapture, saw "not
+the very essence of God, but a certain reflection of His clarity."
+But Augustine clearly comes to an opposite decision, not only in his
+book (De videndo Deum), but also in Gen. ad lit. xii, 28 (quoted in a
+gloss on 2 Cor. 12:2). Indeed the words themselves of the Apostle
+indicate this. For he says that "he heard secret words, which it is
+not granted unto man to utter": and such would seem to be words
+pertaining to the vision of the blessed, which transcends the state
+of the wayfarer, according to Isa. 64:4, "Eye hath not seen, O God,
+besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that love
+[Vulg.: 'wait for'] Thee" [*1 Cor. 2:9]. Therefore it is more
+becoming to hold that he saw God in His essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man's mind is rapt by God to the contemplation of
+divine truth in three ways. First, so that he contemplates it through
+certain imaginary pictures, and such was the ecstasy that came upon
+Peter. Secondly, so that he contemplates the divine truth through its
+intelligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said (Ps.
+115:11): "I said in my excess: Every man is a liar." Thirdly, so that
+he contemplates it in its essence. Such was the rapture of Paul, as
+also of Moses [*Cf. Q. 174, A. 4]; and not without reason, since as
+Moses was the first Teacher of the Jews, so was Paul the first
+"Teacher of the gentiles" [*Cf. I, Q. 68, A. 4].
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Divine essence cannot be seen by a created
+intellect save through the light of glory, of which it is written
+(Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we shall see light." But this light can be
+shared in two ways. First by way of an abiding form, and thus it
+beatifies the saints in heaven. Secondly, by way of a transitory
+passion, as stated above (Q. 171, A. 2) of the light of prophecy; and
+in this way that light was in Paul when he was in rapture. Hence this
+vision did not beatify him simply, so as to overflow into his body,
+but only in a restricted sense. Consequently this rapture pertains
+somewhat to prophecy.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since, in his rapture, Paul was beatified not as to the
+habit, but only as to the act of the blessed, it follows that he had
+not the act of faith at the same time, although he had the habit.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In one way by the third heaven we may understand
+something corporeal, and thus the third heaven denotes the empyrean
+[*1 Tim. 2:7; Cf. I, Q. 12, A. 11, ad 2], which is described as the
+"third," in relation to the aerial and starry heavens, or better
+still, in relation to the aqueous and crystalline heavens. Moreover
+Paul is stated to be rapt to the "third heaven," not as though his
+rapture consisted in the vision of something corporeal, but because
+this place is appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence
+the gloss on 2 Cor. 12 says that the "third heaven is a spiritual
+heaven, where the angels and the holy souls enjoy the contemplation
+of God: and when Paul says that he was rapt to this heaven he means
+that God showed him the life wherein He is to be seen forevermore."
+
+In another way the third heaven may signify a supra-mundane vision.
+Such a vision may be called the third heaven in three ways. First,
+according to the order of the cognitive powers. In this way the first
+heaven would indicate a supramundane bodily vision, conveyed through
+the senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall (Dan.
+5:5); the second heaven would be an imaginary vision such as Isaias
+saw, and John in the Apocalypse; and the third heaven would denote an
+intellectual vision according to Augustine's explanation (Gen. ad
+lit. xii, 26, 28, 34). Secondly, the third heaven may be taken
+according to the order of things knowable, the first heaven being
+"the knowledge of heavenly bodies, the second the knowledge of
+heavenly spirits, the third the knowledge of God Himself." Thirdly,
+the third heaven may denote the contemplation of God according to the
+degrees of knowledge whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees
+belongs to the angels of the lowest hierarchy [*Cf. I, Q. 108, A. 1],
+the second to the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the
+angels of the highest hierarchy, according to the gloss on 2 Cor. 12.
+
+And since the vision of God cannot be without delight, he says that he
+was not only "rapt to the third heaven" by reason of his
+contemplation, but also into "Paradise" by reason of the consequent
+delight.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Paul, When in Rapture, Was Withdrawn from His Senses?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, was not
+withdrawn from his senses. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28):
+"Why should we not believe that when so great an apostle, the teacher
+of the gentiles, was rapt to this most sublime vision, God was
+willing to vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to
+take the place of the present life?" Now in that future life after
+the resurrection the saints will see the Divine essence without being
+withdrawn from the senses of the body. Therefore neither did such a
+withdrawal take place in Paul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer, and also enjoyed an
+uninterrupted vision of the Divine essence, without, however, being
+withdrawn from His senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be
+withdrawn from his senses in order for him to see the essence of God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, after seeing God in His essence, Paul remembered
+what he had seen in that vision; hence he said (2 Cor. 12:4): "He
+heard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter." Now the
+memory belongs to the sensitive faculty according to the Philosopher
+(De Mem. et Remin. i). Therefore it seems that Paul, while seeing the
+essence of God, was not withdrawn from his senses.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27): "Unless a
+man in some way depart this life, whether by going altogether out of
+his body or by turning away and withdrawing from his carnal senses,
+so that he truly knows not as the Apostle said, whether he be in the
+body or out of the body, he is not rapt and caught up into that
+vision.*" [*The text of St. Augustine reads: "when he is rapt," etc.]
+
+_I answer that,_ The Divine essence cannot be seen by man through any
+cognitive power other than the intellect. Now the human intellect
+does not turn to intelligible objects except by means of the
+phantasms [*Cf. I, Q. 84, A. 7] which it takes from the senses
+through the intelligible species; and it is in considering these
+phantasms that the intellect judges of and coordinates sensible
+objects. Hence in any operation that requires abstraction of the
+intellect from phantasms, there must be also withdrawal of the
+intellect from the senses. Now in the state of the wayfarer it is
+necessary for man's intellect, if it see God's essence, to be
+withdrawn from phantasms. For God's essence cannot be seen by means
+of a phantasm, nor indeed by any created intelligible species [*Cf.
+I, Q. 12, A. 2], since God's essence infinitely transcends not only
+all bodies, which are represented by phantasms, but also all
+intelligible creatures. Now when man's intellect is uplifted to the
+sublime vision of God's essence, it is necessary that his mind's
+whole attention should be summoned to that purpose in such a way that
+he understand naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely in
+God. Therefore it is impossible for man while a wayfarer to see God
+in His essence without being withdrawn from his senses.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 3, Obj. 2), after the resurrection,
+in the blessed who see God in His essence, there will be an overflow
+from the intellect to the lower powers and even to the body. Hence it
+is in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision that the soul
+will turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is no
+such overflow in those who are raptured, as stated (A. 3, Obj. 2, ad
+2), and consequently the comparison fails.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The intellect of Christ's soul was glorified by the
+habit of the light of glory, whereby He saw the Divine essence much
+more fully than an angel or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on
+account of the passibility of His body, in respect of which He was
+"made a little lower than the angels" (Heb. 2:9), by dispensation,
+and not on account of any defect on the part of His intellect. Hence
+there is no comparison between Him and other wayfarers.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Paul, after seeing God in His essence, remembered what
+he had known in that vision, by means of certain intelligible species
+that remained in his intellect by way of habit; even as in the
+absence of the sensible object, certain impressions remain in the
+soul which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so this
+was the knowledge that he was unable wholly to think over or express
+in words.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 5]
+
+Whether, While in This State, Paul's Soul Was Wholly Separated from
+His Body?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that, while in this state, Paul's soul was
+wholly separated from his body. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6, 7):
+"While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by
+faith, and not by sight" [*_Per speciem,_ i.e. by an intelligible
+species]. Now, while in that state, Paul was not absent from the
+Lord, for he saw Him by a species, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore
+he was not in the body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a power of the soul cannot be uplifted above the
+soul's essence wherein it is rooted. Now in this rapture the
+intellect, which is a power of the soul, was withdrawn from its
+bodily surroundings through being uplifted to divine contemplation.
+Much more therefore was the essence of the soul separated from the
+body.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the forces of the vegetative soul are more material
+than those of the sensitive soul. Now in order for him to be rapt to
+the vision of God, it was necessary for him to be withdrawn from the
+forces of the sensitive soul, as stated above (A. 4). Much more,
+therefore, was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces
+of the vegetative soul. Now when these forces cease to operate, the
+soul is no longer in any way united to the body. Therefore it would
+seem that in Paul's rapture it was necessary for the soul to be
+wholly separated from the body.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. CXLVII, 13, ad Paulin.; de
+videndo Deum): "It is not incredible that this sublime revelation"
+(namely, that they should see God in His essence) "was vouchsafed
+certain saints, without their departing this life so completely as to
+leave nothing but a corpse for burial." Therefore it was not
+necessary for Paul's soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated
+from his body.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, Obj. 1), in the rapture of
+which we are speaking now, man is uplifted by God's power, "from that
+which is according to nature to that which is above nature."
+Wherefore two things have to be considered: first, what pertains to
+man according to nature; secondly, what has to be done by God in man
+above his nature. Now, since the soul is united to the body as its
+natural form, it belongs to the soul to have a natural disposition to
+understand by turning to phantasms; and this is not withdrawn by the
+divine power from the soul in rapture, since its state undergoes no
+change, as stated above (A. 3, ad 2, 3). Yet, this state remaining,
+actual conversion to phantasms and sensible objects is withdrawn from
+the soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which
+transcends all phantasms, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore it was
+not necessary that his soul in rapture should be so separated from
+the body as to cease to be united thereto as its form; and yet it was
+necessary for his intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms and the
+perception of sensible objects.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In this rapture Paul was absent from the Lord as
+regards his state, since he was still in the state of a wayfarer, but
+not as regards the act by which he saw God by a species, as stated
+above (A. 3, ad 2, 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A faculty of the soul is not uplifted by the natural
+power above the mode becoming the essence of the soul; but it can be
+uplifted by the divine power to something higher, even as a body by
+the violence of a stronger power is lifted up above the place
+befitting it according to its specific nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The forces of the vegetative soul do not operate
+through the soul being intent thereon, as do the sensitive forces,
+but by way of nature. Hence in the case of rapture there is no need
+for withdrawal from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose
+operations would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellective
+knowledge.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 6]
+
+Did Paul Know Whether His Soul Were Separated from His Body?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that Paul was not ignorant whether his
+soul were separated from his body. For he says (2 Cor. 12:2): "I know
+a man in Christ rapt even to the third heaven." Now man denotes
+something composed of soul and body; and rapture differs from death.
+Seemingly therefore he knew that his soul was not separated from his
+body by death, which is the more probable seeing that this is the
+common opinion of the Doctors.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it appears from the same words of the Apostle that
+he knew whither he was rapt, since it was "to the third heaven." Now
+this shows that he knew whether he was in the body or not, for if he
+knew the third heaven to be something corporeal, he must have known
+that his soul was not separated from his body, since a corporeal
+thing cannot be an object of sight save through the body. Therefore
+it would seem that he was not ignorant whether his soul were
+separated from his body.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28) that "when in
+rapture, he saw God with the same vision as the saints see Him in
+heaven." Now from the very fact that the saints see God, they know
+whether their soul is separated from their body. Therefore Paul too
+knew this.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Cor. 12:3): "Whether in the body,
+or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth."
+
+_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question must be gathered
+from the Apostle's very words, whereby he says he knew something,
+namely that he was "rapt even to the third heaven," and that
+something he knew not, namely "whether" he were "in the body or out
+of the body." This may be understood in two ways. First, the words
+"whether in the body or out of the body" may refer not to the very
+being of the man who was rapt (as though he knew not whether his soul
+were in his body or not), but to the mode of rapture, so that he
+ignored whether his body besides his soul, or, on the other hand, his
+soul alone, were rapt to the third heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated
+(Ezech. 8:3) to have been "brought in the vision of God into
+Jerusalem." This was the explanation of a certain Jew according to
+Jerome (Prolog. super Daniel.), where he says that "lastly our
+Apostle" (thus said the Jew) "durst not assert that he was rapt in
+his body, but said: 'Whether in the body or out of the body, I know
+not.'"
+
+Augustine, however, disapproves of this explanation (Gen. ad lit.
+xii, 3 seqq.) for this reason that the Apostle states that he knew he
+was rapt even to the third heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really
+the third heaven to which he was rapt, and not an imaginary likeness
+of the third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third heaven to
+an imaginary third heaven, in the same way he might state that he was
+rapt in the body, meaning, by body, an image of his body, such as
+appears in one's dreams. Now if he knew it to be really the third
+heaven, it follows that either he knew it to be something spiritual
+and incorporeal, and then his body could not be rapt thither; or he
+knew it to be something corporeal, and then his soul could not be
+rapt thither without his body, unless it were separated from his
+body. Consequently we must explain the matter otherwise, by saying
+that the Apostle knew himself to be rapt both in soul and body, but
+that he ignored how his soul stood in relation to his body, to wit,
+whether it were accompanied by his body or not.
+
+Here we find a diversity of opinions. For some say that the Apostle
+knew his soul to be united to his body as its form, but ignored
+whether it were abstracted from its senses, or again whether it were
+abstracted from the operations of the vegetative soul. But he could
+not but know that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that he
+knew himself to be rapt; and as to his being abstracted from the
+operation of the vegetative soul, this was not of such importance as
+to require him to be so careful in mentioning it. It follows, then,
+that the Apostle ignored whether his soul were united to his body as
+its form, or separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this
+say that the Apostle did not consider the matter while he was in
+rapture, because he was wholly intent upon God, but that afterwards
+he questioned the point, when taking cognizance of what he had seen.
+But this also is contrary to the Apostle's words, for he there
+distinguishes between the past and what happened subsequently, since
+he states that at the present time he knows that he was rapt
+"fourteen years ago," and that at the present time he knows not
+"whether he was in the body or out of the body."
+
+Consequently we must assert that both before and after he ignored
+whether his soul were separated from his body. Wherefore Augustine
+(Gen. ad lit. xii, 5), after discussing the question at length,
+concludes: "Perhaps then we must infer that he ignored whether, when
+he was rapt to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the
+same way as the soul is in the body, when we speak of a living body
+either of a waking or of a sleeping man, or of one that is withdrawn
+from his bodily senses during ecstasy), or whether his soul went out
+of his body altogether, so that his body lay dead."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes by the figure of synecdoche a part of man,
+especially the soul which is the principal part, denotes a man. Or
+again we might take this to mean that he whom he states to have been
+rapt was a man not at the time of his rapture, but fourteen years
+afterwards: for he says "I know a man," not "I know a rapt man."
+Again nothing hinders death brought about by God being called
+rapture; and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3): "If the
+Apostle doubted the matter, who of us will dare to be certain about
+it?" Wherefore those who have something to say on this subject speak
+with more conjecture than certainty.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle knew that either the heaven in question was
+something incorporeal, or that he saw something incorporeal in that
+heaven; yet this could be done by his intellect, even without his
+soul being separated from his body.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Paul's vision, while he was in rapture, was like the
+vision of the blessed in one respect, namely as to the thing seen;
+and, unlike, in another respect, namely as to the mode of seeing,
+because he saw not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence
+Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 36): "Although, when the Apostle
+was rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he lacked that
+full and perfect knowledge of things which is in the angels, in that
+he knew not whether he was in the body, or out of the body, this will
+surely not be lacking after reunion with the body in the resurrection
+of the dead, when this corruptible will put on incorruption."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 176
+
+OF THE GRACE OF TONGUES
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider those gratuitous graces that pertain to speech,
+and (1) the grace of tongues; (2) the grace of the word of wisdom and
+knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether by the grace of tongues a man acquires the knowledge of
+all languages?
+
+(2) Of the comparison between this gift and the grace of prophecy.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 176, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Those Who Received the Gift of Tongues Spoke in Every
+Language?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that those who received the gift of tongues did
+not speak in every language. For that which is granted to certain
+persons by the divine power is the best of its kind: thus our Lord
+turned the water into good wine, as stated in John 2:10. Now those
+who had the gift of tongues spoke better in their own language; since
+a gloss on Heb. 1, says that "it is not surprising that the epistle
+to the Hebrews is more graceful in style than the other epistles,
+since it is natural for a man to have more command over his own than
+over a strange language. For the Apostle wrote the other epistles in
+a foreign, namely the Greek, idiom; whereas he wrote this in the
+Hebrew tongue." Therefore the apostles did not receive the knowledge
+of all languages by a gratuitous grace.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one is
+sufficient; and much less does God Whose work is more orderly than
+nature's. Now God could make His disciples to be understood by all,
+while speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on Acts 2:6, "Every man
+heard them speak in his own tongue," says that "they spoke in every
+tongue, or speaking in their own, namely the Hebrew language, were
+understood by all, as though they spoke the language proper to each."
+Therefore it would seem that they had not the knowledge to speak in
+all languages.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all graces flow from Christ to His body, which is
+the Church, according to John 1:16, "Of His fullness we all have
+received." Now we do not read that Christ spoke more than one
+language, nor does each one of the faithful now speak save in one
+tongue. Therefore it would seem that Christ's disciples did not
+receive the grace to the extent of speaking in all languages.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 2:4) that "they were all
+filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers
+tongues, according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak"; on which
+passage a gloss of Gregory [*Hom. xxx in Ev.] says that "the Holy
+Ghost appeared over the disciples under the form of fiery tongues,
+and gave them the knowledge of all tongues."
+
+_I answer that,_ Christ's first disciples were chosen by Him in order
+that they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His
+faith everywhere, according to Matt. 28:19, "Going . . . teach ye all
+nations." Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to
+teach others should need to be taught by others, either as to how
+they should speak to other people, or as to how they were to
+understand those who spoke to them; and all the more seeing that
+those who were being sent were of one nation, that of Judea,
+according to Isa. 27:6, "When they shall rush out from Jacob [*Vulg.:
+'When they shall rush in unto Jacob,' etc.] . . . they shall fill
+the face of the world with seed." Moreover those who were being sent
+were poor and powerless; nor at the outset could they have easily
+found someone to interpret their words faithfully to others, or to
+explain what others said to them, especially as they were sent to
+unbelievers. Consequently it was necessary, in this respect, that God
+should provide them with the gift of tongues; in order that, as the
+diversity of tongues was brought upon the nations when they fell away
+to idolatry, according to Gen. 11, so when the nations were to be
+recalled to the worship of one God a remedy to this diversity might
+be applied by the gift of tongues.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As it is written (1 Cor. 12:7), "the manifestation of
+the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and consequently both
+Paul and the other apostles were divinely instructed in the languages
+of all nations sufficiently for the requirements of the teaching of
+the faith. But as regards the grace and elegance of style which human
+art adds to a language, the Apostle was instructed in his own, but
+not in a foreign tongue. Even so they were sufficiently instructed in
+wisdom and scientific knowledge, as required for teaching the faith,
+but not as to all things known by acquired science, for instance the
+conclusions of arithmetic and geometry.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although either was possible, namely that, while
+speaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they
+should speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should
+speak in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection of
+their knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also
+to understand what was said by others. Whereas if their one language
+were intelligible to all, this would either have been due to the
+knowledge of those who understood their speech, or it would have
+amounted to an illusion, since a man's words would have had a
+different sound in another's ears, from that with which they were
+uttered. Hence a gloss says on Acts 2:6 that "it was a greater
+miracle that they should speak all kinds of tongues"; and Paul says
+(1 Cor. 14:18): "I thank my God I speak with all your tongues."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Christ in His own person purposed preaching to only one
+nation, namely the Jews. Consequently, although without any doubt He
+possessed most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there was no
+need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore, as Augustine
+says (Tract. xxxii in Joan.), "whereas even now the Holy Ghost is
+received, yet no one speaks in the tongues of all nations, because
+the Church herself already speaks the languages of all nations: since
+whoever is not in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 176, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Gift of Tongues Is More Excellent Than the Grace of Prophecy?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent
+than the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper
+to better persons, according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now
+the gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing in
+the sequence of Pentecost [*The sequence: _Sancti Spiritus adsit
+nobis gratia_ ascribed to King Robert of France, the reputed author
+of the _Veni Sancte Spiritus._ Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI]: "On
+this day Thou gavest Christ's apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to
+all time": whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament,
+according to Heb. 1:1, "God Who at sundry times and in divers manners
+spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets." Therefore it
+would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift
+of prophecy.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that whereby we are directed to God is seemingly
+more excellent than that whereby we are directed to men. Now, by the
+gift of tongues, man is directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is
+directed to man; for it is written (1 Cor. 14:2, 3): "He that
+speaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . but
+he that prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto edification." Therefore
+it would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the
+gift of prophecy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the gift of tongues abides like a habit in the
+person who has it, and "he can use it when he will"; wherefore it is
+written (1 Cor. 14:18): "I thank my God I speak with all your
+tongues." But it is not so with the gift of prophecy, as stated above
+(Q. 171, A. 2). Therefore the gift of tongues would seem to be more
+excellent than the gift of prophecy.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the "interpretation of speeches" would seem to be
+contained under prophecy, because the Scriptures are expounded by the
+same Spirit from Whom they originated. Now the interpretation of
+speeches is placed after "divers kinds of tongues" (1 Cor. 12:10).
+Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than
+the gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part of the latter.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:5): "Greater is he
+that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues."
+
+_I answer that,_ The gift of prophecy surpasses the gift of tongues,
+in three ways. First, because the gift of tongues regards the
+utterance of certain words, which signify an intelligible truth, and
+this again is signified by the phantasms which appear in an imaginary
+vision; wherefore Augustine compares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 8) the gift
+of tongues to an imaginary vision. On the other hand, it has been
+stated above (Q. 173, A. 2) that the gift of prophecy consists in the
+mind itself being enlightened so as to know an intelligible truth.
+Wherefore, as the prophetic enlightenment is more excellent than the
+imaginary vision, as stated above (Q. 174, A. 2), so also is prophecy
+more excellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself.
+Secondly, because the gift of prophecy regards the knowledge of
+things, which is more excellent than the knowledge of words, to which
+the gift of tongues pertains.
+
+Thirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more profitable. The Apostle
+proves this in three ways (1 Cor. 14); first, because prophecy is
+more profitable to the edification of the Church, for which purpose
+he that speaketh in tongues profiteth nothing, unless interpretation
+follow (1 Cor. 14:4, 5). Secondly, as regards the speaker himself,
+for if he be enabled to speak in divers tongues without understanding
+them, which pertains to the gift of prophecy, his own mind would not
+be edified (1 Cor. 14:7-14). Thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose
+especial benefit the gift of tongues seems to have been given; since
+perchance they might think those who speak in tongues to be mad (1
+Cor. 14:23), for instance the Jews deemed the apostles drunk when the
+latter spoke in various tongues (Acts 2:13): whereas by prophecies
+the unbeliever is convinced, because the secrets of his heart are
+made manifest (Acts 2:25).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 174, A. 3, ad 1), it belongs to the
+excellence of prophecy that a man is not only enlightened by an
+intelligible light, but also that he should perceive an imaginary
+vision: and so again it belongs to the perfection of the Holy Ghost's
+operation, not only to fill the mind with the prophetic light, and
+the imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in the Old
+Testament, but also to endow the tongue with external erudition, in
+the utterance of various signs of speech. All this is done in the New
+Testament, according to 1 Cor. 14:26, "Every one of you hath a psalm,
+hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation," i.e. a prophetic
+revelation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: By the gift of prophecy man is directed to God in his
+mind, which is more excellent than being directed to Him in his
+tongue. "He that speaketh in a tongue" is said to speak "not unto
+men," i.e. to men's understanding or profit, but unto God's
+understanding and praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is
+directed both to God and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect
+gift.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Prophetic revelation extends to the knowledge of all
+things supernatural; wherefore from its very perfection it results
+that in this imperfect state of life it cannot be had perfectly by
+way of habit, but only imperfectly by way of passion. On the other
+hand, the gift of tongues is confined to a certain particular
+knowledge, namely of human words; wherefore it is not inconsistent
+with the imperfection of this life, that it should be had perfectly
+and by way of habit.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The interpretation of speeches is reducible to the gift
+of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened so as to understand
+and explain any obscurities of speech arising either from a
+difficulty in the things signified, or from the words uttered being
+unknown, or from the figures of speech employed, according to Dan.
+5:16, "I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret obscure
+things, and resolve difficult things." Hence the interpretation of
+speeches is more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from
+the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 14:5), "Greater is he that
+prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues; unless perhaps he
+interpret." Yet the interpretation of speeches is placed after the
+gift of tongues, because the interpretation of speeches extends even
+to the interpretation of divers kinds of tongues.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 177
+
+OF THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of
+which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit is
+given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge." Under
+this head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?
+
+(2) To whom is the grace becoming?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 177, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Any Gratuitous Grace Attaches to Words?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a gratuitous grace does not attach to
+words. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of
+nature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a
+man is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade, as
+Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the
+grace of words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of words is
+not a gratuitous grace.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the
+Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech, but
+in power." Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with
+words.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no grace is given through merit, since "if by grace,
+it is not now of works" (Rom. 11:6). But the word is sometimes given
+to a man on his merits. For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in
+explanation of Ps. 118:43, "Take not Thou the word of truth utterly
+out of my mouth" that "the word of truth is that which Almighty God
+gives to them that do it, and takes away from them that do it not."
+Therefore it would seem that the gift of the word is not a gratuitous
+grace.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it behooves man to declare in words things
+pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to
+the gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom
+and the word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of
+faith should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 6:5): "A gracious tongue in
+a good man shall abound [Vulg.: 'aboundeth']." Now man's goodness is
+by grace. Therefore graciousness in words is also by grace.
+
+_I answer that,_ The gratuitous graces are given for the profit of
+others, as stated above (I-II, Q. 111, AA. 1, 4). Now the knowledge a
+man receives from God cannot be turned to another's profit, except by
+means of speech. And since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything
+that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the
+members of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not only
+speaks so as to be understood by different people, which pertains to
+the gift of tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains
+to the grace _of the word._
+
+This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the
+intellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as _to teach._
+Secondly, in order to move the affections, so that a man willingly
+hearkens to the word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as
+_to please_ his hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but
+in order to draw them to listen to God's word. Thirdly, in order that
+men may love that which is signified by the word, and desire to
+fulfill it, and this is the case when a man so speaks as _to sway_
+his hearers. In order to effect this the Holy Ghost makes use of the
+human tongue as of an instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work
+within. Hence Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (Hom. xxx in
+Ev.): "Unless the Holy Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain
+does the voice of the teacher resound in the ears of the body."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a more
+excellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the
+Holy Ghost effects more excellently by the grace of words that which
+art can effect in a less efficient manner.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the word that relies
+on human eloquence without the power of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore he
+says just before (1 Cor. 4:19): "I . . . will know, not the speech of
+them that are puffed up, but the power": and of himself he had
+already said (1 Cor. 2:4): "My speech and my preaching was not in the
+persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit
+and power."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, the grace of the word is given to a
+man for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes through
+the fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the
+speaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this grace
+directly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying
+grace also is withdrawn on account of a person's fault, and yet he
+does not merit it by his good works, which, however, remove the
+obstacles to grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As stated above, the grace of the word is directed to
+the profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith to others
+this is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence Augustine says
+(De Trin. xiv, 1) that "to know how faith may profit the godly and be
+defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the Apostle means by
+knowledge." Hence it was not necessary for him to mention the word of
+faith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the word of knowledge
+and of wisdom.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 177, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Grace of the Word of Wisdom and Knowledge Is Becoming to
+Women?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of the word of wisdom and
+knowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to
+this grace, as stated in the foregoing Article. Now it is becoming to
+a woman to teach; for it is written (Prov. 4:3, 4): "I was an only
+son in the sight of my mother, and she taught me [*Vulg.: 'I was my
+father's son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother.
+And he taught me.']." Therefore this grace is becoming to women.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the grace of prophecy is greater than the grace of
+the word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than its
+utterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah
+(Judges 4:4), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4
+Kings 22:14), and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts 21:9).
+Moreover the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:5): "Every woman praying or
+prophesying," etc. Much more therefore would it seem that the grace
+of the word is becoming to a woman.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet. 4:10): "As every man hath
+received grace ministering the same one to another." Now some women
+receive the grace of wisdom and knowledge, which they cannot minister
+to others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the
+word is becoming to women.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34): "Let women keep
+silence in the churches," and (1 Tim. 2:12): "I suffer not a woman to
+teach." Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word.
+Therefore the grace of the word is not becoming to women.
+
+_I answer that,_ Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way
+privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this
+respect the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another
+way, publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this is
+not permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the
+condition attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be
+subject to man, as appears from Gen. 3:16. Now teaching and
+persuading publicly in the church belong not to subjects but to the
+prelates (although men who are subjects may do these things if they
+be so commissioned, because their subjection is not a result of their
+natural sex, as it is with women, but of some thing supervening by
+accident). Secondly, lest men's minds be enticed to lust, for it is
+written (Ecclus. 9:11): "Her conversation burneth as fire." Thirdly,
+because as a rule women are not perfected in wisdom, so as to be fit
+to be intrusted with public teaching.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks of private teaching whereby a
+father instructs his son.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The grace of prophecy consists in God enlightening the
+mind, on the part of which there is no difference of sex among men,
+according to Col. 3:10, 11, "Putting on the new" man, "him who is
+renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that created
+him, where there is neither male nor female [*Vulg.: 'Neither Gentile
+nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian,
+bond nor free.' Cf. I, Q. 93, A. 6, ad 2 footnote]." Now the grace of
+the word pertains to the instruction of men among whom the difference
+of sex is found. Hence the comparison fails.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The recipients of a divinely conferred grace administer
+it in different ways according to their various conditions. Hence
+women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can
+administer it by teaching privately but not publicly.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 178
+
+OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there
+are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?
+
+(2) To whom is it becoming?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 178, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Is a Gratuitous Grace of Working Miracles?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no gratuitous grace is directed to
+the working of miracles. For every grace puts something in the one to
+whom it is given (Cf. I-II, Q. 90, A. 1). Now the working of miracles
+puts nothing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles
+are wrought at the touch even of a dead body. Thus we read (4 Kings
+13:21) that "some . . . cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus.
+And when it had touched the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life,
+and stood upon his feet." Therefore the working of miracles does not
+belong to a gratuitous grace.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost,
+according to 1 Cor. 12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the
+same Spirit." Now the working of miracles is effected even by the
+unclean spirit, according to Matt. 24:24, "There shall arise false
+Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders."
+Therefore it would seem that the working of miracles does not belong
+to a gratuitous grace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, miracles are divided into "signs," "wonders" or
+"portents," and "virtues." [*Cf. 2 Thess. 2:9, where the Douay
+version renders _virtus_ by "power." The use of the word "virtue" in
+the sense of a miracle is now obsolete, and the generic term
+"miracle" is elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 1 Cor. 12:10, 28; Heb.
+2:4; Acts 2:22]. Therefore it is unreasonable to reckon the "working
+of miracles" a gratuitous grace, any more than the "working of signs"
+and "wonders."
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the miraculous restoring to health is done by the
+power of God. Therefore the grace of healing should not be
+distinguished from the working of miracles.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the working of miracles results from faith--either
+of the worker, according to 1 Cor. 13:2, "If I should have all faith,
+so that I could remove mountains," or of other persons for whose sake
+miracles are wrought, according to Matt. 13:58, "And He wrought not
+many miracles there, because of their unbelief." Therefore, if faith
+be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superfluous to reckon in
+addition the working of signs as another gratuitous grace.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:9, 10) says that among
+other gratuitous graces, "to another" is given "the grace of healing
+. . . to another, the working of miracles."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 177, A. 1), the Holy Ghost
+provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto
+salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous graces are directed. Now
+just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be
+brought to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and
+the grace of the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed
+in order that it be rendered credible. This is done by the working of
+miracles, according to Mk. 16:20, "And confirming the word with signs
+that followed": and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive
+at the intelligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore
+just as man led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some
+knowledge of God through His natural effects, so is he brought to a
+certain degree of supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by
+certain supernatural effects which are called miracles. Therefore the
+working of miracles belongs to a gratuitous grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known
+supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that
+can be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine
+omnipotence which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is
+impossible for the principle of working miracles to be a quality
+abiding as a habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as the
+prophet's mind is moved by divine inspiration to know something
+supernaturally, so too is it possible for the mind of the miracle
+worker to be moved to do something resulting in the miraculous effect
+which God causes by His power. Sometimes this takes place after
+prayer, as when Peter raised to life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40):
+sometimes without any previous prayer being expressed, as when Peter
+by upbraiding the lying Ananias and Saphira delivered them to death
+(Acts 5:4, 9). Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 30) that "the saints
+work miracles, sometimes by authority, sometimes by prayer." In
+either case, however, God is the principal worker, for He uses
+instrumentally either man's inward movement, or his speech, or some
+outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a dead body. Thus
+when Josue had said as though authoritatively (Josh. 10:12): "Move
+not, O sun, toward Gabaon," it is said afterwards (Josh. 10:14):
+"There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying the
+voice of a man."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be
+wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (2
+Thess. 2:9) that the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the
+working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." To
+quote the words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), "it is a matter of
+debate whether they are called signs and lying wonders, because he
+will deceive the senses of mortals by imaginary visions, in that he
+will seem to do what he does not, or because, though they be real
+wonders, they will seduce into falsehood them that believe." They are
+said to be real, because the things themselves will be real, just as
+Pharaoh's magicians made real frogs and real serpents; but they will
+not be real miracles, because they will be done by the power of
+natural causes, as stated in the First Part (Q. 114, A. 4); whereas
+the working of miracles which is ascribed to a gratuitous grace, is
+done by God's power for man's profit.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Two things may be considered in miracles. One is that
+which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature,
+and in this respect miracles are called "virtues." The other thing is
+the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation
+of something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly
+called "signs": but on account of some excellence they receive the
+name of "wonder" or "prodigy," as showing something from afar
+(_procul_).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The "grace of healing" is mentioned separately, because
+by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on man in
+addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely the
+bringing of men to the knowledge of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for two
+reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of faith,
+secondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence on which faith
+relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the grace
+of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the faith,
+so too is the grace of miracles necessary that people may be
+confirmed in their faith.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 178, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Wicked Can Work Miracles?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For
+miracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1).
+Now the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to John 9:31,
+"We know that God doth not hear sinners," and Prov. 28:9, "He that
+turneth away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an
+abomination." Therefore it would seem that the wicked cannot work
+miracles.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to Matt.
+17:19, "If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to
+this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove." Now
+"faith without works is dead," according to James 2:20, so that,
+seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would
+seem that the wicked, since they do not good works, cannot work
+miracles.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to Heb.
+2:4, "God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and divers
+miracles": wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain
+persons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear
+witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men
+cannot work miracles.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the good are more closely united to God than the
+wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore do
+the wicked.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should have
+all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I
+am nothing." Now whosoever has not charity is wicked, because "this
+gift alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the
+kingdom from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin.
+xv, 18). Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work
+miracles.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds,
+because they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while
+others are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true
+miracle, because they are done by the power of some natural cause.
+Both of these can be done by the demons, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2).
+
+True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God
+works them for man's benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for
+the confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a
+person's holiness, which God desires to propose as an example of
+virtue. In the first way miracles can be wrought by any one who
+preaches the true faith and calls upon Christ's name, as even the
+wicked do sometimes. In this way even the wicked can work miracles.
+Hence Jerome commenting on Matt. 7:22, "Have not we prophesied in Thy
+name?" says: "Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the
+casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do
+these things, but to the invoking of Christ's name, that men may
+honor God, by invoking Whom such great miracles are wrought."
+
+In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints,
+since it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought
+during their lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by
+others. For we read (Acts 19:11, 12) that "God wrought by the hand of
+Paul . . . miracles" and "even there were brought from his body to
+the sick, handkerchiefs . . . and the diseases departed from them."
+In this way indeed there is nothing to prevent a sinner from working
+miracles by invoking a saint; but the miracle is ascribed not to him,
+but to the one in proof of whose holiness such things are done.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 83, A. 16) when we were treating of
+prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but on God's
+mercy, which extends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers even
+of sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says (Tract.
+xliv in Joan.) that "the blind man spoke these words before he was
+anointed," that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; "since God
+does hear sinners." When it is said that the prayer of one who hears
+not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the
+sinner's merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for
+the spiritual welfare of the one who prays--as the publican was heard
+(Luke 18:14)--or for the good of others and for God's glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Faith without works is said to be dead, as regards the
+believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace. But
+nothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead
+instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while
+employing instrumentally the faith of a sinner.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose for
+which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine
+never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although
+sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ's name which they
+invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If
+they teach a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as
+confirming their teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness.
+Hence Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): "Magicians work miracles
+in one way, good Christians in another, wicked Christians in another.
+Magicians by private compact with the demons, good Christians by
+their manifest righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of
+righteousness."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), "the reason
+why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most baneful
+error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply greater
+gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is
+obtained."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 179
+
+OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must next consider active and contemplative life. This
+consideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into
+active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the
+active life; (4) Of the comparison between the active and the
+contemplative life.
+
+Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
+
+(2) Whether this is an adequate division?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 179, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Life Is Fittingly Divided into Active and Contemplative?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into
+active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by
+its essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in
+living things to live is to be." Now the soul is the principle of
+action and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that
+life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is
+unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and
+contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of
+the intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to
+understand," since "to live" comes first to living things through the
+vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4).
+Therefore life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to
+Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in
+rest, according to Wis. 8:16: "When I enter into my house, I shall
+repose myself with her." Therefore it would seem that life is
+unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): "There is a
+twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the
+active life and the contemplative."
+
+_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, those things are said to live
+whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which
+is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which
+is most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing
+gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it,
+and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to
+consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in
+sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding
+and acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of
+every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on
+which he is most intent; thus especially does he wish "to associate
+with his friends" (Ethic. ix, 12).
+
+Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the
+contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on
+external actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided
+into active and contemplative.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Each thing's proper form that makes it actually _to be_
+is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence _to live_ is,
+in living things, _to be,_ because living things through having
+_being_ from their form, act in such and such a way.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Life in general is not divided into active and
+contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from
+having an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect
+and human life.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external
+movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the
+intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement;
+in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation
+and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is
+defined "the act of a perfect thing." In this way Dionysius (Div.
+Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation,
+namely, "straight," "circular," and "oblique" [*Cf. Q. 180, A. 6].
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 179, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Life Is Adequately Divided into Active and Contemplative?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into
+active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that
+there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure,"
+the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the
+"contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and
+contemplative would seem to be inadequate.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1, 2, 3, 19) mentions
+three kinds of life, namely the life of "leisure" which pertains to
+the contemplative, the "busy" life which pertains to the active, and
+a third "composed of both." Therefore it would seem that life is
+inadequately divided into active and contemplative.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man's life is diversified according to the divers
+actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two
+occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life
+should be divided into more kinds than the active and the
+contemplative.
+
+_On the contrary,_ These two lives are signified by the two wives of
+Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the
+two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the
+active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom. xiv
+in Ezech.]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were
+more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active
+and contemplative.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), this division applies
+to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is
+divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective
+knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to
+the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains
+to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is
+adequately divided into active and contemplative.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures
+of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. _Ethic._ i, 5), it is the life "of a beast."
+Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into
+active and contemplative.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore
+it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale
+in white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise
+that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one
+of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life
+sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All the occupations of human actions, if
+directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right
+reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities
+of the present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the
+other hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong
+to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life.
+Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of
+truth belong to the contemplative life.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 180
+
+OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there
+are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or
+also to the affections?
+
+(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
+
+(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in
+several?
+
+(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the
+contemplative life?
+
+(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to
+the vision of God?
+
+(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div.
+Nom. iv);
+
+(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;
+
+(8) Of the duration of contemplation.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Contemplative Life Has Nothing to Do with the Affections,
+and Pertains Wholly to the Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to
+do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the
+Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that "the end
+of contemplation is truth." Now truth pertains wholly to the
+intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly
+regards the intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.)
+that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or
+rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from _rah_ and _irzn_;
+Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.], signifies the contemplative life." Now the
+vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore
+the contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to
+the contemplative life, "to rest from external action." Now the
+affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore
+it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the
+appetitive power.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
+contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God
+and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator." Now
+desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 26, A. 2). Therefore the
+contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or
+appetitive power.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) theirs is said to be
+the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of
+truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (I-II, Q.
+12, A. 1), because intention is of the end which is the object of the
+will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of
+the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive
+cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which
+moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as
+stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1).
+
+Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the
+senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen
+because, as it is written (Matt. 6:21), "where thy treasure is, there
+is thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one
+acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative
+life to consist in the "love of God," inasmuch as through loving God
+we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when
+he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life
+terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the
+result being that love also becomes more intense.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of
+contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable
+and delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive
+power.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: We are urged to the vision of the first
+principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says
+(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life tramples on all
+cares and longs to see the face of its Creator."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The appetitive power moves not only the bodily
+members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to
+practice the act of contemplation, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Contemplative Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the
+contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
+contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor
+with the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are
+prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of
+God and of our neighbor, for "love . . . is the fulfilling of the
+Law" (Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues
+belong to the contemplative life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the
+contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
+mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its
+Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart,
+which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf. Q. 8, A. 7]. For it is
+written (Matt. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall
+see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness,
+without which no man shall see God." Therefore it would seem that the
+moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
+contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is
+signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gen. 29:17) that she was "of
+a beautiful countenance." Now the beauty of the soul consists in the
+moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
+43, 45, 46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the
+contemplative life.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The moral virtues are directed to external
+actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. A. 1,
+Obj. 3]) that it belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from
+external action." Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the
+contemplative life.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two
+ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong
+to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the
+contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the
+Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which pertains to the
+consideration of truth, "has little influence on the moral virtues":
+wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to
+active but not to contemplative happiness.
+
+On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life
+dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the
+contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the
+impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's intention from
+intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the
+moral virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the
+disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong
+dispositively to the contemplative life.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the contemplative life has its
+motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the
+love of God and our neighbor is requisite to the contemplative life.
+Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but
+dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral
+virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues
+that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the
+reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations,
+according to Isa. 32:17, "The work of justice shall be peace": since
+he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of
+quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the
+contemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of heart.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Beauty, as stated above (Q. 145, A. 2), consists in a
+certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found
+radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty
+seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to
+reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the
+reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence;
+wherefore it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I
+became a lover of her beauty."
+
+On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation,
+in so far as they participate in the order of reason; and especially
+is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which
+especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of
+chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal
+pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as
+Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10).
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 3]
+
+Whether There Are Various Actions Pertaining to the Contemplative
+Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining
+to the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat.
+Contempl. i, 3, 4] distinguishes between "contemplation,"
+"meditation,"    and "cogitation." Yet all these apparently pertain
+to contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there are various
+actions pertaining to the contemplative life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): "But we . . .
+beholding (_speculantes_) the glory of the Lord with open face, are
+transformed into the same clarity [*Vulg.: 'into the same image from
+glory to glory.']." Now this belongs to the contemplative life.
+Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision (_speculatio_)
+belongs to the contemplative life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first and
+greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty." Now according
+to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear.
+Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the
+contemplative life.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, "Prayer," "reading," and "meditation" [*Hugh of St.
+Victor, Alleg. in N.T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the
+contemplative life. Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative
+life: since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is
+signified) "sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Luke
+10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for
+the contemplative life.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Life signifies here the operation on which a man
+is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the
+contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative
+lives.
+
+_I answer that,_ We are now speaking of the contemplative life as
+applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between
+man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the
+truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception
+of a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly,
+then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally
+completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it
+derives its unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this
+final act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles, from
+which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned
+with deducing from the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which
+is sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself
+of the truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation" would
+seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a
+person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may
+comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance
+of certain effects, but also the imaginations. And again the reason's
+discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the
+truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7),
+cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect.
+"Meditation" would seem to be the process of reason from certain
+principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and
+"consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De
+Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
+1), every operation of the intellect may be called "consideration."
+But "contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth;
+wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that
+"contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object
+of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in
+searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is
+prone to wander."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of Augustine
+on this passage, "beholding" (_speculatio_) denotes "seeing in a
+mirror (_speculo_), not from a watch-tower (_specula_)." Now to see a
+thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its
+likeness is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible
+to meditation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the
+apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it
+results from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was
+stated above (A. 1) that contemplation terminates in the affections.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First,
+by means of things received from another. In this way, as regards the
+things he receives from God, he needs _prayer,_ according to Wis.
+7:7, "I called upon" God, "and the spirit of wisdom came upon me":
+while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs _hearing,_
+in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and _reading,_ in so
+far as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ. Secondly, he
+needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires
+_meditation._
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Contemplative Life Consists in the Mere Contemplation of
+God, or Also in the Consideration of Any Truth Whatever?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not
+only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of
+any truth. For it is written (Ps. 138:14): "Wonderful are Thy works,
+and my soul knoweth right well." Now the knowledge of God's works is
+effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem
+that it pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only
+the divine truth, but also any other.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "contemplation
+consists in admiration first of God's majesty, secondly of His
+judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises." Now of
+these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the other
+three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life
+consists not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also
+in the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 6]
+distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to "the
+imagination alone," and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The
+second is in "the imagination guided by reason," and consists in
+considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third
+is in "the reason based on the imagination"; when, to wit, from the
+consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is
+in "the reason and conducted by the reason," when the mind is intent
+on things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The
+fifth is "above the reason," but not contrary to reason, when by
+divine revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be
+comprehended by the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and
+contrary to reason"; when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know
+things that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of
+the mystery of the Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to
+pertain to the divine truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth
+regards not only the divine truth, but also that which is considered
+in creatures.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of truth
+is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a
+perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life
+consists in the contemplation of any truth.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in
+contemplation we seek the principle which is God."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a thing may belong to the
+contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or
+dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative
+life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this
+contemplation is the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine
+says (De Trin. i, 8) that "the contemplation of God is promised us as
+being the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of
+our joys." This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come,
+when we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make us
+perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is
+competent to us imperfectly, namely "through a glass" and "in a dark
+manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate
+beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life to
+come; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's ultimate
+happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.
+
+Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation
+of God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20, "The invisible things of
+God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
+made," it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also
+belongs to the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby
+to the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix)
+that "in the study of creatures we must not exercise an empty and
+futile curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things
+unperishable and everlasting."
+
+Accordingly it is clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2, 3) that
+four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life;
+first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of
+contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects;
+fourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation of the
+divine truth itself.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: David sought the knowledge of God's works, so that he
+might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps. 142:5,
+6): "I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy
+hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: By considering the divine judgments man is guided to
+the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the
+divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's
+mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be
+vouchsafed.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by means
+of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists
+in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step
+consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the
+third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible
+things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible
+objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is
+the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable
+by means of sensibles, but which the reason is able to grasp; the
+sixth step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the
+reason can neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime
+contemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately
+perfected.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the
+divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to
+the divine truth.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 5]
+
+Whether in the Present State of Life the Contemplative Life Can Reach
+to the Vision of the Divine Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the present state of life the
+contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence.
+For, as stated in Gen. 32:30, Jacob said: "I have seen God face to
+face, and my soul has been saved." Now the vision of God's face is
+the vision of the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the
+present life one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in
+His essence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "contemplative men
+withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things, nor
+do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if
+these follow them they prudently drive them away: but being desirous
+of seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of
+their limited comprehension, and through longing to reach what is
+above them, they overcome that which they are." Now man is not
+hindered from seeing the Divine essence, which is the
+incomprehensible light, save by the necessity of turning to corporeal
+phantasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of the
+present life can extend to the vision of the incomprehensible light
+in its essence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): "All creatures are
+small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of
+God," the blessed Benedict, to wit, "saw a fiery globe in the tower
+and angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such
+things by the light of God." Now the blessed Benedict was still in
+this life. Therefore the contemplation of the present life can extend
+to the vision of the essence of God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "As long as we
+live in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of
+contemplation as to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of
+incomprehensible light."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), "no one
+seeing God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have
+their play: and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by
+going altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal
+senses, he is not caught up into that vision." This has been
+carefully discussed above (Q. 175, AA. 4, 5), where we spoke of
+rapture, and in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 2), where we treated of the
+vision of God.
+
+Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways.
+First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually making use of
+the bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can
+nowise attain to the vision of God's essence. Secondly, one may be in
+this life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say,
+when the soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as to
+make use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination,
+as happens in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the
+present life can attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
+Consequently the highest degree of contemplation in the present life
+is that which Paul had in rapture, whereby he was in a middle state
+between the present life and the life to come.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad Caium. Monach.), "if anyone
+seeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but
+something belonging to God." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.):
+"By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul sees
+something of lower degree, and is thereby refreshed so that
+afterwards it may attain to the glory of vision." Accordingly the
+words of Jacob, "I saw God face to face" do not imply that he saw
+God's essence, but that he saw some shape [*Cf. I, Q. 12, A. 11, ad
+1], imaginary of course, wherein God spoke to him. Or, "since we know
+a man by his face, by the face of God he signified his knowledge of
+Him," according to a gloss of Gregory on the same passage.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the present state of life human contemplation is
+impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see
+the intelligible species in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states
+(De Anima iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the
+phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of
+the intelligible truth: and this not only in natural knowledge, but
+also in that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius says (Coel.
+Hier. i) that "the Divine glory shows us the angelic hierarchies
+under certain symbolic figures, and by its power we are brought back
+to the single ray of light," i.e. to the simple knowledge of the
+intelligible truth. It is in this sense that we must understand the
+statement of Gregory that "contemplatives do not carry along with
+them the shadows of things corporeal," since their contemplation is
+not fixed on them, but on the consideration of the intelligible truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: By these words Gregory does not imply that the blessed
+Benedict, in that vision, saw God in His essence, but he wishes to
+show that because "all creatures are small to him that sees God," it
+follows that all things can easily be seen through the enlightenment
+of the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: "For however little he may
+see of the Creator's light, all created things become petty to him."
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Operation of Contemplation Is Fittingly Divided into a
+Threefold Movement, Circular, Straight and Oblique?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the operation of contemplation is
+unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, "circular,"
+"straight," and "oblique" (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation pertains
+exclusively to rest, according to Wis. 8:16, "When I go into my
+house, I shall repose myself with her." Now movement is opposed to
+rest. Therefore the operations of the contemplative life should not
+be described as movements.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the
+intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes
+these movements as being different in the angels from what they are
+in the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "circular" movement
+in the angel is "according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and
+the good." On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the
+soul to several things: the first of which is the "withdrawal of the
+soul into itself from externals"; the second is "a certain
+concentration of its powers, whereby it is rendered free of error and
+of outward occupation"; and the third is "union with those things
+that are above it." Again, he describes differently their respective
+straight movements. For he says that the straight movement of the
+angel is that by which he proceeds to the care of those things that
+are beneath him. On the other hand, he describes the straight
+movement of the soul as being twofold: first, "its progress towards
+things that are near it"; secondly, "its uplifting from external
+things to simple contemplation." Further, he assigns a different
+oblique movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the
+angels to the fact that "while providing for those who have less they
+remain unchanged in relation to God": whereas he assigns the oblique
+movement of the soul to the fact that "the soul is enlightened in
+Divine knowledge by reasoning and discoursing." Therefore it would
+seem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned
+according to the ways mentioned above.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl. i, 5) mentions
+many other different movements in likeness to the birds of the air.
+"For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another
+swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the
+right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag
+behind many times; others fly in a circle now more now less extended;
+and others remain suspended almost immovably in one place." Therefore
+it would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 119, A. 1, ad 3), the operation
+of the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists, is
+called a movement, in so far as movement is the act of a perfect
+thing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 1). Since,
+however, it is through sensible objects that we come to the knowledge
+of intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take
+place without movement, the result is that even intelligible
+operations are described as movements, and are differentiated in
+likeness to various movements. Now of bodily movements, local
+movements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in _Phys._
+viii, 7; wherefore the foremost among intelligible operations are
+described by being likened to them. These movements are of three
+kinds; for there is the "circular" movement, by which a thing moves
+uniformly round one point as center, another is the "straight"
+movement, by which a thing goes from one point to another; the third
+is "oblique," being composed as it were of both the others.
+Consequently, in intelligible operations, that which is simply
+uniform is compared to circular movement; the intelligible operation
+by which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the
+straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites
+something of uniformity with progress to various points is compared
+to the oblique movement.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: External bodily movements are opposed to the quiet of
+contemplation, which consists in rest from outward occupations: but
+the movements of intellectual operations belong to the quiet of
+contemplation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Man is like the angels in intellect generically, but
+the intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man.
+Consequently these movements must be ascribed to souls and angels in
+different ways, according as they are differently related to
+uniformity. For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two
+respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from
+the variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands
+the truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple
+intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires
+intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a
+certain discoursing of the reason.
+
+Wherefore Dionysius assigns the "circular" movement of the angels to
+the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and unceasing, having
+neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither
+beginning nor end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the
+part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack
+of uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which arises from the
+variety of external things: this is removed by the soul withdrawing
+from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the
+circular movement of the soul is "the soul's withdrawal into itself
+from external objects." Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires
+to be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discoursing of
+reason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the
+simple contemplation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated
+by his saying in the second place that "the soul's intellectual
+powers must be uniformly concentrated," in other words that
+discoursing must be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the
+contemplation of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul
+there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the
+understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition.
+Afterwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly the
+uniformity which is like that of the angels, for then all things
+being laid aside, the soul continues in the contemplation of God
+alone. This he expresses by saying: "Then being thus made uniform
+unitedly," i.e. conformably, "by the union of its powers, it is
+conducted to the good and the beautiful." The "straight" movement of
+the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to another by
+considering them, but only to the order of his providence, namely to
+the fact that the higher angel enlightens the lower angels through
+the angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he says:
+"The angel's movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to the
+care of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things
+are direct," i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct
+order. Whereas he ascribes the "straight" movement in the soul to the
+soul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of
+intelligible objects. The "oblique" movement in the angels he
+describes as being composed of the straight and circular movements,
+inasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with
+their contemplation of God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul
+he also declares to be partly straight and partly circular, in so far
+as in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from the
+distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and
+backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either
+straight [or] oblique movement, because they all denote discursions
+of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or
+from the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to
+below: if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to
+left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and
+forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near at hand
+or far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of
+reason from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to
+the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if
+it be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the
+oblique movement as explained above (ad 2). That alone which he
+describes as immobility belongs to the circular movement.
+
+Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of
+contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 7]
+
+Whether There Is Delight in Contemplation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.
+For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation
+resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there
+is no delight in contemplation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight.
+Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory says
+(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when the soul strives to contemplate God,
+it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes,
+because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the
+incomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs,
+because even while tasting, it fails." Therefore there is no delight
+in contemplation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as
+stated in _Ethic._ x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is
+imperfect, according to 1 Cor. 13:12, "We see now through a glass in
+a dark manner." Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the
+contemplative life.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight. Now
+contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated
+(Gen. 32) that after Jacob had said (Gen. 32:30), "'I have seen God
+face to face' . . . he halted on his foot (Gen. 32:31) . . . because
+he touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank" (Gen. 32:32).
+Therefore seemingly there is no delight in contemplation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis.
+8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any
+tediousness, but joy and gladness": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
+Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly
+lovable."
+
+_I answer that,_ There may be delight in any particular contemplation
+in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [*Cf. I-II, Q.
+3, A. 5], because each individual delights in the operation which
+befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of
+the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal:
+the result being that "all men naturally desire to know," so that
+consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more
+delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom
+and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without
+difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of
+its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even
+as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is
+pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves.
+Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the
+contemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, as stated above
+(AA. 1, 2, ad 1), it follows that there is delight in the
+contemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself,
+but also by reason of the Divine love.
+
+In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight,
+both because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5), when we were treating of the
+passions, and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity
+surpasses all love. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see
+that the Lord is sweet."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the contemplative life consists chiefly in an
+act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it
+is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And
+since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term
+also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the
+appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very
+delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore
+Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when we see one whom we love,
+we are so aflame as to love him more." And this is the ultimate
+perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be
+not only seen but also loved.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of an
+external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights not
+in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he
+strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal, he
+delights yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that
+"the more peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the
+triumph." But there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the
+part of the truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part
+of our defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags
+us down to lower things, according to Wis. 9:15, "The corruptible
+body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth
+down the mind that museth upon many things." Hence it is that when
+man attains to the contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more,
+while he hates the more his own deficiency and the weight of his
+corruptible body, so as to say with the Apostle (Rom. 7:24): "Unhappy
+man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"
+Wherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "When God is once known
+by desire and understanding, He withers all carnal pleasure in us."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The contemplation of God in this life is imperfect in
+comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the
+delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as compared with
+the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written (Ps.
+35:9): "Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure."
+Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to be had by
+wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other
+contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that
+which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal.
+i, 5): "We may happen to have our own little theories about those
+sublime beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but
+feebly, nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us
+more delight than any of those things that are round about us": and
+Gregory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The
+contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries
+the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and discovers the
+spiritual world to the eyes of the mind."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot,
+"because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax
+strong in the love of God," as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.).
+"Thus when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot sound
+while the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans
+only on that foot which is sound."
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Contemplative Life Is Continuous?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is not
+continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things
+pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of
+this life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. 13:8, "Whether
+prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge
+shall be destroyed." Therefore the contemplative life is made void.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by
+snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says
+(Confess. x, 40), "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in
+my inmost soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous
+weight I sink down again." Again, Gregory commenting on the words of
+Job 4:15, "When a spirit passed before me," says (Moral. v, 33): "The
+mind does not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward
+contemplation, for it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the
+very immensity of the light." Therefore the contemplative life is not
+continuous.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be
+continuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher
+(Ethic. x, 7), "is better than the life which is according to man."
+Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous.
+
+_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Luke 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the
+best part, which shall not be taken away from her," since as Gregory
+says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.), "the contemplative life begins here so
+that it may be perfected in our heavenly home."
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing may be described as continuous in two ways:
+first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is
+evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for
+two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and
+unchangeable things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there
+is nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in
+_Topic._ i, 13. But even in our regard contemplative life is
+continuous--both because it is competent to us in respect of the
+incorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it
+can endure after this life--and because in the works of the
+contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the
+more able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher
+observes (Ethic. x, 7).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The manner of contemplation is not the same here as in
+heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of
+charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory
+speaks in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The contemplative life
+begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the
+fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater
+love when we see Him Whom we love."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now the
+highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine
+contemplation, according to Dionysius [*Cf. Coel. Hier. iii], and as
+we have stated above (A. 6, ad 2). Hence although contemplation
+cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as
+regards the other contemplative acts.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher declares the contemplative life to be
+above man, because it befits us "so far as there is in us something
+divine" (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is incorruptible
+and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure longer.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 181
+
+OF THE ACTIVE LIFE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the active life, under which head there are four
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active
+life?
+
+(2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life?
+
+(3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life?
+
+(4) Of the duration of the active life.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 1]
+
+Whether All the Actions of the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Active
+Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not
+all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards
+only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv
+in Ezech.) that "the active life is to give bread to the hungry," and
+after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other
+people he adds finally, "and to give to each and every one whatever
+he needs." Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all
+the acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its
+parts, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. 2, 8; I-II, Q. 60, AA. 2, 3).
+Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the
+active life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that Lia who was
+blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which "being
+occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor
+both by word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous
+offspring of good deeds." Now this would seem to belong to charity,
+whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to the moral virtues.
+Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the
+active life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 2), the moral virtues
+dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection
+belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the moral
+virtues do not pertain to the active life.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): "In the
+active life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice
+of good works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye
+being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine
+light." Now all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral
+virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the
+active life.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) the active and the
+contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of
+men intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the
+consideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative
+life, while the other is external work to which the active life is
+directed.
+
+Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not
+to the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of
+little or no avail." Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong
+essentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher
+(Ethic. x, 8) subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one
+man is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher
+proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described with
+reference to our relations with other people, because it consists in
+these things, not exclusively, but principally.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtues,
+for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this is what
+Gregory here ascribes to the active life.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of
+another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter
+virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the
+active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are
+comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we
+practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves,
+and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues
+belong to the active life.
+
+It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a
+disposition to the contemplative life.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Prudence Pertains to the Active Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the
+active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the
+cognitive power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power.
+Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive
+power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the "active
+life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it is signified
+by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that
+one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems that
+prudence does not pertain to the active life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prudence stands between the moral and the
+intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the
+active life, as stated above (A. 1), so do the intellectual virtues
+pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that
+prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative
+life, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes
+mention (De Civ. Dei xix, 2, 3, 19).
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence
+pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 6), if
+one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially
+in moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is
+directed: for instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is
+a thief rather than an adulterer," according to the Philosopher
+(Ethic. v, 2). Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is
+directed to the works of the moral virtues as its end, since it is
+"right reason applied to action" (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of
+the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher
+says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was stated above (A. 1, ad
+3) that the moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of
+contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of
+prudence, which is of itself directed to the works of the moral
+virtues, belongs directly to the active life, provided we take
+prudence in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it.
+
+If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any
+kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part
+thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De
+Offic. i, 5) says that "the man who is able most clearly and quickly
+to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be
+considered most prudent and wise."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Moral works take their species from their end, as
+stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), wherefore the knowledge
+pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the
+very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through
+having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the
+active life.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: External occupation makes a man see less in
+intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with
+which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the
+external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more
+clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence,
+both on account of experience, and on account of the mind's
+attention, since "brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sallust
+observes [*Bell. Catilin., LI].
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Prudence is said to be intermediate between the
+intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same
+subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same
+matter as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is
+intermediate between the active and the contemplative life as regards
+the things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied
+sometimes with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal
+things.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 811, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Teaching Is a Work of the Active or of the Contemplative Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active
+but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.)
+that "the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods,
+at least through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose
+minds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty." But this
+pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the
+contemplative life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the same
+kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher
+says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an indication of
+knowledge." Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the
+contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the
+contemplative life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the
+contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another,
+belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it
+belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by
+teaching him, of the truth we have meditated.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active
+life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words
+of wisdom."
+
+_I answer that,_ The act of teaching has a twofold object. For
+teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the
+interior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or
+object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching
+belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life.
+It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly,
+so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to
+the contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in
+the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says
+(De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the
+better part," namely the contemplative life, "let them be busy with
+the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with
+salutary knowledge," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to
+the contemplative life.
+
+The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and
+thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all
+doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to
+its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and
+love of truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument
+clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains
+to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far
+as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to
+bring another man to understand the truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He who prays for another does nothing towards the man
+for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible
+truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by
+external action. Hence the comparison fails.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Active Life Remains After This Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the active life remains after this
+life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as
+stated above (A. 1). But the moral virtues endure after this life
+according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life
+remains after this life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as
+stated above (A. 3). But in the life to come when "we shall be like
+the angels," teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in
+the angels of whom one "enlightens, cleanses, and perfects" [*Coel.
+Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the "receiving of
+knowledge," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it
+would seem that the active life remains after this life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more is
+it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly
+more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "we
+can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to
+maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life." Therefore the
+active life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after
+this life.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active
+life ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to
+be perfected in our heavenly home."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the active life has its end
+in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of
+contemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative
+life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of
+external actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at
+all, these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as
+Augustine says at the end of _De Civitate Dei_ xxii, 30, "there we
+shall rest and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and
+praise." And he had said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "there
+God will be seen without end, loved without wearying, praised without
+tiring: such will be the occupation of all, the common love, the
+universal activity."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 136, A. 1, ad 1), the moral virtues
+will remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as
+to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are those that
+conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted
+above Augustine denotes by "rest," and this rest excludes not only
+outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the passions.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The contemplative life, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 4),
+consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and as to this, one
+angel does not teach another, since according to Matt. 18:10, "the
+little ones' angels," who belong to the lower order, "always see the
+face of the Father"; and so, in the life to come, no man will teach
+another of God, but "we shall" all "see Him as He is" (1 John 3:2).
+This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremiah 31:34: "They shall
+teach no more every man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord: for
+all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest."
+
+But as regards things pertaining to the "dispensation of the
+mysteries of God," one angel teaches another by cleansing,
+enlightening, and perfecting him: and thus they have something of
+the active life so long as the world lasts, from the fact that they
+are occupied in administering to the creatures below them. This is
+signified by the fact that Jacob saw angels "ascending" the
+ladder--which refers to contemplation--and "descending"--which refers
+to action. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), "they do
+not wander abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the
+joys of inward contemplation." Hence in them the active life does not
+differ from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the
+works of the active life are a hindrance to contemplation.
+
+Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the
+administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to us not by
+reason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of
+our seeing God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That the durability of the active life in the
+present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life
+arises not from any property of either life considered in itself, but
+from our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of
+contemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral.
+ii, 3) that "the mind through its very weakness being repelled from
+that immense height recoils on itself."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 182
+
+OF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must now consider the active life in comparison with the
+contemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence?
+
+(2) Which of them has the greater merit?
+
+(3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?
+
+(4) Of their order.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Active Life Is More Excellent Than the Contemplative?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is more excellent
+than the contemplative. For "that which belongs to better men would
+seem to be worthier and better," as the Philosopher says (Top. iii,
+1). Now the active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely
+prelates, who are placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "in our actions we must not
+love honor or power in this life." Therefore it would seem that the
+active life is more excellent than the contemplative.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the
+more important; thus the military art, being the more important,
+directs the art of the bridle-maker [*Ethic. i, 1]. Now it belongs to
+the active life to direct and command the contemplative, as appears
+from the words addressed to Moses (Ex. 19:21), "Go down and charge
+the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the" fixed "limits
+to see the Lord." Therefore the active life is more excellent than
+the contemplative.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing in
+order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
+12:31): "Be zealous for the better gifts." Now some are taken away
+from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the
+active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state
+of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more
+excellent than the contemplative.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Luke 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the
+best part, which shall not be taken away from her." Now Mary figures
+the contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is more
+excellent than the active.
+
+_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent
+in themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect.
+Accordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more
+excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight
+reasons (Ethic. x, 7, 8). The first is, because the contemplative
+life becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the
+intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things
+intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals.
+Hence Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is
+interpreted "the vision of the principle," [*Or rather, 'One seeing
+the principle,' if derived from _rah_ and _irzn_; Cf. Jerome, De Nom.
+Hebr.] whereas as Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is
+signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. The second reason is because the
+contemplative life can be more continuous, although not as regards
+the highest degree of contemplation, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 8,
+ad 2; Q. 181, A. 4, ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative
+life is signified, is described as "sitting" all the time "at the
+Lord's feet." Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more
+delightful than the active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.
+Serm. ciii) that "Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted." Fourthly,
+because in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since
+he needs fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Luke
+10:41): "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many
+things." Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved more for
+its own sake, while the active life is directed to something else.
+Hence it is written (Ps. 36:4): "One thing I have asked of the Lord,
+this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all
+the days of my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord."
+Sixthly, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest,
+according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still and see that I am God." Seventhly,
+because the contemplative life is according to Divine things, whereas
+active life is according to human things; wherefore Augustine says
+(De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): "'In the beginning was the Word': to Him
+was Mary hearkening: 'The Word was made flesh': Him was Martha
+serving." Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according to
+that which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; whereas in
+the works of the active life the lower powers also, which are common
+to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore (Ps. 35:7) after the
+words, "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord," that which is
+special to man is added (Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we shall see
+light."
+
+Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Luke 10:42) when He says: "Mary hath
+chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," which
+words Augustine (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: "Not--Thou
+hast chosen badly but--She has chosen better. Why better?
+Listen--because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden
+of necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the
+sweetness of truth is eternal."
+
+Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer
+the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too
+the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): "It is better to be wise than
+to be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich . . ."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Not only the active life concerns prelates, they should
+also excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii,
+1): "A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted than
+others in contemplation."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The contemplative life consists in a certain liberty of
+mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the contemplative
+life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal
+but of eternal things." And Boethius says (De Consol. v, 2): "The
+soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze on the
+Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things." Wherefore
+it is evident that the active life does not directly command the
+contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life
+as dispositions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly
+serves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says
+(Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the active life is bondage, whereas the
+contemplative life is freedom."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a man is called away from the contemplative
+life to the works of the active life, on account of some necessity of
+the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake
+contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19):
+"The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity
+undertake an honest toil," the work namely of the active life. "If no
+one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the
+research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we
+must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must
+not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive
+ourselves of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us." Hence it
+is clear that when a person is called from the contemplative life to
+the active life, this is done by way not of subtraction but of
+addition.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Active Life Is of Greater Merit Than the Contemplative?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit
+than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed
+is due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, "Every man shall receive
+his own reward according to his own labor." Now labor is ascribed to
+the active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says
+(Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "Whosoever is converted to God must first of
+all sweat from labor, i.e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may
+rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle." Therefore
+the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the
+happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on John 21:22, "So
+I will have him to remain till I come," says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.):
+"This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me
+conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun
+here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall
+come." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "contemplation
+begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home." Now the
+life to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving the
+reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to
+have less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the
+character of reward.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that "no sacrifice
+is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls." Now by the zeal for
+souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it
+would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than
+the active.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are the
+merits of the active life, but greater still those of the
+contemplative."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4), the root of
+merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), charity
+consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by
+itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated
+above (Q. 27, A. 8). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to
+the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which
+pertains directly to the love of our neighbor for God's sake. Now the
+contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of
+God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the love of" the
+Divine "truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative
+life, for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life
+seeks, as stated above (Q. 181, A. 4, ad 2). On the other hand, the
+active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor,
+because it is "busy about much serving" (Luke 10:40). Wherefore the
+contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active
+life. This is moreover asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "The
+contemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the
+latter labors under the stress of present work," by reason of the
+necessity of assisting our neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt
+relish has a foretaste of the coming rest," i.e. the contemplation of
+God.
+
+Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of
+the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life.
+For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then
+suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the
+time being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake.
+Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 9:3): "I wished myself to be an anathema
+from Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom expounds as
+follows (De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis.]): "His
+mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired
+above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he
+pleased Christ."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the
+accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the
+essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor
+borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign
+thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this
+life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived at
+perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and
+if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the
+greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without
+some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it
+does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on
+account of the practice of greater Divine charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when
+something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially
+accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in
+sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his
+soul, according to Ecclus. 30:24, "Have pity on thy own soul,
+pleasing God"; in the second place, the souls of others, according to
+Apoc. 22:17, "He that heareth, let him say: Come." And the more
+closely a man unites his own or another's soul to God, the more
+acceptable is his sacrifice to God; wherefore it is more acceptable
+to God that one apply one's own soul and the souls of others to
+contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that "no
+sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls," does not
+mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of
+the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to
+God one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external
+gifts.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Contemplative Life Is Hindered by the Active Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by
+the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain
+stillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still, and see that I
+am God"; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to
+Luke 10:41, "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many
+things." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, clearness of vision is a requisite for the
+contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance to clear vision;
+for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it "is blear-eyed and
+fruitful, because the active life, being occupied with work, sees
+less." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one contrary hinders the other. Now the active and
+the contemplative life are apparently contrary to one another, since
+the active life is busy about many things, while the contemplative
+life attends to the contemplation of one; wherefore they differ in
+opposition to one another. Therefore it would seem that the
+contemplative life is hindered by the active.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to
+hold the fortress of contemplation, must first of all train in the
+camp of action."
+
+_I answer that,_ The active life may be considered from two points of
+view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external
+works: and thus it is evident that the active life hinders the
+contemplative, in so far as it is impossible for one to be busy with
+external action, and at the same time give oneself to Divine
+contemplation. Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting
+and directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point
+of view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the
+latter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions.
+Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the
+fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp of
+action. Thus after careful study they will learn whether they no
+longer wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity the
+wrongs their neighbors do to them, whether their soul is neither
+overcome with joy in the presence of temporal goods, nor cast down
+with too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way
+they will know when they withdraw within themselves, in order to
+explore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with them the
+shadows of the things corporeal, or, if these follow them, whether
+they prudently drive them away." Hence the work of the active life
+conduces to the contemplative, by quelling the interior passions
+which give rise to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered.
+
+This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for these arguments
+consider the occupation itself of external actions, and not the effect
+which is the quelling of the passions.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Active Life Precedes the Contemplative?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the active life does not precede the
+contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the
+love of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our
+neighbor. Now the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor,
+since we love our neighbor for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the
+contemplative life also precedes the active life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "It should be
+observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to
+contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the
+contemplative to the active life." Therefore the active is not simply
+prior to the contemplative.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any
+order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now the
+active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects;
+for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Often those who were able to
+contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when
+pressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live
+advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures
+are killed by the sword of their inaction."
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with
+regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes
+the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and
+are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active
+life. For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is
+compared to the lower reason which is assigned to action, and the
+husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband,
+as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3, 7, 12).
+
+Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first
+in the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the
+contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above
+(A. 1; Q. 181, A. 1, ad 3); and, in the order of generation,
+disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and
+according to its nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The contemplative life is directed to the love of God,
+not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the active
+life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor. Hence
+Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "Without the contemplative life it
+is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit not the
+good actions we are able to do; but we cannot enter therein without
+the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do."
+
+From this it is also evident that the active precedes the
+contemplative life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the
+order of generation, that which is proper to the perfect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Progress from the active to the contemplative life is
+according to the order of generation; whereas the return from the
+contemplative life to the active is according to the order of
+direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the
+contemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the
+acquired habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in _Ethic._ ii,
+7.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He that is prone to yield to his passions on account
+of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life by
+reason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37)
+that "there be some so restless that when they are free from labor
+they labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for
+thought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear." Others, on
+the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they
+are apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves
+wholly to action, this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore
+Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "some are so slothful of mind that
+if they chance to have any hard work to do they give way at the very
+outset." Yet, as he adds further on, "often . . . love stimulates
+slothful souls to work, and fear restrains souls that are disturbed
+in contemplation." Consequently those who are more adapted to the
+active life can prepare themselves for the contemplative by the
+practice of the active life; while none the less, those who are more
+adapted to the contemplative life can take upon themselves the works
+of the active life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation.
+_______________________
+
+TREATISE ON THE STATES OF LIFE (QQ. 183-189)
+_______________________
+
+OF MAN'S VARIOUS DUTIES AND STATES IN GENERAL
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must next consider man's various states and duties. We shall
+consider (1) man's duties and states in general; (2) the state of the
+perfect in particular.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What constitutes a state among men?
+
+(2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties?
+
+(3) Of the diversity of duties;
+
+(4) Of the diversity of states.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Notion of a State Denotes a Condition of Freedom or
+Servitude?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the notion of a state does not denote
+a condition of freedom or servitude. For "state" takes its name from
+"standing." Now a person is said to stand on account of his being
+upright; and Gregory says (Moral. vii, 17): "To fall by speaking
+harmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness." But
+a man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his will to God;
+wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," says:
+"The upright are those who direct their heart according to God's
+will." Therefore it would seem that obedience to the Divine
+commandments suffices alone for the notion of a state.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the word "state" seems to denote immobility
+according to 1 Cor. 15:48, "Be ye steadfast (_stabiles_) and
+immovable"; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xxi in Ezech.): "The stone
+is foursquare, and is stable on all sides, if no disturbance will
+make it fall." Now it is virtue that enables us "to act with
+immobility," according to _Ethic._ ii, 4. Therefore it would seem
+that a state is acquired by every virtuous action.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the word "state" seems to indicate height of a kind;
+because to stand is to be raised upwards. Now one man is made higher
+than another by various duties; and in like manner men are raised
+upwards in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore the
+mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for a
+difference of states.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is thus laid down in the Decretals (II, qu. vi,
+can. Si Quando): "Whenever anyone intervene in a cause where life or
+state is at stake he must do so, not by a proxy, but in his own
+person"; and "state" here has reference to freedom or servitude.
+Therefore it would seem that nothing differentiates a man's state,
+except that which refers to freedom or servitude.
+
+_I answer that,_ "State," properly speaking, denotes a kind of
+position, whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility in a
+manner according with its nature. For it is natural to man that his
+head should be directed upwards, his feet set firmly on the ground,
+and his other intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and
+this is not the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only when
+he stands upright: nor again is he said to stand, if he move, but
+only when he is still. Hence it is again that even in human acts, a
+matter is said to have stability (_statum_) in reference to its own
+disposition in the point of a certain immobility or restfulness.
+Consequently matters which easily change and are extrinsic to them do
+not constitute a state among men, for instance that a man be rich or
+poor, of high or low rank, and so forth. Wherefore in the civil law
+[*Dig. I, IX, De Senatoribus] (Lib. Cassius ff. De Senatoribus) it is
+said that if a man be removed from the senate, he is deprived of his
+dignity rather than of his state. But that alone seemingly pertains
+to a man's state, which regards an obligation binding his person, in
+so far, to wit, as a man is his own master or subject to another, not
+indeed from any slight or unstable cause, but from one that is firmly
+established; and this is something pertaining to the nature of
+freedom or servitude. Therefore state properly regards freedom or
+servitude whether in spiritual or in civil matters.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Uprightness as such does not pertain to the notion of
+state, except in so far as it is connatural to man with the addition
+of a certain restfulness. Hence other animals are said to stand
+without its being required that they should be upright; nor again are
+men said to stand, however upright their position be, unless they be
+still.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Immobility does not suffice for the notion of state;
+since even one who sits or lies down is still, and yet he is not said
+to stand.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Duty implies relation to act; while grades denote an
+order of superiority and inferiority. But state requires immobility
+in that which regards a condition of the person himself.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Should Be Different Duties or States in the Church?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there should not be different duties
+or states in the Church. For distinction is opposed to unity. Now the
+faithful of Christ are called to unity according to John 17:21, 22:
+"That they . . . may be one in Us . . . as We also are one."
+Therefore there should not be a distinction of duties and states in
+the Church.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one
+suffices. But the working of grace is much more orderly than the
+working of nature. Therefore it were more fitting for things
+pertaining to the operations of grace to be administered by the same
+persons, so that there would not be a distinction of duties and
+states in the Church.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the good of the Church seemingly consists chiefly in
+peace, according to Ps. 147:3, "Who hath placed peace in thy
+borders," and 2 Cor. 13:11, "Have peace, and the God of peace . . .
+shall be with you." Now distinction is a hindrance to peace, for
+peace would seem to result from likeness, according to Ecclus. 13:19,
+"Every beast loveth its like," while the Philosopher says (Polit.
+vii, 5) that "a little difference causes dissension in a state."
+Therefore it would seem that there ought not to be a distinction of
+states and duties in the Church.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written in praise of the Church (Ps. 44:10)
+that she is "surrounded with variety": and a gloss on these words
+says that "the Queen," namely the Church, "is bedecked with the
+teaching of the apostles, the confession of martyrs, the purity of
+virgins, the sorrowings of penitents."
+
+_I answer that,_ The difference of states and duties in the Church
+regards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection of
+the Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection,
+which in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found in the created
+universe except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, the
+fulness of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, flows forth to
+His members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the
+Church. This is the meaning of the Apostle's words (Eph. 4:11, 12):
+"He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some
+evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of
+the saints." Secondly, it regards the need of those actions which are
+necessary in the Church. For a diversity of actions requires a
+diversity of men appointed to them, in order that all things may be
+accomplished without delay or confusion; and this is indicated by the
+Apostle (Rom. 12:4, 5), "As in one body we have many members, but all
+the members have not the same office, so we being many are one body
+in Christ." Thirdly, this belongs to the dignity and beauty of the
+Church, which consist in a certain order; wherefore it is written (3
+Kings 10:4, 5) that "when the queen of Saba saw all the wisdom of
+Solomon . . . and the apartments of his servants, and the order of
+his ministers . . . she had no longer any spirit in her." Hence the
+Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:20) that "in a great house there are not only
+vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The distinction of states and duties is not an obstacle
+to the unity of the Church, for this results from the unity of faith,
+charity, and mutual service, according to the saying of the Apostle
+(Eph. 4:16): "From whom the whole body being compacted," namely by
+faith, "and fitly joined together," namely by charity, "by what every
+joint supplieth," namely by one man serving another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as nature does not employ many means where one
+suffices, so neither does it confine itself to one where many are
+required, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), "If
+the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing?" Hence there
+was need in the Church, which is Christ's body, for the members to be
+differentiated by various duties, states, and grades.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as in the natural body the various members are
+held together in unity by the power of the quickening spirit, and are
+dissociated from one another as soon as that spirit departs, so too
+in the Church's body the peace of the various members is preserved by
+the power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of the Church, as
+stated in John 6:64. Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 4:3): "Careful to
+keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." Now a man departs
+from this unity of spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an
+earthly kingdom peace ceases when the citizens seek each man his own.
+Besides, the peace both of mind and of an earthly commonwealth is the
+better preserved by a distinction of duties and states, since thereby
+the greater number have a share in public actions. Wherefore the
+Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:24, 25) that "God hath tempered (_the body_)
+together that there might be no schism in the body, but the members
+might be mutually careful one for another."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Duties Differ According to Their Actions?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that duties do not differ according to
+their actions. For there are infinite varieties of human acts both in
+spirituals and in temporals. Now there can be no certain distinction
+among things that are infinite in number. Therefore human duties
+cannot be differentiated according to a difference of acts.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the active and the contemplative life differ
+according to their acts, as stated above (Q. 179, A. 1). But the
+distinction of duties seems to be other than the distinction of
+lives. Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, even ecclesiastical orders, states, and grades
+seemingly differ according to their acts. If, then, duties differ
+according to their acts it would seem that duties, grades, and states
+differ in the same way. Yet this is not true, since they are divided
+into their respective parts in different ways. Therefore duties do
+not differ according to their acts.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "_officium_
+(duty) takes its name from _efficere_ (to effect), as though it were
+instead of _efficium,_ by the change of one letter for the sake of
+the sound." But effecting pertains to action. Therefore duties differ
+according to their acts.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), difference among the members
+of the Church is directed to three things: perfection, action, and
+beauty; and according to these three we may distinguish a threefold
+distinction among the faithful. One, with regard to perfection, and
+thus we have the difference of states, in reference to which some
+persons are more perfect than others. Another distinction regards
+action and this is the distinction of duties: for persons are said to
+have various duties when they are appointed to various actions. A
+third distinction regards the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and
+thus we distinguish various grades according as in the same state or
+duty one person is above another. Hence according to a variant text
+[*The Septuagint] it is written (Ps. 47:4): "In her grades shall God
+be known."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The material diversity of human acts is infinite. It is
+not thus that duties differ, but by their formal diversity which
+results from diverse species of acts, and in this way human acts are
+not infinite.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Life is predicated of a thing absolutely: wherefore
+diversity of lives results from a diversity of acts which are
+becoming to man considered in himself. But efficiency, whence we have
+the word "office" (as stated above), denotes action tending to
+something else according to _Metaph._ ix, text. 16 [*Ed. Did. viii,
+8]. Hence offices differ properly in respect of acts that are
+referred to other persons; thus a teacher is said to have an office,
+and so is a judge, and so forth. Wherefore Isidore says (Etym. vi,
+19) that "to have an office is to be officious," i.e. harmful "to no
+one, but to be useful to all."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Differences of state, offices and grades are taken from
+different things, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Yet these three
+things may concur in the same subject: thus when a person is
+appointed to a higher action, he attains thereby both office and
+grade, and sometimes, besides this, a state of perfection, on account
+of the sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The
+ecclesiastical orders are particularly distinct according to divine
+offices. For Isidore says (Etym. vi): "There are various kinds of
+offices; but the foremost is that which relates to sacred and Divine
+things."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Difference of States Applies to Those Who Are Beginning,
+Progressing, or Perfect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the difference of states does not
+apply to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect. For
+"diverse genera have diverse species and differences" [*Aristotle,
+Categ. ii]. Now this difference of beginning, progress, and
+perfection is applied to the degrees of charity, as stated above (Q.
+24, A. 9), where we were treating of charity. Therefore it would seem
+that the differences of states should not be assigned in this manner.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1), state regards a condition of
+servitude or freedom, which apparently has no connection with the
+aforesaid difference of beginning, progress, and perfection.
+Therefore it is unfitting to divide state in this way.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of beginning, progress, and
+perfection seems to refer to _more_ and _less,_ and this seemingly
+implies the notion of grades. But the distinction of grades differs
+from that of states, as we have said above (AA. 2, 3). Therefore
+state is unfittingly divided according to beginning, progress, and
+perfection.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 11): "There are three
+states of the converted, the beginning, the middle, and the
+perfection"; and (Hom. xv in Ezech.): "Other is the beginning of
+virtue, other its progress, and other still its perfection."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) state regards freedom or
+servitude. Now in spiritual things there is a twofold servitude and a
+twofold freedom: for there is the servitude of sin and the servitude
+of justice; and there is likewise a twofold freedom, from sin, and
+from justice, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Rom. 6:20,
+22), "When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice
+. . . but now being made free from sin," you are . . . "become
+servants to God."
+
+Now the servitude of sin or justice consists in being inclined to
+evil by a habit of sin, or inclined to good by a habit of justice:
+and in like manner freedom from sin is not to be overcome by the
+inclination to sin, and freedom from justice is not to be held back
+from evil for the love of justice. Nevertheless, since man, by his
+natural reason, is inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to
+natural reason, it follows that freedom from sin is true freedom
+which is united to the servitude of justice, since they both incline
+man to that which is becoming to him. In like manner true servitude
+is the servitude of sin, which is connected with freedom from
+justice, because man is thereby hindered from attaining that which is
+proper to him. That a man become the servant of justice or sin
+results from his efforts, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 6:16): "To
+whom you yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants you are whom
+you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto
+justice." Now in every human effort we can distinguish a beginning, a
+middle, and a term; and consequently the state of spiritual servitude
+and freedom is differentiated according to these things, namely, the
+beginning--to which pertains the state of beginners--the middle, to
+which pertains the state of the proficient--and the term, to which
+belongs the state of the perfect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Freedom from sin results from charity which "is poured
+forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom.
