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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + + + + +PHILEBUS + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + +The Philebus appears to be one of the later writings of Plato, in which the +style has begun to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has become +subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the development of +abstract thought great advances have been made on the Protagoras or the +Phaedrus, and even on the Republic. But there is a corresponding +diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a +laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and +incompleteness in the general design. As in the speeches of Thucydides, +the multiplication of ideas seems to interfere with the power of +expression. Instead of the equally diffused grace and ease of the earlier +dialogues there occur two or three highly-wrought passages; instead of the +ever-flowing play of humour, now appearing, now concealed, but always +present, are inserted a good many bad jests, as we may venture to term +them. We may observe an attempt at artificial ornament, and far-fetched +modes of expression; also clamorous demands on the part of his companions, +that Socrates shall answer his own questions, as well as other defects of +style, which remind us of the Laws. The connection is often abrupt and +inharmonious, and far from clear. Many points require further explanation; +e.g. the reference of pleasure to the indefinite class, compared with the +assertion which almost immediately follows, that pleasure and pain +naturally have their seat in the third or mixed class: these two +statements are unreconciled. In like manner, the table of goods does not +distinguish between the two heads of measure and symmetry; and though a +hint is given that the divine mind has the first place, nothing is said of +this in the final summing up. The relation of the goods to the sciences +does not appear; though dialectic may be thought to correspond to the +highest good, the sciences and arts and true opinions are enumerated in the +fourth class. We seem to have an intimation of a further discussion, in +which some topics lightly passed over were to receive a fuller +consideration. The various uses of the word 'mixed,' for the mixed life, +the mixed class of elements, the mixture of pleasures, or of pleasure and +pain, are a further source of perplexity. Our ignorance of the opinions +which Plato is attacking is also an element of obscurity. Many things in a +controversy might seem relevant, if we knew to what they were intended to +refer. But no conjecture will enable us to supply what Plato has not told +us; or to explain, from our fragmentary knowledge of them, the relation in +which his doctrine stood to the Eleatic Being or the Megarian good, or to +the theories of Aristippus or Antisthenes respecting pleasure. Nor are we +able to say how far Plato in the Philebus conceives the finite and infinite +(which occur both in the fragments of Philolaus and in the Pythagorean +table of opposites) in the same manner as contemporary Pythagoreans. + +There is little in the characters which is worthy of remark. The Socrates +of the Philebus is devoid of any touch of Socratic irony, though here, as +in the Phaedrus, he twice attributes the flow of his ideas to a sudden +inspiration. The interlocutor Protarchus, the son of Callias, who has been +a hearer of Gorgias, is supposed to begin as a disciple of the partisans of +pleasure, but is drawn over to the opposite side by the arguments of +Socrates. The instincts of ingenuous youth are easily induced to take the +better part. Philebus, who has withdrawn from the argument, is several +times brought back again, that he may support pleasure, of which he remains +to the end the uncompromising advocate. On the other hand, the youthful +group of listeners by whom he is surrounded, 'Philebus' boys' as they are +termed, whose presence is several times intimated, are described as all of +them at last convinced by the arguments of Socrates. They bear a very +faded resemblance to the interested audiences of the Charmides, Lysis, or +Protagoras. Other signs of relation to external life in the dialogue, or +references to contemporary things and persons, with the single exception of +the allusions to the anonymous enemies of pleasure, and the teachers of the +flux, there are none. + +The omission of the doctrine of recollection, derived from a previous state +of existence, is a note of progress in the philosophy of Plato. The +transcendental theory of pre-existent ideas, which is chiefly discussed by +him in the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Phaedrus, has given way to a +psychological one. The omission is rendered more significant by his having +occasion to speak of memory as the basis of desire. Of the ideas he treats +in the same sceptical spirit which appears in his criticism of them in the +Parmenides. He touches on the same difficulties and he gives no answer to +them. His mode of speaking of the analytical and synthetical processes may +be compared with his discussion of the same subject in the Phaedrus; here +he dwells on the importance of dividing the genera into all the species, +while in the Phaedrus he conveys the same truth in a figure, when he speaks +of carving the whole, which is described under the image of a victim, into +parts or members, 'according to their natural articulation, without +breaking any of them.' There is also a difference, which may be noted, +between the two dialogues. For whereas in the Phaedrus, and also in the +Symposium, the dialectician is described as a sort of enthusiast or lover, +in the Philebus, as in all the later writings of Plato, the element of love +is wanting; the topic is only introduced, as in the Republic, by way of +illustration. On other subjects of which they treat in common, such as the +nature and kinds of pleasure, true and false opinion, the nature of the +good, the order and relation of the sciences, the Republic is less advanced +than the Philebus, which contains, perhaps, more metaphysical truth more +obscurely expressed than any other Platonic dialogue. Here, as Plato +expressly tells us, he is 'forging weapons of another make,' i.e. new +categories and modes of conception, though 'some of the old ones might do +again.' + +But if superior in thought and dialectical power, the Philebus falls very +far short of the Republic in fancy and feeling. The development of the +reason undisturbed by the emotions seems to be the ideal at which Plato +aims in his later dialogues. There is no mystic enthusiasm or rapturous +contemplation of ideas. Whether we attribute this change to the greater +feebleness of age, or to the development of the quarrel between philosophy +and poetry in Plato's own mind, or perhaps, in some degree, to a +carelessness about artistic effect, when he was absorbed in abstract ideas, +we can hardly be wrong in assuming, amid such a variety of indications, +derived from style as well as subject, that the Philebus belongs to the +later period of his life and authorship. But in this, as in all the later +writings of Plato, there are not wanting thoughts and expressions in which +he rises to his highest level. + +The plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, the want of plan renders the +progress of the dialogue difficult to follow. A few leading ideas seem to +emerge: the relation of the one and many, the four original elements, the +kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge, the scale of goods. These are +only partially connected with one another. The dialogue is not rightly +entitled 'Concerning pleasure' or 'Concerning good,' but should rather be +described as treating of the relations of pleasure and knowledge, after +they have been duly analyzed, to the good. (1) The question is asked, +whether pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or some nature higher than +either; and if the latter, how pleasure and wisdom are related to this +higher good. (2) Before we can reply with exactness, we must know the kinds +of pleasure and the kinds of knowledge. (3) But still we may affirm +generally, that the combined life of pleasure and wisdom or knowledge has +more of the character of the good than either of them when isolated. (4) +to determine which of them partakes most of the higher nature, we must know +under which of the four unities or elements they respectively fall. These +are, first, the infinite; secondly, the finite; thirdly, the union of the +two; fourthly, the cause of the union. Pleasure is of the first, wisdom or +knowledge of the third class, while reason or mind is akin to the fourth or +highest. + +(5) Pleasures are of two kinds, the mixed and unmixed. Of mixed pleasures +there are three classes--(a) those in which both the pleasures and pains +are corporeal, as in eating and hunger; (b) those in which there is a pain +of the body and pleasure of the mind, as when you are hungry and are +looking forward to a feast; (c) those in which the pleasure and pain are +both mental. Of unmixed pleasures there are four kinds: those of sight, +hearing, smell, knowledge. + +(6) The sciences are likewise divided into two classes, theoretical and +productive: of the latter, one part is pure, the other impure. The pure +part consists of arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing. Arts like +carpentering, which have an exact measure, are to be regarded as higher +than music, which for the most part is mere guess-work. But there is also +a higher arithmetic, and a higher mensuration, which is exclusively +theoretical; and a dialectical science, which is higher still and the +truest and purest knowledge. + +(7) We are now able to determine the composition of the perfect life. +First, we admit the pure pleasures and the pure sciences; secondly, the +impure sciences, but not the impure pleasures. We have next to discover +what element of goodness is contained in this mixture. There are three +criteria of goodness--beauty, symmetry, truth. These are clearly more akin +to reason than to pleasure, and will enable us to fix the places of both of +them in the scale of good. First in the scale is measure; the second place +is assigned to symmetry; the third, to reason and wisdom; the fourth, to +knowledge and true opinion; the fifth, to pure pleasures; and here the Muse +says 'Enough.' + +'Bidding farewell to Philebus and Socrates,' we may now consider the +metaphysical conceptions which are presented to us. These are (I) the +paradox of unity and plurality; (II) the table of categories or elements; +(III) the kinds of pleasure; (IV) the kinds of knowledge; (V) the +conception of the good. We may then proceed to examine (VI) the relation +of the Philebus to the Republic, and to other dialogues. + +I. The paradox of the one and many originated in the restless dialectic of +Zeno, who sought to prove the absolute existence of the one by showing the +contradictions that are involved in admitting the existence of the many +(compare Parm.). Zeno illustrated the contradiction by well-known examples +taken from outward objects. But Socrates seems to intimate that the time +had arrived for discarding these hackneyed illustrations; such difficulties +had long been solved by common sense ('solvitur ambulando'); the fact of +the co-existence of opposites was a sufficient answer to them. He will +leave them to Cynics and Eristics; the youth of Athens may discourse of +them to their parents. To no rational man could the circumstance that the +body is one, but has many members, be any longer a stumbling-block. + +Plato's difficulty seems to begin in the region of ideas. He cannot +understand how an absolute unity, such as the Eleatic Being, can be broken +up into a number of individuals, or be in and out of them at once. +Philosophy had so deepened or intensified the nature of one or Being, by +the thoughts of successive generations, that the mind could no longer +imagine 'Being' as in a state of change or division. To say that the verb +of existence is the copula, or that unity is a mere unit, is to us easy; +but to the Greek in a particular stage of thought such an analysis involved +the same kind of difficulty as the conception of God existing both in and +out of the world would to ourselves. Nor was he assisted by the analogy of +sensible objects. The sphere of mind was dark and mysterious to him; but +instead of being illustrated by sense, the greatest light appeared to be +thrown on the nature of ideas when they were contrasted with sense. + +Both here and in the Parmenides, where similar difficulties are raised, +Plato seems prepared to desert his ancient ground. He cannot tell the +relation in which abstract ideas stand to one another, and therefore he +transfers the one and many out of his transcendental world, and proceeds to +lay down practical rules for their application to different branches of +knowledge. As in the Republic he supposes the philosopher to proceed by +regular steps, until he arrives at the idea of good; as in the Sophist and +Politicus he insists that in dividing the whole into its parts we should +bisect in the middle in the hope of finding species; as in the Phaedrus +(see above) he would have 'no limb broken' of the organism of knowledge;-- +so in the Philebus he urges the necessity of filling up all the +intermediate links which occur (compare Bacon's 'media axiomata') in the +passage from unity to infinity. With him the idea of science may be said +to anticipate science; at a time when the sciences were not yet divided, he +wants to impress upon us the importance of classification; neither +neglecting the many individuals, nor attempting to count them all, but +finding the genera and species under which they naturally fall. Here, +then, and in the parallel passages of the Phaedrus and of the Sophist, is +found the germ of the most fruitful notion of modern science. + +Plato describes with ludicrous exaggeration the influence exerted by the +one and many on the minds of young men in their first fervour of +metaphysical enthusiasm (compare Republic). But they are none the less an +everlasting quality of reason or reasoning which never grows old in us. At +first we have but a confused conception of them, analogous to the eyes +blinking at the light in the Republic. To this Plato opposes the +revelation from Heaven of the real relations of them, which some +Prometheus, who gave the true fire from heaven, is supposed to have +imparted to us. Plato is speaking of two things--(1) the crude notion of +the one and many, which powerfully affects the ordinary mind when first +beginning to think; (2) the same notion when cleared up by the help of +dialectic. + +To us the problem of the one and many has lost its chief interest and +perplexity. We readily acknowledge that a whole has many parts, that the +continuous is also the divisible, that in all objects of sense there is a +one and many, and that a like principle may be applied to analogy to purely +intellectual conceptions. If we attend to the meaning of the words, we are +compelled to admit that two contradictory statements are true. But the +antinomy is so familiar as to be scarcely observed by us. Our sense of the +contradiction, like Plato's, only begins in a higher sphere, when we speak +of necessity and free-will, of mind and body, of Three Persons and One +Substance, and the like. The world of knowledge is always dividing more +and more; every truth is at first the enemy of every other truth. Yet +without this division there can be no truth; nor any complete truth without +the reunion of the parts into a whole. And hence the coexistence of +opposites in the unity of the idea is regarded by Hegel as the supreme +principle of philosophy; and the law of contradiction, which is affirmed by +logicians to be an ultimate principle of the human mind, is displaced by +another law, which asserts the coexistence of contradictories as imperfect +and divided elements of the truth. Without entering further into the +depths of Hegelianism, we may remark that this and all similar attempts to +reconcile antinomies have their origin in the old Platonic problem of the +'One and Many.' + +II. 1. The first of Plato's categories or elements is the infinite. This +is the negative of measure or limit; the unthinkable, the unknowable; of +which nothing can be affirmed; the mixture or chaos which preceded distinct +kinds in the creation of the world; the first vague impression of sense; +the more or less which refuses to be reduced to rule, having certain +affinities with evil, with pleasure, with ignorance, and which in the scale +of being is farthest removed from the beautiful and good. To a Greek of +the age of Plato, the idea of an infinite mind would have been an +absurdity. He would have insisted that 'the good is of the nature of the +finite,' and that the infinite is a mere negative, which is on the level of +sensation, and not of thought. He was aware that there was a distinction +between the infinitely great and the infinitely small, but he would have +equally denied the claim of either to true existence. Of that positive +infinity, or infinite reality, which we attribute to God, he had no +conception. + +The Greek conception of the infinite would be more truly described, in our +way of speaking, as the indefinite. To us, the notion of infinity is +subsequent rather than prior to the finite, expressing not absolute vacancy +or negation, but only the removal of limit or restraint, which we suppose +to exist not before but after we have already set bounds to thought and +matter, and divided them after their kinds. From different points of view, +either the finite or infinite may be looked upon respectively both as +positive and negative (compare 'Omnis determinatio est negatio')' and the +conception of the one determines that of the other. The Greeks and the +moderns seem to be nearly at the opposite poles in their manner of +regarding them. And both are surprised when they make the discovery, as +Plato has done in the Sophist, how large an element negation forms in the +framework of their thoughts. + +2, 3. The finite element which mingles with and regulates the infinite is +best expressed to us by the word 'law.' It is that which measures all +things and assigns to them their limit; which preserves them in their +natural state, and brings them within the sphere of human cognition. This +is described by the terms harmony, health, order, perfection, and the like. +All things, in as far as they are good, even pleasures, which are for the +most part indefinite, partake of this element. We should be wrong in +attributing to Plato the conception of laws of nature derived from +observation and experiment. And yet he has as intense a conviction as any +modern philosopher that nature does not proceed by chance. But observing +that the wonderful construction of number and figure, which he had within +himself, and which seemed to be prior to himself, explained a part of the +phenomena of the external world, he extended their principles to the whole, +finding in them the true type both of human life and of the order of +nature. + +Two other points may be noticed respecting the third class. First, that +Plato seems to be unconscious of any interval or chasm which separates the +finite from the infinite. The one is in various ways and degrees working +in the other. Hence he has implicitly answered the difficulty with which +he started, of how the one could remain one and yet be divided among many +individuals, or 'how ideas could be in and out of themselves,' and the +like. Secondly, that in this mixed class we find the idea of beauty. +Good, when exhibited under the aspect of measure or symmetry, becomes +beauty. And if we translate his language into corresponding modern terms, +we shall not be far wrong in saying that here, as well as in the Republic, +Plato conceives beauty under the idea of proportion. + +4. Last and highest in the list of principles or elements is the cause of +the union of the finite and infinite, to which Plato ascribes the order of +the world. Reasoning from man to the universe, he argues that as there is +a mind in the one, there must be a mind in the other, which he identifies +with the royal mind of Zeus. This is the first cause of which 'our +ancestors spoke,' as he says, appealing to tradition, in the Philebus as +well as in the Timaeus. The 'one and many' is also supposed to have been +revealed by tradition. For the mythical element has not altogether +disappeared. + +Some characteristic differences may here be noted, which distinguish the +ancient from the modern mode of conceiving God. + +a. To Plato, the idea of God or mind is both personal and impersonal. Nor +in ascribing, as appears to us, both these attributes to him, and in +speaking of God both in the masculine and neuter gender, did he seem to +himself inconsistent. For the difference between the personal and +impersonal was not marked to him as to ourselves. We make a fundamental +distinction between a thing and a person, while to Plato, by the help of +various intermediate abstractions, such as end, good, cause, they appear +almost to meet in one, or to be two aspects of the same. Hence, without +any reconciliation or even remark, in the Republic he speaks at one time of +God or Gods, and at another time of the Good. So in the Phaedrus he seems +to pass unconsciously from the concrete to the abstract conception of the +Ideas in the same dialogue. Nor in the Philebus is he careful to show in +what relation the idea of the divine mind stands to the supreme principle +of measure. + +b. Again, to us there is a strongly-marked distinction between a first +cause and a final cause. And we should commonly identify a first cause +with God, and the final cause with the world, which is His work. But +Plato, though not a Pantheist, and very far from confounding God with the +world, tends to identify the first with the final cause. The cause of the +union of the finite and infinite might be described as a higher law; the +final measure which is the highest expression of the good may also be +described as the supreme law. Both these conceptions are realized chiefly +by the help of the material world; and therefore when we pass into the +sphere of ideas can hardly be distinguished. + +The four principles are required for the determination of the relative +places of pleasure and wisdom. Plato has been saying that we should +proceed by regular steps from the one to the many. Accordingly, before +assigning the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first find out +and arrange in order the general principles of things. Mind is ascertained +to be akin to the nature of the cause, while pleasure is found in the +infinite or indefinite class. We may now proceed to divide pleasure and +knowledge after their kinds. + +III. 1. Plato speaks of pleasure as indefinite, as relative, as a +generation, and in all these points of view as in a category distinct from +good. For again we must repeat, that to the Greek 'the good is of the +nature of the finite,' and, like virtue, either is, or is nearly allied to, +knowledge. The modern philosopher would remark that the indefinite is +equally real with the definite. Health and mental qualities are in the +concrete undefined; they are nevertheless real goods, and Plato rightly +regards them as falling under the finite class. Again, we are able to +define objects or ideas, not in so far as they are in the mind, but in so +far as they are manifested externally, and can therefore be reduced to rule +and measure. And if we adopt the test of definiteness, the pleasures of +the body are more capable of being defined than any other pleasures. As in +art and knowledge generally, we proceed from without inwards, beginning +with facts of sense, and passing to the more ideal conceptions of mental +pleasure, happiness, and the like. + +2. Pleasure is depreciated as relative, while good is exalted as absolute. +But this distinction seems to arise from an unfair mode of regarding them; +the abstract idea of the one is compared with the concrete experience of +the other. For all pleasure and all knowledge may be viewed either +abstracted from the mind, or in relation to the mind (compare Aristot. Nic. +Ethics). The first is an idea only, which may be conceived as absolute and +unchangeable, and then the abstract idea of pleasure will be equally +unchangeable with that of knowledge. But when we come to view either as +phenomena of consciousness, the same defects are for the most part incident +to both of them. Our hold upon them is equally transient and uncertain; +the mind cannot be always in a state of intellectual tension, any more than +capable of feeling pleasure always. The knowledge which is at one time +clear and distinct, at another seems to fade away, just as the pleasure of +health after sickness, or of eating after hunger, soon passes into a +neutral state of unconsciousness and indifference. Change and alternation +are necessary for the mind as well as for the body; and in this is to be +acknowledged, not an element of evil, but rather a law of nature. The +chief difference between subjective pleasure and subjective knowledge in +respect of permanence is that the latter, when our feeble faculties are +able to grasp it, still conveys to us an idea of unchangeableness which +cannot be got rid of. + +3. In the language of ancient philosophy, the relative character of +pleasure is described as becoming or generation. This is relative to Being +or Essence, and from one point of view may be regarded as the Heraclitean +flux in contrast with the Eleatic Being; from another, as the transient +enjoyment of eating and drinking compared with the supposed permanence of +intellectual pleasures. But to us the distinction is unmeaning, and +belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed away. Plato himself +seems to have suspected that the continuance or life of things is quite as +much to be attributed to a principle of rest as of motion (compare Charm. +Cratyl.). A later view of pleasure is found in Aristotle, who agrees with +Plato in many points, e.g. in his view of pleasure as a restoration to +nature, in his distinction between bodily and mental, between necessary and +non-necessary pleasures. But he is also in advance of Plato; for he +affirms that pleasure is not in the body at all; and hence not even the +bodily pleasures are to be spoken of as generations, but only as +accompanied by generation (Nic. Eth.). + +4. Plato attempts to identify vicious pleasures with some form of error, +and insists that the term false may be applied to them: in this he appears +to be carrying out in a confused manner the Socratic doctrine, that virtue +is knowledge, vice ignorance. He will allow of no distinction between the +pleasures and the erroneous opinions on which they are founded, whether +arising out of the illusion of distance or not. But to this we naturally +reply with Protarchus, that the pleasure is what it is, although the +calculation may be false, or the after-effects painful. It is difficult to +acquit Plato, to use his own language, of being a 'tyro in dialectics,' +when he overlooks such a distinction. Yet, on the other hand, we are +hardly fair judges of confusions of thought in those who view things +differently from ourselves. + +5. There appears also to be an incorrectness in the notion which occurs +both here and in the Gorgias, of the simultaneousness of merely bodily +pleasures and pains. We may, perhaps, admit, though even this is not free +from doubt, that the feeling of pleasureable hope or recollection is, or +rather may be, simultaneous with acute bodily suffering. But there is no +such coexistence of the pain of thirst with the pleasures of drinking; they +are not really simultaneous, for the one expels the other. Nor does Plato +seem to have considered that the bodily pleasures, except in certain +extreme cases, are unattended with pain. Few philosophers will deny that a +degree of pleasure attends eating and drinking; and yet surely we might as +well speak of the pains of digestion which follow, as of the pains of +hunger and thirst which precede them. Plato's conception is derived partly +from the extreme case of a man suffering pain from hunger or thirst, partly +from the image of a full and empty vessel. But the truth is rather, that +while the gratification of our bodily