diff options
| author | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 05:17:41 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 05:17:41 -0700 |
| commit | 23526498360d679210293a86f0dad6ed11a4638e (patch) | |
| tree | a48dfb0c5edfac30ae09e19d45cf602dc254a83a | |
| -rw-r--r-- | .gitattributes | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 1744-h.zip | bin | 0 -> 99364 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 1744-h/1744-h.htm | 7310 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 1744.txt | 6043 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 1744.zip | bin | 0 -> 95841 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | LICENSE.txt | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/philb10.txt | 5825 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/philb10.zip | bin | 0 -> 94206 bytes |
9 files changed, 19194 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/1744-h.zip b/1744-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..8204b90 --- /dev/null +++ b/1744-h.zip diff --git a/1744-h/1744-h.htm b/1744-h/1744-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d3310d --- /dev/null +++ b/1744-h/1744-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,7310 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> + <head> + <title> + Philebus, by Plato + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Philebus, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Philebus + +Author: Plato + +Release Date: October 30, 2008 [EBook #1744] +Last Updated: January 15, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILEBUS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + PHILEBUS + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + By Plato + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated by Benjamin Jowett + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Contents + </h3> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> PHILEBUS </a> + </p> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + </h2> + <p> + The Philebus appears to be one of the later writings of Plato, in which + the style has begun to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has + become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the + development of abstract thought great advances have been made on the + Protagoras or the Phaedrus, and even on the Republic. But there is a + corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the + persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and + incompleteness in the general design. As in the speeches of Thucydides, + the multiplication of ideas seems to interfere with the power of + expression. Instead of the equally diffused grace and ease of the earlier + dialogues there occur two or three highly-wrought passages; instead of the + ever-flowing play of humour, now appearing, now concealed, but always + present, are inserted a good many bad jests, as we may venture to term + them. We may observe an attempt at artificial ornament, and far-fetched + modes of expression; also clamorous demands on the part of his companions, + that Socrates shall answer his own questions, as well as other defects of + style, which remind us of the Laws. The connection is often abrupt and + inharmonious, and far from clear. Many points require further explanation; + e.g. the reference of pleasure to the indefinite class, compared with the + assertion which almost immediately follows, that pleasure and pain + naturally have their seat in the third or mixed class: these two + statements are unreconciled. In like manner, the table of goods does not + distinguish between the two heads of measure and symmetry; and though a + hint is given that the divine mind has the first place, nothing is said of + this in the final summing up. The relation of the goods to the sciences + does not appear; though dialectic may be thought to correspond to the + highest good, the sciences and arts and true opinions are enumerated in + the fourth class. We seem to have an intimation of a further discussion, + in which some topics lightly passed over were to receive a fuller + consideration. The various uses of the word 'mixed,' for the mixed life, + the mixed class of elements, the mixture of pleasures, or of pleasure and + pain, are a further source of perplexity. Our ignorance of the opinions + which Plato is attacking is also an element of obscurity. Many things in a + controversy might seem relevant, if we knew to what they were intended to + refer. But no conjecture will enable us to supply what Plato has not told + us; or to explain, from our fragmentary knowledge of them, the relation in + which his doctrine stood to the Eleatic Being or the Megarian good, or to + the theories of Aristippus or Antisthenes respecting pleasure. Nor are we + able to say how far Plato in the Philebus conceives the finite and + infinite (which occur both in the fragments of Philolaus and in the + Pythagorean table of opposites) in the same manner as contemporary + Pythagoreans. + </p> + <p> + There is little in the characters which is worthy of remark. The Socrates + of the Philebus is devoid of any touch of Socratic irony, though here, as + in the Phaedrus, he twice attributes the flow of his ideas to a sudden + inspiration. The interlocutor Protarchus, the son of Callias, who has been + a hearer of Gorgias, is supposed to begin as a disciple of the partisans + of pleasure, but is drawn over to the opposite side by the arguments of + Socrates. The instincts of ingenuous youth are easily induced to take the + better part. Philebus, who has withdrawn from the argument, is several + times brought back again, that he may support pleasure, of which he + remains to the end the uncompromising advocate. On the other hand, the + youthful group of listeners by whom he is surrounded, 'Philebus' boys' as + they are termed, whose presence is several times intimated, are described + as all of them at last convinced by the arguments of Socrates. They bear a + very faded resemblance to the interested audiences of the Charmides, + Lysis, or Protagoras. Other signs of relation to external life in the + dialogue, or references to contemporary things and persons, with the + single exception of the allusions to the anonymous enemies of pleasure, + and the teachers of the flux, there are none. + </p> + <p> + The omission of the doctrine of recollection, derived from a previous + state of existence, is a note of progress in the philosophy of Plato. The + transcendental theory of pre-existent ideas, which is chiefly discussed by + him in the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Phaedrus, has given way to a + psychological one. The omission is rendered more significant by his having + occasion to speak of memory as the basis of desire. Of the ideas he treats + in the same sceptical spirit which appears in his criticism of them in the + Parmenides. He touches on the same difficulties and he gives no answer to + them. His mode of speaking of the analytical and synthetical processes may + be compared with his discussion of the same subject in the Phaedrus; here + he dwells on the importance of dividing the genera into all the species, + while in the Phaedrus he conveys the same truth in a figure, when he + speaks of carving the whole, which is described under the image of a + victim, into parts or members, 'according to their natural articulation, + without breaking any of them.' There is also a difference, which may be + noted, between the two dialogues. For whereas in the Phaedrus, and also in + the Symposium, the dialectician is described as a sort of enthusiast or + lover, in the Philebus, as in all the later writings of Plato, the element + of love is wanting; the topic is only introduced, as in the Republic, by + way of illustration. On other subjects of which they treat in common, such + as the nature and kinds of pleasure, true and false opinion, the nature of + the good, the order and relation of the sciences, the Republic is less + advanced than the Philebus, which contains, perhaps, more metaphysical + truth more obscurely expressed than any other Platonic dialogue. Here, as + Plato expressly tells us, he is 'forging weapons of another make,' i.e. + new categories and modes of conception, though 'some of the old ones might + do again.' + </p> + <p> + But if superior in thought and dialectical power, the Philebus falls very + far short of the Republic in fancy and feeling. The development of the + reason undisturbed by the emotions seems to be the ideal at which Plato + aims in his later dialogues. There is no mystic enthusiasm or rapturous + contemplation of ideas. Whether we attribute this change to the greater + feebleness of age, or to the development of the quarrel between philosophy + and poetry in Plato's own mind, or perhaps, in some degree, to a + carelessness about artistic effect, when he was absorbed in abstract + ideas, we can hardly be wrong in assuming, amid such a variety of + indications, derived from style as well as subject, that the Philebus + belongs to the later period of his life and authorship. But in this, as in + all the later writings of Plato, there are not wanting thoughts and + expressions in which he rises to his highest level. + </p> + <p> + The plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, the want of plan renders the + progress of the dialogue difficult to follow. A few leading ideas seem to + emerge: the relation of the one and many, the four original elements, the + kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge, the scale of goods. These are + only partially connected with one another. The dialogue is not rightly + entitled 'Concerning pleasure' or 'Concerning good,' but should rather be + described as treating of the relations of pleasure and knowledge, after + they have been duly analyzed, to the good. (1) The question is asked, + whether pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or some nature higher than + either; and if the latter, how pleasure and wisdom are related to this + higher good. (2) Before we can reply with exactness, we must know the + kinds of pleasure and the kinds of knowledge. (3) But still we may affirm + generally, that the combined life of pleasure and wisdom or knowledge has + more of the character of the good than either of them when isolated. (4) + to determine which of them partakes most of the higher nature, we must + know under which of the four unities or elements they respectively fall. + These are, first, the infinite; secondly, the finite; thirdly, the union + of the two; fourthly, the cause of the union. Pleasure is of the first, + wisdom or knowledge of the third class, while reason or mind is akin to + the fourth or highest. + </p> + <p> + (5) Pleasures are of two kinds, the mixed and unmixed. Of mixed pleasures + there are three classes—(a) those in which both the pleasures and + pains are corporeal, as in eating and hunger; (b) those in which there is + a pain of the body and pleasure of the mind, as when you are hungry and + are looking forward to a feast; (c) those in which the pleasure and pain + are both mental. Of unmixed pleasures there are four kinds: those of + sight, hearing, smell, knowledge. + </p> + <p> + (6) The sciences are likewise divided into two classes, theoretical and + productive: of the latter, one part is pure, the other impure. The pure + part consists of arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing. Arts like + carpentering, which have an exact measure, are to be regarded as higher + than music, which for the most part is mere guess-work. But there is also + a higher arithmetic, and a higher mensuration, which is exclusively + theoretical; and a dialectical science, which is higher still and the + truest and purest knowledge. + </p> + <p> + (7) We are now able to determine the composition of the perfect life. + First, we admit the pure pleasures and the pure sciences; secondly, the + impure sciences, but not the impure pleasures. We have next to discover + what element of goodness is contained in this mixture. There are three + criteria of goodness—beauty, symmetry, truth. These are clearly more + akin to reason than to pleasure, and will enable us to fix the places of + both of them in the scale of good. First in the scale is measure; the + second place is assigned to symmetry; the third, to reason and wisdom; the + fourth, to knowledge and true opinion; the fifth, to pure pleasures; and + here the Muse says 'Enough.' + </p> + <p> + 'Bidding farewell to Philebus and Socrates,' we may now consider the + metaphysical conceptions which are presented to us. These are (I) the + paradox of unity and plurality; (II) the table of categories or elements; + (III) the kinds of pleasure; (IV) the kinds of knowledge; (V) the + conception of the good. We may then proceed to examine (VI) the relation + of the Philebus to the Republic, and to other dialogues. + </p> + <p> + I. The paradox of the one and many originated in the restless dialectic of + Zeno, who sought to prove the absolute existence of the one by showing the + contradictions that are involved in admitting the existence of the many + (compare Parm.). Zeno illustrated the contradiction by well-known examples + taken from outward objects. But Socrates seems to intimate that the time + had arrived for discarding these hackneyed illustrations; such + difficulties had long been solved by common sense ('solvitur ambulando'); + the fact of the co-existence of opposites was a sufficient answer to them. + He will leave them to Cynics and Eristics; the youth of Athens may + discourse of them to their parents. To no rational man could the + circumstance that the body is one, but has many members, be any longer a + stumbling-block. + </p> + <p> + Plato's difficulty seems to begin in the region of ideas. He cannot + understand how an absolute unity, such as the Eleatic Being, can be broken + up into a number of individuals, or be in and out of them at once. + Philosophy had so deepened or intensified the nature of one or Being, by + the thoughts of successive generations, that the mind could no longer + imagine 'Being' as in a state of change or division. To say that the verb + of existence is the copula, or that unity is a mere unit, is to us easy; + but to the Greek in a particular stage of thought such an analysis + involved the same kind of difficulty as the conception of God existing + both in and out of the world would to ourselves. Nor was he assisted by + the analogy of sensible objects. The sphere of mind was dark and + mysterious to him; but instead of being illustrated by sense, the greatest + light appeared to be thrown on the nature of ideas when they were + contrasted with sense. + </p> + <p> + Both here and in the Parmenides, where similar difficulties are raised, + Plato seems prepared to desert his ancient ground. He cannot tell the + relation in which abstract ideas stand to one another, and therefore he + transfers the one and many out of his transcendental world, and proceeds + to lay down practical rules for their application to different branches of + knowledge. As in the Republic he supposes the philosopher to proceed by + regular steps, until he arrives at the idea of good; as in the Sophist and + Politicus he insists that in dividing the whole into its parts we should + bisect in the middle in the hope of finding species; as in the Phaedrus + (see above) he would have 'no limb broken' of the organism of knowledge;—so + in the Philebus he urges the necessity of filling up all the intermediate + links which occur (compare Bacon's 'media axiomata') in the passage from + unity to infinity. With him the idea of science may be said to anticipate + science; at a time when the sciences were not yet divided, he wants to + impress upon us the importance of classification; neither neglecting the + many individuals, nor attempting to count them all, but finding the genera + and species under which they naturally fall. Here, then, and in the + parallel passages of the Phaedrus and of the Sophist, is found the germ of + the most fruitful notion of modern science. + </p> + <p> + Plato describes with ludicrous exaggeration the influence exerted by the + one and many on the minds of young men in their first fervour of + metaphysical enthusiasm (compare Republic). But they are none the less an + everlasting quality of reason or reasoning which never grows old in us. At + first we have but a confused conception of them, analogous to the eyes + blinking at the light in the Republic. To this Plato opposes the + revelation from Heaven of the real relations of them, which some + Prometheus, who gave the true fire from heaven, is supposed to have + imparted to us. Plato is speaking of two things—(1) the crude notion + of the one and many, which powerfully affects the ordinary mind when first + beginning to think; (2) the same notion when cleared up by the help of + dialectic. + </p> + <p> + To us the problem of the one and many has lost its chief interest and + perplexity. We readily acknowledge that a whole has many parts, that the + continuous is also the divisible, that in all objects of sense there is a + one and many, and that a like principle may be applied to analogy to + purely intellectual conceptions. If we attend to the meaning of the words, + we are compelled to admit that two contradictory statements are true. But + the antinomy is so familiar as to be scarcely observed by us. Our sense of + the contradiction, like Plato's, only begins in a higher sphere, when we + speak of necessity and free-will, of mind and body, of Three Persons and + One Substance, and the like. The world of knowledge is always dividing + more and more; every truth is at first the enemy of every other truth. Yet + without this division there can be no truth; nor any complete truth + without the reunion of the parts into a whole. And hence the coexistence + of opposites in the unity of the idea is regarded by Hegel as the supreme + principle of philosophy; and the law of contradiction, which is affirmed + by logicians to be an ultimate principle of the human mind, is displaced + by another law, which asserts the coexistence of contradictories as + imperfect and divided elements of the truth. Without entering further into + the depths of Hegelianism, we may remark that this and all similar + attempts to reconcile antinomies have their origin in the old Platonic + problem of the 'One and Many.' + </p> + <p> + II. 1. The first of Plato's categories or elements is the infinite. This + is the negative of measure or limit; the unthinkable, the unknowable; of + which nothing can be affirmed; the mixture or chaos which preceded + distinct kinds in the creation of the world; the first vague impression of + sense; the more or less which refuses to be reduced to rule, having + certain affinities with evil, with pleasure, with ignorance, and which in + the scale of being is farthest removed from the beautiful and good. To a + Greek of the age of Plato, the idea of an infinite mind would have been an + absurdity. He would have insisted that 'the good is of the nature of the + finite,' and that the infinite is a mere negative, which is on the level + of sensation, and not of thought. He was aware that there was a + distinction between the infinitely great and the infinitely small, but he + would have equally denied the claim of either to true existence. Of that + positive infinity, or infinite reality, which we attribute to God, he had + no conception. + </p> + <p> + The Greek conception of the infinite would be more truly described, in our + way of speaking, as the indefinite. To us, the notion of infinity is + subsequent rather than prior to the finite, expressing not absolute + vacancy or negation, but only the removal of limit or restraint, which we + suppose to exist not before but after we have already set bounds to + thought and matter, and divided them after their kinds. From different + points of view, either the finite or infinite may be looked upon + respectively both as positive and negative (compare 'Omnis determinatio + est negatio')' and the conception of the one determines that of the other. + The Greeks and the moderns seem to be nearly at the opposite poles in + their manner of regarding them. And both are surprised when they make the + discovery, as Plato has done in the Sophist, how large an element negation + forms in the framework of their thoughts. + </p> + <p> + 2, 3. The finite element which mingles with and regulates the infinite is + best expressed to us by the word 'law.' It is that which measures all + things and assigns to them their limit; which preserves them in their + natural state, and brings them within the sphere of human cognition. This + is described by the terms harmony, health, order, perfection, and the + like. All things, in as far as they are good, even pleasures, which are + for the most part indefinite, partake of this element. We should be wrong + in attributing to Plato the conception of laws of nature derived from + observation and experiment. And yet he has as intense a conviction as any + modern philosopher that nature does not proceed by chance. But observing + that the wonderful construction of number and figure, which he had within + himself, and which seemed to be prior to himself, explained a part of the + phenomena of the external world, he extended their principles to the + whole, finding in them the true type both of human life and of the order + of nature. + </p> + <p> + Two other points may be noticed respecting the third class. First, that + Plato seems to be unconscious of any interval or chasm which separates the + finite from the infinite. The one is in various ways and degrees working + in the other. Hence he has implicitly answered the difficulty with which + he started, of how the one could remain one and yet be divided among many + individuals, or 'how ideas could be in and out of themselves,' and the + like. Secondly, that in this mixed class we find the idea of beauty. Good, + when exhibited under the aspect of measure or symmetry, becomes beauty. + And if we translate his language into corresponding modern terms, we shall + not be far wrong in saying that here, as well as in the Republic, Plato + conceives beauty under the idea of proportion. + </p> + <p> + 4. Last and highest in the list of principles or elements is the cause of + the union of the finite and infinite, to which Plato ascribes the order of + the world. Reasoning from man to the universe, he argues that as there is + a mind in the one, there must be a mind in the other, which he identifies + with the royal mind of Zeus. This is the first cause of which 'our + ancestors spoke,' as he says, appealing to tradition, in the Philebus as + well as in the Timaeus. The 'one and many' is also supposed to have been + revealed by tradition. For the mythical element has not altogether + disappeared. + </p> + <p> + Some characteristic differences may here be noted, which distinguish the + ancient from the modern mode of conceiving God. + </p> + <p> + a. To Plato, the idea of God or mind is both personal and impersonal. Nor + in ascribing, as appears to us, both these attributes to him, and in + speaking of God both in the masculine and neuter gender, did he seem to + himself inconsistent. For the difference between the personal and + impersonal was not marked to him as to ourselves. We make a fundamental + distinction between a thing and a person, while to Plato, by the help of + various intermediate abstractions, such as end, good, cause, they appear + almost to meet in one, or to be two aspects of the same. Hence, without + any reconciliation or even remark, in the Republic he speaks at one time + of God or Gods, and at another time of the Good. So in the Phaedrus he + seems to pass unconsciously from the concrete to the abstract conception + of the Ideas in the same dialogue. Nor in the Philebus is he careful to + show in what relation the idea of the divine mind stands to the supreme + principle of measure. + </p> + <p> + b. Again, to us there is a strongly-marked distinction between a first + cause and a final cause. And we should commonly identify a first cause + with God, and the final cause with the world, which is His work. But + Plato, though not a Pantheist, and very far from confounding God with the + world, tends to identify the first with the final cause. The cause of the + union of the finite and infinite might be described as a higher law; the + final measure which is the highest expression of the good may also be + described as the supreme law. Both these conceptions are realized chiefly + by the help of the material world; and therefore when we pass into the + sphere of ideas can hardly be distinguished. + </p> + <p> + The four principles are required for the determination of the relative + places of pleasure and wisdom. Plato has been saying that we should + proceed by regular steps from the one to the many. Accordingly, before + assigning the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first find + out and arrange in order the general principles of things. Mind is + ascertained to be akin to the nature of the cause, while pleasure is found + in the infinite or indefinite class. We may now proceed to divide pleasure + and knowledge after their kinds. + </p> + <p> + III. 1. Plato speaks of pleasure as indefinite, as relative, as a + generation, and in all these points of view as in a category distinct from + good. For again we must repeat, that to the Greek 'the good is of the + nature of the finite,' and, like virtue, either is, or is nearly allied + to, knowledge. The modern philosopher would remark that the indefinite is + equally real with the definite. Health and mental qualities are in the + concrete undefined; they are nevertheless real goods, and Plato rightly + regards them as falling under the finite class. Again, we are able to + define objects or ideas, not in so far as they are in the mind, but in so + far as they are manifested externally, and can therefore be reduced to + rule and measure. And if we adopt the test of definiteness, the pleasures + of the body are more capable of being defined than any other pleasures. As + in art and knowledge generally, we proceed from without inwards, beginning + with facts of sense, and passing to the more ideal conceptions of mental + pleasure, happiness, and the like. + </p> + <p> + 2. Pleasure is depreciated as relative, while good is exalted as absolute. + But this distinction seems to arise from an unfair mode of regarding them; + the abstract idea of the one is compared with the concrete experience of + the other. For all pleasure and all knowledge may be viewed either + abstracted from the mind, or in relation to the mind (compare Aristot. + Nic. Ethics). The first is an idea only, which may be conceived as + absolute and unchangeable, and then the abstract idea of pleasure will be + equally unchangeable with that of knowledge. But when we come to view + either as phenomena of consciousness, the same defects are for the most + part incident to both of them. Our hold upon them is equally transient and + uncertain; the mind cannot be always in a state of intellectual tension, + any more than capable of feeling pleasure always. The knowledge which is + at one time clear and distinct, at another seems to fade away, just as the + pleasure of health after sickness, or of eating after hunger, soon passes + into a neutral state of unconsciousness and indifference. Change and + alternation are necessary for the mind as well as for the body; and in + this is to be acknowledged, not an element of evil, but rather a law of + nature. The chief difference between subjective pleasure and subjective + knowledge in respect of permanence is that the latter, when our feeble + faculties are able to grasp it, still conveys to us an idea of + unchangeableness which cannot be got rid of. + </p> + <p> + 3. In the language of ancient philosophy, the relative character of + pleasure is described as becoming or generation. This is relative to Being + or Essence, and from one point of view may be regarded as the Heraclitean + flux in contrast with the Eleatic Being; from another, as the transient + enjoyment of eating and drinking compared with the supposed permanence of + intellectual pleasures. But to us the distinction is unmeaning, and + belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed away. Plato himself + seems to have suspected that the continuance or life of things is quite as + much to be attributed to a principle of rest as of motion (compare Charm. + Cratyl.). A later view of pleasure is found in Aristotle, who agrees with + Plato in many points, e.g. in his view of pleasure as a restoration to + nature, in his distinction between bodily and mental, between necessary + and non-necessary pleasures. But he is also in advance of Plato; for he + affirms that pleasure is not in the body at all; and hence not even the + bodily pleasures are to be spoken of as generations, but only as + accompanied by generation (Nic. Eth.). + </p> + <p> + 4. Plato attempts to identify vicious pleasures with some form of error, + and insists that the term false may be applied to them: in this he appears + to be carrying out in a confused manner the Socratic doctrine, that virtue + is knowledge, vice ignorance. He will allow of no distinction between the + pleasures and the erroneous opinions on which they are founded, whether + arising out of the illusion of distance or not. But to this we naturally + reply with Protarchus, that the pleasure is what it is, although the + calculation may be false, or the after-effects painful. It is difficult to + acquit Plato, to use his own language, of being a 'tyro in dialectics,' + when he overlooks such a distinction. Yet, on the other hand, we are + hardly fair judges of confusions of thought in those who view things + differently from ourselves. + </p> + <p> + 5. There appears also to be an incorrectness in the notion which occurs + both here and in the Gorgias, of the simultaneousness of merely bodily + pleasures and pains. We may, perhaps, admit, though even this is not free + from doubt, that the feeling of pleasureable hope or recollection is, or + rather may be, simultaneous with acute bodily suffering. But there is no + such coexistence of the pain of thirst with the pleasures of drinking; + they are not really simultaneous, for the one expels the other. Nor does + Plato seem to have considered that the bodily pleasures, except in certain + extreme cases, are unattended with pain. Few philosophers will deny that a + degree of pleasure attends eating and drinking; and yet surely we might as + well speak of the pains of digestion which follow, as of the pains of + hunger and thirst which precede them. Plato's conception is derived partly + from the extreme case of a man suffering pain from hunger or thirst, + partly from the image of a full and empty vessel. But the truth is rather, + that while the gratification of our bodily desires constantly affords some + degree of pleasure, the antecedent pains are scarcely perceived by us, + being almost done away with by use and regularity. + </p> + <p> + 6. The desire to classify pleasures as accompanied or not accompanied by + antecedent pains, has led Plato to place under one head the pleasures of + smell and sight, as well as those derived from sounds of music and from + knowledge. He would have done better to make a separate class of the + pleasures of smell, having no association of mind, or perhaps to have + divided them into natural and artificial. The pleasures of sight and sound + might then have been regarded as being the expression of ideas. But this + higher and truer point of view never appears to have occurred to Plato. + Nor has he any distinction between the fine arts and the mechanical; and, + neither here nor anywhere, an adequate conception of the beautiful in + external things. + </p> + <p> + 7. Plato agrees partially with certain 'surly or fastidious' philosophers, + as he terms them, who defined pleasure to be the absence of pain. They are + also described as eminent in physics. There is unfortunately no school of + Greek philosophy known to us which combined these two characteristics. + Antisthenes, who was an enemy of pleasure, was not a physical philosopher; + the atomists, who were physical philosophers, were not enemies of + pleasure. Yet such a combination of opinions is far from being impossible. + Plato's omission to mention them by name has created the same uncertainty + respecting them which also occurs respecting the 'friends of the ideas' + and the 'materialists' in the Sophist. + </p> + <p> + On the whole, this discussion is one of the least satisfactory in the + dialogues of Plato. While the ethical nature of pleasure is scarcely + considered, and the merely physical phenomenon imperfectly analysed, too + much weight is given to ideas of measure and number, as the sole principle + of good. The comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really a comparison + of two elements, which have no common measure, and which cannot be + excluded from each other. Feeling is not opposed to knowledge, and in all + consciousness there is an element of both. The most abstract kinds of + knowledge are inseparable from some pleasure or pain, which accompanies + the acquisition or possession of them: the student is liable to grow weary + of them, and soon discovers that continuous mental energy is not granted + to men. The most sensual pleasure, on the other hand, is inseparable from + the consciousness of pleasure; no man can be happy who, to borrow Plato's + illustration, is leading the life of an oyster. Hence (by his own + confession) the main thesis is not worth determining; the real interest + lies in the incidental discussion. We can no more separate pleasure from + knowledge in the Philebus than we can separate justice from happiness in + the Republic. + </p> + <p> + IV. An interesting account is given in the Philebus of the rank and order + of the sciences or arts, which agrees generally with the scheme of + knowledge in the Sixth Book of the Republic. The chief difference is, that + the position of the arts is more exactly defined. They are divided into an + empirical part and a scientific part, of which the first is mere + guess-work, the second is determined by rule and measure. Of the more + empirical arts, music is given as an example; this, although affirmed to + be necessary to human life, is depreciated. Music is regarded from a point + of view entirely opposite to that of the Republic, not as a sublime + science, coordinate with astronomy, but as full of doubt and conjecture. + According to the standard of accuracy which is here adopted, it is rightly + placed lower in the scale than carpentering, because the latter is more + capable of being reduced to measure. + </p> + <p> + The theoretical element of the arts may also become a purely abstract + science, when separated from matter, and is then said to be pure and + unmixed. The distinction which Plato here makes seems to be the same as + that between pure and applied mathematics, and may be expressed in the + modern formula—science is art theoretical, art is science practical. + In the reason which he gives for the superiority of the pure science of + number over the mixed or applied, we can only agree with him in part. He + says that the numbers which the philosopher employs are always the same, + whereas the numbers which are used in practice represent different sizes + or quantities. He does not see that this power of expressing different + quantities by the same symbol is the characteristic and not the defect of + numbers, and is due to their abstract nature;—although we admit of + course what Plato seems to feel in his distinctions between pure and + impure knowledge, that the imperfection of matter enters into the + applications of them. + </p> + <p> + Above the other sciences, as in the Republic, towers dialectic, which is + the science of eternal Being, apprehended by the purest mind and reason. + The lower sciences, including the mathematical, are akin to opinion rather + than to reason, and are placed together in the fourth class of goods. The + relation in which they stand to dialectic is obscure in the Republic, and + is not cleared up in the Philebus. + </p> + <p> + V. Thus far we have only attained to the vestibule or ante-chamber of the + good; for there is a good exceeding knowledge, exceeding essence, which, + like Glaucon in the Republic, we find a difficulty in apprehending. This + good is now to be exhibited to us under various aspects and gradations. + The relative dignity of pleasure and knowledge has been determined; but + they have not yet received their exact position in the scale of goods. + Some difficulties occur to us in the enumeration: First, how are we to + distinguish the first from the second class of goods, or the second from + the third? Secondly, why is there no mention of the supreme mind? Thirdly, + the nature of the fourth class. Fourthly, the meaning of the allusion to a + sixth class, which is not further investigated. + </p> + <p> + (I) Plato seems to proceed in his table of goods, from the more abstract + to the less abstract; from the subjective to the objective; until at the + lower end of the scale we fairly descend into the region of human action + and feeling. To him, the greater the abstraction the greater the truth, + and he is always tending to see abstractions within abstractions; which, + like the ideas in the Parmenides, are always appearing one behind another. + Hence we find a difficulty in following him into the sphere of thought + which he is seeking to attain. First in his scale of goods he places + measure, in which he finds the eternal nature: this would be more + naturally expressed in modern language as eternal law, and seems to be + akin both to the finite and to the mind or cause, which were two of the + elements in the former table. Like the supreme nature in the Timaeus, like + the ideal beauty in the Symposium or the Phaedrus, or like the ideal good + in the Republic, this is the absolute and unapproachable being. But this + being is manifested in symmetry and beauty everywhere, in the order of + nature and of mind, in the relations of men to one another. For the word + 'measure' he now substitutes the word 'symmetry,' as if intending to + express measure conceived as relation. He then proceeds to regard the good + no longer in an objective form, but as the human reason seeking to attain + truth by the aid of dialectic; such at least we naturally infer to be his + meaning, when we consider that both here and in the Republic the sphere of + nous or mind is assigned to dialectic. (2) It is remarkable (see above) + that this personal conception of mind is confined to the human mind, and + not extended to the divine. (3) If we may be allowed to interpret one + dialogue of Plato by another, the sciences of figure and number are + probably classed with the arts and true opinions, because they proceed + from hypotheses (compare Republic). (4) The sixth class, if a sixth class + is to be added, is playfully set aside by a quotation from Orpheus: Plato + means to say that a sixth class, if there be such a class, is not worth + considering, because pleasure, having only gained the fifth place in the + scale of goods, is already out of the running. + </p> + <p> + VI. We may now endeavour to ascertain the relation of the Philebus to the + other dialogues. Here Plato shows the same indifference to his own + doctrine of Ideas which he has already manifested in the Parmenides and + the Sophist. The principle of the one and many of which he here speaks, is + illustrated by examples in the Sophist and Statesman. Notwithstanding the + differences of style, many resemblances may be noticed between the + Philebus and Gorgias. The theory of the simultaneousness of pleasure and + pain is common to both of them (Phil. Gorg.); there is also a common + tendency in them to take up arms against pleasure, although the view of + the Philebus, which is probably the later of the two dialogues, is the + more moderate. There seems to be an allusion to the passage in the + Gorgias, in which Socrates dilates on the pleasures of itching and + scratching. Nor is there any real discrepancy in the manner in which + Gorgias and his art are spoken of in the two dialogues. For Socrates is + far from implying that the art of rhetoric has a real sphere of practical + usefulness: he only means that the refutation of the claims of Gorgias is + not necessary for his present purpose. He is saying in effect: 'Admit, if + you please, that rhetoric is the greatest and usefullest of sciences:—this + does not prove that dialectic is not the purest and most exact.' From the + Sophist and Statesman we know that his hostility towards the sophists and + rhetoricians was not mitigated in later life; although both in the + Statesman and Laws he admits of a higher use of rhetoric. + </p> + <p> + Reasons have been already given for assigning a late date to the Philebus. + That the date is probably later than that of the Republic, may be further + argued on the following grounds:—1. The general resemblance to the + later dialogues and to the Laws: 2. The more complete account of the + nature of good and pleasure: 3. The distinction between perception, + memory, recollection, and opinion which indicates a great progress in + psychology; also between understanding and imagination, which is described + under the figure of the scribe and the painter. A superficial notion may + arise that Plato probably wrote shorter dialogues, such as the Philebus, + the Sophist, and the Statesman, as studies or preparations for longer + ones. This view may be natural; but on further reflection is seen to be + fallacious, because these three dialogues are found to make an advance + upon the metaphysical conceptions of the Republic. And we can more easily + suppose that Plato composed shorter writings after longer ones, than + suppose that he lost hold of further points of view which he had once + attained. + </p> + <p> + It is more easy to find traces of the Pythagoreans, Eleatics, Megarians, + Cynics, Cyrenaics and of the ideas of Anaxagoras, in the Philebus, than to + say how much is due to each of them. Had we fuller records of those old + philosophers, we should probably find Plato in the midst of the fray + attempting to combine Eleatic and Pythagorean doctrines, and seeking to + find a truth beyond either Being or number; setting up his own concrete + conception of good against the abstract practical good of the Cynics, or + the abstract intellectual good of the Megarians, and his own idea of + classification against the denial of plurality in unity which is also + attributed to them; warring against the Eristics as destructive of truth, + as he had formerly fought against the Sophists; taking up a middle + position between the Cynics and Cyrenaics in his doctrine of pleasure; + asserting with more consistency than Anaxagoras the existence of an + intelligent mind and cause. Of the Heracliteans, whom he is said by + Aristotle to have cultivated in his youth, he speaks in the Philebus, as + in the Theaetetus and Cratylus, with irony and contempt. But we have not + the knowledge which would enable us to pursue further the line of + reflection here indicated; nor can we expect to find perfect clearness or + order in the first efforts of mankind to understand the working of their + own minds. The ideas which they are attempting to analyse, they are also + in process of creating; the abstract universals of which they are seeking + to adjust the relations have been already excluded by them from the + category of relation. + </p> + <p> + ... + </p> + <p> + The Philebus, like the Cratylus, is supposed to be the continuation of a + previous discussion. An argument respecting the comparative claims of + pleasure and wisdom to rank as the chief good has been already carried on + between Philebus and Socrates. The argument is now transferred to + Protarchus, the son of Callias, a noble Athenian youth, sprung from a + family which had spent 'a world of money' on the Sophists (compare Apol.; + Crat.; Protag.). Philebus, who appears to be the teacher, or elder friend, + and perhaps the lover, of Protarchus, takes no further part in the + discussion beyond asserting in the strongest manner his adherence, under + all circumstances, to the cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p> + Socrates suggests that they shall have a first and second palm of victory. + For there may be a good higher than either pleasure or wisdom, and then + neither of them will gain the first prize, but whichever of the two is + more akin to this higher good will have a right to the second. They agree, + and Socrates opens the game by enlarging on the diversity and opposition + which exists among pleasures. For there are pleasures of all kinds, good + and bad, wise and foolish—pleasures of the temperate as well as of + the intemperate. Protarchus replies that although pleasures may be opposed + in so far as they spring from opposite sources, nevertheless as pleasures + they are alike. Yes, retorts Socrates, pleasure is like pleasure, as + figure is like figure and colour like colour; yet we all know that there + is great variety among figures and colours. Protarchus does not see the + drift of this remark; and Socrates proceeds to ask how he can have a right + to attribute a new predicate (i.e. 'good') to pleasures in general, when + he cannot deny that they are different? What common property in all of + them does he mean to indicate by the term 'good'? If he continues to + assert that there is some trivial sense in which pleasure is one, Socrates + may retort by saying that knowledge is one, but the result will be that + such merely verbal and trivial conceptions, whether of knowledge or + pleasure, will spoil the discussion, and will prove the incapacity of the + two disputants. In order to avoid this danger, he proposes that they shall + beat a retreat, and, before they proceed, come to an understanding about + the 'high argument' of the one and the many. + </p> + <p> + Protarchus agrees to the proposal, but he is under the impression that + Socrates means to discuss the common question—how a sensible object + can be one, and yet have opposite attributes, such as 'great' and 'small,' + 'light' and 'heavy,' or how there can be many members in one body, and the + like wonders. Socrates has long ceased to see any wonder in these + phenomena; his difficulties begin with the application of number to + abstract unities (e.g.'man,' 'good') and with the attempt to divide them. + For have these unities of idea any real existence? How, if imperishable, + can they enter into the world of generation? How, as units, can they be + divided and dispersed among different objects? Or do they exist in their + entirety in each object? These difficulties are but imperfectly answered + by Socrates in what follows. + </p> + <p> + We speak of a one and many, which is ever flowing in and out of all + things, concerning which a young man often runs wild in his first + metaphysical enthusiasm, talking about analysis and synthesis to his + father and mother and the neighbours, hardly sparing even his dog. This + 'one in many' is a revelation of the order of the world, which some + Prometheus first made known to our ancestors; and they, who were better + men and nearer the gods than we are, have handed it down to us. To know + how to proceed by regular steps from one to many, and from many to one, is + just what makes the difference between eristic and dialectic. And the + right way of proceeding is to look for one idea or class in all things, + and when you have found one to look for more than one, and for all that + there are, and when you have found them all and regularly divided a + particular field of knowledge into classes, you may leave the further + consideration of individuals. But you must not pass at once either from + unity to infinity, or from infinity to unity. In music, for example, you + may begin with the most general notion, but this alone will not make you a + musician: you must know also the number and nature of the intervals, and + the systems which are framed out of them, and the rhythms of the dance + which correspond to them. And when you have a similar knowledge of any + other subject, you may be said to know that subject. In speech again there + are infinite varieties of sound, and some one who was a wise man, or more + than man, comprehended them all in the classes of mutes, vowels, and + semivowels, and gave to each of them a name, and assigned them to the art + of grammar. + </p> + <p> + 'But whither, Socrates, are you going? And what has this to do with the + comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom:' Socrates replies, that + before we can adjust their respective claims, we want to know the number + and kinds of both of them. What are they? He is requested to answer the + question himself. That he will, if he may be allowed to make one or two + preliminary remarks. In the first place he has a dreamy recollection of + hearing that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the highest good, for the + good should be perfect and sufficient. But is the life of pleasure perfect + and sufficient, when deprived of memory, consciousness, anticipation? Is + not this the life of an oyster? Or is the life of mind sufficient, if + devoid of any particle of pleasure? Must not the union of the two be + higher and more eligible than either separately? And is not the element + which makes this mixed life eligible more akin to mind than to pleasure? + Thus pleasure is rejected and mind is rejected. And yet there may be a + life of mind, not human but divine, which conquers still. + </p> + <p> + But, if we are to pursue this argument further, we shall require some new + weapons; and by this, I mean a new classification of existence. (1) There + is a finite element of existence, and (2) an infinite, and (3) the union + of the two, and (4) the cause of the union. More may be added if they are + wanted, but at present we can do without them. And first of the infinite + or indefinite:—That is the class which is denoted by the terms more + or less, and is always in a state of comparison. All words or ideas to + which the words 'gently,' 'extremely,' and other comparative expressions + are applied, fall under this class. The infinite would be no longer + infinite, if limited or reduced to measure by number and quantity. The + opposite class is the limited or finite, and includes all things which + have number and quantity. And there is a third class of generation into + essence by the union of the finite and infinite, in which the finite gives + law to the infinite;—under this are comprehended health, strength, + temperate seasons, harmony, beauty, and the like. The goddess of beauty + saw the universal wantonness of all things, and gave law and order to be + the salvation of the soul. But no effect can be generated without a cause, + and therefore there must be a fourth class, which is the cause of + generation; for the cause or agent is not the same as the patient or + effect. + </p> + <p> + And now, having obtained our classes, we may determine in which our + conqueror life is to be placed: Clearly in the third or mixed class, in + which the finite gives law to the infinite. And in which is pleasure to + find a place? As clearly in the infinite or indefinite, which alone, as + Protarchus thinks (who seems to confuse the infinite with the + superlative), gives to pleasure the character of the absolute good. Yes, + retorts Socrates, and also to pain the character of absolute evil. And + therefore the infinite cannot be that which imparts to pleasure the nature + of the good. But where shall we place mind? That is a very serious and + awful question, which may be prefaced by another. Is mind or chance the + lord of the universe? All philosophers will say the first, and yet, + perhaps, they may be only magnifying themselves. And for this reason I + should like to consider the matter a little more deeply, even though some + lovers of disorder in the world should ridicule my attempt. + </p> + <p> + Now the elements earth, air, fire, water, exist in us, and they exist in + the cosmos; but they are purer and fairer in the cosmos than they are in + us, and they come to us from thence. And as we have a soul as well as a + body, in like manner the elements of the finite, the infinite, the union + of the two, and the cause, are found to exist in us. And if they, like the + elements, exist in us, and the three first exist in the world, must not + the fourth or cause which is the noblest of them, exist in the world? And + this cause is wisdom or mind, the royal mind of Zeus, who is the king of + all, as there are other gods who have other noble attributes. Observe how + well this agrees with the testimony of men of old, who affirmed mind to be + the ruler of the universe. And remember that mind belongs to the class + which we term the cause, and pleasure to the infinite or indefinite class. + We will examine the place and origin of both. + </p> + <p> + What is the origin of pleasure? Her natural seat is the mixed class, in + which health and harmony were placed. Pain is the violation, and pleasure + the restoration of limit. There is a natural union of finite and infinite, + which in hunger, thirst, heat, cold, is impaired—this is painful, + but the return to nature, in which the elements are restored to their + normal proportions, is pleasant. Here is our first class of pleasures. And + another class of pleasures and pains are hopes and fears; these are in the + mind only. And inasmuch as the pleasures are unalloyed by pains and the + pains by pleasures, the examination of them may show us whether all + pleasure is to be desired, or whether this entire desirableness is not + rather the attribute of another class. But if pleasures and pains consist + in the violation and restoration of limit, may there not be a neutral + state, in which there is neither dissolution nor restoration? That is a + further question, and admitting, as we must, the possibility of such a + state, there seems to be no reason why the life of wisdom should not exist + in this neutral state, which is, moreover, the state of the gods, who + cannot, without indecency, be supposed to feel either joy or sorrow. + </p> + <p> + The second class of pleasures involves memory. There are affections which + are extinguished before they reach the soul, and of these there is no + consciousness, and therefore no memory. And there are affections which the + body and soul feel together, and this feeling is termed consciousness. And + memory is the preservation of consciousness, and reminiscence is the + recovery of consciousness. Now the memory of pleasure, when a man is in + pain, is the memory of the opposite of his actual bodily state, and is + therefore not in the body, but in the mind. And there may be an + intermediate state, in which a person is balanced between pleasure and + pain; in his body there is want which is a cause of pain, but in his mind + a sure hope of replenishment, which is pleasant. (But if the hope be + converted into despair, he has two pains and not a balance of pain and + pleasure.) Another question is raised: May not pleasures, like opinions, + be true and false? In the sense of being real, both must be admitted to be + true: nor can we deny that to both of them qualities may be attributed; + for pleasures as well as opinions may be described as good or bad. And + though we do not all of us allow that there are true and false pleasures, + we all acknowledge that there are some pleasures associated with right + opinion, and others with falsehood and ignorance. Let us endeavour to + analyze the nature of this association. + </p> + <p> + Opinion is based on perception, which may be correct or mistaken. You may + see a figure at a distance, and say first of all, 'This is a man,' and + then say, 'No, this is an image made by the shepherds.' And you may affirm + this in a proposition to your companion, or make the remark mentally to + yourself. Whether the words are actually spoken or not, on such occasions + there is a scribe within who registers them, and a painter who paints the + images of the things which the scribe has written down in the soul,—at + least that is my own notion of the process; and the words and images which + are inscribed by them may be either true or false; and they may represent + either past, present, or future. And, representing the future, they must + also represent the pleasures and pains of anticipation—the visions + of gold and other fancies which are never wanting in the mind of man. Now + these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions, which are sometimes + true, and sometimes false; for the good, who are the friends of the gods, + see true pictures of the future, and the bad false ones. And as there may + be opinion about things which are not, were not, and will not be, which is + opinion still, so there may be pleasure about things which are not, were + not, and will not be, which is pleasure still,—that is to say, false + pleasure; and only when false, can pleasure, like opinion, be vicious. + Against this conclusion Protarchus reclaims. + </p> + <p> + Leaving his denial for the present, Socrates proceeds to show that some + pleasures are false from another point of view. In desire, as we admitted, + the body is divided from the soul, and hence pleasures and pains are often + simultaneous. And we further admitted that both of them belonged to the + infinite class. How, then, can we compare them? Are we not liable, or + rather certain, as in the case of sight, to be deceived by distance and + relation? In this case the pleasures and pains are not false because based + upon false opinion, but are themselves false. And there is another + illusion: pain has often been said by us to arise out of the derangement—pleasure + out of the restoration—of our nature. But in passing from one to the + other, do we not experience neutral states, which although they appear + pleasureable or painful are really neither? For even if we admit, with the + wise man whom Protarchus loves (and only a wise man could have ever + entertained such a notion), that all things are in a perpetual flux, still + these changes are often unconscious, and devoid either of pleasure or + pain. We assume, then, that there are three states—pleasureable, + painful, neutral; we may embellish a little by calling them gold, silver, + and that which is neither. + </p> + <p> + But there are certain natural philosophers who will not admit a third + state. Their instinctive dislike to pleasure leads them to affirm that + pleasure is only the absence of pain. They are noble fellows, and, + although we do not agree with them, we may use them as diviners who will + indicate to us the right track. They will say, that the nature of anything + is best known from the examination of extreme cases, e.g. the nature of + hardness from the examination of the hardest things; and that the nature + of pleasure will be best understood from an examination of the most + intense pleasures. Now these are the pleasures of the body, not of the + mind; the pleasures of disease and not of health, the pleasures of the + intemperate and not of the temperate. I am speaking, not of the frequency + or continuance, but only of the intensity of such pleasures, and this is + given them by contrast with the pain or sickness of body which precedes + them. Their morbid nature is illustrated by the lesser instances of + itching and scratching, respecting which I swear that I cannot tell + whether they are a pleasure or a pain. (1) Some of these arise out of a + transition from one state of the body to another, as from cold to hot; (2) + others are caused by the contrast of an internal pain and an external + pleasure in the body: sometimes the feeling of pain predominates, as in + itching and tingling, when they are relieved by scratching; sometimes the + feeling of pleasure: or the pleasure which they give may be quite + overpowering, and is then accompanied by all sorts of unutterable feelings + which have a death of delights in them. But there are also mixed pleasures + which are in the mind only. For are not love and sorrow as well as anger + 'sweeter than honey,' and also full of pain? Is there not a mixture of + feelings in the spectator of tragedy? and of comedy also? 'I do not + understand that last.' Well, then, with the view of lighting up the + obscurity of these mixed feelings, let me ask whether envy is painful. + 'Yes.' And yet the envious man finds something pleasing in the misfortunes + of others? 'True.' And ignorance is a misfortune? 'Certainly.' And one + form of ignorance is self-conceit—a man may fancy himself richer, + fairer, better, wiser than he is? 'Yes.' And he who thus deceives himself + may be strong or weak? 'He may.' And if he is strong we fear him, and if + he is weak we laugh at him, which is a pleasure, and yet we envy him, + which is a pain? These mixed feelings are the rationale of tragedy and + comedy, and equally the rationale of the greater drama of human life. + (There appears to be some confusion in this passage. There is no + difficulty in seeing that in comedy, as in tragedy, the spectator may view + the performance with mixed feelings of pain as well as of pleasure; nor is + there any difficulty in understanding that envy is a mixed feeling, which + rejoices not without pain at the misfortunes of others, and laughs at + their ignorance of themselves. But Plato seems to think further that he + has explained the feeling of the spectator in comedy sufficiently by a + theory which only applies to comedy in so far as in comedy we laugh at the + conceit or weakness of others. He has certainly given a very partial + explanation of the ridiculous.) Having shown how sorrow, anger, envy are + feelings of a mixed nature, I will reserve the consideration of the + remainder for another occasion. + </p> + <p> + Next follow the unmixed pleasures; which, unlike the philosophers of whom + I was speaking, I believe to be real. These unmixed pleasures are: (1) The + pleasures derived from beauty of form, colour, sound, smell, which are + absolutely pure; and in general those which are unalloyed with pain: (2) + The pleasures derived from the acquisition of knowledge, which in + themselves are pure, but may be attended by an accidental pain of + forgetting; this, however, arises from a subsequent act of reflection, of + which we need take no account. At the same time, we admit that the latter + pleasures are the property of a very few. To these pure and unmixed + pleasures we ascribe measure, whereas all others belong to the class of + the infinite, and are liable to every species of excess. And here several + questions arise for consideration:—What is the meaning of pure and + impure, of moderate and immoderate? We may answer the question by an + illustration: Purity of white paint consists in the clearness or quality + of the white, and this is distinct from the quantity or amount of white + paint; a little pure white is fairer than a great deal which is impure. + But there is another question:—Pleasure is affirmed by ingenious + philosophers to be a generation; they say that there are two natures—one + self-existent, the other dependent; the one noble and majestic, the other + failing in both these qualities. 'I do not understand.' There are lovers + and there are loves. 'Yes, I know, but what is the application?' The + argument is in play, and desires to intimate that there are relatives and + there are absolutes, and that the relative is for the sake of the + absolute; and generation is for the sake of essence. Under relatives I + class all things done with a view to generation; and essence is of the + class of good. But if essence is of the class of good, generation must be + of some other class; and our friends, who affirm that pleasure is a + generation, would laugh at the notion that pleasure is a good; and at that + other notion, that pleasure is produced by generation, which is only the + alternative of destruction. Who would prefer such an alternation to the + equable life of pure thought? Here is one absurdity, and not the only one, + to which the friends of pleasure are reduced. For is there not also an + absurdity in affirming that good is of the soul only; or in declaring that + the best of men, if he be in pain, is bad? + </p> + <p> + And now, from the consideration of pleasure, we pass to that of knowledge. + Let us reflect that there are two kinds of knowledge—the one + creative or productive, and the other educational and philosophical. Of + the creative arts, there is one part purer or more akin to knowledge than + the other. There is an element of guess-work and an element of number and + measure in them. In music, for example, especially in flute-playing, the + conjectural element prevails; while in carpentering there is more + application of rule and measure. Of the creative arts, then, we may make + two classes—the less exact and the more exact. And the exacter part + of all of them is really arithmetic and mensuration. But arithmetic and + mensuration again may be subdivided with reference either to their use in + the concrete, or to their nature in the abstract—as they are + regarded popularly in building and binding, or theoretically by + philosophers. And, borrowing the analogy of pleasure, we may say that the + philosophical use of them is purer than the other. Thus we have two arts + of arithmetic, and two of mensuration. And truest of all in the estimation + of every rational man is dialectic, or the science of being, which will + forget and disown us, if we forget and disown her. + </p> + <p> + 'But, Socrates, I have heard Gorgias say that rhetoric is the greatest and + usefullest of arts; and I should not like to quarrel either with him or + you.' Neither is there any inconsistency, Protarchus, with his statement + in what I am now saying; for I am not maintaining that dialectic is the + greatest or usefullest, but only that she is the truest of arts; my remark + is not quantitative but qualitative, and refers not to the advantage or + repetition of either, but to the degree of truth which they attain—here + Gorgias will not care to compete; this is what we affirm to be possessed + in the highest degree by dialectic. And do not let us appeal to Gorgias or + Philebus or Socrates, but ask, on behalf of the argument, what are the + highest truths which the soul has the power of attaining. And is not this + the science which has a firmer grasp of them than any other? For the arts + generally are only occupied with matters of opinion, and with the + production and action and passion of this sensible world. But the highest + truth is that which is eternal and unchangeable. And reason and wisdom are + concerned with the eternal; and these are the very claimants, if not for + the first, at least for the second place, whom I propose as rivals to + pleasure. + </p> + <p> + And now, having the materials, we may proceed to mix them—first + recapitulating the question at issue. + </p> + <p> + Philebus affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed them to be one + nature; I affirmed that they were two natures, and declared that knowledge + was more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that the two together were + more eligible than either taken singly; and to this we adhere. Reason + intimates, as at first, that we should seek the good not in the unmixed + life, but in the mixed. + </p> + <p> + The cup is ready, waiting to be mingled, and here are two fountains, one + of honey, the other of pure water, out of which to make the fairest + possible mixture. There are pure and impure pleasures—pure and + impure sciences. Let us consider the sections of each which have the most + of purity and truth; to admit them all indiscriminately would be + dangerous. First we will take the pure sciences; but shall we mingle the + impure—the art which uses the false rule and the false measure? That + we must, if we are any of us to find our way home; man cannot live upon + pure mathematics alone. And must I include music, which is admitted to be + guess-work? 'Yes, you must, if human life is to have any humanity.' Well, + then, I will open the door and let them all in; they shall mingle in an + Homeric 'meeting of the waters.' And now we turn to the pleasures; shall I + admit them? 'Admit first of all the pure pleasures; secondly, the + necessary.' And what shall we say about the rest? First, ask the pleasures—they + will be too happy to dwell with wisdom. Secondly, ask the arts and + sciences—they reply that the excesses of intemperance are the ruin + of them; and that they would rather only have the pleasures of health and + temperance, which are the handmaidens of virtue. But still we want truth? + That is now added; and so the argument is complete, and may be compared to + an incorporeal law, which is to hold fair rule over a living body. And now + we are at the vestibule of the good, in which there are three chief + elements—truth, symmetry, and beauty. These will be the criterion of + the comparative claims of pleasure and wisdom. + </p> + <p> + Which has the greater share of truth? Surely wisdom; for pleasure is the + veriest impostor in the world, and the perjuries of lovers have passed + into a proverb. + </p> + <p> + Which of symmetry? Wisdom again; for nothing is more immoderate than + pleasure. + </p> + <p> + Which of beauty? Once more, wisdom; for pleasure is often unseemly, and + the greatest pleasures are put out of sight. + </p> + <p> + Not pleasure, then, ranks first in the scale of good, but measure, and + eternal harmony. + </p> + <p> + Second comes the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect. + </p> + <p> + Third, mind and wisdom. + </p> + <p> + Fourth, sciences and arts and true opinions. + </p> + <p> + Fifth, painless pleasures. + </p> + <p> + Of a sixth class, I have no more to say. Thus, pleasure and mind may both + renounce the claim to the first place. But mind is ten thousand times + nearer to the chief good than pleasure. Pleasure ranks fifth and not + first, even though all the animals in the world assert the contrary. + </p> + <p> + ... + </p> + <p> + From the days of Aristippus and Epicurus to our own times the nature of + pleasure has occupied the attention of philosophers. 'Is pleasure an evil? + a good? the only good?' are the simple forms which the enquiry assumed + among the Socratic schools. But at an early stage of the controversy + another question was asked: 'Do pleasures differ in kind? and are some + bad, some good, and some neither bad nor good?' There are bodily and there + are mental pleasures, which were at first confused but afterwards + distinguished. A distinction was also made between necessary and + unnecessary pleasures; and again between pleasures which had or had not + corresponding pains. The ancient philosophers were fond of asking, in the + language of their age, 'Is pleasure a "becoming" only, and therefore + transient and relative, or do some pleasures partake of truth and Being?' + To these ancient speculations the moderns have added a further question:—'Whose + pleasure? The pleasure of yourself, or of your neighbour,—of the + individual, or of the world?' This little addition has changed the whole + aspect of the discussion: the same word is now supposed to include two + principles as widely different as benevolence and self-love. Some modern + writers have also distinguished between pleasure the test, and pleasure + the motive of actions. For the universal test of right actions (how I know + them) may not always be the highest or best motive of them (why I do + them). + </p> + <p> + Socrates, as we learn from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, first drew + attention to the consequences of actions. Mankind were said by him to act + rightly when they knew what they were doing, or, in the language of the + Gorgias, 'did what they would.' He seems to have been the first who + maintained that the good was the useful (Mem.). In his eagerness for + generalization, seeking, as Aristotle says, for the universal in Ethics + (Metaph.), he took the most obvious intellectual aspect of human action + which occurred to him. He meant to emphasize, not pleasure, but the + calculation of pleasure; neither is he arguing that pleasure is the chief + good, but that we should have a principle of choice. He did not intend to + oppose 'the useful' to some higher conception, such as the Platonic ideal, + but to chance and caprice. The Platonic Socrates pursues the same vein of + thought in the Protagoras, where he argues against the so-called sophist + that pleasure and pain are the final standards and motives of good and + evil, and that the salvation of human life depends upon a right estimate + of pleasures greater or less when seen near and at a distance. The + testimony of Xenophon is thus confirmed by that of Plato, and we are + therefore justified in calling Socrates the first utilitarian; as indeed + there is no side or aspect of philosophy which may not with reason be + ascribed to him—he is Cynic and Cyrenaic, Platonist and Aristotelian + in one. But in the Phaedo the Socratic has already passed into a more + ideal point of view; and he, or rather Plato speaking in his person, + expressly repudiates the notion that the exchange of a less pleasure for a + greater can be an exchange of virtue. Such virtue is the virtue of + ordinary men who live in the world of appearance; they are temperate only + that they may enjoy the pleasures of intemperance, and courageous from + fear of danger. Whereas the philosopher is seeking after wisdom and not + after pleasure, whether near or distant: he is the mystic, the initiated, + who has learnt to despise the body and is yearning all his life long for a + truth which will hereafter be revealed to him. In the Republic the + pleasures of knowledge are affirmed to be superior to other pleasures, + because the philosopher so estimates them; and he alone has had experience + of both kinds. (Compare a similar argument urged by one of the latest + defenders of Utilitarianism, Mill's Utilitarianism). In the Philebus, + Plato, although he regards the enemies of pleasure with complacency, still + further modifies the transcendentalism of the Phaedo. For he is compelled + to confess, rather reluctantly, perhaps, that some pleasures, i.e. those + which have no antecedent pains, claim a place in the scale of goods. + </p> + <p> + There have been many reasons why not only Plato but mankind in general + have been unwilling to acknowledge that 'pleasure is the chief good.' + Either they have heard a voice calling to them out of another world; or + the life and example of some great teacher has cast their thoughts of + right and wrong in another mould; or the word 'pleasure' has been + associated in their mind with merely animal enjoyment. They could not + believe that what they were always striving to overcome, and the power or + principle in them which overcame, were of the same nature. The pleasure of + doing good to others and of bodily self-indulgence, the pleasures of + intellect and the pleasures of sense, are so different:—Why then + should they be called by a common name? Or, if the equivocal or + metaphorical use of the word is justified by custom (like the use of other + words which at first referred only to the body, and then by a figure have + been transferred to the mind), still, why should we make an ambiguous word + the corner-stone of moral philosophy? To the higher thinker the + Utilitarian or hedonist mode of speaking has been at variance with + religion and with any higher conception both of politics and of morals. It + has not satisfied their imagination; it has offended their taste. To + elevate pleasure, 'the most fleeting of all things,' into a general idea + seems to such men a contradiction. They do not desire to bring down their + theory to the level of their practice. The simplicity of the 'greatest + happiness' principle has been acceptable to philosophers, but the better + part of the world has been slow to receive it. + </p> + <p> + Before proceeding, we may make a few admissions which will narrow the + field of dispute; and we may as well leave behind a few prejudices, which + intelligent opponents of Utilitarianism have by this time 'agreed to + discard'. We admit that Utility is coextensive with right, and that no + action can be right which does not tend to the happiness of mankind; we + acknowledge that a large class of actions are made right or wrong by their + consequences only; we say further that mankind are not too mindful, but + that they are far too regardless of consequences, and that they need to + have the doctrine of utility habitually inculcated on them. We recognize + the value of a principle which can supply a connecting link between Ethics + and Politics, and under which all human actions are or may be included. + The desire to promote happiness is no mean preference of expediency to + right, but one of the highest and noblest motives by which human nature + can be animated. Neither in referring actions to the test of utility have + we to make a laborious calculation, any more than in trying them by other + standards of morals. For long ago they have been classified sufficiently + for all practical purposes by the thinker, by the legislator, by the + opinion of the world. Whatever may be the hypothesis on which they are + explained, or which in doubtful cases may be applied to the regulation of + them, we are very rarely, if ever, called upon at the moment of performing + them to determine their effect upon the happiness of mankind. + </p> + <p> + There is a theory which has been contrasted with Utility by Paley and + others—the theory of a moral sense: Are our ideas of right and wrong + innate or derived from experience? This, perhaps, is another of those + speculations which intelligent men might 'agree to discard.' For it has + been worn threadbare; and either alternative is equally consistent with a + transcendental or with an eudaemonistic system of ethics, with a greatest + happiness principle or with Kant's law of duty. Yet to avoid + misconception, what appears to be the truth about the origin of our moral + ideas may be shortly summed up as follows:—To each of us + individually our moral ideas come first of all in childhood through the + medium of education, from parents and teachers, assisted by the + unconscious influence of language; they are impressed upon a mind which at + first is like a waxen tablet, adapted to receive them; but they soon + become fixed or set, and in after life are strengthened, or perhaps + weakened by the force of public opinion. They may be corrected and + enlarged by experience, they may be reasoned about, they may be brought + home to us by the circumstances of our lives, they may be intensified by + imagination, by reflection, by a course of action likely to confirm them. + Under the influence of religious feeling or by an effort of thought, any + one beginning with the ordinary rules of morality may create out of them + for himself ideals of holiness and virtue. They slumber in the minds of + most men, yet in all of us there remains some tincture of affection, some + desire of good, some sense of truth, some fear of the law. Of some such + state or process each individual is conscious in himself, and if he + compares his own experience with that of others he will find the witness + of their consciences to coincide with that of his own. All of us have + entered into an inheritance which we have the power of appropriating and + making use of. No great effort of mind is required on our part; we learn + morals, as we learn to talk, instinctively, from conversing with others, + in an enlightened age, in a civilized country, in a good home. A + well-educated child of ten years old already knows the essentials of + morals: 'Thou shalt not steal,' 'thou shalt speak the truth,' 'thou shalt + love thy parents,' 'thou shalt fear God.' What more does he want? + </p> + <p> + But whence comes this common inheritance or stock of moral ideas? Their + beginning, like all other beginnings of human things, is obscure, and is + the least important part of them. Imagine, if you will, that Society + originated in the herding of brutes, in their parental instincts, in their + rude attempts at self-preservation:—Man is not man in that he + resembles, but in that he differs from them. We must pass into another + cycle of existence, before we can discover in him by any evidence + accessible to us even the germs of our moral ideas. In the history of the + world, which viewed from within is the history of the human mind, they + have been slowly created by religion, by poetry, by law, having their + foundation in the natural affections and in the necessity of some degree + of truth and justice in a social state; they have been deepened and + enlarged by the efforts of great thinkers who have idealized and connected + them—by the lives of saints and prophets who have taught and + exemplified them. The schools of ancient philosophy which seem so far from + us—Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and a few + modern teachers, such as Kant and Bentham, have each of them supplied + 'moments' of thought to the world. The life of Christ has embodied a + divine love, wisdom, patience, reasonableness. For his image, however + imperfectly handed down to us, the modern world has received a standard + more perfect in idea than the societies of ancient times, but also further + removed from practice. For there is certainly a greater interval between + the theory and practice of Christians than between the theory and practice + of the Greeks and Romans; the ideal is more above us, and the aspiration + after good has often lent a strange power to evil. And sometimes, as at + the Reformation, or French Revolution, when the upper classes of a + so-called Christian country have become corrupted by priestcraft, by + casuistry, by licentiousness, by despotism, the lower have risen up and + re-asserted the natural sense of religion and right. + </p> + <p> + We may further remark that our moral ideas, as the world grows older, + perhaps as we grow older ourselves, unless they have been undermined in us + by false philosophy or the practice of mental analysis, or infected by the + corruption of society or by some moral disorder in the individual, are + constantly assuming a more natural and necessary character. The habit of + the mind, the opinion of the world, familiarizes them to us; and they take + more and more the form of immediate intuition. The moral sense comes last + and not first in the order of their development, and is the instinct which + we have inherited or acquired, not the nobler effort of reflection which + created them and which keeps them alive. We do not stop to reason about + common honesty. Whenever we are not blinded by self-deceit, as for example + in judging the actions of others, we have no hesitation in determining + what is right and wrong. The principles of morality, when not at variance + with some desire or worldly interest of our own, or with the opinion of + the public, are hardly perceived by us; but in the conflict of reason and + passion they assert their authority and are not overcome without remorse. + </p> + <p> + Such is a brief outline of the history of our moral ideas. We have to + distinguish, first of all, the manner in which they have grown up in the + world from the manner in which they have been communicated to each of us. + We may represent them to ourselves as flowing out of the boundless ocean + of language and thought in little rills, which convey them to the heart + and brain of each individual. But neither must we confound the theories or + aspects of morality with the origin of our moral ideas. These are not the + roots or 'origines' of morals, but the latest efforts of reflection, the + lights in which the whole moral world has been regarded by different + thinkers and successive generations of men. If we ask: Which of these many + theories is the true one? we may answer: All of them—moral sense, + innate ideas, a priori, a posteriori notions, the philosophy of + experience, the philosophy of intuition—all of them have added + something to our conception of Ethics; no one of them is the whole truth. + But to decide how far our ideas of morality are derived from one source or + another; to determine what history, what philosophy has contributed to + them; to distinguish the original, simple elements from the manifold and + complex applications of them, would be a long enquiry too far removed from + the question which we are now pursuing. + </p> + <p> + Bearing in mind the distinction which we have been seeking to establish + between our earliest and our most mature ideas of morality, we may now + proceed to state the theory of Utility, not exactly in the words, but in + the spirit of one of its ablest and most moderate supporters (Mill's + Utilitarianism):—'That which alone makes actions either right or + desirable is their utility, or tendency to promote the happiness of + mankind, or, in other words, to increase the sum of pleasure in the world. + But all pleasures are not the same: they differ in quality as well as in + quantity, and the pleasure which is superior in quality is incommensurable + with the inferior. Neither is the pleasure or happiness, which we seek, + our own pleasure, but that of others,—of our family, of our country, + of mankind. The desire of this, and even the sacrifice of our own interest + to that of other men, may become a passion to a rightly educated nature. + The Utilitarian finds a place in his system for this virtue and for every + other.' + </p> + <p> + Good or happiness or pleasure is thus regarded as the true and only end of + human life. To this all our desires will be found to tend, and in + accordance with this all the virtues, including justice, may be explained. + Admitting that men rest for a time in inferior ends, and do not cast their + eyes beyond them, these ends are really dependent on the greater end of + happiness, and would not be pursued, unless in general they had been found + to lead to it. The existence of such an end is proved, as in Aristotle's + time, so in our own, by the universal fact that men desire it. The + obligation to promote it is based upon the social nature of man; this + sense of duty is shared by all of us in some degree, and is capable of + being greatly fostered and strengthened. So far from being inconsistent + with religion, the greatest happiness principle is in the highest degree + agreeable to it. For what can be more reasonable than that God should will + the happiness of all his creatures? and in working out their happiness we + may be said to be 'working together with him.' Nor is it inconceivable + that a new enthusiasm of the future, far stronger than any old religion, + may be based upon such a conception. + </p> + <p> + But then for the familiar phrase of the 'greatest happiness principle,' it + seems as if we ought now to read 'the noblest happiness principle,' 'the + happiness of others principle'—the principle not of the greatest, + but of the highest pleasure, pursued with no more regard to our own + immediate interest than is required by the law of self-preservation. + Transfer the thought of happiness to another life, dropping the external + circumstances which form so large a part of our idea of happiness in this, + and the meaning of the word becomes indistinguishable from holiness, + harmony, wisdom, love. By the slight addition 'of others,' all the + associations of the word are altered; we seem to have passed over from one + theory of morals to the opposite. For allowing that the happiness of + others is reflected on ourselves, and also that every man must live before + he can do good to others, still the last limitation is a very trifling + exception, and the happiness of another is very far from compensating for + the loss of our own. According to Mr. Mill, he would best carry out the + principle of utility who sacrificed his own pleasure most to that of his + fellow-men. But if so, Hobbes and Butler, Shaftesbury and Hume, are not so + far apart as they and their followers imagine. The thought of self and the + thought of others are alike superseded in the more general notion of the + happiness of mankind at large. But in this composite good, until society + becomes perfected, the friend of man himself has generally the least + share, and may be a great sufferer. + </p> + <p> + And now what objection have we to urge against a system of moral + philosophy so beneficent, so enlightened, so ideal, and at the same time + so practical,—so Christian, as we may say without exaggeration,—and + which has the further advantage of resting morality on a principle + intelligible to all capacities? Have we not found that which Socrates and + Plato 'grew old in seeking'? Are we not desirous of happiness, at any rate + for ourselves and our friends, if not for all mankind? If, as is natural, + we begin by thinking of ourselves first, we are easily led on to think of + others; for we cannot help acknowledging that what is right for us is the + right and inheritance of others. We feel the advantage of an abstract + principle wide enough and strong enough to override all the particularisms + of mankind; which acknowledges a universal good, truth, right; which is + capable of inspiring men like a passion, and is the symbol of a cause for + which they are ready to contend to their life's end. + </p> + <p> + And if we test this principle by the lives of its professors, it would + certainly appear inferior to none as a rule of action. From the days of + Eudoxus (Arist. Ethics) and Epicurus to our own, the votaries of pleasure + have gained belief for their principles by their practice. Two of the + noblest and most disinterested men who have lived in this century, Bentham + and J. S. Mill, whose lives were a long devotion to the service of their + fellows, have been among the most enthusiastic supporters of utility; + while among their contemporaries, some who were of a more mystical turn of + mind, have ended rather in aspiration than in action, and have been found + unequal to the duties of life. Looking back on them now that they are + removed from the scene, we feel that mankind has been the better for them. + The world was against them while they lived; but this is rather a reason + for admiring than for depreciating them. Nor can any one doubt that the + influence of their philosophy on politics—especially on foreign + politics, on law, on social life, has been upon the whole beneficial. + Nevertheless, they will never have justice done to them, for they do not + agree either with the better feeling of the multitude or with the idealism + of more refined thinkers. Without Bentham, a great word in the history of + philosophy would have remained unspoken. Yet to this day it is rare to + hear his name received with any mark of respect such as would be freely + granted to the ambiguous memory of some father of the Church. The odium + which attached to him when alive has not been removed by his death. For he + shocked his contemporaries by egotism and want of taste; and this + generation which has reaped the benefit of his labours has inherited the + feeling of the last. He was before his own age, and is hardly remembered + in this. + </p> + <p> + While acknowledging the benefits which the greatest happiness principle + has conferred upon mankind, the time appears to have arrived, not for + denying its claims, but for criticizing them and comparing them with other + principles which equally claim to lie at the foundation of ethics. Any one + who adds a general principle to knowledge has been a benefactor to the + world. But there is a danger that, in his first enthusiasm, he may not + recognize the proportions or limitations to which his truth is subjected; + he does not see how far he has given birth to a truism, or how that which + is a truth to him is a truism to the rest of the world; or may degenerate + in the next generation. He believes that to be the whole which is only a + part,—to be the necessary foundation which is really only a valuable + aspect of the truth. The systems of all philosophers require the criticism + of 'the morrow,' when the heat of imagination which forged them has + cooled, and they are seen in the temperate light of day. All of them have + contributed to enrich the mind of the civilized world; none of them occupy + that supreme or exclusive place which their authors would have assigned to + them. + </p> + <p> + We may preface the criticism with a few preliminary remarks:— + </p> + <p> + Mr. Mill, Mr. Austin, and others, in their eagerness to maintain the + doctrine of utility, are fond of repeating that we are in a lamentable + state of uncertainty about morals. While other branches of knowledge have + made extraordinary progress, in moral philosophy we are supposed by them + to be no better than children, and with few exceptions—that is to + say, Bentham and his followers—to be no further advanced than men + were in the age of Socrates and Plato, who, in their turn, are deemed to + be as backward in ethics as they necessarily were in physics. But this, + though often asserted, is recanted almost in a breath by the same writers + who speak thus depreciatingly of our modern ethical philosophy. For they + are the first to acknowledge that we have not now to begin classifying + actions under the head of utility; they would not deny that about the + general conceptions of morals there is a practical agreement. There is no + more doubt that falsehood is wrong than that a stone falls to the ground, + although the first does not admit of the same ocular proof as the second. + There is no greater uncertainty about the duty of obedience to parents and + to the law of the land than about the properties of triangles. Unless we + are looking for a new moral world which has no marrying and giving in + marriage, there is no greater disagreement in theory about the right + relations of the sexes than about the composition of water. These and a + few other simple principles, as they have endless applications in + practice, so also may be developed in theory into counsels of perfection. + </p> + <p> + To what then is to be attributed this opinion which has been often + entertained about the uncertainty of morals? Chiefly to this,—that + philosophers have not always distinguished the theoretical and the + casuistical uncertainty of morals from the practical certainty. There is + an uncertainty about details,—whether, for example, under given + circumstances such and such a moral principle is to be enforced, or + whether in some cases there may not be a conflict of duties: these are the + exceptions to the ordinary rules of morality, important, indeed, but not + extending to the one thousandth or one ten-thousandth part of human + actions. This is the domain of casuistry. Secondly, the aspects under + which the most general principles of morals may be presented to us are + many and various. The mind of man has been more than usually active in + thinking about man. The conceptions of harmony, happiness, right, freedom, + benevolence, self-love, have all of them seemed to some philosopher or + other the truest and most comprehensive expression of morality. There is + no difference, or at any rate no great difference, of opinion about the + right and wrong of actions, but only about the general notion which + furnishes the best explanation or gives the most comprehensive view of + them. This, in the language of Kant, is the sphere of the metaphysic of + ethics. But these two uncertainties at either end, en tois malista + katholou and en tois kath ekasta, leave space enough for an intermediate + principle which is practically certain. + </p> + <p> + The rule of human life is not dependent on the theories of philosophers: + we know what our duties are for the most part before we speculate about + them. And the use of speculation is not to teach us what we already know, + but to inspire in our minds an interest about morals in general, to + strengthen our conception of the virtues by showing that they confirm one + another, to prove to us, as Socrates would have said, that they are not + many, but one. There is the same kind of pleasure and use in reducing + morals, as in reducing physics, to a few very simple truths. And not + unfrequently the more general principle may correct prejudices and + misconceptions, and enable us to regard our fellow-men in a larger and + more generous spirit. + </p> + <p> + The two qualities which seem to be most required in first principles of + ethics are, (1) that they should afford a real explanation of the facts, + (2) that they should inspire the mind,—should harmonize, strengthen, + settle us. We can hardly estimate the influence which a simple principle + such as 'Act so as to promote the happiness of mankind,' or 'Act so that + the rule on which thou actest may be adopted as a law by all rational + beings,' may exercise on the mind of an individual. They will often seem + to open a new world to him, like the religious conceptions of faith or the + spirit of God. The difficulties of ethics disappear when we do not suffer + ourselves to be distracted between different points of view. But to + maintain their hold on us, the general principles must also be + psychologically true—they must agree with our experience, they must + accord with the habits of our minds. + </p> + <p> + When we are told that actions are right or wrong only in so far as they + tend towards happiness, we naturally ask what is meant by 'happiness.' For + the term in the common use of language is only to a certain extent + commensurate with moral good and evil. We should hardly say that a good + man could be utterly miserable (Arist. Ethics), or place a bad man in the + first rank of happiness. But yet, from various circumstances, the measure + of a man's happiness may be out of all proportion to his desert. And if we + insist on calling the good man alone happy, we shall be using the term in + some new and transcendental sense, as synonymous with well-being. We have + already seen that happiness includes the happiness of others as well as + our own; we must now comprehend unconscious as well as conscious happiness + under the same word. There is no harm in this extension of the meaning, + but a word which admits of such an extension can hardly be made the basis + of a philosophical system. The exactness which is required in philosophy + will not allow us to comprehend under the same term two ideas so different + as the subjective feeling of pleasure or happiness and the objective + reality of a state which receives our moral approval. + </p> + <p> + Like Protarchus in the Philebus, we can give no answer to the question, + 'What is that common quality which in all states of human life we call + happiness? which includes the lower and the higher kind of happiness, and + is the aim of the noblest, as well as of the meanest of mankind?' If we + say 'Not pleasure, not virtue, not wisdom, nor yet any quality which we + can abstract from these'—what then? After seeming to hover for a + time on the verge of a great truth, we have gained only a truism. + </p> + <p> + Let us ask the question in another form. What is that which constitutes + happiness, over and above the several ingredients of health, wealth, + pleasure, virtue, knowledge, which are included under it? Perhaps we + answer, 'The subjective feeling of them.' But this is very far from being + coextensive with right. Or we may reply that happiness is the whole of + which the above-mentioned are the parts. Still the question recurs, 'In + what does the whole differ from all the parts?' And if we are unable to + distinguish them, happiness will be the mere aggregate of the goods of + life. + </p> + <p> + Again, while admitting that in all right action there is an element of + happiness, we cannot help seeing that the utilitarian theory supplies a + much easier explanation of some virtues than of others. Of many patriotic + or benevolent actions we can give a straightforward account by their + tendency to promote happiness. For the explanation of justice, on the + other hand, we have to go a long way round. No man is indignant with a + thief because he has not promoted the greatest happiness of the greatest + number, but because he has done him a wrong. There is an immeasurable + interval between a crime against property or life, and the omission of an + act of charity or benevolence. Yet of this interval the utilitarian theory + takes no cognizance. The greatest happiness principle strengthens our + sense of positive duties towards others, but weakens our recognition of + their rights. To promote in every way possible the happiness of others may + be a counsel of perfection, but hardly seems to offer any ground for a + theory of obligation. For admitting that our ideas of obligation are + partly derived from religion and custom, yet they seem also to contain + other essential elements which cannot be explained by the tendency of + actions to promote happiness. Whence comes the necessity of them? Why are + some actions rather than others which equally tend to the happiness of + mankind imposed upon us with the authority of law? 