+5:5). Hence it is written (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the
+Lord is, there is liberty." Wherefore the same division applies to
+charity as to the state of those who enjoy spiritual freedom.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Men are said to be beginners, proficient, and perfect
+(so far as these terms indicate different states), not in relation to
+any occupation whatever, but in relation to such occupations as
+pertain to spiritual freedom or servitude, as stated above (A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As already observed (A. 3, ad 3), nothing hinders grade
+and state from concurring in the same subject. For even in earthly
+affairs those who are free, not only belong to a different state from
+those who are in service, but are also of a different grade.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 184
+
+OF THE STATE OF PERFECTION IN GENERAL
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider those things that pertain to the state of
+perfection whereto the other states are directed. For the
+consideration of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the
+legislator; and in relation to the sacred ministry it comes under the
+consideration of orders of which we shall treat in the Third Part
+[*Suppl., Q. 34].
+
+Concerning the state of the perfect, a three-fold consideration
+presents itself: (1) The state of perfection in general; (2) Things
+relating to the perfection of bishops; (3) Things relating to the
+perfection of religious.
+
+Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether perfection bears any relation to charity?
+
+(2) Whether one can be perfect in this life?
+
+(3) Whether the perfection of this life consists chiefly in observing
+the counsels or the commandments?
+
+(4) Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?
+
+(5) Whether especially prelates and religious are in the state of
+perfection?
+
+(6) Whether all prelates are in the state of perfection?
+
+(7) Which is the more perfect, the episcopal or the religious state?
+
+(8) The comparison between religious and parish priests and
+archdeacons.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Perfection of the Christian Life Consists Chiefly in
+Charity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the perfection of the Christian life
+does not consist chiefly in charity. For the Apostle says (1 Cor.
+14:20): "In malice be children, but in sense be perfect." But charity
+regards not the senses but the affections. Therefore it would seem
+that the perfection of the Christian life does not chiefly consist in
+charity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Eph. 6:13): "Take unto you the armor
+of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day, and to stand
+in all things perfect"; and the text continues (Eph. 6:14, 16),
+speaking of the armor of God: "Stand therefore having your loins girt
+about with truth, and having on the breast-plate of justice . . . in
+all things taking the shield of faith." Therefore the perfection of
+the Christian life consists not only in charity, but also in other
+virtues.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, virtues like other habits, are specified by their
+acts. Now it is written (James 1:4) that "patience hath a perfect
+work." Therefore seemingly the state of perfection consists more
+specially in patience.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 3:14): "Above all things have
+charity, which is the bond of perfection," because it binds, as it
+were, all the other virtues together in perfect unity.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be perfect in so far as it
+attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection thereof. Now
+it is charity that unites us to God, Who is the last end of the human
+mind, since "he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in
+him" (1 John 4:16). Therefore the perfection of the Christian life
+consists radically in charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The perfection of the human senses would seem to
+consist chiefly in their concurring together in the unity of truth,
+according to 1 Cor. 1:10, "That you be perfect in the same mind
+(_sensu_), and in the same judgment." Now this is effected by charity
+which operates consent in us men. Wherefore even the perfection of
+the senses consists radically in the perfection of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A man may be said to be perfect in two ways. First,
+simply: and this perfection regards that which belongs to a thing's
+nature, for instance an animal may be said to be perfect when it
+lacks nothing in the disposition of its members and in such things as
+are necessary for an animal's life. Secondly, a thing is said to be
+perfect relatively: and this perfection regards something connected
+with the thing externally, such as whiteness or blackness or
+something of the kind. Now the Christian life consists chiefly in
+charity whereby the soul is united to God; wherefore it is written (1
+John 3:14): "He that loveth not abideth in death." Hence the
+perfection of the Christian life consists simply in charity, but in
+the other virtues relatively. And since that which is simply, is
+paramount and greatest in comparison with other things, it follows
+that the perfection of charity is paramount in relation to the
+perfection that regards the other virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Patience is stated to have a perfect work in relation
+to charity, in so far as it is an effect of the abundance of charity
+that a man bears hardships patiently, according to Rom. 8:35,
+"Who . . . shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall
+tribulation? Or distress?" etc.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Any One Can Be Perfect in This Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that none can be perfect in this life. For
+the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which is perfect is come,
+that which is in part shall be done away." Now in this life that
+which is in part is not done away; for in this life faith and hope,
+which are in part, remain. Therefore none can be perfect in this life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "The perfect is that which lacks nothing" (Phys.
+iii, 6). Now there is no one in this life who lacks nothing; for it
+is written (James 3:2): "In many things we all offend"; and (Ps.
+138:16): "Thy eyes did see my imperfect being." Therefore none is
+perfect in this life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life, as stated (A.
+1), relates to charity, which comprises the love of God and of our
+neighbor. Now, neither as to the love of God can one have perfect
+charity in this life, since according to Gregory (Hom. xiv in Ezech.)
+"the furnace of love which begins to burn here, will burn more
+fiercely when we see Him Whom we love"; nor as to the love of our
+neighbor, since in this life we cannot love all our neighbors
+actually, even though we love them habitually; and habitual love is
+imperfect. Therefore it seems that no one can be perfect in this life.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Divine law does not prescribe the impossible.
+Yet it prescribes perfection according to Matt. 5:48, "Be you . . .
+perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect." Therefore
+seemingly one can be perfect in this life.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the perfection of the
+Christian life consists in charity. Now perfection implies a certain
+universality because according to _Phys._ iii, 6, "the perfect is
+that which lacks nothing." Hence we may consider a threefold
+perfection. One is absolute, and answers to a totality not only on
+the part of the lover, but also on the part of the object loved, so
+that God be loved as much as He is lovable. Such perfection as this
+is not possible to any creature, but is competent to God alone, in
+Whom good is wholly and essentially.
+
+Another perfection answers to an absolute totality on the part of the
+lover, so that the affective faculty always actually tends to God as
+much as it possibly can; and such perfection as this is not possible
+so long as we are on the way, but we shall have it in heaven.
+
+The third perfection answers to a totality neither on the part of the
+object served, nor on the part of the lover as regards his always
+actually tending to God, but on the part of the lover as regards the
+removal of obstacles to the movement of love towards God, in which
+sense Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII, qu. 36) that "carnal desire is the
+bane of charity; to have no carnal desires is the perfection of
+charity." Such perfection as this can be had in this life, and in two
+ways. First, by the removal from man's affections of all that is
+contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and there can be no charity
+apart from this perfection, wherefore it is necessary for salvation.
+Secondly, by the removal from man's affections not only of whatever
+is contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders the mind's
+affections from tending wholly to God. Charity is possible apart from
+this perfection, for instance in those who are beginners and in those
+who are proficient.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking there of heavenly perfection
+which is not possible to those who are on the way.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those who are perfect in this life are said to "offend
+in many things" with regard to venial sins, which result from the
+weakness of the present life: and in this respect they have an
+"imperfect being" in comparison with the perfection of heaven.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As the conditions of the present life do not allow of a
+man always tending actually to God, so neither does it allow of his
+tending actually to each individual neighbor; but it suffices for him
+to tend to all in common and collectively, and to each individual
+habitually and according to the preparedness of his mind. Now in the
+love of our neighbor, as in the love of God we may observe a twofold
+perfection: one without which charity is impossible, and consisting
+in one's having in one's affections nothing that is contrary to the
+love of one's neighbor; and another without which it is possible to
+have charity. The latter perfection may be considered in three ways.
+First, as to the extent of love, through a man loving not only his
+friends and acquaintances but also strangers and even his enemies,
+for as Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) this is a mark of the
+perfect children of God. Secondly, as to the intensity of love, which
+is shown by the things which man despises for his neighbor's sake,
+through his despising not only external goods for the sake of his
+neighbor, but also bodily hardships and even death, according to John
+15:13, "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his
+life for his friends." Thirdly, as to the effect of love, so that a
+man will surrender not only temporal but also spiritual goods and
+even himself, for his neighbor's sake, according to the words of the
+Apostle (2 Cor. 12:15), "But I most gladly will spend and be spent
+myself for your souls."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 3]
+
+Whether, in This Life, Perfection Consists in the Observance of the
+Commandments or of the Counsels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that, in this life, perfection consists in
+the observance not of the commandments but of the counsels. For our
+Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all
+[Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come,
+follow Me." Now this is a counsel. Therefore perfection regards the
+counsels and not the precepts.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all are bound to the observance of the commandments,
+since this is necessary for salvation. Therefore, if the perfection
+of the Christian life consists in observing the commandments, it
+follows that perfection is necessary for salvation, and that all are
+bound thereto; and this is evidently false.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life is gauged
+according to charity, as stated above (A. 1). Now the perfection of
+charity, seemingly, does not consist in the observance of the
+commandments, since the perfection of charity is preceded both by its
+increase and by its beginning, as Augustine says (Super Canonic.
+Joan. Tract. ix). But the beginning of charity cannot precede the
+observance of the commandments, since according to John 14:23, "If
+any one love Me, he will keep My word." Therefore the perfection of
+life regards not the commandments but the counsels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the
+Lord thy God with thy whole heart," and (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt
+love thy neighbor [Vulg.: 'friend'] as thyself"; and these are the
+commandments of which our Lord said (Matt. 22:40): "On these two
+commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets." Now the
+perfection of charity, in respect of which the Christian life is said
+to be perfect, consists in our loving God with our whole heart, and
+our neighbor as ourselves. Therefore it would seem that perfection
+consists in the observance of the precepts.
+
+_I answer that,_ Perfection is said to consist in a thing in two
+ways: in one way, primarily and essentially; in another, secondarily
+and accidentally. Primarily and essentially the perfection of the
+Christian life consists in charity, principally as to the love of
+God, secondarily as to the love of our neighbor, both of which are
+the matter of the chief commandments of the Divine law, as stated
+above. Now the love of God and of our neighbor is not commanded
+according to a measure, so that what is in excess of the measure be a
+matter of counsel. This is evident from the very form of the
+commandment, pointing, as it does, to perfection--for instance in the
+words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart": since
+"the whole" is the same as "the perfect," according to the
+Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6), and in the words, "Thou shalt love thy
+neighbor as thyself," since every one loves himself most. The reason
+of this is that "the end of the commandment is charity," according to
+the Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5); and the end is not subject to a measure,
+but only such things as are directed to the end, as the Philosopher
+observes (Polit. i, 3); thus a physician does not measure the amount
+of his healing, but how much medicine or diet he shall employ for the
+purpose of healing. Consequently it is evident that perfection
+consists essentially in the observance of the commandments; wherefore
+Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii): "Why then should not this
+perfection be prescribed to man, although no man has it in this life?"
+
+Secondarily and instrumentally, however, perfection consists in the
+observance of the counsels, all of which, like the commandments, are
+directed to charity; yet not in the same way. For the commandments,
+other than the precepts of charity, are directed to the removal of
+things contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity is
+incompatible, whereas the counsels are directed to the removal of
+things that hinder the act of charity, and yet are not contrary to
+charity, such as marriage, the occupation of worldly business, and so
+forth. Hence Augustine says (Enchiridion cxxi): "Whatever things God
+commands, for instance, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' and
+whatever are not commanded, yet suggested by a special counsel, for
+instance, 'It is good for a man not to touch a woman,' are then done
+aright when they are referred to the love of God, and of our neighbor
+for God's sake, both in this world and in the world to come." Hence
+it is that in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, cap. vii) the
+abbot Moses says: "Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures,
+penury and loss of all one's wealth, these are not perfection but
+means to perfection, since not in them does the school of perfection
+find its end, but through them it achieves its end," and he had
+already said that "we endeavor to ascend by these steps to the
+perfection of charity."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In this saying of our Lord something is indicated as
+being the way to perfection by the words, "Go, sell all thou hast,
+and give to the poor"; and something else is added wherein perfection
+consists, when He said, "And follow Me." Hence Jerome in his
+commentary on Matt. 19:27, says that "since it is not enough merely
+to leave, Peter added that which is perfect: 'And have followed
+Thee'"; and Ambrose, commenting on Luke 5:27, "Follow Me," says: "He
+commands him to follow, not with steps of the body, but with devotion
+of the soul, which is the effect of charity." Wherefore it is evident
+from the very way of speaking that the counsels are means of
+attaining to perfection, since it is thus expressed: "If thou wilt be
+perfect, go, sell," etc., as though He said: "By so doing thou shalt
+accomplish this end."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii) "the
+perfection of charity is prescribed to man in this life, because one
+runs not right unless one knows whither to run. And how shall we know
+this if no commandment declares it to us?" And since that which is a
+matter of precept can be fulfilled variously, one does not break a
+commandment through not fulfilling it in the best way, but it is
+enough to fulfil it in any way whatever. Now the perfection of Divine
+love is a matter of precept for all without exception, so that even
+the perfection of heaven is not excepted from this precept, as
+Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii [*Cf. De Spir. et Lit. XXXVI]),
+and one escapes transgressing the precept, in whatever measure one
+attains to the perfection of Divine love. The lowest degree of Divine
+love is to love nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally
+with God, and whoever fails from this degree of perfection nowise
+fulfils the precept. There is another degree of the Divine love,
+which cannot be fulfilled so long as we are on the way, as stated
+above (A. 2), and it is evident that to fail from this is not to be a
+transgressor of the precept; and in like manner one does not
+transgress the precept, if one does not attain to the intermediate
+degrees of perfection, provided one attain to the lowest.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as man has a certain perfection of his nature as
+soon as he is born, which perfection belongs to the very essence of
+his species, while there is another perfection which he acquires by
+growth, so again there is a perfection of charity which belongs to
+the very essence of charity, namely that man love God above all
+things, and love nothing contrary to God, while there is another
+perfection of charity even in this life, whereto a man attains by a
+kind of spiritual growth, for instance when a man refrains even from
+lawful things, in order more freely to give himself to the service of
+God.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Whoever Is Perfect Is in the State of Perfection?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that whoever is perfect is in the state of
+perfection. For, as stated above (A. 3, ad 3), just as bodily
+perfection is reached by bodily growth, so spiritual perfection is
+acquired by spiritual growth. Now after bodily growth one is said to
+have reached the state of perfect age. Therefore seemingly also after
+spiritual growth, when one has already reached spiritual perfection,
+one is in the state of perfection.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to _Phys._ v, 2, movement "from one
+contrary to another" has the same aspect as "movement from less to
+more." Now when a man is changed from sin to grace, he is said to
+change his state, in so far as the state of sin differs from the
+state of grace. Therefore it would seem that in the same manner, when
+one progresses from a lesser to a greater grace, so as to reach the
+perfect degree, one is in the state of perfection.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a man acquires a state by being freed from
+servitude. But one is freed from the servitude of sin by charity,
+because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12). Now one is said to
+be perfect on account of charity, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore,
+seemingly, whoever has perfection, for this very reason has the state
+of perfection.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Some are in the state of perfection, who are
+wholly lacking in charity and grace, for instance wicked bishops or
+religious. Therefore it would seem that on the other hand some have
+the perfection of life, who nevertheless have not the state of
+perfection.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 183, A. 1), state properly
+regards a condition of freedom or servitude. Now spiritual freedom or
+servitude may be considered in man in two ways: first, with respect
+to his internal actions; secondly, with respect to his external
+actions. And since according to 1 Kings 16:7, "man seeth those things
+that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart," it follows that with
+regard to man's internal disposition we consider his spiritual state
+in relation to the Divine judgment, while with regard to his external
+actions we consider man's spiritual state in relation to the Church.
+It is in this latter sense that we are now speaking of states, namely
+in so far as the Church derives a certain beauty from the variety of
+states [*Cf. Q. 183, A. 2].
+
+Now it must be observed, that so far as men are concerned, in order
+that any one attain to a state of freedom or servitude there is
+required first of all an obligation or a release. For the mere fact
+of serving someone does not make a man a slave, since even the free
+serve, according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one
+another": nor again does the mere fact of ceasing to serve make a man
+free, as in the case of a runaway slave; but properly speaking a man
+is a slave if he be bound to serve, and a man is free if he be
+released from service. Secondly, it is required that the aforesaid
+obligation be imposed with a certain solemnity; even as a certain
+solemnity is observed in other matters which among men obtain a
+settlement in perpetuity.
+
+Accordingly, properly speaking, one is said to be in the state of
+perfection, not through having the act of perfect love, but through
+binding himself in perpetuity and with a certain solemnity to those
+things that pertain to perfection. Moreover it happens that some
+persons bind themselves to that which they do not keep, and some
+fulfil that to which they have not bound themselves, as in the case
+of the two sons (Matt. 21:28, 30), one of whom when his father said:
+"Work in my vineyard," answered: "I will not," and "afterwards . . .
+he went," while the other "answering said: I go . . . and he went
+not." Wherefore nothing hinders some from being perfect without being
+in the state of perfection, and some in the state of perfection
+without being perfect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: By bodily growth a man progresses in things pertaining
+to nature, wherefore he attains to the state of nature; especially
+since "what is according to nature is," in a way, "unchangeable"
+[*Ethic. v, 7], inasmuch as nature is determinate to one thing. In
+like manner by inward spiritual growth a man reaches the state of
+perfection in relation to the Divine judgment. But as regards the
+distinctions of ecclesiastical states, a man does not reach the state
+of perfection except by growth in respect of external actions.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument also regards the interior state. Yet when
+a man passes from sin to grace, he passes from servitude to freedom;
+and this does not result from a mere progress in grace, except when a
+man binds himself to things pertaining to grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Again this argument considers the interior state.
+Nevertheless, although charity causes the change of condition from
+spiritual servitude to spiritual freedom, an increase of charity has
+not the same effect.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Religious and Prelates Are in the State of Perfection?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that prelates and religious are not in the
+state of perfection. For the state of perfection differs from the
+state of the beginners and the proficient. Now no class of men is
+specially assigned to the state of the proficient or of the
+beginners. Therefore it would seem that neither should any class of
+men be assigned to the state of perfection.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the outward state should answer to the inward, else
+one is guilty of lying, "which consists not only in false words, but
+also in deceitful deeds," according to Ambrose in one of his sermons
+(xxx de Tempore). Now there are many prelates and religious who have
+not the inward perfection of charity. Therefore, if all religious and
+prelates are in the state of perfection, it would follow that all of
+them that are not perfect are in mortal sin, as deceivers and liars.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (A. 1), perfection is measured
+according to charity. Now the most perfect charity would seem to be
+in the martyrs, according to John 15:13, "Greater love than this no
+man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends": and a gloss
+on Heb. 12:4, "For you have not yet resisted unto blood," says: "In
+this life no love is more perfect than that to which the holy martyrs
+attained, who strove against sin even unto blood." Therefore it would
+seem that the state of perfection should be ascribed to the martyrs
+rather than to religious and bishops.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) ascribes perfection to
+bishops as being perfecters, and (Eccl. Hier. vi) to religious (whom
+he calls monks or _therapeutai_, i.e. servants of God) as being
+perfected.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), there is required for the
+state of perfection a perpetual obligation to things pertaining to
+perfection, together with a certain solemnity. Now both these
+conditions are competent to religious and bishops. For religious bind
+themselves by vow to refrain from worldly affairs, which they might
+lawfully use, in order more freely to give themselves to God, wherein
+consists the perfection of the present life. Hence Dionysius says
+(Eccl. Hier. vi), speaking of religious: "Some call them
+_therapeutai_," i.e. servants, "on account of their rendering pure
+service and homage to God; others call them _monachoi_" [*i.e.
+solitaries; whence the English word 'monk'], "on account of the
+indivisible and single-minded life which by their being wrapped in,"
+i.e. contemplating, "indivisible things, unites them in a Godlike
+union and a perfection beloved of God" [*Cf. Q. 180, A. 6]. Moreover,
+the obligation in both cases is undertaken with a certain solemnity
+of profession and consecration; wherefore Dionysius adds (Eccl. Hier.
+vi): "Hence the holy legislation in bestowing perfect grace on them
+accords them a hallowing invocation."
+
+In like manner bishops bind themselves to things pertaining to
+perfection when they take up the pastoral duty, to which it belongs
+that a shepherd "lay down his life for his sheep," according to John
+10:15. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:12): "Thou . . . hast
+confessed a good confession before many witnesses," that is to say,
+"when he was ordained," as a gloss says on this passage. Again, a
+certain solemnity of consecration is employed together with the
+aforesaid profession, according to 2 Tim. 1:6: "Stir up the grace of
+God which is in thee by the imposition of my hands," which the gloss
+ascribes to the grace of the episcopate. And Dionysius says (Eccl.
+Hier. v) that "when the high priest," i.e. the bishop, "is ordained,
+he receives on his head the most holy imposition of the sacred
+oracles, whereby it is signified that he is a participator in the
+whole and entire hierarchical power, and that not only is he the
+enlightener in all things pertaining to his holy discourses and
+actions, but that he also confers this on others."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Beginning and increase are sought not for their own
+sake, but for the sake of perfection; hence it is only to the state
+of perfection that some are admitted under certain obligations and
+with solemnity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those who enter the state of perfection do not profess
+to be perfect, but to tend to perfection. Hence the Apostle says
+(Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I had already attained, or were already
+perfect; but I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend": and
+afterwards (Phil. 3:15): "Let us therefore as many as are perfect, be
+thus minded." Hence a man who takes up the state of perfection is not
+guilty of lying or deceit through not being perfect, but through
+withdrawing his mind from the intention of reaching perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Martyrdom is the most perfect act of charity. But an
+act of perfection does not suffice to make the state of perfection,
+as stated above (A. 4).
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 6]
+
+Whether All Ecclesiastical Prelates Are in the State of Perfection?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all ecclesiastical prelates are
+in a state of perfection. For Jerome commenting on Titus 1:5,
+"Ordain . . . in every city," etc. says: "Formerly priest was the
+same as bishop," and afterwards he adds: "Just as priests know that
+by the custom of the Church they are subject to the one who is placed
+over them, so too, bishops should recognize that, by custom rather
+than by the very ordinance of our Lord, they are above the priests,
+and are together the rightful governors of the Church." Now bishops
+are in the state of perfection. Therefore those priests also are who
+have the cure of souls.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, just as bishops together with their consecration
+receive the cure of souls, so also do parish priests and archdeacons,
+of whom a gloss on Acts 6:3, "Brethren, look ye out . . . seven men
+of good reputation," says: "The apostles decided here to appoint
+throughout the Church seven deacons, who were to be of a higher
+degree, and as it were the supports of that which is nearest to the
+altar." Therefore it would seem that these also are in the state of
+perfection.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, just as bishops are bound to "lay down their life
+for their sheep," so too are parish priests and archdeacons. But this
+belongs to the perfection of charity, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3).
+Therefore it would seem that parish priests and archdeacons also are
+in the state of perfection.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v): "The order of
+pontiffs is consummative and perfecting, that of the priests is
+illuminative and light-giving, that of the ministers is cleansing and
+discretive." Hence it is evident that perfection is ascribed to
+bishops only.
+
+_I answer that,_ In priests and deacons having cure of souls two
+things may be considered, namely their order and their cure. Their
+order is directed to some act in the Divine offices. Wherefore it has
+been stated above (Q. 183, A. 3, ad 3) that the distinction of orders
+is comprised under the distinction of offices. Hence by receiving a
+certain order a man receives the power of exercising certain sacred
+acts, but he is not bound on this account to things pertaining to
+perfection, except in so far as in the Western Church the receiving
+of a sacred order includes the taking of a vow of continence, which
+is one of the things pertaining to perfection, as we shall state
+further on (Q. 186, A. 4). Therefore it is clear that from the fact
+that a man receives a sacred order a man is not placed simply in the
+state of perfection, although inward perfection is required in order
+that one exercise such acts worthily.
+
+In like manner, neither are they placed in the state of perfection on
+the part of the cure which they take upon themselves. For they are
+not bound by this very fact under the obligation of a perpetual vow
+to retain the cure of souls; but they can surrender it--either by
+entering religion, even without their bishop's permission (cf.
+Decret. xix, qu. 2, can. Duae sunt)--or again an archdeacon may with
+his bishop's permission resign his arch-deaconry or parish, and
+accept a simple prebend without cure, which would be nowise lawful,
+if he were in the state of perfection; for "no man putting his hand
+to the plough and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God" (Luke
+9:62). On the other hand bishops, since they are in the state of
+perfection, cannot abandon the episcopal cure, save by the authority
+of the Sovereign Pontiff (to whom alone it belongs also to dispense
+from perpetual vows), and this for certain causes, as we shall state
+further on (Q. 185, A. 4). Wherefore it is manifest that not all
+prelates are in the state of perfection, but only bishops.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We may speak of priest and bishop in two ways. First,
+with regard to the name: and thus formerly bishops and priests were
+not distinct. For bishops are so called "because they watch over
+others," as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei xix, 19); while the
+priests according to the Greek are "elders." [*Referring to the Greek
+_episkopos_ and _presbyteros_ from which the English 'bishop' and
+'priest' are derived.] Hence the Apostle employs the term "priests"
+in reference to both, when he says (1 Tim. 5:17): "Let the priests
+that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor"; and again he uses
+the term "bishops" in the same way, wherefore addressing the priests
+of the Church of Ephesus he says (Acts 20:28): "Take heed to
+yourselves" and "to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath
+placed you bishops, to rule the church of God."
+
+But as regards the thing signified by these terms, there was always a
+difference between them, even at the time of the apostles. This is
+clear on the authority of Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), and of a gloss
+on Luke 10:1, "After these things the Lord appointed," etc. which
+says: "Just as the apostles were made bishops, so the seventy-two
+disciples were made priests of the second order." Subsequently,
+however, in order to avoid schism, it became necessary to distinguish
+even the terms, by calling the higher ones bishops and the lower ones
+priests. But to assert that priests nowise differ from bishops is
+reckoned by Augustine among heretical doctrines (De Heres. liii),
+where he says that the Arians maintained that "no distinction existed
+between a priest and a bishop."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Bishops have the chief cure of the sheep of their
+diocese, while parish priests and archdeacons exercise an inferior
+ministry under the bishops. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 12:28, "to one,
+helps, to another, governments [*Vulg.: 'God hath set some in the
+church . . . helps, governments,' etc.]," says: "Helps, namely
+assistants to those who are in authority," as Titus was to the
+Apostle, or as archdeacons to the bishop; "governments, namely
+persons of lesser authority, such as priests who have to instruct the
+people": and Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) that "just as we see the
+whole hierarchy culminating in Jesus, so each office culminates in
+its respective godlike hierarch or bishop." Also it is said (XVI, qu.
+i, can. Cunctis): "Priests and deacons must all take care not to do
+anything without their bishop's permission." Wherefore it is evident
+that they stand in relation to their bishop as wardens or mayors to
+the king; and for this reason, just as in earthly governments the
+king alone receives a solemn blessing, while others are appointed by
+simple commission, so too in the Church the episcopal cure is
+conferred with the solemnity of consecration, while the archdeacon or
+parish priest receives his cure by simple appointment; although they
+are consecrated by receiving orders before having a cure.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As parish priests and archdeacons have not the chief
+cure, but a certain ministry as committed to them by the bishop, so
+the pastoral office does not belong to them in chief, nor are they
+bound to lay down their life for the sheep, except in so far as they
+have a share in their cure. Hence we should say that they have an
+office pertaining to perfection rather than that they attain the
+state of perfection.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Religious State Is More Perfect Than That of Prelates?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the religious state is more perfect
+than that of prelates. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt
+be perfect, go" and "sell" all [Vulg.: 'what'] "thou hast, and give
+to the poor"; and religious do this. But bishops are not bound to do
+so; for it is said (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): "Bishops, if
+they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired
+property, and whatever belongs to them personally." Therefore
+religious are in a more perfect state than bishops.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, perfection consists more especially in the love of
+God than in the love of our neighbor. Now the religious state is
+directly ordered to the love of God, wherefore it takes its name from
+"service and homage to God," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi);
+[*Quoted above A. 5] whereas the bishop's state would seem to be
+ordered to the love of our neighbor, of whose cure he is the
+"warden," and from this he takes his name, as Augustine observes (De
+Civ. Dei. xix, 19). Therefore it would seem that the religious state
+is more perfect than that of bishops.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the religious state is directed to the contemplative
+life, which is more excellent than the active life to which the
+episcopal state is directed. For Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7) that
+"Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the
+active life desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias, who
+was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator, exclaimed against
+being sent to preach." Therefore it would seem that the religious
+state is more perfect than the episcopal state.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is not lawful for anyone to pass from a more
+excellent to a less excellent state; for this would be to look back
+[*Cf. Luke 9:62]. Yet a man may pass from the religious to the
+episcopal state, for it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that
+"the holy ordination makes a monk to be a bishop." Therefore the
+episcopal state is more perfect than the religious.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), "the agent
+is ever more excellent than the patient." Now in the genus of
+perfection according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v, vi), bishops are in
+the position of "perfecters," whereas religious are in the position
+of being "perfected"; the former of which pertains to action, and the
+latter to passion. Whence it is evident that the state of perfection
+is more excellent in bishops than in religious.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Renunciation of one's possessions may be considered in
+two ways. First, as being actual: and thus it is not essential, but a
+means, to perfection, as stated above (A. 3). Hence nothing hinders
+the state of perfection from being without renunciation of one's
+possessions, and the same applies to other outward practices.
+Secondly, it may be considered in relation to one's preparedness, in
+the sense of being prepared to renounce or give away all: and this
+belongs directly to perfection. Hence Augustine says (De QQ. Evang.
+ii, qu. 11): "Our Lord shows that the children of wisdom understand
+righteousness to consist neither in eating nor in abstaining, but in
+bearing want patiently." Wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:12): "I
+know . . . both to abound and to suffer need." Now bishops especially
+are bound to despise all things for the honor of God and the
+spiritual welfare of their flock, when it is necessary for them to do
+so, either by giving to the poor of their flock, or by suffering
+"with joy the being stripped of" their "own goods" [*Heb. 10:34].
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That bishops are busy about things pertaining to the
+love of their neighbor, arises out of the abundance of their love of
+God. Hence our Lord asked Peter first of all whether he loved Him,
+and afterwards committed the care of His flock to him. And Gregory
+says (Pastor. i, 5): "If the pastoral care is a proof of love, he who
+refuses to feed God's flock, though having the means to do so, is
+convicted of not loving the supreme Pastor." And it is a sign of
+greater love if a man devotes himself to others for his friend's
+sake, than if he be willing only to serve his friend.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1), "a prelate
+should be foremost in action, and more uplifted than others in
+contemplation," because it is incumbent on him to contemplate, not
+only for his own sake, but also for the purpose of instructing others.
+Hence Gregory applies (Hom. v in Ezech.) the words of Ps. 144:7, "They
+shall publish the memory . . . of Thy sweetness," to perfect men
+returning after their contemplation.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Parish Priests and Archdeacons Are More Perfect Than
+Religious?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that also parish priests and archdeacons
+are more perfect than religious. For Chrysostom says in his Dialogue
+(De Sacerdot. vi): "Take for example a monk, such as Elias, if I may
+exaggerate somewhat, he is not to be compared with one who, cast
+among the people and compelled to carry the sins of many, remains
+firm and strong." A little further on he says: "If I were given the
+choice, where would I prefer to please, in the priestly office, or in
+the monastic solitude, without hesitation I should choose the
+former." Again in the same book (ch. 5) he says: "If you compare the
+toils of this project, namely of the monastic life, with a
+well-employed priesthood, you will find them as far distant from one
+another as a common citizen is from a king." Therefore it would seem
+that priests who have the cure of souls are more perfect than
+religious.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (ad Valerium, Ep. xxi): "Let thy
+religious prudence observe that in this life, and especially at these
+times, there is nothing so difficult, so onerous, so perilous as the
+office of bishop, priest, or deacon; while in God's sight there is no
+greater blessing, if one engage in the fight as ordered by our
+Commander-in-chief." Therefore religious are not more perfect than
+priests or deacons.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Ep. lx, ad Aurel.): "It would be
+most regrettable, were we to exalt monks to such a disastrous degree
+of pride, and deem the clergy deserving of such a grievous insult,"
+as to assert that "'a bad monk is a good clerk,' since sometimes even
+a good monk makes a bad clerk." And a little before this he says that
+"God's servants," i.e. monks, "must not be allowed to think that they
+may easily be chosen for something better," namely the clerical
+state, "if they should become worse thereby," namely by leaving the
+monastic state. Therefore it would seem that those who are in the
+clerical state are more perfect than religious.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is not lawful to pass from a more perfect to a
+less perfect state. Yet it is lawful to pass from the monastic state
+to a priestly office with a cure attached, as appears (XVI, qu. i,
+can. Si quis monachus) from a decree of Pope Gelasius, who says: "If
+there be a monk, who by the merit of his exemplary life is worthy of
+the priesthood, and the abbot under whose authority he fights for
+Christ his King, ask that he be made a priest, the bishop shall take
+him and ordain him in such place as he shall choose fitting." And
+Jerome says (Ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "In the monastery so live
+as to deserve to be a clerk." Therefore parish priests and
+archdeacons are more perfect than religious.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, bishops are in a more perfect state than religious,
+as shown above (A. 7). But parish priests and archdeacons, through
+having cure of souls, are more like bishops than religious are.
+Therefore they are more perfect.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, virtue "is concerned with the difficult and the
+good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to lead a good life in
+the office of parish priest or archdeacon than in the religious
+state. Therefore parish priests and archdeacons have more perfect
+virtue than religious.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is stated (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duce): "If a man
+while governing the people in his church under the bishop and leading
+a secular life is inspired by the Holy Ghost to desire to work out
+his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical rule, since he
+is led by a private law, there is no reason why he should be
+constrained by a public law." Now a man is not led by the law of the
+Holy Ghost, which is here called a "private law," except to something
+more perfect. Therefore it would seem that religious are more perfect
+than archdeacons or parish priests.
+
+_I answer that,_ When we compare things in the point of
+super-eminence, we look not at that in which they agree, but at that
+wherein they differ. Now in parish priests and archdeacons three
+things may be considered, their state, their order, and their office.
+It belongs to their state that they are seculars, to their order that
+they are priests or deacons, to their office that they have the cure
+of souls committed to them.
+
+Accordingly, if we compare these with one who is a religious by
+state, a deacon or priest by order, having the cure of souls by
+office, as many monks and canons regular have, this one will excel in
+the first point, and in the other points he will be equal. But if the
+latter differ from the former in state and office, but agree in
+order, such as religious priests and deacons not having the cure of
+souls, it is evident that the latter will be more excellent than the
+former in state, less excellent in office, and equal in order.
+
+We must therefore consider which is the greater, preeminence of state
+or of office; and here, seemingly, we should take note of two things,
+goodness and difficulty. Accordingly, if we make the comparison with
+a view to goodness, the religious state surpasses the office of
+parish priest or archdeacon, because a religious pledges his whole
+life to the quest of perfection, whereas the parish priest or
+archdeacon does not pledge his whole life to the cure of souls, as a
+bishop does, nor is it competent to him, as it is to a bishop, to
+exercise the cure of souls in chief, but only in certain particulars
+regarding the cure of souls committed to his charge, as stated above
+(A. 6, ad 2). Wherefore the comparison of their religious state with
+their office is like the comparisons of the universal with the
+particular, and of a holocaust with a sacrifice which is less than a
+holocaust according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence it is said
+(XIX, qu. i, can. Clerici qui monachorum.): "Clerics who wish to take
+the monastic vows through being desirous of a better life must be
+allowed by their bishops the free entrance into the monastery."
+
+This comparison, however, must be considered as regarding the genus
+of the deed; for as regards the charity of the doer it happens
+sometimes that a deed which is of less account in its genus is of
+greater merit if it be done out of greater charity.
+
+On the other hand, if we consider the difficulty of leading a good
+life in religion, and in the office of one having the cure of souls,
+in this way it is more difficult to lead a good life together with
+the exercise of the cure of souls, on account of outward dangers:
+although the religious life is more difficult as regards the genus of
+the deed, by reason of the strictness of religious observance. If,
+however, the religious is also without orders, as in the case of
+religious lay brethren, then it is evident that the pre-eminence of
+order excels in the point of dignity, since by holy orders a man is
+appointed to the most august ministry of serving Christ Himself in
+the sacrament of the altar. For this requires a greater inward
+holiness than that which is requisite for the religious state, since
+as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) the monastic order must follow the
+priestly orders, and ascend to Divine things in imitation of them.
+Hence, other things being equal, a cleric who is in holy orders, sins
+more grievously if he do something contrary to holiness than a
+religious who is not in holy orders: although a religious who is not
+in orders is bound to regular observance to which persons in holy
+orders are not bound.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We might answer briefly these quotations from
+Chrysostom by saying that he speaks not of a priest of lesser order
+who has the cure of souls, but of a bishop, who is called a
+high-priest; and this agrees with the purpose of that book wherein he
+consoles himself and Basil in that they were chosen to be bishops. We
+may, however, pass this over and reply that he speaks in view of the
+difficulty. For he had already said: "When the pilot is surrounded by
+the stormy sea and is able to bring the ship safely out of the
+tempest, then he deserves to be acknowledged by all as a perfect
+pilot"; and afterwards he concludes, as quoted, with regard to the
+monk, "who is not to be compared with one who, cast among the people
+. . . remains firm"; and he gives the reason why, because "both in
+the calm and in the storm he piloted himself to safety." This proves
+nothing more than that the state of one who has the cure of souls is
+fraught with more danger than the monastic state; and to keep oneself
+innocent in face of a greater peril is proof of greater virtue. on
+the other hand, it also indicates greatness of virtue if a man avoid
+dangers by entering religion; hence he does not say that "he would
+prefer the priestly office to the monastic solitude," but that "he
+would rather please" in the former than in the latter, since this is
+a proof of greater virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This passage quoted from Augustine also clearly refers
+to the question of difficulty which proves the greatness of virtue in
+those who lead a good life, as stated above (ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Augustine there compares monks with clerics as regards
+the pre-eminence of order, not as regards the distinction between
+religious and secular life.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Those who are taken from the religious state to receive
+the cure of souls, being already in sacred orders, attain to
+something they had not hitherto, namely the office of the cure, yet
+they do not put aside what they had already. For it is said in the
+Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): "With regard to those monks
+who after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of
+clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose."
+
+On the other hand, parish priests and archdeacons, when they enter
+religion, resign their cure, in order to enter the state of
+perfection. This very fact shows the excellence of the religious
+life. When religious who are not in orders are admitted to the
+clerical state and to the sacred orders, they are clearly promoted to
+something better, as stated: this is indicated by the very way in
+which Jerome expresses himself: "So live in the monastery as to
+deserve to be a clerk."
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Parish priests and archdeacons are more like bishops
+than religious are, in a certain respect, namely as regards the cure
+of souls which they have subordinately; but as regards the obligation
+in perpetuity, religious are more like a bishop, as appears from what
+we have said above (AA. 5, 6).
+
+Reply Obj. 6: The difficulty that arises from the arduousness of the
+deed adds to the perfection of virtue; but the difficulty that
+results from outward obstacles sometimes lessens the perfection of
+virtue--for instance, when a man loves not virtue so much as to wish
+to avoid the obstacles to virtue, according to the saying of the
+Apostle (1 Cor. 9:25), "Everyone that striveth for the mastery
+refraineth himself from all things": and sometimes it is a sign of
+perfect virtue--for instance, when a man forsakes not virtue,
+although he is hindered in the practice of virtue unawares or by some
+unavoidable cause. In the religious state there is greater difficulty
+arising from the arduousness of deeds; whereas for those who in any
+way at all live in the world, there is greater difficulty resulting
+from obstacles to virtue, which obstacles the religious has had the
+foresight to avoid.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 185
+
+OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE EPISCOPAL STATE
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider things pertaining to the episcopal state. Under
+this head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful to refuse the office of bishop definitively?
+
+(3) Whether the better man should be chosen for the episcopal office?
+
+(4) Whether a bishop may pass over to the religious state?
+
+(5) Whether he may lawfully abandon his subjects in a bodily manner?
+
+(6) Whether he can have anything of his own?
+
+(7) Whether he sins mortally by not distributing ecclesiastical goods
+to the poor?
+
+(8) Whether religious who are appointed to the episcopal office are
+bound to religious observances?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Desire the Office of a Bishop?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to desire the office of
+a bishop. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:1): "He that desires [Vulg.:
+'If a man desire'] the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work."
+Now it is lawful and praiseworthy to desire a good work. Therefore it
+is even praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the
+religious, as we have said above (Q. 184, A. 7). But it is
+praiseworthy to desire to enter the religious state. Therefore it is
+also praiseworthy to desire promotion to the episcopal state.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 11:26): "He that hideth up corn
+shall be cursed among the people; but a blessing upon the head of
+them that sell." Now a man who is apt, both in manner of life and by
+knowledge, for the episcopal office, would seem to hide up the
+spiritual corn, if he shun the episcopal state, whereas by accepting
+the episcopal office he enters the state of a dispenser of spiritual
+corn. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a
+bishop, and blameworthy to refuse it.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the deeds of the saints related in Holy Writ are set
+before us as an example, according to Rom. 15:4, "What things soever
+were written, were written for our learning." Now we read (Isa. 6:8)
+that Isaias offered himself for the office of preacher, which belongs
+chiefly to bishops. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire
+the office of a bishop.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The higher
+place, without which the people cannot be ruled, though it be filled
+becomingly, is unbecomingly desired."
+
+_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in the episcopal
+office. One is principal and final, namely the bishop's work, whereby
+the good of our neighbor is intended, according to John 21:17, "Feed
+My sheep." Another thing is the height of degree, for a bishop is
+placed above others, according to Matt. 24:45, "A faithful and a wise
+servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." The third is
+something resulting from these, namely reverence, honor, and a
+sufficiency of temporalities, according to 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the
+priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor."
+Accordingly, to desire the episcopal office on account of these
+incidental goods is manifestly unlawful, and pertains to covetousness
+or ambition. Wherefore our Lord said against the Pharisees (Matt.
+23:6, 7): "They love the first places at feasts, and the first chairs
+in the synagogues, and salutations in the market-place, and to be
+called by men, Rabbi." As regards the second, namely the height of
+degree, it is presumptuous to desire the episcopal office. Hence our
+Lord reproved His disciples for seeking precedence, by saying to them
+(Matt. 20:25): "You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it
+over them." Here Chrysostom says (Hom. lxv in Matth.) that in these
+words "He points out that it is heathenish to seek precedence; and
+thus by comparing them to the gentiles He converted their impetuous
+soul."