desires constantly affords some +degree of pleasure, the antecedent pains are scarcely perceived by us, +being almost done away with by use and regularity. + +6. The desire to classify pleasures as accompanied or not accompanied by +antecedent pains, has led Plato to place under one head the pleasures of +smell and sight, as well as those derived from sounds of music and from +knowledge. He would have done better to make a separate class of the +pleasures of smell, having no association of mind, or perhaps to have +divided them into natural and artificial. The pleasures of sight and sound +might then have been regarded as being the expression of ideas. But this +higher and truer point of view never appears to have occurred to Plato. +Nor has he any distinction between the fine arts and the mechanical; and, +neither here nor anywhere, an adequate conception of the beautiful in +external things. + +7. Plato agrees partially with certain 'surly or fastidious' philosophers, +as he terms them, who defined pleasure to be the absence of pain. They are +also described as eminent in physics. There is unfortunately no school of +Greek philosophy known to us which combined these two characteristics. +Antisthenes, who was an enemy of pleasure, was not a physical philosopher; +the atomists, who were physical philosophers, were not enemies of pleasure. +Yet such a combination of opinions is far from being impossible. Plato's +omission to mention them by name has created the same uncertainty +respecting them which also occurs respecting the 'friends of the ideas' and +the 'materialists' in the Sophist. + +On the whole, this discussion is one of the least satisfactory in the +dialogues of Plato. While the ethical nature of pleasure is scarcely +considered, and the merely physical phenomenon imperfectly analysed, too +much weight is given to ideas of measure and number, as the sole principle +of good. The comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really a comparison +of two elements, which have no common measure, and which cannot be excluded +from each other. Feeling is not opposed to knowledge, and in all +consciousness there is an element of both. The most abstract kinds of +knowledge are inseparable from some pleasure or pain, which accompanies the +acquisition or possession of them: the student is liable to grow weary of +them, and soon discovers that continuous mental energy is not granted to +men. The most sensual pleasure, on the other hand, is inseparable from the +consciousness of pleasure; no man can be happy who, to borrow Plato's +illustration, is leading the life of an oyster. Hence (by his own +confession) the main thesis is not worth determining; the real interest +lies in the incidental discussion. We can no more separate pleasure from +knowledge in the Philebus than we can separate justice from happiness in +the Republic. + +IV. An interesting account is given in the Philebus of the rank and order +of the sciences or arts, which agrees generally with the scheme of +knowledge in the Sixth Book of the Republic. The chief difference is, that +the position of the arts is more exactly defined. They are divided into an +empirical part and a scientific part, of which the first is mere guess- +work, the second is determined by rule and measure. Of the more empirical +arts, music is given as an example; this, although affirmed to be necessary +to human life, is depreciated. Music is regarded from a point of view +entirely opposite to that of the Republic, not as a sublime science, +coordinate with astronomy, but as full of doubt and conjecture. According +to the standard of accuracy which is here adopted, it is rightly placed +lower in the scale than carpentering, because the latter is more capable of +being reduced to measure. + +The theoretical element of the arts may also become a purely abstract +science, when separated from matter, and is then said to be pure and +unmixed. The distinction which Plato here makes seems to be the same as +that between pure and applied mathematics, and may be expressed in the +modern formula--science is art theoretical, art is science practical. In +the reason which he gives for the superiority of the pure science of number +over the mixed or applied, we can only agree with him in part. He says +that the numbers which the philosopher employs are always the same, whereas +the numbers which are used in practice represent different sizes or +quantities. He does not see that this power of expressing different +quantities by the same symbol is the characteristic and not the defect of +numbers, and is due to their abstract nature;--although we admit of course +what Plato seems to feel in his distinctions between pure and impure +knowledge, that the imperfection of matter enters into the applications of +them. + +Above the other sciences, as in the Republic, towers dialectic, which is +the science of eternal Being, apprehended by the purest mind and reason. +The lower sciences, including the mathematical, are akin to opinion rather +than to reason, and are placed together in the fourth class of goods. The +relation in which they stand to dialectic is obscure in the Republic, and +is not cleared up in the Philebus. + +V. Thus far we have only attained to the vestibule or ante-chamber of the +good; for there is a good exceeding knowledge, exceeding essence, which, +like Glaucon in the Republic, we find a difficulty in apprehending. This +good is now to be exhibited to us under various aspects and gradations. +The relative dignity of pleasure and knowledge has been determined; but +they have not yet received their exact position in the scale of goods. +Some difficulties occur to us in the enumeration: First, how are we to +distinguish the first from the second class of goods, or the second from +the third? Secondly, why is there no mention of the supreme mind? +Thirdly, the nature of the fourth class. Fourthly, the meaning of the +allusion to a sixth class, which is not further investigated. + +(I) Plato seems to proceed in his table of goods, from the more abstract to +the less abstract; from the subjective to the objective; until at the lower +end of the scale we fairly descend into the region of human action and +feeling. To him, the greater the abstraction the greater the truth, and he +is always tending to see abstractions within abstractions; which, like the +ideas in the Parmenides, are always appearing one behind another. Hence we +find a difficulty in following him into the sphere of thought which he is +seeking to attain. First in his scale of goods he places measure, in which +he finds the eternal nature: this would be more naturally expressed in +modern language as eternal law, and seems to be akin both to the finite and +to the mind or cause, which were two of the elements in the former table. +Like the supreme nature in the Timaeus, like the ideal beauty in the +Symposium or the Phaedrus, or like the ideal good in the Republic, this is +the absolute and unapproachable being. But this being is manifested in +symmetry and beauty everywhere, in the order of nature and of mind, in the +relations of men to one another. For the word 'measure' he now substitutes +the word 'symmetry,' as if intending to express measure conceived as +relation. He then proceeds to regard the good no longer in an objective +form, but as the human reason seeking to attain truth by the aid of +dialectic; such at least we naturally infer to be his meaning, when we +consider that both here and in the Republic the sphere of nous or mind is +assigned to dialectic. (2) It is remarkable (see above) that this personal +conception of mind is confined to the human mind, and not extended to the +divine. (3) If we may be allowed to interpret one dialogue of Plato by +another, the sciences of figure and number are probably classed with the +arts and true opinions, because they proceed from hypotheses (compare +Republic). (4) The sixth class, if a sixth class is to be added, is +playfully set aside by a quotation from Orpheus: Plato means to say that a +sixth class, if there be such a class, is not worth considering, because +pleasure, having only gained the fifth place in the scale of goods, is +already out of the running. + +VI. We may now endeavour to ascertain the relation of the Philebus to the +other dialogues. Here Plato shows the same indifference to his own +doctrine of Ideas which he has already manifested in the Parmenides and the +Sophist. The principle of the one and many of which he here speaks, is +illustrated by examples in the Sophist and Statesman. Notwithstanding the +differences of style, many resemblances may be noticed between the Philebus +and Gorgias. The theory of the simultaneousness of pleasure and pain is +common to both of them (Phil. Gorg.); there is also a common tendency in +them to take up arms against pleasure, although the view of the Philebus, +which is probably the later of the two dialogues, is the more moderate. +There seems to be an allusion to the passage in the Gorgias, in which +Socrates dilates on the pleasures of itching and scratching. Nor is there +any real discrepancy in the manner in which Gorgias and his art are spoken +of in the two dialogues. For Socrates is far from implying that the art of +rhetoric has a real sphere of practical usefulness: he only means that the +refutation of the claims of Gorgias is not necessary for his present +purpose. He is saying in effect: 'Admit, if you please, that rhetoric is +the greatest and usefullest of sciences:--this does not prove that +dialectic is not the purest and most exact.' From the Sophist and +Statesman we know that his hostility towards the sophists and rhetoricians +was not mitigated in later life; although both in the Statesman and Laws he +admits of a higher use of rhetoric. + +Reasons have been already given for assigning a late date to the Philebus. +That the date is probably later than that of the Republic, may be further +argued on the following grounds:--1. The general resemblance to the later +dialogues and to the Laws: 2. The more complete account of the nature of +good and pleasure: 3. The distinction between perception, memory, +recollection, and opinion which indicates a great progress in psychology; +also between understanding and imagination, which is described under the +figure of the scribe and the painter. A superficial notion may arise that +Plato probably wrote shorter dialogues, such as the Philebus, the Sophist, +and the Statesman, as studies or preparations for longer ones. This view +may be natural; but on further reflection is seen to be fallacious, because +these three dialogues are found to make an advance upon the metaphysical +conceptions of the Republic. And we can more easily suppose that Plato +composed shorter writings after longer ones, than suppose that he lost hold +of further points of view which he had once attained. + +It is more easy to find traces of the Pythagoreans, Eleatics, Megarians, +Cynics, Cyrenaics and of the ideas of Anaxagoras, in the Philebus, than to +say how much is due to each of them. Had we fuller records of those old +philosophers, we should probably find Plato in the midst of the fray +attempting to combine Eleatic and Pythagorean doctrines, and seeking to +find a truth beyond either Being or number; setting up his own concrete +conception of good against the abstract practical good of the Cynics, or +the abstract intellectual good of the Megarians, and his own idea of +classification against the denial of plurality in unity which is also +attributed to them; warring against the Eristics as destructive of truth, +as he had formerly fought against the Sophists; taking up a middle position +between the Cynics and Cyrenaics in his doctrine of pleasure; asserting +with more consistency than Anaxagoras the existence of an intelligent mind +and cause. Of the Heracliteans, whom he is said by Aristotle to have +cultivated in his youth, he speaks in the Philebus, as in the Theaetetus +and Cratylus, with irony and contempt. But we have not the knowledge which +would enable us to pursue further the line of reflection here indicated; +nor can we expect to find perfect clearness or order in the first efforts +of mankind to understand the working of their own minds. The ideas which +they are attempting to analyse, they are also in process of creating; the +abstract universals of which they are seeking to adjust the relations have +been already excluded by them from the category of relation. + +... + +The Philebus, like the Cratylus, is supposed to be the continuation of a +previous discussion. An argument respecting the comparative claims of +pleasure and wisdom to rank as the chief good has been already carried on +between Philebus and Socrates. The argument is now transferred to +Protarchus, the son of Callias, a noble Athenian youth, sprung from a +family which had spent 'a world of money' on the Sophists (compare Apol.; +Crat.; Protag.). Philebus, who appears to be the teacher, or elder friend, +and perhaps the lover, of Protarchus, takes no further part in the +discussion beyond asserting in the strongest manner his adherence, under +all circumstances, to the cause of pleasure. + +Socrates suggests that they shall have a first and second palm of victory. +For there may be a good higher than either pleasure or wisdom, and then +neither of them will gain the first prize, but whichever of the two is more +akin to this higher good will have a right to the second. They agree, and +Socrates opens the game by enlarging on the diversity and opposition which +exists among pleasures. For there are pleasures of all kinds, good and +bad, wise and foolish--pleasures of the temperate as well as of the +intemperate. Protarchus replies that although pleasures may be opposed in +so far as they spring from opposite sources, nevertheless as pleasures they +are alike. Yes, retorts Socrates, pleasure is like pleasure, as figure is +like figure and colour like colour; yet we all know that there is great +variety among figures and colours. Protarchus does not see the drift of +this remark; and Socrates proceeds to ask how he can have a right to +attribute a new predicate (i.e. 'good') to pleasures in general, when he +cannot deny that they are different? What common property in all of them +does he mean to indicate by the term 'good'? If he continues to assert +that there is some trivial sense in which pleasure is one, Socrates may +retort by saying that knowledge is one, but the result will be that such +merely verbal and trivial conceptions, whether of knowledge or pleasure, +will spoil the discussion, and will prove the incapacity of the two +disputants. In order to avoid this danger, he proposes that they shall +beat a retreat, and, before they proceed, come to an understanding about +the 'high argument' of the one and the many. + +Protarchus agrees to the proposal, but he is under the impression that +Socrates means to discuss the common question--how a sensible object can be +one, and yet have opposite attributes, such as 'great' and 'small,' 'light' +and 'heavy,' or how there can be many members in one body, and the like +wonders. Socrates has long ceased to see any wonder in these phenomena; +his difficulties begin with the application of number to abstract unities +(e.g.'man,' 'good') and with the attempt to divide them. For have these +unities of idea any real existence? How, if imperishable, can they enter +into the world of generation? How, as units, can they be divided and +dispersed among different objects? Or do they exist in their entirety in +each object? These difficulties are but imperfectly answered by Socrates +in what follows. + +We speak of a one and many, which is ever flowing in and out of all things, +concerning which a young man often runs wild in his first metaphysical +enthusiasm, talking about analysis and synthesis to his father and mother +and the neighbours, hardly sparing even his dog. This 'one in many' is a +revelation of the order of the world, which some Prometheus first made +known to our ancestors; and they, who were better men and nearer the gods +than we are, have handed it down to us. To know how to proceed by regular +steps from one to many, and from many to one, is just what makes the +difference between eristic and dialectic. And the right way of proceeding +is to look for one idea or class in all things, and when you have found one +to look for more than one, and for all that there are, and when you have +found them all and regularly divided a particular field of knowledge into +classes, you may leave the further consideration of individuals. But you +must not pass at once either from unity to infinity, or from infinity to +unity. In music, for example, you may begin with the most general notion, +but this alone will not make you a musician: you must know also the number +and nature of the intervals, and the systems which are framed out of them, +and the rhythms of the dance which correspond to them. And when you have a +similar knowledge of any other subject, you may be said to know that +subject. In speech again there are infinite varieties of sound, and some +one who was a wise man, or more than man, comprehended them all in the +classes of mutes, vowels, and semivowels, and gave to each of them a name, +and assigned them to the art of grammar. + +'But whither, Socrates, are you going? And what has this to do with the +comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom:' Socrates replies, that +before we can adjust their respective claims, we want to know the number +and kinds of both of them. What are they? He is requested to answer the +question himself. That he will, if he may be allowed to make one or two +preliminary remarks. In the first place he has a dreamy recollection of +hearing that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the highest good, for the +good should be perfect and sufficient. But is the life of pleasure perfect +and sufficient, when deprived of memory, consciousness, anticipation? Is +not this the life of an oyster? Or is the life of mind sufficient, if +devoid of any particle of pleasure? Must not the union of the two be +higher and more eligible than either separately? And is not the element +which makes this mixed life eligible more akin to mind than to pleasure? +Thus pleasure is rejected and mind is rejected. And yet there may be a +life of mind, not human but divine, which conquers still. + +But, if we are to pursue this argument further, we shall require some new +weapons; and by this, I mean a new classification of existence. (1) There +is a finite element of existence, and (2) an infinite, and (3) the union of +the two, and (4) the cause of the union. More may be added if they are +wanted, but at present we can do without them. And first of the infinite +or indefinite:--That is the class which is denoted by the terms more or +less, and is always in a state of comparison. All words or ideas to which +the words 'gently,' 'extremely,' and other comparative expressions are +applied, fall under this class. The infinite would be no longer infinite, +if limited or reduced to measure by number and quantity. The opposite +class is the limited or finite, and includes all things which have number +and quantity. And there is a third class of generation into essence by the +union of the finite and infinite, in which the finite gives law to the +infinite;--under this are comprehended health, strength, temperate seasons, +harmony, beauty, and the like. The goddess of beauty saw the universal +wantonness of all things, and gave law and order to be the salvation of the +soul. But no effect can be generated without a cause, and therefore there +must be a fourth class, which is the cause of generation; for the cause or +agent is not the same as the patient or effect. + +And now, having obtained our classes, we may determine in which our +conqueror life is to be placed: Clearly in the third or mixed class, in +which the finite gives law to the infinite. And in which is pleasure to +find a place? As clearly in the infinite or indefinite, which alone, as +Protarchus thinks (who seems to confuse the infinite with the superlative), +gives to pleasure the character of the absolute good. Yes, retorts +Socrates, and also to pain the character of absolute evil. And therefore +the infinite cannot be that which imparts to pleasure the nature of the +good. But where shall we place mind? That is a very serious and awful +question, which may be prefaced by another. Is mind or chance the lord of +the universe? All philosophers will say the first, and yet, perhaps, they +may be only magnifying themselves. And for this reason I should like to +consider the matter a little more deeply, even though some lovers of +disorder in the world should ridicule my attempt. + +Now the elements earth, air, fire, water, exist in us, and they exist in +the cosmos; but they are purer and fairer in the cosmos than they are in +us, and they come to us from thence. And as we have a soul as well as a +body, in like manner the elements of the finite, the infinite, the union of +the two, and the cause, are found to exist in us. And if they, like the +elements, exist in us, and the three first exist in the world, must not the +fourth or cause which is the noblest of them, exist in the world? And this +cause is wisdom or mind, the royal mind of Zeus, who is the king of all, as +there are other gods who have other noble attributes. Observe how well +this agrees with the testimony of men of old, who affirmed mind to be the +ruler of the universe. And remember that mind belongs to the class which +we term the cause, and pleasure to the infinite or indefinite class. We +will examine the place and origin of both. + +What is the origin of pleasure? Her natural seat is the mixed class, in +which health and harmony were placed. Pain is the violation, and pleasure +the restoration of limit. There is a natural union of finite and infinite, +which in hunger, thirst, heat, cold, is impaired--this is painful, but the +return to nature, in which the elements are restored to their normal +proportions, is pleasant. Here is our first class of pleasures. And +another class of pleasures and pains are hopes and fears; these are in the +mind only. And inasmuch as the pleasures are unalloyed by pains and the +pains by pleasures, the examination of them may show us whether all +pleasure is to be desired, or whether this entire desirableness is not +rather the attribute of another class. But if pleasures and pains consist +in the violation and restoration of limit, may there not be a neutral +state, in which there is neither dissolution nor restoration? That is a +further question, and admitting, as we must, the possibility of such a +state, there seems to be no reason why the life of wisdom should not exist +in this neutral state, which is, moreover, the state of the gods, who +cannot, without indecency, be supposed to feel either joy or sorrow. + +The second class of pleasures involves memory. There are affections which +are extinguished before they reach the soul, and of these there is no +consciousness, and therefore no memory. And there are affections which the +body and soul feel together, and this feeling is termed consciousness. And +memory is the preservation of consciousness, and reminiscence is the +recovery of consciousness. Now the memory of pleasure, when a man is in +pain, is the memory of the opposite of his actual bodily state, and is +therefore not in the body, but in the mind. And there may be an +intermediate state, in which a person is balanced between pleasure and +pain; in his body there is want which is a cause of pain, but in his mind a +sure hope of replenishment, which is pleasant. (But if the hope be +converted into despair, he has two pains and not a balance of pain and +pleasure.) Another question is raised: May not pleasures, like opinions, +be true and false? In the sense of being real, both must be admitted to be +true: nor can we deny that to both of them qualities may be attributed; +for pleasures as well as opinions may be described as good or bad. And +though we do not all of us allow that there are true and false pleasures, +we all acknowledge that there are some pleasures associated with right +opinion, and others with falsehood and ignorance. Let us endeavour to +analyze the nature of this association. + +Opinion is based on perception, which may be correct or mistaken. You may +see a figure at a distance, and say first of all, 'This is a man,' and then +say, 'No, this is an image made by the shepherds.' And you may affirm this +in a proposition to your companion, or make the remark mentally to +yourself. Whether the words are actually spoken or not, on such occasions +there is a scribe within who registers them, and a painter who paints the +images of the things which the scribe has written down in the soul,--at +least that is my own notion of the process; and the words and images which +are inscribed by them may be either true or false; and they may represent +either past, present, or future. And, representing the future, they must +also represent the pleasures and pains of anticipation--the visions of gold +and other fancies which are never wanting in the mind of man. Now these +hopes, as they are termed, are propositions, which are sometimes true, and +sometimes false; for the good, who are the friends of the gods, see true +pictures of the future, and the bad false ones. And as there may be +opinion about things which are not, were not, and will not be, which is +opinion still, so there may be pleasure about things which are not, were +not, and will not be, which is pleasure still,--that is to say, false +pleasure; and only when false, can pleasure, like opinion, be vicious. +Against this conclusion Protarchus reclaims. + +Leaving his denial for the present, Socrates proceeds to show that some +pleasures are false from another point of view. In desire, as we admitted, +the body is divided from the soul, and hence pleasures and pains are often +simultaneous. And we further admitted that both of them belonged to the +infinite class. How, then, can we compare them? Are we not liable, or +rather certain, as in the case of sight, to be deceived by distance and +relation? In this case the pleasures and pains are not false because based +upon false opinion, but are themselves false. And there is another +illusion: pain has often been said by us to arise out of the derangement-- +pleasure out of the restoration--of our nature. But in passing from one to +the other, do we not experience neutral states, which although they appear +pleasureable or painful are really neither? For even if we admit, with the +wise man whom Protarchus loves (and only a wise man could have ever +entertained such a notion), that all things are in a perpetual flux, still +these changes are often unconscious, and devoid either of pleasure or pain. +We assume, then, that there are three states--pleasureable, painful, +neutral; we may embellish a little by calling them gold, silver, and that +which is neither. + +But there are certain natural philosophers who will not admit a third +state. Their instinctive dislike to pleasure leads them to affirm that +pleasure is only the absence of pain. They are noble fellows, and, +although we do not agree with them, we may use them as diviners who will +indicate to us the right track. They will say, that the nature of anything +is best known from the examination of extreme cases, e.g. the nature of +hardness from the examination of the hardest things; and that the nature of +pleasure will be best understood from an examination of the most intense +pleasures. Now these are the pleasures of the body, not of the mind; the +pleasures of disease and not of health, the pleasures of the intemperate +and not of the temperate. I am speaking, not of the frequency or +continuance, but only of the intensity of such pleasures, and this is given +them by contrast with the pain or sickness of body which precedes them. +Their morbid nature is illustrated by the lesser instances of itching and +scratching, respecting which I swear that I cannot tell whether they are a +pleasure or a pain. (1) Some of these arise out of a transition from one +state of the body to another, as from cold to hot; (2) others are caused by +the contrast of an internal pain and an external pleasure in the body: +sometimes the feeling of pain predominates, as in itching and tingling, +when they are relieved by scratching; sometimes the feeling of pleasure: +or the pleasure which they give may be quite overpowering, and is then +accompanied by all sorts of unutterable feelings which have a death of +delights in them. But there are also mixed pleasures which are in the mind +only. For are not love and sorrow as well as anger 'sweeter than honey,' +and also full of pain? Is there not a mixture of feelings in the spectator +of tragedy? and of comedy also? 