'You ought' and 'you + had better' are fundamental distinctions in human thought; and having such + distinctions, why should we seek to efface and unsettle them? + </p> + <p> + Bentham and Mr. Mill are earnest in maintaining that happiness includes + the happiness of others as well as of ourselves. But what two notions can + be more opposed in many cases than these? Granting that in a perfect state + of the world my own happiness and that of all other men would coincide, in + the imperfect state they often diverge, and I cannot truly bridge over the + difficulty by saying that men will always find pleasure in sacrificing + themselves or in suffering for others. Upon the greatest happiness + principle it is admitted that I am to have a share, and in consistency I + should pursue my own happiness as impartially as that of my neighbour. But + who can decide what proportion should be mine and what his, except on the + principle that I am most likely to be deceived in my own favour, and had + therefore better give the larger share, if not all, to him? + </p> + <p> + Further, it is admitted that utility and right coincide, not in particular + instances, but in classes of actions. But is it not distracting to the + conscience of a man to be told that in the particular case they are + opposed? Happiness is said to be the ground of moral obligation, yet he + must not do what clearly conduces to his own happiness if it is at + variance with the good of the whole. Nay, further, he will be taught that + when utility and right are in apparent conflict any amount of utility does + not alter by a hair's-breadth the morality of actions, which cannot be + allowed to deviate from established law or usage; and that the + non-detection of an immoral act, say of telling a lie, which may often + make the greatest difference in the consequences, not only to himself, but + to all the world, makes none whatever in the act itself. + </p> + <p> + Again, if we are concerned not with particular actions but with classes of + actions, is the tendency of actions to happiness a principle upon which we + can classify them? There is a universal law which imperatively declares + certain acts to be right or wrong:—can there be any universality in + the law which measures actions by their tendencies towards happiness? For + an act which is the cause of happiness to one person may be the cause of + unhappiness to another; or an act which if performed by one person may + increase the happiness of mankind may have the opposite effect if + performed by another. Right can never be wrong, or wrong right, that there + are no actions which tend to the happiness of mankind which may not under + other circumstances tend to their unhappiness. Unless we say not only that + all right actions tend to happiness, but that they tend to happiness in + the same degree in which they are right (and in that case the word 'right' + is plainer), we weaken the absoluteness of our moral standard; we reduce + differences in kind to differences in degree; we obliterate the stamp + which the authority of ages has set upon vice and crime. + </p> + <p> + Once more: turning from theory to practice we feel the importance of + retaining the received distinctions of morality. Words such as truth, + justice, honesty, virtue, love, have a simple meaning; they have become + sacred to us,—'the word of God' written on the human heart: to no + other words can the same associations be attached. We cannot explain them + adequately on principles of utility; in attempting to do so we rob them of + their true character. We give them a meaning often paradoxical and + distorted, and generally weaker than their signification in common + language. And as words influence men's thoughts, we fear that the hold of + morality may also be weakened, and the sense of duty impaired, if virtue + and vice are explained only as the qualities which do or do not contribute + to the pleasure of the world. In that very expression we seem to detect a + false ring, for pleasure is individual not universal; we speak of eternal + and immutable justice, but not of eternal and immutable pleasure; nor by + any refinement can we avoid some taint of bodily sense adhering to the + meaning of the word. + </p> + <p> + Again: the higher the view which men take of life, the more they lose + sight of their own pleasure or interest. True religion is not working for + a reward only, but is ready to work equally without a reward. It is not + 'doing the will of God for the sake of eternal happiness,' but doing the + will of God because it is best, whether rewarded or unrewarded. And this + applies to others as well as to ourselves. For he who sacrifices himself + for the good of others, does not sacrifice himself that they may be saved + from the persecution which he endures for their sakes, but rather that + they in their turn may be able to undergo similar sufferings, and like him + stand fast in the truth. To promote their happiness is not his first + object, but to elevate their moral nature. Both in his own case and that + of others there may be happiness in the distance, but if there were no + happiness he would equally act as he does. We are speaking of the highest + and noblest natures; and a passing thought naturally arises in our minds, + 'Whether that can be the first principle of morals which is hardly + regarded in their own case by the greatest benefactors of mankind?' + </p> + <p> + The admissions that pleasures differ in kind, and that actions are already + classified; the acknowledgment that happiness includes the happiness of + others, as well as of ourselves; the confusion (not made by Aristotle) + between conscious and unconscious happiness, or between happiness the + energy and happiness the result of the energy, introduce uncertainty and + inconsistency into the whole enquiry. We reason readily and cheerfully + from a greatest happiness principle. But we find that utilitarians do not + agree among themselves about the meaning of the word. Still less can they + impart to others a common conception or conviction of the nature of + happiness. The meaning of the word is always insensibly slipping away from + us, into pleasure, out of pleasure, now appearing as the motive, now as + the test of actions, and sometimes varying in successive sentences. And as + in a mathematical demonstration an error in the original number disturbs + the whole calculation which follows, this fundamental uncertainty about + the word vitiates all the applications of it. Must we not admit that a + notion so uncertain in meaning, so void of content, so at variance with + common language and opinion, does not comply adequately with either of our + two requirements? It can neither strike the imaginative faculty, nor give + an explanation of phenomena which is in accordance with our individual + experience. It is indefinite; it supplies only a partial account of human + actions: it is one among many theories of philosophers. It may be compared + with other notions, such as the chief good of Plato, which may be best + expressed to us under the form of a harmony, or with Kant's obedience to + law, which may be summed up under the word 'duty,' or with the Stoical + 'Follow nature,' and seems to have no advantage over them. All of these + present a certain aspect of moral truth. None of them are, or indeed + profess to be, the only principle of morals. + </p> + <p> + And this brings us to speak of the most serious objection to the + utilitarian system—its exclusiveness. There is no place for Kant or + Hegel, for Plato and Aristotle alongside of it. They do not reject the + greatest happiness principle, but it rejects them. Now the phenomena of + moral action differ, and some are best explained upon one principle and + some upon another: the virtue of justice seems to be naturally connected + with one theory of morals, the virtues of temperance and benevolence with + another. The characters of men also differ; and some are more attracted by + one aspect of the truth, some by another. The firm stoical nature will + conceive virtue under the conception of law, the philanthropist under that + of doing good, the quietist under that of resignation, the enthusiast + under that of faith or love. The upright man of the world will desire + above all things that morality should be plain and fixed, and should use + language in its ordinary sense. Persons of an imaginative temperament will + generally be dissatisfied with the words 'utility' or 'pleasure': their + principle of right is of a far higher character—what or where to be + found they cannot always distinctly tell;—deduced from the laws of + human nature, says one; resting on the will of God, says another; based + upon some transcendental idea which animates more worlds than one, says a + third: + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + on nomoi prokeintai upsipodes, ouranian + di aithera teknothentes. +</pre> + <p> + To satisfy an imaginative nature in any degree, the doctrine of utility + must be so transfigured that it becomes altogether different and loses all + simplicity. + </p> + <p> + But why, since there are different characters among men, should we not + allow them to envisage morality accordingly, and be thankful to the great + men who have provided for all of us modes and instruments of thought? + Would the world have been better if there had been no Stoics or Kantists, + no Platonists or Cartesians? No more than if the other pole of moral + philosophy had been excluded. All men have principles which are above + their practice; they admit premises which, if carried to their + conclusions, are a sufficient basis of morals. In asserting liberty of + speculation we are not encouraging individuals to make right or wrong for + themselves, but only conceding that they may choose the form under which + they prefer to contemplate them. Nor do we say that one of these aspects + is as true and good as another; but that they all of them, if they are not + mere sophisms and illusions, define and bring into relief some part of the + truth which would have been obscure without their light. Why should we + endeavour to bind all men within the limits of a single metaphysical + conception? The necessary imperfection of language seems to require that + we should view the same truth under more than one aspect. + </p> + <p> + We are living in the second age of utilitarianism, when the charm of + novelty and the fervour of the first disciples has passed away. The + doctrine is no longer stated in the forcible paradoxical manner of + Bentham, but has to be adapted to meet objections; its corners are rubbed + off, and the meaning of its most characteristic expressions is softened. + The array of the enemy melts away when we approach him. The greatest + happiness of the greatest number was a great original idea when enunciated + by Bentham, which leavened a generation and has left its mark on thought + and civilization in all succeeding times. His grasp of it had the + intensity of genius. In the spirit of an ancient philosopher he would have + denied that pleasures differed in kind, or that by happiness he meant + anything but pleasure. He would perhaps have revolted us by his + thoroughness. The 'guardianship of his doctrine' has passed into other + hands; and now we seem to see its weak points, its ambiguities, its want + of exactness while assuming the highest exactness, its one-sidedness, its + paradoxical explanation of several of the virtues. No philosophy has ever + stood this criticism of the next generation, though the founders of all of + them have imagined that they were built upon a rock. And the utilitarian + system, like others, has yielded to the inevitable analysis. Even in the + opinion of 'her admirers she has been terribly damaged' (Phil.), and is no + longer the only moral philosophy, but one among many which have + contributed in various degrees to the intellectual progress of mankind. + </p> + <p> + But because the utilitarian philosophy can no longer claim 'the prize,' we + must not refuse to acknowledge the great benefits conferred by it on the + world. All philosophies are refuted in their turn, says the sceptic, and + he looks forward to all future systems sharing the fate of the past. All + philosophies remain, says the thinker; they have done a great work in + their own day, and they supply posterity with aspects of the truth and + with instruments of thought. Though they may be shorn of their glory, they + retain their place in the organism of knowledge. + </p> + <p> + And still there remain many rules of morals which are better explained and + more forcibly inculcated on the principle of utility than on any other. + The question Will such and such an action promote the happiness of myself, + my family, my country, the world? may check the rising feeling of pride or + honour which would cause a quarrel, an estrangement, a war. 'How can I + contribute to the greatest happiness of others?' is another form of the + question which will be more attractive to the minds of many than a + deduction of the duty of benevolence from a priori principles. In politics + especially hardly any other argument can be allowed to have weight except + the happiness of a people. All parties alike profess to aim at this, which + though often used only as the disguise of self-interest has a great and + real influence on the minds of statesmen. In religion, again, nothing can + more tend to mitigate superstition than the belief that the good of man is + also the will of God. This is an easy test to which the prejudices and + superstitions of men may be brought:—whatever does not tend to the + good of men is not of God. And the ideal of the greatest happiness of + mankind, especially if believed to be the will of God, when compared with + the actual fact, will be one of the strongest motives to do good to + others. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, when the temptation is to speak falsely, to be + dishonest or unjust, or in any way to interfere with the rights of others, + the argument that these actions regarded as a class will not conduce to + the happiness of mankind, though true enough, seems to have less force + than the feeling which is already implanted in the mind by conscience and + authority. To resolve this feeling into the greatest happiness principle + takes away from its sacred and authoritative character. The martyr will + not go to the stake in order that he may promote the happiness of mankind, + but for the sake of the truth: neither will the soldier advance to the + cannon's mouth merely because he believes military discipline to be for + the good of mankind. It is better for him to know that he will be shot, + that he will be disgraced, if he runs away—he has no need to look + beyond military honour, patriotism, 'England expects every man to do his + duty.' These are stronger motives than the greatest happiness of the + greatest number, which is the thesis of a philosopher, not the watchword + of an army. For in human actions men do not always require broad + principles; duties often come home to us more when they are limited and + defined, and sanctioned by custom and public opinion. + </p> + <p> + Lastly, if we turn to the history of ethics, we shall find that our moral + ideas have originated not in utility but in religion, in law, in + conceptions of nature, of an ideal good, and the like. And many may be + inclined to think that this conclusively disproves the claim of utility to + be the basis of morals. But the utilitarian will fairly reply (see above) + that we must distinguish the origin of ethics from the principles of them—the + historical germ from the later growth of reflection. And he may also truly + add that for two thousand years and more, utility, if not the originating, + has been the great corrective principle in law, in politics, in religion, + leading men to ask how evil may be diminished and good increased—by + what course of policy the public interest may be promoted, and to + understand that God wills the happiness, not of some of his creatures and + in this world only, but of all of them and in every stage of their + existence. + </p> + <p> + 'What is the place of happiness or utility in a system of moral + philosophy?' is analogous to the question asked in the Philebus, 'What + rank does pleasure hold in the scale of goods?' Admitting the greatest + happiness principle to be true and valuable, and the necessary foundation + of that part of morals which relates to the consequences of actions, we + still have to consider whether this or some other general notion is the + highest principle of human life. We may try them in this comparison by + three tests—definiteness, comprehensiveness, and motive power. + </p> + <p> + There are three subjective principles of morals,—sympathy, + benevolence, self-love. But sympathy seems to rest morality on feelings + which differ widely even in good men; benevolence and self-love torture + one half of our virtuous actions into the likeness of the other. The + greatest happiness principle, which includes both, has the advantage over + all these in comprehensiveness, but the advantage is purchased at the + expense of definiteness. + </p> + <p> + Again, there are the legal and political principles of morals—freedom, + equality, rights of persons; 'Every man to count for one and no man for + more than one,' 'Every man equal in the eye of the law and of the + legislator.' There is also the other sort of political morality, which if + not beginning with 'Might is right,' at any rate seeks to deduce our ideas + of justice from the necessities of the state and of society. According to + this view the greatest good of men is obedience to law: the best human + government is a rational despotism, and the best idea which we can form of + a divine being is that of a despot acting not wholly without regard to law + and order. To such a view the present mixed state of the world, not wholly + evil or wholly good, is supposed to be a witness. More we might desire to + have, but are not permitted. Though a human tyrant would be intolerable, a + divine tyrant is a very tolerable governor of the universe. This is the + doctrine of Thrasymachus adapted to the public opinion of modern times. + </p> + <p> + There is yet a third view which combines the two:—freedom is + obedience to the law, and the greatest order is also the greatest freedom; + 'Act so that thy action may be the law of every intelligent being.' This + view is noble and elevating; but it seems to err, like other + transcendental principles of ethics, in being too abstract. For there is + the same difficulty in connecting the idea of duty with particular duties + as in bridging the gulf between phainomena and onta; and when, as in the + system of Kant, this universal idea or law is held to be independent of + space and time, such a mataion eidos becomes almost unmeaning. + </p> + <p> + Once more there are the religious principles of morals:—the will of + God revealed in Scripture and in nature. No philosophy has supplied a + sanction equal in authority to this, or a motive equal in strength to the + belief in another life. Yet about these too we must ask What will of God? + how revealed to us, and by what proofs? Religion, like happiness, is a + word which has great influence apart from any consideration of its + content: it may be for great good or for great evil. But true religion is + the synthesis of religion and morality, beginning with divine perfection + in which all human perfection is embodied. It moves among ideas of + holiness, justice, love, wisdom, truth; these are to God, in whom they are + personified, what the Platonic ideas are to the idea of good. It is the + consciousness of the will of God that all men should be as he is. It lives + in this world and is known to us only through the phenomena of this world, + but it extends to worlds beyond. Ordinary religion which is alloyed with + motives of this world may easily be in excess, may be fanatical, may be + interested, may be the mask of ambition, may be perverted in a thousand + ways. But of that religion which combines the will of God with our highest + ideas of truth and right there can never be too much. This impossibility + of excess is the note of divine moderation. + </p> + <p> + So then, having briefly passed in review the various principles of moral + philosophy, we may now arrange our goods in order, though, like the reader + of the Philebus, we have a difficulty in distinguishing the different + aspects of them from one another, or defining the point at which the human + passes into the divine. + </p> + <p> + First, the eternal will of God in this world and in another,—justice, + holiness, wisdom, love, without succession of acts (ouch e genesis + prosestin), which is known to us in part only, and reverenced by us as + divine perfection. + </p> + <p> + Secondly, human perfection, or the fulfilment of the will of God in this + world, and co-operation with his laws revealed to us by reason and + experience, in nature, history, and in our own minds. + </p> + <p> + Thirdly, the elements of human perfection,—virtue, knowledge, and + right opinion. + </p> + <p> + Fourthly, the external conditions of perfection,—health and the + goods of life. + </p> + <p> + Fifthly, beauty and happiness,—the inward enjoyment of that which is + best and fairest in this world and in the human soul. + </p> + <p> + ... + </p> + <p> + The Philebus is probably the latest in time of the writings of Plato with + the exception of the Laws. We have in it therefore the last development of + his philosophy. The extreme and one-sided doctrines of the Cynics and + Cyrenaics are included in a larger whole; the relations of pleasure and + knowledge to each other and to the good are authoritatively determined; + the Eleatic Being and the Heraclitean Flux no longer divide the empire of + thought; the Mind of Anaxagoras has become the Mind of God and of the + World. The great distinction between pure and applied science for the + first time has a place in philosophy; the natural claim of dialectic to be + the Queen of the Sciences is once more affirmed. This latter is the bond + of union which pervades the whole or nearly the whole of the Platonic + writings. And here as in several other dialogues (Phaedrus, Republic, + etc.) it is presented to us in a manner playful yet also serious, and + sometimes as if the thought of it were too great for human utterance and + came down from heaven direct. It is the organization of knowledge + wonderful to think of at a time when knowledge itself could hardly be said + to exist. It is this more than any other element which distinguishes + Plato, not only from the presocratic philosophers, but from Socrates + himself. + </p> + <p> + We have not yet reached the confines of Aristotle, but we make a somewhat + nearer approach to him in the Philebus than in the earlier Platonic + writings. The germs of logic are beginning to appear, but they are not + collected into a whole, or made a separate science or system. Many + thinkers of many different schools have to be interposed between the + Parmenides or Philebus of Plato, and the Physics or Metaphysics of + Aristotle. It is this interval upon which we have to fix our minds if we + would rightly understand the character of the transition from one to the + other. Plato and Aristotle do not dovetail into one another; nor does the + one begin where the other ends; there is a gulf between them not to be + measured by time, which in the fragmentary state of our knowledge it is + impossible to bridge over. It follows that the one cannot be interpreted + by the other. At any rate, it is not Plato who is to be interpreted by + Aristotle, but Aristotle by Plato. Of all philosophy and of all art the + true understanding is to be sought not in the afterthoughts of posterity, + but in the elements out of which they have arisen. For the previous stage + is a tendency towards the ideal at which they are aiming; the later is a + declination or deviation from them, or even a perversion of them. No man's + thoughts were ever so well expressed by his disciples as by himself. + </p> + <p> + But although Plato in the Philebus does not come into any close connexion + with Aristotle, he is now a long way from himself and from the beginnings + of his own philosophy. At the time of his death he left his system still + incomplete; or he may be more truly said to have had no system, but to + have lived in the successive stages or moments of metaphysical thought + which presented themselves from time to time. The earlier discussions + about universal ideas and definitions seem to have died away; the + correlation of ideas has taken their place. The flowers of rhetoric and + poetry have lost their freshness and charm; and a technical language has + begun to supersede and overgrow them. But the power of thinking tends to + increase with age, and the experience of life to widen and deepen. The + good is summed up under categories which are not summa genera, but heads + or gradations of thought. The question of pleasure and the relation of + bodily pleasures to mental, which is hardly treated of elsewhere in Plato, + is here analysed with great subtlety. The mean or measure is now made the + first principle of good. Some of these questions reappear in Aristotle, as + does also the distinction between metaphysics and mathematics. But there + are many things in Plato which have been lost in Aristotle; and many + things in Aristotle not to be found in Plato. The most remarkable + deficiency in Aristotle is the disappearance of the Platonic dialectic, + which in the Aristotelian school is only used in a comparatively + unimportant and trivial sense. The most remarkable additions are the + invention of the Syllogism, the conception of happiness as the foundation + of morals, the reference of human actions to the standard of the better + mind of the world, or of the one 'sensible man' or 'superior person.' His + conception of ousia, or essence, is not an advance upon Plato, but a + return to the poor and meagre abstractions of the Eleatic philosophy. The + dry attempt to reduce the presocratic philosophy by his own rather + arbitrary standard of the four causes, contrasts unfavourably with Plato's + general discussion of the same subject (Sophist). To attempt further to + sum up the differences between the two great philosophers would be out of + place here. Any real discussion of their relation to one another must be + preceded by an examination into the nature and character of the + Aristotelian writings and the form in which they have come down to us. + This enquiry is not really separable from an investigation of Theophrastus + as well as Aristotle and of the remains of other schools of philosophy as + well as of the Peripatetics. But, without entering on this wide field, + even a superficial consideration of the logical and metaphysical works + which pass under the name of Aristotle, whether we suppose them to have + come directly from his hand or to be the tradition of his school, is + sufficient to show how great was the mental activity which prevailed in + the latter half of the fourth century B.C.; what eddies and whirlpools of + controversies were surging in the chaos of thought, what transformations + of the old philosophies were taking place everywhere, what eclecticisms + and syncretisms and realisms and nominalisms were affecting the mind of + Hellas. The decline of philosophy during this period is no less remarkable + than the loss of freedom; and the two are not unconnected with each other. + But of the multitudinous sea of opinions which were current in the age of + Aristotle we have no exact account. We know of them from allusions only. + And we cannot with advantage fill up the void of our knowledge by + conjecture: we can only make allowance for our ignorance. + </p> + <p> + There are several passages in the Philebus which are very characteristic + of Plato, and which we shall do well to consider not only in their + connexion, but apart from their connexion as inspired sayings or oracles + which receive their full interpretation only from the history of + philosophy in later ages. The more serious attacks on traditional beliefs + which are often veiled under an unusual simplicity or irony are of this + kind. Such, for example, is the excessive and more than human awe which + Socrates expresses about the names of the gods, which may be not unaptly + compared with the importance attached by mankind to theological terms in + other ages; for this also may be comprehended under the satire of + Socrates. Let us observe the religious and intellectual enthusiasm which + shines forth in the following, 'The power and faculty of loving the truth, + and of doing all things for the sake of the truth': or, again, the + singular acknowledgment which may be regarded as the anticipation of a new + logic, that 'In going to war for mind I must have weapons of a different + make from those which I used before, although some of the old ones may do + again.' Let us pause awhile to reflect on a sentence which is full of + meaning to reformers of religion or to the original thinker of all ages: + 'Shall we then agree with them of old time, and merely reassert the + notions of others without risk to ourselves; or shall we venture also to + share in the risk and bear the reproach which will await us': i.e. if we + assert mind to be the author of nature. Let us note the remarkable words, + 'That in the divine nature of Zeus there is the soul and mind of a King, + because there is in him the power of the cause,' a saying in which + theology and philosophy are blended and reconciled; not omitting to + observe the deep insight into human nature which is shown by the + repetition of the same thought 'All philosophers are agreed that mind is + the king of heaven and earth' with the ironical addition, 'in this way + truly they magnify themselves.' Nor let us pass unheeded the indignation + felt by the generous youth at the 'blasphemy' of those who say that Chaos + and Chance Medley created the world; or the significance of the words + 'those who said of old time that mind rules the universe'; or the pregnant + observation that 'we are not always conscious of what we are doing or of + what happens to us,' a chance expression to which if philosophers had + attended they would have escaped many errors in psychology. We may + contrast the contempt which is poured upon the verbal difficulty of the + one and many, and the seriousness with the unity of opposites is regarded + from the higher point of view of abstract ideas: or compare the simple + manner in which the question of cause and effect and their mutual + dependence is regarded by Plato (to which modern science has returned in + Mill and Bacon), and the cumbrous fourfold division of causes in the + Physics and Metaphysics of Aristotle, for which it has puzzled the world + to find a use in so many centuries. When we consider the backwardness of + knowledge in the age of Plato, the boldness with which he looks forward + into the distance, the many questions of modern philosophy which are + anticipated in his writings, may we not truly describe him in his own + words as a 'spectator of all time and of all existence'? + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PHILEBUS + </h2> + <p> + PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Observe, Protarchus, the nature of the position which you are + now going to take from Philebus, and what the other position is which I + maintain, and which, if you do not approve of it, is to be controverted by + you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, and + the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living being, + whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and intelligence and memory, + and their kindred, right opinion and true reasoning, are better and more + desirable than pleasure for all who are able to partake of them, and that + to all such who are or ever will be they are the most advantageous of all + things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of + the argument? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Nothing could be fairer, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned to + you? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left + the field. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to be + ascertained. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall we further agree— + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: To what? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That you and I must now try to indicate some state and + disposition of the soul, which has the property of making all men happy. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, by all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a + state? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what if there be a third state, which is better than either? + Then both of us are vanquished—are we not? But if this life, which + really has the power of making men happy, turn out to be more akin to + pleasure than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage + over the life of wisdom. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, + then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;—do you agree? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what do you say, Philebus? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: I say, and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the + conqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have + no longer a voice in the matter? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: True enough. Nevertheless I would clear myself and deliver my + soul of you; and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do so. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You may appeal to us; we too will be the witnesses of your + words. And now, Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we + will proceed with the argument. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus + says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the + gods is more than human—it exceeds all other fears. And now I would + not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what she + pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just + now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one + name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she + takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the + intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very + temperance,—that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish + fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and + how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite + pleasures are severally alike! + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring from + opposite sources, but they are not in themselves opposite. For must not + pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure,—that is, + like itself? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, my good friend, just as colour is like colour;—in so + far as colours are colours, there is no difference between them; and yet + we all know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed to + white: or again, as figure is like figure, for all figures are + comprehended under one class; and yet particular figures may be absolutely + opposed to one another, and there is an infinite diversity of them. And we + might find similar examples in many other things; therefore do not rely + upon this argument, which would go to prove the unity of the most extreme + opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a similar opposition among + pleasures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to + them a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good; now + although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, as + we are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good; but you call them + all good, and at the same time are compelled, if you are pressed, to + acknowledge that they are unlike. And so you must tell us what is the + identical quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which makes + you designate all of them as good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any one who + asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some + pleasures are good and others bad? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one + another, and sometimes opposed? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Not in so far as they are pleasures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are + to say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures, but that they + are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do not pierce + our dull minds, but we go on arguing all the same, like the weakest and + most inexperienced reasoners? (Probably corrupt.) + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, I mean to say, that in self-defence I may, if I like, + follow your example, and assert boldly that the two things most unlike are + most absolutely alike; and the result will be that you and I will prove + ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing; and the argument will + be blown away and lost. Suppose that we put back, and return to the old + position; then perhaps we may come to an understanding with one another. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind, and those other + qualities which I, when asked by you at first what is the nature of the + good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case with the pleasures of + which you spoke. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The sciences are a numerous class, and will be found to present + great differences. But even admitting that, like the pleasures, they are + opposite as well as different, should I be worthy of the name of + dialectician if, in order to avoid this difficulty, I were to say (as you + are saying of pleasure) that there is no difference between one science + and another;—would not the argument founder and disappear like an + idle tale, although we might ourselves escape drowning by clinging to a + fallacy? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: May none of this befal us, except the deliverance! Yet I like + the even-handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let us + assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and + different sciences. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the differences + between my good and yours; but let us bring them to the light in the hope + that, in the process of testing them, they may show whether pleasure is to + be called the good, or wisdom, or some third quality; for surely we are + not now simply contending in order that my view or that yours may prevail, + but I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting for the truth. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly we ought. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish the + principle on which the argument rests. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What principle? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty, and + some men sometimes against their will. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Speak plainer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel of + nature; for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful + propositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by + nature one and also many, dividing the single 'me' into many 'me's,' and + even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten + thousand other ways? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes + about the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this time + agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true + course of thought; and no more favour is shown to that other puzzle, in + which a person proves the members and parts of anything to be divided, and + then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof of his + own words: Why, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, and the + many are only one. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected with + this subject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and + acknowledged? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things + that are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving, for in + those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as I was + saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed; but when the + assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the + good one, then the interest which attaches to these and similar unities + and the attempt which is made to divide them gives birth to a controversy. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of what nature? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real + existence; and then how each individual unity, being always the same, and + incapable either of generation or of destruction, but retaining a + permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and + multiplied in the infinity of the world of generation, or as still entire + and yet divided from itself, which latter would seem to be the greatest + impossibility of all, for how can one and the same thing be at the same + time in one and in many things? These, Protarchus, are the real + difficulties, and this is the one and many to which they relate; they are + the source of great perplexity if ill decided, and the right determination + of them is very helpful. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is what I should wish. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear + them discussed; Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move, and + we had better not stir him up with questions. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious + battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we begin thus? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We say that the one and many become identified by thought, and + that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of every + word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never cease, and + is not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of + thought itself, which never grows old. Any young man, when he first tastes + these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure + of wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no stone, or + rather no thought unturned, now rolling up the many into the one, and + kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles + himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his + neighbours, whether they are older or younger, or of his own age—that + makes no difference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no human + being who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian + would have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only be + found. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are + young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all set upon + you, if you abuse us? We understand what you mean; but is there no charm + by which we may dispel all this confusion, no more excellent way of + arriving at the truth? If there is, we hope that you will guide us into + that way, and we will do our best to follow, for the enquiry in which we + are engaged, Socrates, is not unimportant. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The reverse of unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and + there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite way, + which has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me helpless in + the hour of need. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Tell us what that is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: One which may be easily pointed out, but is by no means easy of + application; it is the parent of all the discoveries in the arts. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Tell us what it is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among + men by the hands of a new Prometheus, and therewith a blaze of light; and + the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the gods than we are, handed + down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be are composed of + one and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted in them: seeing, + then, that such is the order of the world, we too ought in every enquiry + to begin by laying down one idea of that which is the subject of enquiry; + this unity we shall find in everything. Having found it, we may next + proceed to look for two, if there be two, or, if not, then for three or + some other number, subdividing each of these units, until at last the + unity with which we began is seen not only to be one and many and + infinite, but also a definite number; the infinite must not be suffered to + approach the many until the entire number of the species intermediate + between unity and infinity has been discovered,—then, and not till + then, we may rest from division, and without further troubling ourselves + about the endless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, + as I was saying, is the way of considering and learning and teaching one + another, which the gods have handed down to us. But the wise men of our + time are either too quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity. + Having no method, they make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass + at once to infinity; the intermediate steps never occur to them. And this, + I repeat, is what makes the difference between the mere art of disputation + and true dialectic. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think that I partly understand you Socrates, but I should + like to have a clearer notion of what you are saying. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet, + Protarchus, which you were made to learn as a child. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How do they afford an illustration? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The sound which passes through the lips whether of an individual + or of all men is one and yet infinite. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound is + infinite are we perfect in the art of speech, but the knowledge of the + number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same + kind. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Sound is one in music as well as in grammar? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And there is a higher note and a lower note, and a note of equal + pitch:—may we affirm so much? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you + knew; though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of + music. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nothing. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But when you have learned what sounds are high and what low, and + the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or proportions, + and the systems compounded out of them, which our fathers discovered, and + have handed down to us who are their descendants under the name of + harmonies; and the affections corresponding to them in the movements of + the human body, which when measured by numbers ought, as they say, to be + called rhythms and measures; and they tell us that the same principle + should be applied to every one and many;—when, I say, you have + learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are perfect; and you may be + said to understand any other subject, when you have a similar grasp of it. + But the infinity of kinds and the infinity of individuals which there is + in each of them, when not classified, creates in every one of us a state + of infinite ignorance; and he who never looks for number in anything, will + not himself be looked for in the number of famous men. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent, + Philebus. + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon the + argument? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Indeed he is, and you must answer him. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will; but you must let me make one little remark first about + these matters; I was saying, that he who begins with any individual unity, + should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a definite number, and + now I say conversely, that he who has to begin with infinity should not + jump to unity, but he should look about for some number representing a + certain quantity, and thus out of all end in one. And now let us return + for an illustration of our principle to the case of letters. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said to + have been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first + distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then other + letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e., the semivowels); + these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he distinguished a third + class of letters which we now call mutes, without voice and without sound, + and divided these, and likewise the two other classes of vowels and + semivowels, into the individual sounds, and told the number of them, and + gave to each and all of them the name of letters; and observing that none + of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all, and in + consideration of this common bond which in a manner united them, he + assigned to them all a single art, and this he called the art of grammar + or letters. + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding + the original statement, but I still feel the defect of which I just now + complained. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the + argument? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long + asking. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the question + which, as you say, you have been so long asking? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: How so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility + of pleasure and wisdom? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And we maintain that they are each of them one? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the precise question to which the previous discussion + desires an answer is, how they are one and also many (i.e., how they have + one genus and many species), and are not at once infinite, and what number + of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into + infinity (i.e. into the infinite number of individuals). + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates + has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us shall + answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable to + answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have undertaken + the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were able to + answer, the result methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let us + consider, then, what we are to do:—Socrates, if I understood him + rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is + the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed + that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, + likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest + use in any enquiry. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would + the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him is + that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will tell + you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing with + you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best of human + goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment and + the like were the chief good, you answered—No, not those, but + another class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves of what + you said, and very properly, in order that we may not forget to examine + and compare the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are to be + designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, + are mind and knowledge and understanding and art, and the like. There was + a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully threatened that you + should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled; and you + agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And now, as children say, + what has been fairly given cannot be taken back; cease then to fight + against us in this way. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In what way? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which we + have not as yet any sufficient answer to give; let us not imagine that a + general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if we + are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have promised. Consider, then, + whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge according to their kinds; + or you may let the matter drop, if you are able and willing to find some + other mode of clearing up our controversy. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words 'if + you are willing' dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to have + recalled something to my mind. + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: What is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about + pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they were + to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the good, but + some third thing, which was different from them, and better than either. + If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for + the good will cease to be identified with her:—Am I not right? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds + of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more clearly + as we proceed. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But, let us first agree on some little points. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What are they? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is the good perfect or imperfect? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: The most perfect, Socrates, of all things. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is the good sufficient? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt + after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care + not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is undeniable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of + wisdom, and pass them in review. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure + in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, it cannot + be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want anything, + then it cannot really be the chief good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And will you help us to test these two lives? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then answer. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Ask. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the + enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you + if you had perfect pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and + forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the + greatest pleasures? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true + opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you + were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that + you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the + pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no + true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and + if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on + future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an + oyster or 'pulmo marinus.' Could this be otherwise? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But is such a life eligible? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away + from me the power of speech. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We must keep up our spirits;—let us now take the life of + mind and examine it in turn. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And what is this life of mind? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, + having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having + no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like + feelings? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is likely, + as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to + one that was made out of the union of the two? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, that is the life which I mean. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would + surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in + addition to them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the three + lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man + or for animal. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the + good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and + perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to + live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have + chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own + free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly that seems to be true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus' goddess is + not to be regarded as identical with the good? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Neither is your 'mind' the good, Socrates, for that will be open + to the same objections. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my 'mind'; + but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, I + will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed + life; but we must come to some understanding about the second place. For + you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life; + and in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them + might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further + to argue in opposition to Philebus, that the element which makes this + mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than + to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share + either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own + mind, attain even to the third. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall; in + fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid + low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be + thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim. And if + pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second place, she + would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to + them would she still appear as fair as before. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by + applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nonsense, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which + is an impossibility? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be aware + that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the argument. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and just + at present not at all an easy one. For in going to war in the cause of + mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have weapons of + another make from those which I used before; some, however, of the old + ones may do again. And must I then finish the argument? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of course you must. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us be very careful in laying the foundation. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you do + not object, into three classes. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Upon what principle would you make the division? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us take some of our newly-found notions. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Which of them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of + existence, and also an infinite? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which is + compounded out of them; but I fear that I am ridiculously clumsy at these + processes of division and enumeration. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, my good friend? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I say that a fourth class is still wanted. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What will that be? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a + fourth class to the three others. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of + resolution as well as a cause of composition? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some future + time you shall allow me to have it. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us begin with the first three; and as we find two out of the + three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite them, and + see how in each of them there is a one and many. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: If you would explain to me a little more about them, perhaps I + might be able to follow you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, the two classes are the same which I mentioned before, one + the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the + infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter + discussed. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now consider well; for the question to which I invite your + attention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter and + colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more + and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end? + for if they had an end, the more and less would themselves have an end. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a + more and a less. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and + being endless they must also be infinite. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such an + expression as 'exceedingly,' which you have just uttered, and also the + term 'gently,' have the same significance as more or less; for whenever + they occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity—they are + always introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison of a + more or a less excessive or a more or a less gentle, and at each creation + of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now saying, if + quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to intrude in the + sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, these last would be + driven out of their own domain. When definite quantity is once admitted, + there can be no longer a 'hotter' or a 'colder' (for these are always + progressing, and are never in one stay); but definite quantity is at rest, + and has ceased to progress. Which proves that comparatives, such as the + hotter and the colder, are to be ranked in the class of the infinite. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Your remark certainly has the look of truth, Socrates; but + these subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at first. I + think however, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or + twice, there would be a substantial agreement between us. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather + not waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars, let me know + whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite— + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit of + more or less, or are denoted by the words 'exceedingly,' 'gently,' + 'extremely,' and the like, may not be referred to the class of the + infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous + argument, all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought + together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if possible, set + upon them—do you remember? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit + their opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal, or + again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure—all + these may, I think, be rightly reckoned by us in the class of the limited + or finite; what do you say? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Excellent, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound + kind? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You, I think, will have to tell me that. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen to + my prayers. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Offer up a prayer, then, and think. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am thinking, Protarchus, and I believe that some God has + befriended us. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what you + are saying? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will tell you, and do you listen to my words. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, slower, greater, + smaller, and all that in the preceding argument we placed under the unity + of more and less. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: In the class of the infinite, you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes; and now mingle this with the other. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is the other. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The class of the finite which we ought to have brought together + as we did the infinite; but, perhaps, it will come to the same thing if we + do so now;—when the two are combined, a third will appear. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by the class of the finite? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The class of the equal and the double, and any class which puts + an end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number creates + harmony and proportion among the different elements. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I understand; you seem to me to mean that the various + opposites, when you mingle with them the class of the finite, takes + certain forms. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Does not the right participation in the finite give health—in + disease, for instance? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And whereas the high and low, the swift and the slow are + infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principles aforesaid + introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the introduction + of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse moderation and + harmony? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the + seasons, and all the delights of life? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and + strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: O my + beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal wantonness + and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no limit to + pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and order, + whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, delivers + the soul.—What think you, Protarchus? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Her ways are much to my mind, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You will observe that I have spoken of three classes? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that the + infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of + existences; but what you would make the third I am not so certain. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too + much for you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with the + infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them were + sealed with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we readily + acknowledged it to be by nature one? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand me + to mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being, effected by + the measure which the limit introduces. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I understand. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Still there was, as we said, a fourth class to be investigated, + and you must assist in the investigation; for does not everything which + comes into being, of necessity come into being through a cause? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no + cause? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name; + the agent and the cause may be rightly called one? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall + find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name—shall we + not? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: We shall. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or + effect naturally follows it? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation are + not the same, but different? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of + which they were generated, furnish all the three classes? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven + to be distinct from them,—and may therefore be called a fourth + principle? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: So let us call it. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Quite right; but now, having distinguished the four, I think + that we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them in + order. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and the + second the finite or limited; then follows the third, an essence compound + and generated; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in speaking of + the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now what is the next question, and how came we hither? Were + we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: We were. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, having determined these points, shall we not be better + able to decide about the first and second place, which was the original + subject of dispute? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I dare say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and + wisdom was the conqueror—did we not? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to what + class it is to be assigned? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Beyond a doubt. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class; + which is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the + elements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may therefore be truly + said to comprehend the conqueror life. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all + sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? + Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Let me hear. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class + which admits of more and less? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for + pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity + and degree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the + infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of + good. But now—admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature + of the infinite—in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and + Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? + And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if + we err on this point. + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; + but still I must beg you to answer the question. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must submit to him. + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must + entreat you, Socrates, to be our spokesman, and then we shall not say + anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose a + difficult one; but did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you with + my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to what class mind and + knowledge belong? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You did, indeed, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yet the answer is easy, since all philosophers assert with one + voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth—in reality they are + magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should like + to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more fully. + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Take your own course, Socrates, and never mind length; we shall + not tire of you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a question. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the + guidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our + fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence + and wisdom. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, for + that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy; but the + other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the aspect of + the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars and of the + whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think otherwise. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall we then agree with them of old time in maintaining this + doctrine,—not merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk + to ourselves,—but shall we share in the danger, and take our part of + the reproach which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares + that all is disorder? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That would certainly be my wish. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Let me hear. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We see that the elements which enter into the nature of the + bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor + cries, 'land' (i.e., earth), reappear in the constitution of the world. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: The proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm gathers + over us, and we are at our wit's end. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is something to be remarked about each of these elements. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Only a small fraction of any one of them exists in us, and that + of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy of its + nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is fire within + us, and in the universe. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in the + universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power that fire + has. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and + ruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other + animals, dependent on the universal fire? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is a question which does not deserve an answer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the + earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, and you + would give a similar reply about all the other elements? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his + senses? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I do not think that he could—but now go on to the next + step. When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered + up in one, did we not call them a body? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: We did. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same + reason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same + elements. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body + nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which + we were just now speaking? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to + be asked. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, tell me, is this question worth asking? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: May our body be said to have a soul? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body + of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in + every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the + four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and + the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies + souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and + operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the + attributes of wisdom;—we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the + self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces + of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that + higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Such a supposition is quite unreasonable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the + other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite + and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a + presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and + seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most justly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is + the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the + cause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are pleased to + be called. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O + Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said + of old time that mind rules the universe. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that + mind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause of + all; and I think that you now have my answer. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had + answered. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts + earnest. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the + class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago + discovered? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was + akin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite + and belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have in itself, + a beginning, middle, or end of its own. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I shall be sure to remember. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We must next examine what is their place and under what + conditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since her + class was first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart + from pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: If this is the road, let us take it. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of + pleasure and pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the + aforesaid classes is the mixed one? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we + placed third in the list of four. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That which followed the infinite and the finite; and in which + you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Capital; and now will you please to give me your best attention? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Proceed; I am attending. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is + also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is very probable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the + source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and + shortest words about matters of the greatest moment. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be + a little plainer? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest + illustration? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What phenomena do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of + moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure: once more, the + unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the + natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain, + and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their + original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to + you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and + infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living + beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their own + nature is pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Granted; what you say has a general truth. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating + severally in the two processes which we have described? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an + antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an + expectation of pain, fearful and anxious. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of + the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Right; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to + be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure, + methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is + to be desired, or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not + rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been + mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other + things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not + to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and in + some instances admitting of the nature of good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You say most truly that this is the track which the + investigation should pursue. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and + pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be + the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration + nor of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether any animal who is + in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great + or small? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure + and of pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do not forget that there is such a state; it will make a + great difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this or + not. And I should like to say a few words about it. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What have you to say? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there is + no reason why he should not live in this neutral state. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no + degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be necessary to + him who chose the life of thought and wisdom. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, we said so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this + may not be the most divine of all lives? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have + either joy or sorrow. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Certainly not—there would be a great impropriety in the + assumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not + indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if in + any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion we will + place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second place, + should she have to resign the first. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Just so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is purely + mental, is entirely derived from memory. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I must first of all analyze memory, or rather perception which + is prior to memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to be + properly cleared up. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How will you proceed? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished + before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other + affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock to + both and to each of them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Granted. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but + not of the second? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness + in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in this + case has not yet entered; and to speak of the loss of that which is not + yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction; do you see? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then just be so good as to change the terms. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How shall I change them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing the + state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say + unconsciousness. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I see. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and + motion would be properly called consciousness? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now we know the meaning of the word? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the + preservation of consciousness? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But do we not distinguish memory from recollection? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has + of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced when in + company with the body? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of some + consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and + reminiscence? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is a reason why I say all this. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and + desire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the + previous analysis helps to show the nature of both. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There are certainly many things to be considered in discussing + the generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must + determine the nature and seat of desire. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Ay; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the + answer. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: A fair retort; but let us proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of + desires? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet they are very different; what common nature have we in + view when we call them by a single name? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is not easily + answered; but it must be answered. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us go back to our examples. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Where shall we begin? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do we mean anything when we say 'a man thirsts'? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We mean to say that he 'is empty'? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not thirst desire? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, of drink. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I should say, of replenishment with drink. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of + what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain either + by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment, of which he + has no present or past experience? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet he who desires, surely desires something? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He does not desire that which he experiences, for he experiences + thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires replenishment? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some + way apprehends replenishment? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There must. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be + emptied? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the + replenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other way can + there be? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I cannot imagine any other. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That there is no such thing as desire of the body. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, because the argument shows that the endeavour of every + animal is to the reverse of his bodily state. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is + experiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the argument, having proved that memory attracts us towards + the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires and + the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or + thirsts or has any similar experience. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to me to + imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these affections. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you + speaking? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am speaking of being emptied and replenished, and of all that + relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as well as + of the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the pleasure which + succeeds to it. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what would you say of the intermediate state? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by 'intermediate'? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers + past pleasures which, if they would only return, would relieve him; but as + yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an intermediate + state? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body there is + the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and expectation. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man + who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other + times be quite in despair? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be + filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then man and the other animals have at the same time both + pleasure and pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I suppose so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there + will be the double experience of pain. You observed this and inferred that + the double experience was the single case possible. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the + occasion of raising a question? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we + are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true + and false expectations, or true and false opinions? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very serious + enquiry. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There I agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus' boys, the point to + be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Surely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is + said should be pertinent. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: To be sure I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not + rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or + waking, mad or lunatic? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: So we have always held, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your + opinion? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think that we should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has + arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And such a thing as pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And an opinion must be of something? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And a man must be pleased by something? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite correct. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference; + it will still be an opinion? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, + will always have a real feeling of pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is also quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true + only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is the question. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence + becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this is + what you think should be examined? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in + other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as + well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have + various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we + should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak of + a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse of + rightness? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the + opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its + object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which + is not true, but false? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as we were + saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure + false. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure! + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure + which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is + often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There must be a very great difference, between them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Lead, and I will follow. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, my view is— + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We agree—do we not?—that there is such a thing as + false, and also such a thing as true opinion? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often + consequent upon these—upon true and false opinion, I mean. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always + spring from memory and perception? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of what nature? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and + the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very likely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Soon he begins to interrogate himself. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: In what manner? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He asks himself—'What is that which appears to be standing + by the rock under the tree?' This is the question which he may be supposed + to put to himself when he sees such an appearance. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: To which he may guess the right answer, saying as if in a + whisper to himself—'It is a man.' + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or again, he may be misled, and then he will say—'No, it + is a figure made by the shepherds.' + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in + articulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a + proposition. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him, he + may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in my explanation of + this phenomenon. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is your explanation? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I think that the soul at such times is like a book. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant + feelings seem to almost to write down words in the soul, and when the + inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions + which are the expressions of opinion come into our souls—but when + the scribe within us writes falsely, the result is false. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I quite assent and agree to your statement. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is busy + at the same time in the chambers of the soul. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Who is he? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws + images in the soul of the things which he has described. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: But when and how does he do this? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense + certain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the + subjects of them;—is not this a very common mental phenomenon? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the images answering to true opinions and words are true, + and to false opinions and words false; are they not? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: They are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If we are right so far, there arises a further question. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in + relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I should say in relation to all times alike. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described + already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones; from which we + may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do with the + future? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do all those writings and paintings which, as we were saying + a little while ago, are produced in us, relate to the past and present + only, and not to the future? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: To the future, very much. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When you say, 'Very much,' you mean to imply that all these + representations are hopes about the future, and that mankind are filled + with hopes in every stage of existence? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Answer me another question. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he + not? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly he is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with + hopes? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which + exist in the minds of each of us? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may often + have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture + there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good + fortune. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, + have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false + pictures? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as + the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: They are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good + in true pleasures? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Doubtless. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of + men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of a + similar character? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a + real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the + past, present, or future? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not + right? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real + but illusory character? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure + who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased about things + which neither have nor have ever had any real existence, and, more often + than not, are never likely to exist. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like; + are they not often false? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are + true or false? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: In no other way. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as + they are false. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth; for no one + would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason + of some other great corruption to which they are liable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, of pleasures which are corrupt and caused by corruption we + will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the present + I would rather show by another argument that there are many false + pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist + our final decision. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion which + should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new + argument. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as + they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart + from the soul—do you remember? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, I remember that you said so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily + state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was + experienced. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now you may infer what happens in such cases. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What am I to infer? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That in such cases pleasures and pains come simultaneously; and + there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond to + them, as has been already shown. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And there is another point to which we have agreed. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that + they are of the class of infinites. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly, we said so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But how can we rightly judge of them? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How can we? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is it our intention to judge of their comparative importance and + intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and + pleasure against pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them + accordingly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance + of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine falsely; + and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of pleasures + and pains? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were + saying before. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What was that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the + pleasures and pains with their own falsity. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false + because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison; + the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when placed side by + side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by side with the + pleasures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly, and for the reason which you mention. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element + which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are: you + will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never say + that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or + true. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find + pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are + still more false than these. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how shall we find them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and aches + and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of + nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and repletions, and + evacuations, and also by growth and decay? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, that has been often said. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural + state is pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body + experiences none of these changes. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: When can that be, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Your question, Protarchus, does not help the argument. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why not, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And what was that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may + ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed + either for good or bad? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be + neither pleasure nor pain. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that + we must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise tell us; + for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, and their words are of no mean authority. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I + should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I + mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: To them we will say: 'Good; but are we, or living things in + general, always conscious of what happens to us—for example, of our + growth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly + unconscious of this and similar phenomena?' You must answer for them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: The latter alternative is the true one. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going + up and down cause pleasures and pains? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be— + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains, + but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That, Socrates, is the more correct mode of speaking. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if this be true, the life to which I was just now referring + again appears. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What life? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of + joy. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one + painful, and the third which is neither; what say you? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I should say as you do that there are three of them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if so, the negation of pain will not be the same with + pleasure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live without + pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand him to + mean by that statement? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a + little and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a + third which is neither. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably + spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons who say and + think so. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free + from pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: They say so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And they must think or they would not say that they have + pleasure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I suppose not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct + natures, they are wrong. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then shall we take the view that they are three, as we were just + now saying, or that they are two only—the one being a state of pain, + which is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of itself a + good, and is called pleasant? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all? I do not see + the reason. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies of + our friend Philebus. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And who may they be? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Certain persons who are reputed to be masters in natural + philosophy, who deny the very existence of pleasure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Indeed! + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are + all of them only avoidances of pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, who + divine the truth, not by rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance + and extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of pleasure, + in which they think that there is nothing sound, and her seductive + influence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. This is + the use which you may make of them. And when you have considered the + various grounds of their dislike, you shall hear from me what I deem to be + true pleasures. Having thus examined the nature of pleasure from both + points of view, we will bring her up for judgment. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Well said. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers and + follow in the track of their dislike. I imagine that they would say + something of this sort; they would begin at the beginning, and ask + whether, if we wanted to know the nature of any quality, such as hardness, + we should be more likely to discover it by looking at the hardest things, + rather than at the least hard? You, Protarchus, shall answer these severe + gentlemen as you answer me. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By all means, and I reply to them, that you should look at the + greatest instances. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a class, + we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most extreme + and most vehement? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: In that every one will agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we have + often said, are the pleasures of the body? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we are + sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our answer, + or we shall come to grief. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How will that be? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, because we might be tempted to answer, 'When we are in + health.' + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is the natural answer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind + have the greatest desires? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness, + feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely? Am I not + right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the + satisfaction of their want? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is obvious as soon as it is said. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a person + would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look, not at + health, but at disease? And here you must distinguish:—do not + imagine that I mean to ask whether those who are very ill have more + pleasures than those who are well, but understand that I am speaking of + the magnitude of pleasure; I want to know where pleasures are found to be + most intense. For, as I say, we have to discover what is pleasure, and + what they mean by pleasure who deny her very existence. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think I follow you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You will soon have a better opportunity of showing whether you + do or not, Protarchus. Answer now, and tell me whether you see, I will not + say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness than in + temperance? Reflect before you speak. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I understand you, and see that there is a great difference + between them; the temperate are restrained by the wise man's aphorism of + 'Never too much,' which is their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing + the minds of fools and wantons becomes madness and makes them shout with + delight. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures and + pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body, and + not in a virtuous state. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and + see what makes them the greatest? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: To be sure we ought. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain + disorders. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What disorders? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The pleasures of unseemly disorders, which our severe friends + utterly detest. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What pleasures? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Such, for example, as the relief of itching and other ailments + by scratching, which is the only remedy required. For what in Heaven's + name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us?—Pleasure + or pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: A villainous mixture of some kind, Socrates, I should say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I did not introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any + personal reference to Philebus, but because, without the consideration of + these and similar pleasures, we shall not be able to determine the point + at issue. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Then we had better proceed to analyze this family of + pleasures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in the + body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul; while there + are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to soul and body, + which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and + sometimes pains. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, a + man experiences two opposite feelings; for example, when he is cold and is + growing warm, or again, when he is hot and is becoming cool, and he wants + to have the one and be rid of the other;—the sweet has a bitter, as + the common saying is, and both together fasten upon him and create + irritation and in time drive him to distraction. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That description is very true to nature. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are + sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Of cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example is + afforded by itching, of which we were just now speaking, and by the + tingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within, and + the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not reach the + parts affected; then if you put them to the fire, and as a last resort + apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense pleasure or + pain in the inner parts, which contrasts and mingles with the pain or + pleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts; and this is due to the + forcible separation of what is united, or to the union of what is + separated, and to the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the + slight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle, and causes a gentle + irritation; or again, the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an + excitement in him,—he even leaps for joy, he assumes all sorts of + attitudes, he changes all manner of colours, he gasps for breath, and is + quite amazed, and utters the most irrational exclamations. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, indeed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He will say of himself, and others will say of him, that he is + dying with these delights; and the more dissipated and good-for-nothing he + is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every way; of all pleasures he + declares them to be the greatest; and he reckons him who lives in the most + constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of mankind. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions of + the majority about pleasures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which arise + out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the body; + there are also cases in which the mind contributes an opposite element to + the body, whether of pleasure or pain, and the two unite and form one + mixture. Concerning these I have already remarked, that when a man is + empty he desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity. + But now I must further add what I omitted before, that in all these and + similar emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they are + innumerable), pleasure and pain coalesce in one. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I believe that to be quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures and + pains. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The union which, as we were saying, the mind often experiences + of purely mental feelings. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, + emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful + pleasures? need I remind you of the anger + </p> + <p> + 'Which stirs even a wise man to violence, And is sweeter than honey and + the honeycomb?' + </p> + <p> + And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and + bereavement? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, there is a natural connexion between them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the + spectators smile through their tears? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a + mixed feeling of pain and pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I do not quite understand you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in + recognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There is, I think. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable is + the examination of it, because the difficulty in detecting other cases of + mixed pleasures and pains will be less. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of + the soul? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of + his neighbours at which he is pleased? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an + evil? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: From these considerations learn to know the nature of the + ridiculous. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Explain. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to + describe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general it is + that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at Delphi. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You mean, Socrates, 'Know thyself.' + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I do; and the opposite would be, 'Know not thyself.' + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Indeed I am afraid that I cannot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be + shown? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What are they? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy himself + richer than he is. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is a very common error. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer + than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he really + has not. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of + the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of + mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of + contention and lying conceit of wisdom? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And may not all this be truly called an evil condition? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very evil. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if + we would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure + and pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How can we make the further division which you suggest? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of + themselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two + classes—one having power and might; and the other the reverse. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who + are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may + be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be + more truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in the + powerful is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in + reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in + truth is, ridiculous. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the + admixture of pleasures and pains. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous + pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the + misfortunes of enemies? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends' + misfortunes—is not that wrong? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we + enumerated—the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are + ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May we + not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of + mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: They are ridiculous. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a + misfortune? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly we feel pleasure. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at + the misfortunes of friends? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our + friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy has + been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant; and + so we envy and laugh at the same instant. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure + and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only on the + stage, but on the greater stage of human life; and so in endless other + cases. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I do not see how any one can deny what you say, Socrates, + however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, + and similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a mixture of the + two elements so often named; did I not? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference + only to sorrow and envy and anger. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I see. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then many other cases still remain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the + admixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that there + was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love and similar + affections; and I thought that when I had given you the illustration, you + would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a general truth that the + body without the soul, and the soul without the body, as well as the two + united, are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains; + and so further discussion would have been unnecessary. And now I want to + know whether I may depart; or will you keep me here until midnight? I + fancy that I may obtain my release without many words;—if I promise + that to-morrow I will give you an account of all these cases. But at + present I would rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters + which remain to be settled, before the judgment can be given which + Philebus demands. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their + turn; this is the natural and necessary order. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Excellent. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: These, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to indicate; for with + the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, + I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as witnesses, that there + are pleasures which seem only and are not, and there are others again + which have great power and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled with + pains, and are partly alleviations of agony and distress, both of body and + mind. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in + conceiving to be true? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and + form, and most of those which arise from smells; those of sound, again, + and in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and of + which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with + pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be + plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or + pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, says the + argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane + or solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers + and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively + beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely + beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of + scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character, and + have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will + try to make your meaning clearer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, + then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, + and have natural pleasures associated with them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, there are such pleasures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they + have no necessary admixture of pain; and all pleasures, however and + wherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an + analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I understand. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger + of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And this is the case. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his knowledge, + are there not pains of forgetting? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Not necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, when he + feels grief at the loss of his knowledge. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the + natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: In that case you are right in saying that the loss of + knowledge is not attended with pain. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain; and + they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those + which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description + of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that + those which are not in excess have measure; the great, the excessive, + whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in referring to the class + of the infinite, and of the more and less, which pours through body and + soul alike; and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite right, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, + greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why do you ask, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and + knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and + impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for + judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me and + by all of us. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for + consideration a single instance. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What instance shall we select? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Suppose that we first of all take whiteness. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that + purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most + unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly that which is most unadulterated. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest + or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white + is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Perfectly right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is no need of adducing many similar examples in + illustration of the argument about pleasure; one such is sufficient to + prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure + or unalloyed with pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a + great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Assuredly; and the instance you have given is quite + sufficient. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But what do you say of another question:—have we not heard + that pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do not + certain ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be + grateful to them? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do they mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will explain to you, my dear Protarchus, what they mean, by + putting a question. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Ask, and I will answer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and the + other ever in want of something. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What manner of natures are they? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The one majestic ever, the other inferior. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You speak riddles. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of + them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I should think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Search the universe for two terms which are like these two and + are present everywhere. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yet a third time I must say, Be a little plainer, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in + play, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something else + (relatives), and that other things are the ends to which the former class + subserve (absolutes). + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Your many repetitions make me slow to understand. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning + will become clearer. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very likely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Here are two new principles. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What are they? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: One is the generation of all things, and the other is essence. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I readily accept from you both generation and essence. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake of + essence, or essence for the sake of generation? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You want to know whether that which is called essence is, + properly speaking, for the sake of generation? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me that + ship-building is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of + ship-building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I have no objection, but you must take your part. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, material, + are given to us with a view to generation, and that each generation is + relative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence, and that the whole + of generation is relative to the whole of essence. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Assuredly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sake + of some essence? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that for the sake of which something else is done must be + placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of + something else, in some other class, my good friend. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in + some other class than that of good? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him + who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had no true + being at all; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of pleasure + being a good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Assuredly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation + their highest end. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or + thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted at + the process as if it were pleasure; and they say that they would not wish + to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which might be + mentioned. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is certainly what they appear to think. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite + of generation? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation and + destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we were + saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible + thought. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: He who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is involved + in great absurdities, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Great, indeed; and there is yet another of them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good + or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the soul + only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure; and that courage or + temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul, is not really + a good?—and is there not yet a further absurdity in our being + compelled to say that he who has a feeling of pain and not of pleasure is + bad at the time when he is suffering pain, even though he be the best of + men; and again, that he who has a feeling of pleasure, in so far as he is + pleased at the time when he is pleased, in that degree excels in virtue? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nothing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let us + not appear to be too sparing of mind and knowledge: let us ring their + metal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part, until we have + found out what in them is of the purest nature; and then the truest + elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up for judgment. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Knowledge has two parts,—the one productive, and the other + educational? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in the productive or handicraft arts, is not one part more + akin to knowledge, and the other less; and may not the one part be + regarded as the pure, and the other as the impure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of + them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how do you separate them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing be + taken away from any art, that which remains will not be much. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Not much, certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of the + senses which is given by experience and practice, in addition to a certain + power of guessing, which is commonly called art, and is perfected by + attention and pains. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nothing more, assuredly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism; for sounds are + harmonized, not by measure, but by skilful conjecture; the music of the + flute is always trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating note, and is + therefore mixed up with much that is doubtful and has little which is + certain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the same will be found to hold good of medicine and + husbandry and piloting and generalship. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The art of the builder, on the other hand, which uses a number + of measures and instruments, attains by their help to a greater degree of + accuracy than the other arts. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In ship-building and house-building, and in other branches of + the art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, compass, line, + and a most ingenious machine for straightening wood. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now let us divide the arts of which we were speaking into + two kinds,—the arts which, like music, are less exact in their + results, and those which, like carpentering, are more exact. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Let us make that division. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Of the latter class, the most exact of all are those which we + just now spoke of as primary. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I see that you mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of + weighing and measuring. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Certainly, Protarchus; but are not these also distinguishable + into two kinds? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What are the two kinds? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the first place, arithmetic is of two kinds, one of which is + popular, and the other philosophical. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How would you distinguish them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is a wide difference between them, Protarchus; some + arithmeticians reckon unequal units; as for example, two armies, two oxen, + two very large things or two very small things. The party who are opposed + to them insist that every unit in ten thousand must be the same as every + other unit. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly there is, as you say, a great difference among the + votaries of the science; and there may be reasonably supposed to be two + sorts of arithmetic. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when we compare the art of mensuration which is used in + building with philosophical geometry, or the art of computation which is + used in trading with exact calculation, shall we say of either of the + pairs that it is one or two? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: On the analogy of what has preceded, I should be of opinion + that they were severally two. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think so, but I should like to be told by you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The argument has all along been seeking a parallel to pleasure, + and true to that original design, has gone on to ask whether one sort of + knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly; that was the intention. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown + that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of + certainty? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And just now did not the argument first designate a particular + art by a common term, thus making us believe in the unity of that art; and + then again, as if speaking of two different things, proceed to enquire + whether the art as pursed by philosophers, or as pursued by + non-philosophers, has more of certainty and purity? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is the very question which the argument is asking. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: O Socrates, we have reached a point at which the difference of + clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the answer will be the easier. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly; and let us say in reply, that those arts into which + arithmetic and mensuration enter, far surpass all others; and that of + these the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure philosophic + impulse are infinitely superior in accuracy and truth. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then this is your judgment; and this is the answer which, upon + your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of + misinterpretation? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What answer? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That there are two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration; + and also several other arts which in like manner have this double nature, + and yet only one name. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Let us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you + speak, Socrates, and hope for good luck. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We have explained what we term the most exact arts or sciences. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet, Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us, if + we do not award to her the first place. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And pray, what is dialectic? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Clearly the science which has to do with all that knowledge of + which we are now speaking; for I am sure that all men who have a grain of + intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and + reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of all. + But how would you decide this question, Protarchus? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art of + persuasion far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far the best + of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their + own free will. Now, I should not like to quarrel either with you or with + him. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were not + ashamed? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: As you please. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: May I not have led you into a misapprehension? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Dear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best or + usefullest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and accuracy, and + the greatest amount of truth, however humble and little useful an art. And + as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that his art has the advantage in + usefulness to mankind, he will not quarrel with you for saying that the + study of which I am speaking is superior in this particular of essential + truth; as in the comparison of white colours, a little whiteness, if that + little be only pure, was said to be superior in truth to a great mass + which is impure. And now let us give our best attention and consider well, + not the comparative use or reputation of the sciences, but the power or + faculty, if there be such, which the soul has of loving the truth, and of + doing all things for the sake of it; let us search into the pure element + of mind and intelligence, and then we shall be able to say whether the + science of which I have been speaking is most likely to possess the + faculty, or whether there be some other which has higher claims. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Well, I have been considering, and I can hardly think that any + other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you say so because you observe that the arts in general and + those engaged in them make use of opinion, and are resolutely engaged in + the investigation of matters of opinion? Even he who supposes himself to + be occupied with nature is really occupied with the things of this world, + how created, how acting or acted upon. Is not this the sort of enquiry in + which his life is spent? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things which + are becoming, or which will or have become. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor + have been nor will be unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule of + truth ever become certain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no + fixedness? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How indeed? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then mind and science when employed about such changing things + do not attain the highest truth? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I should imagine not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or + Philebus or Gorgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single point. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What point? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has + to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or + if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has; and that all other + things are to be placed in a second or inferior class. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to + be given to the fairest things? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is natural. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured + most? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And these names may be said to have their truest and most exact + application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of + pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the next place, as to the mixture, here are the ingredients, + pleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who have their + materials ready to their hands. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now we must begin to mix them? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our + memories? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of what? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb, + that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I + believe to be a fair summary of the argument. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Let me hear. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living + beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief good + of all, and that the two names 'good' and 'pleasant' are correctly given + to one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins by + denying this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are two, + and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was + not this what we were saying, Protarchus? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is there not and was there not a further point which was + conceded between us? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What was it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That the good differs from all other things. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: In what respect? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in + all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of + anything else. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of + wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure + was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part + whatever in pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: We did. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take up + the enquiry again and set us right; and assuming memory and wisdom and + knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider + whether he would desire to possess or acquire,—I will not say + pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that + he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any + recollection, however momentary, of the feeling,—but would he desire + to have anything at all, if these faculties were wanting to him? And about + wisdom I ask the same question; can you conceive that any one would choose + to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than with a + certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than + with a certain degree of wisdom? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any + more? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good + cannot possibly be either of them? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less + accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be duly + assigned. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Have we not found a road which leads towards the good? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What road? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover in + what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the discovery + of the man himself? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning, that + we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in + the life which is well mixed than in that which is not? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Far greater. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up + a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who presides + over the ceremony of mingling. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Are not we the cup-bearers? and here are two fountains which are + flowing at our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a fountain + of honey; the other, wisdom, a sober draught in which no wine mingles, is + of water unpleasant but healthful; out of these we must seek to make the + fairest of all possible mixtures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Tell me first;—should we be most likely to succeed if we + mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Perhaps we might. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But I should be afraid of the risk, and I think that I can show + a safer plan. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and + one art to be more exact than another. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; some of + them regarding only the transient and perishing, and others the permanent + and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when judged by the + standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, were truer than the former. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good and right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If, then, we were to begin by mingling the sections of each + class which have the most of truth, will not the union suffice to give us + the loveliest of lives, or shall we still want some elements of another + kind? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think that we ought to do what you suggest. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and has reason as + well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other + things. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: We will suppose such a man. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Will he have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only with + the divine circle and sphere, and knows nothing of our human spheres and + circles, but uses only divine circles and measures in the building of a + house? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is + ridiculous in man. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What do you mean? Do you mean that you are to throw into the cup + and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false measure and + the false circle? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, we must, if any of us is ever to find his way home. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And am I to include music, which, as I was saying just now, is + full of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, I think that you must, if human life is to be a life at + all. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper who + is pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door wide, and let + knowledge of every sort stream in, and the pure mingle with the impure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I do not know, Socrates, that any great harm would come of + having them all, if only you have the first sort. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, shall I let them all flow into what Homer poetically + terms 'a meeting of the waters'? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There—I have let them in, and now I must return to the + fountain of pleasure. For we were not permitted to begin by mingling in a + single stream the true portions of both according to our original + intention; but the love of all knowledge constrained us to let all the + sciences flow in together before the pleasures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now the time has come for us to consider about the pleasures + also, whether we shall in like manner let them go all at once, or at first + only the true ones. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: It will be by far the safer course to let flow the true ones + first. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary + pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle + them? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes; the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to + mingle. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent and + useful always; and if we say of pleasures in like manner that all of them + are good and innocent for all of us at all times, we must let them all + mingle? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do not ask me, Protarchus; but ask the daughters of pleasure and + wisdom to answer for themselves. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Tell us, O beloved—shall we call you pleasures or by some + other name?—would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of + opinion that they would certainly answer as follows: + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: They would answer, as we said before, that for any single class + to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether + possible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with another + and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of things in + general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that may be, of ourselves + in every respect. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And our answer will be:—In that ye have spoken well. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very true. And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and + mind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they will + reply:—'What pleasures do you mean?' + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Likely enough. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have + the greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition + to the true ones? 'Why, Socrates,' they will say, 'how can we? seeing that + they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us; they trouble the + souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness; they prevent + us from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of the children + which are born to us, causing them to be forgotten and unheeded; but the + true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our family, and + also those pleasures which accompany health and temperance, and which + every Virtue, like a goddess, has in her train to follow her about + wherever she goes,—mingle these and not the others; there would be + great want of sense in any one who desires to see a fair and perfect + mixture, and to find in it what is the highest good in man and in the + universe, and to divine what is the true form of good—there would be + great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are always in the + company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the cup.'—Is not + this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her + own behalf, as well as on the behalf of memory and true opinion? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And still there must be something more added, which is a + necessary ingredient in every mixture. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be + created or subsist. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Quite impossible; and now you and Philebus must tell me whether + anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking the + argument is now completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, + which is going to hold fair rule over a living body. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I agree with you, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule + of the habitation of the good? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think that we are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and + which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by + all? When we have discovered it, we will proceed to ask whether this + omnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders any + mixture either of the highest value or of none at all. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Every man knows it. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture + whatever must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and to + the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a confused medley which + brings confusion on the possessor of it. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the + beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world + over. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, + with three we may catch our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the three, + and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of the mixture, + and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion of them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, Protarchus, any man could decide well enough whether + pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more honourable + among gods and men. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to + the end. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We must take each of them separately in their relation to + pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to which + of the two they are severally most akin. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after passing in review + mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to yourself—as + to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There is no need to pause, for the difference between them is + palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and it is said + that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest, perjury is + excused by the gods; for pleasures, like children, have not the least + particle of reason in them; whereas mind is either the same as truth, or + the most like truth, and the truest. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether + pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Here is another question which may be easily answered; for I + imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of + pleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good; but there still remains the third test: Has mind a + greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer + of the two? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: No one, Socrates, either awake or dreaming, ever saw or + imagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly, at any time, past, + present, or future. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Right. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: But when we see some one indulging in pleasures, perhaps in + the greatest of pleasures, the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the + action makes us ashamed; and so we put them out of sight, and consign them + to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere, by word of mouth + to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and wide, that + pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second, but that in + measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the like, the eternal nature + has been found. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful + and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom, you will + not be far wrong, if I divine aright. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I dare say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we + were affirming to appertain specially to the soul—sciences and arts + and true opinions as we called them? These come after the third class, and + form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Surely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us as + painless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed them, + which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Perhaps. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, as Orpheus says, + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song.' +</pre> + <p> + Here, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to set + the crown on our discourse. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said, thus + offering the third libation to the saviour Zeus. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely the + good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you + spoke, meant a recapitulation. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just + been saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, which is maintained, + not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind was + far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than + pleasure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But, suspecting that there were other things which were also + better, I went on to say that if there was anything better than either, + then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure + would lose the second place as well as the first. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You did. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the + unsatisfactory nature of both of them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good + have been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both + wanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But, though they must both resign in favour of another, mind is + ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror + than pleasure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And, according to the judgment which has now been given, + pleasure will rank fifth. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But not first; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and + animals in the world by their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her to be so;—although + the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, determine that + pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts of animals to be + better witnesses than the inspirations of divine philosophy. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And now, Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you have + been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And will you let me go? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There is a little which yet remains, and I will remind you of + it, for I am sure that you will not be the first to go away from an + argument. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Philebus, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILEBUS *** + +***** This file should be named 1744-h.htm or 1744-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/7/4/1744/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + + +</pre> + </body> +</html> diff --git a/1744.txt b/1744.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..839890f --- /dev/null +++ b/1744.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6043 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Philebus, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Philebus + +Author: Plato + +Posting Date: October 30, 2008 [EBook #1744] +Release Date: May, 1999 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILEBUS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +PHILEBUS + +By Plato + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + +The Philebus appears to be one of the later writings of Plato, in which +the style has begun to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element +has become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the +development of abstract thought great advances have been made on the +Protagoras or the Phaedrus, and even on the Republic. But there is a +corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the +persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and +incompleteness in the general design. As in the speeches of Thucydides, +the multiplication of ideas seems to interfere with the power of +expression. Instead of the equally diffused grace and ease of the +earlier dialogues there occur two or three highly-wrought passages; +instead of the ever-flowing play of humour, now appearing, now +concealed, but always present, are inserted a good many bad jests, as +we may venture to term them. We may observe an attempt at artificial +ornament, and far-fetched modes of expression; also clamorous demands +on the part of his companions, that Socrates shall answer his own +questions, as well as other defects of style, which remind us of the +Laws. The connection is often abrupt and inharmonious, and far from +clear. Many points require further explanation; e.g. the reference of +pleasure to the indefinite class, compared with the assertion which +almost immediately follows, that pleasure and pain naturally have their +seat in the third or mixed class: these two statements are unreconciled. +In like manner, the table of goods does not distinguish between the +two heads of measure and symmetry; and though a hint is given that the +divine mind has the first place, nothing is said of this in the final +summing up. The relation of the goods to the sciences does not appear; +though dialectic may be thought to correspond to the highest good, the +sciences and arts and true opinions are enumerated in the fourth class. +We seem to have an intimation of a further discussion, in which some +topics lightly passed over were to receive a fuller consideration. The +various uses of the word 'mixed,' for the mixed life, the mixed class +of elements, the mixture of pleasures, or of pleasure and pain, are a +further source of perplexity. Our ignorance of the opinions which +Plato is attacking is also an element of obscurity. Many things in a +controversy might seem relevant, if we knew to what they were intended +to refer. But no conjecture will enable us to supply what Plato has +not told us; or to explain, from our fragmentary knowledge of them, +the relation in which his doctrine stood to the Eleatic Being or +the Megarian good, or to the theories of Aristippus or Antisthenes +respecting pleasure. Nor are we able to say how far Plato in the +Philebus conceives the finite and infinite (which occur both in the +fragments of Philolaus and in the Pythagorean table of opposites) in the +same manner as contemporary Pythagoreans. + +There is little in the characters which is worthy of remark. The +Socrates of the Philebus is devoid of any touch of Socratic irony, +though here, as in the Phaedrus, he twice attributes the flow of his +ideas to a sudden inspiration. The interlocutor Protarchus, the son of +Callias, who has been a hearer of Gorgias, is supposed to begin as a +disciple of the partisans of pleasure, but is drawn over to the opposite +side by the arguments of Socrates. The instincts of ingenuous youth are +easily induced to take the better part. Philebus, who has withdrawn from +the argument, is several times brought back again, that he may support +pleasure, of which he remains to the end the uncompromising advocate. +On the other hand, the youthful group of listeners by whom he is +surrounded, 'Philebus' boys' as they are termed, whose presence is +several times intimated, are described as all of them at last convinced +by the arguments of Socrates. They bear a very faded resemblance to the +interested audiences of the Charmides, Lysis, or Protagoras. Other +signs of relation to external life in the dialogue, or references +to contemporary things and persons, with the single exception of the +allusions to the anonymous enemies of pleasure, and the teachers of the +flux, there are none. + +The omission of the doctrine of recollection, derived from a previous +state of existence, is a note of progress in the philosophy of Plato. +The transcendental theory of pre-existent ideas, which is chiefly +discussed by him in the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Phaedrus, has given +way to a psychological one. The omission is rendered more significant +by his having occasion to speak of memory as the basis of desire. Of +the ideas he treats in the same sceptical spirit which appears in his +criticism of them in the Parmenides. He touches on the same difficulties +and he gives no answer to them. His mode of speaking of the analytical +and synthetical processes may be compared with his discussion of the +same subject in the Phaedrus; here he dwells on the importance of +dividing the genera into all the species, while in the Phaedrus he +conveys the same truth in a figure, when he speaks of carving the whole, +which is described under the image of a victim, into parts or members, +'according to their natural articulation, without breaking any of +them.' There is also a difference, which may be noted, between the two +dialogues. For whereas in the Phaedrus, and also in the Symposium, +the dialectician is described as a sort of enthusiast or lover, in the +Philebus, as in all the later writings of Plato, the element of love +is wanting; the topic is only introduced, as in the Republic, by way of +illustration. On other subjects of which they treat in common, such as +the nature and kinds of pleasure, true and false opinion, the nature of +the good, the order and relation of the sciences, the Republic is less +advanced than the Philebus, which contains, perhaps, more metaphysical +truth more obscurely expressed than any other Platonic dialogue. Here, +as Plato expressly tells us, he is 'forging weapons of another make,' +i.e. new categories and modes of conception, though 'some of the old +ones might do again.' + +But if superior in thought and dialectical power, the Philebus falls +very far short of the Republic in fancy and feeling. The development of +the reason undisturbed by the emotions seems to be the ideal at which +Plato aims in his later dialogues. There is no mystic enthusiasm or +rapturous contemplation of ideas. Whether we attribute this change to +the greater feebleness of age, or to the development of the quarrel +between philosophy and poetry in Plato's own mind, or perhaps, in some +degree, to a carelessness about artistic effect, when he was absorbed in +abstract ideas, we can hardly be wrong in assuming, amid such a variety +of indications, derived from style as well as subject, that the Philebus +belongs to the later period of his life and authorship. But in this, as +in all the later writings of Plato, there are not wanting thoughts and +expressions in which he rises to his highest level. + +The plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, the want of plan renders +the progress of the dialogue difficult to follow. A few leading ideas +seem to emerge: the relation of the one and many, the four original +elements, the kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge, the scale of +goods. These are only partially connected with one another. The dialogue +is not rightly entitled 'Concerning pleasure' or 'Concerning good,' but +should rather be described as treating of the relations of pleasure +and knowledge, after they have been duly analyzed, to the good. (1) The +question is asked, whether pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or some +nature higher than either; and if the latter, how pleasure and wisdom +are related to this higher good. (2) Before we can reply with exactness, +we must know the kinds of pleasure and the kinds of knowledge. (3) But +still we may affirm generally, that the combined life of pleasure and +wisdom or knowledge has more of the character of the good than either of +them when isolated. (4) to determine which of them partakes most of the +higher nature, we must know under which of the four unities or elements +they respectively fall. These are, first, the infinite; secondly, the +finite; thirdly, the union of the two; fourthly, the cause of the union. +Pleasure is of the first, wisdom or knowledge of the third class, while +reason or mind is akin to the fourth or highest. + +(5) Pleasures are of two kinds, the mixed and unmixed. Of mixed +pleasures there are three classes--(a) those in which both the pleasures +and pains are corporeal, as in eating and hunger; (b) those in which +there is a pain of the body and pleasure of the mind, as when you +are hungry and are looking forward to a feast; (c) those in which the +pleasure and pain are both mental. Of unmixed pleasures there are four +kinds: those of sight, hearing, smell, knowledge. + +(6) The sciences are likewise divided into two classes, theoretical and +productive: of the latter, one part is pure, the other impure. The +pure part consists of arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing. Arts like +carpentering, which have an exact measure, are to be regarded as higher +than music, which for the most part is mere guess-work. But there is +also a higher arithmetic, and a higher mensuration, which is exclusively +theoretical; and a dialectical science, which is higher still and the +truest and purest knowledge. + +(7) We are now able to determine the composition of the perfect life. +First, we admit the pure pleasures and the pure sciences; secondly, the +impure sciences, but not the impure pleasures. We have next to discover +what element of goodness is contained in this mixture. There are three +criteria of goodness--beauty, symmetry, truth. These are clearly more +akin to reason than to pleasure, and will enable us to fix the places +of both of them in the scale of good. First in the scale is measure; the +second place is assigned to symmetry; the third, to reason and wisdom; +the fourth, to knowledge and true opinion; the fifth, to pure pleasures; +and here the Muse says 'Enough.' + +'Bidding farewell to Philebus and Socrates,' we may now consider the +metaphysical conceptions which are presented to us. These are (I) +the paradox of unity and plurality; (II) the table of categories or +elements; (III) the kinds of pleasure; (IV) the kinds of knowledge; +(V) the conception of the good. We may then proceed to examine (VI) the +relation of the Philebus to the Republic, and to other dialogues. + +I. The paradox of the one and many originated in the restless dialectic +of Zeno, who sought to prove the absolute existence of the one by +showing the contradictions that are involved in admitting the existence +of the many (compare Parm.). Zeno illustrated the contradiction by +well-known examples taken from outward objects. But Socrates seems +to intimate that the time had arrived for discarding these hackneyed +illustrations; such difficulties had long been solved by common sense +('solvitur ambulando'); the fact of the co-existence of opposites was +a sufficient answer to them. He will leave them to Cynics and Eristics; +the youth of Athens may discourse of them to their parents. To no +rational man could the circumstance that the body is one, but has many +members, be any longer a stumbling-block. + +Plato's difficulty seems to begin in the region of ideas. He cannot +understand how an absolute unity, such as the Eleatic Being, can be +broken up into a number of individuals, or be in and out of them at +once. Philosophy had so deepened or intensified the nature of one or +Being, by the thoughts of successive generations, that the mind could no +longer imagine 'Being' as in a state of change or division. To say that +the verb of existence is the copula, or that unity is a mere unit, is +to us easy; but to the Greek in a particular stage of thought such an +analysis involved the same kind of difficulty as the conception of God +existing both in and out of the world would to ourselves. Nor was he +assisted by the analogy of sensible objects. The sphere of mind was dark +and mysterious to him; but instead of being illustrated by sense, the +greatest light appeared to be thrown on the nature of ideas when they +were contrasted with sense. + +Both here and in the Parmenides, where similar difficulties are raised, +Plato seems prepared to desert his ancient ground. He cannot tell the +relation in which abstract ideas stand to one another, and therefore he +transfers the one and many out of his transcendental world, and proceeds +to lay down practical rules for their application to different branches +of knowledge. As in the Republic he supposes the philosopher to proceed +by regular steps, until he arrives at the idea of good; as in the +Sophist and Politicus he insists that in dividing the whole into its +parts we should bisect in the middle in the hope of finding species; +as in the Phaedrus (see above) he would have 'no limb broken' of the +organism of knowledge;--so in the Philebus he urges the necessity of +filling up all the intermediate links which occur (compare Bacon's +'media axiomata') in the passage from unity to infinity. With him the +idea of science may be said to anticipate science; at a time when +the sciences were not yet divided, he wants to impress upon us the +importance of classification; neither neglecting the many individuals, +nor attempting to count them all, but finding the genera and species +under which they naturally fall. Here, then, and in the parallel +passages of the Phaedrus and of the Sophist, is found the germ of the +most fruitful notion of modern science. + +Plato describes with ludicrous exaggeration the influence exerted by +the one and many on the minds of young men in their first fervour of +metaphysical enthusiasm (compare Republic). But they are none the less +an everlasting quality of reason or reasoning which never grows old in +us. At first we have but a confused conception of them, analogous to the +eyes blinking at the light in the Republic. To this Plato opposes +the revelation from Heaven of the real relations of them, which some +Prometheus, who gave the true fire from heaven, is supposed to have +imparted to us. Plato is speaking of two things--(1) the crude notion of +the one and many, which powerfully affects the ordinary mind when first +beginning to think; (2) the same notion when cleared up by the help of +dialectic. + +To us the problem of the one and many has lost its chief interest and +perplexity. We readily acknowledge that a whole has many parts, that the +continuous is also the divisible, that in all objects of sense there is +a one and many, and that a like principle may be applied to analogy +to purely intellectual conceptions. If we attend to the meaning of the +words, we are compelled to admit that two contradictory statements are +true. But the antinomy is so familiar as to be scarcely observed by us. +Our sense of the contradiction, like Plato's, only begins in a higher +sphere, when we speak of necessity and free-will, of mind and body, of +Three Persons and One Substance, and the like. The world of knowledge +is always dividing more and more; every truth is at first the enemy of +every other truth. Yet without this division there can be no truth; nor +any complete truth without the reunion of the parts into a whole. And +hence the coexistence of opposites in the unity of the idea is regarded +by Hegel as the supreme principle of philosophy; and the law of +contradiction, which is affirmed by logicians to be an ultimate +principle of the human mind, is displaced by another law, which asserts +the coexistence of contradictories as imperfect and divided elements of +the truth. Without entering further into the depths of Hegelianism, we +may remark that this and all similar attempts to reconcile antinomies +have their origin in the old Platonic problem of the 'One and Many.' + +II. 1. The first of Plato's categories or elements is the infinite. This +is the negative of measure or limit; the unthinkable, the unknowable; +of which nothing can be affirmed; the mixture or chaos which preceded +distinct kinds in the creation of the world; the first vague impression +of sense; the more or less which refuses to be reduced to rule, having +certain affinities with evil, with pleasure, with ignorance, and which +in the scale of being is farthest removed from the beautiful and good. +To a Greek of the age of Plato, the idea of an infinite mind would +have been an absurdity. He would have insisted that 'the good is of the +nature of the finite,' and that the infinite is a mere negative, which +is on the level of sensation, and not of thought. He was aware that +there was a distinction between the infinitely great and the infinitely +small, but he would have equally denied the claim of either to true +existence. Of that positive infinity, or infinite reality, which we +attribute to God, he had no conception. + +The Greek conception of the infinite would be more truly described, in +our way of speaking, as the indefinite. To us, the notion of infinity +is subsequent rather than prior to the finite, expressing not absolute +vacancy or negation, but only the removal of limit or restraint, which +we suppose to exist not before but after we have already set bounds to +thought and matter, and divided them after their kinds. From different +points of view, either the finite or infinite may be looked upon +respectively both as positive and negative (compare 'Omnis determinatio +est negatio')' and the conception of the one determines that of the +other. The Greeks and the moderns seem to be nearly at the opposite +poles in their manner of regarding them. And both are surprised when +they make the discovery, as Plato has done in the Sophist, how large an +element negation forms in the framework of their thoughts. + +2, 3. The finite element which mingles with and regulates the infinite +is best expressed to us by the word 'law.' It is that which measures all +things and assigns to them their limit; which preserves them in their +natural state, and brings them within the sphere of human cognition. +This is described by the terms harmony, health, order, perfection, and +the like. All things, in as far as they are good, even pleasures, which +are for the most part indefinite, partake of this element. We should be +wrong in attributing to Plato the conception of laws of nature derived +from observation and experiment. And yet he has as intense a conviction +as any modern philosopher that nature does not proceed by chance. But +observing that the wonderful construction of number and figure, which he +had within himself, and which seemed to be prior to himself, explained +a part of the phenomena of the external world, he extended their +principles to the whole, finding in them the true type both of human +life and of the order of nature. + +Two other points may be noticed respecting the third class. First, that +Plato seems to be unconscious of any interval or chasm which separates +the finite from the infinite. The one is in various ways and degrees +working in the other. Hence he has implicitly answered the difficulty +with which he started, of how the one could remain one and yet be +divided among many individuals, or 'how ideas could be in and out of +themselves,' and the like. Secondly, that in this mixed class we find +the idea of beauty. Good, when exhibited under the aspect of measure +or symmetry, becomes beauty. And if we translate his language into +corresponding modern terms, we shall not be far wrong in saying that +here, as well as in the Republic, Plato conceives beauty under the idea +of proportion. + +4. Last and highest in the list of principles or elements is the cause +of the union of the finite and infinite, to which Plato ascribes the +order of the world. Reasoning from man to the universe, he argues that +as there is a mind in the one, there must be a mind in the other, which +he identifies with the royal mind of Zeus. This is the first cause of +which 'our ancestors spoke,' as he says, appealing to tradition, in the +Philebus as well as in the Timaeus. The 'one and many' is also supposed +to have been revealed by tradition. For the mythical element has not +altogether disappeared. + +Some characteristic differences may here be noted, which distinguish the +ancient from the modern mode of conceiving God. + +a. To Plato, the idea of God or mind is both personal and impersonal. +Nor in ascribing, as appears to us, both these attributes to him, and in +speaking of God both in the masculine and neuter gender, did he seem +to himself inconsistent. For the difference between the personal and +impersonal was not marked to him as to ourselves. We make a fundamental +distinction between a thing and a person, while to Plato, by the help of +various intermediate abstractions, such as end, good, cause, they appear +almost to meet in one, or to be two aspects of the same. Hence, without +any reconciliation or even remark, in the Republic he speaks at one time +of God or Gods, and at another time of the Good. So in the Phaedrus he +seems to pass unconsciously from the concrete to the abstract conception +of the Ideas in the same dialogue. Nor in the Philebus is he careful to +show in what relation the idea of the divine mind stands to the supreme +principle of measure. + +b. Again, to us there is a strongly-marked distinction between a first +cause and a final cause. And we should commonly identify a first cause +with God, and the final cause with the world, which is His work. But +Plato, though not a Pantheist, and very far from confounding God with +the world, tends to identify the first with the final cause. The cause +of the union of the finite and infinite might be described as a higher +law; the final measure which is the highest expression of the good +may also be described as the supreme law. Both these conceptions are +realized chiefly by the help of the material world; and therefore when +we pass into the sphere of ideas can hardly be distinguished. + +The four principles are required for the determination of the relative +places of pleasure and wisdom. Plato has been saying that we should +proceed by regular steps from the one to the many. Accordingly, before +assigning the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first +find out and arrange in order the general principles of things. Mind +is ascertained to be akin to the nature of the cause, while pleasure is +found in the infinite or indefinite class. We may now proceed to divide +pleasure and knowledge after their kinds. + +III. 1. Plato speaks of pleasure as indefinite, as relative, as a +generation, and in all these points of view as in a category distinct +from good. For again we must repeat, that to the Greek 'the good is of +the nature of the finite,' and, like virtue, either is, or is nearly +allied to, knowledge. The modern philosopher would remark that the +indefinite is equally real with the definite. Health and mental +qualities are in the concrete undefined; they are nevertheless real +goods, and Plato rightly regards them as falling under the finite class. +Again, we are able to define objects or ideas, not in so far as they are +in the mind, but in so far as they are manifested externally, and can +therefore be reduced to rule and measure. And if we adopt the test +of definiteness, the pleasures of the body are more capable of being +defined than any other pleasures. As in art and knowledge generally, we +proceed from without inwards, beginning with facts of sense, and passing +to the more ideal conceptions of mental pleasure, happiness, and the +like. + +2. Pleasure is depreciated as relative, while good is exalted as +absolute. But this distinction seems to arise from an unfair mode +of regarding them; the abstract idea of the one is compared with the +concrete experience of the other. For all pleasure and all knowledge may +be viewed either abstracted from the mind, or in relation to the mind +(compare Aristot. Nic. Ethics). The first is an idea only, which may be +conceived as absolute and unchangeable, and then the abstract idea of +pleasure will be equally unchangeable with that of knowledge. But when +we come to view either as phenomena of consciousness, the same defects +are for the most part incident to both of them. Our hold upon them is +equally transient and uncertain; the mind cannot be always in a state of +intellectual tension, any more than capable of feeling pleasure always. +The knowledge which is at one time clear and distinct, at another seems +to fade away, just as the pleasure of health after sickness, or of +eating after hunger, soon passes into a neutral state of unconsciousness +and indifference. Change and alternation are necessary for the mind as +well as for the body; and in this is to be acknowledged, not an element +of evil, but rather a law of nature. The chief difference between +subjective pleasure and subjective knowledge in respect of permanence is +that the latter, when our feeble faculties are able to grasp it, still +conveys to us an idea of unchangeableness which cannot be got rid of. + +3. In the language of ancient philosophy, the relative character of +pleasure is described as becoming or generation. This is relative to +Being or Essence, and from one point of view may be regarded as the +Heraclitean flux in contrast with the Eleatic Being; from another, +as the transient enjoyment of eating and drinking compared with the +supposed permanence of intellectual pleasures. But to us the distinction +is unmeaning, and belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed +away. Plato himself seems to have suspected that the continuance or life +of things is quite as much to be attributed to a principle of rest as +of motion (compare Charm. Cratyl.). A later view of pleasure is found +in Aristotle, who agrees with Plato in many points, e.g. in his view of +pleasure as a restoration to nature, in his distinction between bodily +and mental, between necessary and non-necessary pleasures. But he is +also in advance of Plato; for he affirms that pleasure is not in the +body at all; and hence not even the bodily pleasures are to be spoken of +as generations, but only as accompanied by generation (Nic. Eth.). + +4. Plato attempts to identify vicious pleasures with some form of error, +and insists that the term false may be applied to them: in this he +appears to be carrying out in a confused manner the Socratic doctrine, +that virtue is knowledge, vice ignorance. He will allow of no +distinction between the pleasures and the erroneous opinions on which +they are founded, whether arising out of the illusion of distance or +not. But to this we naturally reply with Protarchus, that the +pleasure is what it is, although the calculation may be false, or the +after-effects painful. It is difficult to acquit Plato, to use his own +language, of being a 'tyro in dialectics,' when he overlooks such +a distinction. Yet, on the other hand, we are hardly fair judges +of confusions of thought in those who view things differently from +ourselves. + +5. There appears also to be an incorrectness in the notion which occurs +both here and in the Gorgias, of the simultaneousness of merely bodily +pleasures and pains. We may, perhaps, admit, though even this is not +free from doubt, that the feeling of pleasureable hope or recollection +is, or rather may be, simultaneous with acute bodily suffering. But +there is no such coexistence of the pain of thirst with the pleasures +of drinking; they are not really simultaneous, for the one expels the +other. Nor does Plato seem to have considered that the bodily pleasures, +except in certain extreme cases, are unattended with pain. Few +philosophers will deny that a degree of pleasure attends eating +and drinking; and yet surely we might as well speak of the pains of +digestion which follow, as of the pains of hunger and thirst which +precede them. Plato's conception is derived partly from the extreme case +of a man suffering pain from hunger or thirst, partly from the image +of a full and empty vessel. But the truth is rather, that while the +gratification of our bodily desires constantly affords some degree +of pleasure, the antecedent pains are scarcely perceived by us, being +almost done away with by use and regularity. + +6. The desire to classify pleasures as accompanied or not accompanied by +antecedent pains, has led Plato to place under one head the pleasures of +smell and sight, as well as those derived from sounds of music and from +knowledge. He would have done better to make a separate class of the +pleasures of smell, having no association of mind, or perhaps to have +divided them into natural and artificial. The pleasures of sight and +sound might then have been regarded as being the expression of ideas. +But this higher and truer point of view never appears to have occurred +to Plato. Nor has he any distinction between the fine arts and the +mechanical; and, neither here nor anywhere, an adequate conception of +the beautiful in external things. + +7. Plato agrees partially with certain 'surly or fastidious' +philosophers, as he terms them, who defined pleasure to be the absence +of pain. They are also described as eminent in physics. There is +unfortunately no school of Greek philosophy known to us which combined +these two characteristics. Antisthenes, who was an enemy of pleasure, +was not a physical philosopher; the atomists, who were physical +philosophers, were not enemies of pleasure. Yet such a combination of +opinions is far from being impossible. Plato's omission to mention them +by name has created the same uncertainty respecting them which also +occurs respecting the 'friends of the ideas' and the 'materialists' in +the Sophist. + +On the whole, this discussion is one of the least satisfactory in the +dialogues of Plato. While the ethical nature of pleasure is scarcely +considered, and the merely physical phenomenon imperfectly analysed, +too much weight is given to ideas of measure and number, as the sole +principle of good. The comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really +a comparison of two elements, which have no common measure, and which +cannot be excluded from each other. Feeling is not opposed to knowledge, +and in all consciousness there is an element of both. The most abstract +kinds of knowledge are inseparable from some pleasure or pain, which +accompanies the acquisition or possession of them: the student is liable +to grow weary of them, and soon discovers that continuous mental energy +is not granted to men. The most sensual pleasure, on the other hand, is +inseparable from the consciousness of pleasure; no man can be happy who, +to borrow Plato's illustration, is leading the life of an oyster. Hence +(by his own confession) the main thesis is not worth determining; the +real interest lies in the incidental discussion. We can no more separate +pleasure from knowledge in the Philebus than we can separate justice +from happiness in the Republic. + +IV. An interesting account is given in the Philebus of the rank and +order of the sciences or arts, which agrees generally with the scheme +of knowledge in the Sixth Book of the Republic. The chief difference is, +that the position of the arts is more exactly defined. They are divided +into an empirical part and a scientific part, of which the first is mere +guess-work, the second is determined by rule and measure. Of the more +empirical arts, music is given as an example; this, although affirmed +to be necessary to human life, is depreciated. Music is regarded from +a point of view entirely opposite to that of the Republic, not as a +sublime science, coordinate with astronomy, but as full of doubt and +conjecture. According to the standard of accuracy which is here adopted, +it is rightly placed lower in the scale than carpentering, because the +latter is more capable of being reduced to measure. + +The theoretical element of the arts may also become a purely abstract +science, when separated from matter, and is then said to be pure and +unmixed. The distinction which Plato here makes seems to be the same as +that between pure and applied mathematics, and may be expressed in the +modern formula--science is art theoretical, art is science practical. +In the reason which he gives for the superiority of the pure science of +number over the mixed or applied, we can only agree with him in part. He +says that the numbers which the philosopher employs are always the same, +whereas the numbers which are used in practice represent different sizes +or quantities. He does not see that this power of expressing different +quantities by the same symbol is the characteristic and not the defect +of numbers, and is due to their abstract nature;--although we admit of +course what Plato seems to feel in his distinctions between pure and +impure knowledge, that the imperfection of matter enters into the +applications of them. + +Above the other sciences, as in the Republic, towers dialectic, which is +the science of eternal Being, apprehended by the purest mind and reason. +The lower sciences, including the mathematical, are akin to opinion +rather than to reason, and are placed together in the fourth class of +goods. The relation in which they stand to dialectic is obscure in the +Republic, and is not cleared up in the Philebus. + +V. Thus far we have only attained to the vestibule or ante-chamber of +the good; for there is a good exceeding knowledge, exceeding +essence, which, like Glaucon in the Republic, we find a difficulty +in apprehending. This good is now to be exhibited to us under various +aspects and gradations. The relative dignity of pleasure and knowledge +has been determined; but they have not yet received their exact position +in the scale of goods. Some difficulties occur to us in the enumeration: +First, how are we to distinguish the first from the second class of +goods, or the second from the third? Secondly, why is there no mention +of the supreme mind? Thirdly, the nature of the fourth class. Fourthly, +the meaning of the allusion to a sixth class, which is not further +investigated. + +(I) Plato seems to proceed in his table of goods, from the more abstract +to the less abstract; from the subjective to the objective; until at the +lower end of the scale we fairly descend into the region of human action +and feeling. To him, the greater the abstraction the greater the truth, +and he is always tending to see abstractions within abstractions; +which, like the ideas in the Parmenides, are always appearing one behind +another. Hence we find a difficulty in following him into the sphere of +thought which he is seeking to attain. First in his scale of goods he +places measure, in which he finds the eternal nature: this would be more +naturally expressed in modern language as eternal law, and seems to be +akin both to the finite and to the mind or cause, which were two of the +elements in the former table. Like the supreme nature in the Timaeus, +like the ideal beauty in the Symposium or the Phaedrus, or like the +ideal good in the Republic, this is the absolute and unapproachable +being. But this being is manifested in symmetry and beauty everywhere, +in the order of nature and of mind, in the relations of men to one +another. For the word 'measure' he now substitutes the word 'symmetry,' +as if intending to express measure conceived as relation. He then +proceeds to regard the good no longer in an objective form, but as the +human reason seeking to attain truth by the aid of dialectic; such at +least we naturally infer to be his meaning, when we consider that both +here and in the Republic the sphere of nous or mind is assigned +to dialectic. (2) It is remarkable (see above) that this personal +conception of mind is confined to the human mind, and not extended to +the divine. (3) If we may be allowed to interpret one dialogue of Plato +by another, the sciences of figure and number are probably classed +with the arts and true opinions, because they proceed from hypotheses +(compare Republic). (4) The sixth class, if a sixth class is to be +added, is playfully set aside by a quotation from Orpheus: Plato means +to say that a sixth class, if there be such a class, is not worth +considering, because pleasure, having only gained the fifth place in the +scale of goods, is already out of the running. + +VI. We may now endeavour to ascertain the relation of the Philebus to +the other dialogues. Here Plato shows the same indifference to his own +doctrine of Ideas which he has already manifested in the Parmenides and +the Sophist. The principle of the one and many of which he here speaks, +is illustrated by examples in the Sophist and Statesman. Notwithstanding +the differences of style, many resemblances may be noticed between the +Philebus and Gorgias. The theory of the simultaneousness of pleasure +and pain is common to both of them (Phil. Gorg.); there is also a common +tendency in them to take up arms against pleasure, although the view of +the Philebus, which is probably the later of the two dialogues, is +the more moderate. There seems to be an allusion to the passage in +the Gorgias, in which Socrates dilates on the pleasures of itching and +scratching. Nor is there any real discrepancy in the manner in which +Gorgias and his art are spoken of in the two dialogues. For Socrates +is far from implying that the art of rhetoric has a real sphere of +practical usefulness: he only means that the refutation of the claims +of Gorgias is not necessary for his present purpose. He is saying +in effect: 'Admit, if you please, that rhetoric is the greatest and +usefullest of sciences:--this does not prove that dialectic is not the +purest and most exact.' From the Sophist and Statesman we know that his +hostility towards the sophists and rhetoricians was not mitigated in +later life; although both in the Statesman and Laws he admits of a +higher use of rhetoric. + +Reasons have been already given for assigning a late date to the +Philebus. That the date is probably later than that of the Republic, may +be further argued on the following grounds:--1. The general resemblance +to the later dialogues and to the Laws: 2. The more complete account of +the nature of good and pleasure: 3. The distinction between perception, +memory, recollection, and opinion which indicates a great progress +in psychology; also between understanding and imagination, which is +described under the figure of the scribe and the painter. A superficial +notion may arise that Plato probably wrote shorter dialogues, such as +the Philebus, the Sophist, and the Statesman, as studies or preparations +for longer ones. This view may be natural; but on further reflection is +seen to be fallacious, because these three dialogues are found to make +an advance upon the metaphysical conceptions of the Republic. And we can +more easily suppose that Plato composed shorter writings after longer +ones, than suppose that he lost hold of further points of view which he +had once attained. + +It is more easy to find traces of the Pythagoreans, Eleatics, Megarians, +Cynics, Cyrenaics and of the ideas of Anaxagoras, in the Philebus, than +to say how much is due to each of them. Had we fuller records of those +old philosophers, we should probably find Plato in the midst of the fray +attempting to combine Eleatic and Pythagorean doctrines, and seeking to +find a truth beyond either Being or number; setting up his own concrete +conception of good against the abstract practical good of the Cynics, +or the abstract intellectual good of the Megarians, and his own idea of +classification against the denial of plurality in unity which is also +attributed to them; warring against the Eristics as destructive of +truth, as he had formerly fought against the Sophists; taking up a +middle position between the Cynics and Cyrenaics in his doctrine of +pleasure; asserting with more consistency than Anaxagoras the existence +of an intelligent mind and cause. Of the Heracliteans, whom he is said +by Aristotle to have cultivated in his youth, he speaks in the Philebus, +as in the Theaetetus and Cratylus, with irony and contempt. But we have +not the knowledge which would enable us to pursue further the line of +reflection here indicated; nor can we expect to find perfect clearness +or order in the first efforts of mankind to understand the working of +their own minds. The ideas which they are attempting to analyse, they +are also in process of creating; the abstract universals of which they +are seeking to adjust the relations have been already excluded by them +from the category of relation. + +... + +The Philebus, like the Cratylus, is supposed to be the continuation of +a previous discussion. An argument respecting the comparative claims of +pleasure and wisdom to rank as the chief good has been already carried +on between Philebus and Socrates. The argument is now transferred to +Protarchus, the son of Callias, a noble Athenian youth, sprung from +a family which had spent 'a world of money' on the Sophists (compare +Apol.; Crat.; Protag.). Philebus, who appears to be the teacher, or +elder friend, and perhaps the lover, of Protarchus, takes no further +part in the discussion beyond asserting in the strongest manner his +adherence, under all circumstances, to the cause of pleasure. + +Socrates suggests that they shall have a first and second palm of +victory. For there may be a good higher than either pleasure or wisdom, +and then neither of them will gain the first prize, but whichever of the +two is more akin to this higher good will have a right to the second. +They agree, and Socrates opens the game by enlarging on the diversity +and opposition which exists among pleasures. For there are pleasures of +all kinds, good and bad, wise and foolish--pleasures of the temperate as +well as of the intemperate. Protarchus replies that although pleasures +may be opposed in so far as they spring from opposite sources, +nevertheless as pleasures they are alike. Yes, retorts Socrates, +pleasure is like pleasure, as figure is like figure and colour like +colour; yet we all know that there is great variety among figures and +colours. Protarchus does not see the drift of this remark; and Socrates +proceeds to ask how he can have a right to attribute a new predicate +(i.e. 