+
+On the other hand, to desire to do good to one's neighbor is in
+itself praiseworthy, and virtuous. Nevertheless, since considered as
+an episcopal act it has the height of degree attached to it, it would
+seem that, unless there be manifest and urgent reason for it, it
+would be presumptuous for any man to desire to be set over others in
+order to do them good. Thus Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8) that "it was
+praiseworthy to seek the office of a bishop when it was certain to
+bring one into graver dangers." Wherefore it was not easy to find a
+person to accept this burden, especially seeing that it is through
+the zeal of charity that one divinely instigated to do so, according
+to Gregory, who says (Pastor. i, 7) that "Isaias being desirous of
+profiting his neighbor, commendably desired the office of preacher."
+
+Nevertheless, anyone may, without presumption, desire to do such like
+works if he should happen to be in that office, or to be worthy of
+doing them; so that the object of his desire is the good work and not
+the precedence in dignity. Hence Chrysostom* says: "It is indeed good
+to desire a good work, but to desire the primacy of honor is vanity.
+For primacy seeks one that shuns it, and abhors one that desires it."
+[*The quotation is from the Opus Imperfectum in Matth. (Hom. xxxv),
+falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom.]
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), "when the Apostle said
+this he who was set over the people was the first to be dragged to
+the torments of martyrdom," so that there was nothing to be desired
+in the episcopal office, save the good work. Wherefore Augustine says
+(De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that when the Apostle said, "'Whoever desireth
+the office of bishop, desireth a good work,' he wished to explain
+what the episcopacy is: for it denotes work and not honor: since
+_skopos_ signifies 'watching.' Wherefore if we like we may render
+_episkopein_ by the Latin _superintendere_ (to watch over): thus a
+man may know himself to be no bishop if he loves to precede rather
+than to profit others." For, as he observed shortly before, "in our
+actions we should seek, not honor nor power in this life, since all
+things beneath the sun are vanity, but the work itself which that
+honor or power enables us to do." Nevertheless, as Gregory says
+(Pastor. i, 8), "while praising the desire" (namely of the good work)
+"he forthwith turns this object of praise into one of fear, when he
+adds: It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless," as though to say:
+"I praise what you seek, but learn first what it is you seek."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There is no parity between the religious and the
+episcopal state, for two reasons. First, because perfection of life
+is a prerequisite of the episcopal state, as appears from our Lord
+asking Peter if he loved Him more than the others, before committing
+the pastoral office to him, whereas perfection is not a prerequisite
+of the religious state, since the latter is the way to perfection.
+Hence our Lord did not say (Matt. 19:21): "If thou art perfect, go,
+sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast," but "If thou wilt be perfect."
+The reason for this difference is because, according to Dionysius
+(Eccl. Hier. vi), perfection pertains actively to the bishop, as the
+"perfecter," but to the monk passively as one who is "perfected": and
+one needs to be perfect in order to bring others to perfection, but
+not in order to be brought to perfection. Now it is presumptuous to
+think oneself perfect, but it is not presumptuous to tend to
+perfection. Secondly, because he who enters the religious state
+subjects himself to others for the sake of a spiritual profit, and
+anyone may lawfully do this. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
+xix, 19): "No man is debarred from striving for the knowledge of
+truth, since this pertains to a praiseworthy ease." On the other
+hand, he who enters the episcopal state is raised up in order to
+watch over others, and no man should seek to be raised thus,
+according to Heb. 5:4, "Neither doth any man take the honor to
+himself, but he that is called by God": and Chrysostom says: "To
+desire supremacy in the Church is neither just nor useful. For what
+wise man seeks of his own accord to submit to such servitude and
+peril, as to have to render an account of the whole Church? None save
+him who fears not God's judgment, and makes a secular abuse of his
+ecclesiastical authority, by turning it to secular uses."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The dispensing of spiritual corn is not to be carried
+on in an arbitrary fashion, but chiefly according to the appointment
+and disposition of God, and in the second place according to the
+appointment of the higher prelates, in whose person it is said (1
+Cor. 4:1): "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ,
+and the dispensers of the mysteries of God." Wherefore a man is not
+deemed to hide spiritual corn if he avoids governing or correcting
+others, and is not competent to do so, neither in virtue of his
+office nor of his superior's command; thus alone is he deemed to hide
+it, when he neglects to dispense it while under obligation to do so
+in virtue of his office, or obstinately refuses to accept the office
+when it is imposed on him. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
+19): "The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity
+undertake an honest labor. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we
+must devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but
+if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of
+us."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "Isaias, who wishing to
+be sent, knew himself to be already cleansed by the live coal taken
+from the altar, shows us that no one should dare uncleansed to
+approach the sacred ministry. Since, then, it is very difficult for
+anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed, it is safer to decline
+the office of preacher."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for a Man to Refuse Absolutely an Appointment to
+the Episcopate?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to refuse absolutely an
+appointment to the episcopate. For as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7),
+"Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the
+active life, desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias who
+was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator by contemplation
+exclaimed against being sent to preach." Now no man sins by being
+unwilling to forgo better things in order to adhere to things that
+are not so good. Since then the love of God surpasses the love of our
+neighbor, and the contemplative life is preferable to the active, as
+shown above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 2; Q. 182, A. 1) it would seem
+that a man sins not if he refuse absolutely the episcopal office.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "it is very
+difficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed: nor
+should anyone uncleansed approach the sacred ministry." Therefore if
+a man perceives that he is not cleansed, however urgently the
+episcopal office be enjoined him, he ought not to accept it.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Jerome (Prologue, super Marc.) says that "it is
+related of the Blessed Mark* that after receiving the faith he cut
+off his thumb that he might be excluded from the priesthood." [*This
+prologue was falsely ascribed to St. Jerome, and the passage quoted
+refers, not to St. Mark the Evangelist, but to a hermit of that name.
+(Cf. Baronius, Anno Christi, 45, num. XLIV)] Likewise some take a vow
+never to accept a bishopric. Now to place an obstacle to a thing
+amounts to the same as refusing it altogether. Therefore it would
+seem that one may, without sin, refuse the episcopal office
+absolutely.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. xlviii ad Eudox.): "If Mother
+Church requires your service, neither accept with greedy conceit, nor
+refuse with fawning indolence"; and afterwards he adds: "Nor prefer
+your ease to the needs of the Church: for if no good men were willing
+to assist her in her labor, you would seek in vain how we could be
+born of her."
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things have to be considered in the acceptance
+of the episcopal office: first, what a man may fittingly desire
+according to his own will; secondly, what it behooves a man to do
+according to the will of another. As regards his own will it becomes
+a man to look chiefly to his own spiritual welfare, whereas that he
+look to the spiritual welfare of others becomes a man according to
+the appointment of another having authority, as stated above (A. 1,
+ad 3). Hence just as it is a mark of an inordinate will that a man of
+his own choice incline to be appointed to the government of others,
+so too it indicates an inordinate will if a man definitively refuse
+the aforesaid office of government in direct opposition to the
+appointment of his superior: and this for two reasons.
+
+First, because this is contrary to the love of our neighbor, for
+whose good a man should offer himself according as place and time
+demand: hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the demands
+of charity undertake an honest labor." Secondly, because this is
+contrary to humility, whereby a man submits to his superior's
+commands: hence Gregory says (Pastor. i, 6): "In God's sight humility
+is genuine when it does not obstinately refuse to submit to what is
+usefully prescribed."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although simply and absolutely speaking the
+contemplative life is more excellent than the active, and the love of
+God better than the love of our neighbor, yet, on the other hand, the
+good of the many should be preferred to the good of the individual.
+Wherefore Augustine says in the passage quoted above: "Nor prefer
+your own ease to the needs of the Church," and all the more since it
+belongs to the love of God that a man undertake the pastoral care of
+Christ's sheep. Hence Augustine, commenting on John 21:17, "Feed My
+sheep," says (Tract. cxxiii in Joan.): "Be it the task of love to
+feed the Lord's flock, even as it was the mark of fear to deny the
+Shepherd."
+
+Moreover prelates are not transferred to the active life, so as to
+forsake the contemplative; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
+19) that "if the burden of the pastoral office be imposed, we must
+not abandon the delights of truth," which are derived from
+contemplation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: No one is bound to obey his superior by doing what is
+unlawful, as appears from what was said above concerning obedience
+(Q. 104, A. 5). Accordingly it may happen that he who is appointed to
+the office of prelate perceive something in himself on account of
+which it is unlawful for him to accept a prelacy. But this obstacle
+may sometimes be removed by the very person who is appointed to the
+pastoral cure--for instance, if he have a purpose to sin, he may
+abandon it--and for this reason he is not excused from being bound to
+obey definitely the superior who has appointed him. Sometimes,
+however, he is unable himself to remove the impediment that makes the
+pastoral office unlawful to him, yet the prelate who appoints him can
+do so--for instance, if he be irregular or excommunicate. In such a
+case he ought to make known his defect to the prelate who has
+appointed him; and if the latter be willing to remove the impediment,
+he is bound humbly to obey. Hence when Moses had said (Ex. 4:10): "I
+beseech thee, Lord, I am not eloquent from yesterday, and the day
+before," the Lord answered (Ex. 4:12): "I will be in thy mouth, and I
+will teach thee what thou shalt speak." At other times the impediment
+cannot be removed, neither by the person appointing nor by the one
+appointed--for instance, if an archbishop be unable to dispense from
+an irregularity; wherefore a subject, if irregular, would not be
+bound to obey him by accepting the episcopate or even sacred orders.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is not in itself necessary for salvation to accept
+the episcopal office, but it becomes necessary by reason of the
+superior's command. Now one may lawfully place an obstacle to things
+thus necessary for salvation, before the command is given; else it
+would not be lawful to marry a second time, lest one should thus
+incur an impediment to the episcopate or holy orders. But this would
+not be lawful in things necessary for salvation. Hence the Blessed
+Mark did not act against a precept by cutting off his finger,
+although it is credible that he did this by the instigation of the
+Holy Ghost, without which it would be unlawful for anyone to lay
+hands on himself. If a man take a vow not to accept the bishop's
+office, and by this intend to bind himself not even to accept it in
+obedience to his superior prelate, his vow is unlawful; but if he
+intend to bind himself, so far as it lies with him, not to seek the
+episcopal office, nor to accept it except under urgent necessity, his
+vow is lawful, because he vows to do what it becomes a man to do.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 3]
+
+Whether He That Is Appointed to the Episcopate Ought to Be Better
+Than Others?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one who is appointed to the
+episcopate ought to be better than others. For our Lord, when about
+to commit the pastoral office to Peter, asked him if he loved Him
+more than the others. Now a man is the better through loving God the
+more. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be appointed to
+the episcopal office except he be better than others.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Pope Symmachus says (can. Vilissimus I, qu. 1): "A
+man is of very little worth who though excelling in dignity, excels
+not in knowledge and holiness." Now he who excels in knowledge and
+holiness is better. Therefore a man ought not to be appointed to the
+episcopate unless he be better than others.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in every genus the lesser are governed by the
+greater, as corporeal things are governed by things spiritual, and
+the lower bodies by the higher, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 3).
+Now a bishop is appointed to govern others. Therefore he should be
+better than others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Decretal [*Can. Cum dilectus, de Electione]
+says that "it suffices to choose a good man, nor is it necessary to
+choose the better man."
+
+_I answer that,_ In designating a man for the episcopal office,
+something has to be considered on the part of the person designate,
+and something on the part of the designator. For on the part of the
+designator, whether by election or by appointment, it is required
+that he choose such a one as will dispense the divine mysteries
+faithfully. These should be dispensed for the good of the Church,
+according to 1 Cor. 14:12, "Seek to abound unto the edifying of the
+Church"; and the divine mysteries are not committed to men for their
+own meed, which they should await in the life to come. Consequently
+he who has to choose or appoint one for a bishop is not bound to take
+one who is best simply, i.e. according to charity, but one who is
+best for governing the Church, one namely who is able to instruct,
+defend, and govern the Church peacefully. Hence Jerome, commenting on
+Titus 1:5, says against certain persons that "some seek to erect as
+pillars of the Church, not those whom they know to be more useful to
+the Church, but those whom they love more, or those by whose
+obsequiousness they have been cajoled or undone, or for whom some
+person in authority has spoken, and, not to say worse than this, have
+succeeded by means of gifts in being made clerics."
+
+Now this pertains to the respect of persons, which in such matters is
+a grave sin. Wherefore a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. clxvii ad Hieron.]
+on James 2:1, "Brethren, have not . . . with respect of persons,"
+says: "If this distinction of sitting and standing be referred to
+ecclesiastical honors, we must not deem it a slight sin to 'have the
+faith of the Lord of glory with respect of persons.' For who would
+suffer a rich man to be chosen for the Church's seat of honor, in
+despite of a poor man who is better instructed and holier?"
+
+On the part of the person appointed, it is not required that he
+esteem himself better than others, for this would be proud and
+presumptuous; but it suffices that he perceive nothing in himself
+which would make it unlawful for him to take up the office of
+prelate. Hence although Peter was asked by our Lord if he loved Him
+more than the others, he did not, in his reply, set himself before
+the others, but answered simply that he loved Christ.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord knew that, by His own bestowal, Peter was in
+other respects fitted to govern the Church: wherefore He questioned
+him about his greater love, to show that when we find a man otherwise
+fitted for the government of the Church, we must look chiefly to his
+pre-eminence in the love of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This statement refers to the pursuits of the man who is
+placed in authority. For he should aim at showing himself to be more
+excellent than others in both knowledge and holiness. Wherefore
+Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1) "the occupations of a prelate ought to
+excel those of the people, as much as the shepherd's life excels that
+of his flock." But he is not to be blamed and looked upon as
+worthless if he excelled not before being raised to the prelacy.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to 1 Cor. 12:4 seqq., "there are diversities
+of graces . . . and . . . of ministries . . . and . . . of
+operations." Hence nothing hinders one from being more fitted for the
+office of governing, who does not excel in the grace of holiness. It
+is otherwise in the government of the natural order, where that which
+is higher in the natural order is for that very reason more fitted to
+dispose of those that are lower.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 4]
+
+Whether a Bishop May Lawfully Forsake the Episcopal Cure, in Order to
+Enter Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that a bishop cannot lawfully forsake his
+episcopal cure in order to enter religion. For no one can lawfully
+pass from a more perfect to a less perfect state; since this is "to
+look back," which is condemned by the words of our Lord (Luke 9:62),
+"No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for
+the kingdom of God." Now the episcopal state is more perfect than the
+religious, as shown above (Q. 184, A. 7). Therefore just as it is
+unlawful to return to the world from the religious state, so is it
+unlawful to pass from the episcopal to the religious state.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the order of grace is more congruous than the order
+of nature. Now according to nature a thing is not moved in contrary
+directions; thus if a stone be naturally moved downwards, it cannot
+naturally return upwards from below. But according to the order of
+grace it is lawful to pass from the religious to the episcopal state.
+Therefore it is not lawful to pass contrariwise from the episcopal to
+the religious state.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in the works of grace nothing should be inoperative.
+Now when once a man is consecrated bishop he retains in perpetuity
+the spiritual power of giving orders and doing like things that
+pertain to the episcopal office: and this power would seemingly
+remain inoperative in one who gives up the episcopal cure. Therefore
+it would seem that a bishop may not forsake the episcopal cure and
+enter religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ No man is compelled to do what is in itself
+unlawful. Now those who seek to resign their episcopal cure are
+compelled to resign (Extra, de Renunt. cap. Quidam). Therefore
+apparently it is not unlawful to give up the episcopal cure.
+
+_I answer that,_ The perfection of the episcopal state consists in
+this that for love of God a man binds himself to work for the
+salvation of his neighbor, wherefore he is bound to retain the
+pastoral cure so long as he is able to procure the spiritual welfare
+of the subjects entrusted to his care: a matter which he must not
+neglect--neither for the sake of the quiet of divine contemplation,
+since the Apostle, on account of the needs of his subjects, suffered
+patiently to be delayed even from the contemplation of the life to
+come, according to Phil. 1:22-25, "What I shall choose I know not,
+but I am straitened between two, having a desire to be dissolved, and
+to be with Christ, a thing by far better. But to abide still in the
+flesh is needful for you. And having this confidence, I know that I
+shall abide"; nor for the sake of avoiding any hardships or of
+acquiring any gain whatsoever, because as it is written (John 10:11),
+"the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep."
+
+At times, however, it happens in several ways that a bishop is
+hindered from procuring the spiritual welfare of his subjects.
+Sometimes on account of his own defect, either of conscience (for
+instance if he be guilty of murder or simony), or of body (for
+example if he be old or infirm), or of irregularity arising, for
+instance, from bigamy. Sometimes he is hindered through some defect
+in his subjects, whom he is unable to profit. Hence Gregory says
+(Dial. ii, 3): "The wicked must be borne patiently, when there are
+some good who can be succored, but when there is no profit at all for
+the good, it is sometimes useless to labor for the wicked. Wherefore
+the perfect when they find that they labor in vain are often minded
+to go elsewhere in order to labor with fruit." Sometimes again this
+hindrance arises on the part of others, as when scandal results from
+a certain person being in authority: for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
+8:13): "If meat scandalize my brother, I will never eat flesh":
+provided, however, the scandal is not caused by the wickedness of
+persons desirous of subverting the faith or the righteousness of the
+Church; because the pastoral cure is not to be laid aside on account
+of scandal of this kind, according to Matt. 15:14, "Let them alone,"
+those namely who were scandalized at the truth of Christ's teaching,
+"they are blind, and leaders of the blind."
+
+Nevertheless just as a man takes upon himself the charge of authority
+at the appointment of a higher superior, so too it behooves him to be
+subject to the latter's authority in laying aside the accepted charge
+for the reasons given above. Hence Innocent III says (Extra, de
+Renunt., cap. Nisi cum pridem): "Though thou hast wings wherewith
+thou art anxious to fly away into solitude, they are so tied by the
+bonds of authority, that thou art not free to fly without our
+permission." For the Pope alone can dispense from the perpetual vow,
+by which a man binds himself to the care of his subjects, when he
+took upon himself the episcopal office.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The perfection of religious and that of bishops are
+regarded from different standpoints. For it belongs to the perfection
+of a religious to occupy oneself in working out one's own salvation,
+whereas it belongs to the perfection of a bishop to occupy oneself in
+working for the salvation of others. Hence so long as a man can be
+useful to the salvation of his neighbor, he would be going back, if
+he wished to pass to the religious state, to busy himself only with
+his own salvation, since he has bound himself to work not only for
+his own but also for others' salvation. Wherefore Innocent III says
+in the Decretal quoted above that "it is more easily allowable for a
+monk to ascend to the episcopacy, than for a bishop to descend to the
+monastic life. If, however, he be unable to procure the salvation of
+others it is meet he should seek his own."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: On account of no obstacle should a man forego the work
+of his own salvation, which pertains to the religious state. But
+there may be an obstacle to the procuring of another's salvation;
+wherefore a monk may be raised to the episcopal state wherein he is
+able also to work out his own salvation. And a bishop, if he be
+hindered from procuring the salvation of others, may enter the
+religious life, and may return to his bishopric should the obstacle
+cease, for instance by the correction of his subjects, cessation of
+the scandal, healing of his infirmity, removal of his ignorance by
+sufficient instruction. Again, if he owed his promotion to simony of
+which he was in ignorance, and resigning his episcopate entered the
+religious life, he can be reappointed to another bishopric [*Cap.
+Post translat., de Renunt.]. On the other hand, if a man be deposed
+from the episcopal office for some sin, and confined in a monastery
+that he may do penance, he cannot be reappointed to a bishopric.
+Hence it is stated (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy synod
+orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity
+to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means
+rise again to the episcopate."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even in natural things power remains inactive on
+account of a supervening obstacle, for instance the act of sight
+ceases through an affliction of the eye. So neither is it
+unreasonable if, through the occurrence of some obstacle from
+without, the episcopal power remain without the exercise of its act.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 5]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for a Bishop on Account of Bodily Persecution to
+Abandon the Flock Committed to His Care?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful for a bishop, on
+account of some temporal persecution, to withdraw his bodily presence
+from the flock committed to his care. For our Lord said (John 10:12)
+that he is a hireling and no true shepherd, who "seeth the wolf
+coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv
+in Ev.) that "the wolf comes upon the sheep when any man by his
+injustice and robbery oppresses the faithful and the humble."
+Therefore if, on account of the persecution of a tyrant, a bishop
+withdraws his bodily presence from the flock entrusted to his care,
+it would seem that he is a hireling and not a shepherd.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 6:1): "My son, if thou be
+surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a
+stranger," and afterwards (Prov. 6:3): "Run about, make haste, stir
+up thy friend." Gregory expounds these words and says (Pastor. iii,
+4): "To be surety for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by
+engaging oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an
+example to the lives of others, is warned not only to watch but even
+to rouse his friend." Now he cannot do this if he withdraw his bodily
+presence from his flock. Therefore it would seem that a bishop should
+not on account of persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his
+flock.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the perfection of the bishop's state
+that he devote himself to the care of his neighbor. Now it is
+unlawful for one who has professed the state of perfection to forsake
+altogether the things that pertain to perfection. Therefore it would
+seem unlawful for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the
+execution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of devoting
+himself to works of perfection in a monastery.
+
+_On the contrary,_ our Lord commanded the apostles, whose successors
+bishops are (Matt. 10:23): "When they shall persecute you in this
+city, flee into another."
+
+_I answer that,_ In any obligation the chief thing to be considered
+is the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind themselves to fulfil
+the pastoral office for the sake of the salvation of their subjects.
+Consequently when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal
+presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal
+presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal
+advantage, nor even on account of some impending danger to his
+person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his
+sheep.
+
+On the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can be
+sufficiently provided for by another person in the absence of the
+pastor, it is lawful for the pastor to withdraw his bodily presence
+from his flock, either for the sake of some advantage to the Church,
+or on account of some danger to his person. Hence Augustine says (Ep.
+ccxxviii ad Honorat.): "Christ's servants may flee from one city to
+another, when one of them is specially sought out by persecutors: in
+order that the Church be not abandoned by others who are not so
+sought for. When, however, the same danger threatens all, those who
+stand in need of others must not be abandoned by those whom they
+need." For "if it is dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship
+when the sea is calm, how much more so when it is stormy," as Pope
+Nicholas I says (cf. VII, qu. i, can. Sciscitaris).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To flee as a hireling is to prefer temporal advantage
+or one's bodily welfare to the spiritual welfare of one's neighbor.
+Hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev.): "A man cannot endanger himself
+for the sake of his sheep, if he uses his authority over them not
+through love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore he
+fears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what he loves." But
+he who, in order to avoid danger, leaves the flock without
+endangering the flock, does not flee as a hireling.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If he who is surety for another be unable to fulfil his
+engagement, it suffices that he fulfil it through another. Hence if a
+superior is hindered from attending personally to the care of his
+subjects, he fulfils his obligation if he do so through another.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When a man is appointed to a bishopric, he
+embraces the state of perfection as regards one kind of perfection;
+and if he be hindered from the practice thereof, he is not bound to
+another kind of perfection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious
+state. Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention of
+devoting himself to his neighbor's salvation, should an opportunity
+offer, and necessity require it of him.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 6]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for a Bishop to Have Property of His Own?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for a bishop to have
+property of his own. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt
+be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the
+poor . . . and come, follow Me"; whence it would seem to follow that
+voluntary poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the
+state of perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for them to
+possess anything as their own.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, bishops take the place of the apostles in the
+Church, according to a gloss on Luke 10:1. Now our Lord commanded the
+apostles to possess nothing of their own, according to Matt. 10:9,
+"Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses";
+wherefore Peter said for himself and the other apostles (Matt.
+19:27): "Behold we have left all things and have followed Thee."
+Therefore it would seem that bishops are bound to keep this command,
+and to possess nothing of their own.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): "The Greek
+_kleros_ denotes the Latin _sors._ Hence clerics are so called either
+because they are of the Lord's estate, or because the Lord Himself is
+the estate, i.e. portion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord,
+can have nothing besides God; and if he have gold and silver,
+possessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the Lord
+does not vouchsafe to be his portion also." Therefore it would seem
+that not only bishops but even clerics should have nothing of their
+own.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is stated (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus):
+"Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or
+acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally."
+
+_I answer that,_ No one is bound to works of supererogation, unless
+he binds himself specially thereto by vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep.
+cxxvii ad Paulin. et Arment.): "Since you have taken the vow, you
+have already bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before
+you were bound by the vow, you were free to submit." Now it is
+evident that to live without possessing anything is a work of
+supererogation, for it is a matter not of precept but of counsel.
+Wherefore our Lord after saying to the young man: "If thou wilt enter
+into life, keep the commandments," said afterwards by way of
+addition: "If thou wilt be perfect go sell" all "that thou hast, and
+give to the poor" (Matt. 19:17, 21). Bishops, however, do not bind
+themselves at their ordination to live without possessions of their
+own; nor indeed does the pastoral office, to which they bind
+themselves, make it necessary for them to live without anything of
+their own. Therefore bishops are not bound to live without
+possessions of their own.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1) the perfection of
+the Christian life does not essentially consist in voluntary poverty,
+but voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the perfection of
+life. Hence it does not follow that where there is greater poverty
+there is greater perfection; indeed the highest perfection is
+compatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it was said
+(Gen. 17:1): "Walk before Me and be perfect," is stated to have been
+rich (Gen. 13:2).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This saying of our Lord can be understood in three
+ways. First, mystically, that we should possess neither gold nor
+silver means that the preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal
+wisdom and eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage.
+
+Secondly, according to Augustine's explanation (De Consens. Ev. ii,
+30), we are to understand that our Lord said this not in command but
+in permission. For he permitted them to go preaching without gold or
+silver or other means, since they were to receive the means of
+livelihood from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added: "For
+the workman is worthy of his meat." And yet if anyone were to use his
+own means in preaching the Gospel, this would be a work of
+supererogation, as Paul says in reference to himself (1 Cor. 9:12,
+15).
+
+Thirdly, according to the exposition of Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Rom.
+xvi, 3, we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands on His
+disciples in reference to the mission on which they were sent to
+preach to the Jews, so that they might be encouraged to trust in His
+power, seeing that He provided for their wants without their having
+means of their own. But it does not follow from this that they, or
+their successors, were obliged to preach the Gospel without having
+means of their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor. 11:8) that he
+"received wages" of other churches for preaching to the Corinthians,
+wherefore it is clear that he possessed something sent to him by
+others. And it seems foolish to say that so many holy bishops as
+Athanasius, Ambrose, and Augustine would have disobeyed these
+commandments if they believed themselves bound to observe them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every part is less than the whole. Accordingly a man
+has other portions together with God, if he becomes less intent on
+things pertaining to God by occupying himself with things of the
+world. Now neither bishops nor clerics ought thus to possess means of
+their own, that while busy with their own they neglect those that
+concern the worship of God.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Bishops Sin Mortally If They Distribute Not to the Poor the
+Ecclesiastical Goods Which Accrue to Them?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that bishops sin mortally if they
+distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which they
+acquire. For Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. lxiv, de Temp., among the
+supposititious works of St. Jerome] expounding Luke 12:16, "The land
+of a certain . . . man brought forth plenty of fruits," says: "Let no
+man claim as his own that which he has taken and obtained by violence
+from the common property in excess of his requirements"; and
+afterwards he adds: "It is not less criminal to take from him who
+has, than, when you are able and have plenty to refuse him who has
+not." Now it is a mortal sin to take another's property by violence.
+Therefore bishops sin mortally if they give not to the poor that
+which they have in excess.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Isa. 3:14, "The spoil of the
+poor is in your house," says that "ecclesiastical goods belong to the
+poor." Now whoever keeps for himself or gives to others that which
+belongs to another, sins mortally and is bound to restitution.
+Therefore if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations
+or friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would seem that
+they are bound to restitution.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, much more may one take what is necessary for oneself
+from the goods of the Church, than accumulate a surplus therefrom.
+Yet Jerome says in a letter to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Can. Clericos,
+cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam; cause. xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv,
+among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]: "It is right that
+those clerics who receive no goods from their parents and relations
+should be supported from the funds of the Church. But those who have
+sufficient income from their parents and their own possessions, if
+they take what belongs to the poor, they commit and incur the guilt
+of sacrilege." Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:16): "If any of
+the faithful have widows, let him minister to them, and let not the
+Church be charged, that there may be sufficient for them that are
+widows indeed." Much more therefore do bishops sin mortally if they
+give not to the poor the surplus of their ecclesiastical goods.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Many bishops do not give their surplus to the
+poor, but would seem commendably to lay it out so as to increase the
+revenue of the Church.
+
+_I answer that,_ The same is not to be said of their own goods which
+bishops may possess, and of ecclesiastical goods. For they have real
+dominion over their own goods; wherefore from the very nature of the
+case they are not bound to give these things to others, and may
+either keep them for themselves or bestow them on others at will.
+Nevertheless they may sin in this disposal by inordinate affection,
+which leads them either to accumulate more than they should, or not
+to assist others, in accordance with the demands of charity; yet they
+are not bound to restitution, because such things are entrusted to
+their ownership.
+
+On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or
+trustees. For Augustine says (Ep. clxxxv ad Bonif.): "If we possess
+privately what is enough for us, other things belong not to us but to
+the poor, and we have the dispensing of them; but we can claim
+ownership of them only by wicked theft." Now dispensing requires good
+faith, according to 1 Cor. 4:2, "Here now it is required among the
+dispensers that a man be found faithful." Moreover ecclesiastical
+goods are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to
+the divine worship and the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said
+(XII, qu. ii, can. de reditibus): "Of the Church's revenues or the
+offerings of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the
+bishop, two parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of
+suspension, for the ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit of the
+poor; the remaining part is to be divided among the clergy according
+to their respective merits." Accordingly if the goods which are
+assigned to the use of the bishop are distinct from those which are
+appointed for the use of the poor, or the ministers, or for the
+ecclesiastical worship, and if the bishop keeps back for himself part
+of that which should be given to the poor, or to the ministers for
+their use, or expended on the divine worship, without doubt he is an
+unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally, and is bound to restitution.
+
+But as regards those goods which are deputed to his private use, the
+same apparently applies as to his own property, namely that he sins
+through immoderate attachment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds
+moderation in what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others
+according to the demands of charity.
+
+On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods,
+their distribution is entrusted to his good faith; and if he fail or
+exceed in a slight degree, this may happen without prejudice to his
+good faith, because in such matters a man cannot possibly decide
+precisely what ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be
+very great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently he would
+seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty of mortal sin. For it
+is written (Matt. 24:48-51) that "if that evil servant shall say in
+his heart: My lord is long a-coming," which shows contempt of God's
+judgment, "and shall begin to strike his fellow-servants," which is a
+sign of pride, "and shall eat and drink with drunkards," which
+proceeds from lust, "the lord of that servant shall come in a day
+that he hopeth not . . . and shall separate him," namely from the
+fellowship of good men, "and appoint his portion with hypocrites,"
+namely in hell.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Ambrose refers to the administration not
+only of ecclesiastical things but also of any goods whatever from
+which a man is bound, as a duty of charity, to provide for those who
+are in need. But it is not possible to state definitely when this
+need is such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal sin, as
+is the case in other points of detail that have to be considered in
+human acts: for the decision in such matters is left to human
+prudence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above the goods of the Church have to be
+employed not only for the use of the poor, but also for other
+purposes. Hence if a bishop or cleric wish to deprive himself of that
+which is assigned to his own use, and give it to his relations or
+others, he sins not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit,
+that they cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby.
+Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "It is a commendable liberality
+if you overlook not your kindred when you know them to be in want;
+yet not so as to wish to make them rich with what you can give to the
+poor."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The goods of churches should not all be given to the
+poor, except in a case of necessity: for then, as Ambrose says (De
+Offic. ii, 28), even the vessels consecrated to the divine worship
+are to be sold for the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the
+poor. In such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to
+maintain himself on the goods of the Church, always supposing him to
+have a patrimony of his own on which to support himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The goods of the churches should be employed for the
+good of the poor. Consequently a man is to be commended if, there
+being no present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the
+surplus from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays it by
+for some future use connected with the Church or the needs of the
+poor. But if there be a pressing need for helping the poor, to lay by
+for the future is a superfluous and inordinate saving, and is
+forbidden by our Lord Who said (Matt. 6:34): "Be . . . not solicitous
+for the morrow."
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Religious Who Are Raised to the Episcopate Are Bound to
+Religious Observances?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that religious who are raised to the
+episcopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said
+(XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that a "canonical election loosens a
+monk from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic profession,
+and the holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop." Now the regular
+observances pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore religious who
+are appointed bishops are not bound to religious observances.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, he who ascends from a lower to a higher degree is
+seemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower
+degree: thus it was stated above (Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1) that a
+religious is not bound to keep the vows he made in the world. But a
+religious who is appointed to the episcopate ascends to something
+greater, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7). Therefore it would seem that
+a bishop is not bound to those things whereto he was bound in the
+state of religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, religious would seem to be bound above all to
+obedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious
+who are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of
+their order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound
+to poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (Obj. 1) "when
+the holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the right,
+as the lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance." Moreover
+they are sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less therefore are
+they bound to other regular observances.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De
+Monachis): "With regard to those who after long residence in a
+monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay
+aside their former purpose."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2) the religious state
+pertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while the
+episcopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of
+perfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal
+state, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to
+perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of
+perfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with
+perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with
+perfection, it is confirmed the more. Thus when the scholar has
+become a professor it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it
+becomes him to read and meditate even more than before. Accordingly
+we must assert that if there be among religious observances any that
+instead of being an obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard
+of perfection, such as continence, poverty, and so forth, a
+religious, even after he has been made a bishop, remains bound to
+observe these, and consequently to wear the habit of his order, which
+is a sign of this obligation.
+
+On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious
+observances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for
+instance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or
+watchings and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the
+episcopal office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them,
+according to the needs of his person or office, and the manner of
+life of those among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious
+superiors dispense themselves in such matters.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is loosened
+from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything, but in
+those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated
+above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The vows of those who are living in the world are
+compared to the vows of religion as the particular to the universal,
+as stated above (Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1). But the vows of religion are
+compared to the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now
+the particular is superfluous when one has the universal, whereas the
+disposition is still necessary when perfection has been attained.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is accidental that religious who are bishops are not
+bound to obey the superiors of their order, because, to wit, they
+have ceased to be their subjects; even as those same religious
+superiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains virtually,
+so that if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be bound
+to obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both the statutes of
+their rule in the way mentioned above, and their superiors if they
+have any.
+
+As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal
+inheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is
+added (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that after he has been ordained
+bishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed
+according to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire.
+
+Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with
+the sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with
+his death, after which a testament comes into force according to the
+Apostle (Heb. 9:17). If, however, by the Pope's permission he make a
+will, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but
+we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power of his
+administration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his
+death.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 186
+
+OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS STATE PROPERLY CONSISTS
+(In Ten Articles)
+
+We must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which
+consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider
+those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly,
+those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the
+different kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the
+religious state.
+
+Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the religious state is perfect?
+
+(2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels?
+
+(3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state?
+
+(4) Whether continency is necessary?
+
+(5) Whether obedience is necessary?
+
+(6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow?
+
+(7) Of the sufficiency of these vows;
+
+(8) Of their comparison one with another;
+
+(9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a
+statute of his rule?
+
+(10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more
+grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Religion Implies a State of Perfection?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of
+perfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not
+seemingly pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for
+salvation, whether because "thereby we are bound (_religamur_) to the
+one almighty God," as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because
+it takes its name from "our returning (_religimus_) to God Whom we
+had lost by neglecting Him" [*Cf. Q. 81, A. 1], according to
+Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that religion
+does not denote the state of perfection.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
+53) is that "which offers worship and ceremony to the Divine nature."
+Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain
+to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of
+states, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 2; Q. 183, A. 3). Therefore it
+would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the state of perfection is distinct from the state
+of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also some
+are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does not
+denote the state of perfection.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, religion would seem a place of repentance; for it is
+said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy synod
+orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity
+to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means
+rise again to the episcopate." Now a place of repentance is opposed
+to the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi) places
+penitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be
+cleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of
+perfection.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. i, 7)
+abbot Moses speaking of religious says: "We must recognize that we
+have to undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil,
+privation, reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these
+degrees to mount to the perfection of charity." Now things pertaining
+to human acts are specified and denominated from the intention of the
+end. Therefore religious belong to the state of perfection.
+
+Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those who are called
+servants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and
+subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 2) that which is
+applicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to
+that to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of
+"fortitude" is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of
+the mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of
+"temperance," by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures.
+Now religion as stated above (Q. 81, A. 2; A. 3, ad 2) is a virtue
+whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of God.
+Wherefore those are called religious antonomastically, who give
+themselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust
+to God. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): "Some there are who
+keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their
+tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess." Now
+the perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated
+above (Q. 184, A. 2), and in this sense religion denotes the state of
+perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To offer something to the worship of God is necessary
+for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one's possessions to
+the worship of God belongs to perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4, ad 1, 2; Q.
+85, A. 3) when we were treating of the virtue of religion, religion
+has reference not only to the offering of sacrifices and other like
+things that are proper to religion, but also to the acts of all the
+virtues which in so far as these are referred to God's service and
+honor become acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes his whole
+life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to religion, and
+thus by reason of the religious life that they lead, those who are in
+the state of perfection are called religious.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 184, AA. 4, 6) religion denotes the
+state of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it does not
+follow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already perfect,
+but that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on Matt.
+19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect," etc., says (Tract. viii in Matth.)
+that "he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to become
+perfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his
+goods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will
+begin to lead him to all the virtues." Thus all are not perfect in
+religion, but some are beginners, some proficient.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The religious state was instituted chiefly that we
+might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the
+obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the
+obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut
+off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs
+to penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the
+religious state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII,
+qu. ii, cap. Admonere) a man who had killed his wife is counseled to
+enter a monastery which is described as "better and lighter," rather
+than to do public penance while remaining in the world.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Every Religious Is Bound to Keep All the Counsels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that every religious is bound to keep all
+the counsels. For whoever professes a certain state of life is bound
+to observe whatever belongs to that state. Now each religious
+professes the state of perfection. Therefore every religious is bound
+to keep all the counsels that pertain to the state of perfection.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that "he who
+renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who
+has gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness." Now it
+belongs specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it
+belongs to them also to do all the good they can. and so it would
+seem that each of them is bound to fulfil all the counsels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if it is not requisite for the state of perfection
+to fulfil all the counsels, it would seem enough to fulfil some of
+them. But this is false, since some who lead a secular life fulfil
+some of the counsels, for instance those who observe continence.
+Therefore it would seem that every religious who is in the state of
+perfection is bound to fulfil whatever pertains to perfection: and
+such are the counsels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ one is not bound, unless one bind oneself, to do
+works of supererogation. But every religious does not bind himself to
+keep all the counsels, but to certain definite ones, some to some,
+others to others. Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing pertains to perfection in three ways. First,
+essentially, and thus, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 3) the perfect
+observance of the precepts of charity belongs to perfection.
+Secondly, a thing belongs to perfection consequently: such are those
+things that result from the perfection of charity, for instance to
+bless them that curse you (Luke 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like
+kind, which though they be binding as regards the preparedness of the
+mind, so that one has to fulfil them when necessity requires; yet are
+sometimes fulfilled, without there being any necessity, through
+superabundance of charity. Thirdly, a thing belongs to perfection
+instrumentally and dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence,
+and the like.
+
+Now it has been stated (A. 1) that the perfection of charity is the
+end of the religious state. And the religious state is a school or
+exercise for the attainment of perfection, which men strive to reach
+by various practices, just as a physician may use various remedies in
+order to heal. But it is evident that for him who works for an end it
+is not necessary that he should already have attained the end, but it
+is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. Hence he who
+enters the religious state is not bound to have perfect charity, but
+he is bound to tend to this, and use his endeavors to have perfect
+charity.
+
+For the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those things that
+result from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend
+to fulfil them: against which intention he acts if he contemns them,
+wherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them.
+
+In like manner he is not bound to observe all the practices whereby
+perfection may be attained, but only those which are definitely
+prescribed to him by the rule which he has professed.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: He who enters religion does not make profession to be
+perfect, but he professes to endeavor to attain perfection; even as
+he who enters the schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to
+study in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine says (De
+Civ. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to profess to be a wise
+man, but acknowledged himself, "a lover of wisdom." Hence a religious
+does not violate his profession if he be not perfect, but only if he
+despises to tend to perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as, though all are bound to love God with their
+whole heart, yet there is a certain wholeness of perfection which
+cannot be omitted without sin, and another wholeness which can be
+omitted without sin (Q. 184, A. 2, ad 3), provided there be no
+contempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious and
+seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do whatever good they
+can, for to all without exception it is said (Eccles. 9:10):
+"Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly." Yet there is a
+way of fulfilling this precept, so as to avoid sin, namely if one do
+what one can as required by the conditions of one's state of life:
+provided there be no contempt of doing better things, which contempt
+sets the mind against spiritual progress.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There are some counsels such that if they be omitted,
+man's whole life would be taken up with secular business; for
+instance if he have property of his own, or enter the married state,
+or do something of the kind that regards the essential vows of
+religion themselves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such
+like counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about certain
+particular better actions, which can be omitted without one's life
+being taken up with secular actions; wherefore there is no need for
+religious to be bound to fulfil all of them.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Poverty Is Required for Religious Perfection?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that poverty is not required for religious
+perfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently
+belong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful
+for a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor.
+8:12) lays down the way in which the faithful are to give alms
+saying: "If the will be forward, it is accepted according to that
+which a man hath," i.e. "you should keep back what you need," and
+afterwards he adds (2 Cor. 8:13): "For I mean not that others should
+be eased, and you burthened," i.e. "with poverty," according to a
+gloss. Moreover a gloss on 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to
+be covered," says: "Though we brought nothing, and will carry nothing
+away, we must not give up these temporal things altogether."
+Therefore it seems that voluntary poverty is not requisite for
+religious perfection.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whosoever exposes himself to danger sins. But he who
+renounces all he has and embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself
+to danger--not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, "Lest perhaps
+. . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the
+name of my God," and Ecclus. 27:1, "Through poverty many have
+sinned"--but also corporal, for it is written (Eccles. 7:13): "As
+wisdom is a defense, so money is a defense," and the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. iv, 1) that "the waste of property appears to be a sort of
+ruining of one's self, since thereby man lives." Therefore it would
+seem that voluntary poverty is not requisite for the perfection of
+religious life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue observes the mean," as stated in _Ethic._
+ii, 6. But he who renounces all by voluntary poverty seems to go to
+the extreme rather than to observe the mean. Therefore he does not
+act virtuously: and so this does not pertain to the perfection of
+life.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the ultimate perfection of man consists in
+happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; for it is written
+(Ecclus. 31:8): "Blessed is the rich man that is found without
+blemish," and the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that "riches
+contribute instrumentally to happiness." Therefore voluntary poverty
+is not requisite for religious perfection.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the
+religious state. But bishops may have property, as stated above (Q.