'I do not understand that last.' Well, +then, with the view of lighting up the obscurity of these mixed feelings, +let me ask whether envy is painful. 'Yes.' And yet the envious man finds +something pleasing in the misfortunes of others? 'True.' And ignorance is +a misfortune? 'Certainly.' And one form of ignorance is self-conceit--a +man may fancy himself richer, fairer, better, wiser than he is? 'Yes.' +And he who thus deceives himself may be strong or weak? 'He may.' And if +he is strong we fear him, and if he is weak we laugh at him, which is a +pleasure, and yet we envy him, which is a pain? These mixed feelings are +the rationale of tragedy and comedy, and equally the rationale of the +greater drama of human life. (There appears to be some confusion in this +passage. There is no difficulty in seeing that in comedy, as in tragedy, +the spectator may view the performance with mixed feelings of pain as well +as of pleasure; nor is there any difficulty in understanding that envy is a +mixed feeling, which rejoices not without pain at the misfortunes of +others, and laughs at their ignorance of themselves. But Plato seems to +think further that he has explained the feeling of the spectator in comedy +sufficiently by a theory which only applies to comedy in so far as in +comedy we laugh at the conceit or weakness of others. He has certainly +given a very partial explanation of the ridiculous.) Having shown how +sorrow, anger, envy are feelings of a mixed nature, I will reserve the +consideration of the remainder for another occasion. + +Next follow the unmixed pleasures; which, unlike the philosophers of whom I +was speaking, I believe to be real. These unmixed pleasures are: (1) The +pleasures derived from beauty of form, colour, sound, smell, which are +absolutely pure; and in general those which are unalloyed with pain: (2) +The pleasures derived from the acquisition of knowledge, which in +themselves are pure, but may be attended by an accidental pain of +forgetting; this, however, arises from a subsequent act of reflection, of +which we need take no account. At the same time, we admit that the latter +pleasures are the property of a very few. To these pure and unmixed +pleasures we ascribe measure, whereas all others belong to the class of the +infinite, and are liable to every species of excess. And here several +questions arise for consideration:--What is the meaning of pure and impure, +of moderate and immoderate? We may answer the question by an illustration: +Purity of white paint consists in the clearness or quality of the white, +and this is distinct from the quantity or amount of white paint; a little +pure white is fairer than a great deal which is impure. But there is +another question:--Pleasure is affirmed by ingenious philosophers to be a +generation; they say that there are two natures--one self-existent, the +other dependent; the one noble and majestic, the other failing in both +these qualities. 'I do not understand.' There are lovers and there are +loves. 'Yes, I know, but what is the application?' The argument is in +play, and desires to intimate that there are relatives and there are +absolutes, and that the relative is for the sake of the absolute; and +generation is for the sake of essence. Under relatives I class all things +done with a view to generation; and essence is of the class of good. But +if essence is of the class of good, generation must be of some other class; +and our friends, who affirm that pleasure is a generation, would laugh at +the notion that pleasure is a good; and at that other notion, that pleasure +is produced by generation, which is only the alternative of destruction. +Who would prefer such an alternation to the equable life of pure thought? +Here is one absurdity, and not the only one, to which the friends of +pleasure are reduced. For is there not also an absurdity in affirming that +good is of the soul only; or in declaring that the best of men, if he be in +pain, is bad? + +And now, from the consideration of pleasure, we pass to that of knowledge. +Let us reflect that there are two kinds of knowledge--the one creative or +productive, and the other educational and philosophical. Of the creative +arts, there is one part purer or more akin to knowledge than the other. +There is an element of guess-work and an element of number and measure in +them. In music, for example, especially in flute-playing, the conjectural +element prevails; while in carpentering there is more application of rule +and measure. Of the creative arts, then, we may make two classes--the less +exact and the more exact. And the exacter part of all of them is really +arithmetic and mensuration. But arithmetic and mensuration again may be +subdivided with reference either to their use in the concrete, or to their +nature in the abstract--as they are regarded popularly in building and +binding, or theoretically by philosophers. And, borrowing the analogy of +pleasure, we may say that the philosophical use of them is purer than the +other. Thus we have two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration. And +truest of all in the estimation of every rational man is dialectic, or the +science of being, which will forget and disown us, if we forget and disown +her. + +'But, Socrates, I have heard Gorgias say that rhetoric is the greatest and +usefullest of arts; and I should not like to quarrel either with him or +you.' Neither is there any inconsistency, Protarchus, with his statement +in what I am now saying; for I am not maintaining that dialectic is the +greatest or usefullest, but only that she is the truest of arts; my remark +is not quantitative but qualitative, and refers not to the advantage or +repetition of either, but to the degree of truth which they attain--here +Gorgias will not care to compete; this is what we affirm to be possessed in +the highest degree by dialectic. And do not let us appeal to Gorgias or +Philebus or Socrates, but ask, on behalf of the argument, what are the +highest truths which the soul has the power of attaining. And is not this +the science which has a firmer grasp of them than any other? For the arts +generally are only occupied with matters of opinion, and with the +production and action and passion of this sensible world. But the highest +truth is that which is eternal and unchangeable. And reason and wisdom are +concerned with the eternal; and these are the very claimants, if not for +the first, at least for the second place, whom I propose as rivals to +pleasure. + +And now, having the materials, we may proceed to mix them--first +recapitulating the question at issue. + +Philebus affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed them to be one +nature; I affirmed that they were two natures, and declared that knowledge +was more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that the two together were +more eligible than either taken singly; and to this we adhere. Reason +intimates, as at first, that we should seek the good not in the unmixed +life, but in the mixed. + +The cup is ready, waiting to be mingled, and here are two fountains, one of +honey, the other of pure water, out of which to make the fairest possible +mixture. There are pure and impure pleasures--pure and impure sciences. +Let us consider the sections of each which have the most of purity and +truth; to admit them all indiscriminately would be dangerous. First we +will take the pure sciences; but shall we mingle the impure--the art which +uses the false rule and the false measure? That we must, if we are any of +us to find our way home; man cannot live upon pure mathematics alone. And +must I include music, which is admitted to be guess-work? 'Yes, you must, +if human life is to have any humanity.' Well, then, I will open the door +and let them all in; they shall mingle in an Homeric 'meeting of the +waters.' And now we turn to the pleasures; shall I admit them? 'Admit +first of all the pure pleasures; secondly, the necessary.' And what shall +we say about the rest? First, ask the pleasures--they will be too happy to +dwell with wisdom. Secondly, ask the arts and sciences--they reply that +the excesses of intemperance are the ruin of them; and that they would +rather only have the pleasures of health and temperance, which are the +handmaidens of virtue. But still we want truth? That is now added; and so +the argument is complete, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which +is to hold fair rule over a living body. And now we are at the vestibule +of the good, in which there are three chief elements--truth, symmetry, and +beauty. These will be the criterion of the comparative claims of pleasure +and wisdom. + +Which has the greater share of truth? Surely wisdom; for pleasure is the +veriest impostor in the world, and the perjuries of lovers have passed into +a proverb. + +Which of symmetry? Wisdom again; for nothing is more immoderate than +pleasure. + +Which of beauty? Once more, wisdom; for pleasure is often unseemly, and +the greatest pleasures are put out of sight. + +Not pleasure, then, ranks first in the scale of good, but measure, and +eternal harmony. + +Second comes the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect. + +Third, mind and wisdom. + +Fourth, sciences and arts and true opinions. + +Fifth, painless pleasures. + +Of a sixth class, I have no more to say. Thus, pleasure and mind may both +renounce the claim to the first place. But mind is ten thousand times +nearer to the chief good than pleasure. Pleasure ranks fifth and not +first, even though all the animals in the world assert the contrary. + +... + +From the days of Aristippus and Epicurus to our own times the nature of +pleasure has occupied the attention of philosophers. 'Is pleasure an evil? +a good? the only good?' are the simple forms which the enquiry assumed +among the Socratic schools. But at an early stage of the controversy +another question was asked: 'Do pleasures differ in kind? and are some +bad, some good, and some neither bad nor good?' There are bodily and there +are mental pleasures, which were at first confused but afterwards +distinguished. A distinction was also made between necessary and +unnecessary pleasures; and again between pleasures which had or had not +corresponding pains. The ancient philosophers were fond of asking, in the +language of their age, 'Is pleasure a "becoming" only, and therefore +transient and relative, or do some pleasures partake of truth and Being?' +To these ancient speculations the moderns have added a further question:-- +'Whose pleasure? The pleasure of yourself, or of your neighbour,--of the +individual, or of the world?' This little addition has changed the whole +aspect of the discussion: the same word is now supposed to include two +principles as widely different as benevolence and self-love. Some modern +writers have also distinguished between pleasure the test, and pleasure the +motive of actions. For the universal test of right actions (how I know +them) may not always be the highest or best motive of them (why I do them). + +Socrates, as we learn from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, first drew +attention to the consequences of actions. Mankind were said by him to act +rightly when they knew what they were doing, or, in the language of the +Gorgias, 'did what they would.' He seems to have been the first who +maintained that the good was the useful (Mem.). In his eagerness for +generalization, seeking, as Aristotle says, for the universal in Ethics +(Metaph.), he took the most obvious intellectual aspect of human action +which occurred to him. He meant to emphasize, not pleasure, but the +calculation of pleasure; neither is he arguing that pleasure is the chief +good, but that we should have a principle of choice. He did not intend to +oppose 'the useful' to some higher conception, such as the Platonic ideal, +but to chance and caprice. The Platonic Socrates pursues the same vein of +thought in the Protagoras, where he argues against the so-called sophist +that pleasure and pain are the final standards and motives of good and +evil, and that the salvation of human life depends upon a right estimate of +pleasures greater or less when seen near and at a distance. The testimony +of Xenophon is thus confirmed by that of Plato, and we are therefore +justified in calling Socrates the first utilitarian; as indeed there is no +side or aspect of philosophy which may not with reason be ascribed to him-- +he is Cynic and Cyrenaic, Platonist and Aristotelian in one. But in the +Phaedo the Socratic has already passed into a more ideal point of view; and +he, or rather Plato speaking in his person, expressly repudiates the notion +that the exchange of a less pleasure for a greater can be an exchange of +virtue. Such virtue is the virtue of ordinary men who live in the world of +appearance; they are temperate only that they may enjoy the pleasures of +intemperance, and courageous from fear of danger. Whereas the philosopher +is seeking after wisdom and not after pleasure, whether near or distant: +he is the mystic, the initiated, who has learnt to despise the body and is +yearning all his life long for a truth which will hereafter be revealed to +him. In the Republic the pleasures of knowledge are affirmed to be +superior to other pleasures, because the philosopher so estimates them; and +he alone has had experience of both kinds. (Compare a similar argument +urged by one of the latest defenders of Utilitarianism, Mill's +Utilitarianism). In the Philebus, Plato, although he regards the enemies +of pleasure with complacency, still further modifies the transcendentalism +of the Phaedo. For he is compelled to confess, rather reluctantly, +perhaps, that some pleasures, i.e. those which have no antecedent pains, +claim a place in the scale of goods. + +There have been many reasons why not only Plato but mankind in general have +been unwilling to acknowledge that 'pleasure is the chief good.' Either +they have heard a voice calling to them out of another world; or the life +and example of some great teacher has cast their thoughts of right and +wrong in another mould; or the word 'pleasure' has been associated in their +mind with merely animal enjoyment. They could not believe that what they +were always striving to overcome, and the power or principle in them which +overcame, were of the same nature. The pleasure of doing good to others +and of bodily self-indulgence, the pleasures of intellect and the pleasures +of sense, are so different:--Why then should they be called by a common +name? Or, if the equivocal or metaphorical use of the word is justified by +custom (like the use of other words which at first referred only to the +body, and then by a figure have been transferred to the mind), still, why +should we make an ambiguous word the corner-stone of moral philosophy? To +the higher thinker the Utilitarian or hedonist mode of speaking has been at +variance with religion and with any higher conception both of politics and +of morals. It has not satisfied their imagination; it has offended their +taste. To elevate pleasure, 'the most fleeting of all things,' into a +general idea seems to such men a contradiction. They do not desire to +bring down their theory to the level of their practice. The simplicity of +the 'greatest happiness' principle has been acceptable to philosophers, but +the better part of the world has been slow to receive it. + +Before proceeding, we may make a few admissions which will narrow the field +of dispute; and we may as well leave behind a few prejudices, which +intelligent opponents of Utilitarianism have by this time 'agreed to +discard'. We admit that Utility is coextensive with right, and that no +action can be right which does not tend to the happiness of mankind; we +acknowledge that a large class of actions are made right or wrong by their +consequences only; we say further that mankind are not too mindful, but +that they are far too regardless of consequences, and that they need to +have the doctrine of utility habitually inculcated on them. We recognize +the value of a principle which can supply a connecting link between Ethics +and Politics, and under which all human actions are or may be included. +The desire to promote happiness is no mean preference of expediency to +right, but one of the highest and noblest motives by which human nature can +be animated. Neither in referring actions to the test of utility have we +to make a laborious calculation, any more than in trying them by other +standards of morals. For long ago they have been classified sufficiently +for all practical purposes by the thinker, by the legislator, by the +opinion of the world. Whatever may be the hypothesis on which they are +explained, or which in doubtful cases may be applied to the regulation of +them, we are very rarely, if ever, called upon at the moment of performing +them to determine their effect upon the happiness of mankind. + +There is a theory which has been contrasted with Utility by Paley and +others--the theory of a moral sense: Are our ideas of right and wrong +innate or derived from experience? This, perhaps, is another of those +speculations which intelligent men might 'agree to discard.' For it has +been worn threadbare; and either alternative is equally consistent with a +transcendental or with an eudaemonistic system of ethics, with a greatest +happiness principle or with Kant's law of duty. Yet to avoid +misconception, what appears to be the truth about the origin of our moral +ideas may be shortly summed up as follows:--To each of us individually our +moral ideas come first of all in childhood through the medium of education, +from parents and teachers, assisted by the unconscious influence of +language; they are impressed upon a mind which at first is like a waxen +tablet, adapted to receive them; but they soon become fixed or set, and in +after life are strengthened, or perhaps weakened by the force of public +opinion. They may be corrected and enlarged by experience, they may be +reasoned about, they may be brought home to us by the circumstances of our +lives, they may be intensified by imagination, by reflection, by a course +of action likely to confirm them. Under the influence of religious feeling +or by an effort of thought, any one beginning with the ordinary rules of +morality may create out of them for himself ideals of holiness and virtue. +They slumber in the minds of most men, yet in all of us there remains some +tincture of affection, some desire of good, some sense of truth, some fear +of the law. Of some such state or process each individual is conscious in +himself, and if he compares his own experience with that of others he will +find the witness of their consciences to coincide with that of his own. +All of us have entered into an inheritance which we have the power of +appropriating and making use of. No great effort of mind is required on +our part; we learn morals, as we learn to talk, instinctively, from +conversing with others, in an enlightened age, in a civilized country, in a +good home. A well-educated child of ten years old already knows the +essentials of morals: 'Thou shalt not steal,' 'thou shalt speak the +truth,' 'thou shalt love thy parents,' 'thou shalt fear God.' What more +does he want? + +But whence comes this common inheritance or stock of moral ideas? Their +beginning, like all other beginnings of human things, is obscure, and is +the least important part of them. Imagine, if you will, that Society +originated in the herding of brutes, in their parental instincts, in their +rude attempts at self-preservation:--Man is not man in that he resembles, +but in that he differs from them. We must pass into another cycle of +existence, before we can discover in him by any evidence accessible to us +even the germs of our moral ideas. In the history of the world, which +viewed from within is the history of the human mind, they have been slowly +created by religion, by poetry, by law, having their foundation in the +natural affections and in the necessity of some degree of truth and justice +in a social state; they have been deepened and enlarged by the efforts of +great thinkers who have idealized and connected them--by the lives of +saints and prophets who have taught and exemplified them. The schools of +ancient philosophy which seem so far from us--Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, +the Stoics, the Epicureans, and a few modern teachers, such as Kant and +Bentham, have each of them supplied 'moments' of thought to the world. The +life of Christ has embodied a divine love, wisdom, patience, +reasonableness. For his image, however imperfectly handed down to us, the +modern world has received a standard more perfect in idea than the +societies of ancient times, but also further removed from practice. For +there is certainly a greater interval between the theory and practice of +Christians than between the theory and practice of the Greeks and Romans; +the ideal is more above us, and the aspiration after good has often lent a +strange power to evil. And sometimes, as at the Reformation, or French +Revolution, when the upper classes of a so-called Christian country have +become corrupted by priestcraft, by casuistry, by licentiousness, by +despotism, the lower have risen up and re-asserted the natural sense of +religion and right. + +We may further remark that our moral ideas, as the world grows older, +perhaps as we grow older ourselves, unless they have been undermined in us +by false philosophy or the practice of mental analysis, or infected by the +corruption of society or by some moral disorder in the individual, are +constantly assuming a more natural and necessary character. The habit of +the mind, the opinion of the world, familiarizes them to us; and they take +more and more the form of immediate intuition. The moral sense comes last +and not first in the order of their development, and is the instinct which +we have inherited or acquired, not the nobler effort of reflection which +created them and which keeps them alive. We do not stop to reason about +common honesty. Whenever we are not blinded by self-deceit, as for example +in judging the actions of others, we have no hesitation in determining what +is right and wrong. The principles of morality, when not at variance with +some desire or worldly interest of our own, or with the opinion of the +public, are hardly perceived by us; but in the conflict of reason and +passion they assert their authority and are not overcome without remorse. + +Such is a brief outline of the history of our moral ideas. We have to +distinguish, first of all, the manner in which they have grown up in the +world from the manner in which they have been communicated to each of us. +We may represent them to ourselves as flowing out of the boundless ocean of +language and thought in little rills, which convey them to the heart and +brain of each individual. But neither must we confound the theories or +aspects of morality with the origin of our moral ideas. These are not the +roots or 'origines' of morals, but the latest efforts of reflection, the +lights in which the whole moral world has been regarded by different +thinkers and successive generations of men. If we ask: Which of these +many theories is the true one? we may answer: All of them--moral sense, +innate ideas, a priori, a posteriori notions, the philosophy of experience, +the philosophy of intuition--all of them have added something to our +conception of Ethics; no one of them is the whole truth. But to decide how +far our ideas of morality are derived from one source or another; to +determine what history, what philosophy has contributed to them; to +distinguish the original, simple elements from the manifold and complex +applications of them, would be a long enquiry too far removed from the +question which we are now pursuing. + +Bearing in mind the distinction which we have been seeking to establish +between our earliest and our most mature ideas of morality, we may now +proceed to state the theory of Utility, not exactly in the words, but in +the spirit of one of its ablest and most moderate supporters (Mill's +Utilitarianism):--'That which alone makes actions either right or desirable +is their utility, or tendency to promote the happiness of mankind, or, in +other words, to increase the sum of pleasure in the world. But all +pleasures are not the same: they differ in quality as well as in quantity, +and the pleasure which is superior in quality is incommensurable with the +inferior. Neither is the pleasure or happiness, which we seek, our own +pleasure, but that of others,--of our family, of our country, of mankind. +The desire of this, and even the sacrifice of our own interest to that of +other men, may become a passion to a rightly educated nature. The +Utilitarian finds a place in his system for this virtue and for every +other.' + +Good or happiness or pleasure is thus regarded as the true and only end of +human life. To this all our desires will be found to tend, and in +accordance with this all the virtues, including justice, may be explained. +Admitting that men rest for a time in inferior ends, and do not cast their +eyes beyond them, these ends are really dependent on the greater end of +happiness, and would not be pursued, unless in general they had been found +to lead to it. The existence of such an end is proved, as in Aristotle's +time, so in our own, by the universal fact that men desire it. The +obligation to promote it is based upon the social nature of man; this sense +of duty is shared by all of us in some degree, and is capable of being +greatly fostered and strengthened. So far from being inconsistent with +religion, the greatest happiness principle is in the highest degree +agreeable to it. For what can be more reasonable than that God should will +the happiness of all his creatures? and in working out their happiness we +may be said to be 'working together with him.' Nor is it inconceivable +that a new enthusiasm of the future, far stronger than any old religion, +may be based upon such a conception. + +But then for the familiar phrase of the 'greatest happiness principle,' it +seems as if we ought now to read 'the noblest happiness principle,' 'the +happiness of others principle'--the principle not of the greatest, but of +the highest pleasure, pursued with no more regard to our own immediate +interest than is required by the law of self-preservation. Transfer the +thought of happiness to another life, dropping the external circumstances +which form so large a part of our idea of happiness in this, and the +meaning of the word becomes indistinguishable from holiness, harmony, +wisdom, love. By the slight addition 'of others,' all the associations of +the word are altered; we seem to have passed over from one theory of morals +to the opposite. For allowing that the happiness of others is reflected on +ourselves, and also that every man must live before he can do good to +others, still the last limitation is a very trifling exception, and the +happiness of another is very far from compensating for the loss of our own. +According to Mr. Mill, he would best carry out the principle of utility who +sacrificed his own pleasure most to that of his fellow-men. But if so, +Hobbes and Butler, Shaftesbury and Hume, are not so far apart as they and +their followers imagine. The thought of self and the thought of others are +alike superseded in the more general notion of the happiness of mankind at +large. But in this composite good, until society becomes perfected, the +friend of man himself has generally the least share, and may be a great +sufferer. + +And now what objection have we to urge against a system of moral philosophy +so beneficent, so enlightened, so ideal, and at the same time so +practical,--so Christian, as we may say without exaggeration,--and which +has the further advantage of resting morality on a principle intelligible +to all capacities? Have we not found that which Socrates and Plato 'grew +old in seeking'? Are we not desirous of