'good') to pleasures in general, when he cannot deny that they are +different? What common property in all of them does he mean to indicate +by the term 'good'? If he continues to assert that there is some trivial +sense in which pleasure is one, Socrates may retort by saying that +knowledge is one, but the result will be that such merely verbal and +trivial conceptions, whether of knowledge or pleasure, will spoil the +discussion, and will prove the incapacity of the two disputants. In +order to avoid this danger, he proposes that they shall beat a retreat, +and, before they proceed, come to an understanding about the 'high +argument' of the one and the many. + +Protarchus agrees to the proposal, but he is under the impression that +Socrates means to discuss the common question--how a sensible object can +be one, and yet have opposite attributes, such as 'great' and 'small,' +'light' and 'heavy,' or how there can be many members in one body, and +the like wonders. Socrates has long ceased to see any wonder in these +phenomena; his difficulties begin with the application of number to +abstract unities (e.g.'man,' 'good') and with the attempt to divide +them. For have these unities of idea any real existence? How, if +imperishable, can they enter into the world of generation? How, as +units, can they be divided and dispersed among different objects? Or do +they exist in their entirety in each object? These difficulties are but +imperfectly answered by Socrates in what follows. + +We speak of a one and many, which is ever flowing in and out of all +things, concerning which a young man often runs wild in his first +metaphysical enthusiasm, talking about analysis and synthesis to his +father and mother and the neighbours, hardly sparing even his dog. This +'one in many' is a revelation of the order of the world, which some +Prometheus first made known to our ancestors; and they, who were better +men and nearer the gods than we are, have handed it down to us. To know +how to proceed by regular steps from one to many, and from many to one, +is just what makes the difference between eristic and dialectic. And the +right way of proceeding is to look for one idea or class in all things, +and when you have found one to look for more than one, and for all that +there are, and when you have found them all and regularly divided a +particular field of knowledge into classes, you may leave the further +consideration of individuals. But you must not pass at once either from +unity to infinity, or from infinity to unity. In music, for example, you +may begin with the most general notion, but this alone will not make you +a musician: you must know also the number and nature of the intervals, +and the systems which are framed out of them, and the rhythms of the +dance which correspond to them. And when you have a similar knowledge of +any other subject, you may be said to know that subject. In speech again +there are infinite varieties of sound, and some one who was a wise man, +or more than man, comprehended them all in the classes of mutes, vowels, +and semivowels, and gave to each of them a name, and assigned them to +the art of grammar. + +'But whither, Socrates, are you going? And what has this to do with the +comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom:' Socrates replies, that +before we can adjust their respective claims, we want to know the number +and kinds of both of them. What are they? He is requested to answer the +question himself. That he will, if he may be allowed to make one or two +preliminary remarks. In the first place he has a dreamy recollection of +hearing that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the highest good, for +the good should be perfect and sufficient. But is the life of pleasure +perfect and sufficient, when deprived of memory, consciousness, +anticipation? Is not this the life of an oyster? Or is the life of mind +sufficient, if devoid of any particle of pleasure? Must not the union of +the two be higher and more eligible than either separately? And is not +the element which makes this mixed life eligible more akin to mind than +to pleasure? Thus pleasure is rejected and mind is rejected. And yet +there may be a life of mind, not human but divine, which conquers still. + +But, if we are to pursue this argument further, we shall require some +new weapons; and by this, I mean a new classification of existence. (1) +There is a finite element of existence, and (2) an infinite, and (3) the +union of the two, and (4) the cause of the union. More may be added if +they are wanted, but at present we can do without them. And first of the +infinite or indefinite:--That is the class which is denoted by the terms +more or less, and is always in a state of comparison. All words or +ideas to which the words 'gently,' 'extremely,' and other comparative +expressions are applied, fall under this class. The infinite would be +no longer infinite, if limited or reduced to measure by number and +quantity. The opposite class is the limited or finite, and includes all +things which have number and quantity. And there is a third class of +generation into essence by the union of the finite and infinite, in +which the finite gives law to the infinite;--under this are comprehended +health, strength, temperate seasons, harmony, beauty, and the like. The +goddess of beauty saw the universal wantonness of all things, and gave +law and order to be the salvation of the soul. But no effect can be +generated without a cause, and therefore there must be a fourth class, +which is the cause of generation; for the cause or agent is not the same +as the patient or effect. + +And now, having obtained our classes, we may determine in which our +conqueror life is to be placed: Clearly in the third or mixed class, in +which the finite gives law to the infinite. And in which is pleasure to +find a place? As clearly in the infinite or indefinite, which alone, +as Protarchus thinks (who seems to confuse the infinite with the +superlative), gives to pleasure the character of the absolute good. Yes, +retorts Socrates, and also to pain the character of absolute evil. And +therefore the infinite cannot be that which imparts to pleasure the +nature of the good. But where shall we place mind? That is a very +serious and awful question, which may be prefaced by another. Is mind +or chance the lord of the universe? All philosophers will say the first, +and yet, perhaps, they may be only magnifying themselves. And for this +reason I should like to consider the matter a little more deeply, even +though some lovers of disorder in the world should ridicule my attempt. + +Now the elements earth, air, fire, water, exist in us, and they exist in +the cosmos; but they are purer and fairer in the cosmos than they are in +us, and they come to us from thence. And as we have a soul as well as a +body, in like manner the elements of the finite, the infinite, the union +of the two, and the cause, are found to exist in us. And if they, like +the elements, exist in us, and the three first exist in the world, +must not the fourth or cause which is the noblest of them, exist in the +world? And this cause is wisdom or mind, the royal mind of Zeus, who +is the king of all, as there are other gods who have other noble +attributes. Observe how well this agrees with the testimony of men of +old, who affirmed mind to be the ruler of the universe. And remember +that mind belongs to the class which we term the cause, and pleasure to +the infinite or indefinite class. We will examine the place and origin +of both. + +What is the origin of pleasure? Her natural seat is the mixed class, +in which health and harmony were placed. Pain is the violation, and +pleasure the restoration of limit. There is a natural union of finite +and infinite, which in hunger, thirst, heat, cold, is impaired--this is +painful, but the return to nature, in which the elements are restored +to their normal proportions, is pleasant. Here is our first class of +pleasures. And another class of pleasures and pains are hopes and fears; +these are in the mind only. And inasmuch as the pleasures are unalloyed +by pains and the pains by pleasures, the examination of them may show +us whether all pleasure is to be desired, or whether this entire +desirableness is not rather the attribute of another class. But if +pleasures and pains consist in the violation and restoration of limit, +may there not be a neutral state, in which there is neither dissolution +nor restoration? That is a further question, and admitting, as we must, +the possibility of such a state, there seems to be no reason why +the life of wisdom should not exist in this neutral state, which is, +moreover, the state of the gods, who cannot, without indecency, be +supposed to feel either joy or sorrow. + +The second class of pleasures involves memory. There are affections +which are extinguished before they reach the soul, and of these there +is no consciousness, and therefore no memory. And there are affections +which the body and soul feel together, and this feeling is termed +consciousness. And memory is the preservation of consciousness, and +reminiscence is the recovery of consciousness. Now the memory of +pleasure, when a man is in pain, is the memory of the opposite of his +actual bodily state, and is therefore not in the body, but in the mind. +And there may be an intermediate state, in which a person is balanced +between pleasure and pain; in his body there is want which is a cause of +pain, but in his mind a sure hope of replenishment, which is pleasant. +(But if the hope be converted into despair, he has two pains and not +a balance of pain and pleasure.) Another question is raised: May not +pleasures, like opinions, be true and false? In the sense of being real, +both must be admitted to be true: nor can we deny that to both of them +qualities may be attributed; for pleasures as well as opinions may be +described as good or bad. And though we do not all of us allow that +there are true and false pleasures, we all acknowledge that there are +some pleasures associated with right opinion, and others with +falsehood and ignorance. Let us endeavour to analyze the nature of this +association. + +Opinion is based on perception, which may be correct or mistaken. You +may see a figure at a distance, and say first of all, 'This is a man,' +and then say, 'No, this is an image made by the shepherds.' And you +may affirm this in a proposition to your companion, or make the remark +mentally to yourself. Whether the words are actually spoken or not, +on such occasions there is a scribe within who registers them, and a +painter who paints the images of the things which the scribe has written +down in the soul,--at least that is my own notion of the process; and +the words and images which are inscribed by them may be either true +or false; and they may represent either past, present, or future. And, +representing the future, they must also represent the pleasures and +pains of anticipation--the visions of gold and other fancies which are +never wanting in the mind of man. Now these hopes, as they are termed, +are propositions, which are sometimes true, and sometimes false; for the +good, who are the friends of the gods, see true pictures of the future, +and the bad false ones. And as there may be opinion about things which +are not, were not, and will not be, which is opinion still, so there may +be pleasure about things which are not, were not, and will not be, which +is pleasure still,--that is to say, false pleasure; and only when +false, can pleasure, like opinion, be vicious. Against this conclusion +Protarchus reclaims. + +Leaving his denial for the present, Socrates proceeds to show that +some pleasures are false from another point of view. In desire, as we +admitted, the body is divided from the soul, and hence pleasures and +pains are often simultaneous. And we further admitted that both of them +belonged to the infinite class. How, then, can we compare them? Are we +not liable, or rather certain, as in the case of sight, to be deceived +by distance and relation? In this case the pleasures and pains are not +false because based upon false opinion, but are themselves false. And +there is another illusion: pain has often been said by us to arise out +of the derangement--pleasure out of the restoration--of our nature. But +in passing from one to the other, do we not experience neutral states, +which although they appear pleasureable or painful are really neither? +For even if we admit, with the wise man whom Protarchus loves (and only +a wise man could have ever entertained such a notion), that all things +are in a perpetual flux, still these changes are often unconscious, and +devoid either of pleasure or pain. We assume, then, that there are three +states--pleasureable, painful, neutral; we may embellish a little by +calling them gold, silver, and that which is neither. + +But there are certain natural philosophers who will not admit a third +state. Their instinctive dislike to pleasure leads them to affirm that +pleasure is only the absence of pain. They are noble fellows, and, +although we do not agree with them, we may use them as diviners who +will indicate to us the right track. They will say, that the nature of +anything is best known from the examination of extreme cases, e.g. the +nature of hardness from the examination of the hardest things; and that +the nature of pleasure will be best understood from an examination of +the most intense pleasures. Now these are the pleasures of the body, not +of the mind; the pleasures of disease and not of health, the pleasures +of the intemperate and not of the temperate. I am speaking, not of the +frequency or continuance, but only of the intensity of such pleasures, +and this is given them by contrast with the pain or sickness of body +which precedes them. Their morbid nature is illustrated by the lesser +instances of itching and scratching, respecting which I swear that I +cannot tell whether they are a pleasure or a pain. (1) Some of these +arise out of a transition from one state of the body to another, as from +cold to hot; (2) others are caused by the contrast of an internal pain +and an external pleasure in the body: sometimes the feeling of pain +predominates, as in itching and tingling, when they are relieved by +scratching; sometimes the feeling of pleasure: or the pleasure which +they give may be quite overpowering, and is then accompanied by all +sorts of unutterable feelings which have a death of delights in them. +But there are also mixed pleasures which are in the mind only. For are +not love and sorrow as well as anger 'sweeter than honey,' and also full +of pain? Is there not a mixture of feelings in the spectator of tragedy? +and of comedy also? 'I do not understand that last.' Well, then, with +the view of lighting up the obscurity of these mixed feelings, let +me ask whether envy is painful. 'Yes.' And yet the envious man finds +something pleasing in the misfortunes of others? 'True.' And +ignorance is a misfortune? 'Certainly.' And one form of ignorance is +self-conceit--a man may fancy himself richer, fairer, better, wiser than +he is? 'Yes.' And he who thus deceives himself may be strong or weak? +'He may.' And if he is strong we fear him, and if he is weak we laugh +at him, which is a pleasure, and yet we envy him, which is a pain? These +mixed feelings are the rationale of tragedy and comedy, and equally the +rationale of the greater drama of human life. (There appears to be some +confusion in this passage. There is no difficulty in seeing that in +comedy, as in tragedy, the spectator may view the performance with mixed +feelings of pain as well as of pleasure; nor is there any difficulty in +understanding that envy is a mixed feeling, which rejoices not without +pain at the misfortunes of others, and laughs at their ignorance of +themselves. But Plato seems to think further that he has explained the +feeling of the spectator in comedy sufficiently by a theory which only +applies to comedy in so far as in comedy we laugh at the conceit or +weakness of others. He has certainly given a very partial explanation of +the ridiculous.) Having shown how sorrow, anger, envy are feelings of +a mixed nature, I will reserve the consideration of the remainder for +another occasion. + +Next follow the unmixed pleasures; which, unlike the philosophers of +whom I was speaking, I believe to be real. These unmixed pleasures are: +(1) The pleasures derived from beauty of form, colour, sound, smell, +which are absolutely pure; and in general those which are unalloyed with +pain: (2) The pleasures derived from the acquisition of knowledge, which +in themselves are pure, but may be attended by an accidental pain of +forgetting; this, however, arises from a subsequent act of reflection, +of which we need take no account. At the same time, we admit that the +latter pleasures are the property of a very few. To these pure and +unmixed pleasures we ascribe measure, whereas all others belong to the +class of the infinite, and are liable to every species of excess. And +here several questions arise for consideration:--What is the meaning of +pure and impure, of moderate and immoderate? We may answer the question +by an illustration: Purity of white paint consists in the clearness or +quality of the white, and this is distinct from the quantity or amount +of white paint; a little pure white is fairer than a great deal which +is impure. But there is another question:--Pleasure is affirmed by +ingenious philosophers to be a generation; they say that there are +two natures--one self-existent, the other dependent; the one noble +and majestic, the other failing in both these qualities. 'I do not +understand.' There are lovers and there are loves. 'Yes, I know, but +what is the application?' The argument is in play, and desires to +intimate that there are relatives and there are absolutes, and that the +relative is for the sake of the absolute; and generation is for the +sake of essence. Under relatives I class all things done with a view to +generation; and essence is of the class of good. But if essence is +of the class of good, generation must be of some other class; and our +friends, who affirm that pleasure is a generation, would laugh at the +notion that pleasure is a good; and at that other notion, that pleasure +is produced by generation, which is only the alternative of destruction. +Who would prefer such an alternation to the equable life of pure +thought? Here is one absurdity, and not the only one, to which the +friends of pleasure are reduced. For is there not also an absurdity in +affirming that good is of the soul only; or in declaring that the best +of men, if he be in pain, is bad? + +And now, from the consideration of pleasure, we pass to that of +knowledge. Let us reflect that there are two kinds of knowledge--the one +creative or productive, and the other educational and philosophical. +Of the creative arts, there is one part purer or more akin to knowledge +than the other. There is an element of guess-work and an element +of number and measure in them. In music, for example, especially in +flute-playing, the conjectural element prevails; while in carpentering +there is more application of rule and measure. Of the creative arts, +then, we may make two classes--the less exact and the more exact. And +the exacter part of all of them is really arithmetic and mensuration. +But arithmetic and mensuration again may be subdivided with reference +either to their use in the concrete, or to their nature in the +abstract--as they are regarded popularly in building and binding, or +theoretically by philosophers. And, borrowing the analogy of pleasure, +we may say that the philosophical use of them is purer than the other. +Thus we have two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration. And truest +of all in the estimation of every rational man is dialectic, or the +science of being, which will forget and disown us, if we forget and +disown her. + +'But, Socrates, I have heard Gorgias say that rhetoric is the greatest +and usefullest of arts; and I should not like to quarrel either with +him or you.' Neither is there any inconsistency, Protarchus, with +his statement in what I am now saying; for I am not maintaining that +dialectic is the greatest or usefullest, but only that she is the truest +of arts; my remark is not quantitative but qualitative, and refers not +to the advantage or repetition of either, but to the degree of truth +which they attain--here Gorgias will not care to compete; this is what +we affirm to be possessed in the highest degree by dialectic. And do not +let us appeal to Gorgias or Philebus or Socrates, but ask, on behalf of +the argument, what are the highest truths which the soul has the power +of attaining. And is not this the science which has a firmer grasp +of them than any other? For the arts generally are only occupied with +matters of opinion, and with the production and action and passion of +this sensible world. But the highest truth is that which is eternal and +unchangeable. And reason and wisdom are concerned with the eternal; and +these are the very claimants, if not for the first, at least for the +second place, whom I propose as rivals to pleasure. + +And now, having the materials, we may proceed to mix them--first +recapitulating the question at issue. + +Philebus affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed them to be +one nature; I affirmed that they were two natures, and declared that +knowledge was more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that the two +together were more eligible than either taken singly; and to this we +adhere. Reason intimates, as at first, that we should seek the good not +in the unmixed life, but in the mixed. + +The cup is ready, waiting to be mingled, and here are two fountains, +one of honey, the other of pure water, out of which to make the fairest +possible mixture. There are pure and impure pleasures--pure and impure +sciences. Let us consider the sections of each which have the most of +purity and truth; to admit them all indiscriminately would be +dangerous. First we will take the pure sciences; but shall we mingle the +impure--the art which uses the false rule and the false measure? That +we must, if we are any of us to find our way home; man cannot live upon +pure mathematics alone. And must I include music, which is admitted to +be guess-work? 'Yes, you must, if human life is to have any humanity.' +Well, then, I will open the door and let them all in; they shall mingle +in an Homeric 'meeting of the waters.' And now we turn to the pleasures; +shall I admit them? 'Admit first of all the pure pleasures; secondly, +the necessary.' And what shall we say about the rest? First, ask the +pleasures--they will be too happy to dwell with wisdom. Secondly, ask +the arts and sciences--they reply that the excesses of intemperance are +the ruin of them; and that they would rather only have the pleasures of +health and temperance, which are the handmaidens of virtue. But still we +want truth? That is now added; and so the argument is complete, and may +be compared to an incorporeal law, which is to hold fair rule over a +living body. And now we are at the vestibule of the good, in which there +are three chief elements--truth, symmetry, and beauty. These will be the +criterion of the comparative claims of pleasure and wisdom. + +Which has the greater share of truth? Surely wisdom; for pleasure is the +veriest impostor in the world, and the perjuries of lovers have passed +into a proverb. + +Which of symmetry? Wisdom again; for nothing is more immoderate than +pleasure. + +Which of beauty? Once more, wisdom; for pleasure is often unseemly, and +the greatest pleasures are put out of sight. + +Not pleasure, then, ranks first in the scale of good, but measure, and +eternal harmony. + +Second comes the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect. + +Third, mind and wisdom. + +Fourth, sciences and arts and true opinions. + +Fifth, painless pleasures. + +Of a sixth class, I have no more to say. Thus, pleasure and mind may +both renounce the claim to the first place. But mind is ten thousand +times nearer to the chief good than pleasure. Pleasure ranks fifth and +not first, even though all the animals in the world assert the contrary. + +... + +From the days of Aristippus and Epicurus to our own times the nature +of pleasure has occupied the attention of philosophers. 'Is pleasure +an evil? a good? the only good?' are the simple forms which the enquiry +assumed among the Socratic schools. But at an early stage of the +controversy another question was asked: 'Do pleasures differ in kind? +and are some bad, some good, and some neither bad nor good?' There are +bodily and there are mental pleasures, which were at first confused but +afterwards distinguished. A distinction was also made between necessary +and unnecessary pleasures; and again between pleasures which had or had +not corresponding pains. The ancient philosophers were fond of asking, +in the language of their age, 'Is pleasure a "becoming" only, and +therefore transient and relative, or do some pleasures partake of truth +and Being?' To these ancient speculations the moderns have added a +further question:--'Whose pleasure? The pleasure of yourself, or of your +neighbour,--of the individual, or of the world?' This little addition +has changed the whole aspect of the discussion: the same word is now +supposed to include two principles as widely different as benevolence +and self-love. Some modern writers have also distinguished between +pleasure the test, and pleasure the motive of actions. For the universal +test of right actions (how I know them) may not always be the highest or +best motive of them (why I do them). + +Socrates, as we learn from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, first drew +attention to the consequences of actions. Mankind were said by him to +act rightly when they knew what they were doing, or, in the language of +the Gorgias, 'did what they would.' He seems to have been the first who +maintained that the good was the useful (Mem.). In his eagerness for +generalization, seeking, as Aristotle says, for the universal in Ethics +(Metaph.), he took the most obvious intellectual aspect of human action +which occurred to him. He meant to emphasize, not pleasure, but the +calculation of pleasure; neither is he arguing that pleasure is the +chief good, but that we should have a principle of choice. He did not +intend to oppose 'the useful' to some higher conception, such as the +Platonic ideal, but to chance and caprice. The Platonic Socrates pursues +the same vein of thought in the Protagoras, where he argues against the +so-called sophist that pleasure and pain are the final standards and +motives of good and evil, and that the salvation of human life depends +upon a right estimate of pleasures greater or less when seen near and +at a distance. The testimony of Xenophon is thus confirmed by that of +Plato, and we are therefore justified in calling Socrates the first +utilitarian; as indeed there is no side or aspect of philosophy which +may not with reason be ascribed to him--he is Cynic and Cyrenaic, +Platonist and Aristotelian in one. But in the Phaedo the Socratic has +already passed into a more ideal point of view; and he, or rather +Plato speaking in his person, expressly repudiates the notion that the +exchange of a less pleasure for a greater can be an exchange of virtue. +Such virtue is the virtue of ordinary men who live in the world of +appearance; they are temperate only that they may enjoy the pleasures +of intemperance, and courageous from fear of danger. Whereas the +philosopher is seeking after wisdom and not after pleasure, whether near +or distant: he is the mystic, the initiated, who has learnt to despise +the body and is yearning all his life long for a truth which will +hereafter be revealed to him. In the Republic the pleasures of knowledge +are affirmed to be superior to other pleasures, because the philosopher +so estimates them; and he alone has had experience of both kinds. +(Compare a similar argument urged by one of the latest defenders of +Utilitarianism, Mill's Utilitarianism). In the Philebus, Plato, although +he regards the enemies of pleasure with complacency, still further +modifies the transcendentalism of the Phaedo. For he is compelled to +confess, rather reluctantly, perhaps, that some pleasures, i.e. those +which have no antecedent pains, claim a place in the scale of goods. + +There have been many reasons why not only Plato but mankind in general +have been unwilling to acknowledge that 'pleasure is the chief good.' +Either they have heard a voice calling to them out of another world; or +the life and example of some great teacher has cast their thoughts +of right and wrong in another mould; or the word 'pleasure' has been +associated in their mind with merely animal enjoyment. They could not +believe that what they were always striving to overcome, and the power +or principle in them which overcame, were of the same nature. The +pleasure of doing good to others and of bodily self-indulgence, +the pleasures of intellect and the pleasures of sense, are so +different:--Why then should they be called by a common name? Or, if the +equivocal or metaphorical use of the word is justified by custom (like +the use of other words which at first referred only to the body, and +then by a figure have been transferred to the mind), still, why should +we make an ambiguous word the corner-stone of moral philosophy? To the +higher thinker the Utilitarian or hedonist mode of speaking has been at +variance with religion and with any higher conception both of politics +and of morals. It has not satisfied their imagination; it has offended +their taste. To elevate pleasure, 'the most fleeting of all things,' +into a general idea seems to such men a contradiction. They do not +desire to bring down their theory to the level of their practice. The +simplicity of the 'greatest happiness' principle has been acceptable to +philosophers, but the better part of the world has been slow to receive +it. + +Before proceeding, we may make a few admissions which will narrow the +field of dispute; and we may as well leave behind a few prejudices, +which intelligent opponents of Utilitarianism have by this time 'agreed +to discard'. We admit that Utility is coextensive with right, and that +no action can be right which does not tend to the happiness of mankind; +we acknowledge that a large class of actions are made right or wrong +by their consequences only; we say further that mankind are not too +mindful, but that they are far too regardless of consequences, and that +they need to have the doctrine of utility habitually inculcated on them. +We recognize the value of a principle which can supply a connecting link +between Ethics and Politics, and under which all human actions are or +may be included. The desire to promote happiness is no mean preference +of expediency to right, but one of the highest and noblest motives by +which human nature can be animated. Neither in referring actions to the +test of utility have we to make a laborious calculation, any more than +in trying them by other standards of morals. For long ago they have been +classified sufficiently for all practical purposes by the thinker, +by the legislator, by the opinion of the world. Whatever may be the +hypothesis on which they are explained, or which in doubtful cases +may be applied to the regulation of them, we are very rarely, if ever, +called upon at the moment of performing them to determine their effect +upon the happiness of mankind. + +There is a theory which has been contrasted with Utility by Paley and +others--the theory of a moral sense: Are our ideas of right and wrong +innate or derived from experience? This, perhaps, is another of those +speculations which intelligent men might 'agree to discard.' For it has +been worn threadbare; and either alternative is equally consistent +with a transcendental or with an eudaemonistic system of ethics, with +a greatest happiness principle or with Kant's law of duty. Yet to avoid +misconception, what appears to be the truth about the origin of +our moral ideas may be shortly summed up as follows:--To each of us +individually our moral ideas come first of all in childhood through +the medium of education, from parents and teachers, assisted by the +unconscious influence of language; they are impressed upon a mind which +at first is like a waxen tablet, adapted to receive them; but they soon +become fixed or set, and in after life are strengthened, or perhaps +weakened by the force of public opinion. They may be corrected and +enlarged by experience, they may be reasoned about, they may be brought +home to us by the circumstances of our lives, they may be intensified +by imagination, by reflection, by a course of action likely to confirm +them. Under the influence of religious feeling or by an effort of +thought, any one beginning with the ordinary rules of morality may +create out of them for himself ideals of holiness and virtue. They +slumber in the minds of most men, yet in all of us there remains some +tincture of affection, some desire of good, some sense of truth, some +fear of the law. Of some such state or process each individual is +conscious in himself, and if he compares his own experience with that +of others he will find the witness of their consciences to coincide with +that of his own. All of us have entered into an inheritance which we +have the power of appropriating and making use of. No great effort of +mind is required on our part; we learn morals, as we learn to talk, +instinctively, from conversing with others, in an enlightened age, in +a civilized country, in a good home. A well-educated child of ten years +old already knows the essentials of morals: 'Thou shalt not steal,' +'thou shalt speak the truth,' 'thou shalt love thy parents,' 'thou shalt +fear God.' What more does he want? + +But whence comes this common inheritance or stock of moral ideas? Their +beginning, like all other beginnings of human things, is obscure, and +is the least important part of them. Imagine, if you will, that Society +originated in the herding of brutes, in their parental instincts, in +their rude attempts at self-preservation:--Man is not man in that he +resembles, but in that he differs from them. We must pass into another +cycle of existence, before we can discover in him by any evidence +accessible to us even the germs of our moral ideas. In the history of +the world, which viewed from within is the history of the human mind, +they have been slowly created by religion, by poetry, by law, having +their foundation in the natural affections and in the necessity of some +degree of truth and justice in a social state; they have been deepened +and enlarged by the efforts of great thinkers who have idealized and +connected them--by the lives of saints and prophets who have taught and +exemplified them. The schools of ancient philosophy which seem so far +from us--Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and +a few modern teachers, such as Kant and Bentham, have each of them +supplied 'moments' of thought to the world. The life of Christ has +embodied a divine love, wisdom, patience, reasonableness. For his image, +however imperfectly handed down to us, the modern world has received a +standard more perfect in idea than the societies of ancient times, but +also further removed from practice. For there is certainly a greater +interval between the theory and practice of Christians than between the +theory and practice of the Greeks and Romans; the ideal is more above +us, and the aspiration after good has often lent a strange power to +evil. And sometimes, as at the Reformation, or French Revolution, when +the upper classes of a so-called Christian country have become corrupted +by priestcraft, by casuistry, by licentiousness, by despotism, the lower +have risen up and re-asserted the natural sense of religion and right. + +We may further remark that our moral ideas, as the world grows older, +perhaps as we grow older ourselves, unless they have been undermined in +us by false philosophy or the practice of mental analysis, or +infected by the corruption of society or by some moral disorder in +the individual, are constantly assuming a more natural and necessary +character. The habit of the mind, the opinion of the world, familiarizes +them to us; and they take more and more the form of immediate intuition. +The moral sense comes last and not first in the order of their +development, and is the instinct which we have inherited or acquired, +not the nobler effort of reflection which created them and which keeps +them alive. We do not stop to reason about common honesty. Whenever we +are not blinded by self-deceit, as for example in judging the actions +of others, we have no hesitation in determining what is right and wrong. +The principles of morality, when not at variance with some desire or +worldly interest of our own, or with the opinion of the public, are +hardly perceived by us; but in the conflict of reason and passion they +assert their authority and are not overcome without remorse. + +Such is a brief outline of the history of our moral ideas. We have to +distinguish, first of all, the manner in which they have grown up in the +world from the manner in which they have been communicated to each of +us. We may represent them to ourselves as flowing out of the boundless +ocean of language and thought in little rills, which convey them to the +heart and brain of each individual. But neither must we confound the +theories or aspects of morality with the origin of our moral ideas. +These are not the roots or 'origines' of morals, but the latest efforts +of reflection, the lights in which the whole moral world has been +regarded by different thinkers and successive generations of men. If we +ask: Which of these many theories is the true one? we may answer: All +of them--moral sense, innate ideas, a priori, a posteriori notions, the +philosophy of experience, the philosophy of intuition--all of them have +added something to our conception of Ethics; no one of them is the whole +truth. But to decide how far our ideas of morality are derived from +one source or another; to determine what history, what philosophy has +contributed to them; to distinguish the original, simple elements from +the manifold and complex applications of them, would be a long enquiry +too far removed from the question which we are now pursuing. + +Bearing in mind the distinction which we have been seeking to establish +between our earliest and our most mature ideas of morality, we may now +proceed to state the theory of Utility, not exactly in the words, but +in the spirit of one of its ablest and most moderate supporters (Mill's +Utilitarianism):--'That which alone makes actions either right or +desirable is their utility, or tendency to promote the happiness of +mankind, or, in other words, to increase the sum of pleasure in the +world. But all pleasures are not the same: they differ in quality as +well as in quantity, and the pleasure which is superior in quality is +incommensurable with the inferior. Neither is the pleasure or happiness, +which we seek, our own pleasure, but that of others,--of our family, of +our country, of mankind. The desire of this, and even the sacrifice of +our own interest to that of other men, may become a passion to a rightly +educated nature. The Utilitarian finds a place in his system for this +virtue and for every other.' + +Good or happiness or pleasure is thus regarded as the true and only end +of human life. To this all our desires will be found to tend, and +in accordance with this all the virtues, including justice, may be +explained. Admitting that men rest for a time in inferior ends, and do +not cast their eyes beyond them, these ends are really dependent on the +greater end of happiness, and would not be pursued, unless in general +they had been found to lead to it. The existence of such an end is +proved, as in Aristotle's time, so in our own, by the universal fact +that men desire it. The obligation to promote it is based upon the +social nature of man; this sense of duty is shared by all of us in some +degree, and is capable of being greatly fostered and strengthened. +So far from being inconsistent with religion, the greatest happiness +principle is in the highest degree agreeable to it. For what can be more +reasonable than that God should will the happiness of all his creatures? +and in working out their happiness we may be said to be 'working +together with him.' Nor is it inconceivable that a new enthusiasm of +the future, far stronger than any old religion, may be based upon such a +conception. + +But then for the familiar phrase of the 'greatest happiness principle,' +it seems as if we ought now to read 'the noblest happiness principle,' +'the happiness of others principle'--the principle not of the greatest, +but of the highest pleasure, pursued with no more regard to our own +immediate interest than is required by the law of self-preservation. +Transfer the thought of happiness to another life, dropping the external +circumstances which form so large a part of our idea of happiness +in this, and the meaning of the word becomes indistinguishable from +holiness, harmony, wisdom, love. By the slight addition 'of others,' all +the associations of the word are altered; we seem to have passed +over from one theory of morals to the opposite. For allowing that the +happiness of others is reflected on ourselves, and also that every man +must live before he can do good to others, still the last limitation is +a very trifling exception, and the happiness of another is very far from +compensating for the loss of our own. According to Mr. Mill, he would +best carry out the principle of utility who sacrificed his own +pleasure most to that of his fellow-men. But if so, Hobbes and Butler, +Shaftesbury and Hume, are not so far apart as they and their followers +imagine. The thought of self and the thought of others are alike +superseded in the more general notion of the happiness of mankind at +large. But in this composite good, until society becomes perfected, the +friend of man himself has generally the least share, and may be a great +sufferer. + +And now what objection have we to urge against a system of moral +philosophy so beneficent, so enlightened, so ideal, and at the same time +so practical,--so Christian, as we may say without exaggeration,--and +which has the further advantage of resting morality on a principle +intelligible to all capacities? Have we not found that which Socrates +and Plato 'grew old in seeking'? Are we not desirous of happiness, at +any rate for ourselves and our friends, if not for all mankind? If, as +is natural, we begin by thinking of ourselves first, we are easily led +on to think of others; for we cannot help acknowledging that what +is right for us is the right and inheritance of others. We feel the +advantage of an abstract principle wide enough and strong enough +to override all the particularisms of mankind; which acknowledges a +universal good, truth, right; which is capable of inspiring men like +a passion, and is the symbol of a cause for which they are ready to +contend to their life's end. + +And if we test this principle by the lives of its professors, it would +certainly appear inferior to none as a rule of action. From the days +of Eudoxus (Arist. Ethics) and Epicurus to our own, the votaries of +pleasure have gained belief for their principles by their practice. +Two of the noblest and most disinterested men who have lived in this +century, Bentham and J. S. Mill, whose lives were a long devotion to +the service of their fellows, have been among the most enthusiastic +supporters of utility; while among their contemporaries, some who were +of a more mystical turn of mind, have ended rather in aspiration than in +action, and have been found unequal to the duties of life. Looking back +on them now that they are removed from the scene, we feel that mankind +has been the better for them. The world was against them while they +lived; but this is rather a reason for admiring than for depreciating +them. Nor can any one doubt that the influence of their philosophy on +politics--especially on foreign politics, on law, on social life, has +been upon the whole beneficial. Nevertheless, they will never have +justice done to them, for they do not agree either with the better +feeling of the multitude or with the idealism of more refined thinkers. +Without Bentham, a great word in the history of philosophy would have +remained unspoken. Yet to this day it is rare to hear his name received +with any mark of respect such as would be freely granted to the +ambiguous memory of some father of the Church. The odium which attached +to him when alive has not been removed by his death. For he shocked his +contemporaries by egotism and want of taste; and this generation which +has reaped the benefit of his labours has inherited the feeling of the +last. He was before his own age, and is hardly remembered in this. + +While acknowledging the benefits which the greatest happiness principle +has conferred upon mankind, the time appears to have arrived, not for +denying its claims, but for criticizing them and comparing them with +other principles which equally claim to lie at the foundation of ethics. +Any one who adds a general principle to knowledge has been a benefactor +to the world. But there is a danger that, in his first enthusiasm, he +may not recognize the proportions or limitations to which his truth is +subjected; he does not see how far he has given birth to a truism, or +how that which is a truth to him is a truism to the rest of the world; +or may degenerate in the next generation. He believes that to be the +whole which is only a part,--to be the necessary foundation which +is really only a valuable aspect of the truth. The systems of all +philosophers require the criticism of 'the morrow,' when the heat of +imagination which forged them has cooled, and they are seen in the +temperate light of day. All of them have contributed to enrich the mind +of the civilized world; none of them occupy that supreme or exclusive +place which their authors would have assigned to them. + +We may preface the criticism with a few preliminary remarks:-- + +Mr. Mill, Mr. Austin, and others, in their eagerness to maintain the +doctrine of utility, are fond of repeating that we are in a lamentable +state of uncertainty about morals. While other branches of knowledge +have made extraordinary progress, in moral philosophy we are supposed by +them to be no better than children, and with few exceptions--that is to +say, Bentham and his followers--to be no further advanced than men were +in the age of Socrates and Plato, who, in their turn, are deemed to be +as backward in ethics as they necessarily were in physics. But this, +though often asserted, is recanted almost in a breath by the same +writers who speak thus depreciatingly of our modern ethical philosophy. +For they are the first to acknowledge that we have not now to begin +classifying actions under the head of utility; they would not deny that +about the general conceptions of morals there is a practical agreement. +There is no more doubt that falsehood is wrong than that a stone falls +to the ground, although the first does not admit of the same ocular +proof as the second. There is no greater uncertainty about the duty +of obedience to parents and to the law of the land than about the +properties of triangles. Unless we are looking for a new moral world +which has no marrying and giving in marriage, there is no greater +disagreement in theory about the right relations of the sexes than about +the composition of water. These and a few other simple principles, as +they have endless applications in practice, so also may be developed in +theory into counsels of perfection. + +To what then is to be attributed this opinion which has been often +entertained about the uncertainty of morals? Chiefly to this,--that +philosophers have not always distinguished the theoretical and the +casuistical uncertainty of morals from the practical certainty. There +is an uncertainty about details,--whether, for example, under given +circumstances such and such a moral principle is to be enforced, or +whether in some cases there may not be a conflict of duties: these are +the exceptions to the ordinary rules of morality, important, indeed, but +not extending to the one thousandth or one ten-thousandth part of human +actions. This is the domain of casuistry. Secondly, the aspects under +which the most general principles of morals may be presented to us are +many and various. The mind of man has been more than usually active +in thinking about man. The conceptions of harmony, happiness, right, +freedom, benevolence, self-love, have all of them seemed to some +philosopher or other the truest and most comprehensive expression of +morality. There is no difference, or at any rate no great difference, of +opinion about the right and wrong of actions, but only about the +general notion which furnishes the best explanation or gives the most +comprehensive view of them. This, in the language of Kant, is the sphere +of the metaphysic of ethics. But these two uncertainties at either end, +en tois malista katholou and en tois kath ekasta, leave space enough for +an intermediate principle which is practically certain. + +The rule of human life is not dependent on the theories of philosophers: +we know what our duties are for the most part before we speculate about +them. And the use of speculation is not to teach us what we already +know, but to inspire in our minds an interest about morals in general, +to strengthen our conception of the virtues by showing that they confirm +one another, to prove to us, as Socrates would have said, that they +are not many, but one. There is the same kind of pleasure and use in +reducing morals, as in reducing physics, to a few very simple truths. +And not unfrequently the more general principle may correct prejudices +and misconceptions, and enable us to regard our fellow-men in a larger +and more generous spirit. + +The two qualities which seem to be most required in first principles of +ethics are, (1) that they should afford a real explanation of the facts, +(2) that they should inspire the mind,--should harmonize, strengthen, +settle us. We can hardly estimate the influence which a simple principle +such as 'Act so as to promote the happiness of mankind,' or 'Act so that +the rule on which thou actest may be adopted as a law by all rational +beings,' may exercise on the mind of an individual. They will often seem +to open a new world to him, like the religious conceptions of faith or +the spirit of God. The difficulties of ethics disappear when we do not +suffer ourselves to be distracted between different points of view. +But to maintain their hold on us, the general principles must also be +psychologically true--they must agree with our experience, they must +accord with the habits of our minds. + +When we are told that actions are right or wrong only in so far as they +tend towards happiness, we naturally ask what is meant by 'happiness.' +For the term in the common use of language is only to a certain extent +commensurate with moral good and evil. We should hardly say that a good +man could be utterly miserable (Arist. Ethics), or place a bad man in +the first rank of happiness. But yet, from various circumstances, the +measure of a man's happiness may be out of all proportion to his desert. +And if we insist on calling the good man alone happy, we shall be +using the term in some new and transcendental sense, as synonymous with +well-being. We have already seen that happiness includes the happiness +of others as well as our own; we must now comprehend unconscious as well +as conscious happiness under the same word. There is no harm in this +extension of the meaning, but a word which admits of such an extension +can hardly be made the basis of a philosophical system. The exactness +which is required in philosophy will not allow us to comprehend under +the same term two ideas so different as the subjective feeling of +pleasure or happiness and the objective reality of a state which +receives our moral approval. + +Like Protarchus in the Philebus, we can give no answer to the question, +'What is that common quality which in all states of human life we call +happiness? which includes the lower and the higher kind of happiness, +and is the aim of the noblest, as well as of the meanest of mankind?' If +we say 'Not pleasure, not virtue, not wisdom, nor yet any quality which +we can abstract from these'--what then? After seeming to hover for a +time on the verge of a great truth, we have gained only a truism. + +Let us ask the question in another form. What is that which constitutes +happiness, over and above the several ingredients of health, wealth, +pleasure, virtue, knowledge, which are included under it? Perhaps we +answer, 'The subjective feeling of them.' But this is very far from +being coextensive with right. Or we may reply that happiness is the +whole of which the above-mentioned are the parts. Still the question +recurs, 'In what does the whole differ from all the parts?' And if we +are unable to distinguish them, happiness will be the mere aggregate of +the goods of life. + +Again, while admitting that in all right action there is an element of +happiness, we cannot help seeing that the utilitarian theory supplies +a much easier explanation of some virtues than of others. Of many +patriotic or benevolent actions we can give a straightforward account by +their tendency to promote happiness. For the explanation of justice, on +the other hand, we have to go a long way round. No man is indignant +with a thief because he has not promoted the greatest happiness of +the greatest number, but because he has done him a wrong. There is an +immeasurable interval between a crime against property or life, and the +omission of an act of charity or benevolence. Yet of this interval the +utilitarian theory takes no cognizance. The greatest happiness principle +strengthens our sense of positive duties towards others, but weakens +our recognition of their rights. To promote in every way possible the +happiness of others may be a counsel of perfection, but hardly seems +to offer any ground for a theory of obligation. For admitting that our +ideas of obligation are partly derived from religion and custom, yet +they seem also to contain other essential elements which cannot be +explained by the tendency of actions to promote happiness. Whence comes +the necessity of them? Why are some actions rather than others which +equally tend to the happiness of mankind imposed upon us with the +authority of law? 'You ought' and 'you had better' are fundamental +distinctions in human thought; and having such distinctions, why should +we seek to efface and unsettle them? + +Bentham and Mr. Mill are earnest in maintaining that happiness includes +the happiness of others as well as of ourselves. But what two notions +can be more opposed in many cases than these? Granting that in a perfect +state of the world my own happiness and that of all other men would +coincide, in the imperfect state they often diverge, and I cannot truly +bridge over the difficulty by saying that men will always find pleasure +in sacrificing themselves or in suffering for others. Upon the greatest +happiness principle it is admitted that I am to have a share, and in +consistency I should pursue my own happiness as impartially as that of +my neighbour. But who can decide what proportion should be mine and what +his, except on the principle that I am most likely to be deceived in my +own favour, and had therefore better give the larger share, if not all, +to him? + +Further, it is admitted that utility and right coincide, not in +particular instances, but in classes of actions. But is it not +distracting to the conscience of a man to be told that in the particular +case they are opposed? Happiness is said to be the ground of moral +obligation, yet he must not do what clearly conduces to his own +happiness if it is at variance with the good of the whole. Nay, further, +he will be taught that when utility and right are in apparent conflict +any amount of utility does not alter by a hair's-breadth the morality +of actions, which cannot be allowed to deviate from established law or +usage; and that the non-detection of an immoral act, say of telling a +lie, which may often make the greatest difference in the consequences, +not only to himself, but to all the world, makes none whatever in the +act itself. + +Again, if we are concerned not with particular actions but with classes +of actions, is the tendency of actions to happiness a principle upon +which we can classify them? There is a universal law which imperatively +declares certain acts to be right or wrong:--can there be any +universality in the law which measures actions by their tendencies +towards happiness? For an act which is the cause of happiness to one +person may be the cause of unhappiness to another; or an act which if +performed by one person may increase the happiness of mankind may have +the opposite effect if performed by another. Right can never be wrong, +or wrong right, that there are no actions which tend to the happiness +of mankind which may not under other circumstances tend to their +unhappiness. Unless we say not only that all right actions tend to +happiness, but that they tend to happiness in the same degree in which +they are right (and in that case the word 'right' is plainer), we weaken +the absoluteness of our moral standard; we reduce differences in kind +to differences in degree; we obliterate the stamp which the authority of +ages has set upon vice and crime. + +Once more: turning from theory to practice we feel the importance of +retaining the received distinctions of morality. Words such as truth, +justice, honesty, virtue, love, have a simple meaning; they have become +sacred to us,--'the word of God' written on the human heart: to no other +words can the same associations be attached. We cannot explain them +adequately on principles of utility; in attempting to do so we rob them +of their true character. We give them a meaning often paradoxical and +distorted, and generally weaker than their signification in common +language. And as words influence men's thoughts, we fear that the hold +of morality may also be weakened, and the sense of duty impaired, if +virtue and vice are explained only as the qualities which do or do not +contribute to the pleasure of the world. In that very expression we seem +to detect a false ring, for pleasure is individual not universal; we +speak of eternal and immutable justice, but not of eternal and immutable +pleasure; nor by any refinement can we avoid some taint of bodily sense +adhering to the meaning of the word. + +Again: the higher the view which men take of life, the more they lose +sight of their own pleasure or interest. True religion is not working +for a reward only, but is ready to work equally without a reward. It is +not 'doing the will of God for the sake of eternal happiness,' but doing +the will of God because it is best, whether rewarded or unrewarded. And +this applies to others as well as to ourselves. For he who sacrifices +himself for the good of others, does not sacrifice himself that they +may be saved from the persecution which he endures for their sakes, +but rather that they in their turn may be able to undergo similar +sufferings, and like him stand fast in the truth. To promote their +happiness is not his first object, but to elevate their moral nature. +Both in his own case and that of others there may be happiness in the +distance, but if there were no happiness he would equally act as he +does. We are speaking of the highest and noblest natures; and a passing +thought naturally arises in our minds, 'Whether that can be the first +principle of morals which is hardly regarded in their own case by the +greatest benefactors of mankind?' + +The admissions that pleasures differ in kind, and that actions are +already classified; the acknowledgment that happiness includes the +happiness of others, as well as of ourselves; the confusion (not made +by Aristotle) between conscious and unconscious happiness, or between +happiness the energy and happiness the result of the energy, introduce +uncertainty and inconsistency into the whole enquiry. We reason readily +and cheerfully from a greatest happiness principle. But we find that +utilitarians do not agree among themselves about the meaning of the +word. Still less can they impart to others a common conception or +conviction of the nature of happiness. The meaning of the word is always +insensibly slipping away from us, into pleasure, out of pleasure, now +appearing as the motive, now as the test of actions, and sometimes +varying in successive sentences. And as in a mathematical demonstration +an error in the original number disturbs the whole calculation which +follows, this fundamental uncertainty about the word vitiates all the +applications of it. Must we not admit that a notion so uncertain in +meaning, so void of content, so at variance with common language and +opinion, does not comply adequately with either of our two requirements? +It can neither strike the imaginative faculty, nor give an explanation +of phenomena which is in accordance with our individual experience. It +is indefinite; it supplies only a partial account of human actions: +it is one among many theories of philosophers. It may be compared +with other notions, such as the chief good of Plato, which may be best +expressed to us under the form of a harmony, or with Kant's obedience to +law, which may be summed up under the word 'duty,' or with the Stoical +'Follow nature,' and seems to have no advantage over them. All of these +present a certain aspect of moral truth. None of them are, or indeed +profess to be, the only principle of morals. + +And this brings us to speak of the most serious objection to the +utilitarian system--its exclusiveness. There is no place for Kant or +Hegel, for Plato and Aristotle alongside of it. They do not reject the +greatest happiness principle, but it rejects them. Now the phenomena of +moral action differ, and some are best explained upon one principle and +some upon another: the virtue of justice seems to be naturally connected +with one theory of morals, the virtues of temperance and benevolence +with another. The characters of men also differ; and some are more +attracted by one aspect of the truth, some by another. The firm +stoical nature will conceive virtue under the conception of law, the +philanthropist under that of doing good, the quietist under that of +resignation, the enthusiast under that of faith or love. The upright man +of the world will desire above all things that morality should be plain +and fixed, and should use language in its ordinary sense. Persons of an +imaginative temperament will generally be dissatisfied with the words +'utility' or 'pleasure': their principle of right is of a far higher +character--what or where to be found they cannot always distinctly +tell;--deduced from the laws of human nature, says one; resting on the +will of God, says another; based upon some transcendental idea which +animates more worlds than one, says a third: + + on nomoi prokeintai upsipodes, ouranian + di aithera teknothentes. + +To satisfy an imaginative nature in any degree, the doctrine of utility +must be so transfigured that it becomes altogether different and loses +all simplicity. + +But why, since there are different characters among men, should we not +allow them to envisage morality accordingly, and be thankful to the +great men who have provided for all of us modes and instruments of +thought? Would the world have been better if there had been no Stoics or +Kantists, no Platonists or Cartesians? No more than if the other pole +of moral philosophy had been excluded. All men have principles which +are above their practice; they admit premises which, if carried to their +conclusions, are a sufficient basis of morals. In asserting liberty of +speculation we are not encouraging individuals to make right or wrong +for themselves, but only conceding that they may choose the form under +which they prefer to contemplate them. Nor do we say that one of these +aspects is as true and good as another; but that they all of them, if +they are not mere sophisms and illusions, define and bring into relief +some part of the truth which would have been obscure without their +light. Why should we endeavour to bind all men within the limits of a +single metaphysical conception? The necessary imperfection of language +seems to require that we should view the same truth under more than one +aspect. + +We are living in the second age of utilitarianism, when the charm of +novelty and the fervour of the first disciples has passed away. The +doctrine is no longer stated in the forcible paradoxical manner of +Bentham, but has to be adapted to meet objections; its corners are +rubbed off, and the meaning of its most characteristic expressions is +softened. The array of the enemy melts away when we approach him. The +greatest happiness of the greatest number was a great original idea when +enunciated by Bentham, which leavened a generation and has left its mark +on thought and civilization in all succeeding times. His grasp of it +had the intensity of genius. In the spirit of an ancient philosopher he +would have denied that pleasures differed in kind, or that by happiness +he meant anything but pleasure. He would perhaps have revolted us by his +thoroughness. The 'guardianship of his doctrine' has passed into other +hands; and now we seem to see its weak points, its ambiguities, its want +of exactness while assuming the highest exactness, its one-sidedness, +its paradoxical explanation of several of the virtues. No philosophy has +ever stood this criticism of the next generation, though the founders +of all of them have imagined that they were built upon a rock. And the +utilitarian system, like others, has yielded to the inevitable analysis. +Even in the opinion of 'her admirers she has been terribly damaged' +(Phil.), and is no longer the only moral philosophy, but one among many +which have contributed in various degrees to the intellectual progress +of mankind. + +But because the utilitarian philosophy can no longer claim 'the prize,' +we must not refuse to acknowledge the great benefits conferred by it on +the world. All philosophies are refuted in their turn, says the sceptic, +and he looks forward to all future systems sharing the fate of the past. +All philosophies remain, says the thinker; they have done a great work +in their own day, and they supply posterity with aspects of the truth +and with instruments of thought. Though they may be shorn of their +glory, they retain their place in the organism of knowledge. + +And still there remain many rules of morals which are better explained +and more forcibly inculcated on the principle of utility than on any +other. The question Will such and such an action promote the happiness +of myself, my family, my country, the world? may check the rising +feeling of pride or honour which would cause a quarrel, an estrangement, +a war. 'How can I contribute to the greatest happiness of others?' is +another form of the question which will be more attractive to the +minds of many than a deduction of the duty of benevolence from a priori +principles. In politics especially hardly any other argument can be +allowed to have weight except the happiness of a people. All parties +alike profess to aim at this, which though often used only as the +disguise of self-interest has a great and real influence on the minds +of statesmen. In religion, again, nothing can more tend to mitigate +superstition than the belief that the good of man is also the will of +God. This is an easy test to which the prejudices and superstitions of +men may be brought:--whatever does not tend to the good of men is not of +God. And the ideal of the greatest happiness of mankind, especially if +believed to be the will of God, when compared with the actual fact, will +be one of the strongest motives to do good to others. + +On the other hand, when the temptation is to speak falsely, to be +dishonest or unjust, or in any way to interfere with the rights of +others, the argument that these actions regarded as a class will not +conduce to the happiness of mankind, though true enough, seems to have +less force than the feeling which is already implanted in the mind by +conscience and authority. To resolve this feeling into the greatest +happiness principle takes away from its sacred and authoritative +character. The martyr will not go to the stake in order that he may +promote the happiness of mankind, but for the sake of the truth: +neither will the soldier advance to the cannon's mouth merely because he +believes military discipline to be for the good of mankind. It is better +for him to know that he will be shot, that he will be disgraced, if he +runs away--he has no need to look beyond military honour, patriotism, +'England expects every man to do his duty.' These are stronger motives +than the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which is the thesis +of a philosopher, not the watchword of an army. For in human actions +men do not always require broad principles; duties often come home to +us more when they are limited and defined, and sanctioned by custom and +public opinion. + +Lastly, if we turn to the history of ethics, we shall find that our +moral ideas have originated not in utility but in religion, in law, in +conceptions of nature, of an ideal good, and the like. And many may be +inclined to think that this conclusively disproves the claim of utility +to be the basis of morals. But the utilitarian will fairly reply (see +above) that we must distinguish the origin of ethics from the principles +of them--the historical germ from the later growth of reflection. And he +may also truly add that for two thousand years and more, utility, if +not the originating, has been the great corrective principle in law, in +politics, in religion, leading men to ask how evil may be diminished +and good increased--by what course of policy the public interest may be +promoted, and to understand that God wills the happiness, not of some +of his creatures and in this world only, but of all of them and in every +stage of their existence. + +'What is the place of happiness or utility in a system of moral +philosophy?' is analogous to the question asked in the Philebus, 'What +rank does pleasure hold in the scale of goods?' Admitting the greatest +happiness principle to be true and valuable, and the necessary +foundation of that part of morals which relates to the consequences of +actions, we still have to consider whether this or some other general +notion is the highest principle of human life. We may try them in this +comparison by three tests--definiteness, comprehensiveness, and motive +power. + +There are three subjective principles of morals,--sympathy, benevolence, +self-love. But sympathy seems to rest morality on feelings which differ +widely even in good men; benevolence and self-love torture one half +of our virtuous actions into the likeness of the other. The greatest +happiness principle, which includes both, has the advantage over all +these in comprehensiveness, but the advantage is purchased at the +expense of definiteness. + +Again, there are the legal and political principles of morals--freedom, +equality, rights of persons; 'Every man to count for one and no man +for more than one,' 'Every man equal in the eye of the law and of the +legislator.' There is also the other sort of political morality, which +if not beginning with 'Might is right,' at any rate seeks to deduce +our ideas of justice from the necessities of the state and of society. +According to this view the greatest good of men is obedience to law: the +best human government is a rational despotism, and the best idea which +we can form of a divine being is that of a despot acting not wholly +without regard to law and order. To such a view the present mixed +state of the world, not wholly evil or wholly good, is supposed to be a +witness. More we might desire to have, but are not permitted. Though a +human tyrant would be intolerable, a divine tyrant is a very tolerable +governor of the universe. This is the doctrine of Thrasymachus adapted +to the public opinion of modern times. + +There is yet a third view which combines the two:--freedom is obedience +to the law, and the greatest order is also the greatest freedom; 'Act so +that thy action may be the law of every intelligent being.' This view +is noble and elevating; but it seems to err, like other transcendental +principles of ethics, in being too abstract. For there is the same +difficulty in connecting the idea of duty with particular duties as +in bridging the gulf between phainomena and onta; and when, as in the +system of Kant, this universal idea or law is held to be independent of +space and time, such a mataion eidos becomes almost unmeaning. + +Once more there are the religious principles of morals:--the will of +God revealed in Scripture and in nature. No philosophy has supplied a +sanction equal in authority to this, or a motive equal in strength to +the belief in another life. Yet about these too we must ask What will of +God? how revealed to us, and by what proofs? Religion, like happiness, +is a word which has great influence apart from any consideration of its +content: it may be for great good or for great evil. But true religion +is the synthesis of religion and morality, beginning with divine +perfection in which all human perfection is embodied. It moves among +ideas of holiness, justice, love, wisdom, truth; these are to God, in +whom they are personified, what the Platonic ideas are to the idea of +good. It is the consciousness of the will of God that all men should +be as he is. It lives in this world and is known to us only through +the phenomena of this world, but it extends to worlds beyond. Ordinary +religion which is alloyed with motives of this world may easily be +in excess, may be fanatical, may be interested, may be the mask of +ambition, may be perverted in a thousand ways. But of that religion +which combines the will of God with our highest ideas of truth and right +there can never be too much. This impossibility of excess is the note of +divine moderation. + +So then, having briefly passed in review the various principles of moral +philosophy, we may now arrange our goods in order, though, like the +reader of the Philebus, we have a difficulty in distinguishing the +different aspects of them from one another, or defining the point at +which the human passes into the divine. + +First, the eternal will of God in this world and in another,--justice, +holiness, wisdom, love, without succession of acts (ouch e genesis +prosestin), which is known to us in part only, and reverenced by us as +divine perfection. + +Secondly, human perfection, or the fulfilment of the will of God in +this world, and co-operation with his laws revealed to us by reason and +experience, in nature, history, and in our own minds. + +Thirdly, the elements of human perfection,--virtue, knowledge, and right +opinion. + +Fourthly, the external conditions of perfection,--health and the goods +of life. + +Fifthly, beauty and happiness,--the inward enjoyment of that which is +best and fairest in this world and in the human soul. + +... + +The Philebus is probably the latest in time of the writings of Plato +with the exception of the Laws. We have in it therefore the last +development of his philosophy. The extreme and one-sided doctrines of +the Cynics and Cyrenaics are included in a larger whole; the +relations of pleasure and knowledge to each other and to the good are +authoritatively determined; the Eleatic Being and the Heraclitean Flux +no longer divide the empire of thought; the Mind of Anaxagoras has +become the Mind of God and of the World. The great distinction between +pure and applied science for the first time has a place in philosophy; +the natural claim of dialectic to be the Queen of the Sciences is once +more affirmed. This latter is the bond of union which pervades the whole +or nearly the whole of the Platonic writings. And here as in several +other dialogues (Phaedrus, Republic, etc.) it is presented to us in a +manner playful yet also serious, and sometimes as if the thought of it +were too great for human utterance and came down from heaven direct. It +is the organization of knowledge wonderful to think of at a time when +knowledge itself could hardly be said to exist. It is this more than any +other element which distinguishes Plato, not only from the presocratic +philosophers, but from Socrates himself. + +We have not yet reached the confines of Aristotle, but we make a +somewhat nearer approach to him in the Philebus than in the earlier +Platonic writings. The germs of logic are beginning to appear, but they +are not collected into a whole, or made a separate science or system. +Many thinkers of many different schools have to be interposed between +the Parmenides or Philebus of Plato, and the Physics or Metaphysics of +Aristotle. It is this interval upon which we have to fix our minds if we +would rightly understand the character of the transition from one to the +other. Plato and Aristotle do not dovetail into one another; nor does +the one begin where the other ends; there is a gulf between them not to +be measured by time, which in the fragmentary state of our knowledge +it is impossible to bridge over. It follows that the one cannot be +interpreted by the other. At any rate, it is not Plato who is to be +interpreted by Aristotle, but Aristotle by Plato. Of all philosophy +and of all art the true understanding is to be sought not in the +afterthoughts of posterity, but in the elements out of which they have +arisen. For the previous stage is a tendency towards the ideal at which +they are aiming; the later is a declination or deviation from them, or +even a perversion of them. No man's thoughts were ever so well expressed +by his disciples as by himself. + +But although Plato in the Philebus does not come into any close +connexion with Aristotle, he is now a long way from himself and from the +beginnings of his own philosophy. At the time of his death he left his +system still incomplete; or he may be more truly said to have had +no system, but to have lived in the successive stages or moments of +metaphysical thought which presented themselves from time to time. The +earlier discussions about universal ideas and definitions seem to have +died away; the correlation of ideas has taken their place. The flowers +of rhetoric and poetry have lost their freshness and charm; and a +technical language has begun to supersede and overgrow them. But the +power of thinking tends to increase with age, and the experience of life +to widen and deepen. The good is summed up under categories which are +not summa genera, but heads or gradations of thought. The question of +pleasure and the relation of bodily pleasures to mental, which is hardly +treated of elsewhere in Plato, is here analysed with great subtlety. The +mean or measure is now made the first principle of good. Some of these +questions reappear in Aristotle, as does also the distinction between +metaphysics and mathematics. But there are many things in Plato which +have been lost in Aristotle; and many things in Aristotle not to be +found in Plato. The most remarkable deficiency in Aristotle is the +disappearance of the Platonic dialectic, which in the Aristotelian +school is only used in a comparatively unimportant and trivial sense. +The most remarkable additions are the invention of the Syllogism, the +conception of happiness as the foundation of morals, the reference of +human actions to the standard of the better mind of the world, or of +the one 'sensible man' or 'superior person.' His conception of ousia, +or essence, is not an advance upon Plato, but a return to the poor and +meagre abstractions of the Eleatic philosophy. The dry attempt to reduce +the presocratic philosophy by his own rather arbitrary standard of the +four causes, contrasts unfavourably with Plato's general discussion of +the same subject (Sophist). To attempt further to sum up the differences +between the two great philosophers would be out of place here. Any +real discussion of their relation to one another must be preceded by an +examination into the nature and character of the Aristotelian writings +and the form in which they have come down to us. This enquiry is not +really separable from an investigation of Theophrastus as well as +Aristotle and of the remains of other schools of philosophy as well as +of the Peripatetics. But, without entering on this wide field, even a +superficial consideration of the logical and metaphysical works which +pass under the name of Aristotle, whether we suppose them to have +come directly from his hand or to be the tradition of his school, is +sufficient to show how great was the mental activity which prevailed in +the latter half of the fourth century B.C.; what eddies and +whirlpools of controversies were surging in the chaos of thought, what +transformations of the old philosophies were taking place everywhere, +what eclecticisms and syncretisms and realisms and nominalisms were +affecting the mind of Hellas. The decline of philosophy during this +period is no less remarkable than the loss of freedom; and the two +are not unconnected with each other. But of the multitudinous sea of +opinions which were current in the age of Aristotle we have no exact +account. We know of them from allusions only. And we cannot with +advantage fill up the void of our knowledge by conjecture: we can only +make allowance for our ignorance. + +There are several passages in the Philebus which are very characteristic +of Plato, and which we shall do well to consider not only in their +connexion, but apart from their connexion as inspired sayings or +oracles which receive their full interpretation only from the history +of philosophy in later ages. The more serious attacks on traditional +beliefs which are often veiled under an unusual simplicity or irony are +of this kind. Such, for example, is the excessive and more than human +awe which Socrates expresses about the names of the gods, which may +be not unaptly compared with the importance attached by mankind to +theological terms in other ages; for this also may be comprehended under +the satire of Socrates. Let us observe the religious and intellectual +enthusiasm which shines forth in the following, 'The power and faculty +of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of the truth': +or, again, the singular acknowledgment which may be regarded as the +anticipation of a new logic, that 'In going to war for mind I must have +weapons of a different make from those which I used before, although +some of the old ones may do again.' Let us pause awhile to reflect on +a sentence which is full of meaning to reformers of religion or to the +original thinker of all ages: 'Shall we then agree with them of +old time, and merely reassert the notions of others without risk to +ourselves; or shall we venture also to share in the risk and bear the +reproach which will await us': i.e. if we assert mind to be the author +of nature. Let us note the remarkable words, 'That in the divine nature +of Zeus there is the soul and mind of a King, because there is in him +the power of the cause,' a saying in which theology and philosophy are +blended and reconciled; not omitting to observe the deep insight into +human nature which is shown by the repetition of the same thought 'All +philosophers are agreed that mind is the king of heaven and earth' with +the ironical addition, 'in this way truly they magnify themselves.' Nor +let us pass unheeded the indignation felt by the generous youth at the +'blasphemy' of those who say that Chaos and Chance Medley created the +world; or the significance of the words 'those who said of old time that +mind rules the universe'; or the pregnant observation that 'we are +not always conscious of what we are doing or of what happens to us,' a +chance expression to which if philosophers had attended they would have +escaped many errors in psychology. We may contrast the contempt which +is poured upon the verbal difficulty of the one and many, and the +seriousness with the unity of opposites is regarded from the higher +point of view of abstract ideas: or compare the simple manner in which +the question of cause and effect and their mutual dependence is regarded +by Plato (to which modern science has returned in Mill and Bacon), and +the cumbrous fourfold division of causes in the Physics and Metaphysics +of Aristotle, for which it has puzzled the world to find a use in so +many centuries. When we consider the backwardness of knowledge in +the age of Plato, the boldness with which he looks forward into the +distance, the many questions of modern philosophy which are anticipated +in his writings, may we not truly describe him in his own words as a +'spectator of all time and of all existence'? + + + + +PHILEBUS + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus. + + +SOCRATES: Observe, Protarchus, the nature of the position which you are +now going to take from Philebus, and what the other position is which I +maintain, and which, if you do not approve of it, is to be controverted +by you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides? + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, +and the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living +being, whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and intelligence +and memory, and their kindred, right opinion and true reasoning, are +better and more desirable than pleasure for all who are able to partake +of them, and that to all such who are or ever will be they are the most +advantageous of all things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement +of the two sides of the argument? + +PHILEBUS: Nothing could be fairer, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned +to you? + +PROTARCHUS: I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left +the field. + +SOCRATES: Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to +be ascertained. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Shall we further agree-- + +PROTARCHUS: To what? + +SOCRATES: That you and I must now try to indicate some state and +disposition of the soul, which has the property of making all men happy. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, by all means. + +SOCRATES: And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a +state? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And what if there be a third state, which is better than +either? Then both of us are vanquished--are we not? But if this life, +which really has the power of making men happy, turn out to be more +akin to pleasure than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the +advantage over the life of wisdom. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to +wisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;--do you agree? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say, Philebus? + +PHILEBUS: I say, and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the +conqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus. + +PROTARCHUS: You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have +no longer a voice in the matter? + +PHILEBUS: True enough. Nevertheless I would clear myself and deliver my +soul of you; and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do so. + +PROTARCHUS: You may appeal to us; we too will be the witnesses of your +words. And now, Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we +will proceed with the argument. + +SOCRATES: Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus +says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of +the gods is more than human--it exceeds all other fears. And now I would +not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what +she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was +just now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She +has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet +surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we +not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has +pleasure in his very temperance,--that the fool is pleased when he is +full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in +his wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these +opposite pleasures are severally alike! + +PROTARCHUS: Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring +from opposite sources, but they are not in themselves opposite. For must +not pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure,--that is, +like itself? + +SOCRATES: Yes, my good friend, just as colour is like colour;--in so far +as colours are colours, there is no difference between them; and yet we +all know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed +to white: or again, as figure is like figure, for all figures are +comprehended under one class; and yet particular figures may be +absolutely opposed to one another, and there is an infinite diversity of +them. And we might find similar examples in many other things; therefore +do not rely upon this argument, which would go to prove the unity of +the most extreme opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a similar +opposition among pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument? + +SOCRATES: Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to +them a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good; now +although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, +as we are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good; but you call +them all good, and at the same time are compelled, if you are pressed, +to acknowledge that they are unlike. And so you must tell us what is the +identical quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which makes +you designate all of them as good. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any one who +asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some +pleasures are good and others bad? + +SOCRATES: And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one +another, and sometimes opposed? + +PROTARCHUS: Not in so far as they are pleasures. + +SOCRATES: That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we +are to say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures, but that +they are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do +not pierce our dull minds, but we go on arguing all the same, like the +weakest and most inexperienced reasoners? (Probably corrupt.) + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Why, I mean to say, that in self-defence I may, if I like, +follow your example, and assert boldly that the two things most unlike +are most absolutely alike; and the result will be that you and I will +prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing; and the +argument will be blown away and lost. Suppose that we put back, and +return to the old position; then perhaps we may come to an understanding +with one another. + +PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you? + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind, and those other +qualities which I, when asked by you at first what is the nature of the +good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case with the pleasures +of which you spoke. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: The sciences are a numerous class, and will be found to +present great differences. But even admitting that, like the pleasures, +they are opposite as well as different, should I be worthy of the name +of dialectician if, in order to avoid this difficulty, I were to say +(as you are saying of pleasure) that there is no difference between one +science and another;--would not the argument founder and disappear like +an idle tale, although we might ourselves escape drowning by clinging to +a fallacy? + +PROTARCHUS: May none of this befal us, except the deliverance! Yet I +like the even-handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let +us assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and +different sciences. + +SOCRATES: And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the differences +between my good and yours; but let us bring them to the light in +the hope that, in the process of testing them, they may show whether +pleasure is to be called the good, or wisdom, or some third quality; for +surely we are not now simply contending in order that my view or that +yours may prevail, but I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting +for the truth. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly we ought. + +SOCRATES: Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish +the principle on which the argument rests. + +PROTARCHUS: What principle? + +SOCRATES: A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty, +and some men sometimes against their will. + +PROTARCHUS: Speak plainer. + +SOCRATES: The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel +of nature; for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful +propositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack. + +PROTARCHUS: Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by +nature one and also many, dividing the single 'me' into many 'me's,' +and even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten +thousand other ways? + +SOCRATES: Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes +about the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this time +agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true +course of thought; and no more favour is shown to that other puzzle, in +which a person proves the members and parts of anything to be divided, +and then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof +of his own words: Why, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, +and the many are only one. + +PROTARCHUS: But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected +with this subject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and +acknowledged? + +SOCRATES: When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things +that are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving, for +in those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as +I was saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed; but when +the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, +or the good one, then the interest which attaches to these and similar +unities and the attempt which is made to divide them gives birth to a +controversy. + +PROTARCHUS: Of what nature? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real +existence; and then how each individual unity, being always the same, +and incapable either of generation or of destruction, but retaining +a permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and +multiplied in the infinity of the world of generation, or as still +entire and yet divided from itself, which latter would seem to be the +greatest impossibility of all, for how can one and the same thing be at +the same time in one and in many things? These, Protarchus, are the real +difficulties, and this is the one and many to which they relate; +they are the source of great perplexity if ill decided, and the right +determination of them is very helpful. + +PROTARCHUS: Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions. + +SOCRATES: That is what I should wish. + +PROTARCHUS: And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear +them discussed; Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move, +and we had better not stir him up with questions. + +SOCRATES: Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious +battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we begin thus? + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: We say that the one and many become identified by thought, and +that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of every +word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never cease, and +is not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of +thought itself, which never grows old. Any young man, when he first +tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found +a treasure of wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no +stone, or rather no thought unturned, now rolling up the many into the +one, and kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them; he +puzzles himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his +neighbours, whether they are older or younger, or of his own age--that +makes no difference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no +human being who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a +barbarian would have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could +only be found. + +PROTARCHUS: Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us +are young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all set +upon you, if you abuse us? We understand what you mean; but is there no +charm by which we may dispel all this confusion, no more excellent way +of arriving at the truth? If there is, we hope that you will guide us +into that way, and we will do our best to follow, for the enquiry in +which we are engaged, Socrates, is not unimportant. + +SOCRATES: The reverse of unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you, +and there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite +way, which has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me +helpless in the hour of need. + +PROTARCHUS: Tell us what that is. + +SOCRATES: One which may be easily pointed out, but is by no means easy +of application; it is the parent of all the discoveries in the arts. + +PROTARCHUS: Tell us what it is. + +SOCRATES: A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among +men by the hands of a new Prometheus, and therewith a blaze of light; +and the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the gods than we +are, handed down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be are +composed of one and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted in +them: seeing, then, that such is the order of the world, we too ought +in every enquiry to begin by laying down one idea of that which is the +subject of enquiry; this unity we shall find in everything. Having found +it, we may next proceed to look for two, if there be two, or, if not, +then for three or some other number, subdividing each of these units, +until at last the unity with which we began is seen not only to be one +and many and infinite, but also a definite number; the infinite must not +be suffered to approach the many until the entire number of the species +intermediate between unity and infinity has been discovered,--then, and +not till then, we may rest from division, and without further troubling +ourselves about the endless individuals may allow them to drop into +infinity. This, as I was saying, is the way of considering and learning +and teaching one another, which the gods have handed down to us. But +the wise men of our time are either too quick or too slow in conceiving +plurality in unity. Having no method, they make their one and many +anyhow, and from unity pass at once to infinity; the intermediate steps +never occur to them. And this, I repeat, is what makes the difference +between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic. + +PROTARCHUS: I think that I partly understand you Socrates, but I should +like to have a clearer notion of what you are saying. + +SOCRATES: I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet, +Protarchus, which you were made to learn as a child. + +PROTARCHUS: How do they afford an illustration? + +SOCRATES: The sound which passes through the lips whether of an +individual or of all men is one and yet infinite. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound +is infinite are we perfect in the art of speech, but the knowledge of +the number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same +kind. + +PROTARCHUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Sound is one in music as well as in grammar? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And there is a higher note and a lower note, and a note of +equal pitch:--may we affirm so much? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you +knew; though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of +music. + +PROTARCHUS: Nothing. + +SOCRATES: But when you have learned what sounds are high and what +low, and the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or +proportions, and the systems compounded out of them, which our fathers +discovered, and have handed down to us who are their descendants under +the name of harmonies; and the affections corresponding to them in the +movements of the human body, which when measured by numbers ought, as +they say, to be called rhythms and measures; and they tell us that the +same principle should be applied to every one and many;--when, I say, +you have learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are perfect; and +you may be said to understand any other subject, when you have a similar +grasp of it. But the infinity of kinds and the infinity of individuals +which there is in each of them, when not classified, creates in every +one of us a state of infinite ignorance; and he who never looks for +number in anything, will not himself be looked for in the number of +famous men. + +PROTARCHUS: I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent, +Philebus. + +PHILEBUS: I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon the +argument? + +SOCRATES: Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus. + +PROTARCHUS: Indeed he is, and you must answer him. + +SOCRATES: I will; but you must let me make one little remark first about +these matters; I was saying, that he who begins with any individual +unity, should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a definite +number, and now I say conversely, that he who has to begin with infinity +should not jump to unity, but he should look about for some number +representing a certain quantity, and thus out of all end in one. And +now let us return for an illustration of our principle to the case of +letters. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said +to have been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first +distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then +other letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e., the +semivowels); these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he +distinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes, without +voice and without sound, and divided these, and likewise the two other +classes of vowels and semivowels, into the individual sounds, and +told the number of them, and gave to each and all of them the name of +letters; and observing that none of us could learn any one of them and +not learn them all, and in consideration of this common bond which in +a manner united them, he assigned to them all a single art, and this he +called the art of grammar or letters. + +PHILEBUS: The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding +the original statement, but I still feel the defect of which I just now +complained. + +SOCRATES: Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the +argument? + +PHILEBUS: Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long +asking. + +SOCRATES: Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the +question which, as you say, you have been so long asking? + +PHILEBUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility +of pleasure and wisdom? + +PHILEBUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And we maintain that they are each of them one? + +PHILEBUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the precise question to which the previous discussion +desires an answer is, how they are one and also many (i.e., how they +have one genus and many species), and are not at once infinite, and what +number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass +into infinity (i.e. into the infinite number of individuals). + +PROTARCHUS: That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates +has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us +shall answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable +to answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have +undertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were +able to answer, the result methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let +us consider, then, what we are to do:--Socrates, if I understood him +rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is +the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom. + +SOCRATES: Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed +that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, +likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the +smallest use in any enquiry. + +PROTARCHUS: That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would +the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him +is that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will +tell you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing +with you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best +of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and +enjoyment and the like were the chief good, you answered--No, not those, +but another class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves +of what you said, and very properly, in order that we may not forget to +examine and compare the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are +to be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of +pursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art, and the +like. There was a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully +threatened that you should not be allowed to go home until the question +was settled; and you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And +now, as children say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken back; +cease then to fight against us in this way. + +SOCRATES: In what way? + +PHILEBUS: Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which we +have not as yet any sufficient answer to give; let us not imagine that a +general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if +we are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have promised. Consider, +then, whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge according to their +kinds; or you may let the matter drop, if you are able and willing to +find some other mode of clearing up our controversy. + +SOCRATES: If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words +'if you are willing' dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to +have recalled something to my mind. + +PHILEBUS: What is that? + +SOCRATES: I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about +pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they +were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the +good, but some third thing, which was different from them, and better +than either. If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the +victory, for the good will cease to be identified with her:--Am I not +right? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the +kinds of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more +clearly as we proceed. + +PROTARCHUS: Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose. + +SOCRATES: But, let us first agree on some little points. + +PROTARCHUS: What are they? + +SOCRATES: Is the good perfect or imperfect? + +PROTARCHUS: The most perfect, Socrates, of all things. + +SOCRATES: And is the good sufficient? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things. + +SOCRATES: And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt +after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and +care not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by +good. + +PROTARCHUS: That is undeniable. + +SOCRATES: Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of +wisdom, and pass them in review. + +PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any +pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, +it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want +anything, then it cannot really be the chief good. + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And will you help us to test these two lives? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then answer. + +PROTARCHUS: Ask. + +SOCRATES: Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in +the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly I should. + +SOCRATES: Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to +you if you had perfect pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and +forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want +sight? + +PROTARCHUS: Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things. + +SOCRATES: Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the +greatest pleasures? + +PROTARCHUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, +nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of +whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of +intelligence. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect +that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of +the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you +had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you +were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to +calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a +man, but of an oyster or 'pulmo marinus.' Could this be otherwise? + +PROTARCHUS: No. + +SOCRATES: But is such a life eligible? + +PROTARCHUS: I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away +from me the power of speech. + +SOCRATES: We must keep up our spirits;--let us now take the life of mind +and examine it in turn. + +PROTARCHUS: And what is this life of mind? + +SOCRATES: I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, +having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but +having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and +the like feelings? + +PROTARCHUS: Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is +likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else. + +SOCRATES: What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to +one that was made out of the union of the two? + +PROTARCHUS: Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom? + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is the life which I mean. + +PROTARCHUS: There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all +would surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and +in addition to them. + +SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence? + +PROTARCHUS: To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the +three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible +for man or for animal. + +SOCRATES: Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the +good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and +perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to +live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have +chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own +free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly that seems to be true. + +SOCRATES: And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus' goddess +is not to be regarded as identical with the good? + +PHILEBUS: Neither is your 'mind' the good, Socrates, for that will be +open to the same objections. + +SOCRATES: Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my 'mind'; +but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, +I will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the +mixed life; but we must come to some understanding about the second +place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the +mixed life; and in that case although neither of them would be the good, +one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might +proceed further to argue in opposition to Philebus, that the element +which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more +similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot +be truly said to share either in the first or second place, and does +not, if I may trust my own mind, attain even to the third. + +PROTARCHUS: Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall; +in fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is +laid low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore +be thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim. +And if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second +place, she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for +not even to them would she still appear as fair as before. + +SOCRATES: Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by +applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her? + +PROTARCHUS: Nonsense, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, +which is an impossibility? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be +aware that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the +argument. + +SOCRATES: Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and just +at present not at all an easy one. For in going to war in the cause of +mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have weapons of +another make from those which I used before; some, however, of the old +ones may do again. And must I then finish the argument? + +PROTARCHUS: Of course you must. + +SOCRATES: Let us be very careful in laying the foundation. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you +do not object, into three classes. + +PROTARCHUS: Upon what principle would you make the division? + +SOCRATES: Let us take some of our newly-found notions. + +PROTARCHUS: Which of them? + +SOCRATES: Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of +existence, and also an infinite? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which +is compounded out of them; but I fear that I am ridiculously clumsy at +these processes of division and enumeration. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, my good friend? + +SOCRATES: I say that a fourth class is still wanted. + +PROTARCHUS: What will that be? + +SOCRATES: Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a +fourth class to the three others. + +PROTARCHUS: And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of +resolution as well as a cause of composition? + +SOCRATES: Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some future +time you shall allow me to have it. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let us begin with the first three; and as we find two out of +the three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite +them, and see how in each of them there is a one and many. + +PROTARCHUS: If you would explain to me a little more about them, perhaps +I might be able to follow you. + +SOCRATES: Well, the two classes are the same which I mentioned before, +one the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the +infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter +discussed. + +PROTARCHUS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And now consider well; for the question to which I invite your +attention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter and +colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more +and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any +end? for if they had an end, the more and less would themselves have an +end. + +PROTARCHUS: That is most true. + +SOCRATES: Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a +more and a less. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and +being endless they must also be infinite. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such +an expression as 'exceedingly,' which you have just uttered, and also +the term 'gently,' have the same significance as more or less; for +whenever they occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity--they +are always introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison +of a more or a less excessive or a more or a less gentle, and at each +creation of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now +saying, if quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to +intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, these +last would be driven out of their own domain. When definite quantity +is once admitted, there can be no longer a 'hotter' or a 'colder' (for +these are always progressing, and are never in one stay); but definite +quantity is at rest, and has ceased to progress. Which proves that +comparatives, such as the hotter and the colder, are to be ranked in the +class of the infinite. + +PROTARCHUS: Your remark certainly has the look of truth, Socrates; but +these subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at first. I +think however, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or +twice, there would be a substantial agreement between us. + +SOCRATES: Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather +not waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars, let me know +whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite-- + +PROTARCHUS: What? + +SOCRATES: I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit +of more or less, or are denoted by the words 'exceedingly,' 'gently,' +'extremely,' and the like, may not be referred to the class of the +infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous +argument, all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought +together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if possible, set +upon them--do you remember? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit +their opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal, +or again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure--all +these may, I think, be rightly reckoned by us in the class of the +limited or finite; what do you say? + +PROTARCHUS: Excellent, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound +kind? + +PROTARCHUS: You, I think, will have to tell me that. + +SOCRATES: Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen +to my prayers. + +PROTARCHUS: Offer up a prayer, then, and think. + +SOCRATES: I am thinking, Protarchus, and I believe that some God has +befriended us. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what +you are saying? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you, and do you listen to my words. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, slower, +greater, smaller, and all that in the preceding argument we placed under +the unity of more and less. + +PROTARCHUS: In the class of the infinite, you mean? + +SOCRATES: Yes; and now mingle this with the other. + +PROTARCHUS: What is the other. + +SOCRATES: The class of the finite which we ought to have brought +together as we did the infinite; but, perhaps, it will come to the same +thing if we do so now;--when the two are combined, a third will appear. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by the class of the finite? + +SOCRATES: The class of the equal and the double, and any class which +puts an end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number +creates harmony and proportion among the different elements. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand; you seem to me to mean that the various +opposites, when you mingle with them the class of the finite, takes +certain forms. + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: Does not the right participation in the finite give health--in +disease, for instance? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And whereas the high and low, the swift and the slow are +infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principles aforesaid +introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly. + +SOCRATES: Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the +introduction of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse +moderation and harmony? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the +seasons, and all the delights of life? + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health +and strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: +O my beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal +wantonness and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no +limit to pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and +order, whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, +delivers the soul.--What think you, Protarchus? + +PROTARCHUS: Her ways are much to my mind, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: You will observe that I have spoken of three classes? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that +the infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of +existences; but what you would make the third I am not so certain. + +SOCRATES: That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too +much for you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with +the infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them were +sealed with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we readily +acknowledged it to be by nature one? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand +me to mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being, +effected by the measure which the limit introduces. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand. + +SOCRATES: Still there was, as we said, a fourth class to be +investigated, and you must assist in the investigation; for does not +everything which comes into being, of necessity come into being through +a cause? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no +cause? + +SOCRATES: And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name; +the agent and the cause may be rightly called one? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall +find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name--shall we not? + +PROTARCHUS: We shall. + +SOCRATES: The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or +effect naturally follows it? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation are +not the same, but different? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of +which they were generated, furnish all the three classes? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily +proven to be distinct from them,--and may therefore be called a fourth +principle? + +PROTARCHUS: So let us call it. + +SOCRATES: Quite right; but now, having distinguished the four, I think +that we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them +in order. + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and +the second the finite or limited; then follows the third, an essence +compound and generated; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in +speaking of the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And now what is the next question, and how came we hither? +Were we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or +wisdom? + +PROTARCHUS: We were. + +SOCRATES: And now, having determined these points, shall we not be +better able to decide about the first and second place, which was the +original subject of dispute? + +PROTARCHUS: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and +wisdom was the conqueror--did we not? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to +what class it is to be assigned? + +PROTARCHUS: Beyond a doubt. + +SOCRATES: This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class; +which is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the +elements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may therefore be +truly said to comprehend the conqueror life. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all +sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? +Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer? + +PHILEBUS: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class +which admits of more and less? + +PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; +for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in +quantity and degree. + +SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the +infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of +good. But now--admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature +of the infinite--in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and +Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and +mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very +serious if we err on this point. + +PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god. + +SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite +goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question. + +PROTARCHUS: Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must submit to +him. + +PHILEBUS: And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must +entreat you, Socrates, to be our spokesman, and then we shall not say +anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite. + +SOCRATES: I must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose +a difficult one; but did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you +with my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to what class mind +and knowledge belong? + +PROTARCHUS: You did, indeed, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Yet the answer is easy, since all philosophers assert with +one voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth--in reality they are +magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should +like to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more +fully. + +PHILEBUS: Take your own course, Socrates, and never mind length; we +shall not tire of you. + +SOCRATES: Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a +question. + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the +guidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our +fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence +and wisdom. + +PROTARCHUS: Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, +for that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy; +but the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the +aspect of the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars +and of the whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think +otherwise. + +SOCRATES: Shall we then agree with them of old time in maintaining this +doctrine,--not merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk to +ourselves,--but shall we share in the danger, and take our part of the +reproach which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares that +all is disorder? + +PROTARCHUS: That would certainly be my wish. + +SOCRATES: Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: We see that the elements which enter into the nature of the +bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor +cries, 'land' (i.e., earth), reappear in the constitution of the world. + +PROTARCHUS: The proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm +gathers over us, and we are at our wit's end. + +SOCRATES: There is something to be remarked about each of these +elements. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: Only a small fraction of any one of them exists in us, and +that of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy +of its nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is +fire within us, and in the universe. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in +the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power +that fire has. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and +ruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other +animals, dependent on the universal fire? + +PROTARCHUS: That is a question which does not deserve an answer. + +SOCRATES: Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of +the earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, +and you would give a similar reply about all the other elements? + +PROTARCHUS: Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his +senses? + +SOCRATES: I do not think that he could--but now go on to the next step. +When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in +one, did we not call them a body? + +PROTARCHUS: We did. + +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same +reason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same +elements. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body +nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which +we were just now speaking? + +PROTARCHUS: That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve +to be asked. + +SOCRATES: Well, tell me, is this question worth asking? + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: May our body be said to have a soul? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the +body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies +but in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the +four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, +and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our +bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, +and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the +attributes of wisdom;--we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the +self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great +provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not +also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things? + +PROTARCHUS: Such a supposition is quite unreasonable. + +SOCRATES: Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting +the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty +infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well +as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years +and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind? + +PROTARCHUS: Most justly. + +SOCRATES: And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there +is the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the +cause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are pleased +to be called. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, +O Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who +said of old time that mind rules the universe. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that +mind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause +of all; and I think that you now have my answer. + +PROTARCHUS: I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had +answered. + +SOCRATES: A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts +earnest. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the +class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago +discovered? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was +akin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite +and belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have in +itself, a beginning, middle, or end of its own. + +PROTARCHUS: I shall be sure to remember. + +SOCRATES: We must next examine what is their place and under what +conditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since +her class was first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested +apart from pain. + +PROTARCHUS: If this is the road, let us take it. + +SOCRATES: I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of +pleasure and pain. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class. + +PROTARCHUS: And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the +aforesaid classes is the mixed one? + +SOCRATES: I will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we +placed third in the list of four. + +PROTARCHUS: That which followed the infinite and the finite; and in +which you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony. + +SOCRATES: Capital; and now will you please to give me your best +attention? + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed; I am attending. + +SOCRATES: I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is +also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain. + +PROTARCHUS: That is very probable. + +SOCRATES: And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the +source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and +shortest words about matters of the greatest moment. + +PROTARCHUS: I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to +be a little plainer? + +SOCRATES: Do not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest +illustration? + +PROTARCHUS: What phenomena do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect +of moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure: once more, the +unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the +natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is +pain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements +to their original state is pleasure. And would not the general +proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural +union of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before, make +up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of return +of all things to their own nature is pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Granted; what you say has a general truth. + +SOCRATES: Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating +severally in the two processes which we have described? + +PROTARCHUS: Good. + +SOCRATES: Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an +antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an +expectation of pain, fearful and anxious. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is +of the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation. + +SOCRATES: Right; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose +them to be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with +pleasure, methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class +of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of entire +desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes +which have been mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and +cold, and other things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired +and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but +only sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good. + +PROTARCHUS: You say most truly that this is the track which the +investigation should pursue. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and +pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will +be the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of +restoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether +any animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of +pleasure or pain, great or small? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then here we have a third state, over and above that of +pleasure and of pain? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And do not forget that there is such a state; it will make a +great difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this +or not. And I should like to say a few words about it. + +PROTARCHUS: What have you to say? + +SOCRATES: Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there +is no reason why he should not live in this neutral state. + +PROTARCHUS: You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing? + +SOCRATES: Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, +no degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be +necessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, we said so. + +SOCRATES: Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this +may not be the most divine of all lives? + +PROTARCHUS: If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have +either joy or sorrow. + +SOCRATES: Certainly not--there would be a great impropriety in the +assumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not +indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if +in any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion +we will place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second +place, should she have to resign the first. + +PROTARCHUS: Just so. + +SOCRATES: The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is +purely mental, is entirely derived from memory. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I must first of all analyze memory, or rather perception +which is prior to memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to be +properly cleared up. + +PROTARCHUS: How will you proceed? + +SOCRATES: Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished +before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other +affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock +to both and to each of them. + +PROTARCHUS: Granted. + +SOCRATES: And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first +but not of the second? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness +in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in +this case has not yet entered; and to speak of the loss of that which +is not yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction; do you +see? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then just be so good as to change the terms. + +PROTARCHUS: How shall I change them? + +SOCRATES: Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing +the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say +unconsciousness. + +PROTARCHUS: I see. + +SOCRATES: And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and +motion would be properly called consciousness? + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Then now we know the meaning of the word? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the +preservation of consciousness? + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: But do we not distinguish memory from recollection? + +PROTARCHUS: I think so. + +SOCRATES: And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul +has of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced +when in company with the body? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of +some consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and +reminiscence? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: There is a reason why I say all this. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and +desire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the +previous analysis helps to show the nature of both. + +PROTARCHUS: Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point. + +SOCRATES: There are certainly many things to be considered in discussing +the generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must +determine the nature and seat of desire. + +PROTARCHUS: Ay; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing. + +SOCRATES: Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find +the answer. + +PROTARCHUS: A fair retort; but let us proceed. + +SOCRATES: Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of +desires? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And yet they are very different; what common nature have we in +view when we call them by a single name? + +PROTARCHUS: By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is not easily +answered; but it must be answered. + +SOCRATES: Then let us go back to our examples. + +PROTARCHUS: Where shall we begin? + +SOCRATES: Do we mean anything when we say 'a man thirsts'? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: We mean to say that he 'is empty'? + +PROTARCHUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And is not thirst desire? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, of drink. + +SOCRATES: Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink? + +PROTARCHUS: I should say, of replenishment with drink. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of +what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly so. + +SOCRATES: But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain +either by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment, of +which he has no present or past experience? + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And yet he who desires, surely desires something? + +PROTARCHUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: He does not desire that which he experiences, for +he experiences thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires +replenishment? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some +way apprehends replenishment? + +PROTARCHUS: There must. + +SOCRATES: And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be +emptied? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the +replenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other way +can there be? + +PROTARCHUS: I cannot imagine any other. + +SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence? + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: That there is no such thing as desire of the body. + +PROTARCHUS: Why so? + +SOCRATES: Why, because the argument shows that the endeavour of every +animal is to the reverse of his bodily state. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is +experiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the argument, having proved that memory attracts us +towards the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the +desires and the moving principle in every living being have their origin +in the soul. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or +thirsts or has any similar experience. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + +SOCRATES: Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to +me to imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these +affections. + +PROTARCHUS: Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you +speaking? + +SOCRATES: I am speaking of being emptied and replenished, and of all +that relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as +well as of the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the +pleasure which succeeds to it. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the intermediate state? + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by 'intermediate'? + +SOCRATES: I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers +past pleasures which, if they would only return, would relieve him; +but as yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an +intermediate state? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased? + +PROTARCHUS: Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body +there is the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and +expectation. + +SOCRATES: What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man +who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other +times be quite in despair? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be +filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then man and the other animals have at the same time both +pleasure and pain? + +PROTARCHUS: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there +will be the double experience of pain. You observed this and inferred +that the double experience was the single case possible. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the +occasion of raising a question? + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which +we are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false? + +PROTARCHUS: But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains? + +SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or +true and false expectations, or true and false opinions? + +PROTARCHUS: I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not +pleasures. + +SOCRATES: What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very +serious enquiry. + +PROTARCHUS: There I agree. + +SOCRATES: And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus' boys, the point +to be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Surely. + +SOCRATES: No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is +said should be pertinent. + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: I am always wondering at the question which has now been +raised. + +PROTARCHUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true? + +PROTARCHUS: To be sure I do. + +SOCRATES: Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did +not rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping +or waking, mad or lunatic? + +PROTARCHUS: So we have always held, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your +opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: I think that we should. + +SOCRATES: Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has +arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And such a thing as pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And an opinion must be of something? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And a man must be pleased by something? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite correct. + +SOCRATES: And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no +difference; it will still be an opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, +will always have a real feeling of pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is also quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure +true only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is the question. + +SOCRATES: You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence +becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this +is what you think should be examined? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities +in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of +quality? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain +as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have +various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we +should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak +of a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse +of rightness? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that +the opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its +object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name? + +PROTARCHUS: Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we? + +SOCRATES: And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion +which is not true, but false? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as we were +saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure +false. + +SOCRATES: How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of +pleasure! + +PROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear. + +SOCRATES: And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure +which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is +often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance? + +PROTARCHUS: There must be a very great difference, between them. + +SOCRATES: Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference. + +PROTARCHUS: Lead, and I will follow. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, my view is-- + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: We agree--do we not?--that there is such a thing as false, and +also such a thing as true opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often +consequent upon these--upon true and false opinion, I mean. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always +spring from memory and perception? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature? + +PROTARCHUS: Of what nature? + +SOCRATES: An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, +and the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees. + +PROTARCHUS: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Soon he begins to interrogate himself. + +PROTARCHUS: In what manner? + +SOCRATES: He asks himself--'What is that which appears to be standing by +the rock under the tree?' This is the question which he may be supposed +to put to himself when he sees such an appearance. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: To which he may guess the right answer, saying as if in a +whisper to himself--'It is a man.' + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Or again, he may be misled, and then he will say--'No, it is a +figure made by the shepherds.' + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in +articulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a +proposition. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him, +he may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in my explanation +of this phenomenon. + +PROTARCHUS: What is your explanation? + +SOCRATES: I think that the soul at such times is like a book. + +PROTARCHUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant +feelings seem to almost to write down words in the soul, and when the +inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions +which are the expressions of opinion come into our souls--but when the +scribe within us writes falsely, the result is false. + +PROTARCHUS: I quite assent and agree to your statement. + +SOCRATES: I must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is +busy at the same time in the chambers of the soul. + +PROTARCHUS: Who is he? + +SOCRATES: The painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws +images in the soul of the things which he has described. + +PROTARCHUS: But when and how does he do this? + +SOCRATES: When a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense +certain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the +subjects of them;--is not this a very common mental phenomenon? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And the images answering to true opinions and words are true, +and to false opinions and words false; are they not? + +PROTARCHUS: They are. + +SOCRATES: If we are right so far, there arises a further question. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only +in relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future +also? + +PROTARCHUS: I should say in relation to all times alike. + +SOCRATES: Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described +already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones; from which +we may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do with the +future? + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And do all those writings and paintings which, as we were +saying a little while ago, are produced in us, relate to the past and +present only, and not to the future? + +PROTARCHUS: To the future, very much. + +SOCRATES: When you say, 'Very much,' you mean to imply that all these +representations are hopes about the future, and that mankind are filled +with hopes in every stage of existence? + +PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Answer me another question. + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he +not? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly he is. + +SOCRATES: And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled +with hopes? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which +exist in the minds of each of us? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may +often have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the +picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his +good fortune. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, +have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false +pictures? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as +the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: They are. + +SOCRATES: The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good +in true pleasures? + +PROTARCHUS: Doubtless. + +SOCRATES: Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of +men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of +a similar character? + +PROTARCHUS: There are. + +SOCRATES: And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had +a real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in +the past, present, or future? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not +right? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real +but illusory character? + +PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real +pleasure who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased +about things which neither have nor have ever had any real existence, +and, more often than not, are never likely to exist. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable. + +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the +like; are they not often false? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are +true or false? + +PROTARCHUS: In no other way. + +SOCRATES: Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as +they are false. + +PROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth; for no +one would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by +reason of some other great corruption to which they are liable. + +SOCRATES: Well, of pleasures which are corrupt and caused by corruption +we will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the +present I would rather show by another argument that there are many +false pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this +may assist our final decision. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures. + +SOCRATES: I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion +which should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new +argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, +as they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings +apart from the soul--do you remember? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, I remember that you said so. + +SOCRATES: And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily +state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was +experienced. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then now you may infer what happens in such cases. + +PROTARCHUS: What am I to infer? + +SOCRATES: That in such cases pleasures and pains come simultaneously; +and there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond +to them, as has been already shown. + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And there is another point to which we have agreed. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that +they are of the class of infinites. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly, we said so. + +SOCRATES: But how can we rightly judge of them? + +PROTARCHUS: How can we? + +SOCRATES: Is it our intention to judge of their comparative importance +and intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, +and pleasure against pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them +accordingly. + +SOCRATES: Well, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or +distance of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine +falsely; and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of +pleasures and pains? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater. + +SOCRATES: Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were +saying before. + +PROTARCHUS: What was that? + +SOCRATES: Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the +pleasures and pains with their own falsity. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and +false because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to +comparison; the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when +placed side by side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by +side with the pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly, and for the reason which you mention. + +SOCRATES: And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element +which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are: you +will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never say +that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or +true. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find +pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are +still more false than these. + +PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how shall we find them? + +SOCRATES: If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains +and aches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a +corruption of nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and +repletions, and evacuations, and also by growth and decay? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that has been often said. + +SOCRATES: And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural +state is pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body +experiences none of these changes. + +PROTARCHUS: When can that be, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Your question, Protarchus, does not help the argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Why not, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine. + +PROTARCHUS: And what was that? + +SOCRATES: Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I +may ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were? + +PROTARCHUS: You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed +either for good or bad? + +SOCRATES: Yes. + +PROTARCHUS: Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be +neither pleasure nor pain. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that +we must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise tell +us; for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, and their words are of no mean authority. + +SOCRATES: Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I +should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I +mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight. + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: To them we will say: 'Good; but are we, or living things in +general, always conscious of what happens to us--for example, of +our growth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly +unconscious of this and similar phenomena?' You must answer for them. + +PROTARCHUS: The latter alternative is the true one. + +SOCRATES: Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going +up and down cause pleasures and pains? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be-- + +PROTARCHUS: What? + +SOCRATES: If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains, +but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither. + +PROTARCHUS: That, Socrates, is the more correct mode of speaking. + +SOCRATES: But if this be true, the life to which I was just now +referring again appears. + +PROTARCHUS: What life? + +SOCRATES: The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of +joy. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, +one painful, and the third which is neither; what say you? + +PROTARCHUS: I should say as you do that there are three of them. + +SOCRATES: But if so, the negation of pain will not be the same with +pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live +without pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand +him to mean by that statement? + +PROTARCHUS: I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain. + +SOCRATES: Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a +little and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a +third which is neither. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver? + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or +reasonably spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons who say and +think so. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free +from pain? + +PROTARCHUS: They say so. + +SOCRATES: And they must think or they would not say that they have +pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct +natures, they are wrong. + +PROTARCHUS: But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures. + +SOCRATES: Then shall we take the view that they are three, as we were +just now saying, or that they are two only--the one being a state of +pain, which is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of +itself a good, and is called pleasant? + +PROTARCHUS: But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all? I do not +see the reason. + +SOCRATES: You, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies +of our friend Philebus. + +PROTARCHUS: And who may they be? + +SOCRATES: Certain persons who are reputed to be masters in natural +philosophy, who deny the very existence of pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: Indeed! + +SOCRATES: They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are +all of them only avoidances of pain. + +PROTARCHUS: And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them? + +SOCRATES: Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, who +divine the truth, not by rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance +and extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of +pleasure, in which they think that there is nothing sound, and her +seductive influence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not +pleasure. This is the use which you may make of them. And when you have +considered the various grounds of their dislike, you shall hear from +me what I deem to be true pleasures. Having thus examined the nature of +pleasure from both points of view, we will bring her up for judgment. + +PROTARCHUS: Well said. + +SOCRATES: Then let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers +and follow in the track of their dislike. I imagine that they would +say something of this sort; they would begin at the beginning, and +ask whether, if we wanted to know the nature of any quality, such as +hardness, we should be more likely to discover it by looking at the +hardest things, rather than at the least hard? You, Protarchus, shall +answer these severe gentlemen as you answer me. + +PROTARCHUS: By all means, and I reply to them, that you should look at +the greatest instances. + +SOCRATES: Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a +class, we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most +extreme and most vehement? + +PROTARCHUS: In that every one will agree. + +SOCRATES: And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we +have often said, are the pleasures of the body? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we +are sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our +answer, or we shall come to grief. + +PROTARCHUS: How will that be? + +SOCRATES: Why, because we might be tempted to answer, 'When we are in +health.' + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is the natural answer. + +SOCRATES: Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which +mankind have the greatest desires? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness, +feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely? Am I not +right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the +satisfaction of their want? + +PROTARCHUS: That is obvious as soon as it is said. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a person +would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look, not at +health, but at disease? And here you must distinguish:--do not imagine +that I mean to ask whether those who are very ill have more pleasures +than those who are well, but understand that I am speaking of the +magnitude of pleasure; I want to know where pleasures are found to be +most intense. For, as I say, we have to discover what is pleasure, and +what they mean by pleasure who deny her very existence. + +PROTARCHUS: I think I follow you. + +SOCRATES: You will soon have a better opportunity of showing whether you +do or not, Protarchus. Answer now, and tell me whether you see, I will +not say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness +than in temperance? Reflect before you speak. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand you, and see that there is a great difference +between them; the temperate are restrained by the wise man's aphorism of +'Never too much,' which is their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing +the minds of fools and wantons becomes madness and makes them shout with +delight. + +SOCRATES: Very good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures +and pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body, +and not in a virtuous state. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and +see what makes them the greatest? + +PROTARCHUS: To be sure we ought. + +SOCRATES: Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain +disorders. + +PROTARCHUS: What disorders? + +SOCRATES: The pleasures of unseemly disorders, which our severe friends +utterly detest. + +PROTARCHUS: What pleasures? + +SOCRATES: Such, for example, as the relief of itching and other ailments +by scratching, which is the only remedy required. For what in Heaven's +name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us?--Pleasure +or pain? + +PROTARCHUS: A villainous mixture of some kind, Socrates, I should say. + +SOCRATES: I did not introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any +personal reference to Philebus, but because, without the consideration +of these and similar pleasures, we shall not be able to determine the +point at issue. + +PROTARCHUS: Then we had better proceed to analyze this family of +pleasures. + +SOCRATES: You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain? + +PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in +the body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul; while +there are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to soul +and body, which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures +and sometimes pains. + +PROTARCHUS: How is that? + +SOCRATES: Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, +a man experiences two opposite feelings; for example, when he is cold +and is growing warm, or again, when he is hot and is becoming cool, +and he wants to have the one and be rid of the other;--the sweet has a +bitter, as the common saying is, and both together fasten upon him and +create irritation and in time drive him to distraction. + +PROTARCHUS: That description is very true to nature. + +SOCRATES: And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are +sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Of cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example +is afforded by itching, of which we were just now speaking, and by the +tingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within, and +the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not reach the +parts affected; then if you put them to the fire, and as a last resort +apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense pleasure or +pain in the inner parts, which contrasts and mingles with the pain or +pleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts; and this is due to +the forcible separation of what is united, or to the union of what is +separated, and to the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and +the slight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle, and causes a gentle +irritation; or again, the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an +excitement in him,--he even leaps for joy, he assumes all sorts of +attitudes, he changes all manner of colours, he gasps for breath, and is +quite amazed, and utters the most irrational exclamations. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, indeed. + +SOCRATES: He will say of himself, and others will say of him, that he is +dying with these delights; and the more dissipated and good-for-nothing +he is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every way; of all +pleasures he declares them to be the greatest; and he reckons him who +lives in the most constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of +mankind. + +PROTARCHUS: That, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions +of the majority about pleasures. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which +arise out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the +body; there are also cases in which the mind contributes an opposite +element to the body, whether of pleasure or pain, and the two unite and +form one mixture. Concerning these I have already remarked, that when a +man is empty he desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in +vacuity. But now I must further add what I omitted before, that in all +these and similar emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they +are innumerable), pleasure and pain coalesce in one. + +PROTARCHUS: I believe that to be quite true. + +SOCRATES: There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures +and pains. + +PROTARCHUS: What is that? + +SOCRATES: The union which, as we were saying, the mind often experiences +of purely mental feelings. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, +emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful +pleasures? need I remind you of the anger + +'Which stirs even a wise man to violence, And is sweeter than honey and +the honeycomb?' + +And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and +bereavement? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, there is a natural connexion between them. + +SOCRATES: And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the +spectators smile through their tears? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly I do. + +SOCRATES: And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a +mixed feeling of pain and pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: I do not quite understand you. + +SOCRATES: I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in +recognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy. + +PROTARCHUS: There is, I think. + +SOCRATES: And the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable +is the examination of it, because the difficulty in detecting other +cases of mixed pleasures and pains will be less. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of +the soul? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of +his neighbours at which he is pleased? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an +evil? + +PROTARCHUS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: From these considerations learn to know the nature of the +ridiculous. + +PROTARCHUS: Explain. + +SOCRATES: The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to +describe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general it +is that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at Delphi. + +PROTARCHUS: You mean, Socrates, 'Know thyself.' + +SOCRATES: I do; and the opposite would be, 'Know not thyself.' + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three. + +PROTARCHUS: Indeed I am afraid that I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will. + +SOCRATES: Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be +shown? + +PROTARCHUS: What are they? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy +himself richer than he is. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is a very common error. + +SOCRATES: And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer +than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he +really has not. + +PROTARCHUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods +of the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they +are. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion. + +SOCRATES: And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass +of mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit +of contention and lying conceit of wisdom? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And may not all this be truly called an evil condition? + +PROTARCHUS: Very evil. + +SOCRATES: But we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if +we would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure +and pain. + +PROTARCHUS: How can we make the further division which you suggest? + +SOCRATES: All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of +themselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two +classes--one having power and might; and the other the reverse. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them +who are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, +may be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may +be more truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in +the powerful is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in +reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in +truth is, ridiculous. + +PROTARCHUS: That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the +admixture of pleasures and pains. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous +pain? + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the +misfortunes of enemies? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends' +misfortunes--is not that wrong? + +PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly. + +SOCRATES: Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we +enumerated--the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are +ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May +we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this +state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous? + +PROTARCHUS: They are ridiculous. + +SOCRATES: And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a +misfortune? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly we feel pleasure. + +SOCRATES: And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at +the misfortunes of friends? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our +friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy +has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant; +and so we envy and laugh at the same instant. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the argument implies that there are combinations of +pleasure and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only +on the stage, but on the greater stage of human life; and so in endless +other cases. + +PROTARCHUS: I do not see how any one can deny what you say, Socrates, +however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion. + +SOCRATES: I mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, +envy, and similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a +mixture of the two elements so often named; did I not? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had +reference only to sorrow and envy and anger. + +PROTARCHUS: I see. + +SOCRATES: Then many other cases still remain? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the +admixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that +there was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love +and similar affections; and I thought that when I had given you the +illustration, you would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a +general truth that the body without the soul, and the soul without +the body, as well as the two united, are susceptible of all sorts of +admixtures of pleasures and pains; and so further discussion would have +been unnecessary. And now I want to know whether I may depart; or will +you keep me here until midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my release +without many words;--if I promise that to-morrow I will give you an +account of all these cases. But at present I would rather sail in +another direction, and go to other matters which remain to be settled, +before the judgment can be given which Philebus demands. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course. + +SOCRATES: Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their +turn; this is the natural and necessary order. + +PROTARCHUS: Excellent. + +SOCRATES: These, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to indicate; for +with the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation +of pain, I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as witnesses, +that there are pleasures which seem only and are not, and there are +others again which have great power and appear in many forms, yet +are intermingled with pains, and are partly alleviations of agony and +distress, both of body and mind. + +PROTARCHUS: Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in +conceiving to be true? + +SOCRATES: True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour +and form, and most of those which arise from smells; those of +sound, again, and in general those of which the want is painless and +unconscious, and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant +and unalloyed with pain. + +PROTARCHUS: Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean. + +SOCRATES: My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour +to be plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of +animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, +says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, +and the plane or solid figures which are formed out of them by +turning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles; for these I affirm +to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are +eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, +quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours which +are of the same character, and have similar pleasures; now do you +understand my meaning? + +PROTARCHUS: I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you +will try to make your meaning clearer. + +SOCRATES: When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure +tone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely +beautiful, and have natural pleasures associated with them. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, there are such pleasures. + +SOCRATES: The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they +have no necessary admixture of pain; and all pleasures, however and +wherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an +analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand. + +SOCRATES: To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger +of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them. + +PROTARCHUS: And this is the case. + +SOCRATES: Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his +knowledge, are there not pains of forgetting? + +PROTARCHUS: Not necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, when +he feels grief at the loss of his knowledge. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the +natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection. + +PROTARCHUS: In that case you are right in saying that the loss of +knowledge is not attended with pain. + +SOCRATES: These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain; and +they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and +those which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our +description of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no +measure, but that those which are not in excess have measure; the great, +the excessive, whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in +referring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less, which +pours through body and soul alike; and the others we shall refer to the +class which has measure. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Still there is something more to be considered about +pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, +abundance, greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms +stand to truth? + +PROTARCHUS: Why do you ask, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and +knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and +impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for +judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me +and by all of us. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Let us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for +consideration a single instance. + +PROTARCHUS: What instance shall we select? + +SOCRATES: Suppose that we first of all take whiteness. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is +that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most +unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly that which is most unadulterated. + +SOCRATES: True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the +greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most +beautiful? + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white +is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed. + +PROTARCHUS: Perfectly right. + +SOCRATES: There is no need of adducing many similar examples in +illustration of the argument about pleasure; one such is sufficient to +prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure +or unalloyed with pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a +great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind. + +PROTARCHUS: Assuredly; and the instance you have given is quite +sufficient. + +SOCRATES: But what do you say of another question:--have we not heard +that pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do not +certain ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to +be grateful to them? + +PROTARCHUS: What do they mean? + +SOCRATES: I will explain to you, my dear Protarchus, what they mean, by +putting a question. + +PROTARCHUS: Ask, and I will answer. + +SOCRATES: I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and +the other ever in want of something. + +PROTARCHUS: What manner of natures are they? + +SOCRATES: The one majestic ever, the other inferior. + +PROTARCHUS: You speak riddles. + +SOCRATES: You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of +them. + +PROTARCHUS: I should think so. + +SOCRATES: Search the universe for two terms which are like these two and +are present everywhere. + +PROTARCHUS: Yet a third time I must say, Be a little plainer, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: There is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in +play, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something +else (relatives), and that other things are the ends to which the former +class subserve (absolutes). + +PROTARCHUS: Your many repetitions make me slow to understand. + +SOCRATES: As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning +will become clearer. + +PROTARCHUS: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Here are two new principles. + +PROTARCHUS: What are they? + +SOCRATES: One is the generation of all things, and the other is essence. + +PROTARCHUS: I readily accept from you both generation and essence. + +SOCRATES: Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake +of essence, or essence for the sake of generation? + +PROTARCHUS: You want to know whether that which is called essence is, +properly speaking, for the sake of generation? + +SOCRATES: Yes. + +PROTARCHUS: By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question. + +SOCRATES: I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me +that ship-building is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of +ship-building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question. + +PROTARCHUS: Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I have no objection, but you must take your part. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, +material, are given to us with a view to generation, and that each +generation is relative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence, +and that the whole of generation is relative to the whole of essence. + +PROTARCHUS: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sake +of some essence? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And that for the sake of which something else is done must +be placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of +something else, in some other class, my good friend. + +PROTARCHUS: Most certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in +some other class than that of good? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + +SOCRATES: Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him +who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had no +true being at all; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of +pleasure being a good. + +PROTARCHUS: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation +their highest end. + +PROTARCHUS: Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean? + +SOCRATES: I am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or +thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted +at the process as if it were pleasure; and they say that they would not +wish to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which might +be mentioned. + +PROTARCHUS: That is certainly what they appear to think. + +SOCRATES: And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite +of generation? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation and +destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we were +saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible +thought. + +PROTARCHUS: He who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is +involved in great absurdities, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Great, indeed; and there is yet another of them. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing +good or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in +the soul only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure; and that +courage or temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul, +is not really a good?--and is there not yet a further absurdity in our +being compelled to say that he who has a feeling of pain and not of +pleasure is bad at the time when he is suffering pain, even though he be +the best of men; and again, that he who has a feeling of pleasure, in +so far as he is pleased at the time when he is pleased, in that degree +excels in virtue? + +PROTARCHUS: Nothing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this. + +SOCRATES: And now, having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let +us not appear to be too sparing of mind and knowledge: let us ring their +metal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part, until we +have found out what in them is of the purest nature; and then the truest +elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up for judgment. + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: Knowledge has two parts,--the one productive, and the other +educational? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And in the productive or handicraft arts, is not one part +more akin to knowledge, and the other less; and may not the one part be +regarded as the pure, and the other as the impure? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of +them. + +PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how do you separate them? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing +be taken away from any art, that which remains will not be much. + +PROTARCHUS: Not much, certainly. + +SOCRATES: The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of the +senses which is given by experience and practice, in addition to +a certain power of guessing, which is commonly called art, and is +perfected by attention and pains. + +PROTARCHUS: Nothing more, assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism; for sounds +are harmonized, not by measure, but by skilful conjecture; the music of +the flute is always trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating note, +and is therefore mixed up with much that is doubtful and has little +which is certain. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And the same will be found to hold good of medicine and +husbandry and piloting and generalship. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: The art of the builder, on the other hand, which uses a number +of measures and instruments, attains by their help to a greater degree +of accuracy than the other arts. + +PROTARCHUS: How is that? + +SOCRATES: In ship-building and house-building, and in other branches of +the art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, compass, line, +and a most ingenious machine for straightening wood. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then now let us divide the arts of which we were speaking into +two kinds,--the arts which, like music, are less exact in their results, +and those which, like carpentering, are more exact. + +PROTARCHUS: Let us make that division. + +SOCRATES: Of the latter class, the most exact of all are those which we +just now spoke of as primary. + +PROTARCHUS: I see that you mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of +weighing and measuring. + +SOCRATES: Certainly, Protarchus; but are not these also distinguishable +into two kinds? + +PROTARCHUS: What are the two kinds? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, arithmetic is of two kinds, one of which +is popular, and the other philosophical. + +PROTARCHUS: How would you distinguish them? + +SOCRATES: There is a wide difference between them, Protarchus; some +arithmeticians reckon unequal units; as for example, two armies, two +oxen, two very large things or two very small things. The party who are +opposed to them insist that every unit in ten thousand must be the same +as every other unit. + +PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly there is, as you say, a great difference among +the votaries of the science; and there may be reasonably supposed to be +two sorts of arithmetic. + +SOCRATES: And when we compare the art of mensuration which is used in +building with philosophical geometry, or the art of computation which +is used in trading with exact calculation, shall we say of either of the +pairs that it is one or two? + +PROTARCHUS: On the analogy of what has preceded, I should be of opinion +that they were severally two. + +SOCRATES: Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject? + +PROTARCHUS: I think so, but I should like to be told by you. + +SOCRATES: The argument has all along been seeking a parallel to +pleasure, and true to that original design, has gone on to ask whether +one sort of knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer +than another. + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly; that was the intention. + +SOCRATES: And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown +that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of +certainty? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And just now did not the argument first designate a particular +art by a common term, thus making us believe in the unity of that art; +and then again, as if speaking of two different things, proceed to +enquire whether the art as pursed by philosophers, or as pursued by +non-philosophers, has more of certainty and purity? + +PROTARCHUS: That is the very question which the argument is asking. + +SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry? + +PROTARCHUS: O Socrates, we have reached a point at which the difference +of clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous. + +SOCRATES: Then the answer will be the easier. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly; and let us say in reply, that those arts into +which arithmetic and mensuration enter, far surpass all others; and that +of these the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure philosophic +impulse are infinitely superior in accuracy and truth. + +SOCRATES: Then this is your judgment; and this is the answer which, +upon your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of +misinterpretation? + +PROTARCHUS: What answer? + +SOCRATES: That there are two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration; +and also several other arts which in like manner have this double +nature, and yet only one name. + +PROTARCHUS: Let us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you +speak, Socrates, and hope for good luck. + +SOCRATES: We have explained what we term the most exact arts or +sciences. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: And yet, Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us, +if we do not award to her the first place. + +PROTARCHUS: And pray, what is dialectic? + +SOCRATES: Clearly the science which has to do with all that knowledge of +which we are now speaking; for I am sure that all men who have a grain +of intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being +and reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of +all. But how would you decide this question, Protarchus? + +PROTARCHUS: I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art +of persuasion far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far the +best of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of +their own free will. Now, I should not like to quarrel either with you +or with him. + +SOCRATES: You mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were not +ashamed? + +PROTARCHUS: As you please. + +SOCRATES: May I not have led you into a misapprehension? + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: Dear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best +or usefullest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and accuracy, +and the greatest amount of truth, however humble and little useful +an art. And as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that his art has the +advantage in usefulness to mankind, he will not quarrel with you +for saying that the study of which I am speaking is superior in this +particular of essential truth; as in the comparison of white colours, a +little whiteness, if that little be only pure, was said to be superior +in truth to a great mass which is impure. And now let us give our best +attention and consider well, not the comparative use or reputation of +the sciences, but the power or faculty, if there be such, which the soul +has of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of it; let +us search into the pure element of mind and intelligence, and then we +shall be able to say whether the science of which I have been speaking +is most likely to possess the faculty, or whether there be some other +which has higher claims. + +PROTARCHUS: Well, I have been considering, and I can hardly think that +any other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this. + +SOCRATES: Do you say so because you observe that the arts in general and +those engaged in them make use of opinion, and are resolutely engaged in +the investigation of matters of opinion? Even he who supposes himself +to be occupied with nature is really occupied with the things of this +world, how created, how acting or acted upon. Is not this the sort of +enquiry in which his life is spent? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: He is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things +which are becoming, or which will or have become. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor +have been nor will be unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule of +truth ever become certain? + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no +fixedness? + +PROTARCHUS: How indeed? + +SOCRATES: Then mind and science when employed about such changing things +do not attain the highest truth? + +PROTARCHUS: I should imagine not. + +SOCRATES: And now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or +Philebus or Gorgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single point. + +PROTARCHUS: What point? + +SOCRATES: Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has +to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, +or if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has; and that all other +things are to be placed in a second or inferior class. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest +to be given to the fairest things? + +PROTARCHUS: That is natural. + +SOCRATES: And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured +most? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And these names may be said to have their truest and most +exact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true +being? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of +pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: In the next place, as to the mixture, here are the +ingredients, pleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who +have their materials ready to their hands. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And now we must begin to mix them? + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our +memories? + +PROTARCHUS: Of what? + +SOCRATES: Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb, +that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is good. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I +believe to be a fair summary of the argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living +beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief +good of all, and that the two names 'good' and 'pleasant' are correctly +given to one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins +by denying this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are +two, and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and +was not this what we were saying, Protarchus? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And is there not and was there not a further point which was +conceded between us? + +PROTARCHUS: What was it? + +SOCRATES: That the good differs from all other things. + +PROTARCHUS: In what respect? + +SOCRATES: In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and +in all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of +anything else. + +PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of +wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure +was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part +whatever in pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: We did. + +SOCRATES: And did we think that either of them alone would be +sufficient? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take +up the enquiry again and set us right; and assuming memory and wisdom +and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him +consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire,--I will not say +pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception +that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any +recollection, however momentary, of the feeling,--but would he desire to +have anything at all, if these faculties were wanting to him? And about +wisdom I ask the same question; can you conceive that any one would +choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than +with a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, +rather than with a certain degree of wisdom? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any +more? + +SOCRATES: Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good +cannot possibly be either of them? + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less +accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be +duly assigned. + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: Have we not found a road which leads towards the good? + +PROTARCHUS: What road? + +SOCRATES: Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover +in what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the +discovery of the man himself? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning, +that we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in +the life which is well mixed than in that which is not? + +PROTARCHUS: Far greater. + +SOCRATES: Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering +up a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who +presides over the ceremony of mingling. + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Are not we the cup-bearers? and here are two fountains which +are flowing at our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a +fountain of honey; the other, wisdom, a sober draught in which no wine +mingles, is of water unpleasant but healthful; out of these we must seek +to make the fairest of all possible mixtures. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Tell me first;--should we be most likely to succeed if we +mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom? + +PROTARCHUS: Perhaps we might. + +SOCRATES: But I should be afraid of the risk, and I think that I can +show a safer plan. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and +one art to be more exact than another. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; some +of them regarding only the transient and perishing, and others the +permanent and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when +judged by the standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, were truer +than the former. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good and right. + +SOCRATES: If, then, we were to begin by mingling the sections of each +class which have the most of truth, will not the union suffice to give +us the loveliest of lives, or shall we still want some elements of +another kind? + +PROTARCHUS: I think that we ought to do what you suggest. + +SOCRATES: Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and has reason +as well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other +things. + +PROTARCHUS: We will suppose such a man. + +SOCRATES: Will he have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only with +the divine circle and sphere, and knows nothing of our human spheres and +circles, but uses only divine circles and measures in the building of a +house? + +PROTARCHUS: The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is +ridiculous in man. + +SOCRATES: What do you mean? Do you mean that you are to throw into the +cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false measure +and the false circle? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, we must, if any of us is ever to find his way home. + +SOCRATES: And am I to include music, which, as I was saying just now, is +full of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, I think that you must, if human life is to be a life at +all. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper +who is pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door wide, and let +knowledge of every sort stream in, and the pure mingle with the impure? + +PROTARCHUS: I do not know, Socrates, that any great harm would come of +having them all, if only you have the first sort. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, shall I let them all flow into what Homer +poetically terms 'a meeting of the waters'? + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: There--I have let them in, and now I must return to the +fountain of pleasure. For we were not permitted to begin by mingling +in a single stream the true portions of both according to our original +intention; but the love of all knowledge constrained us to let all the +sciences flow in together before the pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And now the time has come for us to consider about the +pleasures also, whether we shall in like manner let them go all at once, +or at first only the true ones. + +PROTARCHUS: It will be by far the safer course to let flow the true ones +first. + +SOCRATES: Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary +pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle +them? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes; the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to +mingle. + +SOCRATES: The knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent +and useful always; and if we say of pleasures in like manner that all of +them are good and innocent for all of us at all times, we must let them +all mingle? + +PROTARCHUS: What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take? + +SOCRATES: Do not ask me, Protarchus; but ask the daughters of pleasure +and wisdom to answer for themselves. + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: Tell us, O beloved--shall we call you pleasures or by some +other name?--would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of +opinion that they would certainly answer as follows: + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: They would answer, as we said before, that for any single +class to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether +possible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with +another and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of +things in general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that may be, +of ourselves in every respect. + +PROTARCHUS: And our answer will be:--In that ye have spoken well. + +SOCRATES: Very true. And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and +mind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they will +reply:--'What pleasures do you mean?' + +PROTARCHUS: Likely enough. + +SOCRATES: And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have +the greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition +to the true ones? 'Why, Socrates,' they will say, 'how can we? seeing +that they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us; they trouble +the souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness; they +prevent us from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of +the children which are born to us, causing them to be forgotten and +unheeded; but the true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to +be of our family, and also those pleasures which accompany health and +temperance, and which every Virtue, like a goddess, has in her train to +follow her about wherever she goes,--mingle these and not the others; +there would be great want of sense in any one who desires to see a fair +and perfect mixture, and to find in it what is the highest good in man +and in the universe, and to divine what is the true form of good--there +would be great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are +always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the +cup.'--Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has +made, both on her own behalf, as well as on the behalf of memory and +true opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: Most certainly. + +SOCRATES: And still there must be something more added, which is a +necessary ingredient in every mixture. + +PROTARCHUS: What is that? + +SOCRATES: Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be +created or subsist. + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: Quite impossible; and now you and Philebus must tell me +whether anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of +thinking the argument is now completed, and may be compared to an +incorporeal law, which is going to hold fair rule over a living body. + +PROTARCHUS: I agree with you, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And may we not say with reason that we are now at the +vestibule of the habitation of the good? + +PROTARCHUS: I think that we are. + +SOCRATES: What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, +and which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved +by all? When we have discovered it, we will proceed to ask whether this +omnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge. + +SOCRATES: And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders +any mixture either of the highest value or of none at all. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Every man knows it. + +PROTARCHUS: What? + +SOCRATES: He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture +whatever must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and +to the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a confused medley +which brings confusion on the possessor of it. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And now the power of the good has retired into the region of +the beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the +world over. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, +with three we may catch our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the +three, and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of +the mixture, and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion of +them. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + +SOCRATES: And now, Protarchus, any man could decide well enough whether +pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more honourable +among gods and men. + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued +to the end. + +SOCRATES: We must take each of them separately in their relation to +pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to which +of the two they are severally most akin. + +PROTARCHUS: You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after passing +in review mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to +yourself--as to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth. + +PROTARCHUS: There is no need to pause, for the difference between them +is palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and it is +said that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest, +perjury is excused by the gods; for pleasures, like children, have not +the least particle of reason in them; whereas mind is either the same as +truth, or the most like truth, and the truest. + +SOCRATES: Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask +whether pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Here is another question which may be easily answered; for I +imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of +pleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but there still remains the third test: Has mind +a greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the +fairer of the two? + +PROTARCHUS: No one, Socrates, either awake or dreaming, ever saw or +imagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly, at any time, past, +present, or future. + +SOCRATES: Right. + +PROTARCHUS: But when we see some one indulging in pleasures, perhaps in +the greatest of pleasures, the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the +action makes us ashamed; and so we put them out of sight, and consign +them to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of +day. + +SOCRATES: Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere, by word of +mouth to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and +wide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second, +but that in measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the like, the +eternal nature has been found. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said. + +SOCRATES: In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful +and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom, you will +not be far wrong, if I divine aright. + +PROTARCHUS: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we +were affirming to appertain specially to the soul--sciences and arts and +true opinions as we called them? These come after the third class, and +form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure +is. + +PROTARCHUS: Surely. + +SOCRATES: The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us +as painless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed +them, which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses. + +PROTARCHUS: Perhaps. + +SOCRATES: And now, as Orpheus says, + + 'With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song.' + +Here, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to set +the crown on our discourse. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said, thus +offering the third libation to the saviour Zeus. + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely the +good. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you +spoke, meant a recapitulation. + +SOCRATES: Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just +been saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, which is maintained, +not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind +was far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than +pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: But, suspecting that there were other things which were also +better, I went on to say that if there was anything better than either, +then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure +would lose the second place as well as the first. + +PROTARCHUS: You did. + +SOCRATES: Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the +unsatisfactory nature of both of them. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good +have been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both +wanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: But, though they must both resign in favour of another, +mind is ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the +conqueror than pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And, according to the judgment which has now been given, +pleasure will rank fifth. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: But not first; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and +animals in the world by their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her to be +so;--although the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, +determine that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts +of animals to be better witnesses than the inspirations of divine +philosophy. + +PROTARCHUS: And now, Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you +have been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us. + +SOCRATES: And will you let me go? + +PROTARCHUS: There is a little which yet remains, and I will remind you +of it, for I am sure that you will not be the first to go away from an +argument. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Philebus, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILEBUS *** + +***** This file should be named 1744.txt or 1744.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/7/4/1744/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. diff --git a/1744.zip b/1744.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..aef6e2b --- /dev/null +++ b/1744.zip diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..40eaf8f --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #1744 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1744) diff --git a/old/philb10.txt b/old/philb10.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b9b7ab --- /dev/null +++ b/old/philb10.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5825 @@ + +The Project Gutenberg Etext of Philebus by Plato +translated by B. Jowett, #28 in our series by Plato. + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check +the copyright laws for your country before posting these files!! + +Please take a look at the important information in this header. +We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an +electronic path open for the next readers. Do not remove this. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**Etexts Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*These Etexts Prepared By Hundreds of Volunteers and Donations* + +Information on contacting Project Gutenberg to get Etexts, and +further information is included below. We need your donations. + + +Philebus + +by Plato + +May, 1999 [Etext #1744] + + +*******The Project Gutenberg Etext of Philebus by Plato******* +#28 in our series by Plato +******This file should be named philb10.txt or philb10.zip****** + +Corrected EDITIONS of our etexts get a new NUMBER, philb11.txt +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, philb10a.txt + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + +Project Gutenberg Etexts are usually created from multiple editions, +all of which are in the Public Domain in the United States, unless a +copyright notice is included. Therefore, we usually do NOT keep +these books in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +We are now trying to release all our books one month in advance +of the official release dates, for time for better editing. + +Please note: neither this list nor its contents are final till +midnight of the last day of the month of any such announcement. +The official release date of all Project Gutenberg Etexts is at +Midnight, Central Time, of the last day of the stated month. A +preliminary version may often be posted for suggestion, comment +and editing by those who wish to do so. To be sure you have an +up to date first edition [xxxxx10x.xxx] please check file sizes +in the first week of the next month. Since our ftp program has +a bug in it that scrambles the date [tried to fix and failed] a +look at the file size will have to do, but we will try to see a +new copy has at least one byte more or less. + + +Information about Project Gutenberg (one page) + +We produce about two million dollars for each hour we work. The +fifty hours is one conservative estimate for how long it we take +to get any etext selected, entered, proofread, edited, copyright +searched and analyzed, the copyright letters written, etc. This +projected audience is one hundred million readers. If our value +per text is nominally estimated at one dollar then we produce $2 +million dollars per hour this year as we release thirty-six text +files per month, or 432 more Etexts in 1999 for a total of 2000+ +If these reach just 10% of the computerized population, then the +total should reach over 200 billion Etexts given away this year. + +The Goal of Project Gutenberg is to Give Away One Trillion Etext +Files by the December 31, 2001. [10,000 x 100,000,000=Trillion] +This is ten thousand titles each to one hundred million readers, +which is only ~5% of the present number of computer users. + +At our revised rates of production, we will reach only one-third +of that goal by the end of 2001, or about 3,333 Etexts unless we +manage to get some real funding; currently our funding is mostly +from Michael Hart's salary at Carnegie-Mellon University, and an +assortment of sporadic gifts; this salary is only good for a few +more years, so we are looking for something to replace it, as we +don't want Project Gutenberg to be so dependent on one person. + +We need your donations more than ever! + + +All donations should be made to "Project Gutenberg/CMU": and are +tax deductible to the extent allowable by law. (CMU = Carnegie- +Mellon University). + +For these and other matters, please mail to: + +Project Gutenberg +P. O. Box 2782 +Champaign, IL 61825 + +When all other email fails try our Executive Director: +Michael S. Hart <hart@pobox.com> + +We would prefer to send you this information by email. + +****** + +To access Project Gutenberg etexts, use any Web browser +to view http://promo.net/pg. This site lists Etexts by +author and by title, and includes information about how +to get involved with Project Gutenberg. You could also +download our past Newsletters, or subscribe here. This +is one of our major sites, please email hart@pobox.com, +for a more complete list of our various sites. + +To go directly to the etext collections, use FTP or any +Web browser to visit a Project Gutenberg mirror (mirror +sites are available on 7 continents; mirrors are listed +at http://promo.net/pg). + +Mac users, do NOT point and click, typing works better. + +Example FTP session: + +ftp sunsite.unc.edu +login: anonymous +password: your@login +cd pub/docs/books/gutenberg +cd etext90 through etext99 +dir [to see files] +get or mget [to get files. . .set bin for zip files] +GET GUTINDEX.?? [to get a year's listing of books, e.g., GUTINDEX.99] +GET GUTINDEX.ALL [to get a listing of ALL books] + +*** + +**Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor** + +(Three Pages) + + +***START**THE SMALL PRINT!**FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS**START*** +Why is this "Small Print!" statement here? You know: lawyers. +They tell us you might sue us if there is something wrong with +your copy of this etext, even if you got it for free from +someone other than us, and even if what's wrong is not our +fault. So, among other things, this "Small Print!" statement +disclaims most of our liability to you. It also tells you how +you can distribute copies of this etext if you want to. + +*BEFORE!* YOU USE OR READ THIS ETEXT +By using or reading any part of this PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm +etext, you indicate that you understand, agree to and accept +this "Small Print!" statement. If you do not, you can receive +a refund of the money (if any) you paid for this etext by +sending a request within 30 days of receiving it to the person +you got it from. If you received this etext on a physical +medium (such as a disk), you must return it with your request. + +ABOUT PROJECT GUTENBERG-TM ETEXTS +This PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext, like most PROJECT GUTENBERG- +tm etexts, is a "public domain" work distributed by Professor +Michael S. Hart through the Project Gutenberg Association at +Carnegie-Mellon University (the "Project"). Among other +things, this means that no one owns a United States copyright +on or for this work, so the Project (and you!) can copy and +distribute it in the United States without permission and +without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth +below, apply if you wish to copy and distribute this etext +under the Project's "PROJECT GUTENBERG" trademark. + +To create these etexts, the Project expends considerable +efforts to identify, transcribe and proofread public domain +works. Despite these efforts, the Project's etexts and any +medium they may be on may contain "Defects". Among other +things, Defects may take the form of incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other +intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged +disk or other etext medium, a computer virus, or computer +codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment. + +LIMITED WARRANTY; DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES +But for the "Right of Replacement or Refund" described below, +[1] the Project (and any other party you may receive this +etext from as a PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext) disclaims all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including +legal fees, and [2] YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE OR +UNDER STRICT LIABILITY, OR FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR CONTRACT, +INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE +OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE +POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. + +If you discover a Defect in this etext within 90 days of +receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) +you paid for it by sending an explanatory note within that +time to the person you received it from. If you received it +on a physical medium, you must return it with your note, and +such person may choose to alternatively give you a replacement +copy. If you received it electronically, such person may +choose to alternatively give you a second opportunity to +receive it electronically. + +THIS ETEXT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED TO YOU "AS-IS". NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE TO YOU AS +TO THE ETEXT OR ANY MEDIUM IT MAY BE ON, INCLUDING BUT NOT +LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A +PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Some states do not allow disclaimers of implied warranties or +the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages, so the +above disclaimers and exclusions may not apply to you, and you +may have other legal rights. + +INDEMNITY +You will indemnify and hold the Project, its directors, +officers, members and agents harmless from all liability, cost +and expense, including legal fees, that arise directly or +indirectly from any of the following that you do or cause: +[1] distribution of this etext, [2] alteration, modification, +or addition to the etext, or [3] any Defect. + +DISTRIBUTION UNDER "PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm" +You may distribute copies of this etext electronically, or by +disk, book or any other medium if you either delete this +"Small Print!" and all other references to Project Gutenberg, +or: + +[1] Only give exact copies of it. Among other things, this + requires that you do not remove, alter or modify the + etext or this "small print!" statement. You may however, + if you wish, distribute this etext in machine readable + binary, compressed, mark-up, or proprietary form, + including any form resulting from conversion by word pro- + cessing or hypertext software, but only so long as + *EITHER*: + + [*] The etext, when displayed, is clearly readable, and + does *not* contain characters other than those + intended by the author of the work, although tilde + (~), asterisk (*) and underline (_) characters may + be used to convey punctuation intended by the + author, and additional characters may be used to + indicate hypertext links; OR + + [*] The etext may be readily converted by the reader at + no expense into plain ASCII, EBCDIC or equivalent + form by the program that displays the etext (as is + the case, for instance, with most word processors); + OR + + [*] You provide, or agree to also provide on request at + no additional cost, fee or expense, a copy of the + etext in its original plain ASCII form (or in EBCDIC + or other equivalent proprietary form). + +[2] Honor the etext refund and replacement provisions of this + "Small Print!" statement. + +[3] Pay a trademark license fee to the Project of 20% of the + net profits you derive calculated using the method you + already use to calculate your applicable taxes. If you + don't derive profits, no royalty is due. Royalties are + payable to "Project Gutenberg Association/Carnegie-Mellon + University" within the 60 days following each + date you prepare (or were legally required to prepare) + your annual (or equivalent periodic) tax return. + +WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO? +The Project gratefully accepts contributions in money, time, +scanning machines, OCR software, public domain etexts, royalty +free copyright licenses, and every other sort of contribution +you can think of. Money should be paid to "Project Gutenberg +Association / Carnegie-Mellon University". + +*END*THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + + + + +PHILEBUS + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + +The Philebus appears to be one of the later writings of Plato, in which the +style has begun to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has become +subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the development of +abstract thought great advances have been made on the Protagoras or the +Phaedrus, and even on the Republic. But there is a corresponding +diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a +laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and +incompleteness in the general design. As in the speeches of Thucydides, +the multiplication of ideas seems to interfere with the power of +expression. Instead of the equally diffused grace and ease of the earlier +dialogues there occur two or three highly-wrought passages; instead of the +ever-flowing play of humour, now appearing, now concealed, but always +present, are inserted a good many bad jests, as we may venture to term +them. We may observe an attempt at artificial ornament, and far-fetched +modes of expression; also clamorous demands on the part of his companions, +that Socrates shall answer his own questions, as well as other defects of +style, which remind us of the Laws. The connection is often abrupt and +inharmonious, and far from clear. Many points require further explanation; +e.g. the reference of pleasure to the indefinite class, compared with the +assertion which almost immediately follows, that pleasure and pain +naturally have their seat in the third or mixed class: these two +statements are unreconciled. In like manner, the table of goods does not +distinguish between the two heads of measure and symmetry; and though a +hint is given that the divine mind has the first place, nothing is said of +this in the final summing up. The relation of the goods to the sciences +does not appear; though dialectic may be thought to correspond to the +highest good, the sciences and arts and true opinions are enumerated in the +fourth class. We seem to have an intimation of a further discussion, in +which some topics lightly passed over were to receive a fuller +consideration. The various uses of the word 'mixed,' for the mixed life, +the mixed class of elements, the mixture of pleasures, or of pleasure and +pain, are a further source of perplexity. Our ignorance of the opinions +which Plato is attacking is also an element of obscurity. Many things in a +controversy might seem relevant, if we knew to what they were intended to +refer. But no conjecture will enable us to supply what Plato has not told +us; or to explain, from our fragmentary knowledge of them, the relation in +which his doctrine stood to the Eleatic Being or the Megarian good, or to +the theories of Aristippus or Antisthenes respecting pleasure. Nor are we +able to say how far Plato in the Philebus conceives the finite and infinite +(which occur both in the fragments of Philolaus and in the Pythagorean +table of opposites) in the same manner as contemporary Pythagoreans. + +There is little in the characters which is worthy of remark. The Socrates +of the Philebus is devoid of any touch of Socratic irony, though here, as +in the Phaedrus, he twice attributes the flow of his ideas to a sudden +inspiration. The interlocutor Protarchus, the son of Callias, who has been +a hearer of Gorgias, is supposed to begin as a disciple of the partisans of +pleasure, but is drawn over to the opposite side by the arguments of +Socrates. The instincts of ingenuous youth are easily induced to take the +better part. Philebus, who has withdrawn from the argument, is several +times brought back again, that he may support pleasure, of which he remains +to the end the uncompromising advocate. On the other hand, the youthful +group of listeners by whom he is surrounded, 'Philebus' boys' as they are +termed, whose presence is several times intimated, are described as all of +them at last convinced by the arguments of Socrates. They bear a very +faded resemblance to the interested audiences of the Charmides, Lysis, or +Protagoras. Other signs of relation to external life in the dialogue, or +references to contemporary things and persons, with the single exception of +the allusions to the anonymous enemies of pleasure, and the teachers of the +flux, there are none. + +The omission of the doctrine of recollection, derived from a previous state +of existence, is a note of progress in the philosophy of Plato. The +transcendental theory of pre-existent ideas, which is chiefly discussed by +him in the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Phaedrus, has given way to a +psychological one. The omission is rendered more significant by his having +occasion to speak of memory as the basis of desire. Of the ideas he treats +in the same sceptical spirit which appears in his criticism of them in the +Parmenides. He touches on the same difficulties and he gives no answer to +them. His mode of speaking of the analytical and synthetical processes may +be compared with his discussion of the same subject in the Phaedrus; here +he dwells on the importance of dividing the genera into all the species, +while in the Phaedrus he conveys the same truth in a figure, when he speaks +of carving the whole, which is described under the image of a victim, into +parts or members, 'according to their natural articulation, without +breaking any of them.' There is also a difference, which may be noted, +between the two dialogues. For whereas in the Phaedrus, and also in the +Symposium, the dialectician is described as a sort of enthusiast or lover, +in the Philebus, as in all the later writings of Plato, the element of love +is wanting; the topic is only introduced, as in the Republic, by way of +illustration. On other subjects of which they treat in common, such as the +nature and kinds of pleasure, true and false opinion, the nature of the +good, the order and relation of the sciences, the Republic is less advanced +than the Philebus, which contains, perhaps, more metaphysical truth more +obscurely expressed than any other Platonic dialogue. Here, as Plato +expressly tells us, he is 'forging weapons of another make,' i.e. new +categories and modes of conception, though 'some of the old ones might do +again.' + +But if superior in thought and dialectical power, the Philebus falls very +far short of the Republic in fancy and feeling. The development of the +reason undisturbed by the emotions seems to be the ideal at which Plato +aims in his later dialogues. There is no mystic enthusiasm or rapturous +contemplation of ideas. Whether we attribute this change to the greater +feebleness of age, or to the development of the quarrel between philosophy +and poetry in Plato's own mind, or perhaps, in some degree, to a +carelessness about artistic effect, when he was absorbed in abstract ideas, +we can hardly be wrong in assuming, amid such a variety of indications, +derived from style as well as subject, that the Philebus belongs to the +later period of his life and authorship. But in this, as in all the later +writings of Plato, there are not wanting thoughts and expressions in which +he rises to his highest level. + +The plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, the want of plan renders the +progress of the dialogue difficult to follow. A few leading ideas seem to +emerge: the relation of the one and many, the four original elements, the +kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge, the scale of goods. These are +only partially connected with one another. The dialogue is not rightly +entitled 'Concerning pleasure' or 'Concerning good,' but should rather be +described as treating of the relations of pleasure and knowledge, after +they have been duly analyzed, to the good. (1) The question is asked, +whether pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or some nature higher than +either; and if the latter, how pleasure and wisdom are related to this +higher good. (2) Before we can reply with exactness, we must know the kinds +of pleasure and the kinds of knowledge. (3) But still we may affirm +generally, that the combined life of pleasure and wisdom or knowledge has +more of the character of the good than either of them when isolated. (4) +to determine which of them partakes most of the higher nature, we must know +under which of the four unities or elements they respectively fall. These +are, first, the infinite; secondly, the finite; thirdly, the union of the +two; fourthly, the cause of the union. Pleasure is of the first, wisdom or +knowledge of the third class, while reason or mind is akin to the fourth or +highest. + +(5) Pleasures are of two kinds, the mixed and unmixed. Of mixed pleasures +there are three classes--(a) those in which both the pleasures and pains +are corporeal, as in eating and hunger; (b) those in which there is a pain +of the body and pleasure of the mind, as when you are hungry and are +looking forward to a feast; (c) those in which the pleasure and pain are +both mental. Of unmixed pleasures there are four kinds: those of sight, +hearing, smell, knowledge. + +(6) The sciences are likewise divided into two classes, theoretical and +productive: of the latter, one part is pure, the other impure. The pure +part consists of arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing. Arts like +carpentering, which have an exact measure, are to be regarded as higher +than music, which for the most part is mere guess-work. But there is also +a higher arithmetic, and a higher mensuration, which is exclusively +theoretical; and a dialectical science, which is higher still and the +truest and purest knowledge. + +(7) We are now able to determine the composition of the perfect life. +First, we admit the pure pleasures and the pure sciences; secondly, the +impure sciences, but not the impure pleasures. We have next to discover +what element of goodness is contained in this mixture. There are three +criteria of goodness--beauty, symmetry, truth. These are clearly more akin +to reason than to pleasure, and will enable us to fix the places of both of +them in the scale of good. First in the scale is measure; the second place +is assigned to symmetry; the third, to reason and wisdom; the fourth, to +knowledge and true opinion; the fifth, to pure pleasures; and here the Muse +says 'Enough.' + +'Bidding farewell to Philebus and Socrates,' we may now consider the +metaphysical conceptions which are presented to us. These are (I) the +paradox of unity and plurality; (II) the table of categories or elements; +(III) the kinds of pleasure; (IV) the kinds of knowledge; (V) the +conception of the good. We may then proceed to examine (VI) the relation +of the Philebus to the Republic, and to other dialogues. + +I. The paradox of the one and many originated in the restless dialectic of +Zeno, who sought to prove the absolute existence of the one by showing the +contradictions that are involved in admitting the existence of the many +(compare Parm.). Zeno illustrated the contradiction by well-known examples +taken from outward objects. But Socrates seems to intimate that the time +had arrived for discarding these hackneyed illustrations; such difficulties +had long been solved by common sense ('solvitur ambulando'); the fact of +the co-existence of opposites was a sufficient answer to them. He will +leave them to Cynics and Eristics; the youth of Athens may discourse of +them to their parents. To no rational man could the circumstance that the +body is one, but has many members, be any longer a stumbling-block. + +Plato's difficulty seems to begin in the region of ideas. He cannot +understand how an absolute unity, such as the Eleatic Being, can be broken +up into a number of individuals, or be in and out of them at once. +Philosophy had so deepened or intensified the nature of one or Being, by +the thoughts of successive generations, that the mind could no longer +imagine 'Being' as in a state of change or division. To say that the verb +of existence is the copula, or that unity is a mere unit, is to us easy; +but to the Greek in a particular stage of thought such an analysis involved +the same kind of difficulty as the conception of God existing both in and +out of the world would to ourselves. Nor was he assisted by the analogy of +sensible objects. The sphere of mind was dark and mysterious to him; but +instead of being illustrated by sense, the greatest light appeared to be +thrown on the nature of ideas when they were contrasted with sense. + +Both here and in the Parmenides, where similar difficulties are raised, +Plato seems prepared to desert his ancient ground. He cannot tell the +relation in which abstract ideas stand to one another, and therefore he +transfers the one and many out of his transcendental world, and proceeds to +lay down practical rules for their application to different branches of +knowledge. As in the Republic he supposes the philosopher to proceed by +regular steps, until he arrives at the idea of good; as in the Sophist and +Politicus he insists that in dividing the whole into its parts we should +bisect in the middle in the hope of finding species; as in the Phaedrus +(see above) he would have 'no limb broken' of the organism of knowledge;-- +so in the Philebus he urges the necessity of filling up all the +intermediate links which occur (compare Bacon's 'media axiomata') in the +passage from unity to infinity. With him the idea of science may be said +to anticipate science; at a time when the sciences were not yet divided, he +wants to impress upon us the importance of classification; neither +neglecting the many individuals, nor attempting to count them all, but +finding the genera and species under which they naturally fall. Here, +then, and in the parallel passages of the Phaedrus and of the Sophist, is +found the germ of the most fruitful notion of modern science. + +Plato describes with ludicrous exaggeration the influence exerted by the +one and many on the minds of young men in their first fervour of +metaphysical enthusiasm (compare Republic). But they are none the less an +everlasting quality of reason or reasoning which never grows old in us. At +first we have but a confused conception of them, analogous to the eyes +blinking at the light in the Republic. To this Plato opposes the +revelation from Heaven of the real relations of them, which some +Prometheus, who gave the true fire from heaven, is supposed to have +imparted to us. Plato is speaking of two things--(1) the crude notion of +the one and many, which powerfully affects the ordinary mind when first +beginning to think; (2) the same notion when cleared up by the help of +dialectic. + +To us the problem of the one and many has lost its chief interest and +perplexity. We readily acknowledge that a whole has many parts, that the +continuous is also the divisible, that in all objects of sense there is a +one and many, and that a like principle may be applied to analogy to purely +intellectual conceptions. If we attend to the meaning of the words, we are +compelled to admit that two contradictory statements are true. But the +antinomy is so familiar as to be scarcely observed by us. Our sense of the +contradiction, like Plato's, only begins in a higher sphere, when we speak +of necessity and free-will, of mind and body, of Three Persons and One +Substance, and the like. The world of knowledge is always dividing more +and more; every truth is at first the enemy of every other truth. Yet +without this division there can be no truth; nor any complete truth without +the reunion of the parts into a whole. And hence the coexistence of +opposites in the unity of the idea is regarded by Hegel as the supreme +principle of philosophy; and the law of contradiction, which is affirmed by +logicians to be an ultimate principle of the human mind, is displaced by +another law, which asserts the coexistence of contradictories as imperfect +and divided elements of the truth. Without entering further into the +depths of Hegelianism, we may remark that this and all similar attempts to +reconcile antinomies have their origin in the old Platonic problem of the +'One and Many.' + +II. 1. The first of Plato's categories or elements is the infinite. This +is the negative of measure or limit; the unthinkable, the unknowable; of +which nothing can be affirmed; the mixture or chaos which preceded distinct +kinds in the creation of the world; the first vague impression of sense; +the more or less which refuses to be reduced to rule, having certain +affinities with evil, with pleasure, with ignorance, and which in the scale +of being is farthest removed from the beautiful and good. To a Greek of +the age of Plato, the idea of an infinite mind would have been an +absurdity. He would have insisted that 'the good is of the nature of the +finite,' and that the infinite is a mere negative, which is on the level of +sensation, and not of thought. He was aware that there was a distinction +between the infinitely great and the infinitely small, but he would have +equally denied the claim of either to true existence. Of that positive +infinity, or infinite reality, which we attribute to God, he had no +conception. + +The Greek conception of the infinite would be more truly described, in our +way of speaking, as the indefinite. To us, the notion of infinity is +subsequent rather than prior to the finite, expressing not absolute vacancy +or negation, but only the removal of limit or restraint, which we suppose +to exist not before but after we have already set bounds to thought and +matter, and divided them after their kinds. From different points of view, +either the finite or infinite may be looked upon respectively both as +positive and negative (compare 'Omnis determinatio est negatio')' and the +conception of the one determines that of the other. The Greeks and the +moderns seem to be nearly at the opposite poles in their manner of +regarding them. And both are surprised when they make the discovery, as +Plato has done in the Sophist, how large an element negation forms in the +framework of their thoughts. + +2, 3. The finite element which mingles with and regulates the infinite is +best expressed to us by the word 'law.' It is that which measures all +things and assigns to them their limit; which preserves them in their +natural state, and brings them within the sphere of human cognition. This +is described by the terms harmony, health, order, perfection, and the like. +All things, in as far as they are good, even pleasures, which are for the +most part indefinite, partake of this element. We should be wrong in +attributing to Plato the conception of laws of nature derived from +observation and experiment. And yet he has as intense a conviction as any +modern philosopher that nature does not proceed by chance. But observing +that the wonderful construction of number and figure, which he had within +himself, and which seemed to be prior to himself, explained a part of the +phenomena of the external world, he extended their principles to the whole, +finding in them the true type both of human life and of the order of +nature. + +Two other points may be noticed respecting the third class. First, that +Plato seems to be unconscious of any interval or chasm which separates the +finite from the infinite. The one is in various ways and degrees working +in the other. Hence he has implicitly answered the difficulty with which +he started, of how the one could remain one and yet be divided among many +individuals, or 'how ideas could be in and out of themselves,' and the +like. Secondly, that in this mixed class we find the idea of beauty. +Good, when exhibited under the aspect of measure or symmetry, becomes +beauty. And if we translate his language into corresponding modern terms, +we shall not be far wrong in saying that here, as well as in the Republic, +Plato conceives beauty under the idea of proportion. + +4. Last and highest in the list of principles or elements is the cause of +the union of the finite and infinite, to which Plato ascribes the order of +the world. Reasoning from man to the universe, he argues that as there is +a mind in the one, there must be a mind in the other, which he identifies +with the royal mind of Zeus. This is the first cause of which 'our +ancestors spoke,' as he says, appealing to tradition, in the Philebus as +well as in the Timaeus. The 'one and many' is also supposed to have been +revealed by tradition. For the mythical element has not altogether +disappeared. + +Some characteristic differences may here be noted, which distinguish the +ancient from the modern mode of conceiving God. + +a. To Plato, the idea of God or mind is both personal and impersonal. Nor +in ascribing, as appears to us, both these attributes to him, and in +speaking of God both in the masculine and neuter gender, did he seem to +himself inconsistent. For the difference between the personal and +impersonal was not marked to him as to ourselves. We make a fundamental +distinction between a thing and a person, while to Plato, by the help of +various intermediate abstractions, such as end, good, cause, they appear +almost to meet in one, or to be two aspects of the same. Hence, without +any reconciliation or even remark, in the Republic he speaks at one time of +God or Gods, and at another time of the Good. So in the Phaedrus he seems +to pass unconsciously from the concrete to the abstract conception of the +Ideas in the same dialogue. Nor in the Philebus is he careful to show in +what relation the idea of the divine mind stands to the supreme principle +of measure. + +b. Again, to us there is a strongly-marked distinction between a first +cause and a final cause. And we should commonly identify a first cause +with God, and the final cause with the world, which is His work. But +Plato, though not a Pantheist, and very far from confounding God with the +world, tends to identify the first with the final cause. The cause of the +union of the finite and infinite might be described as a higher law; the +final measure which is the highest expression of the good may also be +described as the supreme law. Both these conceptions are realized chiefly +by the help of the material world; and therefore when we pass into the +sphere of ideas can hardly be distinguished. + +The four principles are required for the determination of the relative +places of pleasure and wisdom. Plato has been saying that we should +proceed by regular steps from the one to the many. Accordingly, before +assigning the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first find out +and arrange in order the general principles of things. Mind is ascertained +to be akin to the nature of the cause, while pleasure is found in the +infinite or indefinite class. We may now proceed to divide pleasure and +knowledge after their kinds. + +III. 1. Plato speaks of pleasure as indefinite, as relative, as a +generation, and in all these points of view as in a category distinct from +good. For again we must repeat, that to the Greek 'the good is of the +nature of the finite,' and, like virtue, either is, or is nearly allied to, +knowledge. The modern philosopher would remark that the indefinite is +equally real with the definite. Health and mental qualities are in the +concrete undefined; they are nevertheless real goods, and Plato rightly +regards them as falling under the finite class. Again, we are able to +define objects or ideas, not in so far as they are in the mind, but in so +far as they are manifested externally, and can therefore be reduced to rule +and measure. And if we adopt the test of definiteness, the pleasures of +the body are more capable of being defined than any other pleasures. As in +art and knowledge generally, we proceed from without inwards, beginning +with facts of sense, and passing to the more ideal conceptions of mental +pleasure, happiness, and the like. + +2. Pleasure is depreciated as relative, while good is exalted as absolute. +But this distinction seems to arise from an unfair mode of regarding them; +the abstract idea of the one is compared with the concrete experience of +the other. For all pleasure and all knowledge may be viewed either +abstracted from the mind, or in relation to the mind (compare Aristot. Nic. +Ethics). The first is an idea only, which may be conceived as absolute and +unchangeable, and then the abstract idea of pleasure will be equally +unchangeable with that of knowledge. But when we come to view either as +phenomena of consciousness, the same defects are for the most part incident +to both of them. Our hold upon them is equally transient and uncertain; +the mind cannot be always in a state of intellectual tension, any more than +capable of feeling pleasure always. The knowledge which is at one time +clear and distinct, at another seems to fade away, just as the pleasure of +health after sickness, or of eating after hunger, soon passes into a +neutral state of unconsciousness and indifference. Change and alternation +are necessary for the mind as well as for the body; and in this is to be +acknowledged, not an element of evil, but rather a law of nature. The +chief difference between subjective pleasure and subjective knowledge in +respect of permanence is that the latter, when our feeble faculties are +able to grasp it, still conveys to us an idea of unchangeableness which +cannot be got rid of. + +3. In the language of ancient philosophy, the relative character of +pleasure is described as becoming or generation. This is relative to Being +or Essence, and from one point of view may be regarded as the Heraclitean +flux in contrast with the Eleatic Being; from another, as the transient +enjoyment of eating and drinking compared with the supposed permanence of +intellectual pleasures. But to us the distinction is unmeaning, and +belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed away. Plato himself +seems to have suspected that the continuance or life of things is quite as +much to be attributed to a principle of rest as of motion (compare Charm. +Cratyl.). A later view of pleasure is found in Aristotle, who agrees with +Plato in many points, e.g. in his view of pleasure as a restoration to +nature, in his distinction between bodily and mental, between necessary and +non-necessary pleasures. But he is also in advance of Plato; for he +affirms that pleasure is not in the body at all; and hence not even the +bodily pleasures are to be spoken of as generations, but only as +accompanied by generation (Nic. Eth.). + +4. Plato attempts to identify vicious pleasures with some form of error, +and insists that the term false may be applied to them: in this he appears +to be carrying out in a confused manner the Socratic doctrine, that virtue +is knowledge, vice ignorance. He will allow of no distinction between the +pleasures and the erroneous opinions on which they are founded, whether +arising out of the illusion of distance or not. But to this we naturally +reply with Protarchus, that the pleasure is what it is, although the +calculation may be false, or the after-effects painful. It is difficult to +acquit Plato, to use his own language, of being a 'tyro in dialectics,' +when he overlooks such a distinction. Yet, on the other hand, we are +hardly fair judges of confusions of thought in those who view things +differently from ourselves. + +5. There appears also to be an incorrectness in the notion which occurs +both here and in the Gorgias, of the simultaneousness of merely bodily +pleasures and pains. We may, perhaps, admit, though even this is not free +from doubt, that the feeling of pleasureable hope or recollection is, or +rather may be, simultaneous with acute bodily suffering. But there is no +such coexistence of the pain of thirst with the pleasures of drinking; they +are not really simultaneous, for the one expels the other. Nor does Plato +seem to have considered that the bodily pleasures, except in certain +extreme cases, are unattended with pain. Few philosophers will deny that a +degree of pleasure attends eating and drinking; and yet surely we might as +well speak of the pains of digestion which follow, as of the pains of +hunger and thirst which precede them. Plato's conception is derived partly +from the extreme case of a man suffering pain from hunger or thirst, partly +from the image of a full and empty vessel. But the truth is rather, that +while the gratification of our bodily desires constantly affords some +degree of pleasure, the antecedent pains are scarcely perceived by us, +being almost done away with by use and regularity. + +6. The desire to classify pleasures as accompanied or not accompanied by +antecedent pains, has led Plato to place under one head the pleasures of +smell and sight, as well as those derived from sounds of music and from +knowledge. He would have done better to make a separate class of the +pleasures of smell, having no association of mind, or perhaps to have +divided them into natural and artificial. The pleasures of sight and sound +might then have been regarded as being the expression of ideas. But this +higher and truer point of view never appears to have occurred to Plato. +Nor has he any distinction between the fine arts and the mechanical; and, +neither here nor anywhere, an adequate conception of the beautiful in +external things. + +7. Plato agrees partially with certain 'surly or fastidious' philosophers, +as he terms them, who defined pleasure to be the absence of pain. They are +also described as eminent in physics. There is unfortunately no school of +Greek philosophy known to us which combined these two characteristics. +Antisthenes, who was an enemy of pleasure, was not a physical philosopher; +the atomists, who were physical philosophers, were not enemies of pleasure. +Yet such a combination of opinions is far from being impossible. Plato's +omission to mention them by name has created the same uncertainty +respecting them which also occurs respecting the 'friends of the ideas' and +the 'materialists' in the Sophist. + +On the whole, this discussion is one of the least satisfactory in the +dialogues of Plato. While the ethical nature of pleasure is scarcely +considered, and the merely physical phenomenon imperfectly analysed, too +much weight is given to ideas of measure and number, as the sole principle +of good. The comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really a comparison +of two elements, which have no common measure, and which cannot be excluded +from each other. Feeling is not opposed to knowledge, and in all +consciousness there is an element of both. The most abstract kinds of +knowledge are inseparable from some pleasure or pain, which accompanies the +acquisition or possession of them: the student is liable to grow weary of +them, and soon discovers that continuous mental energy is not granted to +men. The most sensual pleasure, on the other hand, is inseparable from the +consciousness of pleasure; no man can be happy who, to borrow Plato's +illustration, is leading the life of an oyster. Hence (by his own +confession) the main thesis is not worth determining; the real interest +lies in the incidental discussion. We can no more separate pleasure from +knowledge in the Philebus than we can separate justice from happiness in +the Republic. + +IV. An interesting account is given in the Philebus of the rank and order +of the sciences or arts, which agrees generally with the scheme of +knowledge in the Sixth Book of the Republic. The chief difference is, that +the position of the arts is more exactly defined. They are divided into an +empirical part and a scientific part, of which the first is mere guess- +work, the second is determined by rule and measure. Of the more empirical +arts, music is given as an example; this, although affirmed to be necessary +to human life, is depreciated. Music is regarded from a point of view +entirely opposite to that of the Republic, not as a sublime science, +coordinate with astronomy, but as full of doubt and conjecture. According +to the standard of accuracy which is here adopted, it is rightly placed +lower in the scale than carpentering, because the latter is more capable of +being reduced to measure. + +The theoretical element of the arts may also become a purely abstract +science, when separated from matter, and is then said to be pure and +unmixed. The distinction which Plato here makes seems to be the same as +that between pure and applied mathematics, and may be expressed in the +modern formula--science is art theoretical, art is science practical. In +the reason which he gives for the superiority of the pure science of number +over the mixed or applied, we can only agree with him in part. He says +that the numbers which the philosopher employs are always the same, whereas +the numbers which are used in practice represent different sizes or +quantities. He does not see that this power of expressing different +quantities by the same symbol is the characteristic and not the defect of +numbers, and is due to their abstract nature;--although we admit of course +what Plato seems to feel in his distinctions between pure and impure +knowledge, that the imperfection of matter enters into the applications of +them. + +Above the other sciences, as in the Republic, towers dialectic, which is +the science of eternal Being, apprehended by the purest mind and reason. +The lower sciences, including the mathematical, are akin to opinion rather +than to reason, and are placed together in the fourth class of goods. The +relation in which they stand to dialectic is obscure in the Republic, and +is not cleared up in the Philebus. + +V. Thus far we have only attained to the vestibule or ante-chamber of the +good; for there is a good exceeding knowledge, exceeding essence, which, +like Glaucon in the Republic, we find a difficulty in apprehending. This +good is now to be exhibited to us under various aspects and gradations. +The relative dignity of pleasure and knowledge has been determined; but +they have not yet received their exact position in the scale of goods. +Some difficulties occur to us in the enumeration: First, how are we to +distinguish the first from the second class of goods, or the second from +the third? Secondly, why is there no mention of the supreme mind? +Thirdly, the nature of the fourth class. Fourthly, the meaning of the +allusion to a sixth class, which is not further investigated. + +(I) Plato seems to proceed in his table of goods, from the more abstract to +the less abstract; from the subjective to the objective; until at the lower +end of the scale we fairly descend into the region of human action and +feeling. To him, the greater the abstraction the greater the truth, and he +is always tending to see abstractions within abstractions; which, like the +ideas in the Parmenides, are always appearing one behind another. Hence we +find a difficulty in following him into the sphere of thought which he is +seeking to attain. First in his scale of goods he places measure, in which +he finds the eternal nature: this would be more naturally expressed in +modern language as eternal law, and seems to be akin both to the finite and +to the mind or cause, which were two of the elements in the former table. +Like the supreme nature in the Timaeus, like the ideal beauty in the +Symposium or the Phaedrus, or like the ideal good in the Republic, this is +the absolute and unapproachable being. But this being is manifested in +symmetry and beauty everywhere, in the order of nature and of mind, in the +relations of men to one another. For the word 'measure' he now substitutes +the word 'symmetry,' as if intending to express measure conceived as +relation. He then proceeds to regard the good no longer in an objective +form, but as the human reason seeking to attain truth by the aid of +dialectic; such at least we naturally infer to be his meaning, when we +consider that both here and in the Republic the sphere of nous or mind is +assigned to dialectic. (2) It is remarkable (see above) that this personal +conception of mind is confined to the human mind, and not extended to the +divine. (3) If we may be allowed to interpret one dialogue of Plato by +another, the sciences of figure and number are probably classed with the +arts and true opinions, because they proceed from hypotheses (compare +Republic). (4) The sixth class, if a sixth class is to be added, is +playfully set aside by a quotation from Orpheus: Plato means to say that a +sixth class, if there be such a class, is not worth considering, because +pleasure, having only gained the fifth place in the scale of goods, is +already out of the running. + +VI. We may now endeavour to ascertain the relation of the Philebus to the +other dialogues. Here Plato shows the same indifference to his own +doctrine of Ideas which he has already manifested in the Parmenides and the +Sophist. The principle of the one and many of which he here speaks, is +illustrated by examples in the Sophist and Statesman. Notwithstanding the +differences of style, many resemblances may be noticed between the Philebus +and Gorgias. The theory of the simultaneousness of pleasure and pain is +common to both of them (Phil. Gorg.); there is also a common tendency in +them to take up arms against pleasure, although the view of the Philebus, +which is probably the later of the two dialogues, is the more moderate. +There seems to be an allusion to the passage in the Gorgias, in which +Socrates dilates on the pleasures of itching and scratching. Nor is there +any real discrepancy in the manner in which Gorgias and his art are spoken +of in the two dialogues. For Socrates is far from implying that the art of +rhetoric has a real sphere of practical usefulness: he only means that the +refutation of the claims of Gorgias is not necessary for his present +purpose. He is saying in effect: 'Admit, if you please, that rhetoric is +the greatest and usefullest of sciences:--this does not prove that +dialectic is not the purest and most exact.' From the Sophist and +Statesman we know that his hostility towards the sophists and rhetoricians +was not mitigated in later life; although both in the Statesman and Laws he +admits of a higher use of rhetoric. + +Reasons have been already given for assigning a late date to the Philebus. +That the date is probably later than that of the Republic, may be further +argued on the following grounds:--1. The general resemblance to the later +dialogues and to the Laws: 2. The more complete account of the nature of +good and pleasure: 3. The distinction between perception, memory, +recollection, and opinion which indicates a great progress in psychology; +also between understanding and imagination, which is described under the +figure of the scribe and the painter. A superficial notion may arise that +Plato probably wrote shorter dialogues, such as the Philebus, the Sophist, +and the Statesman, as studies or preparations for longer ones. This view +may be natural; but on further reflection is seen to be fallacious, because +these three dialogues are found to make an advance upon the metaphysical +conceptions of the Republic. And we can more easily suppose that Plato +composed shorter writings after longer ones, than suppose that he lost hold +of further points of view which he had once attained. + +It is more easy to find traces of the Pythagoreans, Eleatics, Megarians, +Cynics, Cyrenaics and of the ideas of Anaxagoras, in the Philebus, than to +say how much is due to each of them. Had we fuller records of those old +philosophers, we should probably find Plato in the midst of the fray +attempting to combine Eleatic and Pythagorean doctrines, and seeking to +find a truth beyond either Being or number; setting up his own concrete +conception of good against the abstract practical good of the Cynics, or +the abstract intellectual good of the Megarians, and his own idea of +classification against the denial of plurality in unity which is also +attributed to them; warring against the Eristics as destructive of truth, +as he had formerly fought against the Sophists; taking up a middle position +between the Cynics and Cyrenaics in his doctrine of pleasure; asserting +with more consistency than Anaxagoras the existence of an intelligent mind +and cause. Of the Heracliteans, whom he is said by Aristotle to have +cultivated in his youth, he speaks in the Philebus, as in the Theaetetus +and Cratylus, with irony and contempt. But we have not the knowledge which +would enable us to pursue further the line of reflection here indicated; +nor can we expect to find perfect clearness or order in the first efforts +of mankind to understand the working of their own minds. The ideas which +they are attempting to analyse, they are also in process of creating; the +abstract universals of which they are seeking to adjust the relations have +been already excluded by them from the category of relation. + +... + +The Philebus, like the Cratylus, is supposed to be the continuation of a +previous discussion. An argument respecting the comparative claims of +pleasure and wisdom to rank as the chief good has been already carried on +between Philebus and Socrates. The argument is now transferred to +Protarchus, the son of Callias, a noble Athenian youth, sprung from a +family which had spent 'a world of money' on the Sophists (compare Apol.; +Crat.; Protag.). Philebus, who appears to be the teacher, or elder friend, +and perhaps the lover, of Protarchus, takes no further part in the +discussion beyond asserting in the strongest manner his adherence, under +all circumstances, to the cause of pleasure. + +Socrates suggests that they shall have a first and second palm of victory. +For there may be a good higher than either pleasure or wisdom, and then +neither of them will gain the first prize, but whichever of the two is more +akin to this higher good will have a right to the second. They agree, and +Socrates opens the game by enlarging on the diversity and opposition which +exists among pleasures. For there are pleasures of all kinds, good and +bad, wise and foolish--pleasures of the temperate as well as of the +intemperate. Protarchus replies that although pleasures may be opposed in +so far as they spring from opposite sources, nevertheless as pleasures they +are alike. Yes, retorts Socrates, pleasure is like pleasure, as figure is +like figure and colour like colour; yet we all know that there is great +variety among figures and colours. Protarchus does not see the drift of +this remark; and Socrates proceeds to ask how he can have a right to +attribute a new predicate (i.e. 'good') to pleasures in general, when he +cannot deny that they are different? What common property in all of them +does he mean to indicate by the term 'good'? If he continues to assert +that there is some trivial sense in which pleasure is one, Socrates may +retort by saying that knowledge is one, but the result will be that such +merely verbal and trivial conceptions, whether of knowledge or pleasure, +will spoil the discussion, and will prove the incapacity of the two +disputants. In order to avoid this danger, he proposes that they shall +beat a retreat, and, before they proceed, come to an understanding about +the 'high argument' of the one and the many. + +Protarchus agrees to the proposal, but he is under the impression that +Socrates means to discuss the common question--how a sensible object can be +one, and yet have opposite attributes, such as 'great' and 'small,' 'light' +and 'heavy,' or how there can be many members in one body, and the like +wonders. Socrates has long ceased to see any wonder in these phenomena; +his difficulties begin with the application of number to abstract unities +(e.g.'man,' 'good') and with the attempt to divide them. For have these +unities of idea any real existence? How, if imperishable, can they enter +into the world of generation? How, as units, can they be divided and +dispersed among different objects? Or do they exist in their entirety in +each object? These difficulties are but imperfectly answered by Socrates +in what follows. + +We speak of a one and many, which is ever flowing in and out of all things, +concerning which a young man often runs wild in his first metaphysical +enthusiasm, talking about analysis and synthesis to his father and mother +and the neighbours, hardly sparing even his dog. This 'one in many' is a +revelation of the order of the world, which some Prometheus first made +known to our ancestors; and they, who were better men and nearer the gods +than we are, have handed it down to us. To know how to proceed by regular +steps from one to many, and from many to one, is just what makes the +difference between eristic and dialectic. And the right way of proceeding +is to look for one idea or class in all things, and when you have found one +to look for more than one, and for all that there are, and when you have +found them all and regularly divided a particular field of knowledge into +classes, you may leave the further consideration of individuals. But you +must not pass at once either from unity to infinity, or from infinity to +unity. In music, for example, you may begin with the most general notion, +but this alone will not make you a musician: you must know also the number +and nature of the intervals, and the systems which are framed out of them, +and the rhythms of the dance which correspond to them. And when you have a +similar knowledge of any other subject, you may be said to know that +subject. In speech again there are infinite varieties of sound, and some +one who was a wise man, or more than man, comprehended them all in the +classes of mutes, vowels, and semivowels, and gave to each of them a name, +and assigned them to the art of grammar. + +'But whither, Socrates, are you going? And what has this to do with the +comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom:' Socrates replies, that +before we can adjust their respective claims, we want to know the number +and kinds of both of them. What are they? He is requested to answer the +question himself. That he will, if he may be allowed to make one or two +preliminary remarks. In the first place he has a dreamy recollection of +hearing that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the highest good, for the +good should be perfect and sufficient. But is the life of pleasure perfect +and sufficient, when deprived of memory, consciousness, anticipation? Is +not this the life of an oyster? Or is the life of mind sufficient, if +devoid of any particle of pleasure? Must not the union of the two be +higher and more eligible than either separately? And is not the element +which makes this mixed life eligible more akin to mind than to pleasure? +Thus pleasure is rejected and mind is rejected. And yet there may be a +life of mind, not human but divine, which conquers still. + +But, if we are to pursue this argument further, we shall require some new +weapons; and by this, I mean a new classification of existence. (1) There +is a finite element of existence, and (2) an infinite, and (3) the union of +the two, and (4) the cause of the union. More may be added if they are +wanted, but at present we can do without them. And first of the infinite +or indefinite:--That is the class which is denoted by the terms more or +less, and is always in a state of comparison. All words or ideas to which +the words 'gently,' 'extremely,' and other comparative expressions are +applied, fall under this class. The infinite would be no longer infinite, +if limited or reduced to measure by number and quantity. The opposite +class is the limited or finite, and includes all things which have number +and quantity. And there is a third class of generation into essence by the +union of the finite and infinite, in which the finite gives law to the +infinite;--under this are comprehended health, strength, temperate seasons, +harmony, beauty, and the like. The goddess of beauty saw the universal +wantonness of all things, and gave law and order to be the salvation of the +soul. But no effect can be generated without a cause, and therefore there +must be a fourth class, which is the cause of generation; for the cause or +agent is not the same as the patient or effect. + +And now, having obtained our classes, we may determine in which our +conqueror life is to be placed: Clearly in the third or mixed class, in +which the finite gives law to the infinite. And in which is pleasure to +find a place? As clearly in the infinite or indefinite, which alone, as +Protarchus thinks (who seems to confuse the infinite with the superlative), +gives to pleasure the character of the absolute good. Yes, retorts +Socrates, and also to pain the character of absolute evil. And therefore +the infinite cannot be that which imparts to pleasure the nature of the +good. But where shall we place mind? That is a very serious and awful +question, which may be prefaced by another. Is mind or chance the lord of +the universe? All philosophers will say the first, and yet, perhaps, they +may be only magnifying themselves. And for this reason I should like to +consider the matter a little more deeply, even though some lovers of +disorder in the world should ridicule my attempt. + +Now the elements earth, air, fire, water, exist in us, and they exist in +the cosmos; but they are purer and fairer in the cosmos than they are in +us, and they come to us from thence. And as we have a soul as well as a +body, in like manner the elements of the finite, the infinite, the union of +the two, and the cause, are found to exist in us. And if they, like the +elements, exist in us, and the three first exist in the world, must not the +fourth or cause which is the noblest of them, exist in the world? And this +cause is wisdom or mind, the royal mind of Zeus, who is the king of all, as +there are other gods who have other noble attributes. Observe how well +this agrees with the testimony of men of old, who affirmed mind to be the +ruler of the universe. And remember that mind belongs to the class which +we term the cause, and pleasure to the infinite or indefinite class. We +will examine the place and origin of both. + +What is the origin of pleasure? Her natural seat is the mixed class, in +which health and harmony were placed. Pain is the violation, and pleasure +the restoration of limit. There is a natural union of finite and infinite, +which in hunger, thirst, heat, cold, is impaired--this is painful, but the +return to nature, in which the elements are restored to their normal +proportions, is pleasant. Here is our first class of pleasures. And +another class of pleasures and pains are hopes and fears; these are in the +mind only. And inasmuch as the pleasures are unalloyed by pains and the +pains by pleasures, the examination of them may show us whether all +pleasure is to be desired, or whether this entire desirableness is not +rather the attribute of another class. But if pleasures and pains consist +in the violation and restoration of limit, may there not be a neutral +state, in which there is neither dissolution nor restoration? That is a +further question, and admitting, as we must, the possibility of such a +state, there seems to be no reason why the life of wisdom should not exist +in this neutral state, which is, moreover, the state of the gods, who +cannot, without indecency, be supposed to feel either joy or sorrow. + +The second class of pleasures involves memory. There are affections which +are extinguished before they reach the soul, and of these there is no +consciousness, and therefore no memory. And there are affections which the +body and soul feel together, and this feeling is termed consciousness. And +memory is the preservation of consciousness, and reminiscence is the +recovery of consciousness. Now the memory of pleasure, when a man is in +pain, is the memory of the opposite of his actual bodily state, and is +therefore not in the body, but in the mind. And there may be an +intermediate state, in which a person is balanced between pleasure and +pain; in his body there is want which is a cause of pain, but in his mind a +sure hope of replenishment, which is pleasant. (But if the hope be +converted into despair, he has two pains and not a balance of pain and +pleasure.) Another question is raised: May not pleasures, like opinions, +be true and false? In the sense of being real, both must be admitted to be +true: nor can we deny that to both of them qualities may be attributed; +for pleasures as well as opinions may be described as good or bad. And +though we do not all of us allow that there are true and false pleasures, +we all acknowledge that there are some pleasures associated with right +opinion, and others with falsehood and ignorance. Let us endeavour to +analyze the nature of this association. + +Opinion is based on perception, which may be correct or mistaken. You may +see a figure at a distance, and say first of all, 'This is a man,' and then +say, 'No, this is an image made by the shepherds.' And you may affirm this +in a proposition to your companion, or make the remark mentally to +yourself. Whether the words are actually spoken or not, on such occasions +there is a scribe within who registers them, and a painter who paints the +images of the things which the scribe has written down in the soul,--at +least that is my own notion of the process; and the words and images which +are inscribed by them may be either true or false; and they may represent +either past, present, or future. And, representing the future, they must +also represent the pleasures and pains of anticipation--the visions of gold +and other fancies which are never wanting in the mind of man. Now these +hopes, as they are termed, are propositions, which are sometimes true, and +sometimes false; for the good, who are the friends of the gods, see true +pictures of the future, and the bad false ones. And as there may be +opinion about things which are not, were not, and will not be, which is +opinion still, so there may be pleasure about things which are not, were +not, and will not be, which is pleasure still,--that is to say, false +pleasure; and only when false, can pleasure, like opinion, be vicious. +Against this conclusion Protarchus reclaims. + +Leaving his denial for the present, Socrates proceeds to show that some +pleasures are false from another point of view. In desire, as we admitted, +the body is divided from the soul, and hence pleasures and pains are often +simultaneous. And we further admitted that both of them belonged to the +infinite class. How, then, can we compare them? Are we not liable, or +rather certain, as in the case of sight, to be deceived by distance and +relation? In this case the pleasures and pains are not false because based +upon false opinion, but are themselves false. And there is another +illusion: pain has often been said by us to arise out of the derangement-- +pleasure out of the restoration--of our nature. But in passing from one to +the other, do we not experience neutral states, which although they appear +pleasureable or painful are really neither? For even if we admit, with the +wise man whom Protarchus loves (and only a wise man could have ever +entertained such a notion), that all things are in a perpetual flux, still +these changes are often unconscious, and devoid either of pleasure or pain. +We assume, then, that there are three states--pleasureable, painful, +neutral; we may embellish a little by calling them gold, silver, and that +which is neither. + +But there are certain natural philosophers who will not admit a third +state. Their instinctive dislike to pleasure leads them to affirm that +pleasure is only the absence of pain. They are noble fellows, and, +although we do not agree with them, we may use them as diviners who will +indicate to us the right track. They will say, that the nature of anything +is best known from the examination of extreme cases, e.g. the nature of +hardness from the examination of the hardest things; and that the nature of +pleasure will be best understood from an examination of the most intense +pleasures. Now these are the pleasures of the body, not of the mind; the +pleasures of disease and not of health, the pleasures of the intemperate +and not of the temperate. I am speaking, not of the frequency or +continuance, but only of the intensity of such pleasures, and this is given +them by contrast with the pain or sickness of body which precedes them. +Their morbid nature is illustrated by the lesser instances of itching and +scratching, respecting which I swear that I cannot tell whether they are a +pleasure or a pain. (1) Some of these arise out of a transition from one +state of the body to another, as from cold to hot; (2) others are caused by +the contrast of an internal pain and an external pleasure in the body: +sometimes the feeling of pain predominates, as in itching and tingling, +when they are relieved by scratching; sometimes the feeling of pleasure: +or the pleasure which they give may be quite overpowering, and is then +accompanied by all sorts of unutterable feelings which have a death of +delights in them. But there are also mixed pleasures which are in the mind +only. For are not love and sorrow as well as anger 'sweeter than honey,' +and also full of pain? Is there not a mixture of feelings in the spectator +of tragedy? and of comedy also? 'I do not understand that last.' Well, +then, with the view of lighting up the obscurity of these mixed feelings, +let me ask whether envy is painful. 'Yes.' And yet the envious man finds +something pleasing in the misfortunes of others? 'True.' And ignorance is +a misfortune? 'Certainly.' And one form of ignorance is self-conceit--a +man may fancy himself richer, fairer, better, wiser than he is? 'Yes.' +And he who thus deceives himself may be strong or weak? 