+185, A. 6). Therefore religious may also.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, almsgiving is a work most acceptable to God, and as
+Chrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep. ad Hebr.) "is a most effective remedy
+in repentance." Now poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it would
+seem that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. viii, 26): "There are some of
+the righteous who bracing themselves up to lay hold of the very
+height of perfection, while they aim at higher objects within,
+abandon all things without." Now, as stated above, (AA. 1, 2), it
+belongs properly to religious to brace themselves up in order to lay
+hold of the very height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them
+to abandon all outward things by voluntary poverty.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the religious state is an
+exercise and a school for attaining to the perfection of charity. For
+this it is necessary that a man wholly withdraw his affections from
+worldly things; since Augustine says (Confess. x, 29), speaking to
+God: "Too little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee,
+which he loveth not for Thee." Wherefore he says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu.
+36) that "greater charity means less cupidity, perfect charity means
+no cupidity." Now the possession of worldly things draws a man's mind
+to the love of them: hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi ad Paulin. et
+Theras.) that "we are more firmly attached to earthly things when we
+have them than when we desire them: since why did that young man go
+away sad, save because he had great wealth? For it is one thing not
+to wish to lay hold of what one has not, and another to renounce what
+one already has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter
+are cut off as a limb." And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in Matth.)
+that "the possession of wealth kindles a greater flame and the desire
+for it becomes stronger."
+
+Hence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of charity the
+first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby a man lives without
+property of his own, according to the saying of our Lord (Matt.
+19:21), "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou
+hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As the gloss adds, "when the Apostle said this (namely
+'not that you should be burthened,' i.e. with poverty)," he did not
+mean that "it were better not to give: but he feared for the weak,
+whom he admonished so to give as not to suffer privation." Hence in
+like manner the other gloss means not that it is unlawful to renounce
+all one's temporal goods, but that this is not required of necessity.
+Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "Our Lord does not wish,"
+namely does not command us "to pour out our wealth all at once, but
+to dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his oxen,
+and fed the poor with that which was his own so that no household
+care might hold him back."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: He who renounces all his possessions for Christ's sake
+exposes himself to no danger, neither spiritual nor corporal. For
+spiritual danger ensues from poverty when the latter is not
+voluntary; because those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire
+of money-getting, fall into many sins, according to 1 Tim. 6:9, "They
+that will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the
+devil." This attachment is put away by those who embrace voluntary
+poverty, but it gathers strength in those who have wealth, as stated
+above. Again bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on
+following Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust
+themselves to divine providence. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
+in Monte ii, 17): "Those who seek first the kingdom of God and His
+justice are not weighed down by anxiety lest they lack what is
+necessary."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), the mean
+of virtue is taken according to right reason, not according to the
+quantity of a thing. Consequently whatever may be done in accordance
+with right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the
+quantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however, be against
+right reason to throw away all one's possessions through
+intemperance, or without any useful purpose; whereas it is in
+accordance with right reason to renounce wealth in order to devote
+oneself to the contemplation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are
+said to have done this; for Jerome says (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin.): "The
+famous Theban, Crates, once a very wealthy man, when he was going to
+Athens to study philosophy, cast away a large amount of gold; for he
+considered that he could not possess both gold and virtue at the same
+time." Much more therefore is it according to right reason for a man
+to renounce all he has, in order perfectly to follow Christ.
+Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust. Monach.): "Poor thyself,
+follow Christ poor."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Happiness or felicity is twofold. One is perfect, to
+which we look forward in the life to come; the other is imperfect, in
+respect of which some are said to be happy in this life. The
+happiness of this life is twofold, one is according to the active
+life, the other according to the contemplative life, as the
+Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 7, 8). Now wealth conduces
+instrumentally to the happiness of the active life which consists in
+external actions, because as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) "we
+do many things by friends, by riches, by political influence, as it
+were by instruments." On the other hand, it does not conduce to the
+happiness of the contemplative life, rather is it an obstacle
+thereto, inasmuch as the anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet of
+the soul, which is most necessary to one who contemplates. Hence it
+is that the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 8) that "for actions many
+things are needed, but the contemplative man needs no such things,"
+namely external goods, "for his operation; in fact they are obstacles
+to his contemplation."
+
+Man is directed to future happiness by charity; and since voluntary
+poverty is an efficient exercise for the attaining of perfect
+charity, it follows that it is of great avail in acquiring the
+happiness of heaven. Wherefore our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "Go, sell
+all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt
+have treasure in heaven." Now riches once they are possessed are in
+themselves of a nature to hinder the perfection of charity,
+especially by enticing and distracting the mind. Hence it is written
+(Matt. 13:22) that "the care of this world and the deceitfulness of
+riches choketh up the word" of God, for as Gregory says (Hom. xv in
+Ev.) by "preventing the good desire from entering into the heart,
+they destroy life at its very outset." Consequently it is difficult
+to safeguard charity amidst riches: wherefore our Lord said (Matt.
+19:23) that "a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of
+heaven," which we must understand as referring to one who actually
+has wealth, since He says that this is impossible for him who places
+his affection in riches, according to the explanation of Chrysostom
+(Hom. lxiii in Matth.), for He adds (Matt. 19:24): "It is easier for
+a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to
+enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence it is not said simply that
+the "rich man" is blessed, but "the rich man that is found without
+blemish, and that hath not gone after gold," and this because he has
+done a difficult thing, wherefore the text continues (Matt. 19:9):
+"Who is he? and we will praise him; for he hath done wonderful things
+in his life," namely by not loving riches though placed in the midst
+of them.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The episcopal state is not directed to the attainment
+of perfection, but rather to the effect that, in virtue of the
+perfection which he already has, a man may govern others, by
+administering not only spiritual but also temporal things. This
+belongs to the active life, wherein many things occur that may be
+done by means of wealth as an instrument, as stated (ad 4). Wherefore
+it is not required of bishops, who make profession of governing
+Christ's flock, that they have nothing of their own, whereas it is
+required of religious who make profession of learning to obtain
+perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: The renouncement of one's own wealth is compared to
+almsgiving as the universal to the particular, and as the holocaust
+to the sacrifice. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that those
+who assist "the needy with the things they possess, by their good
+deeds offer sacrifice, since they offer up something to God and keep
+back something for themselves; whereas those who keep nothing for
+themselves offer a holocaust which is greater than a sacrifice."
+Wherefore Jerome also says (Contra Vigilant.): "When you declare that
+those do better who retain the use of their possessions, and dole out
+the fruits of their possessions to the poor, it is not I but the Lord
+Who answers you; If thou wilt be perfect," etc., and afterwards he
+goes on to say: "This man whom you praise belongs to the second and
+third degree, and we too commend him: provided we acknowledge the
+first as to be preferred to the second and third." For this reason in
+order to exclude the error of Vigilantius it is said (De Eccl. Dogm.
+xxxviii): "It is a good thing to give away one's goods by dispensing
+them to the poor: it is better to give them away once for all with
+the intention of following the Lord, and, free of solicitude, to be
+poor with Christ."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Perpetual Continence Is Required for Religious Perfection?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that perpetual continence is not required
+for religious perfection. For all perfection of the Christian life
+began with Christ's apostles. Now the apostles do not appear to have
+observed continence, as evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we
+read Matt. 8:14. Therefore it would seem that perpetual continence is
+not requisite for religious perfection.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the first example of perfection is shown to us in
+the person of Abraham, to whom the Lord said (Gen. 17:1): "Walk
+before Me, and be perfect." Now the copy should not surpass the
+example. Therefore perpetual continence is not requisite for
+religious perfection.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which is required for religious perfection is
+to be found in every religious order. Now there are some religious
+who lead a married life. Therefore religious perfection does not
+require perpetual continence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse
+ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit,
+perfecting sanctification in the fear of God." Now cleanness of flesh
+and spirit is safeguarded by continence, for it is said (1 Cor.
+7:34): "The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of
+the Lord that she may be holy both in spirit and in body [Vulg.:
+'both in body and in spirit']." Therefore religious perfection
+requires continence.
+
+_I answer that,_ The religious state requires the removal of whatever
+hinders man from devoting himself entirely to God's service. Now the
+use of sexual union hinders the mind from giving itself wholly to the
+service of God, and this for two reasons. First, on account of its
+vehement delectation, which by frequent repetition increases
+concupiscence, as also the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 12): and
+hence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind from that
+perfect intentness on tending to God. Augustine expresses this when
+he says (Solil. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the
+manly mind from its height as the fondling of women, and those bodily
+contacts which belong to the married state." Secondly, because it
+involves man in solicitude for the control of his wife, his children,
+and his temporalities which serve for their upkeep. Hence the Apostle
+says (1 Cor. 7:32, 33): "He that is without a wife is solicitous for
+the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God: but he
+that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he
+may please his wife."
+
+Therefore perpetual continence, as well as voluntary poverty, is
+requisite for religious perfection. Wherefore just as Vigilantius was
+condemned for equaling riches to poverty, so was Jovinian condemned
+for equaling marriage to virginity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The perfection not only of poverty but also of
+continence was introduced by Christ Who said (Matt. 19:12): "There
+are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs, for the kingdom of
+heaven," and then added: "He that can take, let him take it." And
+lest anyone should be deprived of the hope of attaining perfection,
+he admitted to the state of perfection those even who were married.
+Now the husbands could not without committing an injustice forsake
+their wives, whereas men could without injustice renounce riches.
+Wherefore Peter whom He found married, He severed not from his wife,
+while "He withheld from marriage John who wished to marry" [*Prolog.
+in Joan. among the supposititious works of St. Jerome].
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxii), "the chastity
+of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage, one of which
+Abraham had in use, both of them in habit. For he lived chastely, and
+he might have been chaste without marrying, but it was not requisite
+then." Nevertheless if the patriarchs of old had perfection of mind
+together with wealth and marriage, which is a mark of the greatness
+of their virtue, this is no reason why any weaker person should
+presume to have such great virtue that he can attain to perfection
+though rich and married; as neither does a man unarmed presume to
+attack his enemy, because Samson slew many foes with the jaw-bone of
+an ass. For those fathers, had it been seasonable to observe
+continence and poverty, would have been most careful to observe them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Such ways of living as admit of the use of marriage are
+not the religious life simply and absolutely speaking, but in a
+restricted sense, in so far as they have a certain share in those
+things that belong to the religious state.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Obedience Belongs to Religious Perfection?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that obedience does not belong to
+religious perfection. For those things seemingly belong to religious
+perfection, which are works of supererogation and are not binding
+upon all. But all are bound to obey their superiors, according to the
+saying of the Apostle (Heb. 13:17), "Obey your prelates, and be
+subject to them." Therefore it would seem that obedience does not
+belong to religious perfection.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, obedience would seem to belong properly to those who
+have to be guided by the sense of others, and such persons are
+lacking in discernment. Now the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong
+meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses
+exercised to the discerning of good and evil." Therefore it would
+seem that obedience does not belong to the state of the perfect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if obedience were requisite for religious
+perfection, it would follow that it is befitting to all religious.
+But it is not becoming to all; since some religious lead a solitary
+life, and have no superior whom they obey. Again religious superiors
+apparently are not bound to obedience. Therefore obedience would seem
+not to pertain to religious perfection.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if the vow of obedience were requisite for religion,
+it would follow that religious are bound to obey their superiors in
+all things, just as they are bound to abstain from all venery by
+their vow of continence. But they are not bound to obey them in all
+things, as stated above (Q. 104, A. 5), when we were treating of the
+virtue of obedience. Therefore the vow of obedience is not requisite
+for religion.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, those services are most acceptable to God which are
+done freely and not of necessity, according to 2 Cor. 9:7, "Not with
+sadness or of necessity." Now that which is done out of obedience is
+done of necessity of precept. Therefore those good works are more
+deserving of praise which are done of one's own accord. Therefore the
+vow of obedience is unbecoming to religion whereby men seek to attain
+to that which is better.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Religious perfection consists chiefly in the
+imitation of Christ, according to Matt. 19:21, "If thou wilt be
+perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor,
+and follow Me." Now in Christ obedience is commended above all
+according to Phil. 2:8, "He became [Vulg.: 'becoming'] obedient unto
+death." Therefore seemingly obedience belongs to religious perfection.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3) the religious state is a
+school and exercise for tending to perfection. Now those who are
+being instructed or exercised in order to attain a certain end must
+needs follow the direction of someone under whose control they are
+instructed or exercised so as to attain that end as disciples under a
+master. Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction and
+command of someone as regards things pertaining to the religious
+life; wherefore it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The
+monastic life denotes subjection and discipleship." Now one man is
+subjected to another's command and instruction by obedience: and
+consequently obedience is requisite for religious perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To obey one's superiors in matters that are essential
+to virtue is not a work of supererogation, but is common to all:
+whereas to obey in matters pertaining to the practice of perfection
+belongs properly to religious. This latter obedience is compared to
+the former as the universal to the particular. For those who live in
+the world, keep something for themselves, and offer something to God;
+and in the latter respect they are under obedience to their
+superiors: whereas those who live in religion give themselves wholly
+and their possessions to God, as stated above (AA. 1, 3). Hence their
+obedience is universal.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1, 2), by
+performing actions we contract certain habits, and when we have
+acquired the habit we are best able to perform the actions.
+Accordingly those who have not attained to perfection, acquire
+perfection by obeying, while those who have already acquired
+perfection are most ready to obey, not as though they need to be
+directed to the acquisition of perfection, but as maintaining
+themselves by this means in that which belongs to perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The subjection of religious is chiefly in reference to
+bishops, who are compared to them as perfecters to perfected, as
+Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi), where he also says that the
+"monastic order is subjected to the perfecting virtues of the
+bishops, and is taught by their godlike enlightenment." Hence neither
+hermits nor religious superiors are exempt from obedience to bishops;
+and if they be wholly or partly exempt from obedience to the bishop
+of the diocese, they are nevertheless bound to obey the Sovereign
+Pontiff, not only in matters affecting all in common, but also in
+those which pertain specially to religious discipline.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The vow of obedience taken by religious, extends to the
+disposition of a man's whole life, and in this way it has a certain
+universality, although it does not extend to all individual acts. For
+some of these do not belong to religion, through not being of those
+things that concern the love of God and of our neighbor, such as
+rubbing one's beard, lifting a stick from the ground and so forth,
+which do not come under a vow nor under obedience; and some are
+contrary to religion. Nor is there any comparison with continence
+whereby acts are excluded which are altogether contrary to religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The necessity of coercion makes an act involuntary and
+consequently deprives it of the character of praise or merit; whereas
+the necessity which is consequent upon obedience is a necessity not
+of coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is willing to obey,
+although perhaps he would not be willing to do the thing commanded
+considered in itself. Wherefore since by the vow of obedience a man
+lays himself under the necessity of doing for God's sake certain
+things that are not pleasing in themselves, for this very reason that
+which he does is the more acceptable to God, though it be of less
+account, because man can give nothing greater to God, than by
+subjecting his will to another man's for God's sake. Hence in the
+Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xviii, 7) it is stated that "the
+Sarabaitae are the worst class of monks, because through providing
+for their own needs without being subject to superiors, they are free
+to do as they will; and yet day and night they are more busily
+occupied in work than those who live in monasteries."
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 6]
+
+Whether It Is Requisite for Religious Perfection That Poverty,
+Continence, and Obedience Should Come Under a Vow?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for religious
+perfection that the three aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and
+obedience, should come under a vow. For the school of perfection is
+founded on the principles laid down by our Lord. Now our Lord in
+formulating perfection (Matt. 19:21) said: "If thou wilt be perfect,
+go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor,"
+without any mention of a vow. Therefore it would seem that a vow is
+not necessary for the school of religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a vow is a promise made to God, wherefore (Eccles.
+5:3) the wise man after saying: "If thou hast vowed anything to God,
+defer not to pay it," adds at once, "for an unfaithful and foolish
+promise displeaseth Him." But when a thing is being actually given
+there is no need for a promise. Therefore it suffices for religious
+perfection that one keep poverty, continence, and obedience without.
+vowing them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Ad Pollent., de Adult. Conjug. i,
+14): "The services we render are more pleasing when we might lawfully
+not render them, yet do so out of love." Now it is lawful not to
+render a service which we have not vowed, whereas it is unlawful if
+we have vowed to render it. Therefore seemingly it is more pleasing
+to God to keep poverty, continence, and obedience without a vow.
+Therefore a vow is not requisite for religious perfection.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In the Old Law the Nazareans were consecrated by
+vow according to Num. 6:2, "When a man or woman shall make a vow to
+be sanctified and will consecrate themselves to the Lord," etc. Now
+these were a figure of those "who attain the summit of perfection,"
+as a gloss [*Cf. Moral. ii] of Gregory states. Therefore a vow is
+requisite for religious perfection.
+
+_I answer that,_ It belongs to religious to be in the state of
+perfection, as shown above (Q. 174, A. 5). Now the state of
+perfection requires an obligation to whatever belongs to perfection:
+and this obligation consists in binding oneself to God by means of a
+vow. But it is evident from what has been said (AA. 3, 4, 5) that
+poverty, continence, and obedience belong to the perfection of the
+Christian life. Consequently the religious state requires that one be
+bound to these three by vow. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.):
+"When a man vows to God all his possessions, all his life, all his
+knowledge, it is a holocaust"; and afterwards he says that this
+refers to those who renounce the present world.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord declared that it belongs to the perfection of
+life that a man follow Him, not anyhow, but in such a way as not to
+turn back. Wherefore He says again (Luke 9:62): "No man putting his
+hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God."
+And though some of His disciples went back, yet when our Lord asked
+(John 6:68, 69), "Will you also go away?" Peter answered for the
+others: "Lord, to whom shall we go?" Hence Augustine says (De
+Consensu Ev. ii, 17) that "as Matthew and Mark relate, Peter and
+Andrew followed Him after drawing their boats on to the beach, not as
+though they purposed to return, but as following Him at His command."
+Now this unwavering following of Christ is made fast by a vow:
+wherefore a vow is requisite for religious perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Gregory says (Moral. ii) religious perfection
+requires that a man give "his whole life" to God. But a man cannot
+actually give God his whole life, because that life taken as a whole
+is not simultaneous but successive. Hence a man cannot give his whole
+life to God otherwise than by the obligation of a vow.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Among other services that we can lawfully give, is our
+liberty, which is dearer to man than aught else. Consequently when a
+man of his own accord deprives himself by vow of the liberty of
+abstaining from things pertaining to God's service, this is most
+acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et
+Arment.): "Repent not of thy vow; rejoice rather that thou canst no
+longer do lawfully, what thou mightest have done lawfully but to thy
+own cost. Happy the obligation that compels to better things."
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 7]
+
+Whether It Is Right to Say That Religious Perfection Consists in
+These Three Vows?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not right to say that religious
+perfection consists in these three vows. For the perfection of life
+consists of inward rather than of outward acts, according to Rom.
+14:17, "The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and
+peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." Now the religious vow binds a man
+to things belonging to perfection. Therefore vows of inward actions,
+such as contemplation, love of God and our neighbor, and so forth,
+should pertain to the religious state, rather than the vows of
+poverty, continence, and obedience which refer to outward actions.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the three aforesaid come under the religious vow, in
+so far as they belong to the practice of tending to perfection. But
+there are many other things that religious practice, such as
+abstinence, watchings, and the like. Therefore it would seem that
+these three vows are incorrectly described as pertaining to the state
+of perfection.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, by the vow of obedience a man is bound to do
+according to his superior's command whatever pertains to the practice
+of perfection. Therefore the vow of obedience suffices without the
+two other vows.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, external goods comprise not only riches but also
+honors. Therefore, if religious, by the vow of poverty, renounce
+earthly riches, there should be another vow whereby they may despise
+worldly honors.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is stated (Extra, de Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad
+monasterium) that "the keeping of chastity and the renouncing of
+property are affixed to the monastic rule."
+
+_I answer that,_ The religious state may be considered in three ways.
+First, as being a practice of tending to the perfection of charity:
+secondly, as quieting the human mind from outward solicitude,
+according to 1 Cor. 7:32: "I would have you to be without
+solicitude": thirdly, as a holocaust whereby a man offers himself and
+his possessions wholly to God; and in corresponding manner the
+religious state is constituted by these three vows.
+
+First, as regards the practice of perfection a man is required to
+remove from himself whatever may hinder his affections from tending
+wholly to God, for it is in this that the perfection of charity
+consists. Such hindrances are of three kinds. First, the attachment
+to external goods, which is removed by the vow of poverty; secondly,
+the concupiscence of sensible pleasures, chief among which are
+venereal pleasures, and these are removed by the vow of continence;
+thirdly, the inordinateness of the human will, and this is removed by
+the vow of obedience. In like manner the disquiet of worldly
+solicitude is aroused in man in reference especially to three things.
+First, as regards the dispensing of external things, and this
+solicitude is removed from man by the vow of poverty; secondly, as
+regards the control of wife and children, which is cut away by the
+vow of continence; thirdly, as regards the disposal of one's own
+actions, which is eliminated by the vow of obedience, whereby a man
+commits himself to the disposal of another.
+
+Again, "a holocaust is the offering to God of all that one has,"
+according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Now man has a threefold
+good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 8). First, the good of
+external things, which he wholly offers to God by the vow of
+voluntary poverty: secondly, the good of his own body, and this good
+he offers to God especially by the vow of continence, whereby he
+renounces the greatest bodily pleasures. The third is the good of the
+soul, which man wholly offers to God by the vow of obedience, whereby
+he offers God his own will by which he makes use of all the powers
+and habits of the soul. Therefore the religious state is fittingly
+constituted by the three vows.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the end whereunto the religious
+vow is directed is the perfection of charity, since all the interior
+acts of virtue belong to charity as to their mother, according to 1
+Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Hence the interior
+acts of virtue, for instance humility, patience, and so forth, do not
+come under the religious vow, but this is directed to them as its end.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All other religious observances are directed to the
+three aforesaid principal vows; for if any of them are ordained for
+the purpose of procuring a livelihood, such as labor, questing, and
+so on, they are to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding of
+which religious seek a livelihood by these means. Other observances
+whereby the body is chastised, such as watching, fasting, and the
+like, are directly ordained for the observance of the vow of
+continence. And such religious observances as regard human actions
+whereby a man is directed to the end of religion, namely the love of
+God and his neighbor (such as reading, prayer, visiting the sick, and
+the like), are comprised under the vow of obedience that applies to
+the will, which directs its actions to the end according to the
+ordering of another person. The distinction of habit belongs to all
+three vows, as a sign of being bound by them: wherefore the religious
+habit is given or blessed at the time of profession.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: By obedience a man offers to God his will, to which
+though all human affairs are subject, yet some are subject to it
+alone in a special manner, namely human actions, since passions
+belong also to the sensitive appetite. Wherefore in order to restrain
+the passions of carnal pleasures and of external objects of appetite,
+which hinder the perfection of life, there was need for the vows of
+continence and poverty; but for the ordering of one's own actions
+accordingly as the state of perfection requires, there was need for
+the vow of obedience.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), strictly and
+truly speaking honor is not due save to virtue. Since, however,
+external goods serve instrumentally for certain acts of virtue, the
+consequence is that a certain honor is given to their excellence
+especially by the common people who acknowledge none but outward
+excellence. Therefore since religious tend to the perfection of
+virtue it becomes them not to renounce the honor which God and all
+holy men accord to virtue, according to Ps. 138:17, "But to me Thy
+friends, O God, are made exceedingly honorable." On the other hand,
+they renounce the honor that is given to outward excellence, by the
+very fact that they withdraw from a worldly life: hence no special
+vow is needed for this.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Vow of Obedience Is the Chief of the Three Religious Vows?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the vow of obedience is not the chief
+of the three religious vows. For the perfection of the religious life
+was inaugurated by Christ. Now Christ gave a special counsel of
+poverty; whereas He is not stated to have given a special counsel of
+obedience. Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of
+obedience.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 26:20) that "no price is
+worthy of a continent soul." Now the vow of that which is more worthy
+is itself more excellent. Therefore the vow of continence is more
+excellent than the vow of obedience.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the greater a vow the more indispensable it would
+seem to be. Now the vows of poverty and continence "are so
+inseparable from the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign
+Pontiff can allow them to be broken," according to a Decretal (De
+Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad monasterium): yet he can dispense a
+religious from obeying his superior. Therefore it would seem that the
+vow of obedience is less than the vow of poverty and continence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxv, 14): "Obedience is
+rightly placed before victims, since by victims another's flesh, but
+by obedience one's own will, is sacrificed." Now the religious vows
+are holocausts, as stated above (AA. 1, 3, ad 6). Therefore the vow
+of obedience is the chief of all religious vows.
+
+_I answer that,_ The vow of obedience is the chief of the three
+religious vows, and this for three reasons.
+
+First, because by the vow of obedience man offers God something
+greater, namely his own will; for this is of more account than his
+own body, which he offers God by continence, and than external
+things, which he offers God by the vow of poverty. Wherefore that
+which is done out of obedience is more acceptable to God than that
+which is done of one's own will, according to the saying of Jerome
+(Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): "My words are intended to teach you not
+to rely on your own judgment": and a little further on he says: "You
+may not do what you will; you must eat what you are bidden to eat,
+you may possess as much as you receive, clothe yourself with what is
+given to you." Hence fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done
+of one's own will, according to Isa. 58:3, "Behold in the day of your
+fast your own will is found."
+
+Secondly, because the vow of obedience includes the other vows, but
+not vice versa: for a religious, though bound by vow to observe
+continence and poverty, yet these also come under obedience, as well
+as many other things besides the keeping of continence and poverty.
+
+Thirdly, because the vow of obedience extends properly to those acts
+that are closely connected with the end of religion; and the more
+closely a thing is connected with the end, the better it is.
+
+It follows from this that the vow of obedience is more essential to
+the religious life. For if a man without taking a vow of obedience
+were to observe, even by vow, voluntary poverty and continence, he
+would not therefore belong to the religious state, which is to be
+preferred to virginity observed even by vow; for Augustine says (De
+Virgin. xlvi): "No one, methinks, would prefer virginity to the
+monastic life." [*St. Augustine wrote not _monasterio_ but
+_martyrio_--to "martyrdom"; and St. Thomas quotes the passage
+correctly above, Q. 124, A. 3, and Q. 152, A. 5].
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The counsel of obedience was included in the very
+following of Christ, since to obey is to follow another's will.
+Consequently it is more pertinent to perfection than the vow of
+poverty, because as Jerome, commenting on Matt. 19:27, "Behold we
+have left all things," observes, "Peter added that which is perfect
+when he said: And have followed Thee."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The words quoted mean that continence is to be
+preferred, not to all other acts of virtue, but to conjugal chastity,
+or to external riches of gold and silver which are measured by weight
+[*_Pondere,_ referring to the Latin _ponderatio_ in the Vulgate,
+which the Douay version renders "price."]. Or again continence is
+taken in a general sense for abstinence from all evil, as stated
+above (Q. 155, A. 4, ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Pope cannot dispense a religious from his vow of
+obedience so as to release him from obedience to every superior in
+matters relating to the perfection of life, for he cannot exempt him
+from obedience to himself. He can, however, exempt him from
+subjection to a lower superior, but this is not to dispense him from
+his vow of obedience.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 9]
+
+Whether a Religious Sins Mortally Whenever He Transgresses the Things
+Contained in His Rule?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a religious sins mortally whenever he
+transgresses the things contained in his rule. For to break a vow is
+a sin worthy of condemnation, as appears from 1 Tim. 5:11, 12, where
+the Apostle says that widows who "will marry have [Vulg.: 'having']
+damnation, because they have made void their first faith." But
+religious are bound to a rule by the vows of their profession.
+Therefore they sin mortally by transgressing the things contained in
+their rule.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the rule is enjoined upon a religious in the same
+way as a law. Now he who transgresses a precept of law sins mortally.
+Therefore it would seem that a monk sins mortally if he transgresses
+the things contained in his rule.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, contempt involves a mortal sin. Now whoever
+repeatedly does what he ought not to do seems to sin from contempt.
+Therefore it would seem that a religious sins mortally by frequently
+transgressing the things contained in his rule.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The religious state is safer than the secular
+state; wherefore Gregory at the beginning of his Morals [*Epist.
+Missoria, ad Leand. Episc. i] compares the secular life to the stormy
+sea, and the religious life to the calm port. But if every
+transgression of the things contained in his rule were to involve a
+religious in mortal sin, the religious life would be fraught with
+danger of account of its multitude of observances. Therefore not
+every transgression of the things contained in the rule is a mortal
+sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 1, 2), a thing is
+contained in the rule in two ways. First, as the end of the rule, for
+instance things that pertain to the acts of the virtues; and the
+transgression of these, as regards those which come under a common
+precept, involves a mortal sin; but as regards those which are not
+included in the common obligation of a precept, the transgression
+thereof does not involve a mortal sin, except by reason of contempt,
+because, as stated above (A. 2), a religious is not bound to be
+perfect, but to tend to perfection, to which the contempt of
+perfection is opposed.
+
+Secondly, a thing is contained in the rule through pertaining to the
+outward practice, such as all external observances, to some of which
+a religious is bound by the vow of his profession. Now the vow of
+profession regards chiefly the three things aforesaid, namely
+poverty, continence, and obedience, while all others are directed to
+these. Consequently the transgression of these three involves a
+mortal sin, while the transgression of the others does not involve a
+mortal sin, except either by reason of contempt of the rule (since
+this is directly contrary to the profession whereby a man vows to
+live according to the rule), or by reason of a precept, whether given
+orally by a superior, or expressed in the rule, since this would be
+to act contrary to the vow of obedience.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: He who professes a rule does not vow to observe all the
+things contained in the rule, but he vows the regular life which
+consists essentially in the three aforesaid things. Hence in certain
+religious orders precaution is taken to profess, not the rule, but to
+live according to the rule, i.e. to tend to form one's conduct in
+accordance with the rule as a kind of model; and this is set aside by
+contempt. Yet greater precaution is observed in some religious orders
+by professing obedience according to the rule, so that only that
+which is contrary to a precept of the rule is contrary to the
+profession, while the transgression or omission of other things binds
+only under pain of venial sin, because, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2),
+such things are dispositions to the chief vows. And venial sin is a
+disposition to mortal, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 3), inasmuch
+as it hinders those things whereby a man is disposed to keep the
+chief precepts of Christ's law, namely the precepts of charity.
+
+There is also a religious order, that of the Friars Preachers, where
+such like transgressions or omissions do not, by their very nature,
+involve sin, either mortal or venial; but they bind one to suffer the
+punishment affixed thereto, because it is in this way that they are
+bound to observe such things. Nevertheless they may sin venially or
+mortally through neglect, concupiscence, or contempt.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not all the contents of the law are set forth by way of
+precept; for some are expressed under the form of ordinance or
+statute binding under pain of a fixed punishment. Accordingly, just
+as in the civil law the transgression of a legal statute does not
+always render a man deserving of bodily death, so neither in the law
+of the Church does every ordinance or statute bind under mortal sin;
+and the same applies to the statutes of the rule.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: An action or transgression proceeds from contempt when
+a man's will refuses to submit to the ordinance of the law or rule,
+and from this he proceeds to act against the law or rule. On the
+other hand, he does not sin from contempt, but from some other cause,
+when he is led to do something against the ordinance of the law or
+rule through some particular cause such as concupiscence or anger,
+even though he often repeat the same kind of sin through the same or
+some other cause. Thus Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that
+"not all sins are committed through proud contempt." Nevertheless the
+frequent repetition of a sin leads dispositively to contempt,
+according to the words of Prov. 18:3, "The wicked man, when he is
+come into the depth of sins, contemneth."
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 10]
+
+Whether a Religious Sins More Grievously Than a Secular by the Same
+Kind of Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a religious does not sin more
+grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin. For it is written
+(2 Paralip. 30:18, 19): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all
+them who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their
+fathers, and will not impute it to them that they are not
+sanctified." Now religious apparently follow the Lord the God of
+their fathers with their whole heart rather than seculars, who partly
+give themselves and their possessions to God and reserve part for
+themselves, as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Therefore it would
+seem that it is less imputed to them if they fall short somewhat of
+their sanctification.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God is less angered at a man's sins if he does some
+good deeds, according to 2 Paralip. 19:2, 3, "Thou helpest the
+ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the
+Lord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord:
+but good works are found in thee." Now religious do more good works
+than seculars. Therefore if they commit any sins, God is less angry
+with them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, this present life is not carried through without
+sin, according to James 3:2, "In many things we all offend."
+Therefore if the sins of religious were more grievous than those of
+seculars it would follow that religious are worse off than seculars:
+and consequently it would not be a wholesome counsel to enter
+religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The greater the evil the more it would seem to be
+deplored. But seemingly the sins of those who are in the state of
+holiness and perfection are the most deplorable, for it is written
+(Jer. 23:9): "My heart is broken within me," and afterwards (Jer.
+23:11): "For the prophet and the priest are defiled; and in My house
+I have found their wickedness." Therefore religious and others who
+are in the state of perfection, other things being equal, sin more
+grievously.
+
+_I answer that,_ A sin committed by a religious may be in three ways
+more grievous than a like sin committed by a secular. First, if it be
+against his religious vow; for instance if he be guilty of
+fornication or theft, because by fornication he acts against the vow
+of continence, and by theft against the vow of poverty; and not
+merely against a precept of the divine law. Secondly, if he sin out
+of contempt, because thereby he would seem to be the more ungrateful
+for the divine favors which have raised him to the state of
+perfection. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 10:29) that the believer
+"deserveth worse punishments" who through contempt tramples under
+foot the Son of God. Hence the Lord complains (Jer. 11:15): "What is
+the meaning that My beloved hath wrought much wickedness in My
+house?" Thirdly, the sin of a religious may be greater on account of
+scandal, because many take note of his manner of life: wherefore it
+is written (Jer. 23:14): "I have seen the likeness of adulterers, and
+the way of lying in the Prophets of Jerusalem; and they strengthened
+the hands of the wicked, that no man should return from his evil
+doings."
+
+On the other hand, if a religious, not out of contempt, but out of
+weakness or ignorance, commit a sin that is not against the vow of
+his profession, without giving scandal (for instance if he commit it
+in secret) he sins less grievously in the same kind of sin than a
+secular, because his sin if slight is absorbed as it were by his many
+good works, and if it be mortal, he more easily recovers from it.
+First, because he has a right intention towards God, and though it be
+intercepted for the moment, it is easily restored to its former
+object. Hence Origen commenting on Ps. 36:24, "When he shall fall he
+shall not be bruised," says (Hom. iv in Ps. 36): "The wicked man, if
+he sin, repents not, and fails to make amends for his sin. But the
+just man knows how to make amends and recover himself; even as he who
+had said: 'I know not the man,' shortly afterwards when the Lord had
+looked on him, knew to shed most bitter tears, and he who from the
+roof had seen a woman and desired her knew to say: 'I have sinned and
+done evil before Thee.'" Secondly, he is assisted by his
+fellow-religious to rise again, according to Eccles. 4:10, "If one
+fall he shall be supported by the other: woe to him that is alone,
+for when he falleth he hath none to lift him up."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted refer to things done through weakness
+or ignorance, but not to those that are done out of contempt.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Josaphat also, to whom these words were addressed,
+sinned not out of contempt, but out of a certain weakness of human
+affection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The just sin not easily out of contempt; but sometimes
+they fall into a sin through ignorance or weakness from which they
+easily arise. If, however, they go so far as to sin out of contempt,
+they become most wicked and incorrigible, according to the word of
+Jer. 2:20: "Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and
+thou hast said: 'I will not serve.' For on every high hill and under
+every green tree thou didst prostitute thyself." Hence Augustine says
+(Ep. lxxviii ad Pleb. Hippon.): "From the time I began to serve God,
+even as I scarcely found better men than those who made progress in
+monasteries, so have I not found worse than those who in the
+monastery have fallen."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 187
+
+OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE COMPETENT TO RELIGIOUS
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider the things that are competent to religious; and
+under this head there are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is lawful for them to teach, preach, and do like
+things?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful for them to meddle in secular business?
+
+(3) Whether they are bound to manual labor?
+
+(4) Whether it is lawful for them to live on alms?
+
+(5) Whether it is lawful for them to quest?
+
+(6) Whether it is lawful for them to wear coarser clothes than other
+persons?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Teach, Preach, and the Like?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to teach, preach,
+and the like. For it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam) in an
+ordinance of a synod of Constantinople [*Pseudosynod held by Photius
+in the year 879]: "The monastic life is one of subjection and
+discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care." And
+Jerome says (ad Ripar. et Desider. [*Contra Vigilant. xvi]): "A
+monk's duty is not to teach but to lament." Again Pope Leo [*Leo I,
+Ep. cxx ad Theodoret., 6, cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Adjicimus]: says "Let
+none dare to preach save the priests of the Lord, be he monk or
+layman, and no matter what knowledge he may boast of having." Now it
+is not lawful to exceed the bounds of one's office or transgress the
+ordinance of the Church. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for
+religious to teach, preach, and the like.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in an ordinance of the Council of Nicea (cf. XVI,
+qu. i, can. Placuit) it is laid down as follows: "It is our absolute
+and peremptory command addressed to all that monks shall not hear
+confessions except of one another, as is right, that they shall not
+bury the dead except those dwelling with them in the monastery, or if
+by chance a brother happen to die while on a visit." But just as the
+above belong to the duty of clerics, so also do preaching and
+teaching. Therefore since "the business of a monk differs from that
+of a cleric," as Jerome says (Ep. xiv ad Heliod.), it would seem
+unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and the like.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Regist. v, Ep. 1): "No man can fulfil
+ecclesiastical duties, and keep consistently to the monastic rule":
+and this is quoted XVI, qu. i, can. Nemo potest. Now monks are bound
+to keep consistently to the monastic rule. Therefore it would seem
+that they cannot fulfil ecclesiastical duties, whereof teaching and
+preaching are a part. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for them to
+preach, teach, and do similar things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory is quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Ex
+auctoritate) as saying: "By authority of this decree framed in virtue
+of our apostolic power and the duty of our office, be it lawful to
+monk priests who are configured to the apostles, to preach, baptize,
+give communion, pray for sinners, impose penance, and absolve from
+sin."
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing is declared to be unlawful to a person in
+two ways. First, because there is something in him contrary to that
+which is declared unlawful to him: thus to no man is it lawful to
+sin, because each man has in himself reason and an obligation to
+God's law, to which things sin is contrary. And in this way it is
+said to be unlawful for a person to preach, teach, or do like things,
+because there is in him something incompatible with these things,
+either by reason of a precept--thus those who are irregular by
+ordinance of the Church may not be raised to the sacred orders--or by
+reason of sin, according to Ps. 49:16, "But to the sinner God hath
+said: Why dost thou declare My justice?"
+
+In this way it is not unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and do
+like things, both because they are bound neither by vow nor by
+precept of their rule to abstain from these things, and because they
+are not rendered less apt for these things by any sin committed, but
+on the contrary they are the more apt through having taken upon
+themselves the practice of holiness. For it is foolish to say that a
+man is rendered less fit for spiritual duties through advancing
+himself in holiness; and consequently it is foolish to declare that
+the religious state is an obstacle to the fulfilment of such like
+duties. This error is rejected by Pope Boniface [*Boniface IV] for
+the reasons given above. His words which are quoted (XVI, qu. i, can.
+Sunt. nonnulli) are these: "There are some who without any dogmatic
+proof, and with extreme daring, inspired with a zeal rather of
+bitterness than of love, assert that monks though they be dead to the
+world and live to God, are unworthy of the power of the priestly
+office, and that they cannot confer penance, nor christen, nor
+absolve in virtue of the power divinely bestowed on them in the
+priestly office. But they are altogether wrong." He proves this first
+because it is not contrary to the rule; thus he continues: "For
+neither did the Blessed Benedict the saintly teacher of monks forbid
+this in any way," nor is it forbidden in other rules. Secondly, he
+refutes the above error from the usefulness of the monks, when he
+adds at the end of the same chapter: "The more perfect a man is, the
+more effective is he in these, namely in spiritual works."
+
+Secondly, a thing is said to be unlawful for a man, not on account of
+there being in him something contrary thereto, but because he lacks
+that which enables him to do it: thus it is unlawful for a deacon to
+say mass, because he is not in priestly orders; and it is unlawful
+for a priest to deliver judgment because he lacks the episcopal
+authority. Here, however, a distinction must be made. Because those
+things which are a matter of an order, cannot be deputed to one who
+has not the order, whereas matters of jurisdiction can be deputed to
+those who have not ordinary jurisdiction: thus the delivery of a
+judgment is deputed by the bishop to a simple priest. In this sense
+it is said to be unlawful for monks and other religious to preach,
+teach, and so forth, because the religious state does not give them
+the power to do these things. They can, however, do them if they
+receive orders, or ordinary jurisdiction, or if matters of
+jurisdiction be delegated to them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It results from the words quoted that the fact of their
+being monks does not give monks the power to do these things, yet it
+does not involve in them anything contrary to the performance of
+these acts.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Again, this ordinance of the Council of Nicea forbids
+monks to claim the power of exercising those acts on the ground of
+their being monks, but it does not forbid those acts being delegated
+to them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These two things are incompatible, namely, the ordinary
+cure of ecclesiastical duties, and the observance of the monastic
+rule in a monastery. But this does not prevent monks and other
+religious from being sometimes occupied with ecclesiastical duties
+through being deputed thereto by superiors having ordinary cure;
+especially members of religious orders that are especially instituted
+for that purpose, as we shall say further on (Q. 188, A. 4).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Occupy Themselves with Secular
+Business?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to occupy
+themselves with secular business. For in the decree quoted above (A.
+1) of Pope Boniface it is said that the "Blessed Benedict bade them
+to be altogether free from secular business; and this is most
+explicitly prescribed by the apostolic doctrine and the teaching of
+all the Fathers, not only to religious, but also to all the canonical
+clergy,"    according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man being a soldier to God,
+entangleth himself with secular business." Now it is the duty of all
+religious to be soldiers of God. Therefore it is unlawful for them to
+occupy themselves with secular business.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:11): "That you use your
+endeavor to be quiet, and that you do your own business," which a
+gloss explains thus--"by refraining from other people's affairs, so
+as to be the better able to attend to the amendment of your own
+life." Now religious devote themselves in a special way to the
+amendment of their life. Therefore they should not occupy themselves
+with secular business.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Jerome, commenting on Matt. 11:8, "Behold they that
+are clothed in soft garments are in the houses of kings," says:
+"Hence we gather that an austere life and severe preaching should
+avoid the palaces of kings and the mansions of the voluptuous." But
+the needs of secular business induce men to frequent the palaces of
+kings. Therefore it is unlawful for religious to occupy themselves
+with secular business.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 16:1): "I commend to you
+Phoebe our Sister," and further on (Rom. 16:2), "that you assist her
+in whatsoever business she shall have need of you."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 186, AA. 1, 7, ad 1), the
+religious state is directed to the attainment of the perfection of
+charity, consisting principally in the love of God and secondarily in
+the love of our neighbor. Consequently that which religious intend
+chiefly and for its own sake is to give themselves to God. Yet if
+their neighbor be in need, they should attend to his affairs out of
+charity, according to Gal. 6:2, "Bear ye one another's burthens: and
+so you shall fulfil the law of Christ," since through serving their
+neighbor for God's sake, they are obedient to the divine love. Hence
+it is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before God
+and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their
+tribulation," which means, according to a gloss, to assist the
+helpless in their time of need.