happiness, at any rate for +ourselves and our friends, if not for all mankind? If, as is natural, we +begin by thinking of ourselves first, we are easily led on to think of +others; for we cannot help acknowledging that what is right for us is the +right and inheritance of others. We feel the advantage of an abstract +principle wide enough and strong enough to override all the particularisms +of mankind; which acknowledges a universal good, truth, right; which is +capable of inspiring men like a passion, and is the symbol of a cause for +which they are ready to contend to their life's end. + +And if we test this principle by the lives of its professors, it would +certainly appear inferior to none as a rule of action. From the days of +Eudoxus (Arist. Ethics) and Epicurus to our own, the votaries of pleasure +have gained belief for their principles by their practice. Two of the +noblest and most disinterested men who have lived in this century, Bentham +and J. S. Mill, whose lives were a long devotion to the service of their +fellows, have been among the most enthusiastic supporters of utility; while +among their contemporaries, some who were of a more mystical turn of mind, +have ended rather in aspiration than in action, and have been found unequal +to the duties of life. Looking back on them now that they are removed from +the scene, we feel that mankind has been the better for them. The world +was against them while they lived; but this is rather a reason for admiring +than for depreciating them. Nor can any one doubt that the influence of +their philosophy on politics--especially on foreign politics, on law, on +social life, has been upon the whole beneficial. Nevertheless, they will +never have justice done to them, for they do not agree either with the +better feeling of the multitude or with the idealism of more refined +thinkers. Without Bentham, a great word in the history of philosophy would +have remained unspoken. Yet to this day it is rare to hear his name +received with any mark of respect such as would be freely granted to the +ambiguous memory of some father of the Church. The odium which attached to +him when alive has not been removed by his death. For he shocked his +contemporaries by egotism and want of taste; and this generation which has +reaped the benefit of his labours has inherited the feeling of the last. +He was before his own age, and is hardly remembered in this. + +While acknowledging the benefits which the greatest happiness principle has +conferred upon mankind, the time appears to have arrived, not for denying +its claims, but for criticizing them and comparing them with other +principles which equally claim to lie at the foundation of ethics. Any one +who adds a general principle to knowledge has been a benefactor to the +world. But there is a danger that, in his first enthusiasm, he may not +recognize the proportions or limitations to which his truth is subjected; +he does not see how far he has given birth to a truism, or how that which +is a truth to him is a truism to the rest of the world; or may degenerate +in the next generation. He believes that to be the whole which is only a +part,--to be the necessary foundation which is really only a valuable +aspect of the truth. The systems of all philosophers require the criticism +of 'the morrow,' when the heat of imagination which forged them has cooled, +and they are seen in the temperate light of day. All of them have +contributed to enrich the mind of the civilized world; none of them occupy +that supreme or exclusive place which their authors would have assigned to +them. + +We may preface the criticism with a few preliminary remarks:-- + +Mr. Mill, Mr. Austin, and others, in their eagerness to maintain the +doctrine of utility, are fond of repeating that we are in a lamentable +state of uncertainty about morals. While other branches of knowledge have +made extraordinary progress, in moral philosophy we are supposed by them to +be no better than children, and with few exceptions--that is to say, +Bentham and his followers--to be no further advanced than men were in the +age of Socrates and Plato, who, in their turn, are deemed to be as backward +in ethics as they necessarily were in physics. But this, though often +asserted, is recanted almost in a breath by the same writers who speak thus +depreciatingly of our modern ethical philosophy. For they are the first to +acknowledge that we have not now to begin classifying actions under the +head of utility; they would not deny that about the general conceptions of +morals there is a practical agreement. There is no more doubt that +falsehood is wrong than that a stone falls to the ground, although the +first does not admit of the same ocular proof as the second. There is no +greater uncertainty about the duty of obedience to parents and to the law +of the land than about the properties of triangles. Unless we are looking +for a new moral world which has no marrying and giving in marriage, there +is no greater disagreement in theory about the right relations of the sexes +than about the composition of water. These and a few other simple +principles, as they have endless applications in practice, so also may be +developed in theory into counsels of perfection. + +To what then is to be attributed this opinion which has been often +entertained about the uncertainty of morals? Chiefly to this,--that +philosophers have not always distinguished the theoretical and the +casuistical uncertainty of morals from the practical certainty. There is +an uncertainty about details,--whether, for example, under given +circumstances such and such a moral principle is to be enforced, or whether +in some cases there may not be a conflict of duties: these are the +exceptions to the ordinary rules of morality, important, indeed, but not +extending to the one thousandth or one ten-thousandth part of human +actions. This is the domain of casuistry. Secondly, the aspects under +which the most general principles of morals may be presented to us are many +and various. The mind of man has been more than usually active in thinking +about man. The conceptions of harmony, happiness, right, freedom, +benevolence, self-love, have all of them seemed to some philosopher or +other the truest and most comprehensive expression of morality. There is +no difference, or at any rate no great difference, of opinion about the +right and wrong of actions, but only about the general notion which +furnishes the best explanation or gives the most comprehensive view of +them. This, in the language of Kant, is the sphere of the metaphysic of +ethics. But these two uncertainties at either end, en tois malista +katholou and en tois kath ekasta, leave space enough for an intermediate +principle which is practically certain. + +The rule of human life is not dependent on the theories of philosophers: +we know what our duties are for the most part before we speculate about +them. And the use of speculation is not to teach us what we already know, +but to inspire in our minds an interest about morals in general, to +strengthen our conception of the virtues by showing that they confirm one +another, to prove to us, as Socrates would have said, that they are not +many, but one. There is the same kind of pleasure and use in reducing +morals, as in reducing physics, to a few very simple truths. And not +unfrequently the more general principle may correct prejudices and +misconceptions, and enable us to regard our fellow-men in a larger and more +generous spirit. + +The two qualities which seem to be most required in first principles of +ethics are, (1) that they should afford a real explanation of the facts, +(2) that they should inspire the mind,--should harmonize, strengthen, +settle us. We can hardly estimate the influence which a simple principle +such as 'Act so as to promote the happiness of mankind,' or 'Act so that +the rule on which thou actest may be adopted as a law by all rational +beings,' may exercise on the mind of an individual. They will often seem +to open a new world to him, like the religious conceptions of faith or the +spirit of God. The difficulties of ethics disappear when we do not suffer +ourselves to be distracted between different points of view. But to +maintain their hold on us, the general principles must also be +psychologically true--they must agree with our experience, they must accord +with the habits of our minds. + +When we are told that actions are right or wrong only in so far as they +tend towards happiness, we naturally ask what is meant by 'happiness.' For +the term in the common use of language is only to a certain extent +commensurate with moral good and evil. We should hardly say that a good +man could be utterly miserable (Arist. Ethics), or place a bad man in the +first rank of happiness. But yet, from various circumstances, the measure +of a man's happiness may be out of all proportion to his desert. And if we +insist on calling the good man alone happy, we shall be using the term in +some new and transcendental sense, as synonymous with well-being. We have +already seen that happiness includes the happiness of others as well as our +own; we must now comprehend unconscious as well as conscious happiness +under the same word. There is no harm in this extension of the meaning, +but a word which admits of such an extension can hardly be made the basis +of a philosophical system. The exactness which is required in philosophy +will not allow us to comprehend under the same term two ideas so different +as the subjective feeling of pleasure or happiness and the objective +reality of a state which receives our moral approval. + +Like Protarchus in the Philebus, we can give no answer to the question, +'What is that common quality which in all states of human life we call +happiness? which includes the lower and the higher kind of happiness, and +is the aim of the noblest, as well as of the meanest of mankind?' If we +say 'Not pleasure, not virtue, not wisdom, nor yet any quality which we can +abstract from these'--what then? After seeming to hover for a time on the +verge of a great truth, we have gained only a truism. + +Let us ask the question in another form. What is that which constitutes +happiness, over and above the several ingredients of health, wealth, +pleasure, virtue, knowledge, which are included under it? Perhaps we +answer, 'The subjective feeling of them.' But this is very far from being +coextensive with right. Or we may reply that happiness is the whole of +which the above-mentioned are the parts. Still the question recurs, 'In +what does the whole differ from all the parts?' And if we are unable to +distinguish them, happiness will be the mere aggregate of the goods of +life. + +Again, while admitting that in all right action there is an element of +happiness, we cannot help seeing that the utilitarian theory supplies a +much easier explanation of some virtues than of others. Of many patriotic +or benevolent actions we can give a straightforward account by their +tendency to promote happiness. For the explanation of justice, on the +other hand, we have to go a long way round. No man is indignant with a +thief because he has not promoted the greatest happiness of the greatest +number, but because he has done him a wrong. There is an immeasurable +interval between a crime against property or life, and the omission of an +act of charity or benevolence. Yet of this interval the utilitarian theory +takes no cognizance. The greatest happiness principle strengthens our +sense of positive duties towards others, but weakens our recognition of +their rights. To promote in every way possible the happiness of others may +be a counsel of perfection, but hardly seems to offer any ground for a +theory of obligation. For admitting that our ideas of obligation are +partly derived from religion and custom, yet they seem also to contain +other essential elements which cannot be explained by the tendency of +actions to promote happiness. Whence comes the necessity of them? Why are +some actions rather than others which equally tend to the happiness of +mankind imposed upon us with the authority of law? 'You ought' and 'you +had better' are fundamental distinctions in human thought; and having such +distinctions, why should we seek to efface and unsettle them? + +Bentham and Mr. Mill are earnest in maintaining that happiness includes the +happiness of others as well as of ourselves. But what two notions can be +more opposed in many cases than these? Granting that in a perfect state of +the world my own happiness and that of all other men would coincide, in the +imperfect state they often diverge, and I cannot truly bridge over the +difficulty by saying that men will always find pleasure in sacrificing +themselves or in suffering for others. Upon the greatest happiness +principle it is admitted that I am to have a share, and in consistency I +should pursue my own happiness as impartially as that of my neighbour. But +who can decide what proportion should be mine and what his, except on the +principle that I am most likely to be deceived in my own favour, and had +therefore better give the larger share, if not all, to him? + +Further, it is admitted that utility and right coincide, not in particular +instances, but in classes of actions. But is it not distracting to the +conscience of a man to be told that in the particular case they are +opposed? Happiness is said to be the ground of moral obligation, yet he +must not do what clearly conduces to his own happiness if it is at variance +with the good of the whole. Nay, further, he will be taught that when +utility and right are in apparent conflict any amount of utility does not +alter by a hair's-breadth the morality of actions, which cannot be allowed +to deviate from established law or usage; and that the non-detection of an +immoral act, say of telling a lie, which may often make the greatest +difference in the consequences, not only to himself, but to all the world, +makes none whatever in the act itself. + +Again, if we are concerned not with particular actions but with classes of +actions, is the tendency of actions to happiness a principle upon which we +can classify them? There is a universal law which imperatively declares +certain acts to be right or wrong:--can there be any universality in the +law which measures actions by their tendencies towards happiness? For an +act which is the cause of happiness to one person may be the cause of +unhappiness to another; or an act which if performed by one person may +increase the happiness of mankind may have the opposite effect if performed +by another. Right can never be wrong, or wrong right, that there are no +actions which tend to the happiness of mankind which may not under other +circumstances tend to their unhappiness. Unless we say not only that all +right actions tend to happiness, but that they tend to happiness in the +same degree in which they are right (and in that case the word 'right' is +plainer), we weaken the absoluteness of our moral standard; we reduce +differences in kind to differences in degree; we obliterate the stamp which +the authority of ages has set upon vice and crime. + +Once more: turning from theory to practice we feel the importance of +retaining the received distinctions of morality. Words such as truth, +justice, honesty, virtue, love, have a simple meaning; they have become +sacred to us,--'the word of God' written on the human heart: to no other +words can the same associations be attached. We cannot explain them +adequately on principles of utility; in attempting to do so we rob them of +their true character. We give them a meaning often paradoxical and +distorted, and generally weaker than their signification in common +language. And as words influence men's thoughts, we fear that the hold of +morality may also be weakened, and the sense of duty impaired, if virtue +and vice are explained only as the qualities which do or do not contribute +to the pleasure of the world. In that very expression we seem to detect a +false ring, for pleasure is individual not universal; we speak of eternal +and immutable justice, but not of eternal and immutable pleasure; nor by +any refinement can we avoid some taint of bodily sense adhering to the +meaning of the word. + +Again: the higher the view which men take of life, the more they lose +sight of their own pleasure or interest. True religion is not working for +a reward only, but is ready to work equally without a reward. It is not +'doing the will of God for the sake of eternal happiness,' but doing the +will of God because it is best, whether rewarded or unrewarded. And this +applies to others as well as to ourselves. For he who sacrifices himself +for the good of others, does not sacrifice himself that they may be saved +from the persecution which he endures for their sakes, but rather that they +in their turn may be able to undergo similar sufferings, and like him stand +fast in the truth. To promote their happiness is not his first object, but +to elevate their moral nature. Both in his own case and that of others +there may be happiness in the distance, but if there were no happiness he +would equally act as he does. We are speaking of the highest and noblest +natures; and a passing thought naturally arises in our minds, 'Whether that +can be the first principle of morals which is hardly regarded in their own +case by the greatest benefactors of mankind?' + +The admissions that pleasures differ in kind, and that actions are already +classified; the acknowledgment that happiness includes the happiness of +others, as well as of ourselves; the confusion (not made by Aristotle) +between conscious and unconscious happiness, or between happiness the +energy and happiness the result of the energy, introduce uncertainty and +inconsistency into the whole enquiry. We reason readily and cheerfully +from a greatest happiness principle. But we find that utilitarians do not +agree among themselves about the meaning of the word. Still less can they +impart to others a common conception or conviction of the nature of +happiness. The meaning of the word is always insensibly slipping away from +us, into pleasure, out of pleasure, now appearing as the motive, now as the +test of actions, and sometimes varying in successive sentences. And as in +a mathematical demonstration an error in the original number disturbs the +whole calculation which follows, this fundamental uncertainty about the +word vitiates all the applications of it. Must we not admit that a notion +so uncertain in meaning, so void of content, so at variance with common +language and opinion, does not comply adequately with either of our two +requirements? It can neither strike the imaginative faculty, nor give an +explanation of phenomena which is in accordance with our individual +experience. It is indefinite; it supplies only a partial account of human +actions: it is one among many theories of philosophers. It may be +compared with other notions, such as the chief good of Plato, which may be +best expressed to us under the form of a harmony, or with Kant's obedience +to law, which may be summed up under the word 'duty,' or with the Stoical +'Follow nature,' and seems to have no advantage over them. All of these +present a certain aspect of moral truth. None of them are, or indeed +profess to be, the only principle of morals. + +And this brings us to speak of the most serious objection to the +utilitarian system--its exclusiveness. There is no place for Kant or +Hegel, for Plato and Aristotle alongside of it. They do not reject the +greatest happiness principle, but it rejects them. Now the phenomena of +moral action differ, and some are best explained upon one principle and +some upon another: the virtue of justice seems to be naturally connected +with one theory of morals, the virtues of temperance and benevolence with +another. The characters of men also differ; and some are more attracted by +one aspect of the truth, some by another. The firm stoical nature will +conceive virtue under the conception of law, the philanthropist under that +of doing good, the quietist under that of resignation, the enthusiast under +that of faith or love. The upright man of the world will desire above all +things that morality should be plain and fixed, and should use language in +its ordinary sense. Persons of an imaginative temperament will generally +be dissatisfied with the words 'utility' or 'pleasure': their principle of +right is of a far higher character--what or where to be found they cannot +always distinctly tell;--deduced from the laws of human nature, says one; +resting on the will of God, says another; based upon some transcendental +idea which animates more worlds than one, says a third: + +on nomoi prokeintai upsipodes, ouranian +di aithera teknothentes. + +To satisfy an imaginative nature in any degree, the doctrine of utility +must be so transfigured that it becomes altogether different and loses all +simplicity. + +But why, since there are different characters among men, should we not +allow them to envisage morality accordingly, and be thankful to the great +men who have provided for all of us modes and instruments of thought? +Would the world have been better if there had been no Stoics or Kantists, +no Platonists or Cartesians? No more than if the other pole of moral +philosophy had been excluded. All men have principles which are above +their practice; they admit premises which, if carried to their conclusions, +are a sufficient basis of morals. In asserting liberty of speculation we +are not encouraging individuals to make right or wrong for themselves, but +only conceding that they may choose the form under which they prefer to +contemplate them. Nor do we say that one of these aspects is as true and +good as another; but that they all of them, if they are not mere sophisms +and illusions, define and bring into relief some part of the truth which +would have been obscure without their light. Why should we endeavour to +bind all men within the limits of a single metaphysical conception? The +necessary imperfection of language seems to require that we should view the +same truth under more than one aspect. + +We are living in the second age of utilitarianism, when the charm of +novelty and the fervour of the first disciples has passed away. The +doctrine is no longer stated in the forcible paradoxical manner of Bentham, +but has to be adapted to meet objections; its corners are rubbed off, and +the meaning of its most characteristic expressions is softened. The array +of the enemy melts away when we approach him. The greatest happiness of +the greatest number was a great original idea when enunciated by Bentham, +which leavened a generation and has left its mark on thought and +civilization in all succeeding times. His grasp of it had the intensity of +genius. In the spirit of an ancient philosopher he would have denied that +pleasures differed in kind, or that by happiness he meant anything but +pleasure. He would perhaps have revolted us by his thoroughness. The +'guardianship of his doctrine' has passed into other hands; and now we seem +to see its weak points, its ambiguities, its want of exactness while +assuming the highest exactness, its one-sidedness, its paradoxical +explanation of several of the virtues. No philosophy has ever stood this +criticism of the next generation, though the founders of all of them have +imagined that they were built upon a rock. And the utilitarian system, +like others, has yielded to the inevitable analysis. Even in the opinion +of 'her admirers she has been terribly damaged' (Phil.), and is no longer +the only moral philosophy, but one among many which have contributed in +various degrees to the intellectual progress of mankind. + +But because the utilitarian philosophy can no longer claim 'the prize,' we +must not refuse to acknowledge the great benefits conferred by it on the +world. All philosophies are refuted in their turn, says the sceptic, and +he looks forward to all future systems sharing the fate of the past. All +philosophies remain, says the thinker; they have done a great work in their +own day, and they supply posterity with aspects of the truth and with +instruments of thought. Though they may be shorn of their glory, they +retain their place in the organism of knowledge. + +And still there remain many rules of morals which are better explained and +more forcibly inculcated on the principle of utility than on any other. +The question Will such and such an action promote the happiness of myself, +my family, my country, the world? may check the rising feeling of pride or +honour which would cause a quarrel, an estrangement, a war. 