'He may.' And if +he is strong we fear him, and if he is weak we laugh at him, which is a +pleasure, and yet we envy him, which is a pain? These mixed feelings are +the rationale of tragedy and comedy, and equally the rationale of the +greater drama of human life. (There appears to be some confusion in this +passage. There is no difficulty in seeing that in comedy, as in tragedy, +the spectator may view the performance with mixed feelings of pain as well +as of pleasure; nor is there any difficulty in understanding that envy is a +mixed feeling, which rejoices not without pain at the misfortunes of +others, and laughs at their ignorance of themselves. But Plato seems to +think further that he has explained the feeling of the spectator in comedy +sufficiently by a theory which only applies to comedy in so far as in +comedy we laugh at the conceit or weakness of others. He has certainly +given a very partial explanation of the ridiculous.) Having shown how +sorrow, anger, envy are feelings of a mixed nature, I will reserve the +consideration of the remainder for another occasion. + +Next follow the unmixed pleasures; which, unlike the philosophers of whom I +was speaking, I believe to be real. These unmixed pleasures are: (1) The +pleasures derived from beauty of form, colour, sound, smell, which are +absolutely pure; and in general those which are unalloyed with pain: (2) +The pleasures derived from the acquisition of knowledge, which in +themselves are pure, but may be attended by an accidental pain of +forgetting; this, however, arises from a subsequent act of reflection, of +which we need take no account. At the same time, we admit that the latter +pleasures are the property of a very few. To these pure and unmixed +pleasures we ascribe measure, whereas all others belong to the class of the +infinite, and are liable to every species of excess. And here several +questions arise for consideration:--What is the meaning of pure and impure, +of moderate and immoderate? We may answer the question by an illustration: +Purity of white paint consists in the clearness or quality of the white, +and this is distinct from the quantity or amount of white paint; a little +pure white is fairer than a great deal which is impure. But there is +another question:--Pleasure is affirmed by ingenious philosophers to be a +generation; they say that there are two natures--one self-existent, the +other dependent; the one noble and majestic, the other failing in both +these qualities. 'I do not understand.' There are lovers and there are +loves. 'Yes, I know, but what is the application?' The argument is in +play, and desires to intimate that there are relatives and there are +absolutes, and that the relative is for the sake of the absolute; and +generation is for the sake of essence. Under relatives I class all things +done with a view to generation; and essence is of the class of good. But +if essence is of the class of good, generation must be of some other class; +and our friends, who affirm that pleasure is a generation, would laugh at +the notion that pleasure is a good; and at that other notion, that pleasure +is produced by generation, which is only the alternative of destruction. +Who would prefer such an alternation to the equable life of pure thought? +Here is one absurdity, and not the only one, to which the friends of +pleasure are reduced. For is there not also an absurdity in affirming that +good is of the soul only; or in declaring that the best of men, if he be in +pain, is bad? + +And now, from the consideration of pleasure, we pass to that of knowledge. +Let us reflect that there are two kinds of knowledge--the one creative or +productive, and the other educational and philosophical. Of the creative +arts, there is one part purer or more akin to knowledge than the other. +There is an element of guess-work and an element of number and measure in +them. In music, for example, especially in flute-playing, the conjectural +element prevails; while in carpentering there is more application of rule +and measure. Of the creative arts, then, we may make two classes--the less +exact and the more exact. And the exacter part of all of them is really +arithmetic and mensuration. But arithmetic and mensuration again may be +subdivided with reference either to their use in the concrete, or to their +nature in the abstract--as they are regarded popularly in building and +binding, or theoretically by philosophers. And, borrowing the analogy of +pleasure, we may say that the philosophical use of them is purer than the +other. Thus we have two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration. And +truest of all in the estimation of every rational man is dialectic, or the +science of being, which will forget and disown us, if we forget and disown +her. + +'But, Socrates, I have heard Gorgias say that rhetoric is the greatest and +usefullest of arts; and I should not like to quarrel either with him or +you.' Neither is there any inconsistency, Protarchus, with his statement +in what I am now saying; for I am not maintaining that dialectic is the +greatest or usefullest, but only that she is the truest of arts; my remark +is not quantitative but qualitative, and refers not to the advantage or +repetition of either, but to the degree of truth which they attain--here +Gorgias will not care to compete; this is what we affirm to be possessed in +the highest degree by dialectic. And do not let us appeal to Gorgias or +Philebus or Socrates, but ask, on behalf of the argument, what are the +highest truths which the soul has the power of attaining. And is not this +the science which has a firmer grasp of them than any other? For the arts +generally are only occupied with matters of opinion, and with the +production and action and passion of this sensible world. But the highest +truth is that which is eternal and unchangeable. And reason and wisdom are +concerned with the eternal; and these are the very claimants, if not for +the first, at least for the second place, whom I propose as rivals to +pleasure. + +And now, having the materials, we may proceed to mix them--first +recapitulating the question at issue. + +Philebus affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed them to be one +nature; I affirmed that they were two natures, and declared that knowledge +was more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that the two together were +more eligible than either taken singly; and to this we adhere. Reason +intimates, as at first, that we should seek the good not in the unmixed +life, but in the mixed. + +The cup is ready, waiting to be mingled, and here are two fountains, one of +honey, the other of pure water, out of which to make the fairest possible +mixture. There are pure and impure pleasures--pure and impure sciences. +Let us consider the sections of each which have the most of purity and +truth; to admit them all indiscriminately would be dangerous. First we +will take the pure sciences; but shall we mingle the impure--the art which +uses the false rule and the false measure? That we must, if we are any of +us to find our way home; man cannot live upon pure mathematics alone. And +must I include music, which is admitted to be guess-work? 'Yes, you must, +if human life is to have any humanity.' Well, then, I will open the door +and let them all in; they shall mingle in an Homeric 'meeting of the +waters.' And now we turn to the pleasures; shall I admit them? 'Admit +first of all the pure pleasures; secondly, the necessary.' And what shall +we say about the rest? First, ask the pleasures--they will be too happy to +dwell with wisdom. Secondly, ask the arts and sciences--they reply that +the excesses of intemperance are the ruin of them; and that they would +rather only have the pleasures of health and temperance, which are the +handmaidens of virtue. But still we want truth? That is now added; and so +the argument is complete, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which +is to hold fair rule over a living body. And now we are at the vestibule +of the good, in which there are three chief elements--truth, symmetry, and +beauty. These will be the criterion of the comparative claims of pleasure +and wisdom. + +Which has the greater share of truth? Surely wisdom; for pleasure is the +veriest impostor in the world, and the perjuries of lovers have passed into +a proverb. + +Which of symmetry? Wisdom again; for nothing is more immoderate than +pleasure. + +Which of beauty? Once more, wisdom; for pleasure is often unseemly, and +the greatest pleasures are put out of sight. + +Not pleasure, then, ranks first in the scale of good, but measure, and +eternal harmony. + +Second comes the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect. + +Third, mind and wisdom. + +Fourth, sciences and arts and true opinions. + +Fifth, painless pleasures. + +Of a sixth class, I have no more to say. Thus, pleasure and mind may both +renounce the claim to the first place. But mind is ten thousand times +nearer to the chief good than pleasure. Pleasure ranks fifth and not +first, even though all the animals in the world assert the contrary. + +... + +From the days of Aristippus and Epicurus to our own times the nature of +pleasure has occupied the attention of philosophers. 'Is pleasure an evil? +a good? the only good?' are the simple forms which the enquiry assumed +among the Socratic schools. But at an early stage of the controversy +another question was asked: 'Do pleasures differ in kind? and are some +bad, some good, and some neither bad nor good?' There are bodily and there +are mental pleasures, which were at first confused but afterwards +distinguished. A distinction was also made between necessary and +unnecessary pleasures; and again between pleasures which had or had not +corresponding pains. The ancient philosophers were fond of asking, in the +language of their age, 'Is pleasure a "becoming" only, and therefore +transient and relative, or do some pleasures partake of truth and Being?' +To these ancient speculations the moderns have added a further question:-- +'Whose pleasure? The pleasure of yourself, or of your neighbour,--of the +individual, or of the world?' This little addition has changed the whole +aspect of the discussion: the same word is now supposed to include two +principles as widely different as benevolence and self-love. Some modern +writers have also distinguished between pleasure the test, and pleasure the +motive of actions. For the universal test of right actions (how I know +them) may not always be the highest or best motive of them (why I do them). + +Socrates, as we learn from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, first drew +attention to the consequences of actions. Mankind were said by him to act +rightly when they knew what they were doing, or, in the language of the +Gorgias, 'did what they would.' He seems to have been the first who +maintained that the good was the useful (Mem.). In his eagerness for +generalization, seeking, as Aristotle says, for the universal in Ethics +(Metaph.), he took the most obvious intellectual aspect of human action +which occurred to him. He meant to emphasize, not pleasure, but the +calculation of pleasure; neither is he arguing that pleasure is the chief +good, but that we should have a principle of choice. He did not intend to +oppose 'the useful' to some higher conception, such as the Platonic ideal, +but to chance and caprice. The Platonic Socrates pursues the same vein of +thought in the Protagoras, where he argues against the so-called sophist +that pleasure and pain are the final standards and motives of good and +evil, and that the salvation of human life depends upon a right estimate of +pleasures greater or less when seen near and at a distance. The testimony +of Xenophon is thus confirmed by that of Plato, and we are therefore +justified in calling Socrates the first utilitarian; as indeed there is no +side or aspect of philosophy which may not with reason be ascribed to him-- +he is Cynic and Cyrenaic, Platonist and Aristotelian in one. But in the +Phaedo the Socratic has already passed into a more ideal point of view; and +he, or rather Plato speaking in his person, expressly repudiates the notion +that the exchange of a less pleasure for a greater can be an exchange of +virtue. Such virtue is the virtue of ordinary men who live in the world of +appearance; they are temperate only that they may enjoy the pleasures of +intemperance, and courageous from fear of danger. Whereas the philosopher +is seeking after wisdom and not after pleasure, whether near or distant: +he is the mystic, the initiated, who has learnt to despise the body and is +yearning all his life long for a truth which will hereafter be revealed to +him. In the Republic the pleasures of knowledge are affirmed to be +superior to other pleasures, because the philosopher so estimates them; and +he alone has had experience of both kinds. (Compare a similar argument +urged by one of the latest defenders of Utilitarianism, Mill's +Utilitarianism). In the Philebus, Plato, although he regards the enemies +of pleasure with complacency, still further modifies the transcendentalism +of the Phaedo. For he is compelled to confess, rather reluctantly, +perhaps, that some pleasures, i.e. those which have no antecedent pains, +claim a place in the scale of goods. + +There have been many reasons why not only Plato but mankind in general have +been unwilling to acknowledge that 'pleasure is the chief good.' Either +they have heard a voice calling to them out of another world; or the life +and example of some great teacher has cast their thoughts of right and +wrong in another mould; or the word 'pleasure' has been associated in their +mind with merely animal enjoyment. They could not believe that what they +were always striving to overcome, and the power or principle in them which +overcame, were of the same nature. The pleasure of doing good to others +and of bodily self-indulgence, the pleasures of intellect and the pleasures +of sense, are so different:--Why then should they be called by a common +name? Or, if the equivocal or metaphorical use of the word is justified by +custom (like the use of other words which at first referred only to the +body, and then by a figure have been transferred to the mind), still, why +should we make an ambiguous word the corner-stone of moral philosophy? To +the higher thinker the Utilitarian or hedonist mode of speaking has been at +variance with religion and with any higher conception both of politics and +of morals. It has not satisfied their imagination; it has offended their +taste. To elevate pleasure, 'the most fleeting of all things,' into a +general idea seems to such men a contradiction. They do not desire to +bring down their theory to the level of their practice. The simplicity of +the 'greatest happiness' principle has been acceptable to philosophers, but +the better part of the world has been slow to receive it. + +Before proceeding, we may make a few admissions which will narrow the field +of dispute; and we may as well leave behind a few prejudices, which +intelligent opponents of Utilitarianism have by this time 'agreed to +discard'. We admit that Utility is coextensive with right, and that no +action can be right which does not tend to the happiness of mankind; we +acknowledge that a large class of actions are made right or wrong by their +consequences only; we say further that mankind are not too mindful, but +that they are far too regardless of consequences, and that they need to +have the doctrine of utility habitually inculcated on them. We recognize +the value of a principle which can supply a connecting link between Ethics +and Politics, and under which all human actions are or may be included. +The desire to promote happiness is no mean preference of expediency to +right, but one of the highest and noblest motives by which human nature can +be animated. Neither in referring actions to the test of utility have we +to make a laborious calculation, any more than in trying them by other +standards of morals. For long ago they have been classified sufficiently +for all practical purposes by the thinker, by the legislator, by the +opinion of the world. Whatever may be the hypothesis on which they are +explained, or which in doubtful cases may be applied to the regulation of +them, we are very rarely, if ever, called upon at the moment of performing +them to determine their effect upon the happiness of mankind. + +There is a theory which has been contrasted with Utility by Paley and +others--the theory of a moral sense: Are our ideas of right and wrong +innate or derived from experience? This, perhaps, is another of those +speculations which intelligent men might 'agree to discard.' For it has +been worn threadbare; and either alternative is equally consistent with a +transcendental or with an eudaemonistic system of ethics, with a greatest +happiness principle or with Kant's law of duty. Yet to avoid +misconception, what appears to be the truth about the origin of our moral +ideas may be shortly summed up as follows:--To each of us individually our +moral ideas come first of all in childhood through the medium of education, +from parents and teachers, assisted by the unconscious influence of +language; they are impressed upon a mind which at first is like a waxen +tablet, adapted to receive them; but they soon become fixed or set, and in +after life are strengthened, or perhaps weakened by the force of public +opinion. They may be corrected and enlarged by experience, they may be +reasoned about, they may be brought home to us by the circumstances of our +lives, they may be intensified by imagination, by reflection, by a course +of action likely to confirm them. Under the influence of religious feeling +or by an effort of thought, any one beginning with the ordinary rules of +morality may create out of them for himself ideals of holiness and virtue. +They slumber in the minds of most men, yet in all of us there remains some +tincture of affection, some desire of good, some sense of truth, some fear +of the law. Of some such state or process each individual is conscious in +himself, and if he compares his own experience with that of others he will +find the witness of their consciences to coincide with that of his own. +All of us have entered into an inheritance which we have the power of +appropriating and making use of. No great effort of mind is required on +our part; we learn morals, as we learn to talk, instinctively, from +conversing with others, in an enlightened age, in a civilized country, in a +good home. A well-educated child of ten years old already knows the +essentials of morals: 'Thou shalt not steal,' 'thou shalt speak the +truth,' 'thou shalt love thy parents,' 'thou shalt fear God.' What more +does he want? + +But whence comes this common inheritance or stock of moral ideas? Their +beginning, like all other beginnings of human things, is obscure, and is +the least important part of them. Imagine, if you will, that Society +originated in the herding of brutes, in their parental instincts, in their +rude attempts at self-preservation:--Man is not man in that he resembles, +but in that he differs from them. We must pass into another cycle of +existence, before we can discover in him by any evidence accessible to us +even the germs of our moral ideas. In the history of the world, which +viewed from within is the history of the human mind, they have been slowly +created by religion, by poetry, by law, having their foundation in the +natural affections and in the necessity of some degree of truth and justice +in a social state; they have been deepened and enlarged by the efforts of +great thinkers who have idealized and connected them--by the lives of +saints and prophets who have taught and exemplified them. The schools of +ancient philosophy which seem so far from us--Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, +the Stoics, the Epicureans, and a few modern teachers, such as Kant and +Bentham, have each of them supplied 'moments' of thought to the world. The +life of Christ has embodied a divine love, wisdom, patience, +reasonableness. For his image, however imperfectly handed down to us, the +modern world has received a standard more perfect in idea than the +societies of ancient times, but also further removed from practice. For +there is certainly a greater interval between the theory and practice of +Christians than between the theory and practice of the Greeks and Romans; +the ideal is more above us, and the aspiration after good has often lent a +strange power to evil. And sometimes, as at the Reformation, or French +Revolution, when the upper classes of a so-called Christian country have +become corrupted by priestcraft, by casuistry, by licentiousness, by +despotism, the lower have risen up and re-asserted the natural sense of +religion and right. + +We may further remark that our moral ideas, as the world grows older, +perhaps as we grow older ourselves, unless they have been undermined in us +by false philosophy or the practice of mental analysis, or infected by the +corruption of society or by some moral disorder in the individual, are +constantly assuming a more natural and necessary character. The habit of +the mind, the opinion of the world, familiarizes them to us; and they take +more and more the form of immediate intuition. The moral sense comes last +and not first in the order of their development, and is the instinct which +we have inherited or acquired, not the nobler effort of reflection which +created them and which keeps them alive. We do not stop to reason about +common honesty. Whenever we are not blinded by self-deceit, as for example +in judging the actions of others, we have no hesitation in determining what +is right and wrong. The principles of morality, when not at variance with +some desire or worldly interest of our own, or with the opinion of the +public, are hardly perceived by us; but in the conflict of reason and +passion they assert their authority and are not overcome without remorse. + +Such is a brief outline of the history of our moral ideas. We have to +distinguish, first of all, the manner in which they have grown up in the +world from the manner in which they have been communicated to each of us. +We may represent them to ourselves as flowing out of the boundless ocean of +language and thought in little rills, which convey them to the heart and +brain of each individual. But neither must we confound the theories or +aspects of morality with the origin of our moral ideas. These are not the +roots or 'origines' of morals, but the latest efforts of reflection, the +lights in which the whole moral world has been regarded by different +thinkers and successive generations of men. If we ask: Which of these +many theories is the true one? we may answer: All of them--moral sense, +innate ideas, a priori, a posteriori notions, the philosophy of experience, +the philosophy of intuition--all of them have added something to our +conception of Ethics; no one of them is the whole truth. But to decide how +far our ideas of morality are derived from one source or another; to +determine what history, what philosophy has contributed to them; to +distinguish the original, simple elements from the manifold and complex +applications of them, would be a long enquiry too far removed from the +question which we are now pursuing. + +Bearing in mind the distinction which we have been seeking to establish +between our earliest and our most mature ideas of morality, we may now +proceed to state the theory of Utility, not exactly in the words, but in +the spirit of one of its ablest and most moderate supporters (Mill's +Utilitarianism):--'That which alone makes actions either right or desirable +is their utility, or tendency to promote the happiness of mankind, or, in +other words, to increase the sum of pleasure in the world. But all +pleasures are not the same: they differ in quality as well as in quantity, +and the pleasure which is superior in quality is incommensurable with the +inferior. Neither is the pleasure or happiness, which we seek, our own +pleasure, but that of others,--of our family, of our country, of mankind. +The desire of this, and even the sacrifice of our own interest to that of +other men, may become a passion to a rightly educated nature. The +Utilitarian finds a place in his system for this virtue and for every +other.' + +Good or happiness or pleasure is thus regarded as the true and only end of +human life. To this all our desires will be found to tend, and in +accordance with this all the virtues, including justice, may be explained. +Admitting that men rest for a time in inferior ends, and do not cast their +eyes beyond them, these ends are really dependent on the greater end of +happiness, and would not be pursued, unless in general they had been found +to lead to it. The existence of such an end is proved, as in Aristotle's +time, so in our own, by the universal fact that men desire it. The +obligation to promote it is based upon the social nature of man; this sense +of duty is shared by all of us in some degree, and is capable of being +greatly fostered and strengthened. So far from being inconsistent with +religion, the greatest happiness principle is in the highest degree +agreeable to it. For what can be more reasonable than that God should will +the happiness of all his creatures? and in working out their happiness we +may be said to be 'working together with him.' Nor is it inconceivable +that a new enthusiasm of the future, far stronger than any old religion, +may be based upon such a conception. + +But then for the familiar phrase of the 'greatest happiness principle,' it +seems as if we ought now to read 'the noblest happiness principle,' 'the +happiness of others principle'--the principle not of the greatest, but of +the highest pleasure, pursued with no more regard to our own immediate +interest than is required by the law of self-preservation. Transfer the +thought of happiness to another life, dropping the external circumstances +which form so large a part of our idea of happiness in this, and the +meaning of the word becomes indistinguishable from holiness, harmony, +wisdom, love. By the slight addition 'of others,' all the associations of +the word are altered; we seem to have passed over from one theory of morals +to the opposite. For allowing that the happiness of others is reflected on +ourselves, and also that every man must live before he can do good to +others, still the last limitation is a very trifling exception, and the +happiness of another is very far from compensating for the loss of our own. +According to Mr. Mill, he would best carry out the principle of utility who +sacrificed his own pleasure most to that of his fellow-men. But if so, +Hobbes and Butler, Shaftesbury and Hume, are not so far apart as they and +their followers imagine. The thought of self and the thought of others are +alike superseded in the more general notion of the happiness of mankind at +large. But in this composite good, until society becomes perfected, the +friend of man himself has generally the least share, and may be a great +sufferer. + +And now what objection have we to urge against a system of moral philosophy +so beneficent, so enlightened, so ideal, and at the same time so +practical,--so Christian, as we may say without exaggeration,--and which +has the further advantage of resting morality on a principle intelligible +to all capacities? Have we not found that which Socrates and Plato 'grew +old in seeking'? Are we not desirous of happiness, at any rate for +ourselves and our friends, if not for all mankind? If, as is natural, we +begin by thinking of ourselves first, we are easily led on to think of +others; for we cannot help acknowledging that what is right for us is the +right and inheritance of others. We feel the advantage of an abstract +principle wide enough and strong enough to override all the particularisms +of mankind; which acknowledges a universal good, truth, right; which is +capable of inspiring men like a passion, and is the symbol of a cause for +which they are ready to contend to their life's end. + +And if we test this principle by the lives of its professors, it would +certainly appear inferior to none as a rule of action. From the days of +Eudoxus (Arist. Ethics) and Epicurus to our own, the votaries of pleasure +have gained belief for their principles by their practice. Two of the +noblest and most disinterested men who have lived in this century, Bentham +and J. S. Mill, whose lives were a long devotion to the service of their +fellows, have been among the most enthusiastic supporters of utility; while +among their contemporaries, some who were of a more mystical turn of mind, +have ended rather in aspiration than in action, and have been found unequal +to the duties of life. Looking back on them now that they are removed from +the scene, we feel that mankind has been the better for them. The world +was against them while they lived; but this is rather a reason for admiring +than for depreciating them. Nor can any one doubt that the influence of +their philosophy on politics--especially on foreign politics, on law, on +social life, has been upon the whole beneficial. Nevertheless, they will +never have justice done to them, for they do not agree either with the +better feeling of the multitude or with the idealism of more refined +thinkers. Without Bentham, a great word in the history of philosophy would +have remained unspoken. Yet to this day it is rare to hear his name +received with any mark of respect such as would be freely granted to the +ambiguous memory of some father of the Church. The odium which attached to +him when alive has not been removed by his death. For he shocked his +contemporaries by egotism and want of taste; and this generation which has +reaped the benefit of his labours has inherited the feeling of the last. +He was before his own age, and is hardly remembered in this. + +While acknowledging the benefits which the greatest happiness principle has +conferred upon mankind, the time appears to have arrived, not for denying +its claims, but for criticizing them and comparing them with other +principles which equally claim to lie at the foundation of ethics. Any one +who adds a general principle to knowledge has been a benefactor to the +world. But there is a danger that, in his first enthusiasm, he may not +recognize the proportions or limitations to which his truth is subjected; +he does not see how far he has given birth to a truism, or how that which +is a truth to him is a truism to the rest of the world; or may degenerate +in the next generation. He believes that to be the whole which is only a +part,--to be the necessary foundation which is really only a valuable +aspect of the truth. The systems of all philosophers require the criticism +of 'the morrow,' when the heat of imagination which forged them has cooled, +and they are seen in the temperate light of day. All of them have +contributed to enrich the mind of the civilized world; none of them occupy +that supreme or exclusive place which their authors would have assigned to +them. + +We may preface the criticism with a few preliminary remarks:-- + +Mr. Mill, Mr. Austin, and others, in their eagerness to maintain the +doctrine of utility, are fond of repeating that we are in a lamentable +state of uncertainty about morals. While other branches of knowledge have +made extraordinary progress, in moral philosophy we are supposed by them to +be no better than children, and with few exceptions--that is to say, +Bentham and his followers--to be no further advanced than men were in the +age of Socrates and Plato, who, in their turn, are deemed to be as backward +in ethics as they necessarily were in physics. But this, though often +asserted, is recanted almost in a breath by the same writers who speak thus +depreciatingly of our modern ethical philosophy. For they are the first to +acknowledge that we have not now to begin classifying actions under the +head of utility; they would not deny that about the general conceptions of +morals there is a practical agreement. There is no more doubt that +falsehood is wrong than that a stone falls to the ground, although the +first does not admit of the same ocular proof as the second. There is no +greater uncertainty about the duty of obedience to parents and to the law +of the land than about the properties of triangles. Unless we are looking +for a new moral world which has no marrying and giving in marriage, there +is no greater disagreement in theory about the right relations of the sexes +than about the composition of water. These and a few other simple +principles, as they have endless applications in practice, so also may be +developed in theory into counsels of perfection. + +To what then is to be attributed this opinion which has been often +entertained about the uncertainty of morals? Chiefly to this,--that +philosophers have not always distinguished the theoretical and the +casuistical uncertainty of morals from the practical certainty. There is +an uncertainty about details,--whether, for example, under given +circumstances such and such a moral principle is to be enforced, or whether +in some cases there may not be a conflict of duties: these are the +exceptions to the ordinary rules of morality, important, indeed, but not +extending to the one thousandth or one ten-thousandth part of human +actions. This is the domain of casuistry. Secondly, the aspects under +which the most general principles of morals may be presented to us are many +and various. The mind of man has been more than usually active in thinking +about man. The conceptions of harmony, happiness, right, freedom, +benevolence, self-love, have all of them seemed to some philosopher or +other the truest and most comprehensive expression of morality. There is +no difference, or at any rate no great difference, of opinion about the +right and wrong of actions, but only about the general notion which +furnishes the best explanation or gives the most comprehensive view of +them. This, in the language of Kant, is the sphere of the metaphysic of +ethics. But these two uncertainties at either end, en tois malista +katholou and en tois kath ekasta, leave space enough for an intermediate +principle which is practically certain. + +The rule of human life is not dependent on the theories of philosophers: +we know what our duties are for the most part before we speculate about +them. And the use of speculation is not to teach us what we already know, +but to inspire in our minds an interest about morals in general, to +strengthen our conception of the virtues by showing that they confirm one +another, to prove to us, as Socrates would have said, that they are not +many, but one. There is the same kind of pleasure and use in reducing +morals, as in reducing physics, to a few very simple truths. And not +unfrequently the more general principle may correct prejudices and +misconceptions, and enable us to regard our fellow-men in a larger and more +generous spirit. + +The two qualities which seem to be most required in first principles of +ethics are, (1) that they should afford a real explanation of the facts, +(2) that they should inspire the mind,--should harmonize, strengthen, +settle us. We can hardly estimate the influence which a simple principle +such as 'Act so as to promote the happiness of mankind,' or 'Act so that +the rule on which thou actest may be adopted as a law by all rational +beings,' may exercise on the mind of an individual. They will often seem +to open a new world to him, like the religious conceptions of faith or the +spirit of God. The difficulties of ethics disappear when we do not suffer +ourselves to be distracted between different points of view. But to +maintain their hold on us, the general principles must also be +psychologically true--they must agree with our experience, they must accord +with the habits of our minds. + +When we are told that actions are right or wrong only in so far as they +tend towards happiness, we naturally ask what is meant by 'happiness.' For +the term in the common use of language is only to a certain extent +commensurate with moral good and evil. We should hardly say that a good +man could be utterly miserable (Arist. Ethics), or place a bad man in the +first rank of happiness. But yet, from various circumstances, the measure +of a man's happiness may be out of all proportion to his desert. And if we +insist on calling the good man alone happy, we shall be using the term in +some new and transcendental sense, as synonymous with well-being. We have +already seen that happiness includes the happiness of others as well as our +own; we must now comprehend unconscious as well as conscious happiness +under the same word. There is no harm in this extension of the meaning, +but a word which admits of such an extension can hardly be made the basis +of a philosophical system. The exactness which is required in philosophy +will not allow us to comprehend under the same term two ideas so different +as the subjective feeling of pleasure or happiness and the objective +reality of a state which receives our moral approval. + +Like Protarchus in the Philebus, we can give no answer to the question, +'What is that common quality which in all states of human life we call +happiness? which includes the lower and the higher kind of happiness, and +is the aim of the noblest, as well as of the meanest of mankind?' If we +say 'Not pleasure, not virtue, not wisdom, nor yet any quality which we can +abstract from these'--what then? After seeming to hover for a time on the +verge of a great truth, we have gained only a truism. + +Let us ask the question in another form. What is that which constitutes +happiness, over and above the several ingredients of health, wealth, +pleasure, virtue, knowledge, which are included under it? Perhaps we +answer, 'The subjective feeling of them.' But this is very far from being +coextensive with right. Or we may reply that happiness is the whole of +which the above-mentioned are the parts. Still the question recurs, 'In +what does the whole differ from all the parts?' And if we are unable to +distinguish them, happiness will be the mere aggregate of the goods of +life. + +Again, while admitting that in all right action there is an element of +happiness, we cannot help seeing that the utilitarian theory supplies a +much easier explanation of some virtues than of others. Of many patriotic +or benevolent actions we can give a straightforward account by their +tendency to promote happiness. For the explanation of justice, on the +other hand, we have to go a long way round. No man is indignant with a +thief because he has not promoted the greatest happiness of the greatest +number, but because he has done him a wrong. There is an immeasurable +interval between a crime against property or life, and the omission of an +act of charity or benevolence. Yet of this interval the utilitarian theory +takes no cognizance. The greatest happiness principle strengthens our +sense of positive duties towards others, but weakens our recognition of +their rights. To promote in every way possible the happiness of others may +be a counsel of perfection, but hardly seems to offer any ground for a +theory of obligation. For admitting that our ideas of obligation are +partly derived from religion and custom, yet they seem also to contain +other essential elements which cannot be explained by the tendency of +actions to promote happiness. Whence comes the necessity of them? Why are +some actions rather than others which equally tend to the happiness of +mankind imposed upon us with the authority of law? 'You ought' and 'you +had better' are fundamental distinctions in human thought; and having such +distinctions, why should we seek to efface and unsettle them? + +Bentham and Mr. Mill are earnest in maintaining that happiness includes the +happiness of others as well as of ourselves. But what two notions can be +more opposed in many cases than these? Granting that in a perfect state of +the world my own happiness and that of all other men would coincide, in the +imperfect state they often diverge, and I cannot truly bridge over the +difficulty by saying that men will always find pleasure in sacrificing +themselves or in suffering for others. Upon the greatest happiness +principle it is admitted that I am to have a share, and in consistency I +should pursue my own happiness as impartially as that of my neighbour. But +who can decide what proportion should be mine and what his, except on the +principle that I am most likely to be deceived in my own favour, and had +therefore better give the larger share, if not all, to him? + +Further, it is admitted that utility and right coincide, not in particular +instances, but in classes of actions. But is it not distracting to the +conscience of a man to be told that in the particular case they are +opposed? Happiness is said to be the ground of moral obligation, yet he +must not do what clearly conduces to his own happiness if it is at variance +with the good of the whole. Nay, further, he will be taught that when +utility and right are in apparent conflict any amount of utility does not +alter by a hair's-breadth the morality of actions, which cannot be allowed +to deviate from established law or usage; and that the non-detection of an +immoral act, say of telling a lie, which may often make the greatest +difference in the consequences, not only to himself, but to all the world, +makes none whatever in the act itself. + +Again, if we are concerned not with particular actions but with classes of +actions, is the tendency of actions to happiness a principle upon which we +can classify them? There is a universal law which imperatively declares +certain acts to be right or wrong:--can there be any universality in the +law which measures actions by their tendencies towards happiness? For an +act which is the cause of happiness to one person may be the cause of +unhappiness to another; or an act which if performed by one person may +increase the happiness of mankind may have the opposite effect if performed +by another. Right can never be wrong, or wrong right, that there are no +actions which tend to the happiness of mankind which may not under other +circumstances tend to their unhappiness. Unless we say not only that all +right actions tend to happiness, but that they tend to happiness in the +same degree in which they are right (and in that case the word 'right' is +plainer), we weaken the absoluteness of our moral standard; we reduce +differences in kind to differences in degree; we obliterate the stamp which +the authority of ages has set upon vice and crime. + +Once more: turning from theory to practice we feel the importance of +retaining the received distinctions of morality. Words such as truth, +justice, honesty, virtue, love, have a simple meaning; they have become +sacred to us,--'the word of God' written on the human heart: to no other +words can the same associations be attached. We cannot explain them +adequately on principles of utility; in attempting to do so we rob them of +their true character. We give them a meaning often paradoxical and +distorted, and generally weaker than their signification in common +language. And as words influence men's thoughts, we fear that the hold of +morality may also be weakened, and the sense of duty impaired, if virtue +and vice are explained only as the qualities which do or do not contribute +to the pleasure of the world. In that very expression we seem to detect a +false ring, for pleasure is individual not universal; we speak of eternal +and immutable justice, but not of eternal and immutable pleasure; nor by +any refinement can we avoid some taint of bodily sense adhering to the +meaning of the word. + +Again: the higher the view which men take of life, the more they lose +sight of their own pleasure or interest. True religion is not working for +a reward only, but is ready to work equally without a reward. It is not +'doing the will of God for the sake of eternal happiness,' but doing the +will of God because it is best, whether rewarded or unrewarded. And this +applies to others as well as to ourselves. For he who sacrifices himself +for the good of others, does not sacrifice himself that they may be saved +from the persecution which he endures for their sakes, but rather that they +in their turn may be able to undergo similar sufferings, and like him stand +fast in the truth. To promote their happiness is not his first object, but +to elevate their moral nature. Both in his own case and that of others +there may be happiness in the distance, but if there were no happiness he +would equally act as he does. We are speaking of the highest and noblest +natures; and a passing thought naturally arises in our minds, 'Whether that +can be the first principle of morals which is hardly regarded in their own +case by the greatest benefactors of mankind?' + +The admissions that pleasures differ in kind, and that actions are already +classified; the acknowledgment that happiness includes the happiness of +others, as well as of ourselves; the confusion (not made by Aristotle) +between conscious and unconscious happiness, or between happiness the +energy and happiness the result of the energy, introduce uncertainty and +inconsistency into the whole enquiry. We reason readily and cheerfully +from a greatest happiness principle. But we find that utilitarians do not +agree among themselves about the meaning of the word. Still less can they +impart to others a common conception or conviction of the nature of +happiness. The meaning of the word is always insensibly slipping away from +us, into pleasure, out of pleasure, now appearing as the motive, now as the +test of actions, and sometimes varying in successive sentences. And as in +a mathematical demonstration an error in the original number disturbs the +whole calculation which follows, this fundamental uncertainty about the +word vitiates all the applications of it. Must we not admit that a notion +so uncertain in meaning, so void of content, so at variance with common +language and opinion, does not comply adequately with either of our two +requirements? It can neither strike the imaginative faculty, nor give an +explanation of phenomena which is in accordance with our individual +experience. It is indefinite; it supplies only a partial account of human +actions: it is one among many theories of philosophers. It may be +compared with other notions, such as the chief good of Plato, which may be +best expressed to us under the form of a harmony, or with Kant's obedience +to law, which may be summed up under the word 'duty,' or with the Stoical +'Follow nature,' and seems to have no advantage over them. All of these +present a certain aspect of moral truth. None of them are, or indeed +profess to be, the only principle of morals. + +And this brings us to speak of the most serious objection to the +utilitarian system--its exclusiveness. There is no place for Kant or +Hegel, for Plato and Aristotle alongside of it. They do not reject the +greatest happiness principle, but it rejects them. Now the phenomena of +moral action differ, and some are best explained upon one principle and +some upon another: the virtue of justice seems to be naturally connected +with one theory of morals, the virtues of temperance and benevolence with +another. The characters of men also differ; and some are more attracted by +one aspect of the truth, some by another. The firm stoical nature will +conceive virtue under the conception of law, the philanthropist under that +of doing good, the quietist under that of resignation, the enthusiast under +that of faith or love. The upright man of the world will desire above all +things that morality should be plain and fixed, and should use language in +its ordinary sense. Persons of an imaginative temperament will generally +be dissatisfied with the words 'utility' or 'pleasure': their principle of +right is of a far higher character--what or where to be found they cannot +always distinctly tell;--deduced from the laws of human nature, says one; +resting on the will of God, says another; based upon some transcendental +idea which animates more worlds than one, says a third: + +on nomoi prokeintai upsipodes, ouranian +di aithera teknothentes. + +To satisfy an imaginative nature in any degree, the doctrine of utility +must be so transfigured that it becomes altogether different and loses all +simplicity. + +But why, since there are different characters among men, should we not +allow them to envisage morality accordingly, and be thankful to the great +men who have provided for all of us modes and instruments of thought? +Would the world have been better if there had been no Stoics or Kantists, +no Platonists or Cartesians? No more than if the other pole of moral +philosophy had been excluded. All men have principles which are above +their practice; they admit premises which, if carried to their conclusions, +are a sufficient basis of morals. In asserting liberty of speculation we +are not encouraging individuals to make right or wrong for themselves, but +only conceding that they may choose the form under which they prefer to +contemplate them. Nor do we say that one of these aspects is as true and +good as another; but that they all of them, if they are not mere sophisms +and illusions, define and bring into relief some part of the truth which +would have been obscure without their light. Why should we endeavour to +bind all men within the limits of a single metaphysical conception? The +necessary imperfection of language seems to require that we should view the +same truth under more than one aspect. + +We are living in the second age of utilitarianism, when the charm of +novelty and the fervour of the first disciples has passed away. The +doctrine is no longer stated in the forcible paradoxical manner of Bentham, +but has to be adapted to meet objections; its corners are rubbed off, and +the meaning of its most characteristic expressions is softened. The array +of the enemy melts away when we approach him. The greatest happiness of +the greatest number was a great original idea when enunciated by Bentham, +which leavened a generation and has left its mark on thought and +civilization in all succeeding times. His grasp of it had the intensity of +genius. In the spirit of an ancient philosopher he would have denied that +pleasures differed in kind, or that by happiness he meant anything but +pleasure. He would perhaps have revolted us by his thoroughness. The +'guardianship of his doctrine' has passed into other hands; and now we seem +to see its weak points, its ambiguities, its want of exactness while +assuming the highest exactness, its one-sidedness, its paradoxical +explanation of several of the virtues. No philosophy has ever stood this +criticism of the next generation, though the founders of all of them have +imagined that they were built upon a rock. And the utilitarian system, +like others, has yielded to the inevitable analysis. Even in the opinion +of 'her admirers she has been terribly damaged' (Phil.), and is no longer +the only moral philosophy, but one among many which have contributed in +various degrees to the intellectual progress of mankind. + +But because the utilitarian philosophy can no longer claim 'the prize,' we +must not refuse to acknowledge the great benefits conferred by it on the +world. All philosophies are refuted in their turn, says the sceptic, and +he looks forward to all future systems sharing the fate of the past. All +philosophies remain, says the thinker; they have done a great work in their +own day, and they supply posterity with aspects of the truth and with +instruments of thought. Though they may be shorn of their glory, they +retain their place in the organism of knowledge. + +And still there remain many rules of morals which are better explained and +more forcibly inculcated on the principle of utility than on any other. +The question Will such and such an action promote the happiness of myself, +my family, my country, the world? may check the rising feeling of pride or +honour which would cause a quarrel, an estrangement, a war. 'How can I +contribute to the greatest happiness of others?' is another form of the +question which will be more attractive to the minds of many than a +deduction of the duty of benevolence from a priori principles. In politics +especially hardly any other argument can be allowed to have weight except +the happiness of a people. All parties alike profess to aim at this, which +though often used only as the disguise of self-interest has a great and +real influence on the minds of statesmen. In religion, again, nothing can +more tend to mitigate superstition than the belief that the good of man is +also the will of God. This is an easy test to which the prejudices and +superstitions of men may be brought:--whatever does not tend to the good of +men is not of God. And the ideal of the greatest happiness of mankind, +especially if believed to be the will of God, when compared with the actual +fact, will be one of the strongest motives to do good to others. + +On the other hand, when the temptation is to speak falsely, to be dishonest +or unjust, or in any way to interfere with the rights of others, the +argument that these actions regarded as a class will not conduce to the +happiness of mankind, though true enough, seems to have less force than the +feeling which is already implanted in the mind by conscience and authority. +To resolve this feeling into the greatest happiness principle takes away +from its sacred and authoritative character. The martyr will not go to the +stake in order that he may promote the happiness of mankind, but for the +sake of the truth: neither will the soldier advance to the cannon's mouth +merely because he believes military discipline to be for the good of +mankind. It is better for him to know that he will be shot, that he will +be disgraced, if he runs away--he has no need to look beyond military +honour, patriotism, 'England expects every man to do his duty.' These are +stronger motives than the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which +is the thesis of a philosopher, not the watchword of an army. For in human +actions men do not always require broad principles; duties often come home +to us more when they are limited and defined, and sanctioned by custom and +public opinion. + +Lastly, if we turn to the history of ethics, we shall find that our moral +ideas have originated not in utility but in religion, in law, in +conceptions of nature, of an ideal good, and the like. And many may be +inclined to think that this conclusively disproves the claim of utility to +be the basis of morals. But the utilitarian will fairly reply (see above) +that we must distinguish the origin of ethics from the principles of them-- +the historical germ from the later growth of reflection. And he may also +truly add that for two thousand years and more, utility, if not the +originating, has been the great corrective principle in law, in politics, +in religion, leading men to ask how evil may be diminished and good +increased--by what course of policy the public interest may be promoted, +and to understand that God wills the happiness, not of some of his +creatures and in this world only, but of all of them and in every stage of +their existence. + +'What is the place of happiness or utility in a system of moral +philosophy?' is analogous to the question asked in the Philebus, 'What rank +does pleasure hold in the scale of goods?' Admitting the greatest +happiness principle to be true and valuable, and the necessary foundation +of that part of morals which relates to the consequences of actions, we +still have to consider whether this or some other general notion is the +highest principle of human life. We may try them in this comparison by +three tests--definiteness, comprehensiveness, and motive power. + +There are three subjective principles of morals,--sympathy, benevolence, +self-love. But sympathy seems to rest morality on feelings which differ +widely even in good men; benevolence and self-love torture one half of our +virtuous actions into the likeness of the other. The greatest happiness +principle, which includes both, has the advantage over all these in +comprehensiveness, but the advantage is purchased at the expense of +definiteness. + +Again, there are the legal and political principles of morals--freedom, +equality, rights of persons; 'Every man to count for one and no man for +more than one,' 'Every man equal in the eye of the law and of the +legislator.' There is also the other sort of political morality, which if +not beginning with 'Might is right,' at any rate seeks to deduce our ideas +of justice from the necessities of the state and of society. According to +this view the greatest good of men is obedience to law: the best human +government is a rational despotism, and the best idea which we can form of +a divine being is that of a despot acting not wholly without regard to law +and order. To such a view the present mixed state of the world, not wholly +evil or wholly good, is supposed to be a witness. More we might desire to +have, but are not permitted. Though a human tyrant would be intolerable, a +divine tyrant is a very tolerable governor of the universe. This is the +doctrine of Thrasymachus adapted to the public opinion of modern times. + +There is yet a third view which combines the two:--freedom is obedience to +the law, and the greatest order is also the greatest freedom; 'Act so that +thy action may be the law of every intelligent being.' This view is noble +and elevating; but it seems to err, like other transcendental principles of +ethics, in being too abstract. For there is the same difficulty in +connecting the idea of duty with particular duties as in bridging the gulf +between phainomena and onta; and when, as in the system of Kant, this +universal idea or law is held to be independent of space and time, such a +mataion eidos becomes almost unmeaning. + +Once more there are the religious principles of morals:--the will of God +revealed in Scripture and in nature. No philosophy has supplied a sanction +equal in authority to this, or a motive equal in strength to the belief in +another life. Yet about these too we must ask What will of God? how +revealed to us, and by what proofs? Religion, like happiness, is a word +which has great influence apart from any consideration of its content: it +may be for great good or for great evil. But true religion is the +synthesis of religion and morality, beginning with divine perfection in +which all human perfection is embodied. It moves among ideas of holiness, +justice, love, wisdom, truth; these are to God, in whom they are +personified, what the Platonic ideas are to the idea of good. It is the +consciousness of the will of God that all men should be as he is. It lives +in this world and is known to us only through the phenomena of this world, +but it extends to worlds beyond. Ordinary religion which is alloyed with +motives of this world may easily be in excess, may be fanatical, may be +interested, may be the mask of ambition, may be perverted in a thousand +ways. But of that religion which combines the will of God with our highest +ideas of truth and right there can never be too much. This impossibility +of excess is the note of divine moderation. + +So then, having briefly passed in review the various principles of moral +philosophy, we may now arrange our goods in order, though, like the reader +of the Philebus, we have a difficulty in distinguishing the different +aspects of them from one another, or defining the point at which the human +passes into the divine. + +First, the eternal will of God in this world and in another,--justice, +holiness, wisdom, love, without succession of acts (ouch e genesis +prosestin), which is known to us in part only, and reverenced by us as +divine perfection. + +Secondly, human perfection, or the fulfilment of the will of God in this +world, and co-operation with his laws revealed to us by reason and +experience, in nature, history, and in our own minds. + +Thirdly, the elements of human perfection,--virtue, knowledge, and right +opinion. + +Fourthly, the external conditions of perfection,--health and the goods of +life. + +Fifthly, beauty and happiness,--the inward enjoyment of that which is best +and fairest in this world and in the human soul. + +... + +The Philebus is probably the latest in time of the writings of Plato with +the exception of the Laws. We have in it therefore the last development of +his philosophy. The extreme and one-sided doctrines of the Cynics and +Cyrenaics are included in a larger whole; the relations of pleasure and +knowledge to each other and to the good are authoritatively determined; the +Eleatic Being and the Heraclitean Flux no longer divide the empire of +thought; the Mind of Anaxagoras has become the Mind of God and of the +World. The great distinction between pure and applied science for the +first time has a place in philosophy; the natural claim of dialectic to be +the Queen of the Sciences is once more affirmed. This latter is the bond +of union which pervades the whole or nearly the whole of the Platonic +writings. And here as in several other dialogues (Phaedrus, Republic, +etc.) it is presented to us in a manner playful yet also serious, and +sometimes as if the thought of it were too great for human utterance and +came down from heaven direct. It is the organization of knowledge +wonderful to think of at a time when knowledge itself could hardly be said +to exist. It is this more than any other element which distinguishes +Plato, not only from the presocratic philosophers, but from Socrates +himself. + +We have not yet reached the confines of Aristotle, but we make a somewhat +nearer approach to him in the Philebus than in the earlier Platonic +writings. The germs of logic are beginning to appear, but they are not +collected into a whole, or made a separate science or system. Many +thinkers of many different schools have to be interposed between the +Parmenides or Philebus of Plato, and the Physics or Metaphysics of +Aristotle. It is this interval upon which we have to fix our minds if we +would rightly understand the character of the transition from one to the +other. Plato and Aristotle do not dovetail into one another; nor does the +one begin where the other ends; there is a gulf between them not to be +measured by time, which in the fragmentary state of our knowledge it is +impossible to bridge over. It follows that the one cannot be interpreted +by the other. At any rate, it is not Plato who is to be interpreted by +Aristotle, but Aristotle by Plato. Of all philosophy and of all art the +true understanding is to be sought not in the afterthoughts of posterity, +but in the elements out of which they have arisen. For the previous stage +is a tendency towards the ideal at which they are aiming; the later is a +declination or deviation from them, or even a perversion of them. No man's +thoughts were ever so well expressed by his disciples as by himself. + +But although Plato in the Philebus does not come into any close connexion +with Aristotle, he is now a long way from himself and from the beginnings +of his own philosophy. At the time of his death he left his system still +incomplete; or he may be more truly said to have had no system, but to have +lived in the successive stages or moments of metaphysical thought which +presented themselves from time to time. The earlier discussions about +universal ideas and definitions seem to have died away; the correlation of +ideas has taken their place. The flowers of rhetoric and poetry have lost +their freshness and charm; and a technical language has begun to supersede +and overgrow them. But the power of thinking tends to increase with age, +and the experience of life to widen and deepen. The good is summed up +under categories which are not summa genera, but heads or gradations of +thought. The question of pleasure and the relation of bodily pleasures to +mental, which is hardly treated of elsewhere in Plato, is here analysed +with great subtlety. The mean or measure is now made the first principle +of good. Some of these questions reappear in Aristotle, as does also the +distinction between metaphysics and mathematics. But there are many things +in Plato which have been lost in Aristotle; and many things in Aristotle +not to be found in Plato. The most remarkable deficiency in Aristotle is +the disappearance of the Platonic dialectic, which in the Aristotelian +school is only used in a comparatively unimportant and trivial sense. The +most remarkable additions are the invention of the Syllogism, the +conception of happiness as the foundation of morals, the reference of human +actions to the standard of the better mind of the world, or of the one +'sensible man' or 'superior person.' His conception of ousia, or essence, +is not an advance upon Plato, but a return to the poor and meagre +abstractions of the Eleatic philosophy. The dry attempt to reduce the +presocratic philosophy by his own rather arbitrary standard of the four +causes, contrasts unfavourably with Plato's general discussion of the same +subject (Sophist). To attempt further to sum up the differences between +the two great philosophers would be out of place here. Any real discussion +of their relation to one another must be preceded by an examination into +the nature and character of the Aristotelian writings and the form in which +they have come down to us. This enquiry is not really separable from an +investigation of Theophrastus as well as Aristotle and of the remains of +other schools of philosophy as well as of the Peripatetics. But, without +entering on this wide field, even a superficial consideration of the +logical and metaphysical works which pass under the name of Aristotle, +whether we suppose them to have come directly from his hand or to be the +tradition of his school, is sufficient to show how great was the mental +activity which prevailed in the latter half of the fourth century B.C.; +what eddies and whirlpools of controversies were surging in the chaos of +thought, what transformations of the old philosophies were taking place +everywhere, what eclecticisms and syncretisms and realisms and nominalisms +were affecting the mind of Hellas. The decline of philosophy during this +period is no less remarkable than the loss of freedom; and the two are not +unconnected with each other. But of the multitudinous sea of opinions +which were current in the age of Aristotle we have no exact account. We +know of them from allusions only. And we cannot with advantage fill up the +void of our knowledge by conjecture: we can only make allowance for our +ignorance. + +There are several passages in the Philebus which are very characteristic of +Plato, and which we shall do well to consider not only in their connexion, +but apart from their connexion as inspired sayings or oracles which receive +their full interpretation only from the history of philosophy in later +ages. The more serious attacks on traditional beliefs which are often +veiled under an unusual simplicity or irony are of this kind. Such, for +example, is the excessive and more than human awe which Socrates expresses +about the names of the gods, which may be not unaptly compared with the +importance attached by mankind to theological terms in other ages; for this +also may be comprehended under the satire of Socrates. Let us observe the +religious and intellectual enthusiasm which shines forth in the following, +'The power and faculty of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the +sake of the truth': or, again, the singular acknowledgment which may be +regarded as the anticipation of a new logic, that 'In going to war for mind +I must have weapons of a different make from those which I used before, +although some of the old ones may do again.' Let us pause awhile to +reflect on a sentence which is full of meaning to reformers of religion or +to the original thinker of all ages: 'Shall we then agree with them of old +time, and merely reassert the notions of others without risk to ourselves; +or shall we venture also to share in the risk and bear the reproach which +will await us': i.e. if we assert mind to be the author of nature. Let us +note the remarkable words, 'That in the divine nature of Zeus there is the +soul and mind of a King, because there is in him the power of the cause,' a +saying in which theology and philosophy are blended and reconciled; not +omitting to observe the deep insight into human nature which is shown by +the repetition of the same thought 'All philosophers are agreed that mind +is the king of heaven and earth' with the ironical addition, 'in this way +truly they magnify themselves.' Nor let us pass unheeded the indignation +felt by the generous youth at the 'blasphemy' of those who say that Chaos +and Chance Medley created the world; or the significance of the words +'those who said of old time that mind rules the universe'; or the pregnant +observation that 'we are not always conscious of what we are doing or of +what happens to us,' a chance expression to which if philosophers had +attended they would have escaped many errors in psychology. We may +contrast the contempt which is poured upon the verbal difficulty of the one +and many, and the seriousness with the unity of opposites is regarded from +the higher point of view of abstract ideas: or compare the simple manner +in which the question of cause and effect and their mutual dependence is +regarded by Plato (to which modern science has returned in Mill and Bacon), +and the cumbrous fourfold division of causes in the Physics and Metaphysics +of Aristotle, for which it has puzzled the world to find a use in so many +centuries. When we consider the backwardness of knowledge in the age of +Plato, the boldness with which he looks forward into the distance, the many +questions of modern philosophy which are anticipated in his writings, may +we not truly describe him in his own words as a 'spectator of all time and +of all existence'? + + +PHILEBUS + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus. + + +SOCRATES: Observe, Protarchus, the nature of the position which you are +now going to take from Philebus, and what the other position is which I +maintain, and which, if you do not approve of it, is to be controverted by +you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides? + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, and +the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living being, +whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and intelligence and memory, +and their kindred, right opinion and true reasoning, are better and more +desirable than pleasure for all who are able to partake of them, and that +to all such who are or ever will be they are the most advantageous of all +things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of +the argument? + +PHILEBUS: Nothing could be fairer, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned to +you? + +PROTARCHUS: I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left +the field. + +SOCRATES: Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to be +ascertained. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Shall we further agree-- + +PROTARCHUS: To what? + +SOCRATES: That you and I must now try to indicate some state and +disposition of the soul, which has the property of making all men happy. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, by all means. + +SOCRATES: And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a +state? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And what if there be a third state, which is better than either? +Then both of us are vanquished--are we not? But if this life, which really +has the power of making men happy, turn out to be more akin to pleasure +than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage over the +life of wisdom. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, +then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;--do you agree? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say, Philebus? + +PHILEBUS: I say, and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the +conqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus. + +PROTARCHUS: You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have +no longer a voice in the matter? + +PHILEBUS: True enough. Nevertheless I would clear myself and deliver my +soul of you; and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do so. + +PROTARCHUS: You may appeal to us; we too will be the witnesses of your +words. And now, Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we +will proceed with the argument. + +SOCRATES: Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus +says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the +gods is more than human--it exceeds all other fears. And now I would not +sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what she +pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just +now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one +name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she +takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the +intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very +temperance,--that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies +and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how +foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are +severally alike! + +PROTARCHUS: Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring from +opposite sources, but they are not in themselves opposite. For must not +pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure,--that is, like +itself? + +SOCRATES: Yes, my good friend, just as colour is like colour;--in so far +as colours are colours, there is no difference between them; and yet we all +know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed to white: +or again, as figure is like figure, for all figures are comprehended under +one class; and yet particular figures may be absolutely opposed to one +another, and there is an infinite diversity of them. And we might find +similar examples in many other things; therefore do not rely upon this +argument, which would go to prove the unity of the most extreme opposites. +And I suspect that we shall find a similar opposition among pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument? + +SOCRATES: Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to +them a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good; now +although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, as +we are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good; but you call them +all good, and at the same time are compelled, if you are pressed, to +acknowledge that they are unlike. And so you must tell us what is the +identical quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which makes you +designate all of them as good. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any one who +asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some +pleasures are good and others bad? + +SOCRATES: And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one +another, and sometimes opposed? + +PROTARCHUS: Not in so far as they are pleasures. + +SOCRATES: That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are +to say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures, but that they +are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do not pierce +our dull minds, but we go on arguing all the same, like the weakest and +most inexperienced reasoners? (Probably corrupt.) + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Why, I mean to say, that in self-defence I may, if I like, +follow your example, and assert boldly that the two things most unlike are +most absolutely alike; and the result will be that you and I will prove +ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing; and the argument will +be blown away and lost. Suppose that we put back, and return to the old +position; then perhaps we may come to an understanding with one another. + +PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you? + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind, and those other +qualities which I, when asked by you at first what is the nature of the +good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case with the pleasures of +which you spoke. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: The sciences are a numerous class, and will be found to present +great differences. But even admitting that, like the pleasures, they are +opposite as well as different, should I be worthy of the name of +dialectician if, in order to avoid this difficulty, I were to say (as you +are saying of pleasure) that there is no difference between one science and +another;--would not the argument founder and disappear like an idle tale, +although we might ourselves escape drowning by clinging to a fallacy? + +PROTARCHUS: May none of this befal us, except the deliverance! Yet I like +the even-handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let us +assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and +different sciences. + +SOCRATES: And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the differences +between my good and yours; but let us bring them to the light in the hope +that, in the process of testing them, they may show whether pleasure is to +be called the good, or wisdom, or some third quality; for surely we are not +now simply contending in order that my view or that yours may prevail, but +I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting for the truth. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly we ought. + +SOCRATES: Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish the +principle on which the argument rests. + +PROTARCHUS: What principle? + +SOCRATES: A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty, and +some men sometimes against their will. + +PROTARCHUS: Speak plainer. + +SOCRATES: The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel of +nature; for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful +propositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack. + +PROTARCHUS: Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by +nature one and also many, dividing the single 'me' into many 'me's,' and +even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten thousand +other ways? + +SOCRATES: Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes +about the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this time +agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true +course of thought; and no more favour is shown to that other puzzle, in +which a person proves the members and parts of anything to be divided, and +then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof of his +own words: Why, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, and the +many are only one. + +PROTARCHUS: But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected with +this subject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and +acknowledged? + +SOCRATES: When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things +that are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving, for in +those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as I was +saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed; but when the +assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the good +one, then the interest which attaches to these and similar unities and the +attempt which is made to divide them gives birth to a controversy. + +PROTARCHUS: Of what nature? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real +existence; and then how each individual unity, being always the same, and +incapable either of generation or of destruction, but retaining a permanent +individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and multiplied in the +infinity of the world of generation, or as still entire and yet divided +from itself, which latter would seem to be the greatest impossibility of +all, for how can one and the same thing be at the same time in one and in +many things? These, Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is the +one and many to which they relate; they are the source of great perplexity +if ill decided, and the right determination of them is very helpful. + +PROTARCHUS: Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions. + +SOCRATES: That is what I should wish. + +PROTARCHUS: And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear +them discussed; Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move, and +we had better not stir him up with questions. + +SOCRATES: Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious +battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we begin thus? + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: We say that the one and many become identified by thought, and +that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of every +word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never cease, and is +not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of thought +itself, which never grows old. Any young man, when he first tastes these +subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of +wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no stone, or rather no +thought unturned, now rolling up the many into the one, and kneading them +together, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles himself first and +above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbours, whether they are +older or younger, or of his own age--that makes no difference; neither +father nor mother does he spare; no human being who has ears is safe from +him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian would have no chance of escaping +him, if an interpreter could only be found. + +PROTARCHUS: Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are +young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all set upon you, +if you abuse us? We understand what you mean; but is there no charm by +which we may dispel all this confusion, no more excellent way of arriving +at the truth? If there is, we hope that you will guide us into that way, +and we will do our best to follow, for the enquiry in which we are engaged, +Socrates, is not unimportant. + +SOCRATES: The reverse of unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and +there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite way, which +has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me helpless in the hour +of need. + +PROTARCHUS: Tell us what that is. + +SOCRATES: One which may be easily pointed out, but is by no means easy of +application; it is the parent of all the discoveries in the arts. + +PROTARCHUS: Tell us what it is. + +SOCRATES: A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among +men by the hands of a new Prometheus, and therewith a blaze of light; and +the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the gods than we are, handed +down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be are composed of one +and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted in them: seeing, +then, that such is the order of the world, we too ought in every enquiry to +begin by laying down one idea of that which is the subject of enquiry; this +unity we shall find in everything. Having found it, we may next proceed to +look for two, if there be two, or, if not, then for three or some other +number, subdividing each of these units, until at last the unity with which +we began is seen not only to be one and many and infinite, but also a +definite number; the infinite must not be suffered to approach the many +until the entire number of the species intermediate between unity and +infinity has been discovered,--then, and not till then, we may rest from +division, and without further troubling ourselves about the endless +individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, as I was saying, +is the way of considering and learning and teaching one another, which the +gods have handed down to us. But the wise men of our time are either too +quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity. Having no method, they +make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass at once to infinity; +the intermediate steps never occur to them. And this, I repeat, is what +makes the difference between the mere art of disputation and true +dialectic. + +PROTARCHUS: I think that I partly understand you Socrates, but I should +like to have a clearer notion of what you are saying. + +SOCRATES: I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet, +Protarchus, which you were made to learn as a child. + +PROTARCHUS: How do they afford an illustration? + +SOCRATES: The sound which passes through the lips whether of an individual +or of all men is one and yet infinite. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound is +infinite are we perfect in the art of speech, but the knowledge of the +number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same +kind. + +PROTARCHUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Sound is one in music as well as in grammar? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And there is a higher note and a lower note, and a note of equal +pitch:--may we affirm so much? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you +knew; though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of +music. + +PROTARCHUS: Nothing. + +SOCRATES: But when you have learned what sounds are high and what low, and +the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or proportions, and +the systems compounded out of them, which our fathers discovered, and have +handed down to us who are their descendants under the name of harmonies; +and the affections corresponding to them in the movements of the human +body, which when measured by numbers ought, as they say, to be called +rhythms and measures; and they tell us that the same principle should be +applied to every one and many;--when, I say, you have learned all this, +then, my dear friend, you are perfect; and you may be said to understand +any other subject, when you have a similar grasp of it. But the infinity +of kinds and the infinity of individuals which there is in each of them, +when not classified, creates in every one of us a state of infinite +ignorance; and he who never looks for number in anything, will not himself +be looked for in the number of famous men. + +PROTARCHUS: I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent, +Philebus. + +PHILEBUS: I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon the +argument? + +SOCRATES: Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus. + +PROTARCHUS: Indeed he is, and you must answer him. + +SOCRATES: I will; but you must let me make one little remark first about +these matters; I was saying, that he who begins with any individual unity, +should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a definite number, and +now I say conversely, that he who has to begin with infinity should not +jump to unity, but he should look about for some number representing a +certain quantity, and thus out of all end in one. And now let us return +for an illustration of our principle to the case of letters. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said to +have been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first +distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then other +letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e., the semivowels); +these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he distinguished a third +class of letters which we now call mutes, without voice and without sound, +and divided these, and likewise the two other classes of vowels and +semivowels, into the individual sounds, and told the number of them, and +gave to each and all of them the name of letters; and observing that none +of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all, and in +consideration of this common bond which in a manner united them, he +assigned to them all a single art, and this he called the art of grammar or +letters. + +PHILEBUS: The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding +the original statement, but I still feel the defect of which I just now +complained. + +SOCRATES: Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the +argument? + +PHILEBUS: Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long +asking. + +SOCRATES: Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the question +which, as you say, you have been so long asking? + +PHILEBUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility +of pleasure and wisdom? + +PHILEBUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And we maintain that they are each of them one? + +PHILEBUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the precise question to which the previous discussion +desires an answer is, how they are one and also many (i.e., how they have +one genus and many species), and are not at once infinite, and what number +of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into +infinity (i.e. into the infinite number of individuals). + +PROTARCHUS: That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates +has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us shall +answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable to answer, +and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have undertaken the whole +charge of the argument, but if neither of us were able to answer, the +result methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let us consider, then, +what we are to do:--Socrates, if I understood him rightly, is asking +whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is the number and nature +of them, and the same of wisdom. + +SOCRATES: Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed +that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, +likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest +use in any enquiry. + +PROTARCHUS: That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would +the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him is +that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will tell +you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing with +you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best of human +goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment and +the like were the chief good, you answered--No, not those, but another +class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves of what you said, +and very properly, in order that we may not forget to examine and compare +the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are to be designated as +superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, are mind and +knowledge and understanding and art, and the like. There was a dispute +about which were the best, and we playfully threatened that you should not +be allowed to go home until the question was settled; and you agreed, and +placed yourself at our disposal. And now, as children say, what has been +fairly given cannot be taken back; cease then to fight against us in this +way. + +SOCRATES: In what way? + +PHILEBUS: Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which we +have not as yet any sufficient answer to give; let us not imagine that a +general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if we +are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have promised. Consider, then, +whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge according to their kinds; or +you may let the matter drop, if you are able and willing to find some other +mode of clearing up our controversy. + +SOCRATES: If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words 'if +you are willing' dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to have +recalled something to my mind. + +PHILEBUS: What is that? + +SOCRATES: I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about +pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they were +to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the good, but +some third thing, which was different from them, and better than either. +If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for +the good will cease to be identified with her:--Am I not right? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds +of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more clearly +as we proceed. + +PROTARCHUS: Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose. + +SOCRATES: But, let us first agree on some little points. + +PROTARCHUS: What are they? + +SOCRATES: Is the good perfect or imperfect? + +PROTARCHUS: The most perfect, Socrates, of all things. + +SOCRATES: And is the good sufficient? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things. + +SOCRATES: And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt +after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care +not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by good. + +PROTARCHUS: That is undeniable. + +SOCRATES: Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of +wisdom, and pass them in review. + +PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure +in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, it cannot +be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want anything, then +it cannot really be the chief good. + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And will you help us to test these two lives? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then answer. + +PROTARCHUS: Ask. + +SOCRATES: Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the +enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly I should. + +SOCRATES: Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you +if you had perfect pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and +forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight? + +PROTARCHUS: Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things. + +SOCRATES: Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the +greatest pleasures? + +PROTARCHUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true +opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you +were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that +you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the +pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no +true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and +if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on +future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an +oyster or 'pulmo marinus.' Could this be otherwise? + +PROTARCHUS: No. + +SOCRATES: But is such a life eligible? + +PROTARCHUS: I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away +from me the power of speech. + +SOCRATES: We must keep up our spirits;--let us now take the life of mind +and examine it in turn. + +PROTARCHUS: And what is this life of mind? + +SOCRATES: I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, +having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having +no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like +feelings? + +PROTARCHUS: Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is likely, +as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else. + +SOCRATES: What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to +one that was made out of the union of the two? + +PROTARCHUS: Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom? + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is the life which I mean. + +PROTARCHUS: There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would +surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in +addition to them. + +SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence? + +PROTARCHUS: To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the +three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible +for man or for animal. + +SOCRATES: Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the +good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and +perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to +live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have +chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own +free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly that seems to be true. + +SOCRATES: And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus' goddess is +not to be regarded as identical with the good? + +PHILEBUS: Neither is your 'mind' the good, Socrates, for that will be open +to the same objections. + +SOCRATES: Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my 'mind'; +but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, I +will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed +life; but we must come to some understanding about the second place. For +you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life; and +in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them might +be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further to +argue in opposition to Philebus, that the element which makes this mixed +life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than to +pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share +either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own +mind, attain even to the third. + +PROTARCHUS: Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall; in +fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid +low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be +thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim. And if +pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second place, she +would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to them +would she still appear as fair as before. + +SOCRATES: Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by +applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her? + +PROTARCHUS: Nonsense, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which +is an impossibility? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be aware +that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the argument. + +SOCRATES: Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and just +at present not at all an easy one. For in going to war in the cause of +mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have weapons of +another make from those which I used before; some, however, of the old ones +may do again. And must I then finish the argument? + +PROTARCHUS: Of course you must. + +SOCRATES: Let us be very careful in laying the foundation. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you do +not object, into three classes. + +PROTARCHUS: Upon what principle would you make the division? + +SOCRATES: Let us take some of our newly-found notions. + +PROTARCHUS: Which of them? + +SOCRATES: Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of +existence, and also an infinite? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which is +compounded out of them; but I fear that I am ridiculously clumsy at these +processes of division and enumeration. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, my good friend? + +SOCRATES: I say that a fourth class is still wanted. + +PROTARCHUS: What will that be? + +SOCRATES: Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a +fourth class to the three others. + +PROTARCHUS: And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of +resolution as well as a cause of composition? + +SOCRATES: Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some future +time you shall allow me to have it. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let us begin with the first three; and as we find two out of the +three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite them, and +see how in each of them there is a one and many. + +PROTARCHUS: If you would explain to me a little more about them, perhaps I +might be able to follow you. + +SOCRATES: Well, the two classes are the same which I mentioned before, one +the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the infinite +is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter discussed. + +PROTARCHUS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And now consider well; for the question to which I invite your +attention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter and +colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more +and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end? +for if they had an end, the more and less would themselves have an end. + +PROTARCHUS: That is most true. + +SOCRATES: Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a +more and a less. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and +being endless they must also be infinite. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such an +expression as 'exceedingly,' which you have just uttered, and also the term +'gently,' have the same significance as more or less; for whenever they +occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity--they are always +introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison of a more or a +less excessive or a more or a less gentle, and at each creation of more or +less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now saying, if quantity and +measure did not disappear, but were allowed to intrude in the sphere of +more and less and the other comparatives, these last would be driven out of +their own domain. When definite quantity is once admitted, there can be no +longer a 'hotter' or a 'colder' (for these are always progressing, and are +never in one stay); but definite quantity is at rest, and has ceased to +progress. Which proves that comparatives, such as the hotter and the +colder, are to be ranked in the class of the infinite. + +PROTARCHUS: Your remark certainly has the look of truth, Socrates; but +these subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at first. I +think however, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or +twice, there would be a substantial agreement between us. + +SOCRATES: Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather +not waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars, let me know +whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite-- + +PROTARCHUS: What? + +SOCRATES: I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit of +more or less, or are denoted by the words 'exceedingly,' 'gently,' +'extremely,' and the like, may not be referred to the class of the +infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous +argument, all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought +together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if possible, set +upon them--do you remember? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit +their opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal, or +again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure--all these may, +I think, be rightly reckoned by us in the class of the limited or finite; +what do you say? + +PROTARCHUS: Excellent, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound +kind? + +PROTARCHUS: You, I think, will have to tell me that. + +SOCRATES: Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen to +my prayers. + +PROTARCHUS: Offer up a prayer, then, and think. + +SOCRATES: I am thinking, Protarchus, and I believe that some God has +befriended us. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what you +are saying? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you, and do you listen to my words. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, slower, greater, +smaller, and all that in the preceding argument we placed under the unity +of more and less. + +PROTARCHUS: In the class of the infinite, you mean? + +SOCRATES: Yes; and now mingle this with the other. + +PROTARCHUS: What is the other. + +SOCRATES: The class of the finite which we ought to have brought together +as we did the infinite; but, perhaps, it will come to the same thing if we +do so now;--when the two are combined, a third will appear. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by the class of the finite? + +SOCRATES: The class of the equal and the double, and any class which puts +an end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number creates +harmony and proportion among the different elements. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand; you seem to me to mean that the various +opposites, when you mingle with them the class of the finite, takes certain +forms. + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: Does not the right participation in the finite give health--in +disease, for instance? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And whereas the high and low, the swift and the slow are +infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principles aforesaid +introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly. + +SOCRATES: Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the introduction +of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse moderation and +harmony? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the +seasons, and all the delights of life? + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and +strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: O my +beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal wantonness +and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no limit to +pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and order, whereby, +as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, delivers the soul.-- +What think you, Protarchus? + +PROTARCHUS: Her ways are much to my mind, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: You will observe that I have spoken of three classes? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that the +infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of existences; +but what you would make the third I am not so certain. + +SOCRATES: That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too +much for you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with the +infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them were sealed +with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we readily +acknowledged it to be by nature one? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand me +to mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being, effected by +the measure which the limit introduces. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand. + +SOCRATES: Still there was, as we said, a fourth class to be investigated, +and you must assist in the investigation; for does not everything which +comes into being, of necessity come into being through a cause? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no +cause? + +SOCRATES: And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name; +the agent and the cause may be rightly called one? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall +find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name--shall we not? + +PROTARCHUS: We shall. + +SOCRATES: The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or +effect naturally follows it? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation are +not the same, but different? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of +which they were generated, furnish all the three classes? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven +to be distinct from them,--and may therefore be called a fourth principle? + +PROTARCHUS: So let us call it. + +SOCRATES: Quite right; but now, having distinguished the four, I think +that we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them in +order. + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and the +second the finite or limited; then follows the third, an essence compound +and generated; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in speaking of +the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And now what is the next question, and how came we hither? Were +we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom? + +PROTARCHUS: We were. + +SOCRATES: And now, having determined these points, shall we not be better +able to decide about the first and second place, which was the original +subject of dispute? + +PROTARCHUS: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and +wisdom was the conqueror--did we not? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to what +class it is to be assigned? + +PROTARCHUS: Beyond a doubt. + +SOCRATES: This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class; +which is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the +elements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may therefore be truly +said to comprehend the conqueror life. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all +sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? +Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer? + +PHILEBUS: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class +which admits of more and less? + +PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for +pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity +and degree. + +SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the +infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of +good. But now--admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of +the infinite--in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, +can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us +be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on +this point. + +PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god. + +SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; +but still I must beg you to answer the question. + +PROTARCHUS: Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must submit to him. + +PHILEBUS: And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must +entreat you, Socrates, to be our spokesman, and then we shall not say +anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite. + +SOCRATES: I must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose a +difficult one; but did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you with +my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to what class mind and +knowledge belong? + +PROTARCHUS: You did, indeed, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Yet the answer is easy, since all philosophers assert with one +voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth--in reality they are +magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should +like to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more +fully. + +PHILEBUS: Take your own course, Socrates, and never mind length; we shall +not tire of you. + +SOCRATES: Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a question. + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the +guidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our fathers +have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence and +wisdom. + +PROTARCHUS: Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, for +that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy; but the +other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the aspect of +the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars and of the +whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think otherwise. + +SOCRATES: Shall we then agree with them of old time in maintaining this +doctrine,--not merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk to +ourselves,--but shall we share in the danger, and take our part of the +reproach which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares that +all is disorder? + +PROTARCHUS: That would certainly be my wish. + +SOCRATES: Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: We see that the elements which enter into the nature of the +bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor +cries, 'land' (i.e., earth), reappear in the constitution of the world. + +PROTARCHUS: The proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm gathers +over us, and we are at our wit's end. + +SOCRATES: There is something to be remarked about each of these elements. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: Only a small fraction of any one of them exists in us, and that +of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy of its +nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is fire within +us, and in the universe. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in +the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power that +fire has. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and +ruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other +animals, dependent on the universal fire? + +PROTARCHUS: That is a question which does not deserve an answer. + +SOCRATES: Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the +earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, and you +would give a similar reply about all the other elements? + +PROTARCHUS: Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his +senses? + +SOCRATES: I do not think that he could--but now go on to the next step. +When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in +one, did we not call them a body? + +PROTARCHUS: We did. + +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same +reason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same +elements. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body +nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which we +were just now speaking? + +PROTARCHUS: That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to +be asked. + +SOCRATES: Well, tell me, is this question worth asking? + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: May our body be said to have a soul? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body +of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in +every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the +four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the +cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies +souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and +operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes +of wisdom;--we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements +exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only +fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have +designed the noblest and fairest things? + +PROTARCHUS: Such a supposition is quite unreasonable. + +SOCRATES: Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the +other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite +and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a +presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and +seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind? + +PROTARCHUS: Most justly. + +SOCRATES: And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is +the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the +cause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are pleased to +be called. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O +Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said of +old time that mind rules the universe. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that +mind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause of +all; and I think that you now have my answer. + +PROTARCHUS: I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had +answered. + +SOCRATES: A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts +earnest. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the +class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago +discovered? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was +akin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite and +belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have in itself, a +beginning, middle, or end of its own. + +PROTARCHUS: I shall be sure to remember. + +SOCRATES: We must next examine what is their place and under what +conditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since her +class was first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart +from pain. + +PROTARCHUS: If this is the road, let us take it. + +SOCRATES: I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of +pleasure and pain. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class. + +PROTARCHUS: And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the +aforesaid classes is the mixed one? + +SOCRATES: I will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we +placed third in the list of four. + +PROTARCHUS: That which followed the infinite and the finite; and in which +you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony. + +SOCRATES: Capital; and now will you please to give me your best attention? + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed; I am attending. + +SOCRATES: I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is +also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain. + +PROTARCHUS: That is very probable. + +SOCRATES: And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the +source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and shortest +words about matters of the greatest moment. + +PROTARCHUS: I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be +a little plainer? + +SOCRATES: Do not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest +illustration? + +PROTARCHUS: What phenomena do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of +moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure: once more, the +unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the +natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain, +and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their +original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to +you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and +infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living +beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their own +nature is pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Granted; what you say has a general truth. + +SOCRATES: Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating +severally in the two processes which we have described? + +PROTARCHUS: Good. + +SOCRATES: Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an +antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an +expectation of pain, fearful and anxious. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of +the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation. + +SOCRATES: Right; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to +be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure, +methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is +to be desired, or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not +rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been +mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other +things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not +to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and in +some instances admitting of the nature of good. + +PROTARCHUS: You say most truly that this is the track which the +investigation should pursue. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and +pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be the +condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration nor +of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether any animal who is in +that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or +small? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure +and of pain? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And do not forget that there is such a state; it will make a +great difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this or +not. And I should like to say a few words about it. + +PROTARCHUS: What have you to say? + +SOCRATES: Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there is +no reason why he should not live in this neutral state. + +PROTARCHUS: You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing? + +SOCRATES: Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no +degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be necessary to +him who chose the life of thought and wisdom. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, we said so. + +SOCRATES: Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this +may not be the most divine of all lives? + +PROTARCHUS: If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have +either joy or sorrow. + +SOCRATES: Certainly not--there would be a great impropriety in the +assumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not +indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if in +any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion we will +place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second place, should +she have to resign the first. + +PROTARCHUS: Just so. + +SOCRATES: The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is purely +mental, is entirely derived from memory. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I must first of all analyze memory, or rather perception which +is prior to memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to be properly +cleared up. + +PROTARCHUS: How will you proceed? + +SOCRATES: Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished +before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other +affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock to +both and to each of them. + +PROTARCHUS: Granted. + +SOCRATES: And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but +not of the second? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness +in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in this +case has not yet entered; and to speak of the loss of that which is not yet +in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction; do you see? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then just be so good as to change the terms. + +PROTARCHUS: How shall I change them? + +SOCRATES: Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing the +state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say +unconsciousness. + +PROTARCHUS: I see. + +SOCRATES: And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and +motion would be properly called consciousness? + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Then now we know the meaning of the word? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the +preservation of consciousness? + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: But do we not distinguish memory from recollection? + +PROTARCHUS: I think so. + +SOCRATES: And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has +of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced when in +company with the body? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of some +consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and +reminiscence? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: There is a reason why I say all this. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and +desire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the +previous analysis helps to show the nature of both. + +PROTARCHUS: Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point. + +SOCRATES: There are certainly many things to be considered in discussing +the generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must +determine the nature and seat of desire. + +PROTARCHUS: Ay; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing. + +SOCRATES: Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the +answer. + +PROTARCHUS: A fair retort; but let us proceed. + +SOCRATES: Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of +desires? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And yet they are very different; what common nature have we in +view when we call them by a single name? + +PROTARCHUS: By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is not easily +answered; but it must be answered. + +SOCRATES: Then let us go back to our examples. + +PROTARCHUS: Where shall we begin? + +SOCRATES: Do we mean anything when we say 'a man thirsts'? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: We mean to say that he 'is empty'? + +PROTARCHUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And is not thirst desire? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, of drink. + +SOCRATES: Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink? + +PROTARCHUS: I should say, of replenishment with drink. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of +what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly so. + +SOCRATES: But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain either +by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment, of which he +has no present or past experience? + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And yet he who desires, surely desires something? + +PROTARCHUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: He does not desire that which he experiences, for he experiences +thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires replenishment? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some +way apprehends replenishment? + +PROTARCHUS: There must. + +SOCRATES: And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be +emptied? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the +replenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other way can +there be? + +PROTARCHUS: I cannot imagine any other. + +SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence? + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: That there is no such thing as desire of the body. + +PROTARCHUS: Why so? + +SOCRATES: Why, because the argument shows that the endeavour of every +animal is to the reverse of his bodily state. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is +experiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the argument, having proved that memory attracts us towards +the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires and +the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or +thirsts or has any similar experience. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + +SOCRATES: Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to me to +imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these affections. + +PROTARCHUS: Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you +speaking? + +SOCRATES: I am speaking of being emptied and replenished, and of all that +relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as well as of +the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the pleasure which +succeeds to it. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the intermediate state? + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by 'intermediate'? + +SOCRATES: I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers +past pleasures which, if they would only return, would relieve him; but as +yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an intermediate +state? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased? + +PROTARCHUS: Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body there is +the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and expectation. + +SOCRATES: What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man +who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other +times be quite in despair? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be +filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then man and the other animals have at the same time both +pleasure and pain? + +PROTARCHUS: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there +will be the double experience of pain. You observed this and inferred that +the double experience was the single case possible. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the +occasion of raising a question? + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we +are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false? + +PROTARCHUS: But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains? + +SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true +and false expectations, or true and false opinions? + +PROTARCHUS: I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures. + +SOCRATES: What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very +serious enquiry. + +PROTARCHUS: There I agree. + +SOCRATES: And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus' boys, the point to +be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Surely. + +SOCRATES: No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is +said should be pertinent. + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised. + +PROTARCHUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true? + +PROTARCHUS: To be sure I do. + +SOCRATES: Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not +rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or +waking, mad or lunatic? + +PROTARCHUS: So we have always held, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your +opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: I think that we should. + +SOCRATES: Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has +arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And such a thing as pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And an opinion must be of something? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And a man must be pleased by something? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite correct. + +SOCRATES: And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference; +it will still be an opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, +will always have a real feeling of pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is also quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true +only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is the question. + +SOCRATES: You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence +becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this is +what you think should be examined? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in +other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as +well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have +various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we +should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak of +a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse of +rightness? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the +opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its +object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name? + +PROTARCHUS: Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we? + +SOCRATES: And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which +is not true, but false? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as we were +saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure +false. + +SOCRATES: How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure! + +PROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear. + +SOCRATES: And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure +which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is +often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance? + +PROTARCHUS: There must be a very great difference, between them. + +SOCRATES: Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference. + +PROTARCHUS: Lead, and I will follow. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, my view is-- + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: We agree--do we not?--that there is such a thing as false, and +also such a thing as true opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often +consequent upon these--upon true and false opinion, I mean. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always +spring from memory and perception? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature? + +PROTARCHUS: Of what nature? + +SOCRATES: An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and +the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees. + +PROTARCHUS: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Soon he begins to interrogate himself. + +PROTARCHUS: In what manner? + +SOCRATES: He asks himself--'What is that which appears to be standing by +the rock under the tree?' This is the question which he may be supposed to +put to himself when he sees such an appearance. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: To which he may guess the right answer, saying as if in a +whisper to himself--'It is a man.' + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Or again, he may be misled, and then he will say--'No, it is a +figure made by the shepherds.' + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in +articulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a +proposition. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him, he +may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in my explanation of +this phenomenon. + +PROTARCHUS: What is your explanation? + +SOCRATES: I think that the soul at such times is like a book. + +PROTARCHUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant +feelings seem to almost to write down words in the soul, and when the +inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions +which are the expressions of opinion come into our souls--but when the +scribe within us writes falsely, the result is false. + +PROTARCHUS: I quite assent and agree to your statement. + +SOCRATES: I must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is busy +at the same time in the chambers of the soul. + +PROTARCHUS: Who is he? + +SOCRATES: The painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws +images in the soul of the things which he has described. + +PROTARCHUS: But when and how does he do this? + +SOCRATES: When a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense +certain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the subjects +of them;--is not this a very common mental phenomenon? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And the images answering to true opinions and words are true, +and to false opinions and words false; are they not? + +PROTARCHUS: They are. + +SOCRATES: If we are right so far, there arises a further question. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in +relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also? + +PROTARCHUS: I should say in relation to all times alike. + +SOCRATES: Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described +already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones; from which we +may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do with the future? + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And do all those writings and paintings which, as we were saying +a little while ago, are produced in us, relate to the past and present +only, and not to the future? + +PROTARCHUS: To the future, very much. + +SOCRATES: When you say, 'Very much,' you mean to imply that all these +representations are hopes about the future, and that mankind are filled +with hopes in every stage of existence? + +PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Answer me another question. + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he +not? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly he is. + +SOCRATES: And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with +hopes? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which +exist in the minds of each of us? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may often +have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture +there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good +fortune. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, +have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false pictures? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as +the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: They are. + +SOCRATES: The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good +in true pleasures? + +PROTARCHUS: Doubtless. + +SOCRATES: Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of +men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of a +similar character? + +PROTARCHUS: There are. + +SOCRATES: And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a +real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the +past, present, or future? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not +right? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real +but illusory character? + +PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure +who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased about things +which neither have nor have ever had any real existence, and, more often +than not, are never likely to exist. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable. + +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like; +are they not often false? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are +true or false? + +PROTARCHUS: In no other way. + +SOCRATES: Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as +they are false. + +PROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth; for no one +would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason of +some other great corruption to which they are liable. + +SOCRATES: Well, of pleasures which are corrupt and caused by corruption we +will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the present I +would rather show by another argument that there are many false pleasures +existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist our final +decision. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures. + +SOCRATES: I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion which +should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new +argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as +they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart +from the soul--do you remember? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, I remember that you said so. + +SOCRATES: And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily +state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was +experienced. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then now you may infer what happens in such cases. + +PROTARCHUS: What am I to infer? + +SOCRATES: That in such cases pleasures and pains come simultaneously; and +there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond to +them, as has been already shown. + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And there is another point to which we have agreed. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that +they are of the class of infinites. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly, we said so. + +SOCRATES: But how can we rightly judge of them? + +PROTARCHUS: How can we? + +SOCRATES: Is it our intention to judge of their comparative importance and +intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and +pleasure against pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them +accordingly. + +SOCRATES: Well, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance +of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine falsely; +and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of pleasures and +pains? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater. + +SOCRATES: Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were +saying before. + +PROTARCHUS: What was that? + +SOCRATES: Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the +pleasures and pains with their own falsity. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false +because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison; +the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when placed side by +side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by side with the +pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly, and for the reason which you mention. + +SOCRATES: And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element +which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are: you +will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never say that +the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or true. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find +pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are +still more false than these. + +PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how shall we find them? + +SOCRATES: If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and aches +and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of +nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and repletions, and +evacuations, and also by growth and decay? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that has been often said. + +SOCRATES: And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural +state is pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body +experiences none of these changes. + +PROTARCHUS: When can that be, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Your question, Protarchus, does not help the argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Why not, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine. + +PROTARCHUS: And what was that? + +SOCRATES: Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may +ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were? + +PROTARCHUS: You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed +either for good or bad? + +SOCRATES: Yes. + +PROTARCHUS: Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be +neither pleasure nor pain. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that +we must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise tell us; +for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, and their words are of no mean authority. + +SOCRATES: Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I +should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I +mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight. + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: To them we will say: 'Good; but are we, or living things in +general, always conscious of what happens to us--for example, of our +growth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly +unconscious of this and similar phenomena?' You must answer for them. + +PROTARCHUS: The latter alternative is the true one. + +SOCRATES: Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going +up and down cause pleasures and pains? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be-- + +PROTARCHUS: What? + +SOCRATES: If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains, +but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither. + +PROTARCHUS: That, Socrates, is the more correct mode of speaking. + +SOCRATES: But if this be true, the life to which I was just now referring +again appears. + +PROTARCHUS: What life? + +SOCRATES: The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of +joy. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one +painful, and the third which is neither; what say you? + +PROTARCHUS: I should say as you do that there are three of them. + +SOCRATES: But if so, the negation of pain will not be the same with +pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live without +pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand him to +mean by that statement? + +PROTARCHUS: I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain. + +SOCRATES: Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a +little and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a +third which is neither. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver? + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably +spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons who say and +think so. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free +from pain? + +PROTARCHUS: They say so. + +SOCRATES: And they must think or they would not say that they have +pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct +natures, they are wrong. + +PROTARCHUS: But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures. + +SOCRATES: Then shall we take the view that they are three, as we were just +now saying, or that they are two only--the one being a state of pain, which +is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of itself a good, +and is called pleasant? + +PROTARCHUS: But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all? I do not +see the reason. + +SOCRATES: You, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies of +our friend Philebus. + +PROTARCHUS: And who may they be? + +SOCRATES: Certain persons who are reputed to be masters in natural +philosophy, who deny the very existence of pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: Indeed! + +SOCRATES: They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are +all of them only avoidances of pain. + +PROTARCHUS: And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them? + +SOCRATES: Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, who +divine the truth, not by rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance and +extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of pleasure, in +which they think that there is nothing sound, and her seductive influence +is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. This is the use +which you may make of them. And when you have considered the various +grounds of their dislike, you shall hear from me what I deem to be true +pleasures. Having thus examined the nature of pleasure from both points of +view, we will bring her up for judgment. + +PROTARCHUS: Well said. + +SOCRATES: Then let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers and +follow in the track of their dislike. I imagine that they would say +something of this sort; they would begin at the beginning, and ask whether, +if we wanted to know the nature of any quality, such as hardness, we should +be more likely to discover it by looking at the hardest things, rather than +at the least hard? You, Protarchus, shall answer these severe gentlemen as +you answer me. + +PROTARCHUS: By all means, and I reply to them, that you should look at the +greatest instances. + +SOCRATES: Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a class, +we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most extreme +and most vehement? + +PROTARCHUS: In that every one will agree. + +SOCRATES: And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we have +often said, are the pleasures of the body? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we are +sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our answer, +or we shall come to grief. + +PROTARCHUS: How will that be? + +SOCRATES: Why, because we might be tempted to answer, 'When we are in +health.' + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is the natural answer. + +SOCRATES: Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind +have the greatest desires? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness, +feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely? Am I not +right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the +satisfaction of their want? + +PROTARCHUS: That is obvious as soon as it is said. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a person +would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look, not at +health, but at disease? And here you must distinguish:--do not imagine +that I mean to ask whether those who are very ill have more pleasures than +those who are well, but understand that I am speaking of the magnitude of +pleasure; I want to know where pleasures are found to be most intense. +For, as I say, we have to discover what is pleasure, and what they mean by +pleasure who deny her very existence. + +PROTARCHUS: I think I follow you. + +SOCRATES: You will soon have a better opportunity of showing whether you +do or not, Protarchus. Answer now, and tell me whether you see, I will not +say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness than in +temperance? Reflect before you speak. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand you, and see that there is a great difference +between them; the temperate are restrained by the wise man's aphorism of +'Never too much,' which is their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing +the minds of fools and wantons becomes madness and makes them shout with +delight. + +SOCRATES: Very good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures and +pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body, and not +in a virtuous state. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and +see what makes them the greatest? + +PROTARCHUS: To be sure we ought. + +SOCRATES: Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain +disorders. + +PROTARCHUS: What disorders? + +SOCRATES: The pleasures of unseemly disorders, which our severe friends +utterly detest. + +PROTARCHUS: What pleasures? + +SOCRATES: Such, for example, as the relief of itching and other ailments +by scratching, which is the only remedy required. For what in Heaven's +name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us?--Pleasure or +pain? + +PROTARCHUS: A villainous mixture of some kind, Socrates, I should say. + +SOCRATES: I did not introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any +personal reference to Philebus, but because, without the consideration of +these and similar pleasures, we shall not be able to determine the point at +issue. + +PROTARCHUS: Then we had better proceed to analyze this family of +pleasures. + +SOCRATES: You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain? + +PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in the +body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul; while there +are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to soul and body, +which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes +pains. + +PROTARCHUS: How is that? + +SOCRATES: Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, a +man experiences two opposite feelings; for example, when he is cold and is +growing warm, or again, when he is hot and is becoming cool, and he wants +to have the one and be rid of the other;--the sweet has a bitter, as the +common saying is, and both together fasten upon him and create irritation +and in time drive him to distraction. + +PROTARCHUS: That description is very true to nature. + +SOCRATES: And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are +sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Of cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example is +afforded by itching, of which we were just now speaking, and by the +tingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within, and +the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not reach the +parts affected; then if you put them to the fire, and as a last resort +apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense pleasure or pain +in the inner parts, which contrasts and mingles with the pain or pleasure, +as the case may be, of the outer parts; and this is due to the forcible +separation of what is united, or to the union of what is separated, and to +the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the +slight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle, and causes a gentle +irritation; or again, the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an +excitement in him,--he even leaps for joy, he assumes all sorts of +attitudes, he changes all manner of colours, he gasps for breath, and is +quite amazed, and utters the most irrational exclamations. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, indeed. + +SOCRATES: He will say of himself, and others will say of him, that he is +dying with these delights; and the more dissipated and good-for-nothing he +is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every way; of all pleasures he +declares them to be the greatest; and he reckons him who lives in the most +constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of mankind. + +PROTARCHUS: That, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions of +the majority about pleasures. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which arise +out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the body; there +are also cases in which the mind contributes an opposite element to the +body, whether of pleasure or pain, and the two unite and form one mixture. +Concerning these I have already remarked, that when a man is empty he +desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity. But now +I must further add what I omitted before, that in all these and similar +emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they are innumerable), +pleasure and pain coalesce in one. + +PROTARCHUS: I believe that to be quite true. + +SOCRATES: There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures and +pains. + +PROTARCHUS: What is that? + +SOCRATES: The union which, as we were saying, the mind often experiences +of purely mental feelings. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, +emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful +pleasures? need I remind you of the anger + +'Which stirs even a wise man to violence, +And is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb?' + +And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and +bereavement? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, there is a natural connexion between them. + +SOCRATES: And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the +spectators smile through their tears? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly I do. + +SOCRATES: And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a +mixed feeling of pain and pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: I do not quite understand you. + +SOCRATES: I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in +recognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy. + +PROTARCHUS: There is, I think. + +SOCRATES: And the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable is +the examination of it, because the difficulty in detecting other cases of +mixed pleasures and pains will be less. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of +the soul? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of +his neighbours at which he is pleased? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an +evil? + +PROTARCHUS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: From these considerations learn to know the nature of the +ridiculous. + +PROTARCHUS: Explain. + +SOCRATES: The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to +describe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general it is +that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at Delphi. + +PROTARCHUS: You mean, Socrates, 'Know thyself.' + +SOCRATES: I do; and the opposite would be, 'Know not thyself.' + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three. + +PROTARCHUS: Indeed I am afraid that I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will. + +SOCRATES: Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be +shown? + +PROTARCHUS: What are they? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy himself +richer than he is. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is a very common error. + +SOCRATES: And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer +than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he really +has not. + +PROTARCHUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of +the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion. + +SOCRATES: And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of +mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of +contention and lying conceit of wisdom? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And may not all this be truly called an evil condition? + +PROTARCHUS: Very evil. + +SOCRATES: But we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if +we would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure +and pain. + +PROTARCHUS: How can we make the further division which you suggest? + +SOCRATES: All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of +themselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two +classes--one having power and might; and the other the reverse. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who +are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may be +truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be more +truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in the powerul is +hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in +fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth is, +ridiculous. + +PROTARCHUS: That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the +admixture of pleasures and pains. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous +pain? + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the +misfortunes of enemies? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends' +misfortunes--is not that wrong? + +PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly. + +SOCRATES: Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we +enumerated--the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are +ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May we +not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of +mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous? + +PROTARCHUS: They are ridiculous. + +SOCRATES: And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a +misfortune? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly we feel pleasure. + +SOCRATES: And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at +the misfortunes of friends? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our +friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy has +been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant; and so +we envy and laugh at the same instant. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure +and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only on the stage, +but on the greater stage of human life; and so in endless other cases. + +PROTARCHUS: I do not see how any one can deny what you say, Socrates, +however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion. + +SOCRATES: I mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, +and similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a mixture of the +two elements so often named; did I not? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference +only to sorrow and envy and anger. + +PROTARCHUS: I see. + +SOCRATES: Then many other cases still remain? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the +admixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that there +was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love and similar +affections; and I thought that when I had given you the illustration, you +would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a general truth that the +body without the soul, and the soul without the body, as well as the two +united, are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains; +and so further discussion would have been unnecessary. And now I want to +know whether I may depart; or will you keep me here until midnight? I +fancy that I may obtain my release without many words;--if I promise that +to-morrow I will give you an account of all these cases. But at present I +would rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters which +remain to be settled, before the judgment can be given which Philebus +demands. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course. + +SOCRATES: Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their +turn; this is the natural and necessary order. + +PROTARCHUS: Excellent. + +SOCRATES: These, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to indicate; for with +the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, +I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as witnesses, that there +are pleasures which seem only and are not, and there are others again which +have great power and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled with pains, +and are partly alleviations of agony and distress, both of body and mind. + +PROTARCHUS: Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in +conceiving to be true? + +SOCRATES: True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and +form, and most of those which arise from smells; those of sound, again, and +in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and of +which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with +pain. + +PROTARCHUS: Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean. + +SOCRATES: My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be +plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or +pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, says the +argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane +or solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers +and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively +beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely +beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of +scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character, and +have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning? + +PROTARCHUS: I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will +try to make your meaning clearer. + +SOCRATES: When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, +then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, +and have natural pleasures associated with them. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, there are such pleasures. + +SOCRATES: The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they +have no necessary admixture of pain; and all pleasures, however and +wherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an +analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand. + +SOCRATES: To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger +of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them. + +PROTARCHUS: And this is the case. + +SOCRATES: Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his knowledge, +are there not pains of forgetting? + +PROTARCHUS: Not necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, when he +feels grief at the loss of his knowledge. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the +natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection. + +PROTARCHUS: In that case you are right in saying that the loss of +knowledge is not attended with pain. + +SOCRATES: These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain; and +they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those +which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description +of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that +those which are not in excess have measure; the great, the excessive, +whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in referring to the class +of the infinite, and of the more and less, which pours through body and +soul alike; and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, +greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth? + +PROTARCHUS: Why do you ask, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and +knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and +impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for +judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me and +by all of us. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Let us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for +consideration a single instance. + +PROTARCHUS: What instance shall we select? + +SOCRATES: Suppose that we first of all take whiteness. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that +purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most +unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly that which is most unadulterated. + +SOCRATES: True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest +or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful? + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white +is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed. + +PROTARCHUS: Perfectly right. + +SOCRATES: There is no need of adducing many similar examples in +illustration of the argument about pleasure; one such is sufficient to +prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure or +unalloyed with pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a great +pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind. + +PROTARCHUS: Assuredly; and the instance you have given is quite +sufficient. + +SOCRATES: But what do you say of another question:--have we not heard that +pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do not certain +ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be grateful +to them? + +PROTARCHUS: What do they mean? + +SOCRATES: I will explain to you, my dear Protarchus, what they mean, by +putting a question. + +PROTARCHUS: Ask, and I will answer. + +SOCRATES: I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and the +other ever in want of something. + +PROTARCHUS: What manner of natures are they? + +SOCRATES: The one majestic ever, the other inferior. + +PROTARCHUS: You speak riddles. + +SOCRATES: You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of +them. + +PROTARCHUS: I should think so. + +SOCRATES: Search the universe for two terms which are like these two and +are present everywhere. + +PROTARCHUS: Yet a third time I must say, Be a little plainer, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: There is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in +play, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something else +(relatives), and that other things are the ends to which the former class +subserve (absolutes). + +PROTARCHUS: Your many repetitions make me slow to understand. + +SOCRATES: As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning +will become clearer. + +PROTARCHUS: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Here are two new principles. + +PROTARCHUS: What are they? + +SOCRATES: One is the generation of all things, and the other is essence. + +PROTARCHUS: I readily accept from you both generation and essence. + +SOCRATES: Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake of +essence, or essence for the sake of generation? + +PROTARCHUS: You want to know whether that which is called essence is, +properly speaking, for the sake of generation? + +SOCRATES: Yes. + +PROTARCHUS: By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question. + +SOCRATES: I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me that +ship-building is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of ship- +building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question. + +PROTARCHUS: Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I have no objection, but you must take your part. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, material, +are given to us with a view to generation, and that each generation is +relative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence, and that the whole +of generation is relative to the whole of essence. + +PROTARCHUS: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sake +of some essence? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And that for the sake of which something else is done must be +placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of +something else, in some other class, my good friend. + +PROTARCHUS: Most certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in +some other class than that of good? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + +SOCRATES: Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him +who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had no true +being at all; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of pleasure +being a good. + +PROTARCHUS: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation +their highest end. + +PROTARCHUS: Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean? + +SOCRATES: I am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or +thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted at +the process as if it were pleasure; and they say that they would not wish +to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which might be +mentioned. + +PROTARCHUS: That is certainly what they appear to think. + +SOCRATES: And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite +of generation? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation and +destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we were +saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible +thought. + +PROTARCHUS: He who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is involved +in great absurdities, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Great, indeed; and there is yet another of them. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good +or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the soul +only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure; and that courage or +temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul, is not really a +good?--and is there not yet a further absurdity in our being compelled to +say that he who has a feeling of pain and not of pleasure is bad at the +time when he is suffering pain, even though he be the best of men; and +again, that he who has a feeling of pleasure, in so far as he is pleased at +the time when he is pleased, in that degree excels in virtue? + +PROTARCHUS: Nothing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this. + +SOCRATES: And now, having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let us +not appear to be too sparing of mind and knowledge: let us ring their +metal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part, until we have +found out what in them is of the purest nature; and then the truest +elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up for judgment. + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: Knowledge has two parts,--the one productive, and the other +educational? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And in the productive or handicraft arts, is not one part more +akin to knowledge, and the other less; and may not the one part be regarded +as the pure, and the other as the impure? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of +them. + +PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how do you separate them? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing be +taken away from any art, that which remains will not be much. + +PROTARCHUS: Not much, certainly. + +SOCRATES: The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of the +senses which is given by experience and practice, in addition to a certain +power of guessing, which is commonly called art, and is perfected by +attention and pains. + +PROTARCHUS: Nothing more, assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism; for sounds are +harmonized, not by measure, but by skilful conjecture; the music of the +flute is always trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating note, and is +therefore mixed up with much that is doubtful and has little which is +certain. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And the same will be found to hold good of medicine and +husbandry and piloting and generalship. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: The art of the builder, on the other hand, which uses a number +of measures and instruments, attains by their help to a greater degree of +accuracy than the other arts. + +PROTARCHUS: How is that? + +SOCRATES: In ship-building and house-building, and in other branches of +the art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, compass, line, +and a most ingenious machine for straightening wood. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then now let us divide the arts of which we were speaking into +two kinds,--the arts which, like music, are less exact in their results, +and those which, like carpentering, are more exact. + +PROTARCHUS: Let us make that division. + +SOCRATES: Of the latter class, the most exact of all are those which we +just now spoke of as primary. + +PROTARCHUS: I see that you mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of +weighing and measuring. + +SOCRATES: Certainly, Protarchus; but are not these also distinguishable +into two kinds? + +PROTARCHUS: What are the two kinds? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, arithmetic is of two kinds, one of which is +popular, and the other philosophical. + +PROTARCHUS: How would you distinguish them? + +SOCRATES: There is a wide difference between them, Protarchus; some +arithmeticians reckon unequal units; as for example, two armies, two oxen, +two very large things or two very small things. The party who are opposed +to them insist that every unit in ten thousand must be the same as every +other unit. + +PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly there is, as you say, a great difference among the +votaries of the science; and there may be reasonably supposed to be two +sorts of arithmetic. + +SOCRATES: And when we compare the art of mensuration which is used in +building with philosophical geometry, or the art of computation which is +used in trading with exact calculation, shall we say of either of the pairs +that it is one or two? + +PROTARCHUS: On the analogy of what has preceded, I should be of opinion +that they were severally two. + +SOCRATES: Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject? + +PROTARCHUS: I think so, but I should like to be told by you. + +SOCRATES: The argument has all along been seeking a parallel to pleasure, +and true to that original design, has gone on to ask whether one sort of +knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another. + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly; that was the intention. + +SOCRATES: And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown +that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of +certainty? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And just now did not the argument first designate a particular +art by a common term, thus making us believe in the unity of that art; and +then again, as if speaking of two different things, proceed to enquire +whether the art as pursed by philosophers, or as pursued by non- +philosophers, has more of certainty and purity? + +PROTARCHUS: That is the very question which the argument is asking. + +SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry? + +PROTARCHUS: O Socrates, we have reached a point at which the difference of +clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous. + +SOCRATES: Then the answer will be the easier. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly; and let us say in reply, that those arts into which +arithmetic and mensuration enter, far surpass all others; and that of these +the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure philosophic impulse are +infinitely superior in accuracy and truth. + +SOCRATES: Then this is your judgment; and this is the answer which, upon +your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of +misinterpretation? + +PROTARCHUS: What answer? + +SOCRATES: That there are two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration; +and also several other arts which in like manner have this double nature, +and yet only one name. + +PROTARCHUS: Let us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you +speak, Socrates, and hope for good luck. + +SOCRATES: We have explained what we term the most exact arts or sciences. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: And yet, Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us, if +we do not award to her the first place. + +PROTARCHUS: And pray, what is dialectic? + +SOCRATES: Clearly the science which has to do with all that knowledge of +which we are now speaking; for I am sure that all men who have a grain of +intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and +reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of all. +But how would you decide this question, Protarchus? + +PROTARCHUS: I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art of +persuasion far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far the best +of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their +own free will. Now, I should not like to quarrel either with you or with +him. + +SOCRATES: You mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were not +ashamed? + +PROTARCHUS: As you please. + +SOCRATES: May I not have led you into a misapprehension? + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: Dear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best or +usefullest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and accuracy, and +the greatest amount of truth, however humble and little useful an art. And +as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that his art has the advantage in +usefulness to mankind, he will not quarrel with you for saying that the +study of which I am speaking is superior in this particular of essential +truth; as in the comparison of white colours, a little whiteness, if that +little be only pure, was said to be superior in truth to a great mass which +is impure. And now let us give our best attention and consider well, not +the comparative use or reputation of the sciences, but the power or +faculty, if there be such, which the soul has of loving the truth, and of +doing all things for the sake of it; let us search into the pure element of +mind and intelligence, and then we shall be able to say whether the science +of which I have been speaking is most likely to possess the faculty, or +whether there be some other which has higher claims. + +PROTARCHUS: Well, I have been considering, and I can hardly think that any +other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this. + +SOCRATES: Do you say so because you observe that the arts in general and +those engaged in them make use of opinion, and are resolutely engaged in +the investigation of matters of opinion? Even he who supposes himself to +be occupied with nature is really occupied with the things of this world, +how created, how acting or acted upon. Is not this the sort of enquiry in +which his life is spent? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: He is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things which +are becoming, or which will or have become. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor +have been nor will be unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule of truth +ever become certain? + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no +fixedness? + +PROTARCHUS: How indeed? + +SOCRATES: Then mind and science when employed about such changing things +do not attain the highest truth? + +PROTARCHUS: I should imagine not. + +SOCRATES: And now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or +Philebus or Gorgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single point. + +PROTARCHUS: What point? + +SOCRATES: Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has +to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or if +not, at any rate what is most akin to them has; and that all other things +are to be placed in a second or inferior class. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to +be given to the fairest things? + +PROTARCHUS: That is natural. + +SOCRATES: And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured +most? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And these names may be said to have their truest and most exact +application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of +pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: In the next place, as to the mixture, here are the ingredients, +pleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who have their +materials ready to their hands. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And now we must begin to mix them? + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our +memories? + +PROTARCHUS: Of what? + +SOCRATES: Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb, +that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is good. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I +believe to be a fair summary of the argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living +beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief good +of all, and that the two names 'good' and 'pleasant' are correctly given to +one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins by denying +this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are two, and that +wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was not this +what we were saying, Protarchus? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And is there not and was there not a further point which was +conceded between us? + +PROTARCHUS: What was it? + +SOCRATES: That the good differs from all other things. + +PROTARCHUS: In what respect? + +SOCRATES: In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in +all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of +anything else. + +PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of +wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure +was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part +whatever in pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: We did. + +SOCRATES: And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take up +the enquiry again and set us right; and assuming memory and wisdom and +knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider +whether he would desire to possess or acquire,--I will not say pleasure, +however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that he is +pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection, +however momentary, of the feeling,--but would he desire to have anything at +all, if these faculties were wanting to him? And about wisdom I ask the +same question; can you conceive that any one would choose to have all +wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than with a certain degree of +pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than with a certain +degree of wisdom? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any +more? + +SOCRATES: Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good +cannot possibly be either of them? + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less +accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be duly +assigned. + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: Have we not found a road which leads towards the good? + +PROTARCHUS: What road? + +SOCRATES: Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover in +what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the discovery +of the man himself? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning, that +we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in +the life which is well mixed than in that which is not? + +PROTARCHUS: Far greater. + +SOCRATES: Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up +a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who presides over +the ceremony of mingling. + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Are not we the cup-bearers? and here are two fountains which are +flowing at our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a fountain +of honey; the other, wisdom, a sober draught in which no wine mingles, is +of water unpleasant but healthful; out of these we must seek to make the +fairest of all possible mixtures. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Tell me first;--should we be most likely to succeed if we +mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom? + +PROTARCHUS: Perhaps we might. + +SOCRATES: But I should be afraid of the risk, and I think that I can show +a safer plan. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and +one art to be more exact than another. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; some of +them regarding only the transient and perishing, and others the permanent +and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when judged by the +standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, were truer than the former. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good and right. + +SOCRATES: If, then, we were to begin by mingling the sections of each +class which have the most of truth, will not the union suffice to give us +the loveliest of lives, or shall we still want some elements of another +kind? + +PROTARCHUS: I think that we ought to do what you suggest. + +SOCRATES: Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and has reason as +well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other +things. + +PROTARCHUS: We will suppose such a man. + +SOCRATES: Will he have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only with +the divine circle and sphere, and knows nothing of our human spheres and +circles, but uses only divine circles and measures in the building of a +house? + +PROTARCHUS: The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is +ridiculous in man. + +SOCRATES: What do you mean? Do you mean that you are to throw into the +cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false measure +and the false circle? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, we must, if any of us is ever to find his way home. + +SOCRATES: And am I to include music, which, as I was saying just now, is +full of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, I think that you must, if human life is to be a life at +all. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper who +is pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door wide, and let knowledge +of every sort stream in, and the pure mingle with the impure? + +PROTARCHUS: I do not know, Socrates, that any great harm would come of +having them all, if only you have the first sort. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, shall I let them all flow into what Homer poetically +terms 'a meeting of the waters'? + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: There--I have let them in, and now I must return to the fountain +of pleasure. For we were not permitted to begin by mingling in a single +stream the true portions of both according to our original intention; but +the love of all knowledge constrained us to let all the sciences flow in +together before the pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And now the time has come for us to consider about the pleasures +also, whether we shall in like manner let them go all at once, or at first +only the true ones. + +PROTARCHUS: It will be by far the safer course to let flow the true ones +first. + +SOCRATES: Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary +pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle +them? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes; the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to +mingle. + +SOCRATES: The knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent and +useful always; and if we say of pleasures in like manner that all of them +are good and innocent for all of us at all times, we must let them all +mingle? + +PROTARCHUS: What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take? + +SOCRATES: Do not ask me, Protarchus; but ask the daughters of pleasure and +wisdom to answer for themselves. + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: Tell us, O beloved--shall we call you pleasures or by some other +name?--would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of opinion that +they would certainly answer as follows: + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: They would answer, as we said before, that for any single class +to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether +possible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with another +and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of things in +general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that may be, of ourselves +in every respect. + +PROTARCHUS: And our answer will be:--In that ye have spoken well. + +SOCRATES: Very true. And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and +mind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they will +reply:--'What pleasures do you mean?' + +PROTARCHUS: Likely enough. + +SOCRATES: And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have +the greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition to +the true ones? 'Why, Socrates,' they will say, 'how can we? seeing that +they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us; they trouble the +souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness; they prevent us +from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of the children which +are born to us, causing them to be forgotten and unheeded; but the true and +pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our family, and also +those pleasures which accompany health and temperance, and which every +Virtue, like a goddess, has in her train to follow her about wherever she +goes,--mingle these and not the others; there would be great want of sense +in any one who desires to see a fair and perfect mixture, and to find in it +what is the highest good in man and in the universe, and to divine what is +the true form of good--there would be great want of sense in his allowing +the pleasures, which are always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle +with mind in the cup.'--Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, +which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well as on the behalf of +memory and true opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: Most certainly. + +SOCRATES: And still there must be something more added, which is a +necessary ingredient in every mixture. + +PROTARCHUS: What is that? + +SOCRATES: Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be +created or subsist. + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: Quite impossible; and now you and Philebus must tell me whether +anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking the +argument is now completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which +is going to hold fair rule over a living body. + +PROTARCHUS: I agree with you, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule +of the habitation of the good? + +PROTARCHUS: I think that we are. + +SOCRATES: What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and +which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by +all? When we have discovered it, we will proceed to ask whether this +omnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge. + +SOCRATES: And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders any +mixture either of the highest value or of none at all. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Every man knows it. + +PROTARCHUS: What? + +SOCRATES: He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture +whatever must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and to the +mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a confused medley which +brings confusion on the possessor of it. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the +beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world +over. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, +with three we may catch our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the three, +and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of the mixture, +and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion of them. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + +SOCRATES: And now, Protarchus, any man could decide well enough whether +pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more honourable +among gods and men. + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to +the end. + +SOCRATES: We must take each of them separately in their relation to +pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to which of +the two they are severally most akin. + +PROTARCHUS: You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after passing in review +mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to yourself--as to +whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth. + +PROTARCHUS: There is no need to pause, for the difference between them is +palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and it is said +that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest, perjury is +excused by the gods; for pleasures, like children, have not the least +particle of reason in them; whereas mind is either the same as truth, or +the most like truth, and the truest. + +SOCRATES: Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether +pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Here is another question which may be easily answered; for I +imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of +pleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but there still remains the third test: Has mind a +greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer +of the two? + +PROTARCHUS: No one, Socrates, either awake or dreaming, ever saw or +imagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly, at any time, past, +present, or future. + +SOCRATES: Right. + +PROTARCHUS: But when we see some one indulging in pleasures, perhaps in +the greatest of pleasures, the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the +action makes us ashamed; and so we put them out of sight, and consign them +to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day. + +SOCRATES: Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere, by word of mouth +to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and wide, that +pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second, but that in +measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the like, the eternal nature +has been found. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said. + +SOCRATES: In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful +and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if you reckon in the third dass mind and wisdom, you will +not be far wrong, if I divine aright. + +PROTARCHUS: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we +were affirming to appertain specially to the soul--sciences and arts and +true opinions as we called them? These come after the third class, and +form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is. + +PROTARCHUS: Surely. + +SOCRATES: The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us as +painless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed them, +which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses. + +PROTARCHUS: Perhaps. + +SOCRATES: And now, as Orpheus says, + +'With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song.' + +Here, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to set +the crown on our discourse. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said, thus +offering the third libation to the saviour Zeus. + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely the +good. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you +spoke, meant a recapitulation. + +SOCRATES: Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just +been saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, which is maintained, +not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind was +far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than +pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: But, suspecting that there were other things which were also +better, I went on to say that if there was anything better than either, +then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure +would lose the second place as well as the first. + +PROTARCHUS: You did. + +SOCRATES: Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the +unsatisfactory nature of both of them. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good +have been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both +wanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: But, though they must both resign in favour of another, mind is +ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror than +pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And, according to the judgment which has now been given, +pleasure will rank fifth. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: But not first; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and +animals in the world by their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her to be so;-- +although the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, determine +that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts of animals to +be better witnesses than the inspirations of divine philosophy. + +PROTARCHUS: And now, Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you have +been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us. + +SOCRATES: And will you let me go? + +PROTARCHUS: There is a little which yet remains, and I will remind you of +it, for I am sure that you will not be the first to go away from an +argument. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Philebus by Plato + diff --git a/old/philb10.zip b/old/philb10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..b2e5ac1 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/philb10.zip |