+
+We must conclude therefore that it is unlawful for either monks or
+clerics to carry on secular business from motives of avarice; but
+from motives of charity, and with their superior's permission, they
+may occupy themselves with due moderation in the administration and
+direction of secular business. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals
+(Dist. xxxviii, can. Decrevit): "The holy synod decrees that
+henceforth no cleric shall buy property or occupy himself with
+secular business, save with a view to the care of the fatherless,
+orphans, or widows, or when the bishop of the city commands him to
+take charge of the business connected with the Church." And the same
+applies to religious as to clerics, because they are both debarred
+from secular business on the same grounds, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Monks are forbidden to occupy themselves with secular
+business from motives of avarice, but not from motives of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To occupy oneself with secular business on account of
+another's need is not officiousness but charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To haunt the palaces of kings from motives of pleasure,
+glory, or avarice is not becoming to religious, but there is nothing
+unseemly in their visiting them from motives of piety. Hence it is
+written (4 Kings 4:13): "Hast thou any business, and wilt thou that I
+speak to the king or to the general of the army?" Likewise it becomes
+religious to go to the palaces of kings to rebuke and guide them,
+even as John the Baptist rebuked Herod, as related in Matt. 14:4.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Religious Are Bound to Manual Labor?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that religious are bound to manual labor.
+For religious are not exempt from the observance of precepts. Now
+manual labor is a matter of precept according to 1 Thess. 4:11, "Work
+with your own hands as we commanded you"; wherefore Augustine says
+(De oper. Monach. xxx): "But who can allow these insolent men,"
+namely religious that do no work, of whom he is speaking there, "who
+disregard the most salutary admonishment of the Apostle, not merely
+to be borne with as being weaker than others, but even to preach as
+though they were holier than others." Therefore it would seem that
+religious are bound to manual labor.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. xxi)] on
+2 Thess. 3:10, "If any man will not work, neither let him eat," says:
+"Some say that this command of the Apostle refers to spiritual works,
+and not to the bodily labor of the farmer or craftsman"; and further
+on: "But it is useless for them to try to hide from themselves and
+from others the fact that they are unwilling not only to fulfil, but
+even to understand the useful admonishments of charity"; and again:
+"He wishes God's servants to make a living by working with their
+bodies." Now religious especially are called servants of God, because
+they give themselves entirely to the service of God, as Dionysius
+asserts (Eccl. Hier. vi). Therefore it would seem that they are bound
+to manual labor.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii): "I would
+fain know how they would occupy themselves, who are unwilling to work
+with their body. We occupy our time, say they, with prayers, psalms,
+reading, and the word of God." Yet these things are no excuse, and he
+proves this, as regards each in particular. For in the first place,
+as to prayer, he says: "One prayer of the obedient man is sooner
+granted than ten thousand prayers of the contemptuous": meaning that
+those are contemptuous and unworthy to be heard who work not with
+their hands. Secondly, as to the divine praises he adds: "Even while
+working with their hands they can easily sing hymns to God." Thirdly,
+with regard to reading, he goes on to say: "Those who say they are
+occupied in reading, do they not find there what the Apostle
+commanded? What sort of perverseness is this, to wish to read but not
+to obey what one reads?" Fourthly, he adds in reference to preaching
+[*Cap. xviii]: "If one has to speak, and is so busy that he cannot
+spare time for manual work, can all in the monastery do this? And
+since all cannot do this, why should all make this a pretext for
+being exempt? And even if all were able, they should do so by turns,
+not only so that the others may be occupied in other works, but also
+because it suffices that one speak while many listen." Therefore it
+would seem that religious should not desist from manual labor on
+account of such like spiritual works to which they devote themselves.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Luke 12:33, "Sell what you possess,"
+says: "Not only give your clothes to the poor, but sell what you
+possess, that having once for all renounced all your possessions for
+the Lord's sake, you may henceforth work with the labor of your
+hands, so as to have wherewith to live or to give alms." Now it
+belongs properly to religious to renounce all they have. Therefore it
+would seem likewise to belong to them to live and give alms through
+the labor of their hands.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, religious especially would seem to be bound to
+imitate the life of the apostles, since they profess the state of
+perfection. Now the apostles worked with their own hands, according
+to 1 Cor. 4:12: "We labor, working with our own hands." Therefore it
+would seem that religious are bound to manual labor.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Those precepts that are commonly enjoined upon all
+are equally binding on religious and seculars. But the precept of
+manual labor is enjoined upon all in common, as appears from 2 Thess.
+3:6, "Withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly,"
+etc. (for by brother he signifies every Christian, according to 1
+Cor. 7:12, "If any brother have a wife that believeth not"). Now it
+is written in the same passage (2 Thess. 3:10): "If any man will not
+work, neither let him eat." Therefore religious are not bound to
+manual labor any more than seculars are.
+
+_I answer that,_ Manual labor is directed to four things. First and
+principally to obtain food; wherefore it was said to the first man
+(Gen. 3:19): "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread," and it
+is written (Ps. 127:2): "For thou shalt eat the labors of thy hands."
+Secondly, it is directed to the removal of idleness whence arise many
+evils; hence it is written (Ecclus. 33:28, 29): "Send" thy slave "to
+work, that he be not idle, for idleness hath taught much evil."
+Thirdly, it is directed to the curbing of concupiscence, inasmuch as
+it is a means of afflicting the body; hence it is written (2 Cor.
+6:5, 6): "In labors, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity."
+Fourthly, it is directed to almsgiving, wherefore it is written (Eph.
+4:28): "He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him
+labor, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may
+have something to give to him that suffereth need." Accordingly, in
+so far as manual labor is directed to obtaining food, it comes under
+a necessity of precept in so far as it is necessary for that end:
+since that which is directed to an end derives its necessity from
+that end, being, in effect, so far necessary as the end cannot be
+obtained without it. Consequently he who has no other means of
+livelihood is bound to work with his hands, whatever his condition
+may be. This is signified by the words of the Apostle: "If any man
+will not work, neither let him eat," as though to say: "The necessity
+of manual labor is the necessity of meat." So that if one could live
+without eating, one would not be bound to work with one's hands. The
+same applies to those who have no other lawful means of livelihood:
+since a man is understood to be unable to do what he cannot do
+lawfully. Wherefore we find that the Apostle prescribed manual labor
+merely as a remedy for the sin of those who gained their livelihood
+by unlawful means. For the Apostle ordered manual labor first of all
+in order to avoid theft, as appears from Eph. 4:28, "He that stole,
+let him now steal no more; but rather let him labor, working with his
+hands." Secondly, to avoid the coveting of others' property,
+wherefore it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): "Work with your own hands,
+as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly towards them that are
+without." Thirdly, to avoid the discreditable pursuits whereby some
+seek a livelihood. Hence he says (2 Thess. 3:10-12): "When we were
+with you, this we declared to you: that if any man will not work,
+neither let him eat. For we have heard that there are some among you
+who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously meddling"
+(namely, as a gloss explains it, "who make a living by meddling in
+unlawful things). Now we charge them that are such, and beseech them
+. . . that working with silence, they would eat their own bread."
+Hence Jerome states (Super epist. ad Galat. [*Preface to Bk. ii of
+Commentary]) that the Apostle said this "not so much in his capacity
+of teacher as on account of the faults of the people."
+
+It must, however, be observed that under manual labor are comprised
+all those human occupations whereby man can lawfully gain a
+livelihood, whether by using his hands, his feet, or his tongue. For
+watchmen, couriers, and such like who live by their labor, are
+understood to live by their handiwork: because, since the hand is
+"the organ of organs" [*De Anima iii, 8], handiwork denotes all kinds
+of work, whereby a man may lawfully gain a livelihood.
+
+In so far as manual labor is directed to the removal of idleness, or
+the affliction of the body, it does not come under a necessity of
+precept if we consider it in itself, since there are many other means
+besides manual labor of afflicting the body or of removing idleness:
+for the flesh is afflicted by fastings and watchings, and idleness is
+removed by meditation on the Holy Scriptures and by the divine
+praises. Hence a gloss on Ps. 118:82, "My eyes have failed for Thy
+word," says: "He is not idle who meditates only on God's word; nor is
+he who works abroad any better than he who devotes himself to the
+study of knowing the truth." Consequently for these reasons religious
+are not bound to manual labor, as neither are seculars, except when
+they are so bound by the statutes of their order. Thus Jerome says
+(Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): "The Egyptian monasteries are wont to
+admit none unless they work or labor, not so much for the necessities
+of life, as for the welfare of the soul, lest it be led astray by
+wicked thoughts." But in so far as manual labor is directed to
+almsgiving, it does not come under the necessity of precept, save
+perchance in some particular case, when a man is under an obligation
+to give alms, and has no other means of having the wherewithal to
+assist the poor: for in such a case religious would be bound as well
+as seculars to do manual labor.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This command of the Apostle is of natural law:
+wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:6, "That you withdraw yourselves from
+every brother walking disorderly," says, "otherwise than the natural
+order requires," and he is speaking of those who abstained from
+manual labor. Hence nature has provided man with hands instead of
+arms and clothes, with which she has provided other animals, in order
+that with his hands he may obtain these and all other necessaries.
+Hence it is clear that this precept, even as all the precepts of the
+natural law, is binding on both religious and seculars alike. Yet not
+everyone sins that works not with his hands, because those precepts
+of the natural law which regard the good of the many are not binding
+on each individual, but it suffices that one person apply himself to
+this business and another to that; for instance, that some be
+craftsmen, others husbandmen, others judges, and others teachers, and
+so forth, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), "If
+the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing? If the whole
+were the hearing, where would be the smelling?"
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This gloss is taken from Augustine's _De operibus
+Monachorum,_ cap. 21, where he speaks against certain monks who
+declared it to be unlawful for the servants of God to work with their
+hands, on account of our Lord's saying (Matt. 6:25): "Be not
+solicitous for your life, what you shall eat." Nevertheless his words
+do not imply that religious are bound to work with their hands, if
+they have other means of livelihood. This is clear from his adding:
+"He wishes the servants of God to make a living by working with their
+bodies." Now this does not apply to religious any more than to
+seculars, which is evident for two reasons. First, on account of the
+way in which the Apostle expresses himself, by saying: "That you
+withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly." For he
+calls all Christians brothers, since at that time religious orders
+were not as yet founded. Secondly, because religious have no other
+obligations than what seculars have, except as required by the rule
+they profess: wherefore if their rule contain nothing about manual
+labor, religious are not otherwise bound to manual labor than
+seculars are.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A man may devote himself in two ways to all the
+spiritual works mentioned by Augustine in the passage quoted: in one
+way with a view to the common good, in another with a view to his
+private advantage. Accordingly those who devote themselves publicly
+to the aforesaid spiritual works are thereby exempt from manual labor
+for two reasons: first, because it behooves them to be occupied
+exclusively with such like works; secondly, because those who devote
+themselves to such works have a claim to be supported by those for
+whose advantage they work.
+
+On the other hand, those who devote themselves to such works not
+publicly but privately as it were, ought not on that account to be
+exempt from manual labor, nor have they a claim to be supported by
+the offerings of the faithful, and it is of these that Augustine is
+speaking. For when he says: "They can sing hymns to God even while
+working with their hands; like the craftsmen who give tongue to fable
+telling without withdrawing their hands from their work," it is clear
+that he cannot refer to those who sing the canonical hours in the
+church, but to those who tell psalms or hymns as private prayers.
+Likewise what he says of reading and prayer is to be referred to the
+private prayer and reading which even lay people do at times, and not
+to those who perform public prayers in the church, or give public
+lectures in the schools. Hence he does not say: "Those who say they
+are occupied in teaching and instructing," but: "Those who say they
+are occupied in reading." Again he speaks of that preaching which is
+addressed, not publicly to the people, but to one or a few in
+particular by way of private admonishment. Hence he says expressly:
+"If one has to speak." For according to a gloss on 1 Cor. 2:4,
+"Speech is addressed privately, preaching to many."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Those who despise all for God's sake are bound to work
+with their hands, when they have no other means of livelihood, or of
+almsgiving (should the case occur where almsgiving were a matter of
+precept), but not otherwise, as stated in the Article. It is in this
+sense that the gloss quoted is to be understood.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: That the apostles worked with their hands was sometimes
+a matter of necessity, sometimes a work of supererogation. It was of
+necessity when they failed to receive a livelihood from others. Hence
+a gloss on 1 Cor. 4:12, "We labor, working with our own hands," adds,
+"because no man giveth to us." It was supererogation, as appears from
+1 Cor. 9:12, where the Apostle says that he did not use the power he
+had of living by the Gospel. The Apostle had recourse to this
+supererogation for three motives. First, in order to deprive the
+false apostles of the pretext for preaching, for they preached merely
+for a temporal advantage; hence he says (2 Cor. 11:12): "But what I
+do, that I will do that I may cut off the occasion from them," etc.
+Secondly, in order to avoid burdening those to whom he preached;
+hence he says (2 Cor. 12:13): "What is there that you have had less
+than the other churches, but that I myself was not burthensome to
+you?" Thirdly, in order to give an example of work to the idle; hence
+he says (2 Thess. 3:8, 9): "We worked night and day . . . that we
+might give ourselves a pattern unto you, to imitate us." However, the
+Apostle did not do this in places like Athens where he had facilities
+for preaching daily, as Augustine observes (De oper. Monach. xviii).
+Yet religious are not for this reason bound to imitate the Apostle in
+this matter, since they are not bound to all works of supererogation:
+wherefore neither did the other apostles work with their hands.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Live on Alms?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to live on alms.
+For the Apostle (1 Tim. 5:16) forbids those widows who have other
+means of livelihood to live on the alms of the Church, so that the
+Church may have "sufficient for them that are widows indeed." And
+Jerome says to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2;
+Can. Quoniam, cause xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv among the
+supposititious works of St. Jerome] that "those who have sufficient
+income from their parents and their own possessions, if they take
+what belongs to the poor they commit and incur the guilt of
+sacrilege, and by the abuse of such things they eat and drink
+judgment to themselves." Now religious if they be able-bodied can
+support themselves by the work of their hands. Therefore it would
+seem that they sin if they consume the alms belonging to the poor.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to live at the expense of the faithful is the
+stipend appointed to those who preach the Gospel in payment of their
+labor or work, according to Matt. 10:10: "The workman is worthy of
+his meat." Now it belongs not to religious to preach the Gospel, but
+chiefly to prelates who are pastors and teachers. Therefore religious
+cannot lawfully live on the alms of the faithful.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, religious are in the state of perfection. But it is
+more perfect to give than to receive alms; for it is written (Acts
+20:35): "It is a more blessed thing to give, rather than to receive."
+Therefore they should not live on alms, but rather should they give
+alms of their handiwork.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it belongs to religious to avoid obstacles to virtue
+and occasions of sin. Now the receiving of alms offers an occasion of
+sin, and hinders an act of virtue; hence a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:9,
+"That we might give ourselves a pattern unto you," says: "He who
+through idleness eats often at another's table, must needs flatter
+the one who feeds him." It is also written (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt
+thou take bribes which . . . blind the wise, and pervert the words of
+the just," and (Prov. 22:7): "The borrower is servant to him that
+lendeth." This is contrary to religion, wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess.
+3:9, "That we might give ourselves a pattern," etc., says, "our
+religion calls men to liberty." Therefore it would seem that
+religious should not live on alms.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, religious especially are bound to imitate the
+perfection of the apostles; wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 3:15):
+"Let us . . . as many as are perfect, be thus minded." But the
+Apostle was unwilling to live at the expense of the faithful, either
+in order to cut off the occasion from the false apostles as he
+himself says (2 Cor. 11:12), or to avoid giving scandal to the weak,
+as appears from 1 Cor. 9:12. It would seem therefore that religious
+ought for the same reasons to refrain from living on alms. Hence
+Augustine says (De oper. Monach. 28): "Cut off the occasion of
+disgraceful marketing whereby you lower yourselves in the esteem of
+others, and give scandal to the weak: and show men that you seek not
+an easy livelihood in idleness, but the kingdom of God by the narrow
+and strait way."
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): The Blessed Benedict
+after leaving his home and parents dwelt for three years in a cave,
+and while there lived on the food brought to him by a monk from Rome.
+Nevertheless, although he was able-bodied, we do not read that he
+sought to live by the labor of his hands. Therefore religious may
+lawfully live on alms.
+
+_I answer that,_ A man may lawfully live on what is his or due to
+him. Now that which is given out of liberality becomes the property
+of the person to whom it is given. Wherefore religious and clerics
+whose monasteries or churches have received from the munificence of
+princes or of any of the faithful any endowment whatsoever for their
+support, can lawfully live on such endowment without working with
+their hands, and yet without doubt they live on alms. Wherefore in
+like manner if religious receive movable goods from the faithful they
+can lawfully live on them. For it is absurd to say that a person may
+accept an alms of some great property but not bread or some small sum
+of money. Nevertheless since these gifts would seem to be bestowed on
+religious in order that they may have more leisure for religious
+works, in which the donors of temporal goods wish to have a share,
+the use of such gifts would become unlawful for them if they
+abstained from religious works, because in that case, so far as they
+are concerned, they would be thwarting the intention of those who
+bestowed those gifts.
+
+A thing is due to a person in two ways. First, on account of
+necessity, which makes all things common, as Ambrose [*Basil, Serm.
+de Temp. lxiv, among the supposititious works of St. Ambrose]
+asserts. Consequently if religious be in need they can lawfully live
+on alms. Such necessity may occur in three ways. First, through
+weakness of body, the result being that they are unable to make a
+living by working with their hands. Secondly, because that which they
+gain by their handiwork is insufficient for their livelihood:
+wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii) that "the good works
+of the faithful should not leave God's servants who work with their
+hands without a supply of necessaries, that when the hour comes for
+them to nourish their souls, so as to make it impossible for them to
+do these corporal works, they be not oppressed by want." Thirdly,
+because of the former mode of life of those who were unwont to work
+with their hands: wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxi)
+that "if they had in the world the wherewithal easily to support this
+life without working, and gave it to the needy when they were
+converted to God, we must credit their weakness and bear with it."
+For those who have thus been delicately brought up are wont to be
+unable to bear the toil of bodily labor.
+
+In another way a thing becomes due to a person through his affording
+others something whether temporal or spiritual, according to 1 Cor.
+9:11, "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great
+matter if we reap your carnal things?" And in this sense religious
+may live on alms as being due to them in four ways. First, if they
+preach by the authority of the prelates. Secondly, if they be
+ministers of the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13, 14, "They that
+serve the altar partake with the altar. So also the lord ordained
+that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel." Hence
+Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxi): "If they be gospelers, I
+allow, they have" (a claim to live at the charge of the faithful):
+"if they be ministers of the altar and dispensers of the sacraments,
+they need not insist on it, but it is theirs by perfect right." The
+reason for this is because the sacrament of the altar wherever it be
+offered is common to all the faithful. Thirdly, if they devote
+themselves to the study of Holy Writ to the common profit of the
+whole Church. Wherefore Jerome says (Contra Vigil. xiii): "It is
+still the custom in Judea, not only among us but also among the
+Hebrews, for those who meditate on the law of the Lord day and night,
+and have no other share on earth but God alone, to be supported by
+the subscriptions of the synagogues and of the whole world."
+Fourthly, if they have endowed the monastery with the goods they
+possessed, they may live on the alms given to the monastery. Hence
+Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxv) that "those who renouncing or
+distributing their means, whether ample or of any amount whatever,
+have desired with pious and salutary humility to be numbered among
+the poor of Christ, have a claim on the community and on brotherly
+love to receive a livelihood in return. They are to be commended
+indeed if they work with their hands, but if they be unwilling, who
+will dare to force them? Nor does it matter, as he goes on to say, to
+which monasteries, or in what place any one of them has bestowed his
+goods on his needy brethren; for all Christians belong to one
+commonwealth."
+
+On the other hand, in the default of any necessity, or of their
+affording any profit to others, it is unlawful for religious to wish
+to live in idleness on the alms given to the poor. Hence Augustine
+says (De oper. Monach. xxii): "Sometimes those who enter the
+profession of God's service come from a servile condition of life,
+from tilling the soil or working at some trade or lowly occupation.
+In their case it is not so clear whether they came with the purpose
+of serving God, or of evading a life of want and toil with a view to
+being fed and clothed in idleness, and furthermore to being honored
+by those by whom they were wont to be despised and downtrodden. Such
+persons surely cannot excuse themselves from work on the score of
+bodily weakness, for their former mode of life is evidence against
+them." And he adds further on (De oper. Monach. xxv): "If they be
+unwilling to work, neither let them eat. For if the rich humble
+themselves to piety, it is not that the poor may be exalted to pride;
+since it is altogether unseemly that in a life wherein senators
+become laborers, laborers should become idle, and that where the
+lords of the manor have come after renouncing their ease, the serfs
+should live in comfort."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These authorities must be understood as referring to
+cases of necessity, that is to say, when there is no other means of
+succoring the poor: for then they would be bound not only to refrain
+from accepting alms, but also to give what they have for the support
+of the needy.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Prelates are competent to preach in virtue of their
+office, but religious may be competent to do so in virtue of
+delegation; and thus when they work in the field of the Lord, they
+may make their living thereby, according to 2 Tim. 2:6, "The
+husbandman that laboreth must first partake of the fruits," which a
+gloss explains thus, "that is to say, the preacher, who in the field
+of the Church tills the hearts of his hearers with the plough of
+God's word." Those also who minister to the preachers may live on
+alms. Hence a gloss on Rom. 15:27, "If the Gentiles have been made
+partakers of their spiritual things, they ought also in carnal things
+to minister to them," says, "namely, to the Jews who sent preachers
+from Jerusalem." There are moreover other reasons for which a person
+has a claim to live at the charge of the faithful, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Other things being equal, it is more perfect to give
+than to receive. Nevertheless to give or to give up all one's
+possessions for Christ's sake, and to receive a little for one's
+livelihood is better than to give to the poor part by part, as stated
+above (Q. 186, A. 3, ad 6).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: To receive gifts so as to increase one's wealth, or to
+accept a livelihood from another without having a claim to it, and
+without profit to others or being in need oneself, affords an
+occasion of sin. But this does not apply to religious, as stated
+above.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Whenever there is evident necessity for religious
+living on alms without doing any manual work, as well as an evident
+profit to be derived by others, it is not the weak who are
+scandalized, but those who are full of malice like the Pharisees,
+whose scandal our Lord teaches us to despise (Matt. 15:12-14). If,
+however, these motives of necessity and profit be lacking, the weak
+might possibly be scandalized thereby; and this should be avoided.
+Yet the same scandal might be occasioned through those who live in
+idleness on the common revenues.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 5]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Beg?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to beg. For
+Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxviii): "The most cunning foe has
+scattered on all sides a great number of hypocrites wearing the
+monastic habit, who go wandering about the country," and afterwards
+he adds: "They all ask, they all demand to be supported in their
+profitable penury, or to be paid for a pretended holiness." Therefore
+it would seem that the life of mendicant religious is to be condemned.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): "That you . . . work
+with your own hands as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly
+towards them that are without: and that you want nothing of any
+man's": and a gloss on this passage says: "You must work and not be
+idle, because work is both honorable and a light to the unbeliever:
+and you must not covet that which belongs to another and much less
+beg or take anything." Again a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper.
+Monach. iii)] on 2 Thess. 3:10, "If any man will not work," etc.
+says: "He wishes the servants of God to work with the body, so as to
+gain a livelihood, and not be compelled by want to ask for
+necessaries." Now this is to beg. Therefore it would seem unlawful to
+beg while omitting to work with one's hands.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that which is forbidden by law and contrary to
+justice, is unbecoming to religious. Now begging is forbidden in the
+divine law; for it is written (Deut. 15:4): "There shall be no poor
+nor beggar among you," and (Ps. 36:25): "I have not seen the just
+forsaken, nor his seed seeking bread." Moreover an able-bodied
+mendicant is punished by civil law, according to the law (XI, xxvi,
+de Valid. Mendicant.). Therefore it is unfitting for religious to beg.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, "Shame is about that which is disgraceful," as
+Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Now Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
+30) that "to be ashamed to beg is a sign of good birth." Therefore it
+is disgraceful to beg: and consequently this is unbecoming to
+religious.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, according to our Lord's command it is especially
+becoming to preachers of the Gospel to live on alms, as stated above
+(A. 4). Yet it is not becoming that they should beg, since a gloss on
+2 Tim. 2:6, "The husbandman, that laboreth," etc. says: "The Apostle
+wishes the gospeler to understand that to accept necessaries from
+those among whom he labors is not mendicancy but a right." Therefore
+it would seem unbecoming for religious to beg.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It becomes religious to live in imitation of
+Christ. Now Christ was a mendicant, according to Ps. 39:18, "But I am
+a beggar and poor"; where a gloss says: "Christ said this of Himself
+as bearing the 'form of a servant,'" and further on: "A beggar is one
+who entreats another, and a poor man is one who has not enough for
+himself." Again it is written (Ps. 69:6): "I am needy and poor";
+where a gloss says: "'Needy,' that is a suppliant; 'and poor,' that
+is, not having enough for myself, because I have no worldly wealth."
+And Jerome says in a letter [*Reference unknown]: "Beware lest
+whereas thy Lord," i.e. Christ, "begged, thou amass other people's
+wealth." Therefore it becomes religious to beg.
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in reference to
+mendicancy. The first is on the part of the act itself of begging,
+which has a certain abasement attaching to it; since of all men those
+would seem most abased who are not only poor, but are so needy that
+they have to receive their meat from others. In this way some deserve
+praise for begging out of humility, just as they abase themselves in
+other ways, as being the most efficacious remedy against pride which
+they desire to quench either in themselves or in others by their
+example. For just as a disease that arises from excessive heat is
+most efficaciously healed by things that excel in cold, so proneness
+to pride is most efficaciously healed by those things which savor
+most of abasement. Hence it is said in the Decretals (II, cap. Si
+quis semel, de Paenitentia): "To condescend to the humblest duties,
+and to devote oneself to the lowliest service is an exercise of
+humility; for thus one is able to heal the disease of pride and human
+glory." Hence Jerome praises Fabiola (Ep. lxxvii ad ocean.) for that
+she desired "to receive alms, having poured forth all her wealth for
+Christ's sake." The Blessed Alexis acted in like manner, for, having
+renounced all his possessions for Christ's sake he rejoiced in
+receiving alms even from his own servants. It is also related of the
+Blessed Arsenius in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 6) that he gave
+thanks because he was forced by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it
+is enjoined to some people as a penance for grievous sins to go on a
+pilgrimage begging. Since, however, humility like the other virtues
+should not be without discretion, it behooves one to be discreet in
+becoming a mendicant for the purpose of humiliation, lest a man
+thereby incur the mark of covetousness or of anything else
+unbecoming. Secondly, mendicancy may be considered on the part of
+that which one gets by begging: and thus a man may be led to beg by a
+twofold motive. First, by the desire to have wealth or meat without
+working for it, and such like mendicancy is unlawful; secondly, by a
+motive of necessity or usefulness. The motive is one of necessity if
+a man has no other means of livelihood save begging; and it is a
+motive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish something useful, and
+is unable to do so without the alms of the faithful. Thus alms are
+besought for the building of a bridge, or church, or for any other
+work whatever that is conducive to the common good: thus scholars may
+seek alms that they may devote themselves to the study of wisdom. In
+this way mendicancy is lawful to religious no less than to seculars.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there explicitly of those who beg
+from motives of covetousness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The first gloss speaks of begging from motives of
+covetousness, as appears from the words of the Apostle; while the
+second gloss speaks of those who without effecting any useful
+purpose, beg their livelihood in order to live in idleness. On the
+other hand, he lives not idly who in any way lives usefully.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This precept of the divine law does not forbid anyone
+to beg, but it forbids the rich to be so stingy that some are
+compelled by necessity to beg. The civil law imposes a penalty on
+able-bodied mendicants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of
+necessity.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Disgrace is twofold; one arises from lack of honesty
+[*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1], the other from an external defect, thus it is
+disgraceful for a man to be sick or poor. Such like uncomeliness of
+mendicancy does not pertain to sin, but it may pertain to humility,
+as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Preachers have the right to be fed by those to whom
+they preach: yet if they wish to seek this by begging so as to
+receive it as a free gift and not as a right this will be a mark of
+greater humility.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 6]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Wear Coarser Clothes Than
+Others?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to wear coarser
+clothes than others. For according to the Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22) we
+ought to "refrain from all appearance of evil." Now coarseness of
+clothes has an appearance of evil; for our Lord said (Matt. 7:15):
+"Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep":
+and a gloss on Apoc. 6:8, "Behold a pale horse," says: "The devil
+finding that he cannot succeed, neither by outward afflictions nor by
+manifest heresies, sends in advance false brethren, who under the
+guise of religion assume the characteristics of the black and red
+horses by corrupting the faith." Therefore it would seem that
+religious should not wear coarse clothes.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): "Avoid somber,"
+i.e. black, "equally with glittering apparel. Fine and coarse clothes
+are equally to be shunned, for the one exhales pleasure, the other
+vainglory." Therefore, since vainglory is a graver sin than the use
+of pleasure, it would seem that religious who should aim at what is
+more perfect ought to avoid coarse rather than fine clothes.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, religious should aim especially at doing works of
+penance. Now in works of penance we should use, not outward signs of
+sorrow, but rather signs of joy; for our Lord said (Matt. 6:16):
+"When you fast, be not, as the hypocrites, sad," and afterwards He
+added: "But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head and wash thy
+face." Augustine commenting on these words (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
+ii, 12): "In this chapter we must observe that not only the glare and
+pomp of outward things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a
+subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under
+the guise of God's service." Therefore seemingly religious ought not
+to wear coarse clothes.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:37): "They wandered
+about in sheep-skins, in goat-skins," and a gloss adds--"as Elias and
+others." Moreover it is said in the Decretal XXI, qu. iv, can. Omnis
+jactantia: "If any persons be found to deride those who wear coarse
+and religious apparel they must be reproved. For in the early times
+all those who were consecrated to God went about in common and coarse
+apparel."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12), "in
+all external things, it is not the use but the intention of the user
+that is at fault." In order to judge of this it is necessary to
+observe that coarse and homely apparel may be considered in two ways.
+First, as being a sign of a man's disposition or condition, because
+according to Ecclus. 19:27, "the attire . . . of the man" shows "what
+he is." In this way coarseness of attire is sometimes a sign of
+sorrow: wherefore those who are beset with sorrow are wont to wear
+coarser clothes, just as on the other hand in times of festivity and
+joy they wear finer clothes. Hence penitents make use of coarse
+apparel, for example, the king (Jonah 3:6) who "was clothed with
+sack-cloth," and Achab (3 Kings 21:27) who "put hair-cloth upon his
+flesh." Sometimes, however, it is a sign of the contempt of riches
+and worldly ostentation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustico
+Monach.): "Let your somber attire indicate your purity of mind, your
+coarse robe prove your contempt of the world, yet so that your mind
+be not inflated withal, lest your speech belie your habit." In both
+these ways it is becoming for religious to wear coarse attire, since
+religion is a state of penance and of contempt of worldly glory.
+
+But that a person wish to signify this to others arises from three
+motives. First, in order to humble himself: for just as a man's mind
+is uplifted by fine clothes, so is it humbled by lowly apparel. Hence
+speaking of Achab who "put hair-cloth on his flesh," the Lord said to
+Elias: "Hast thou not seen Achab humbled before Me?" (3 Kings 21:29).
+Secondly, in order to set an example to others; wherefore a gloss on
+Matt. 3:4, "(John) had his garments of camel's hair," says: "He who
+preaches penance is clothed in the habit of penance." Thirdly, on
+account of vainglory; thus Augustine says (cf. Obj. 3) that "even the
+weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation."
+
+Accordingly in the first two ways it is praiseworthy to wear humble
+apparel, but in the third way it is sinful.
+
+Secondly, coarse and homely attire may be considered as the result of
+covetousness or negligence, and thus also it is sinful.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Coarseness of attire has not of itself the appearance
+of evil, indeed it has more the appearance of good, namely of the
+contempt of worldly glory. Hence it is that wicked persons hide their
+wickedness under coarse clothing. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
+in Monte ii, 24) that "the sheep should not dislike their clothing
+for the reason that the wolves sometimes hide themselves under it."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Jerome is speaking there of the coarse attire that is
+worn on account of human glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to our Lord's teaching men should do no deeds
+of holiness for the sake of show: and this is especially the case
+when one does something strange. Hence Chrysostom [*Hom. xiii in
+Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John
+Chrysostom] says: "While praying a man should do nothing strange, so
+as to draw the gaze of others, either by shouting or striking his
+breast, or casting up his hands," because the very strangeness draws
+people's attention to him. Yet blame does not attach to all strange
+behavior that draws people's attention, for it may be done well or
+ill. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "in
+the practice of the Christian religion when a man draws attention to
+himself by unwonted squalor and shabbiness, since he acts thus
+voluntarily and not of necessity, we can gather from his other deeds
+whether his behavior is motivated by contempt of excessive dress or
+by affectation." Religious, however, would especially seem not to act
+thus from affectation, since they wear a coarse habit as a sign of
+their profession whereby they profess contempt of the world.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 188
+
+OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider the different kinds of religious life, and under
+this head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there are different kinds of religious life or only one?
+
+(2) Whether a religious order can be established for the works of the
+active life?
+
+(3) Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?
+
+(4) Whether a religious order can be established for preaching and
+the exercise of like works?
+
+(5) Whether a religious order can be established for the study of
+science?
+
+(6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplative
+life is more excellent than one that is directed to the active life?
+
+(7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing
+something in common?
+
+(8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be preferred to
+the religious life of those who live in community?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Is Only One Religious Order?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one religious order. For
+there can be no diversity in that which is possessed wholly and
+perfectly; wherefore there can be only one sovereign good, as stated
+in the First Part (Q. 6, AA. 2, 3, 4). Now as Gregory says (Hom. xx
+in Ezech.), "when a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his
+life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust," without which there is
+no religious life. Therefore it would seem that there are not many
+religious orders but only one.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, things which agree in essentials differ only
+accidentally. Now there is no religious order without the three
+essential vows of religion, as stated above (Q. 186, AA. 6, 7).
+Therefore it would seem that religious orders differ not
+specifically, but only accidentally.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the state of perfection is competent both to
+religious and to bishops, as stated above (Q. 185, AA. 5, 7). Now the
+episcopate is not diversified specifically, but is one wherever it
+may be; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxlvi ad Evan.): "Wherever a
+bishop is, whether at Rome, or Gubbio, or Constantinople, or Reggio,
+he has the same excellence, the same priesthood." Therefore in like
+manner there is but one religious order.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, anything that may lead to confusion should be
+removed from the Church. Now it would seem that a diversity of
+religious orders might confuse the Christian people, as stated in the
+Decretal de Statu Monach. et Canon. Reg. [*Cap. Ne Nimia, de Relig.
+Dom.]. Therefore seemingly there ought not to be different religious
+orders.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 44:10) that it pertains to the
+adornment of the queen that she is "surrounded with variety."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 186, A, 7; Q. 187, A. 2), the
+religious state is a training school wherein one aims by practice at
+the perfection of charity. Now there are various works of charity to
+which a man may devote himself; and there are also various kinds of
+exercise. Wherefore religious orders may be differentiated in two
+ways. First, according to the different things to which they may be
+directed: thus one may be directed to the lodging of pilgrims,
+another to visiting or ransoming captives. Secondly, there may be
+various religious orders according to the diversity of practices;
+thus in one religious order the body is chastised by abstinence in
+food, in another by the practice of manual labor, scantiness of
+clothes, or the like.
+
+Since, however, the end imports most in every matter, [*Arist.,
+_Topic._ vi 8] religious orders differ more especially according to
+their various ends than according to their various practices.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The obligation to devote oneself wholly to God's
+service is common to every religious order; hence religious do not
+differ in this respect, as though in one religious order a person
+retained some one thing of his own, and in another order some other
+thing. But the difference is in respect of the different things
+wherein one may serve God, and whereby a man may dispose himself to
+the service of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The three essential vows of religion pertain to the
+practice of religion as principles to which all other matters are
+reduced, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 7). But there are various ways
+of disposing oneself to the observance of each of them. For instance
+one disposes oneself to observe the vow of continence, by solitude of
+place, by abstinence, by mutual fellowship, and by many like means.
+Accordingly it is evident that the community of the essential vows is
+compatible with diversity of religious life, both on account of the
+different dispositions and on account of the different ends, as
+explained above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In matters relating to perfection, the bishop stands in
+the position of agent, and the religious as passive, as stated above
+(Q. 184, A. 7). Now the agent, even in natural things, the higher it
+is, is so much the more one, whereas the things that are passive are
+various. Hence with reason the episcopal state is one, while
+religious orders are many.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Confusion is opposed to distinction and order.
+Accordingly the multitude of religious orders would lead to
+confusion, if different religious orders were directed to the same
+end and in the same way, without necessity or utility. Wherefore to
+prevent this happening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish
+a new religious order without the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 2]
+
+Whether a Religious Order Should Be Established for the Works of the
+Active Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order should be
+established for the works of the active life. For every religious
+order belongs to the state of perfection, as stated above (Q. 184, A.
+5; Q. 186, A. 1). Now the perfection of the religious state consists
+in the contemplation of divine things. For Dionysius says (Eccl.
+Hier. vi) that they are "called servants of God by reason of their
+rendering pure service and subjection to God, and on account of the
+indivisible and singular life which unites them by holy reflections,"
+i.e. contemplations, "on invisible things, to the Godlike unity and
+the perfection beloved of God." Therefore seemingly no religious
+order should be established for the works of the active life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the same judgment applies to canons
+regular as to monks, according to Extra, De Postul., cap. Ex parte;
+and De Statu Monach., cap. Quod Dei timorem: for it is stated that
+"they are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of
+monks": and the same would seem to apply to all other religious. Now
+the monastic rule was established for the purpose of the
+contemplative life; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. lviii ad Paulin.): "If
+you wish to be what you are called, a monk," i.e. a solitary, "what
+business have you in a city?" The same is found stated in Extra, De
+Renuntiatione, cap. Nisi cum pridem; and De Regular., cap. Licet
+quibusdam. Therefore it would seem that every religious order is
+directed to the contemplative life, and none to the active life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the active life is concerned with the present world.
+Now all religious are said to renounce the world; wherefore Gregory
+says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): "He who renounces this world, and does all
+the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers
+sacrifice in the wilderness." Therefore it would seem that no
+religious order can be directed to the active life.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and
+undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless
+and widows in their tribulation." Now this belongs to the active
+life. Therefore religious life can be fittingly directed to the
+active life.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the religious state is
+directed to the perfection of charity, which extends to the love of
+God and of our neighbor. Now the contemplative life which seeks to
+devote itself to God alone belongs directly to the love of God, while
+the active life, which ministers to our neighbor's needs, belongs
+directly to the love of one's neighbor. And just as out of charity we
+love our neighbor for God's sake, so the services we render our
+neighbor redound to God, according to Matt. 25:40, "What you have
+done [Vulg.: 'As long as you did it'] to one of these My least
+brethren, you did it to Me." Consequently those services which we
+render our neighbor, in so far as we refer them to God, are described
+as sacrifices, according to Heb. 13:16, "Do not forget to do good and
+to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained." And since
+it belongs properly to religion to offer sacrifice to God, as stated
+above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4, ad 1), it follows that certain
+religious orders are fittingly directed to the works of the active
+life. Wherefore in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4) the
+Abbot Nesteros in distinguishing the various aims of religious orders
+says: "Some direct their intention exclusively to the hidden life of
+the desert and purity of heart; some are occupied with the
+instruction of the brethren and the care of the monasteries; while
+others delight in the service of the guesthouse," i.e. in hospitality.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Service and subjection rendered to God are not
+precluded by the works of the active life, whereby a man serves his
+neighbor for God's sake, as stated in the Article. Nor do these works
+preclude singularity of life; not that they involve man's living
+apart from his fellow-men, but in the sense that each man
+individually devotes himself to things pertaining to the service of
+God; and since religious occupy themselves with the works of the
+active life for God's sake, it follows that their action results from
+their contemplation of divine things. Hence they are not entirely
+deprived of the fruit of the contemplative life.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The same judgment applies to monks and to all other
+religious, as regards things common to all religious orders: for
+instance as regards their devoting themselves wholly to the divine
+service, their observance of the essential vows of religion, and
+their refraining from worldly business. But it does not follow that
+this likeness extends to other things that are proper to the monastic
+profession, and are directed especially to the contemplative life.
+Hence in the aforesaid Decretal, De Postulando, it is not simply
+stated that "the same judgment applies to canons regular" as "to
+monks," but that it applies "in matters already mentioned," namely
+that "they are not to act as advocates in lawsuits." Again the
+Decretal quoted, De Statu Monach., after the statement that "canons
+regular are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of
+monks," goes on to say: "Nevertheless they obey an easier rule."
+Hence it is evident that they are not bound to all that monks are
+bound.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A man may be in the world in two ways: in one way by
+his bodily presence, in another way by the bent of his mind. Hence
+our Lord said to His disciples (John 15:19): "I have chosen you out
+of the world," and yet speaking of them to His Father He said (John
+17:11): "These are in the world, and I come to Thee." Although, then,
+religious who are occupied with the works of the active life are in
+the world as to the presence of the body, they are not in the world
+as regards their bent of mind, because they are occupied with
+external things, not as seeking anything of the world, but merely for
+the sake of serving God: for "they . . . use this world, as if they
+used it not," to quote 1 Cor. 7:31. Hence (James 1:27) after it is
+stated that "religion clean and undefiled . . . is . . . to visit the
+fatherless and widows in their tribulation," it is added, "and to
+keep one's self unspotted from this world," namely to avoid being
+attached to worldly things.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 3]
+
+Whether a Religious Order Can Be Directed to Soldiering?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order can be directed to
+soldiering. For all religious orders belong to the state of
+perfection. Now our Lord said with reference to the perfection of
+Christian life (Matt. 5:39): "I say to you not to resist evil; but if
+one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him also the other,"
+which is inconsistent with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no
+religious order can be established for soldiering.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the bodily encounter of the battlefield is more
+grievous than the encounter in words that takes place between counsel
+at law. Yet religious are forbidden to plead at law, as appears from
+the Decretal De Postulando quoted above (A. 2, Obj. 2). Therefore it
+is much less seemly for a religious order to be established for
+soldiering.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the religious state is a state of penance, as we
+have said above (Q. 187, A. 6). Now according to the code of laws
+soldiering is forbidden to penitents. For it is said in the Decretal
+De Poenit., Dist. v, cap. 3: "It is altogether opposed to the rules
+of the Church, to return to worldly soldiering after doing penance."
+Therefore it is unfitting for any religious order to be established
+for soldiering.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, no religious order may be established for an unjust
+object. But as Isidore says (Etym. xviii, 1), "A just war is one that
+is waged by order of the emperor." Since then religious are private
+individuals, it would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and
+consequently no religious order may be established for this purpose.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. clxxxix; ad Bonifac.), "Beware
+of thinking that none of those can please God who handle war-like
+weapons. Of such was holy David to whom the Lord gave great
+testimony." Now religious orders are established in order that men
+may please God. Therefore nothing hinders the establishing of a
+religious order for the purpose of soldiering.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a religious order may be
+established not only for the works of the contemplative life, but
+also for the works of the active life, in so far as they are
+concerned in helping our neighbor and in the service of God, but not
+in so far as they are directed to a worldly object. Now the
+occupation of soldiering may be directed to the assistance of our
+neighbor, not only as regards private individuals, but also as
+regards the defense of the whole commonwealth. Hence it is said of
+Judas Machabeus (1 Macc. 3:2, 3) that "he [Vulg.: 'they'] fought with
+cheerfulness the battle of Israel, and he got his people great
+honor." It can also be directed to the upkeep of divine worship,
+wherefore (1 Macc. 3:21) Judas is stated to have said: "We will fight
+for our lives and our laws," and further on (1 Macc. 13:3) Simon
+said: "You know what great battles I and my brethren, and the house
+of my father, have fought for the laws and the sanctuary."
+
+Hence a religious order may be fittingly established for soldiering,
+not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for the defense of divine
+worship and public safety, or also of the poor and oppressed,
+according to Ps. 81:4: "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of
+the hand of the sinner."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Not to resist evil may be understood in two ways.
+First, in the sense of forgiving the wrong done to oneself, and thus
+it may pertain to perfection, when it is expedient to act thus for
+the spiritual welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating
+patiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to
+imperfection, or even to vice, if one be able to resist the wrongdoer
+in a becoming manner. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 27): "The
+courage whereby a man in battle defends his country against
+barbarians, or protects the weak at home, or his friends against
+robbers is full of justice": even so our Lord says in the passage
+quoted [*Luke 6:30: "Of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not
+again"; Cf. Matt. 5:40," . . . thy goods, ask them not again."] If,
+however, a man were not to demand the return of that which belongs to
+another, he would sin if it were his business to do so: for it is
+praiseworthy to give away one's own, but not another's property. And
+much less should the things of God be neglected, for as Chrysostom
+[*Hom. v in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St.
+John Chrysostom] says, "it is most wicked to overlook the wrongs done
+to God."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is inconsistent with any religious order to act as
+counsel at law for a worldly object, but it is not inconsistent to do
+so at the orders of one's superior and in favor of one's monastery,
+as stated in the same Decretal, or for the defense of the poor and
+widows. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii, cap.
+1): "The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric is to buy
+property or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view to
+the care of the fatherless . . . and widows." Likewise to be a
+soldier for the sake of some worldly object is contrary to all
+religious life, but this does not apply to those who are soldiers for
+the sake of God's service.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Worldly soldiering is forbidden to penitents, but the
+soldiering which is directed to the service of God is imposed as a
+penance on some people, as in the case of those upon whom it is
+enjoined to take arms in defense of the Holy Land.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The establishment of a religious order for the purpose
+of soldiering does not imply that the religious can wage war on their
+own authority; but they can do so only on the authority of the
+sovereign or of the Church.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 4]
+
+Whether a Religious Order Can Be Established for Preaching or Hearing
+Confessions?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order may be established
+for preaching, or hearing confessions. For it is said (VII, qu. i
+[*Cap. Hoc nequaquam; Cf. Q. 187, A. 1, Obj. 1]): "The monastic life
+is one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or
+pastoral care," and the same apparently applies to religious. Now
+preaching and hearing confessions are the actions of a pastor and
+teacher. Therefore a religious order should not be established for
+this purpose.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the purpose for which a religious order is
+established would seem to be something most proper to the religious
+life, as stated above (A. 1). Now the aforesaid actions are not
+proper to religious but to bishops. Therefore a religious order
+should not be established for the purpose of such actions.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems unfitting that the authority to preach and
+hear confessions should be committed to an unlimited number of men;
+and there is no fixed number of those who are received into a
+religious order. Therefore it is unfitting for a religious order to
+be established for the purpose of the aforesaid actions.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, preachers have a right to receive their livelihood
+from the faithful of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 9. If then the
+office of preaching be committed to a religious order established for
+that purpose, it follows that the faithful of Christ are bound to
+support an unlimited number of persons, which would be a heavy burden
+on them. Therefore a religious order should not be established for
+the exercise of these actions.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the organization of the Church should be in
+accordance with Christ's institution. Now Christ sent first the
+twelve apostles to preach, as related in Luke 9, and afterwards He
+sent the seventy-two disciples, as stated in Luke 10. Moreover,
+according to the gloss of Bede on "And after these things" (Luke
+10:1), "the apostles are represented by the bishops, the seventy-two
+disciples by the lesser priests," i.e. the parish priests. Therefore
+in addition to bishops and parish priests, no religious order should
+be established for the purpose of preaching and hearing confessions.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4),
+Abbot Nesteros, speaking of the various kinds of religious orders,
+says: "Some choosing the care of the sick, others devoting themselves
+to the relief of the afflicted and oppressed, or applying themselves
+to teaching, or giving alms to the poor, have been most highly
+esteemed on account of their devotion and piety." Therefore just as a
+religious order may be established for the care of the sick, so also
+may one be established for teaching the people by preaching and like
+works.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it is fitting for a
+religious order to be established for the works of the active life,
+in so far as they are directed to the good of our neighbor, the
+service of God, and the upkeep of divine worship. Now the good of our
+neighbor is advanced by things pertaining to the spiritual welfare of
+the soul rather than by things pertaining to the supplying of bodily
+needs, in proportion to the excellence of spiritual over corporal
+things. Hence it was stated above (Q. 32, A. 3) that spiritual works
+of mercy surpass corporal works of mercy. Moreover this is more
+pertinent to the service of God, to Whom no sacrifice is more
+acceptable than zeal for souls, as Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.).
+Furthermore, it is a greater thing to employ spiritual arms in
+defending the faithful against the errors of heretics and the
+temptations of the devil, than to protect the faithful by means of
+bodily weapons. Therefore it is most fitting for a religious order to
+be established for preaching and similar works pertaining to the
+salvation of souls.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: He who works by virtue of another, acts as an
+instrument. And a minister is like an "animated instrument," as the
+Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2 [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 11]). Hence if a
+man preach or do something similar by the authority of his superiors,
+he does not rise above the degree of "discipleship" or "subjection,"
+which is competent to religious.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Some religious orders are established for soldiering,
+to wage war, not indeed on their own authority, but on that of the
+sovereign or of the Church who are competent to wage war by virtue of
+their office, as stated above (A. 3, ad 4). In the same way certain
+religious orders are established for preaching and hearing
+confessions, not indeed by their own authority, but by the authority
+of the higher and lower superiors, to whom these things belong by
+virtue of their office. Consequently to assist one's superiors in
+such a ministry is proper to a religious order of this kind.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Bishops do not allow these religious severally and
+indiscriminately to preach or hear confessions, but according to the
+discretion of the religious superiors, or according to their own
+appointment.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The faithful are not bound by law to contribute to the
+support of other than their ordinary prelates, who receive the tithes
+and offerings of the faithful for that purpose, as well as other
+ecclesiastical revenues. But if some men are willing to minister to
+the faithful by exercising the aforesaid acts gratuitously, and
+without demanding payment as of right, the faithful are not burdened
+thereby because their temporal contributions can be liberally repaid
+by those men, nor are they bound by law to contribute, but by
+charity, and yet not so that they be burdened thereby and others
+eased, as stated in 2 Cor. 8:13. If, however, none be found to devote
+themselves gratuitously to services of this kind, the ordinary
+prelate is bound, if he cannot suffice by himself, to seek other
+suitable persons and support them himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The seventy-two disciples are represented not only by
+the parish priests, but by all those of lower order who in any way
+assist the bishops in their office. For we do not read that our Lord
+appointed the seventy-two disciples to certain fixed parishes, but
+that "He sent them two and two before His face into every city and
+place whither He Himself was to come." It was fitting, however, that
+in addition to the ordinary prelates others should be chosen for
+these duties on account of the multitude of the faithful, and the
+difficulty of finding a sufficient number of persons to be appointed
+to each locality, just as it was necessary to establish religious
+orders for military service, on account of the secular princes being
+unable to cope with unbelievers in certain countries.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 5]
+
+Whether a Religious Order Should Be Established for the Purpose of
+Study?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order should not be
+established for the purpose of study. For it is written (Ps. 70:15,
+16): "Because I have not known letters [Douay: 'learning'], I will
+enter into the powers of the Lord," i.e. "Christian virtue,"
+according to a gloss. Now the perfection of Christian virtue,
+seemingly, pertains especially to religious. Therefore it is not for
+them to apply themselves to the study of letters.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which is a source of dissent is unbecoming to
+religious, who are gathered together in the unity of peace. Now study
+leads to dissent: wherefore different schools of thought arose among
+the philosophers. Hence Jerome (Super Epist. ad Tit. 1:5) says:
+"Before a diabolical instinct brought study into religion, and people
+said: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephas," etc. Therefore it
+would seem that no religious order should be established for the
+purpose of study.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, those who profess the Christian religion should
+profess nothing in common with the Gentiles. Now among the Gentiles
+were some who professed philosophy, and even now some secular persons
+are known as professors of certain sciences. Therefore the study of
+letters does not become religious.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Jerome (Ep. liii ad Paulin.) urges him to acquire
+learning in the monastic state, saying: "Let us learn on earth those
+things the knowledge of which will remain in heaven," and further on:
+"Whatever you seek to know, I will endeavor to know with you."
+
+I answer that As stated above (A. 2), religion may be ordained to the
+active and to the contemplative life. Now chief among the works of
+the active life are those which are directly ordained to the
+salvation of souls, such as preaching and the like. Accordingly the
+study of letters is becoming to the religious life in three ways.
+First, as regards that which is proper to the contemplative life, to
+which the study of letters helps in a twofold manner. In one way by
+helping directly to contemplate, namely by enlightening the
+intellect. For the contemplative life of which we are now speaking is
+directed chiefly to the consideration of divine things, as stated
+above (Q. 180, A. 4), to which consideration man is directed by
+study; for which reason it is said in praise of the righteous (Ps.
+1:2) that "he shall meditate day and night" on the law of the Lord,
+and (Ecclus. 39:1): "The wise man will seek out the wisdom of all the
+ancients, and will be occupied in the prophets." In another way the
+study of letters is a help to the contemplative life indirectly, by
+removing the obstacles to contemplation, namely the errors which in
+the contemplation of divine things frequently beset those who are
+ignorant of the scriptures. Thus we read in the Conferences of the
+Fathers (Coll. x, 3) that the Abbot Serapion through simplicity fell
+into the error of the Anthropomorphites, who thought that God had a
+human shape. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi) that "some through
+seeking in contemplation more than they are able to grasp, fall away
+into perverse doctrines, and by failing to be the humble disciples of
+truth become the masters of error." Hence it is written (Eccles.
+2:3): "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I
+might turn my mind to wisdom and might avoid folly."
+
+Secondly, the study of letters is necessary in those religious orders
+that are founded for preaching and other like works; wherefore the
+Apostle (Titus 1:9), speaking of bishops to whose office these acts
+belong, says: "Embracing that faithful word which is according to
+doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to
+convince the gainsayers." Nor does it matter that the apostles were
+sent to preach without having studied letters, because, as Jerome
+says (Ep. liii ad Paulin.), "whatever others acquire by exercise and
+daily meditation in God's law, was taught them by the Holy Ghost."
+
+Thirdly, the study of letters is becoming to religious as regards
+that which is common to all religious orders. For it helps us to
+avoid the lusts of the flesh; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad
+Rust. Monach.): "Love the science of the Scriptures and thou shalt
+have no love for carnal vice." For it turns the mind away from
+lustful thoughts, and tames the flesh on account of the toil that
+study entails according to Ecclus. 31:1, "Watching for riches*
+consumeth the flesh." [*_Vigilia honestatis._ St. Thomas would seem
+to have taken _honestas_ in the sense of virtue]. It also helps to
+remove the desire of riches, wherefore it is written (Wis. 7:8):
+"I . . . esteemed riches nothing in comparison with her," and (1
+Macc. 12:9): "We needed none of these things," namely assistance from
+without, "having for our comfort the holy books that are in our
+hands." It also helps to teach obedience, wherefore Augustine says
+(De oper. Monach. xvii): "What sort of perverseness is this, to wish
+to read, but not to obey what one reads?" Hence it is clearly fitting
+that a religious order be established for the study of letters.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This commentary of the gloss is an exposition of the
+Old Law of which the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): "The letter killeth."
+Hence not to know letters is to disapprove of the circumcision of the
+"letter" and other carnal observances.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Study is directed to knowledge which, without charity,
+"puffeth up," and consequently leads to dissent, according to Prov.
+13:10, "Among the proud there are always dissensions": whereas, with
+charity, it "edifieth and begets concord." Hence the Apostle after
+saying (1 Cor. 1:5): "You are made rich . . . in all utterance and in
+all knowledge," adds (1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the same
+thing, and that there be no schisms among you." But Jerome is not
+speaking here of the study of letters, but of the study of
+dissensions which heretics and schismatics have brought into the
+Christian religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The philosophers professed the study of letters in the
+matter of secular learning: whereas it becomes religious to devote
+themselves chiefly to the study of letters in reference to the
+doctrine that is "according to godliness" (Titus 1:1). It becomes not
+religious, whose whole life is devoted to the service of God, to seek
+for other learning, save in so far as it is referred to the sacred
+doctrine. Hence Augustine says at the end of _De Musica_ vi, 17:
+"Whilst we think that we should not overlook those whom heretics
+delude by the deceitful assurance of reason and knowledge, we are
+slow to advance in the consideration of their methods. Yet we should
+not be praised for doing this, were it not that many holy sons of
+their most loving mother the Catholic Church had done the same under
+the necessity of confounding heretics."
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 6]
+
+Whether a Religious Order That Is Devoted to the Contemplative Life
+Is More Excellent Than on That Is Given to the Active Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order which is devoted to
+the contemplative life is not more excellent than one which is given
+to the active life. For it is said (Extra, de Regular. et Transeunt.
+ad Relig., cap. Licet), quoting the words of Innocent III: "Even as a
+greater good is preferred to a lesser, so the common profit takes
+precedence of private profit: and in this case teaching is rightly
+preferred to silence, responsibility to contemplation, work to rest."
+Now the religious order which is directed to the greater good is
+better. Therefore it would seem that those religious orders that are
+directed to the active life are more excellent than those which are
+directed to the contemplative life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every religious order is directed to the perfection
+of charity, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Now a gloss on Heb. 12:4,
+"For you have not yet resisted unto blood," says: "In this life there
+is no more perfect love than that to which the holy martyrs attained,
+who fought against sin unto blood." Now to fight unto blood is
+becoming those religious who are directed to military service, and
+yet this pertains to the active life. Therefore it would seem that
+religious orders of this kind are the most excellent.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, seemingly the stricter a religious order is, the
+more excellent it is. But there is no reason why certain religious
+orders directed to the active life should not be of stricter
+observance than those directed to the contemplative life. Therefore
+they are more excellent.
+
+_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Luke 10:42) that the "best part"
+was Mary's, by whom the contemplative life is signified.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the difference between one
+religious order and another depends chiefly on the end, and
+secondarily on the exercise. And since one thing cannot be said to be
+more excellent than another save in respect of that in which it
+differs therefrom, it follows that the excellence of one religious
+order over another depends chiefly on their ends, and secondarily on
+their respective exercises. Nevertheless each of these comparisons is
+considered in a different way. For the comparison with respect to the
+end is absolute, since the end is sought for its own sake; whereas
+the comparison with respect to exercise is relative, since exercise
+is sought not for its own sake, but for the sake of the end. Hence a
+religious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to an end
+that is absolutely more excellent either because it is a greater good
+or because it is directed to more goods. If, however, the end be the
+same, the excellence of one religious order over another depends
+secondarily, not on the amount of exercise, but on the proportion of
+the exercise to the end in view. Wherefore in the Conferences of the
+Fathers (Coll. ii, 2) Blessed Antony is quoted, as preferring
+discretion whereby a man moderates all his actions, to fastings,
+watchings, and all such observances.
+
+Accordingly we must say that the work of the active life is twofold.
+one proceeds from the fulness of contemplation, such as teaching and
+preaching. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the words
+of Ps. 144:7, "They shall publish the memory of . . . Thy sweetness,"
+refer "to perfect men returning from their contemplation." And this
+work is more excellent than simple contemplation. For even as it is
+better to enlighten than merely to shine, so is it better to give to
+others the fruits of one's contemplation than merely to contemplate.
+The other work of the active life consists entirely in outward
+occupation, for instance almsgiving, receiving guests, and the like,
+which are less excellent than the works of contemplation, except in
+cases of necessity, as stated above (Q. 182, A. 1). Accordingly the
+highest place in religious orders is held by those which are directed
+to teaching and preaching, which, moreover, are nearest to the
+episcopal perfection, even as in other things "the end of that which
+is first is in conjunction with the beginning of that which is
+second," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. vii). The second place
+belongs to those which are directed to contemplation, and the third
+to those which are occupied with external actions.
+
+Moreover, in each of these degrees it may be noted that one religious
+order excels another through being directed to higher action in the
+same genus; thus among the works of the active life it is better to
+ransom captives than to receive guests, and among the works of the
+contemplative life prayer is better than study. Again one will excel
+another if it be directed to more of these actions than another, or
+if it have statutes more adapted to the attainment of the end in view.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This Decretal refers to the active life as directed to
+the salvation of souls.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those religious orders that are established for the
+purpose of military service aim more directly at shedding the enemy's
+blood than at the shedding of their own, which latter is more
+properly competent to martyrs. Yet there is no reason why religious
+of this description should not acquire the merit of martyrdom in
+certain cases, and in this respect stand higher than other religious;
+even as in some cases the works of the active life take precedence of
+contemplation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Strictness of observances, as the Blessed Antony
+remarks (Conferences of the Fathers; Coll. ii, 2), is not the chief
+object of commendation in a religious order; and it is written (Isa.
+58:5): "Is this such a fast as I have chosen, for a man to afflict
+his soul for a day?" Nevertheless it is adopted in religious life as
+being necessary for taming the flesh, "which if done without
+discretion, is liable to make us fail altogether," as the Blessed
+Antony observes. Wherefore a religious order is not more excellent
+through having stricter observances, but because its observances are
+directed by greater discretion to the end of religion. Thus the
+taming of the flesh is more efficaciously directed to continence by
+means of abstinence in meat and drink, which pertain to hunger and
+thirst, than by the privation of clothing, which pertains to cold and
+nakedness, or by bodily labor.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Religious Perfection Is Diminished by Possessing Something in
+Common?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that religious perfection is diminished by
+possessing something in common. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If
+thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast and give
+to the poor." Hence it is clear that to lack worldly wealth belongs
+to the perfection of Christian life. Now those who possess something
+in common do not lack worldly wealth. Therefore it would seem that
+they do not quite reach to the perfection of Christian life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the perfection of the counsels requires that one
+should be without worldly solicitude; wherefore the Apostle in giving
+the counsel of virginity said (1 Cor. 7:32): "I would have you to be
+without solicitude." Now it belongs to the solicitude of the present
+life that certain people keep something to themselves for the morrow;
+and this solicitude was forbidden His disciples by our Lord (Matt.
+6:34) saying: "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow." Therefore it
+would seem that the perfection of Christian life is diminished by
+having something in common.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, possessions held in common belong in some way to
+each member of the community; wherefore Jerome (Ep. lx ad Heliod.
+Episc.) says in reference to certain people: "They are richer in the
+monastery than they had been in the world; though serving the poor
+Christ they have wealth which they had not while serving the rich
+devil; the Church rejects them now that they are rich, who in the
+world were beggars." But it is derogatory to religious perfection
+that one should possess wealth of one's own. Therefore it is also
+derogatory to religious perfection to possess anything in common.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Gregory (Dial. iii, 14) relates of a very holy man
+named Isaac, that "when his disciples humbly signified that he should
+accept the possessions offered to him for the use of the monastery,
+he being solicitous for the safeguarding of his poverty, held firmly
+to his opinion, saying: A monk who seeks earthly possessions is no
+monk at all": and this refers to possessions held in common, and
+which were offered him for the common use of the monastery. Therefore
+it would seem destructive of religious perfection to possess anything
+in common.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, our Lord in prescribing religious perfection to His
+disciples, said (Matt. 10:9, 10): "Do not possess gold, nor silver,
+nor money in your purses, nor script for your journey." By these
+words, as Jerome says in his commentary, "He reproves those
+philosophers who are commonly called Bactroperatae [*i.e. staff and
+scrip bearers], who as despising the world and valuing all things at
+naught carried their pantry about with them." Therefore it would seem
+derogatory to religious perfection that one should keep something
+whether for oneself or for the common use.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Prosper [*Julianus Pomerius, among the works of
+Prosper] says (De Vita Contempl. ix) and his words are quoted (XII,
+qu. 1, can. Expedit): "It is sufficiently clear both that for the
+sake of perfection one should renounce having anything of one's own,
+and that the possession of revenues, which are of course common
+property, is no hindrance to the perfection of the Church."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 185, A. 6,
+ad 1), perfection consists, essentially, not in poverty, but in
+following Christ, according to the saying of Jerome (Super Matth.
+xix, 27): "Since it is not enough to leave all, Peter adds that which
+is perfect, namely, 'We have followed Thee,'" while poverty is like
+an instrument or exercise for the attainment of perfection. Hence in
+the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the abbot Moses says:
+"Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, poverty, and
+privation of all one's possessions are not perfection, but means of
+perfection."
+
+Now the privation of one's possessions, or poverty, is a means of
+perfection, inasmuch as by doing away with riches we remove certain
+obstacles to charity; and these are chiefly three. The first is the
+cares which riches bring with them; wherefore our Lord said (Matt.
+13:22): "That which was sown [Vulg.: 'He that received the seed']
+among thorns, is he that heareth the word, and the care of this
+world, and the deceitfulness of riches, choketh up the word." The
+second is the love of riches, which increases with the possession of
+wealth; wherefore Jerome says (Super Matth. xix, 23) that "since it
+is difficult to despise riches when we have them, our Lord did not
+say: 'It is impossible for a rich man to enter the kingdom of
+heaven,' but: 'It is difficult.'" The third is vainglory or elation
+which results from riches, according to Ps. 48:7, "They that trust in
+their own strength, and glory in the multitude of their riches."
+
+Accordingly the first of these three cannot be altogether separated
+from riches whether great or small. For man must needs take a certain
+amount of care in acquiring or keeping external things. But so long
+as external things are sought or possessed only in a small quantity,
+and as much as is required for a mere livelihood, such like care does
+not hinder one much; and consequently is not inconsistent with the
+perfection of Christian life. For our Lord did not forbid all care,
+but only such as is excessive and hurtful; wherefore Augustine,
+commenting on Matt. 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your life, what you
+shall eat," says (De Serm. in Monte [*The words quoted are from De
+Operibus Monach. xxvi]): "In saying this He does not forbid them to
+procure these things in so far as they needed them, but to be intent
+on them, and for their sake to do whatever they are bidden to do in
+preaching the Gospel." Yet the possession of much wealth increases
+the weight of care, which is a great distraction to man's mind and
+hinders him from giving himself wholly to God's service. The other
+two, however, namely the love of riches and taking pride or glorying
+in riches, result only from an abundance of wealth.
+
+Nevertheless it makes a difference in this matter if riches, whether
+abundant or moderate, be possessed in private or in common. For the
+care that one takes of one's own wealth, pertains to love of self,
+whereby a man loves himself in temporal matters; whereas the care
+that is given to things held in common pertains to the love of
+charity which "seeketh not her own," but looks to the common good.
+And since religion is directed to the perfection of charity, and
+charity is perfected in "the love of God extending to contempt of
+self" [*Augustine, De Civ. Dei xiv, 28,] it is contrary to religious
+perfection to possess anything in private. But the care that is given
+to common goods may pertain to charity, although it may prove an
+obstacle to some higher act of charity, such as divine contemplation
+or the instructing of one's neighbor. Hence it is evident that to
+have excessive riches in common, whether in movable or in immovable
+property, is an obstacle to perfection, though not absolutely
+incompatible with it; while it is not an obstacle to religious
+perfection to have enough external things, whether movables or
+immovables, as suffice for a livelihood, if we consider poverty in
+relation to the common end of religious orders, which is to devote
+oneself to the service of God. But if we consider poverty in relation
+to the special end of any religious order, then this end being
+presupposed, a greater or lesser degree of poverty is adapted to that
+religious order; and each religious order will be the more perfect in
+respect of poverty, according as it professes a poverty more adapted
+to its end. For it is evident that for the purpose of the outward and
+bodily works of the active life a man needs the assistance of outward
+things, whereas few are required for contemplation. Hence the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "many things are needed for
+action, and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions are. But
+the contemplative man requires no such things for the exercise of his
+act: he needs only the necessaries; other things are an obstacle to
+his contemplation." Accordingly it is clear that a religious order
+directed to the bodily actions of the active life, such as soldiering
+or the lodging of guests, would be imperfect if it lacked common
+riches; whereas those religious orders which are directed to the
+contemplative life are the more perfect, according as the poverty
+they profess burdens them with less care for temporal things. And the
+care of temporal things is so much a greater obstacle to religious
+life as the religious life requires a greater care of spiritual
+things.
+
+Now it is manifest that a religious order established for the purpose
+of contemplating and of giving to others the fruits of one's
+contemplation by teaching and preaching, requires greater care of
+spiritual things than one that is established for contemplation only.
+Wherefore it becomes a religious order of this kind to embrace a
+poverty that burdens one with the least amount of care. Again it is
+clear that to keep what one has acquired at a fitting time for one's
+necessary use involves the least burden of care. Wherefore a
+threefold degree of poverty corresponds to the three aforesaid
+degrees of religious life. For it is fitting that a religious order
+which is directed to the bodily actions of the active life should
+have an abundance of riches in common; that the common possession of
+a religious order directed to contemplation should be more moderate,
+unless the said religious be bound, either themselves or through
+others, to give hospitality or to assist the poor; and that those who
+aim at giving the fruits of their contemplation to others should have
+their life most exempt from external cares; this being accomplished
+by their laying up the necessaries of life procured at a fitting
+time. This, our Lord, the Founder of poverty, taught by His example.
+For He had a purse which He entrusted to Judas, and in which were
+kept the things that were offered to Him, as related in John 12:6.
+
+Nor should it be argued that Jerome (Super Matth. xvii, 26) says: "If
+anyone object that Judas carried money in the purse, we answer that
+He deemed it unlawful to spend the property of the poor on His own
+uses,"    namely by paying the tax--because among those poor His
+disciples held a foremost place, and the money in Christ's purse was
+spent chiefly on their needs. For it is stated (John 4:8) that "His
+disciples were gone into the city to buy meats," and (John 13:29)
+that the disciples "thought, because Judas had the purse, that Jesus
+had said to him: But those things which we have need of for the
+festival day, or that he should give something to the poor." From
+this it is evident that to keep money by, or any other common
+property for the support of religious of the same order, or of any
+other poor, is in accordance with the perfection which Christ taught
+by His example. Moreover, after the resurrection, the disciples from
+whom all religious orders took their origin kept the price of the
+lands, and distributed it according as each one had need (Acts 4:34,
+35).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1), this saying of
+our Lord does not mean that poverty itself is perfection, but that it
+is the means of perfection. Indeed, as shown above (Q. 186, A. 8), it
+is the least of the three chief means of perfection; since the vow of
+continence excels the vow of poverty, and the vow of obedience excels
+them both. Since, however, the means are sought not for their own
+sake, but for the sake of the end, a thing is better, not for being a
+greater instrument, but for being more adapted to the end. Thus a
+physician does not heal the more the more medicine he gives, but the
+more the medicine is adapted to the disease. Accordingly it does not
+follow that a religious order is the more perfect, according as the
+poverty it professes is more perfect, but according as its poverty is
+more adapted to the end both common and special. Granted even that
+the religious order which exceeds others in poverty be more perfect
+in so far as it is poorer, this would not make it more perfect
+simply. For possibly some other religious order might surpass it in
+matters relating to continence, or obedience, and thus be more
+perfect simply, since to excel in better things is to be better
+simply.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord's words (Matt. 6:34), "Be not solicitous for
+tomorrow," do not mean that we are to keep nothing for the morrow;
+for the Blessed Antony shows the danger of so doing, in the
+Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. ii, 2), where he says: "It has been
+our experience that those who have attempted to practice the
+privation of all means of livelihood, so as not to have the
+wherewithal to procure themselves food for one day, have been
+deceived so unawares that they were unable to finish properly the
+work they had undertaken." And, as Augustine says (De oper. Monach.
+xxiii), "if this saying of our Lord, 'Be not solicitous for
+tomorrow,' means that we are to lay nothing by for the morrow, those
+who shut themselves up for many days from the sight of men, and apply
+their whole mind to a life of prayer, will be unable to provide
+themselves with these things." Again he adds afterwards: "Are we to
+suppose that the more holy they are, the less do they resemble the
+birds?" And further on (De oper. Monach. xxiv): "For if it be argued
+from the Gospel that they should lay nothing by, they answer rightly:
+Why then did our Lord have a purse, wherein He kept the money that
+was collected? Why, in days long gone by, when famine was imminent,
+was grain sent to the holy fathers? Why did the apostles thus provide
+for the needs of the saints?"
+
+Accordingly the saying: "Be not solicitous for tomorrow," according
+to Jerome (Super Matth.) is to be rendered thus: "It is enough that
+we think of the present; the future being uncertain, let us leave it
+to God": according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvi in the Opus Imperfectum,
+falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "It is enough to endure the
+toil for necessary things, labor not in excess for unnecessary
+things": according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17):
+"When we do any good action, we should bear in mind not temporal
+things which are denoted by the morrow, but eternal things."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The saying of Jerome applies where there are excessive
+riches, possessed in private as it were, or by the abuse of which
+even the individual members of a community wax proud and wanton. But
+they do not apply to moderate wealth, set by for the common use,
+merely as a means of livelihood of which each one stands in need. For
+it amounts to the same that each one makes use of things pertaining
+to the necessaries of life, and that these things be set by for the
+common use.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Isaac refused to accept the offer of possessions,
+because he feared lest this should lead him to have excessive wealth,
+the abuse of which would be an obstacle to religious perfection.
+Hence Gregory adds (Dial. iii, 14): "He was as afraid of forfeiting
+the security of his poverty, as the rich miser is careful of his
+perishable wealth." It is not, however, related that he refused to
+accept such things as are commonly necessary for the upkeep of life.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5, 6) that bread, wine,
+and the like are natural riches, while money is artificial riches.
+Hence it is that certain philosophers declined to make use of money,
+and employed other things, living according to nature. Wherefore
+Jerome shows by the words of our Lord, Who equally forbade both, that
+it comes to the same to have money and to possess other things
+necessary for life. And though our Lord commanded those who were sent
+to preach not to carry these things on the way, He did not forbid
+them to be possessed in common. How these words of our Lord should be
+understood has been shown above (Q. 185, A. 6 ad 2; I-II, Q. 108, A.
+2, ad 3).
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Religious Life of Those Who Live in Community Is More
+Perfect Than That of Those Who Lead a Solitary Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the religious life of those who live
+in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary
+life. For it is written (Eccles. 4:9): "It is better . . . that two
+should be together, than one; for they have the advantage of their
+society." Therefore the religious life of those who live in community
+would seem to be more perfect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Matt. 18:20): "Where there are two or
+three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them."
+But nothing can be better than the fellowship of Christ. Therefore it
+would seem better to live in community than in solitude.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the vow of obedience is more excellent than the
+other religious vows; and humility is most acceptable to God. Now
+obedience and humility are better observed in company than in
+solitude; for Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic. Monach.): "In solitude
+pride quickly takes man unawares, he sleeps as much as he will, he
+does what he likes"; whereas when instructing one who lives in
+community, he says: "You may not do what you will, you must eat what
+you are bidden to eat, you may possess so much as you receive, you
+must obey one you prefer not to obey, you must be a servant to your
+brethren, you must fear the superior of the monastery as God, love
+him as a father." Therefore it would seem that the religious life of
+those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who
+lead a solitary life.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, our Lord said (Luke 11:33): "No man lighteth a
+candle and putteth it in a hidden place, nor under a bushel." Now
+those who lead a solitary life are seemingly in a hidden place, and
+to be doing no good to any man. Therefore it would seem that their
+religious life is not more perfect.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, that which is in accord with man's nature is
+apparently more pertinent to the perfection of virtue. But man is
+naturally a social animal, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1).
+Therefore it would seem that to lead a solitary life is not more
+perfect than to lead a community life.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii) that
+"those are holier who keep themselves aloof from the approach of all,
+and give their whole mind to a life of prayer."
+
+_I answer that,_ Solitude, like poverty, is not the essence of
+perfection, but a means thereto. Hence in the Conferences of the
+Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the Abbot Moses says that "solitude," even as
+fasting and other like things, is "a sure means of acquiring purity
+of heart." Now it is evident that solitude is a means adapted not to
+action but to contemplation, according to Osee 2:14, "I . . . will
+lead her into solitude [Douay: 'the wilderness']; and I will speak to
+her heart." Wherefore it is not suitable to those religious orders
+that are directed to the works whether corporal or spiritual of the
+active life; except perhaps for a time, after the example of Christ,
+Who as Luke relates (6:12), "went out into a mountain to pray; and He
+passed the whole night in the prayer of God." On the other hand, it
+is suitable to those religious orders that are directed to
+contemplation.
+
+It must, however, be observed that what is solitary should be
+self-sufficing by itself. Now such a thing is one "that lacks
+nothing," and this belongs to the idea of a perfect thing
+[*Aristotle, _Phys._ iii, 6]. Wherefore solitude befits the
+contemplative who has already attained to perfection. This happens in
+two ways: in one way by the gift only of God, as in the case of John
+the Baptist, who was "filled with the Holy Ghost even from his
+mother's womb" (Luke 1:11), so that he was in the desert even as a
+boy; in another way by the practice of virtuous action, according to
+Heb. 5:14: "Strong meat is for the perfect; for them who by custom
+have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil."
+
+Now man is assisted in this practice by the fellowship of others in
+two ways. First, as regards his intellect, to the effect of his being
+instructed in that which he has to contemplate; wherefore Jerome says
+(ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "It pleases me that you have the
+fellowship of holy men, and teach not yourself." Secondly, as regards
+the affections, seeing that man's noisome affections are restrained
+by the example and reproof which he receives from others; for as
+Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 23), commenting on the words, "To whom I
+have given a house in the wilderness" (Job 39:6), "What profits
+solitude of the body, if solitude of the heart be lacking?" Hence a
+social life is necessary for the practice of perfection. Now solitude
+befits those who are already perfect; wherefore Jerome says (ad
+Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "Far from condemning the solitary life,
+we have often commended it. But we wish the soldiers who pass from
+the monastic school to be such as not to be deterred by the hard
+noviciate of the desert, and such as have given proof of their
+conduct for a considerable time."
+
+Accordingly, just as that which is already perfect surpasses that
+which is being schooled in perfection, so the life of the solitaries,
+if duly practiced, surpasses the community life. But if it be
+undertaken without the aforesaid practice, it is fraught with very
+great danger, unless the grace of God supply that which others
+acquire by practice, as in the case of the Blessed Antony and the
+Blessed Benedict.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Solomon shows that two are better than one, on account
+of the help which one affords the other either by "lifting him" up,
+or by "warming him," i.e. giving him spiritual heat (Eccles. 4:10,
+11). But those who have already attained to perfection do not require
+this help.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to 1 John 4:16, "He that abideth in charity
+abideth in God and God in him." Wherefore just as Christ is in the
+midst of those who are united together in the fellowship of brotherly
+love, so does He dwell in the heart of the man who devotes himself to
+divine contemplation through love of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Actual obedience is required of those who need to be
+schooled according to the direction of others in the attainment of
+perfection; but those who are already perfect are sufficiently "led
+by the spirit of God" so that they need not to obey others actually.
+Nevertheless they have obedience in the preparedness of the mind.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), "no one is
+forbidden to seek the knowledge of truth, for this pertains to a
+praiseworthy leisure." That a man be placed "on a candlestick," does
+not concern him but his superiors, and "if this burden is not placed
+on us," as Augustine goes on to say (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), "we must
+devote ourselves to the contemplation of truth," for which purpose
+solitude is most helpful. Nevertheless, those who lead a solitary
+life are most useful to mankind. Hence, referring to them, Augustine
+says (De Morib. Eccl. xxxi): "They dwell in the most lonely places,
+content to live on water and the bread that is brought to them from
+time to time, enjoying colloquy with God to whom they have adhered
+with a pure mind. To some they seem to have renounced human
+intercourse more than is right: but these understand not how much
+such men profit us by the spirit of their prayers, what an example to
+us is the life of those whom we are forbidden to see in the body."
+
+Reply Obj. 5: A man may lead a solitary life for two motives. One is
+because he is unable, as it were, to bear with human fellowship on
+account of his uncouthness of mind; and this is beast-like. The other
+is with a view to adhering wholly to divine things; and this is
+superhuman. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "he who
+associates not with others is either a beast or a god," i.e. a godly
+man.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 189
+
+OF THE ENTRANCE INTO RELIGIOUS LIFE
+(In Ten Articles)
+
+We must now consider the entrance into religious life. Under this
+head there are ten points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether those who are not practiced in the observance of the
+commandments should enter religion?
+
+(2) Whether it is lawful for a person to be bound by vow to enter
+religion?
+
+(3) Whether those who are bound by vow to enter religion are bound to
+fulfil their vow?
+
+(4) Whether those who vow to enter religion are bound to remain there
+in perpetuity?
+
+(5) Whether children should be received into religion?
+
+(6) Whether one should be withheld from entering religion through
+deference to one's parents?
+
+(7) Whether parish priests or archdeacons may enter religion?
+
+(8) Whether one may pass from one religious order to another?
+
+(9) Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?
+
+(10) Whether serious deliberation with one's relations and friends
+is requisite for entrance into religion?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Those Who Are Not Practiced in Keeping the Commandments
+Should Enter Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that none should enter religion but those
+who are practiced in the observance of the commandments. For our Lord
+gave the counsel of perfection to the young man who said that he had
+kept the commandments "from his youth." Now all religious orders
+originate from Christ. Therefore it would seem that none should be
+allowed to enter religion but those who are practiced in the
+observance of the commandments.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ezech., and Moral. xxii):
+"No one comes suddenly to the summit; but he must make a beginning of
+a good life in the smallest matters, so as to accomplish great
+things." Now the great things are the counsels which pertain to the
+perfection of life, while the lesser things are the commandments
+which belong to common righteousness. Therefore it would seem that
+one ought not to enter religion for the purpose of keeping the
+counsels, unless one be already practiced in the observance of the
+precepts.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the religious state, like the holy orders, has a
+place of eminence in the Church. Now, as Gregory writes to the bishop
+Siagrius [*Regist. ix, Ep. 106], "order should be observed in
+ascending to orders. For he seeks a fall who aspires to mount to the
+summit by overpassing the steps." [*The rest of the quotation is from
+Regist. v, Ep. 53, ad Virgil. Episc.]. "For we are well aware that
+walls when built receive not the weight of the beams until the new
+fabric is rid of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with
+weight before they are seasoned they bring down the whole building"
+(Dist. xlviii, can. Sicut neophytus). Therefore it would seem that
+one should not enter religion unless one be practiced in the
+observance of the precepts.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, "As a child that is weaned is
+towards his mother," says: "First we are conceived in the womb of
+Mother Church, by being taught the rudiments of faith. Then we are
+nourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same
+elements. Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being
+regenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in her
+hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in
+good works and are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while
+we progress; until having grown out of infancy we leave our mother's
+milk for a father's control, that is to say, we pass from simple
+doctrine, by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word
+that was in the beginning with God." Afterwards it goes on to say:
+"For those who are just baptized on Holy Saturday are borne in the
+hands of the Church as it were and fed with milk until Pentecost,
+during which time nothing arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising
+at midnight. Afterwards they are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit,
+and being weaned so to speak, begin to fast and keep other difficult
+observances. Many, like the heretics and schismatics, have perverted
+this order by being weaned before the time. Hence they have come to
+naught." Now this order is apparently perverted by those who enter
+religion, or induce others to enter religion, before they are
+practiced in the easier observance of the commandments. Therefore
+they would seem to be heretics or schismatics.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, one should proceed from that which precedes to that
+which follows after. Now the commandments precede the counsels,
+because they are more universal, for "the implication of the one by
+the other is not convertible" [*Categor. ix], since whoever keeps the
+counsels keeps the commandments, but the converse does not hold.
+Seeing then that the right order requires one to pass from that which
+comes first to that which comes after, it follows that one ought not
+to pass to the observance of the counsels in religion, without being
+first of all practiced in the observance of the commandments.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Matthew the publican who was not practiced in the
+observance of the commandments was called by our Lord to the
+observance of the counsels. For it is stated (Luke 5:28) that
+"leaving all things he . . . followed Him." Therefore it is not
+necessary for a person to be practiced in the observance of the
+commandments before passing to the perfection of the counsels.
+
+_I answer that,_ As shown above (Q. 188, A. 1), the religious state
+is a spiritual schooling for the attainment of the perfection of
+charity. This is accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to
+perfect charity by religious observances; and these obstacles are
+those things which attach man's affections to earthly things. Now the
+attachment of man's affections to earthly things is not only an
+obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to the
+loss of charity, when through turning inordinately to temporal goods
+man turns away from the immutable good by sinning mortally. Hence it
+is evident that the observances of the religious state, while
+removing the obstacles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions
+of sin: for instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience,
+and the like withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust and all
+other manner of sins.
+
+Consequently it is right that not only those who are practiced in the
+observance of the commandments should enter religion in order to
+attain to yet greater perfection, but also those who are not
+practiced, in order the more easily to avoid sin and attain to
+perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 20) says: "The young man lies
+when he says: 'All these have I kept from my youth.' For if he had
+fulfilled this commandment, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
+thyself,' why did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all thou
+hast and give to the poor?" But this means that he lied as to the
+perfect observance of this commandment. Hence Origen says (Tract.
+viii super Matth.) that "it is written in the Gospel according to the
+Hebrews that when our Lord had said to him: 'Go, sell all thou hast,'
+the rich man began to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to
+him: How sayest thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets,
+seeing that it is written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
+thyself? Behold many of thy brethren, children of Abraham, are
+clothed in filth, and die of hunger, whilst thy house is full of all
+manner of good things, and nothing whatever hath passed thence to
+them. And thus our Lord reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect,
+go, etc. For it is impossible to fulfil the commandment which says,
+Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, and to be rich, especially
+to have such great wealth." This also refers to the perfect
+fulfilment of this precept. On the other hand, it is true that he
+kept the commandments imperfectly and in a general way. For
+perfection consists chiefly in the observance of the precepts of
+charity, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 3). Wherefore in order to show
+that the perfection of the counsels is useful both to the innocent
+and to sinners, our Lord called not only the innocent youth but also
+the sinner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His call, and the youth obeyed
+not, because sinners are converted to the religious life more easily
+than those who presume on their innocency. It is to the former that
+our Lord says (Matt. 21:31): "The publicans and the harlots shall go
+into the kingdom of God before you."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The highest and the lowest place can be taken in three
+ways. First, in reference to the same state and the same man; and
+thus it is evident that no one comes to the summit suddenly, since
+every man that lives aright, progresses during the whole course of
+his life, so as to arrive at the summit. Secondly, in comparison with
+various states; and thus he who desires to reach to a higher state
+need not begin from a lower state: for instance, if a man wish to be
+a cleric he need not first of all be practiced in the life of a
+layman. Thirdly, in comparison with different persons; and in this
+way it is clear that one man begins straightway not only from a
+higher state, but even from a higher degree of holiness, than the
+highest degree to which another man attains throughout his whole
+life. Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): "All are agreed that the boy
+Benedict began at a high degree of grace and perfection in his daily
+life."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 6) the holy orders
+prerequire holiness, whereas the religious state is a school for the
+attainment of holiness. Hence the burden of orders should be laid on
+the walls when these are already seasoned with holiness, whereas the
+burden of religion seasons the walls, i.e. men, by drawing out the
+damp of vice.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: It is manifest from the words of this gloss that it is
+chiefly a question of the order of doctrine, in so far as one has to
+pass from easy matter to that which is more difficult. Hence it is
+clear from what follows that the statement that certain "heretics"
+and "schismatics have perverted this order" refers to the order of
+doctrine. For it continues thus: "But he says that he has kept these
+things, namely the aforesaid order, binding himself by an oath
+[*Referring to the last words of the verse, and taking _retributio,_
+which Douay renders _reward,_ as meaning 'punishment']. Thus I was
+humble not only in other things but also in knowledge, for 'I was
+humbly minded'; because I was first of all fed with milk, which is
+the Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake of the bread of
+angels, namely the Word that is in the beginning with God." The
+example which is given in proof, of the newly baptized not being
+commanded to fast until Pentecost, shows that no difficult things are
+to be laid on them as an obligation before the Holy Ghost inspires
+them inwardly to take upon themselves difficult things of their own
+choice. Hence after Pentecost and the receiving of the Holy Ghost the
+Church observes a fast. Now the Holy Ghost, according to Ambrose
+(Super Luc. 1:15), "is not confined to any particular age; He ceases
+not when men die, He is not excluded from the maternal womb." Gregory
+also in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.) says: "He fills the boy
+harpist and makes him a psalmist: He fills the boy abstainer and
+makes him a wise judge [*Dan. 1:8-17]," and afterwards he adds: "No
+time is needed to learn whatsoever He will, for He teaches the mind
+by the merest touch." Again it is written (Eccles. 8:8), "It is not
+in man's power to stop the Spirit," and the Apostle admonishes us (1
+Thess. 5:19): "Extinguish not the Spirit," and (Acts 7:51) it is said
+against certain persons: "You always resist the Holy Ghost."
+
+Reply Obj. 5: There are certain chief precepts which are the ends, so
+to say, of the commandments and counsels. These are the precepts of
+charity, and the counsels are directed to them, not that these
+precepts cannot be observed without keeping the counsels, but that
+the keeping of the counsels conduces to the better observance of the
+precepts. The other precepts are secondary and are directed to the
+precepts of charity; in such a way that unless one observe them it is
+altogether impossible to keep the precepts of charity. Accordingly in
+the intention the perfect observance of the precepts of charity
+precedes the counsels, and yet sometimes it follows them in point of
+time. For such is the order of the end in relation to things directed
+to the end. But the observance in a general way of the precepts of
+charity together with the other precepts, is compared to the counsels
+as the common to the proper, because one can observe the precepts
+without observing the counsels, but not vice versa. Hence the common
+observance of the precepts precedes the counsels in the order of
+nature; but it does not follow that it precedes them in point of
+time, for a thing is not in the genus before being in one of the
+species. But the observance of the precepts apart from the counsels
+is directed to the observance of the precepts together with the
+counsels; as an imperfect to a perfect species, even as the
+irrational to the rational animal. Now the perfect is naturally prior
+to the imperfect, since "nature," as Boethius says (De Consol. iii,
+10), "begins with perfect things." And yet it is not necessary for
+the precepts first of all to be observed without the counsels, and
+afterwards with the counsels, just as it is not necessary for one to
+be an ass before being a man, or married before being a virgin. In
+like manner it is not necessary for a person first of all to keep the
+commandments in the world before entering religion; especially as the
+worldly life does not dispose one to religious perfection, but is
+more an obstacle thereto.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 2]
+
+Whether One Ought to Be Bound by Vow to Enter Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to
+enter religion. For in making his profession a man is bound by the
+religious vow. Now before profession a year of probation is allowed,
+according to the rule of the Blessed Benedict (lviii) and according
+to the decree of Innocent IV [*Sext. Decret., cap. Non solum., de
+Regular. et Transeunt, ad Relig.] who moreover forbade anyone to be
+bound to the religious life by profession before completing the year
+of probation. Therefore it would seem that much less ought anyone
+while yet in the world to be bound by vow to enter religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 15): Jews "should be
+persuaded to be converted, not by compulsion but of their own free
+will" (Dist. xlv, can. De Judaeis). Now one is compelled to fulfil
+what one has vowed. Therefore no one should be bound by vow to enter
+religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no one should give another an occasion of falling;
+wherefore it is written (Ex. 21:33, 34): "If a man open a pit . . .
+and an ox or an ass fall into it, the owner of the pit shall pay the
+price of the beasts." Now through being bound by vow to enter
+religion it often happens that people fall into despair and various
+sins. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow
+to enter religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written, (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye, and pay to
+the Lord your God"; and a gloss of Augustine says that "some vows
+concern the individual, such as vows of chastity, virginity, and the
+like." Consequently Holy Scripture invites us to vow these things.
+But Holy Scripture invites us only to that which is better. Therefore
+it is better to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 6), when we were treating
+of vows, one and the same work done in fulfilment of a vow is more
+praiseworthy than if it be done apart from a vow, both because to vow
+is an act of religion, which has a certain pre-eminence among the
+virtues, and because a vow strengthens a man's will to do good; and
+just as a sin is more grievous through proceeding from a will
+obstinate in evil, so a good work is the more praiseworthy through
+proceeding from a will confirmed in good by means of a vow. Therefore
+it is in itself praiseworthy to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The religious vow is twofold. One is the solemn vow
+which makes a man a monk or a brother in some other religious order.
+This is called the profession, and such a vow should be preceded by a
+year's probation, as the objection proves. The other is the simple
+vow which does not make a man a monk or a religious, but only binds
+him to enter religion, and such a vow need not be preceded by a
+year's probation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The words quoted from Gregory must be understood as
+referring to absolute violence. But the compulsion arising from the
+obligation of a vow is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of
+end, because after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of
+salvation unless one fulfil that vow. Such a necessity is not to be
+avoided; indeed, as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Armentar. et
+Paulin.), "happy is the necessity that compels us to better things."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The vow to enter religion is a strengthening of the
+will for better things, and consequently, considered in itself,
+instead of giving a man an occasion of falling, withdraws him from
+it. But if one who breaks a vow falls more grievously, this does not
+derogate from the goodness of the vow, as neither does it derogate
+from the goodness of Baptism that some sin more grievously after
+being baptized.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 3]
+
+Whether One Who Is Bound by a Vow to Enter Religion Is Under an
+Obligation of Entering Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one who is bound by the vow to enter
+religion is not under an obligation of entering religion. For it is
+said in the Decretals (XVII, qu. ii, can. Consaldus): "Consaldus, a
+priest under pressure of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to
+become a monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery or
+abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but he renounced his
+benefice in the hands of a notary; and when he was restored to health
+he refused to become a monk." And afterwards it is added: "We adjudge
+and by apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest be
+admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he be allowed to
+retain them in peace." Now this would not be if he were bound to
+enter religion. Therefore it would seem that one is not bound to keep
+one's vow of entering religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is not in his power. Now
+it is not in a person's power to enter religion, since this depends
+on the consent of those whom he wishes to join. Therefore it would
+seem that a man is not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound
+himself to enter religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a more useful one.
+Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter religion might hinder the
+fulfilment of a vow to take up the cross in defense of the Holy Land;
+and the latter apparently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man
+obtains the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that the
+vow by which a man has bound himself to enter religion is not
+necessarily to be fulfilled.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
+anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
+promise displeaseth him"; and a gloss on Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye, and pay
+to the Lord your God," says: "To vow depends on the will: but after
+the vow has been taken the fulfilment is of obligation."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 1), when we were treating
+of vows, a vow is a promise made to God in matters concerning God.
+Now, as Gregory says in a letter to Boniface [*Innoc. I, Epist. ii,
+Victricio Epo. Rotomag., cap. 14; Cf. can. Viduas: cause. xxvii, qu.
+1]: "If among men of good faith contracts are wont to be absolutely
+irrevocable, how much more shall the breaking of this promise given
+to God be deserving of punishment!" Therefore a man is under an
+obligation to fulfil what he has vowed, provided this be something
+pertaining to God.
+
+Now it is evident that entrance into religion pertains very much to
+God, since thereby man devotes himself entirely to the divine
+service, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1). Hence it follows that he who
+binds himself to enter religion is under an obligation to enter
+religion according as he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that
+if he intend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as
+soon as he can, through the cessation of a lawful impediment; whereas
+if he intend to bind himself to a certain fixed time, or under a
+certain fixed condition, he is bound to enter religion when the time
+comes or the condition is fulfilled.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This priest had made, not a solemn, but a simple vow.
+Hence he was not a monk in effect, so as to be bound by law to dwell
+in a monastery and renounce his cure. However, in the court of
+conscience one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter
+religion. Hence (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Per tuas)
+the Bishop of Grenoble, who had accepted the episcopate after vowing
+to enter religion, without having fulfilled his vow, is counseled
+that if "he wish to heal his conscience he should renounce the
+government of his see and pay his vows to the Most High."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 88, A. 3, ad 2), when we were
+treating of vows, he who has bound himself by vow to enter a certain
+religious order is bound to do what is in his power in order to be
+received in that order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to
+enter the religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound
+to go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only to one
+particular order, he is bound only according to the measure of the
+obligation to which he has engaged himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The vow to enter religion being perpetual is greater
+than the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, which is a temporal vow;
+and as Alexander III says (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap.
+Scripturae), "he who exchanges a temporary service for the perpetual
+service of religion is in no way guilty of breaking his vow."
+
+Moreover it may be reasonably stated that also by entrance into
+religion a man obtains remission of all his sins. For if by giving
+alms a man may forthwith satisfy for his sins, according to Dan.
+4:24, "Redeem thou thy sins with alms," much more does it suffice to
+satisfy for all his sins that a man devote himself wholly to the
+divine service by entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of
+satisfaction, even that of public penance, according to the Decretals
+(XXXIII, qu. i, cap. Admonere) just as a holocaust exceeds a
+sacrifice, as Gregory declares (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence we read in
+the Lives of the Fathers (vi, 1) that by entering religion one
+receives the same grace as by being baptized. And yet even if one
+were not thereby absolved from all debt of punishment, nevertheless
+the entrance into religion is more profitable than a pilgrimage to
+the Holy Land, as regards the advancement in good, which is
+preferable to absolution from punishment.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 4]
+
+Whether He Who Has Vowed to Enter Religion Is Bound to Remain in
+Religion in Perpetuity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that he who has vowed to enter religion,
+is bound in perpetuity to remain in religion. For it is better not to
+enter religion than to leave after entering, according to 2 Pet.
+2:21, "It had been better for them not to have known the way of
+justice, than after they have known it to turn back," and Luke 9:62,
+"No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for
+the kingdom of God." But he who bound himself by the vow to enter
+religion, is under the obligation to enter, as stated above (A. 3).
+Therefore he is also bound to remain for always.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, everyone is bound to avoid that which gives rise to
+scandal, and is a bad example to others. Now by leaving after
+entering religion a man gives a bad example and is an occasion of
+scandal to others, who are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited
+to leave. Therefore it seems that he who enters religion in order to
+fulfil a vow which he had previously taken, is bound to remain
+evermore.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the vow to enter religion is accounted a perpetual
+vow: wherefore it is preferred to temporal vows, as stated above (A.
+3, ad 3; Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1). But this would not be so if a person
+after vowing to enter religion were to enter with the intention of
+leaving. It seems, therefore, that he who vows to enter religion is
+bound also to remain in perpetuity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The vow of religious profession, for the reason
+that it binds a man to remain in religion for evermore, has to be
+preceded by a year of probation; whereas this is not required before
+the simple vow whereby a man binds himself to enter religion.
+Therefore it seems that he who vows to enter religion is not for that
+reason bound to remain there in perpetuity.
+
+_I answer that,_ The obligation of a vow proceeds from the will:
+because "to vow is an act of the will" according to Augustine [*Gloss
+of Peter Lombard on Ps. 75:12]. Consequently the obligation of a vow
+extends as far as the will and intention of the person who takes the
+vow. Accordingly if in vowing he intend to bind himself not only to
+enter religion, but also to remain there evermore, he is bound to
+remain in perpetuity. If, on the other hand, he intend to bind
+himself to enter religion for the purpose of trial, while retaining
+the freedom to remain or not remain, it is clear that he is not bound
+to remain. If, however, in vowing he thought merely of entering
+religion, without thinking of being free to leave, or of remaining in
+perpetuity, it would seem that he is bound to enter religion
+according to the form prescribed by common law, which is that those
+who enter should be given a year's probation. Wherefore he is not
+bound to remain for ever.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is better to enter religion with the purpose of
+making a trial than not to enter at all, because by so doing one
+disposes oneself to remain always. Nor is a person accounted to turn
+or to look back, save when he omits to do that which he engaged to
+do: else whoever does a good work for a time, would be unfit for the
+kingdom of God, unless he did it always, which is evidently false.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A man who has entered religion gives neither scandal
+nor bad example by leaving, especially if he do so for a reasonable
+motive; and if others are scandalized, it will be passive scandal on
+their part, and not active scandal on the part of the person leaving,
+since in doing so, he has done what was lawful, and expedient on
+account of some reasonable motive, such as sickness, weakness, and
+the like.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He who enters with the purpose of leaving forthwith,
+does not seem to fulfil his vow, since this was not his intention in
+vowing. Hence he must change that purpose, at least so as to wish to
+try whether it is good for him to remain in religion, but he is not
+bound to remain for evermore.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Children Should Be Received in Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that children ought not to be received in
+religion. Because it is said (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad
+Relig., cap. Nullus): "No one should be tonsured unless he be of
+legal age and willing." But children, seemingly, are not of legal
+age; nor have they a will of their own, not having perfect use of
+reason. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in
+religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the state of religion would seem to be a state of
+repentance; wherefore religion is derived [*Cf. Q. 81, A. 1] from
+_religare_ (to bind) or from _re-eligere_ (to choose again), as
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 3 [*Cf. De Vera Relig. lv]). But
+repentance does not become children. Therefore it seems that they
+should not enter religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is like that of an oath. But
+children under the age of fourteen ought not to be bound by oath
+(Decret. XXII, qu. v, cap. Pueri and cap. Honestum.). Therefore it
+would seem that neither should they be bound by vow.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is seemingly unlawful to bind a person to an
+obligation that can be justly canceled. Now if any persons of unripe
+age bind themselves to religion, they can be withdrawn by their
+parents or guardians. For it is written in the Decretals (XX, qu. ii,
+can. Puella) that "if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the
+sacred veil of her own accord, her parents or guardians, if they
+choose, can at once declare the deed null and void." It is therefore
+unlawful for children, especially of unripe age, to be admitted or
+bound to religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Matt. 19:14): "Suffer the little
+children, and forbid them not to come to Me." Expounding these words
+Origen says (Tract. vii in Matth.) that "the disciples of Jesus
+before they have been taught the conditions of righteousness [*Cf.
+Matt. 19:16-30], rebuke those who offer children and babes to Christ:
+but our Lord urges His disciples to stoop to the service of children.
+We must therefore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel
+in wisdom we despise the Church's little ones, as though we were
+great, and forbid the children to come to Jesus."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 1), the religious vow is
+twofold. One is the simple vow consisting in a mere promise made to
+God, and proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind. Such
+a vow derives its efficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may
+encounter a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as
+in the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding [*Extra, De
+Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Sicut tenor]. The same applies
+to children who have not reached the required use of reason, so as to
+be capable of guile, which use boys attain, as a rule, at about the
+age of fourteen, and girls at the age of twelve, this being what is
+called "the age of puberty," although in some it comes earlier and in
+others it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of
+nature. Secondly, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters an
+obstacle, if the person who makes a vow to God is not his own master;
+for instance, if a slave, though having the use of reason, vows to
+enter religion, or even is ordained, without the knowledge of his
+master: for his master can annul this, as stated in the Decretals
+(Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). And since boys and girls under the age
+of puberty are naturally in their father's power as regards the
+disposal of their manner of life, their father may either cancel or
+approve their vow, if it please him to do so, as it is expressly said
+with regard to a woman (Num. 30:4).
+
+Accordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a child makes a
+simple vow, not yet having full use of reason, he is not bound in
+virtue of the vow; but if he has the use of reason before reaching
+the age of puberty, he is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his
+vow; yet this obligation may be removed by his father's authority,
+under whose control he still remains, because the ordinance of the
+law whereby one man is subject to another considers what happens in
+the majority of cases. If, however, the child has passed the age of
+puberty, his vow cannot be annulled by the authority of his parents;
+though if he has not the full use of reason, he would not be bound in
+the sight of God.
+
+The other is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a religious.
+Such a vow is subject to the ordinance of the Church, on account of
+the solemnity attached to it. And since the Church considers what
+happens in the majority of cases, a profession made before the age of
+puberty, however much the person who makes profession may have the
+use of reason, or be capable of guile, does not take effect so as to
+make him a religious (Extra, De Regular., etc. cap. Significatum
+est.).
+
+Nevertheless, although they cannot be professed before the age of
+puberty, they can, with the consent of their parents, be received
+into religion to be educated there: thus it is related of John the
+Baptist (Luke 1:80) that "the child grew and was strengthened in
+spirit, and was in the deserts." Hence, as Gregory states (Dial. ii,
+3), "the Roman nobles began to give their sons to the blessed
+Benedict to be nurtured for Almighty God"; and this is most fitting,
+according to Lam. 3:27, "It is good for a man when he has borne the
+yoke from his youth." It is for this reason that by common custom
+children are made to apply themselves to those duties or arts with
+which they are to pass their lives.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The legal age for receiving the tonsure and taking the
+solemn vow of religion is the age of puberty, when a man is able to
+make use of his own will; but before the age of puberty it is
+possible to have reached the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be
+educated in a religious house.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The religious state is chiefly directed to the
+atta[in]ment of perfection, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1, ad 4); and
+accordingly it is becoming to children, who are easily drawn to it.
+But as a consequence it is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as
+occasions of sin are removed by religious observances, as stated
+above (Q. 186, A. 1, ad 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even as children are not bound to take oaths (as the
+canon states), so are they not bound to take vows. If, however, they
+bind themselves by vow or oath to do something, they are bound in
+God's sight, if they have the use of reason, but they are not bound
+in the sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A woman who has not reached the age of puberty is not
+rebuked (Num. 30:4) for taking a vow without her parents' consent:
+but the vow can be made void by her parents. Hence it is evident that
+she does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand that she
+binds herself by vow, so far as she may, without prejudice to her
+parents' authority.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 6]
+
+Whether One Ought to Be Withdrawn from Entering Religion Through
+Deference to One's Parents?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one ought to be withdrawn from
+entering religion through deference to one's parents. For it is not
+lawful to omit that which is of obligation in order to do that which
+is optional. Now deference to one's parents comes under an obligation
+of the precept concerning the honoring of our parents (Ex. 20:12);
+wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:4): "If any widow have children
+or grandchildren, let her learn first to govern her own house, and to
+make a return of duty to her parents." But the entrance to religion
+is optional. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to omit
+deference to one's parents for the sake of entering religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the subjection of a son to his father is
+greater than that of a slave to his master, since sonship is natural,
+while slavery results from the curse of sin, as appears from Gen.
+9:25. Now a slave cannot set aside the service of his master in order
+to enter religion or take holy orders, as stated in the Decretals
+(Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). Much less therefore can a son set aside
+the deference due to his father in order to enter religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a man is more indebted to his parents than to those
+to whom he owes money. Now persons who owe money to anyone cannot
+enter religion. For Gregory says (Regist. viii, Ep. 5) that "those
+who are engaged in trade must by no means be admitted into a
+monastery, when they seek admittance, unless first of all they
+withdraw from public business" (Dist. liii, can. Legem.). Therefore
+seemingly much less may children enter religion in despite of their
+duty to their parents.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is related (Matt. 4:22) that James and John
+"left their nets and father, and followed our Lord." By this, says
+Hilary (Can. iii in Matth.), "we learn that we who intend to follow
+Christ are not bound by the cares of the secular life, and by the
+ties of home."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 101, A. 2, ad 2) when we were
+treating of piety, parents as such have the character of a principle,
+wherefore it is competent to them as such to have the care of their
+children. Hence it is unlawful for a person having children to enter
+religion so as altogether to set aside the care for their children,
+namely without providing for their education. For it is written (1
+Tim. 5:8) that "if any man have not care of his own . . . he hath
+denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel."
+
+Nevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to be assisted
+by their children, in so far, to wit, as they are placed in a
+condition of necessity. Consequently we must say that when their
+parents are in such need that they cannot fittingly be supported
+otherwise than by the help of their children, these latter may not
+lawfully enter religion in despite of their duty to their parents.
+If, however, the parents' necessity be not such as to stand in great
+need of their children's assistance, the latter may, in despite of
+the duty they owe their parents, enter religion even against their
+parents' command, because after the age of puberty every freeman
+enjoys freedom in things concerning the ordering of his state of
+life, especially in such as belong to the service of God, and "we
+should more obey the Father of spirits that we may live [*'Shall we
+not much more obey the Father of Spirits, and live?']," as says the
+Apostle (Heb. 12:9), than obey our parents. Hence as we read (Matt.
+8:22; Luke 9:62) our Lord rebuked the disciple who was unwilling to
+follow him forthwith on account of his father's burial: for there
+were others who could see to this, as Chrysostom remarks [*Hom. xxvii
+in Matth.].
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The commandment of honoring our parents extends not
+only to bodily but also to spiritual service, and to the paying of
+deference. Hence even those who are in religion can fulfil the
+commandment of honoring their parents, by praying for them and by
+revering and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even those
+who live in the world honor their parents in different ways as befits
+their condition.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since slavery was imposed in punishment of sin, it
+follows that by slavery man forfeits something which otherwise he
+would be competent to have, namely the free disposal of his person,
+for "a slave belongs wholly to his master" [*Aristotle, Polit. i, 2].
+On the other hand, the son, through being subject to his father, is
+not hindered from freely disposing of his person by transferring
+himself to the service of God; which is most conducive to man's good.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He who is under a certain fixed obligation cannot
+lawfully set it aside so long as he is able to fulfil it. Wherefore
+if a person is under an obligation to give an account to someone or
+to pay a certain fixed debt, he cannot lawfully evade this obligation
+in order to enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of money, and
+has not wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he can, namely
+by surrendering his goods to his creditor. According to civil law
+[*Cod. IV, x, de Oblig. et Action, 12] money lays an obligation not
+on the person of a freeman, but on his property, because the person
+of a freeman "is above all pecuniary consideration" [*Dig. L, xvii,
+de div. reg. Jur. ant. 106, 176]. Hence, after surrendering his
+property, he may lawfully enter religion, nor is he bound to remain
+in the world in order to earn the means of paying the debt.
+
+On the other hand, he does not owe his father a special debt, except
+as may arise in a case of necessity, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Parish Priests May Lawfully Enter Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that parish priests cannot lawfully enter
+religion. For Gregory says (Past. iii, 4) that "he who undertakes the
+cure of souls, receives an awful warning in the words: 'My son, if
+thou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a
+stranger'" (Prov. 6:1); and he goes on to say, "because to be surety
+for a friend is to take charge of the soul of another on the surety
+of one's own behavior." Now he who is under an obligation to a man
+for a debt, cannot enter religion, unless he pay what he owes, if he
+can. Since then a priest is able to fulfil the cure of souls, to
+which obligation he has pledged his soul, it would seem unlawful for
+him to lay aside the cure of souls in order to enter religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what is lawful to one is likewise lawful to all. But
+if all priests having cure of souls were to enter religion, the
+people would be left without a pastor's care, which would be
+unfitting. Therefore it seems that parish priests cannot lawfully
+enter religion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, chief among the acts to which religious orders are
+directed are those whereby a man gives to others the fruit of his
+contemplation. Now such acts are competent to parish priests and
+archdeacons, whom it becomes by virtue of their office to preach and
+hear confessions. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a parish
+priest or archdeacon to pass over to religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu. ii, cap.
+Duce sunt leges.): "If a man, while governing the people in his
+church under the bishop and leading a secular life, is inspired by
+the Holy Ghost to desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or
+under some canonical rule, even though his bishop withstand him, we
+authorize him to go freely."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 3; Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1),
+the obligation of a perpetual vow stands before every other
+obligation. Now it belongs properly to bishops and religious to be
+bound by perpetual vow to devote themselves to the divine service
+[*Cf. Q. 184, A. 5], while parish priests and archdeacons are not, as
+bishops are, bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to retain the cure
+of souls. Wherefore bishops "cannot lay aside their bishopric for any
+pretext whatever, without the authority of the Roman Pontiff" (Extra,
+De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet.): whereas
+archdeacons and parish priests are free to renounce in the hands of
+the bishop the cure entrusted to them, without the Pope's special
+permission, who alone can dispense from perpetual vows. Therefore it
+is evident that archdeacons and parish priests may lawfully enter
+religion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Parish priests and archdeacons have bound themselves to
+the care of their subjects, as long as they retain their archdeaconry
+or parish, but they did not bind themselves to retain their
+archdeaconry or parish for ever.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Jerome says (Contra Vigil.): "Although they," namely
+religious, "are sorely smitten by thy poisonous tongue, about whom
+you argue, saying; 'If all shut themselves up and live in solitude,
+who will go to church? who will convert worldlings? who will be able
+to urge sinners to virtue?' If this holds true, if all are fools with
+thee, who can be wise? Nor will virginity be commendable, for if all
+be virgins, and none marry, the human race will perish. Virtue is
+rare, and is not desired by many." It is therefore evident that this
+is a foolish alarm; thus might a man fear to draw water lest the
+river run dry. [*St. Thomas gives no reply to the third objection,
+which is sufficiently solved in the body of the article.]
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 8]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Pass from One Religious Order to Another?
+
+Objection 1: It seems unlawful to pass from one religious order to
+another, even a stricter one. For the Apostle says (Heb. 10:25): "Not
+forsaking our assembly, as some are accustomed"; and a gloss
+observes: "Those namely who yield through fear of persecution, or who
+presuming on themselves withdraw from the company of sinners or of
+the imperfect, that they may appear to be righteous." Now those who
+pass from one religious order to another more perfect one would seem
+to do this. Therefore this is seemingly unlawful.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the profession of monks is stricter than that of
+canons regular (Extra, De Statu Monach. et Canonic. Reg., cap. Quod
+Dei timorem). But it is unlawful for anyone to pass from the state of
+canon regular to the monastic state. For it is said in the Decretals
+(XIX, qu. iii, can. Mandamus): "We ordain and without any exception
+forbid any professed canon regular to become a monk, unless (which
+God forbid) he have fallen into public sin." Therefore it would seem
+unlawful for anyone to pass from one religious order to another of
+higher rank.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a person is bound to fulfil what he has vowed, as
+long as he is able lawfully to do so; thus if a man has vowed to
+observe continence, he is bound, even after contracting marriage by
+words in the present tense, to fulfil his vow so long as the marriage
+is not consummated, because he can fulfil the vow by entering
+religion. Therefore if a person may lawfully pass from one religious
+order to another, he will be bound to do so if he vowed it previously
+while in the world. But this would seem objectionable, since in many
+cases it might give rise to scandal. Therefore a religious may not
+pass from one religious order to another stricter one.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (XX, qu. iv, can.
+Virgines): "If sacred virgins design for the good of their soul to
+pass to another monastery on account of a stricter life, and decide
+to remain there, the holy synod allows them to do so": and the same
+would seem to apply to any religious. Therefore one may lawfully pass
+from one religious order to another.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is not commendable to pass from one religious
+order to another: both because this frequently gives scandal to those
+who remain; and because, other things being equal, it is easier to
+make progress in a religious order to which one is accustomed than in
+one to which one is not habituated. Hence in the Conferences of the
+Fathers (Coll. xiv, 5) Abbot Nesteros says: "It is best for each one
+that he should, according to the resolve he has made, hasten with the
+greatest zeal and care to reach the perfection of the work he has
+undertaken, and nowise forsake the profession he has chosen." And
+further on he adds (cap. 6) by way of reason: "For it is impossible
+that one and the same man should excel in all the virtues at once,
+since if he endeavor to practice them equally, he will of necessity,
+while trying to attain them all, end in acquiring none of them
+perfectly": because the various religious orders excel in respect of
+various works of virtue.
+
+Nevertheless one may commendably pass from one religious order to
+another for three reasons. First, through zeal for a more perfect
+religious life, which excellence depends, as stated above (Q. 188, A.
+6), not merely on severity, but chiefly on the end to which a
+religious order is directed, and secondarily on the discretion
+whereby the observances are proportionate to the due end. Secondly,
+on account of a religious order falling away from the perfection it
+ought to have: for instance, if in a more severe religious order, the
+religious begin to live less strictly, it is commendable for one to
+pass even to a less severe religious order if the observance is
+better. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xix, 3, 5, 6)
+Abbot John says of himself that he had passed from the solitary life,
+in which he was professed, to a less severe life, namely of those who
+lived in community, because the hermetical life had fallen into
+decline and laxity. Thirdly, on account of sickness or weakness, the
+result of which sometimes is that one is unable to keep the
+ordinances of a more severe religious order, though able to observe
+those of a less strict religion.
+
+There is, however, a difference in these three cases. For in the
+first case one ought, on account of humility, to seek permission: yet
+this cannot be denied, provided it be certain that this other
+religion is more severe. "And if there be a probable doubt about
+this, one should ask one's superior to decide" (Extra, De Regular. et
+Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet.). In like manner the superior's
+decision should be sought in the second case. In the third case it is
+also necessary to have a dispensation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Those who pass to a stricter religious order, do so not
+out of presumption that they may appear righteous, but out of
+devotion, that they may become more righteous.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Religious orders whether of monks or of canons regular
+are destined to the works of the contemplative life. Chief among
+these are those which are performed in the divine mysteries, and
+these are the direct object of the orders of canons regular, the
+members of which are essentially religious clerics. On the other
+hand, monastic religious are not essentially clerics, according to
+the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, cap. Alia causa). Hence although monastic
+orders are more severe, it would be lawful, supposing the members to
+be lay monks, to pass from the monastic order to an order of canons
+regular, according to the statement of Jerome (Ep. cxxv, ad Rustic.
+Monach.): "So live in the monastery as to deserve to become a
+cleric"; but not conversely, as expressed in the Decretal quoted
+(XIX, qu. iii). If, however, the monks be clerics devoting themselves
+to the sacred ministry, they have this in common with canons regular
+coupled with greater severity, and consequently it will be lawful to
+pass from an order of canons regular to a monastic order, provided
+withal that one seek the superior's permission (XIX, qu. iii; cap.
+Statuimus).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The solemn vow whereby a person is bound to a less
+strict order, is more binding than the simple vow whereby a person is
+bound to a stricter order. For if after taking a simple vow a person
+were to be married, his marriage would not be invalid, as it would be
+after his taking a solemn vow. Consequently a person who is professed
+in a less severe order is not bound to fulfil a simple vow he has
+taken on entering a more severe order.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 9]
+
+Whether One Ought to Induce Others to Enter Religion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no one ought to induce others to
+enter religion. For the blessed Benedict prescribes in his Rule
+(lviii) that "those who seek to enter religion must not easily be
+admitted, but spirits must be tested whether they be of God"; and
+Cassian has the same instruction (De Inst. Caenob. iv, 3). Much less
+therefore is it lawful to induce anyone to enter religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, our Lord said (Matt. 23:15): "Woe to you . . .
+because you go round about the sea and the land to make one
+proselyte, and when he is made you make him the child of hell twofold
+more than yourselves." Now thus would seem to do those who induce
+persons to enter religion. Therefore this would seem blameworthy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no one should induce another to do what is to his
+prejudice. But those who are induced to enter religion, sometimes
+take harm therefrom, for sometimes they are under obligation to enter
+a stricter religion. Therefore it would not seem praiseworthy to
+induce others to enter religion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 26:3, seqq. [*St. Thomas quotes
+the sense, not the words]): "Let one curtain draw the other."
+Therefore one man should draw another to God's service.
+
+_I answer that,_ Those who induce others to enter religion not only
+do not sin, but merit a great reward. For it is written (James 5:20):
+"He who causeth a sinner to be converted from the error of his way,
+shall save his soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins";
+and (Dan. 12:3): "They that instruct many to justice shall be as
+stars for all eternity."
+
+Nevertheless such inducement may be affected by a threefold
+inordinateness. First, if one person force another by violence to
+enter religion: and this is forbidden in the Decretals (XX, qu. iii,
+cap. Praesens). Secondly, if one person persuade another simoniacally
+to enter religion, by giving him presents: and this is forbidden in
+the Decretal (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). But this does not apply to
+the case where one provides a poor person with necessaries by
+educating him in the world for the religious life; or when without
+any compact one gives a person little presents for the sake of good
+fellowship. Thirdly, if one person entices another by lies: for it is
+to be feared that the person thus enticed may turn back on finding
+himself deceived, and thus "the last state of that man" may become
+"worse than the first" (Luke 11:26).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Those who are induced to enter religion have still a
+time of probation wherein they make a trial of the hardships of
+religion, so that they are not easily admitted to the religious life.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to Hilary (Can. xxiv in Matth.) this saying
+of our Lord was a forecast of the wicked endeavors of the Jews, after
+the preaching of Christ, to draw Gentiles or even Christians to
+observe the Jewish ritual, thereby making them doubly children of
+hell, because, to wit, they were not forgiven the former sins which
+they committed while adherents of Judaism, and furthermore they
+incurred the guilt of Jewish perfidy; and thus interpreted these
+words have nothing to do with the case in point.
+
+According to Jerome, however, in his commentary on this passage of
+Matthew, the reference is to the Jews even at the time when it was
+yet lawful to keep the legal observances, in so far as he whom they
+converted to Judaism "from paganism, was merely misled; but when he
+saw the wickedness of his teachers, he returned to his vomit, and
+becoming a pagan deserved greater punishment for his treachery."
+Hence it is manifest that it is not blameworthy to draw others to the
+service of God or to the religious life, but only when one gives a
+bad example to the person converted, whence he becomes worse.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The lesser is included in the greater. Wherefore a
+person who is bound by vow or oath to enter a lesser order, may be
+lawfully induced to enter a greater one, unless there be some special
+obstacle, such as ill-health, or the hope of making greater progress
+in the lesser order. On the other hand, one who is bound by vow or
+oath to enter a greater order, cannot be lawfully induced to enter a
+lesser order, except for some special and evident motive, and then
+with the superior's dispensation.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 10]
+
+Whether It Is Praiseworthy to Enter Religion Without Taking Counsel
+of Many, and Previously Deliberating for a Long Time?
+
+Objection 1: It would not seem praiseworthy to enter religion without
+taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time.
+For it is written (1 John 4:1): "Believe not every spirit, but try
+the spirits if they be of God." Now sometimes a man's purpose of
+entering religion is not of God, since it often comes to naught
+through his leaving the religious life; for it is written (Acts 5:38,
+39): "If this counsel or this work be of God, you cannot overthrow
+it." Therefore it would seem that one ought to make a searching
+inquiry before entering religion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 25:9): "Treat thy cause with
+thy friend." Now a man's cause would seem to be especially one that
+concerns a change in his state of life. Therefore seemingly one ought
+not to enter religion without discussing the matter with one's
+friends.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, our Lord (Luke 14:28) in making a comparison with a
+man who has a mind to build a tower, says that he doth "first sit
+down and reckon the charges that are necessary, whether he have
+wherewithal to finish it," lest he become an object of mockery, for
+that "this man began to build and was not able to finish." Now the
+wherewithal to build the tower, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Laetum
+ccxliii), is nothing less than that "each one should renounce all his
+possessions." Yet it happens sometimes that many cannot do this, nor
+keep other religious observances; and in signification of this it is
+stated (1 Kings 17:39) that David could not walk in Saul's armor, for
+he was not used to it. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to
+enter religion without long deliberation beforehand and taking
+counsel of many.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is stated (Matt. 4:20) that upon our Lord's
+calling them, Peter and Andrew "immediately leaving their nets,
+followed Him." Here Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.): "Such
+obedience as this does Christ require of us, that we delay not even
+for a moment."
+
+_I answer that,_ Long deliberation and the advice of many are
+required in great matters of doubt, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+iii, 3); while advice is unnecessary in matters that are certain and
+fixed. Now with regard to entering religion three points may be
+considered. First, the entrance itself into religion, considered by
+itself; and thus it is certain that entrance into religion is a
+greater good, and to doubt about this is to disparage Christ Who gave
+this counsel. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. c, 2): "The
+East," that is Christ, "calleth thee, and thou turnest to the West,"
+namely mortal and fallible man. Secondly, the entrance into religion
+may be considered in relation to the strength of the person who
+intends to enter. And here again there is no room for doubt about the
+entrance to religion, since those who enter religion trust not to be
+able to stay by their own power, but by the assistance of the divine
+power, according to Isa. 40:31, "They that hope in the Lord shall
+renew their strength, they shall take wings as eagles, they shall run
+and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint." Yet if there be
+some special obstacle (such as bodily weakness, a burden of debts, or
+the like) in such cases a man must deliberate and take counsel with
+such as are likely to help and not hinder him. Hence it is written
+(Ecclus. 37:12): "Treat with a man without religion concerning
+holiness [*The Douay version supplies the negative: 'Treat not . . .
+nor with . . .'], with an unjust man concerning justice," meaning
+that one should not do so, wherefore the text goes on (Ecclus. 37:14,
+15), "Give no heed to these in any matter of counsel, but be
+continually with a holy man." In these matters, however, one should
+not take long deliberation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. and Paulin.
+liii): "Hasten, I pray thee, cut off rather than loosen the rope that
+holds the boat to the shore." Thirdly, we may consider the way of
+entering religion, and which order one ought to enter, and about such
+matters also one may take counsel of those who will not stand in
+one's way.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The saying: "Try the spirits, if they be of God,"
+applies to matters admitting of doubt whether the spirits be of God;
+thus those who are already in religion may doubt whether he who
+offers himself to religion be led by the spirit of God, or be moved
+by hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether he be
+moved by the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to enter religion
+there can be no doubt but that the purpose of entering religion to
+which his heart has given birth is from the spirit of God, for it is
+His spirit "that leads" man "into the land of uprightness" (Ps.
+142:10).
+
+Nor does this prove that it is not of God that some turn back; since
+not all that is of God is incorruptible: else corruptible creatures
+would not be of God, as the Manicheans hold, nor could some who have
+grace from God lose it, which is also heretical. But God's "counsel"
+whereby He makes even things corruptible and changeable, is
+imperishable according to Isa. 46:10, "My counsel shall stand and all
+My will shall be done." Hence the purpose of entering religion needs
+not to be tried whether it be of God, because "it requires no further
+demonstration," as a gloss says on 1 Thess. 5:21, "Prove all things."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even as "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal.
+5:17), so too carnal friends often thwart our spiritual progress,
+according to Mic. 7:6, "A man's enemies are they of his own
+household." Wherefore Cyril expounding Luke 9:61, "Let me first take
+my leave of them that are at my house," says [*Cf. St. Thomas's
+Catena Aurea]: "By asking first to take his leave of them that were
+at his house, he shows he was somewhat of two minds. For to
+communicate with his neighbors, and consult those who are unwilling
+to relish righteousness, is an indication of weakness and turning
+back. Hence he hears our Lord say: 'No man putting his hand to the
+plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God,' because he
+looks back who seeks delay in order to go home and confer with his
+kinsfolk."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The building of the tower signifies the perfection of
+Christian life; and the renunciation of one's possessions is the
+wherewithal to build this tower. Now no one doubts or deliberates
+about wishing to have the wherewithal, or whether he is able to build
+the tower if he have the wherewithal, but what does come under
+deliberation is whether one has the wherewithal. Again it need not be
+a matter of deliberation whether one ought to renounce all that one
+has, or whether by so doing one may be able to attain to perfection;
+whereas it is a matter of deliberation whether that which one is
+doing amounts to the renunciation of all that he has, since unless he
+does renounce (which is to have the wherewithal) he cannot, as the
+text goes on to state, be Christ's disciple, and this is to build the
+tower.
+
+The misgiving of those who hesitate as to whether they may be able to
+attain to perfection by entering religion is shown by many examples
+to be unreasonable. Hence Augustine says (Confess. viii, 11): "On
+that side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go,
+there appeared to me the chaste dignity of continency . . . honestly
+alluring me to come and doubt not, and stretching forth to receive
+and embrace me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples.
+There were so many young men and maidens here, a multitude of youth
+and every age, grave widows and aged virgins . . . And she smiled at
+me with a persuasive mockery as though to say: Canst not thou what
+these youths and these maidens can? Or can they either in themselves,
+and not rather in the Lord their God? . . . Why standest thou in
+thyself, and so standest not? Cast thyself upon Him; fear not, He
+will not withdraw Himself that thou shouldst fall. Cast thyself
+fearlessly upon Him: He will receive and will heal thee."
+
+The example quoted of David is not to the point, because "the arms of
+Saul," as a gloss on the passage observes, "are the sacraments of the
+Law, as being burdensome": whereas religion is the sweet yoke of
+Christ, for as Gregory says (Moral. iv, 33), "what burden does He lay
+on the shoulders of the mind, Who commands us to shun all troublesome
+desires, Who warns us to turn aside from the rough paths of this
+world?"
+
+To those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon themselves He promises
+the refreshment of the divine fruition and the eternal rest of their
+souls.
+
+To which may He Who made this promise bring us, Jesus Christ our
+Lord, "Who is over all things God blessed for ever. Amen."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda
+Secundae), by Thomas Aquinas
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