'How can I +contribute to the greatest happiness of others?' is another form of the +question which will be more attractive to the minds of many than a +deduction of the duty of benevolence from a priori principles. In politics +especially hardly any other argument can be allowed to have weight except +the happiness of a people. All parties alike profess to aim at this, which +though often used only as the disguise of self-interest has a great and +real influence on the minds of statesmen. In religion, again, nothing can +more tend to mitigate superstition than the belief that the good of man is +also the will of God. This is an easy test to which the prejudices and +superstitions of men may be brought:--whatever does not tend to the good of +men is not of God. And the ideal of the greatest happiness of mankind, +especially if believed to be the will of God, when compared with the actual +fact, will be one of the strongest motives to do good to others. + +On the other hand, when the temptation is to speak falsely, to be dishonest +or unjust, or in any way to interfere with the rights of others, the +argument that these actions regarded as a class will not conduce to the +happiness of mankind, though true enough, seems to have less force than the +feeling which is already implanted in the mind by conscience and authority. +To resolve this feeling into the greatest happiness principle takes away +from its sacred and authoritative character. The martyr will not go to the +stake in order that he may promote the happiness of mankind, but for the +sake of the truth: neither will the soldier advance to the cannon's mouth +merely because he believes military discipline to be for the good of +mankind. It is better for him to know that he will be shot, that he will +be disgraced, if he runs away--he has no need to look beyond military +honour, patriotism, 'England expects every man to do his duty.' These are +stronger motives than the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which +is the thesis of a philosopher, not the watchword of an army. For in human +actions men do not always require broad principles; duties often come home +to us more when they are limited and defined, and sanctioned by custom and +public opinion. + +Lastly, if we turn to the history of ethics, we shall find that our moral +ideas have originated not in utility but in religion, in law, in +conceptions of nature, of an ideal good, and the like. And many may be +inclined to think that this conclusively disproves the claim of utility to +be the basis of morals. But the utilitarian will fairly reply (see above) +that we must distinguish the origin of ethics from the principles of them-- +the historical germ from the later growth of reflection. And he may also +truly add that for two thousand years and more, utility, if not the +originating, has been the great corrective principle in law, in politics, +in religion, leading men to ask how evil may be diminished and good +increased--by what course of policy the public interest may be promoted, +and to understand that God wills the happiness, not of some of his +creatures and in this world only, but of all of them and in every stage of +their existence. + +'What is the place of happiness or utility in a system of moral +philosophy?' is analogous to the question asked in the Philebus, 'What rank +does pleasure hold in the scale of goods?' Admitting the greatest +happiness principle to be true and valuable, and the necessary foundation +of that part of morals which relates to the consequences of actions, we +still have to consider whether this or some other general notion is the +highest principle of human life. We may try them in this comparison by +three tests--definiteness, comprehensiveness, and motive power. + +There are three subjective principles of morals,--sympathy, benevolence, +self-love. But sympathy seems to rest morality on feelings which differ +widely even in good men; benevolence and self-love torture one half of our +virtuous actions into the likeness of the other. The greatest happiness +principle, which includes both, has the advantage over all these in +comprehensiveness, but the advantage is purchased at the expense of +definiteness. + +Again, there are the legal and political principles of morals--freedom, +equality, rights of persons; 'Every man to count for one and no man for +more than one,' 'Every man equal in the eye of the law and of the +legislator.' There is also the other sort of political morality, which if +not beginning with 'Might is right,' at any rate seeks to deduce our ideas +of justice from the necessities of the state and of society. According to +this view the greatest good of men is obedience to law: the best human +government is a rational despotism, and the best idea which we can form of +a divine being is that of a despot acting not wholly without regard to law +and order. To such a view the present mixed state of the world, not wholly +evil or wholly good, is supposed to be a witness. More we might desire to +have, but are not permitted. Though a human tyrant would be intolerable, a +divine tyrant is a very tolerable governor of the universe. This is the +doctrine of Thrasymachus adapted to the public opinion of modern times. + +There is yet a third view which combines the two:--freedom is obedience to +the law, and the greatest order is also the greatest freedom; 'Act so that +thy action may be the law of every intelligent being.' This view is noble +and elevating; but it seems to err, like other transcendental principles of +ethics, in being too abstract. For there is the same difficulty in +connecting the idea of duty with particular duties as in bridging the gulf +between phainomena and onta; and when, as in the system of Kant, this +universal idea or law is held to be independent of space and time, such a +mataion eidos becomes almost unmeaning. + +Once more there are the religious principles of morals:--the will of God +revealed in Scripture and in nature. No philosophy has supplied a sanction +equal in authority to this, or a motive equal in strength to the belief in +another life. Yet about these too we must ask What will of God? how +revealed to us, and by what proofs? Religion, like happiness, is a word +which has great influence apart from any consideration of its content: it +may be for great good or for great evil. But true religion is the +synthesis of religion and morality, beginning with divine perfection in +which all human perfection is embodied. It moves among ideas of holiness, +justice, love, wisdom, truth; these are to God, in whom they are +personified, what the Platonic ideas are to the idea of good. It is the +consciousness of the will of God that all men should be as he is. It lives +in this world and is known to us only through the phenomena of this world, +but it extends to worlds beyond. Ordinary religion which is alloyed with +motives of this world may easily be in excess, may be fanatical, may be +interested, may be the mask of ambition, may be perverted in a thousand +ways. But of that religion which combines the will of God with our highest +ideas of truth and right there can never be too much. This impossibility +of excess is the note of divine moderation. + +So then, having briefly passed in review the various principles of moral +philosophy, we may now arrange our goods in order, though, like the reader +of the Philebus, we have a difficulty in distinguishing the different +aspects of them from one another, or defining the point at which the human +passes into the divine. + +First, the eternal will of God in this world and in another,--justice, +holiness, wisdom, love, without succession of acts (ouch e genesis +prosestin), which is known to us in part only, and reverenced by us as +divine perfection. + +Secondly, human perfection, or the fulfilment of the will of God in this +world, and co-operation with his laws revealed to us by reason and +experience, in nature, history, and in our own minds. + +Thirdly, the elements of human perfection,--virtue, knowledge, and right +opinion. + +Fourthly, the external conditions of perfection,--health and the goods of +life. + +Fifthly, beauty and happiness,--the inward enjoyment of that which is best +and fairest in this world and in the human soul. + +... + +The Philebus is probably the latest in time of the writings of Plato with +the exception of the Laws. We have in it therefore the last development of +his philosophy. The extreme and one-sided doctrines of the Cynics and +Cyrenaics are included in a larger whole; the relations of pleasure and +knowledge to each other and to the good are authoritatively determined; the +Eleatic Being and the Heraclitean Flux no longer divide the empire of +thought; the Mind of Anaxagoras has become the Mind of God and of the +World. The great distinction between pure and applied science for the +first time has a place in philosophy; the natural claim of dialectic to be +the Queen of the Sciences is once more affirmed. This latter is the bond +of union which pervades the whole or nearly the whole of the Platonic +writings. And here as in several other dialogues (Phaedrus, Republic, +etc.) it is presented to us in a manner playful yet also serious, and +sometimes as if the thought of it were too great for human utterance and +came down from heaven direct. It is the organization of knowledge +wonderful to think of at a time when knowledge itself could hardly be said +to exist. It is this more than any other element which distinguishes +Plato, not only from the presocratic philosophers, but from Socrates +himself. + +We have not yet reached the confines of Aristotle, but we make a somewhat +nearer approach to him in the Philebus than in the earlier Platonic +writings. The germs of logic are beginning to appear, but they are not +collected into a whole, or made a separate science or system. Many +thinkers of many different schools have to be interposed between the +Parmenides or Philebus of Plato, and the Physics or Metaphysics of +Aristotle. It is this interval upon which we have to fix our minds if we +would rightly understand the character of the transition from one to the +other. Plato and Aristotle do not dovetail into one another; nor does the +one begin where the other ends; there is a gulf between them not to be +measured by time, which in the fragmentary state of our knowledge it is +impossible to bridge over. It follows that the one cannot be interpreted +by the other. At any rate, it is not Plato who is to be interpreted by +Aristotle, but Aristotle by Plato. Of all philosophy and of all art the +true understanding is to be sought not in the afterthoughts of posterity, +but in the elements out of which they have arisen. For the previous stage +is a tendency towards the ideal at which they are aiming; the later is a +declination or deviation from them, or even a perversion of them. No man's +thoughts were ever so well expressed by his disciples as by himself. + +But although Plato in the Philebus does not come into any close connexion +with Aristotle, he is now a long way from himself and from the beginnings +of his own philosophy. At the time of his death he left his system still +incomplete; or he may be more truly said to have had no system, but to have +lived in the successive stages or moments of metaphysical thought which +presented themselves from time to time. The earlier discussions about +universal ideas and definitions seem to have died away; the correlation of +ideas has taken their place. The flowers of rhetoric and poetry have lost +their freshness and charm; and a technical language has begun to supersede +and overgrow them. But the power of thinking tends to increase with age, +and the experience of life to widen and deepen. The good is summed up +under categories which are not summa genera, but heads or gradations of +thought. The question of pleasure and the relation of bodily pleasures to +mental, which is hardly treated of elsewhere in Plato, is here analysed +with great subtlety. The mean or measure is now made the first principle +of good. Some of these questions reappear in Aristotle, as does also the +distinction between metaphysics and mathematics. But there are many things +in Plato which have been lost in Aristotle; and many things in Aristotle +not to be found in Plato. The most remarkable deficiency in Aristotle is +the disappearance of the Platonic dialectic, which in the Aristotelian +school is only used in a comparatively unimportant and trivial sense. The +most remarkable additions are the invention of the Syllogism, the +conception of happiness as the foundation of morals, the reference of human +actions to the standard of the better mind of the world, or of the one +'sensible man' or 'superior person.' His conception of ousia, or essence, +is not an advance upon Plato, but a return to the poor and meagre +abstractions of the Eleatic philosophy. The dry attempt to reduce the +presocratic philosophy by his own rather arbitrary standard of the four +causes, contrasts unfavourably with Plato's general discussion of the same +subject (Sophist). To attempt further to sum up the differences between +the two great philosophers would be out of place here. Any real discussion +of their relation to one another must be preceded by an examination into +the nature and character of the Aristotelian writings and the form in which +they have come down to us. This enquiry is not really separable from an +investigation of Theophrastus as well as Aristotle and of the remains of +other schools of philosophy as well as of the Peripatetics. But, without +entering on this wide field, even a superficial consideration of the +logical and metaphysical works which pass under the name of Aristotle, +whether we suppose them to have come directly from his hand or to be the +tradition of his school, is sufficient to show how great was the mental +activity which prevailed in the latter half of the fourth century B.C.; +what eddies and whirlpools of controversies were surging in the chaos of +thought, what transformations of the old philosophies were taking place +everywhere, what eclecticisms and syncretisms and realisms and nominalisms +were affecting the mind of Hellas. The decline of philosophy during this +period is no less remarkable than the loss of freedom; and the two are not +unconnected with each other. But of the multitudinous sea of opinions +which were current in the age of Aristotle we have no exact account. We +know of them from allusions only. And we cannot with advantage fill up the +void of our knowledge by conjecture: we can only make allowance for our +ignorance. + +There are several passages in the Philebus which are very characteristic of +Plato, and which we shall do well to consider not only in their connexion, +but apart from their connexion as inspired sayings or oracles which receive +their full interpretation only from the history of philosophy in later +ages. The more serious attacks on traditional beliefs which are often +veiled under an unusual simplicity or irony are of this kind. Such, for +example, is the excessive and more than human awe which Socrates expresses +about the names of the gods, which may be not unaptly compared with the +importance attached by mankind to theological terms in other ages; for this +also may be comprehended under the satire of Socrates. Let us observe the +religious and intellectual enthusiasm which shines forth in the following, +'The power and faculty of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the +sake of the truth': or, again, the singular acknowledgment which may be +regarded as the anticipation of a new logic, that 'In going to war for mind +I must have weapons of a different make from those which I used before, +although some of the old ones may do again.' Let us pause awhile to +reflect on a sentence which is full of meaning to reformers of religion or +to the original thinker of all ages: 'Shall we then agree with them of old +time, and merely reassert the notions of others without risk to ourselves; +or shall we venture also to share in the risk and bear the reproach which +will await us': i.e. if we assert mind to be the author of nature. Let us +note the remarkable words, 'That in the divine nature of Zeus there is the +soul and mind of a King, because there is in him the power of the cause,' a +saying in which theology and philosophy are blended and reconciled; not +omitting to observe the deep insight into human nature which is shown by +the repetition of the same thought 'All philosophers are agreed that mind +is the king of heaven and earth' with the ironical addition, 'in this way +truly they magnify themselves.' Nor let us pass unheeded the indignation +felt by the generous youth at the 'blasphemy' of those who say that Chaos +and Chance Medley created the world; or the significance of the words +'those who said of old time that mind rules the universe'; or the pregnant +observation that 'we are not always conscious of what we are doing or of +what happens to us,' a chance expression to which if philosophers had +attended they would have escaped many errors in psychology. We may +contrast the contempt which is poured upon the verbal difficulty of the one +and many, and the seriousness with the unity of opposites is regarded from +the higher point of view of abstract ideas: or compare the simple manner +in which the question of cause and effect and their mutual dependence is +regarded by Plato (to which modern science has returned in Mill and Bacon), +and the cumbrous fourfold division of causes in the Physics and Metaphysics +of Aristotle, for which it has puzzled the world to find a use in so many +centuries. When we consider the backwardness of knowledge in the age of +Plato, the boldness with which he looks forward into the distance, the many +questions of modern philosophy which are anticipated in his writings, may +we not truly describe him in his own words as a 'spectator of all time and +of all existence'? + + +PHILEBUS + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus. + + +SOCRATES: Observe, Protarchus, the nature of the position which you are +now going to take from Philebus, and what the other position is which I +maintain, and which, if you do not approve of it, is to be controverted by +you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides? + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, and +the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living being, +whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and intelligence and memory, +and their kindred, right opinion and true reasoning, are better and more +desirable than pleasure for all who are able to partake of them, and that +to all such who are or ever will be they are the most advantageous of all +things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of +the argument? + +PHILEBUS: Nothing could be fairer, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned to +you? + +PROTARCHUS: I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left +the field. + +SOCRATES: Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to be +ascertained. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Shall we further agree-- + +PROTARCHUS: To what? + +SOCRATES: That you and I must now try to indicate some state and +disposition of the soul, which has the property of making all men happy. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, by all means. + +SOCRATES: And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a +state? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And what if there be a third state, which is better than either? +Then both of us are vanquished--are we not? But if this life, which really +has the power of making men happy, turn out to be more akin to pleasure +than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage over the +life of wisdom. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, +then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;--do you agree? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say, Philebus? + +PHILEBUS: I say, and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the +conqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus. + +PROTARCHUS: You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have +no longer a voice in the matter? + +PHILEBUS: True enough. Nevertheless I would clear myself and deliver my +soul of you; and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do so. + +PROTARCHUS: You may appeal to us; we too will be the witnesses of your +words. And now, Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we +will proceed with the argument. + +SOCRATES: Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus +says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the +gods is more than human--it exceeds all other fears. And now I would not +sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what she +pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just +now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one +name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she +takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the +intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very +temperance,--that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies +and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how +foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are +severally alike! + +PROTARCHUS: Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring from +opposite sources, but they are not in themselves opposite. For must not +pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure,--that is, like +itself? + +SOCRATES: Yes, my good friend, just as colour is like colour;--in so far +as colours are colours, there is no difference between them; and yet we all +know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed to white: +or again, as figure is like figure, for all figures are comprehended under +one class; and yet particular figures may be absolutely opposed to one +another, and there is an infinite diversity of them. And we might find +similar examples in many other things; therefore do not rely upon this +argument, which would go to prove the unity of the most extreme opposites. +And I suspect that we shall find a similar opposition among pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument? + +SOCRATES: Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to +them a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good; now +although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, as +we are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good; but you call them +all good, and at the same time are compelled, if you are pressed, to +acknowledge that they are unlike. And so you must tell us what is the +identical quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which makes you +designate all of them as good. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any one who +asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some +pleasures are good and others bad? + +SOCRATES: And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one +another, and sometimes opposed? + +PROTARCHUS: Not in so far as they are pleasures. + +SOCRATES: That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are +to say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures, but that they +are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do not pierce +our dull minds, but we go on arguing all the same, like the weakest and +most inexperienced reasoners? (Probably corrupt.) + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Why, I mean to say, that in self-defence I may, if I like, +follow your example, and assert boldly that the two things most unlike are +most absolutely alike; and the result will be that you and I will prove +ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing; and the argument will +be blown away and lost. Suppose that we put back, and return to the old +position; then perhaps we may come to an understanding with one another. + +PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you? + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind, and those other +qualities which I, when asked by you at first what is the nature of the +good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case with the pleasures of +which you spoke. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: The sciences are a numerous class, and will be found to present +great differences. But even admitting that, like the pleasures, they are +opposite as well as different, should I be worthy of the name of +dialectician if, in order to avoid this difficulty, I were to say (as you +are saying of pleasure) that there is no difference between one science and +another;--would not the argument founder and disappear like an idle tale, +although we might ourselves escape drowning by clinging to a fallacy? + +PROTARCHUS: May none of this befal us, except the deliverance! Yet I like +the even-handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let us +assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and +different sciences. + +SOCRATES: And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the differences +between my good and yours; but let us bring them to the light in the hope +that, in the process of testing them, they may show whether pleasure is to +be called the good, or wisdom, or some third quality; for surely we are not +now simply contending in order that my view or that yours may prevail, but +I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting for the truth. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly we ought. + +SOCRATES: Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish the +principle on which the argument rests. + +PROTARCHUS: What principle? + +SOCRATES: A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty, and +some men sometimes against their will. + +PROTARCHUS: Speak plainer. + +SOCRATES: The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel of +nature; for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful +propositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack. + +PROTARCHUS: Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by +nature one and also many, dividing the single 'me' into many 'me's,' and +even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten thousand +other ways? + +SOCRATES: Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes +about the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this time +agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true +course of thought; and no more favour is shown to that other puzzle, in +which a person proves the members and parts of anything to be divided, and +then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof of his +own words: Why, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, and the +many are only one. + +PROTARCHUS: But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected with +this subject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and +acknowledged? + +SOCRATES: When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things +that are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving, for in +those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as I was +saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed; but when the +assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the good +one, then the interest which attaches to these and similar unities and the +attempt which is made to divide them gives birth to a controversy. + +PROTARCHUS: Of what nature? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real +existence; and then how each individual unity, being always the same, and +incapable either of generation or of destruction, but retaining a permanent +individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and multiplied in the +infinity of the world of generation, or as still entire and yet divided +from itself, which latter would seem to be the greatest impossibility of +all, for how can one and the same thing be at the same time in one and in +many things? These, Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is the +one and many to which they relate; they are the source of great perplexity +if ill decided, and the right determination of them is very helpful. + +PROTARCHUS: Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions. + +SOCRATES: That is what I should wish. + +PROTARCHUS: And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear +them discussed; Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move, and +we had better not stir him up with questions. + +SOCRATES: Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious +battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we begin thus? + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: We say that the one and many become identified by thought, and +that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of every +word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never cease, and is +not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of thought +itself, which never grows old. Any young man, when he first tastes these +subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of +wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no stone, or rather no +thought unturned, now rolling up the many into the one, and kneading them +together, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles himself first and +above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbours, whether they are +older or younger, or of his own age--that makes no difference; neither +father nor mother does he spare; no human being who has ears is safe from +him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian would have no chance of escaping +him, if an interpreter could only be found. + +PROTARCHUS: Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are +young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all set upon you, +if you abuse us? We understand what you mean; but is there no charm by +which we may dispel all this confusion, no more excellent way of arriving +at the truth? If there is, we hope that you will guide us into that way, +and we will do our best to follow, for the enquiry in which we are engaged, +Socrates, is not unimportant. + +SOCRATES: The reverse of unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and +there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite way, which +has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me helpless in the hour +of need. + +PROTARCHUS: Tell us what that is. + +SOCRATES: One which may be easily pointed out, but is by no means easy of +application; it is the parent of all the discoveries in the arts. + +PROTARCHUS: Tell us what it is. + +SOCRATES: A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among +men by the hands of a new Prometheus, and therewith a blaze of light; and +the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the gods than we are, handed +down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be are composed of one +and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted in them: seeing, +then, that such is the order of the world, we too ought in every enquiry to +begin by laying down one idea of that which is the subject of enquiry; this +unity we shall find in everything. Having found it, we may next proceed to +look for two, if there be two, or, if not, then for three or some other +number, subdividing each of these units, until at last the unity with which +we began is seen not only to be one and many and infinite, but also a +definite number; the infinite must not be suffered to approach the many +until the entire number of the species intermediate between unity and +infinity has been discovered,--then, and not till then, we may rest from +division, and without further troubling ourselves about the endless +individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, as I was saying, +is the way of considering and learning and teaching one another, which the +gods have handed down to us. But the wise men of our time are either too +quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity. Having no method, they +make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass at once to infinity; +the intermediate steps never occur to them. And this, I repeat, is what +makes the difference between the mere art of disputation and true +dialectic. + +PROTARCHUS: I think that I partly understand you Socrates, but I should +like to have a clearer notion of what you are saying. + +SOCRATES: I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet, +Protarchus, which you were made to learn as a child. + +PROTARCHUS: How do they afford an illustration? + +SOCRATES: The sound which passes through the lips whether of an individual +or of all men is one and yet infinite. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound is +infinite are we perfect in the art of speech, but the knowledge of the +number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same +kind. + +PROTARCHUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Sound is one in music as well as in grammar? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And there is a higher note and a lower note, and a note of equal +pitch:--may we affirm so much? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you +knew; though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of +music. + +PROTARCHUS: Nothing. + +SOCRATES: But when you have learned what sounds are high and what low, and +the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or proportions, and +the systems compounded out of them, which our fathers discovered, and have +handed down to us who are their descendants under the name of harmonies; +and the affections corresponding to them in the movements of the human +body, which when measured by numbers ought, as they say, to be called +rhythms and measures; and they tell us that the same principle should be +applied to every one and many;--when, I say, you have learned all this, +then, my dear friend, you are perfect; and you may be said to understand +any other subject, when you have a similar grasp of it. But the infinity +of kinds and the infinity of individuals which there is in each of them, +when not classified, creates in every one of us a state of infinite +ignorance; and he who never looks for number in anything, will not himself +be looked for in the number of famous men. + +PROTARCHUS: I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent, +Philebus. + +PHILEBUS: I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon the +argument? + +SOCRATES: Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus. + +PROTARCHUS: Indeed he is, and you must answer him. + +SOCRATES: I will; but you must let me make one little remark first about +these matters; I was saying, that he who begins with any individual unity, +should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a definite number, and +now I say conversely, that he who has to begin with infinity should not +jump to unity, but he should look about for some number representing a +certain quantity, and thus out of all end in one. And now let us return +for an illustration of our principle to the case of letters. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said to +have been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first +distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then other +letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e., the semivowels); +these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he distinguished a third +class of letters which we now call mutes, without voice and without sound, +and divided these, and likewise the two other classes of vowels and +semivowels, into the individual sounds, and told the number of them, and +gave to each and all of them the name of letters; and observing that none +of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all, and in +consideration of this common bond which in a manner united them, he +assigned to them all a single art, and this he called the art of grammar or +letters. + +PHILEBUS: The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding +the original statement, but I still feel the defect of which I just now +complained. + +SOCRATES: Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the +argument? + +PHILEBUS: Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long +asking. + +SOCRATES: Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the question +which, as you say, you have been so long asking? + +PHILEBUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility +of pleasure and wisdom? + +PHILEBUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And we maintain that they are each of them one? + +PHILEBUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the precise question to which the previous discussion +desires an answer is, how they are one and also many (i.e., how they have +one genus and many species), and are not at once infinite, and what number +of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into +infinity (i.e. into the infinite number of individuals). + +PROTARCHUS: That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates +has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us shall +answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable to answer, +and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have undertaken the whole +charge of the argument, but if neither of us were able to answer, the +result methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let us consider, then, +what we are to do:--Socrates, if I understood him rightly, is asking +whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is the number and nature +of them, and the same of wisdom. + +SOCRATES: Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed +that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, +likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest +use in any enquiry. + +PROTARCHUS: That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would +the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him is +that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will tell +you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing with +you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best of human +goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment and +the like were the chief good, you answered--No, not those, but another +class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves of what you said, +and very properly, in order that we may not forget to examine and compare +the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are to be designated as +superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, are mind and +knowledge and understanding and art, and the like. There was a dispute +about which were the best, and we playfully threatened that you should not +be allowed to go home until the question was settled; and you agreed, and +placed yourself at our disposal. And now, as children say, what has been +fairly given cannot be taken back; cease then to fight against us in this +way. + +SOCRATES: In what way? + +PHILEBUS: Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which we +have not as yet any sufficient answer to give; let us not imagine that a +general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if we +are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have promised. Consider, then, +whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge according to their kinds; or +you may let the matter drop, if you are able and willing to find some other +mode of clearing up our controversy. + +SOCRATES: If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words 'if +you are willing' dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to have +recalled something to my mind. + +PHILEBUS: What is that? + +SOCRATES: I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about +pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they were +to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the good, but +some third thing, which was different from them, and better than either. +If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for +the good will cease to be identified with her:--Am I not right? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds +of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more clearly +as we proceed. + +PROTARCHUS: Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose. + +SOCRATES: But, let us first agree on some little points. + +PROTARCHUS: What are they? + +SOCRATES: Is the good perfect or imperfect? + +PROTARCHUS: The most perfect, Socrates, of all things. + +SOCRATES: And is the good sufficient? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things. + +SOCRATES: And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt +after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care +not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by good. + +PROTARCHUS: That is undeniable. + +SOCRATES: Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of +wisdom, and pass them in review. + +PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure +in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, it cannot +be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want anything, then +it cannot really be the chief good. + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And will you help us to test these two lives? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then answer. + +PROTARCHUS: Ask. + +SOCRATES: Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the +enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly I should. + +SOCRATES: Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you +if you had perfect pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and +forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight? + +PROTARCHUS: Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things. + +SOCRATES: Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the +greatest pleasures? + +PROTARCHUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true +opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you +were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that +you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the +pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no +true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and +if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on +future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an +oyster or 'pulmo marinus.' Could this be otherwise? + +PROTARCHUS: No. + +SOCRATES: But is such a life eligible? + +PROTARCHUS: I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away +from me the power of speech. + +SOCRATES: We must keep up our spirits;--let us now take the life of mind +and examine it in turn. + +PROTARCHUS: And what is this life of mind? + +SOCRATES: I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, +having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having +no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like +feelings? + +PROTARCHUS: Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is likely, +as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else. + +SOCRATES: What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to +one that was made out of the union of the two? + +PROTARCHUS: Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom? + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is the life which I mean. + +PROTARCHUS: There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would +surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in +addition to them. + +SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence? + +PROTARCHUS: To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the +three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible +for man or for animal. + +SOCRATES: Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the +good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and +perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to +live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have +chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own +free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly that seems to be true. + +SOCRATES: And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus' goddess is +not to be regarded as identical with the good? + +PHILEBUS: Neither is your 'mind' the good, Socrates, for that will be open +to the same objections. + +SOCRATES: Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my 'mind'; +but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, I +will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed +life; but we must come to some understanding about the second place. For +you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life; and +in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them might +be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further to +argue in opposition to Philebus, that the element which makes this mixed +life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than to +pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share +either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own +mind, attain even to the third. + +PROTARCHUS: Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall; in +fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid +low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be +thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim. And if +pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second place, she +would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to them +would she still appear as fair as before. + +SOCRATES: Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by +applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her? + +PROTARCHUS: Nonsense, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which +is an impossibility? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be aware +that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the argument. + +SOCRATES: Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and just +at present not at all an easy one. For in going to war in the cause of +mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have weapons of +another make from those which I used before; some, however, of the old ones +may do again. And must I then finish the argument? + +PROTARCHUS: Of course you must. + +SOCRATES: Let us be very careful in laying the foundation. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you do +not object, into three classes. + +PROTARCHUS: Upon what principle would you make the division? + +SOCRATES: Let us take some of our newly-found notions. + +PROTARCHUS: Which of them? + +SOCRATES: Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of +existence, and also an infinite? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which is +compounded out of them; but I fear that I am ridiculously clumsy at these +processes of division and enumeration. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, my good friend? + +SOCRATES: I say that a fourth class is still wanted. + +PROTARCHUS: What will that be? + +SOCRATES: Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a +fourth class to the three others. + +PROTARCHUS: And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of +resolution as well as a cause of composition? + +SOCRATES: Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some future +time you shall allow me to have it. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let us begin with the first three; and as we find two out of the +three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite them, and +see how in each of them there is a one and many. + +PROTARCHUS: If you would explain to me a little more about them, perhaps I +might be able to follow you. + +SOCRATES: Well, the two classes are the same which I mentioned before, one +the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the infinite +is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter discussed. + +PROTARCHUS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And now consider well; for the question to which I invite your +attention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter and +colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more +and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end? +for if they had an end, the more and less would themselves have an end. + +PROTARCHUS: That is most true. + +SOCRATES: Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a +more and a less. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and +being endless they must also be infinite. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such an +expression as 'exceedingly,' which you have just uttered, and also the term +'gently,' have the same significance as more or less; for whenever they +occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity--they are always +introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison of a more or a +less excessive or a more or a less gentle, and at each creation of more or +less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now saying, if quantity and +measure did not disappear, but were allowed to intrude in the sphere of +more and less and the other comparatives, these last would be driven out of +their own domain. When definite quantity is once admitted, there can be no +longer a 'hotter' or a 'colder' (for these are always progressing, and are +never in one stay); but definite quantity is at rest, and has ceased to +progress. Which proves that comparatives, such as the hotter and the +colder, are to be ranked in the class of the infinite. + +PROTARCHUS: Your remark certainly has the look of truth, Socrates; but +these subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at first. I +think however, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or +twice, there would be a substantial agreement between us. + +SOCRATES: Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather +not waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars, let me know +whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite-- + +PROTARCHUS: What? + +SOCRATES: I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit of +more or less, or are denoted by the words 'exceedingly,' 'gently,' +'extremely,' and the like, may not be referred to the class of the +infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous +argument, all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought +together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if possible, set +upon them--do you remember? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit +their opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal, or +again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure--all these may, +I think, be rightly reckoned by us in the class of the limited or finite; +what do you say? + +PROTARCHUS: Excellent, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound +kind? + +PROTARCHUS: You, I think, will have to tell me that. + +SOCRATES: Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen to +my prayers. + +PROTARCHUS: Offer up a prayer, then, and think. + +SOCRATES: I am thinking, Protarchus, and I believe that some God has +befriended us. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what you +are saying? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you, and do you listen to my words. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, slower, greater, +smaller, and all that in the preceding argument we placed under the unity +of more and less. + +PROTARCHUS: In the class of the infinite, you mean? + +SOCRATES: Yes; and now mingle this with the other. + +PROTARCHUS: What is the other. + +SOCRATES: The class of the finite which we ought to have brought together +as we did the infinite; but, perhaps, it will come to the same thing if we +do so now;--when the two are combined, a third will appear. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by the class of the finite? + +SOCRATES: The class of the equal and the double, and any class which puts +an end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number creates +harmony and proportion among the different elements. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand; you seem to me to mean that the various +opposites, when you mingle with them the class of the finite, takes certain +forms. + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: Does not the right participation in the finite give health--in +disease, for instance? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And whereas the high and low, the swift and the slow are +infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principles aforesaid +introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly. + +SOCRATES: Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the introduction +of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse moderation and +harmony? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the +seasons, and all the delights of life? + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and +strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: O my +beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal wantonness +and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no limit to +pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and order, whereby, +as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, delivers the soul.-- +What think you, Protarchus? + +PROTARCHUS: Her ways are much to my mind, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: You will observe that I have spoken of three classes? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that the +infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of existences; +but what you would make the third I am not so certain. + +SOCRATES: That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too +much for you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with the +infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them were sealed +with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we readily +acknowledged it to be by nature one? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand me +to mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being, effected by +the measure which the limit introduces. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand. + +SOCRATES: Still there was, as we said, a fourth class to be investigated, +and you must assist in the investigation; for does not everything which +comes into being, of necessity come into being through a cause? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no +cause? + +SOCRATES: And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name; +the agent and the cause may be rightly called one? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall +find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name--shall we not? + +PROTARCHUS: We shall. + +SOCRATES: The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or +effect naturally follows it? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation are +not the same, but different? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of +which they were generated, furnish all the three classes? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven +to be distinct from them,--and may therefore be called a fourth principle? + +PROTARCHUS: So let us call it. + +SOCRATES: Quite right; but now, having distinguished the four, I think +that we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them in +order. + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and the +second the finite or limited; then follows the third, an essence compound +and generated; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in speaking of +the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And now what is the next question, and how came we hither? Were +we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom? + +PROTARCHUS: We were. + +SOCRATES: And now, having determined these points, shall we not be better +able to decide about the first and second place, which was the original +subject of dispute? + +PROTARCHUS: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and +wisdom was the conqueror--did we not? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to what +class it is to be assigned? + +PROTARCHUS: Beyond a doubt. + +SOCRATES: This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class; +which is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the +elements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may therefore be truly +said to comprehend the conqueror life. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all +sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? +Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer? + +PHILEBUS: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class +which admits of more and less? + +PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for +pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity +and degree. + +SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the +infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of +good. But now--admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of +the infinite--in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, +can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us +be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on +this point. + +PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god. + +SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; +but still I must beg you to answer the question. + +PROTARCHUS: Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must submit to him. + +PHILEBUS: And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must +entreat you, Socrates, to be our spokesman, and then we shall not say +anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite. + +SOCRATES: I must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose a +difficult one; but did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you with +my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to what class mind and +knowledge belong? + +PROTARCHUS: You did, indeed, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Yet the answer is easy, since all philosophers assert with one +voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth--in reality they are +magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should +like to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more +fully. + +PHILEBUS: Take your own course, Socrates, and never mind length; we shall +not tire of you. + +SOCRATES: Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a question. + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the +guidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our fathers +have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence and +wisdom. + +PROTARCHUS: Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, for +that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy; but the +other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the aspect of +the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars and of the +whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think otherwise. + +SOCRATES: Shall we then agree with them of old time in maintaining this +doctrine,--not merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk to +ourselves,--but shall we share in the danger, and take our part of the +reproach which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares that +all is disorder? + +PROTARCHUS: That would certainly be my wish. + +SOCRATES: Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: We see that the elements which enter into the nature of the +bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor +cries, 'land' (i.e., earth), reappear in the constitution of the world. + +PROTARCHUS: The proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm gathers +over us, and we are at our wit's end. + +SOCRATES: There is something to be remarked about each of these elements. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: Only a small fraction of any one of them exists in us, and that +of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy of its +nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is fire within +us, and in the universe. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in +the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power that +fire has. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and +ruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other +animals, dependent on the universal fire? + +PROTARCHUS: That is a question which does not deserve an answer. + +SOCRATES: Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the +earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, and you +would give a similar reply about all the other elements? + +PROTARCHUS: Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his +senses? + +SOCRATES: I do not think that he could--but now go on to the next step. +When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in +one, did we not call them a body? + +PROTARCHUS: We did. + +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same +reason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same +elements. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body +nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which we +were just now speaking? + +PROTARCHUS: That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to +be asked. + +SOCRATES: Well, tell me, is this question worth asking? + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: May our body be said to have a soul? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body +of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in +every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the +four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the +cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies +souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and +operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes +of wisdom;--we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements +exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only +fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have +designed the noblest and fairest things? + +PROTARCHUS: Such a supposition is quite unreasonable. + +SOCRATES: Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the +other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite +and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a +presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and +seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind? + +PROTARCHUS: Most justly. + +SOCRATES: And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is +the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the +cause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are pleased to +be called. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O +Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said of +old time that mind rules the universe. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that +mind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause of +all; and I think that you now have my answer. + +PROTARCHUS: I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had +answered. + +SOCRATES: A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts +earnest. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the +class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago +discovered? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was +akin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite and +belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have in itself, a +beginning, middle, or end of its own. + +PROTARCHUS: I shall be sure to remember. + +SOCRATES: We must next examine what is their place and under what +conditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since her +class was first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart +from pain. + +PROTARCHUS: If this is the road, let us take it. + +SOCRATES: I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of +pleasure and pain. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class. + +PROTARCHUS: And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the +aforesaid classes is the mixed one? + +SOCRATES: I will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we +placed third in the list of four. + +PROTARCHUS: That which followed the infinite and the finite; and in which +you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony. + +SOCRATES: Capital; and now will you please to give me your best attention? + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed; I am attending. + +SOCRATES: I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is +also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain. + +PROTARCHUS: That is very probable. + +SOCRATES: And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the +source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and shortest +words about matters of the greatest moment. + +PROTARCHUS: I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be +a little plainer? + +SOCRATES: Do not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest +illustration? + +PROTARCHUS: What phenomena do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of +moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure: once more, the +unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the +natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain, +and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their +original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to +you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and +infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living +beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their own +nature is pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Granted; what you say has a general truth. + +SOCRATES: Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating +severally in the two processes which we have described? + +PROTARCHUS: Good. + +SOCRATES: Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an +antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an +expectation of pain, fearful and anxious. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of +the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation. + +SOCRATES: Right; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to +be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure, +methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is +to be desired, or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not +rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been +mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other +things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not +to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and in +some instances admitting of the nature of good. + +PROTARCHUS: You say most truly that this is the track which the +investigation should pursue. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and +pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be the +condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration nor +of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether any animal who is in +that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or +small? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure +and of pain? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And do not forget that there is such a state; it will make a +great difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this or +not. And I should like to say a few words about it. + +PROTARCHUS: What have you to say? + +SOCRATES: Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there is +no reason why he should not live in this neutral state. + +PROTARCHUS: You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing? + +SOCRATES: Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no +degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be necessary to +him who chose the life of thought and wisdom. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, we said so. + +SOCRATES: Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this +may not be the most divine of all lives? + +PROTARCHUS: If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have +either joy or sorrow. + +SOCRATES: Certainly not--there would be a great impropriety in the +assumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not +indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if in +any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion we will +place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second place, should +she have to resign the first. + +PROTARCHUS: Just so. + +SOCRATES: The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is purely +mental, is entirely derived from memory. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I must first of all analyze memory, or rather perception which +is prior to memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to be properly +cleared up. + +PROTARCHUS: How will you proceed? + +SOCRATES: Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished +before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other +affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock to +both and to each of them. + +PROTARCHUS: Granted. + +SOCRATES: And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but +not of the second? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness +in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in this +case has not yet entered; and to speak of the loss of that which is not yet +in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction; do you see? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then just be so good as to change the terms. + +PROTARCHUS: How shall I change them? + +SOCRATES: Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing the +state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say +unconsciousness. + +PROTARCHUS: I see. + +SOCRATES: And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and +motion would be properly called consciousness? + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Then now we know the meaning of the word? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the +preservation of consciousness? + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: But do we not distinguish memory from recollection? + +PROTARCHUS: I think so. + +SOCRATES: And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has +of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced when in +company with the body? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of some +consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and +reminiscence? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: There is a reason why I say all this. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and +desire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the +previous analysis helps to show the nature of both. + +PROTARCHUS: Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point. + +SOCRATES: There are certainly many things to be considered in discussing +the generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must +determine the nature and seat of desire. + +PROTARCHUS: Ay; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing. + +SOCRATES: Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the +answer. + +PROTARCHUS: A fair retort; but let us proceed. + +SOCRATES: Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of +desires? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And yet they are very different; what common nature have we in +view when we call them by a single name? + +PROTARCHUS: By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is not easily +answered; but it must be answered. + +SOCRATES: Then let us go back to our examples. + +PROTARCHUS: Where shall we begin? + +SOCRATES: Do we mean anything when we say 'a man thirsts'? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: We mean to say that he 'is empty'? + +PROTARCHUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And is not thirst desire? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, of drink. + +SOCRATES: Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink? + +PROTARCHUS: I should say, of replenishment with drink. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of +what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly so. + +SOCRATES: But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain either +by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment, of which he +has no present or past experience? + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And yet he who desires, surely desires something? + +PROTARCHUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: He does not desire that which he experiences, for he experiences +thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires replenishment? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some +way apprehends replenishment? + +PROTARCHUS: There must. + +SOCRATES: And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be +emptied? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the +replenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other way can +there be? + +PROTARCHUS: I cannot imagine any other. + +SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence? + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: That there is no such thing as desire of the body. + +PROTARCHUS: Why so? + +SOCRATES: Why, because the argument shows that the endeavour of every +animal is to the reverse of his bodily state. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is +experiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the argument, having proved that memory attracts us towards +the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires and +the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or +thirsts or has any similar experience. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + +SOCRATES: Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to me to +imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these affections. + +PROTARCHUS: Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you +speaking? + +SOCRATES: I am speaking of being emptied and replenished, and of all that +relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as well as of +the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the pleasure which +succeeds to it. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the intermediate state? + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by 'intermediate'? + +SOCRATES: I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers +past pleasures which, if they would only return, would relieve him; but as +yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an intermediate +state? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased? + +PROTARCHUS: Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body there is +the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and expectation. + +SOCRATES: What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man +who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other +times be quite in despair? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be +filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then man and the other animals have at the same time both +pleasure and pain? + +PROTARCHUS: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there +will be the double experience of pain. You observed this and inferred that +the double experience was the single case possible. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the +occasion of raising a question? + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we +are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false? + +PROTARCHUS: But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains? + +SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true +and false expectations, or true and false opinions? + +PROTARCHUS: I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures. + +SOCRATES: What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very +serious enquiry. + +PROTARCHUS: There I agree. + +SOCRATES: And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus' boys, the point to +be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Surely. + +SOCRATES: No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is +said should be pertinent. + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised. + +PROTARCHUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true? + +PROTARCHUS: To be sure I do. + +SOCRATES: Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not +rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or +waking, mad or lunatic? + +PROTARCHUS: So we have always held, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your +opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: I think that we should. + +SOCRATES: Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has +arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And such a thing as pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And an opinion must be of something? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And a man must be pleased by something? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite correct. + +SOCRATES: And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference; +it will still be an opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, +will always have a real feeling of pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is also quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true +only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is the question. + +SOCRATES: You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence +becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this is +what you think should be examined? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in +other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as +well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have +various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we +should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak of +a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse of +rightness? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the +opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its +object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name? + +PROTARCHUS: Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we? + +SOCRATES: And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which +is not true, but false? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as we were +saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure +false. + +SOCRATES: How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure! + +PROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear. + +SOCRATES: And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure +which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is +often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance? + +PROTARCHUS: There must be a very great difference, between them. + +SOCRATES: Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference. + +PROTARCHUS: Lead, and I will follow. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, my view is-- + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: We agree--do we not?--that there is such a thing as false, and +also such a thing as true opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often +consequent upon these--upon true and false opinion, I mean. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always +spring from memory and perception? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature? + +PROTARCHUS: Of what nature? + +SOCRATES: An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and +the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees. + +PROTARCHUS: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Soon he begins to interrogate himself. + +PROTARCHUS: In what manner? + +SOCRATES: He asks himself--'What is that which appears to be standing by +the rock under the tree?' This is the question which he may be supposed to +put to himself when he sees such an appearance. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: To which he may guess the right answer, saying as if in a +whisper to himself--'It is a man.' + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Or again, he may be misled, and then he will say--'No, it is a +figure made by the shepherds.' + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in +articulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a +proposition. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him, he +may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in my explanation of +this phenomenon. + +PROTARCHUS: What is your explanation? + +SOCRATES: I think that the soul at such times is like a book. + +PROTARCHUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant +feelings seem to almost to write down words in the soul, and when the +inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions +which are the expressions of opinion come into our souls--but when the +scribe within us writes falsely, the result is false. + +PROTARCHUS: I quite assent and agree to your statement. + +SOCRATES: I must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is busy +at the same time in the chambers of the soul. + +PROTARCHUS: Who is he? + +SOCRATES: The painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws +images in the soul of the things which he has described. + +PROTARCHUS: But when and how does he do this? + +SOCRATES: When a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense +certain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the subjects +of them;--is not this a very common mental phenomenon? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And the images answering to true opinions and words are true, +and to false opinions and words false; are they not? + +PROTARCHUS: They are. + +SOCRATES: If we are right so far, there arises a further question. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in +relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also? + +PROTARCHUS: I should say in relation to all times alike. + +SOCRATES: Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described +already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones; from which we +may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do with the future? + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And do all those writings and paintings which, as we were saying +a little while ago, are produced in us, relate to the past and present +only, and not to the future? + +PROTARCHUS: To the future, very much. + +SOCRATES: When you say, 'Very much,' you mean to imply that all these +representations are hopes about the future, and that mankind are filled +with hopes in every stage of existence? + +PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Answer me another question. + +PROTARCHUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he +not? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly he is. + +SOCRATES: And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with +hopes? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which +exist in the minds of each of us? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may often +have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture +there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good +fortune. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, +have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false pictures? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as +the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: They are. + +SOCRATES: The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good +in true pleasures? + +PROTARCHUS: Doubtless. + +SOCRATES: Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of +men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of a +similar character? + +PROTARCHUS: There are. + +SOCRATES: And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a +real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the +past, present, or future? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not +right? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real +but illusory character? + +PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure +who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased about things +which neither have nor have ever had any real existence, and, more often +than not, are never likely to exist. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable. + +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like; +are they not often false? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are +true or false? + +PROTARCHUS: In no other way. + +SOCRATES: Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as +they are false. + +PROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth; for no one +would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason of +some other great corruption to which they are liable. + +SOCRATES: Well, of pleasures which are corrupt and caused by corruption we +will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the present I +would rather show by another argument that there are many false pleasures +existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist our final +decision. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures. + +SOCRATES: I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion which +should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new +argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as +they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart +from the soul--do you remember? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, I remember that you said so. + +SOCRATES: And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily +state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was +experienced. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then now you may infer what happens in such cases. + +PROTARCHUS: What am I to infer? + +SOCRATES: That in such cases pleasures and pains come simultaneously; and +there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond to +them, as has been already shown. + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And there is another point to which we have agreed. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that +they are of the class of infinites. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly, we said so. + +SOCRATES: But how can we rightly judge of them? + +PROTARCHUS: How can we? + +SOCRATES: Is it our intention to judge of their comparative importance and +intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and +pleasure against pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them +accordingly. + +SOCRATES: Well, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance +of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine falsely; +and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of pleasures and +pains? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater. + +SOCRATES: Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were +saying before. + +PROTARCHUS: What was that? + +SOCRATES: Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the +pleasures and pains with their own falsity. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false +because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison; +the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when placed side by +side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by side with the +pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly, and for the reason which you mention. + +SOCRATES: And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element +which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are: you +will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never say that +the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or true. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find +pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are +still more false than these. + +PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how shall we find them? + +SOCRATES: If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and aches +and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of +nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and repletions, and +evacuations, and also by growth and decay? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that has been often said. + +SOCRATES: And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural +state is pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body +experiences none of these changes. + +PROTARCHUS: When can that be, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Your question, Protarchus, does not help the argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Why not, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine. + +PROTARCHUS: And what was that? + +SOCRATES: Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may +ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were? + +PROTARCHUS: You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed +either for good or bad? + +SOCRATES: Yes. + +PROTARCHUS: Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be +neither pleasure nor pain. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that +we must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise tell us; +for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, and their words are of no mean authority. + +SOCRATES: Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I +should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I +mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight. + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: To them we will say: 'Good; but are we, or living things in +general, always conscious of what happens to us--for example, of our +growth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly +unconscious of this and similar phenomena?' You must answer for them. + +PROTARCHUS: The latter alternative is the true one. + +SOCRATES: Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going +up and down cause pleasures and pains? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be-- + +PROTARCHUS: What? + +SOCRATES: If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains, +but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither. + +PROTARCHUS: That, Socrates, is the more correct mode of speaking. + +SOCRATES: But if this be true, the life to which I was just now referring +again appears. + +PROTARCHUS: What life? + +SOCRATES: The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of +joy. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one +painful, and the third which is neither; what say you? + +PROTARCHUS: I should say as you do that there are three of them. + +SOCRATES: But if so, the negation of pain will not be the same with +pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live without +pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand him to +mean by that statement? + +PROTARCHUS: I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain. + +SOCRATES: Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a +little and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a +third which is neither. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver? + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably +spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons who say and +think so. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free +from pain? + +PROTARCHUS: They say so. + +SOCRATES: And they must think or they would not say that they have +pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct +natures, they are wrong. + +PROTARCHUS: But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures. + +SOCRATES: Then shall we take the view that they are three, as we were just +now saying, or that they are two only--the one being a state of pain, which +is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of itself a good, +and is called pleasant? + +PROTARCHUS: But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all? I do not +see the reason. + +SOCRATES: You, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies of +our friend Philebus. + +PROTARCHUS: And who may they be? + +SOCRATES: Certain persons who are reputed to be masters in natural +philosophy, who deny the very existence of pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: Indeed! + +SOCRATES: They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are +all of them only avoidances of pain. + +PROTARCHUS: And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them? + +SOCRATES: Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, who +divine the truth, not by rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance and +extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of pleasure, in +which they think that there is nothing sound, and her seductive influence +is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. This is the use +which you may make of them. And when you have considered the various +grounds of their dislike, you shall hear from me what I deem to be true +pleasures. Having thus examined the nature of pleasure from both points of +view, we will bring her up for judgment. + +PROTARCHUS: Well said. + +SOCRATES: Then let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers and +follow in the track of their dislike. I imagine that they would say +something of this sort; they would begin at the beginning, and ask whether, +if we wanted to know the nature of any quality, such as hardness, we should +be more likely to discover it by looking at the hardest things, rather than +at the least hard? You, Protarchus, shall answer these severe gentlemen as +you answer me. + +PROTARCHUS: By all means, and I reply to them, that you should look at the +greatest instances. + +SOCRATES: Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a class, +we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most extreme +and most vehement? + +PROTARCHUS: In that every one will agree. + +SOCRATES: And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we have +often said, are the pleasures of the body? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we are +sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our answer, +or we shall come to grief. + +PROTARCHUS: How will that be? + +SOCRATES: Why, because we might be tempted to answer, 'When we are in +health.' + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is the natural answer. + +SOCRATES: Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind +have the greatest desires? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness, +feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely? Am I not +right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the +satisfaction of their want? + +PROTARCHUS: That is obvious as soon as it is said. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a person +would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look, not at +health, but at disease? And here you must distinguish:--do not imagine +that I mean to ask whether those who are very ill have more pleasures than +those who are well, but understand that I am speaking of the magnitude of +pleasure; I want to know where pleasures are found to be most intense. +For, as I say, we have to discover what is pleasure, and what they mean by +pleasure who deny her very existence. + +PROTARCHUS: I think I follow you. + +SOCRATES: You will soon have a better opportunity of showing whether you +do or not, Protarchus. Answer now, and tell me whether you see, I will not +say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness than in +temperance? Reflect before you speak. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand you, and see that there is a great difference +between them; the temperate are restrained by the wise man's aphorism of +'Never too much,' which is their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing +the minds of fools and wantons becomes madness and makes them shout with +delight. + +SOCRATES: Very good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures and +pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body, and not +in a virtuous state. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and +see what makes them the greatest? + +PROTARCHUS: To be sure we ought. + +SOCRATES: Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain +disorders. + +PROTARCHUS: What disorders? + +SOCRATES: The pleasures of unseemly disorders, which our severe friends +utterly detest. + +PROTARCHUS: What pleasures? + +SOCRATES: Such, for example, as the relief of itching and other ailments +by scratching, which is the only remedy required. For what in Heaven's +name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us?--Pleasure or +pain? + +PROTARCHUS: A villainous mixture of some kind, Socrates, I should say. + +SOCRATES: I did not introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any +personal reference to Philebus, but because, without the consideration of +these and similar pleasures, we shall not be able to determine the point at +issue. + +PROTARCHUS: Then we had better proceed to analyze this family of +pleasures. + +SOCRATES: You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain? + +PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in the +body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul; while there +are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to soul and body, +which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes +pains. + +PROTARCHUS: How is that? + +SOCRATES: Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, a +man experiences two opposite feelings; for example, when he is cold and is +growing warm, or again, when he is hot and is becoming cool, and he wants +to have the one and be rid of the other;--the sweet has a bitter, as the +common saying is, and both together fasten upon him and create irritation +and in time drive him to distraction. + +PROTARCHUS: That description is very true to nature. + +SOCRATES: And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are +sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Of cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example is +afforded by itching, of which we were just now speaking, and by the +tingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within, and +the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not reach the +parts affected; then if you put them to the fire, and as a last resort +apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense pleasure or pain +in the inner parts, which contrasts and mingles with the pain or pleasure, +as the case may be, of the outer parts; and this is due to the forcible +separation of what is united, or to the union of what is separated, and to +the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the +slight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle, and causes a gentle +irritation; or again, the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an +excitement in him,--he even leaps for joy, he assumes all sorts of +attitudes, he changes all manner of colours, he gasps for breath, and is +quite amazed, and utters the most irrational exclamations. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, indeed. + +SOCRATES: He will say of himself, and others will say of him, that he is +dying with these delights; and the more dissipated and good-for-nothing he +is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every way; of all pleasures he +declares them to be the greatest; and he reckons him who lives in the most +constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of mankind. + +PROTARCHUS: That, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions of +the majority about pleasures. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which arise +out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the body; there +are also cases in which the mind contributes an opposite element to the +body, whether of pleasure or pain, and the two unite and form one mixture. +Concerning these I have already remarked, that when a man is empty he +desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity. But now +I must further add what I omitted before, that in all these and similar +emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they are innumerable), +pleasure and pain coalesce in one. + +PROTARCHUS: I believe that to be quite true. + +SOCRATES: There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures and +pains. + +PROTARCHUS: What is that? + +SOCRATES: The union which, as we were saying, the mind often experiences +of purely mental feelings. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, +emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful +pleasures? need I remind you of the anger + +'Which stirs even a wise man to violence, +And is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb?' + +And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and +bereavement? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, there is a natural connexion between them. + +SOCRATES: And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the +spectators smile through their tears? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly I do. + +SOCRATES: And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a +mixed feeling of pain and pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: I do not quite understand you. + +SOCRATES: I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in +recognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy. + +PROTARCHUS: There is, I think. + +SOCRATES: And the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable is +the examination of it, because the difficulty in detecting other cases of +mixed pleasures and pains will be less. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of +the soul? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of +his neighbours at which he is pleased? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an +evil? + +PROTARCHUS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: From these considerations learn to know the nature of the +ridiculous. + +PROTARCHUS: Explain. + +SOCRATES: The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to +describe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general it is +that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at Delphi. + +PROTARCHUS: You mean, Socrates, 'Know thyself.' + +SOCRATES: I do; and the opposite would be, 'Know not thyself.' + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three. + +PROTARCHUS: Indeed I am afraid that I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will. + +SOCRATES: Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be +shown? + +PROTARCHUS: What are they? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy himself +richer than he is. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is a very common error. + +SOCRATES: And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer +than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he really +has not. + +PROTARCHUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of +the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion. + +SOCRATES: And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of +mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of +contention and lying conceit of wisdom? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And may not all this be truly called an evil condition? + +PROTARCHUS: Very evil. + +SOCRATES: But we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if +we would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure +and pain. + +PROTARCHUS: How can we make the further division which you suggest? + +SOCRATES: All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of +themselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two +classes--one having power and might; and the other the reverse. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who +are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may be +truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be more +truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in the powerul is +hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in +fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth is, +ridiculous. + +PROTARCHUS: That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the +admixture of pleasures and pains. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy. + +PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous +pain? + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the +misfortunes of enemies? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends' +misfortunes--is not that wrong? + +PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly. + +SOCRATES: Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we +enumerated--the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are +ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May we +not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of +mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous? + +PROTARCHUS: They are ridiculous. + +SOCRATES: And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a +misfortune? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly we feel pleasure. + +SOCRATES: And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at +the misfortunes of friends? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our +friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy has +been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant; and so +we envy and laugh at the same instant. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure +and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only on the stage, +but on the greater stage of human life; and so in endless other cases. + +PROTARCHUS: I do not see how any one can deny what you say, Socrates, +however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion. + +SOCRATES: I mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, +and similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a mixture of the +two elements so often named; did I not? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference +only to sorrow and envy and anger. + +PROTARCHUS: I see. + +SOCRATES: Then many other cases still remain? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the +admixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that there +was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love and similar +affections; and I thought that when I had given you the illustration, you +would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a general truth that the +body without the soul, and the soul without the body, as well as the two +united, are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains; +and so further discussion would have been unnecessary. And now I want to +know whether I may depart; or will you keep me here until midnight? I +fancy that I may obtain my release without many words;--if I promise that +to-morrow I will give you an account of all these cases. But at present I +would rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters which +remain to be settled, before the judgment can be given which Philebus +demands. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course. + +SOCRATES: Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their +turn; this is the natural and necessary order. + +PROTARCHUS: Excellent. + +SOCRATES: These, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to indicate; for with +the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, +I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as witnesses, that there +are pleasures which seem only and are not, and there are others again which +have great power and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled with pains, +and are partly alleviations of agony and distress, both of body and mind. + +PROTARCHUS: Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in +conceiving to be true? + +SOCRATES: True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and +form, and most of those which arise from smells; those of sound, again, and +in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and of +which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with +pain. + +PROTARCHUS: Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean. + +SOCRATES: My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be +plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or +pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, says the +argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane +or solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers +and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively +beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely +beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of +scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character, and +have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning? + +PROTARCHUS: I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will +try to make your meaning clearer. + +SOCRATES: When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, +then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, +and have natural pleasures associated with them. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, there are such pleasures. + +SOCRATES: The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they +have no necessary admixture of pain; and all pleasures, however and +wherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an +analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand. + +SOCRATES: To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger +of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them. + +PROTARCHUS: And this is the case. + +SOCRATES: Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his knowledge, +are there not pains of forgetting? + +PROTARCHUS: Not necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, when he +feels grief at the loss of his knowledge. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the +natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection. + +PROTARCHUS: In that case you are right in saying that the loss of +knowledge is not attended with pain. + +SOCRATES: These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain; and +they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those +which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description +of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that +those which are not in excess have measure; the great, the excessive, +whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in referring to the class +of the infinite, and of the more and less, which pours through body and +soul alike; and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, +greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth? + +PROTARCHUS: Why do you ask, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and +knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and +impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for +judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me and +by all of us. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Let us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for +consideration a single instance. + +PROTARCHUS: What instance shall we select? + +SOCRATES: Suppose that we first of all take whiteness. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that +purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most +unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours? + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly that which is most unadulterated. + +SOCRATES: True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest +or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful? + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white +is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed. + +PROTARCHUS: Perfectly right. + +SOCRATES: There is no need of adducing many similar examples in +illustration of the argument about pleasure; one such is sufficient to +prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure or +unalloyed with pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a great +pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind. + +PROTARCHUS: Assuredly; and the instance you have given is quite +sufficient. + +SOCRATES: But what do you say of another question:--have we not heard that +pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do not certain +ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be grateful +to them? + +PROTARCHUS: What do they mean? + +SOCRATES: I will explain to you, my dear Protarchus, what they mean, by +putting a question. + +PROTARCHUS: Ask, and I will answer. + +SOCRATES: I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and the +other ever in want of something. + +PROTARCHUS: What manner of natures are they? + +SOCRATES: The one majestic ever, the other inferior. + +PROTARCHUS: You speak riddles. + +SOCRATES: You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of +them. + +PROTARCHUS: I should think so. + +SOCRATES: Search the universe for two terms which are like these two and +are present everywhere. + +PROTARCHUS: Yet a third time I must say, Be a little plainer, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: There is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in +play, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something else +(relatives), and that other things are the ends to which the former class +subserve (absolutes). + +PROTARCHUS: Your many repetitions make me slow to understand. + +SOCRATES: As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning +will become clearer. + +PROTARCHUS: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Here are two new principles. + +PROTARCHUS: What are they? + +SOCRATES: One is the generation of all things, and the other is essence. + +PROTARCHUS: I readily accept from you both generation and essence. + +SOCRATES: Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake of +essence, or essence for the sake of generation? + +PROTARCHUS: You want to know whether that which is called essence is, +properly speaking, for the sake of generation? + +SOCRATES: Yes. + +PROTARCHUS: By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question. + +SOCRATES: I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me that +ship-building is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of ship- +building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question. + +PROTARCHUS: Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I have no objection, but you must take your part. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, material, +are given to us with a view to generation, and that each generation is +relative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence, and that the whole +of generation is relative to the whole of essence. + +PROTARCHUS: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sake +of some essence? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And that for the sake of which something else is done must be +placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of +something else, in some other class, my good friend. + +PROTARCHUS: Most certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in +some other class than that of good? + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + +SOCRATES: Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him +who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had no true +being at all; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of pleasure +being a good. + +PROTARCHUS: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation +their highest end. + +PROTARCHUS: Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean? + +SOCRATES: I am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or +thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted at +the process as if it were pleasure; and they say that they would not wish +to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which might be +mentioned. + +PROTARCHUS: That is certainly what they appear to think. + +SOCRATES: And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite +of generation? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation and +destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we were +saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible +thought. + +PROTARCHUS: He who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is involved +in great absurdities, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Great, indeed; and there is yet another of them. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good +or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the soul +only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure; and that courage or +temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul, is not really a +good?--and is there not yet a further absurdity in our being compelled to +say that he who has a feeling of pain and not of pleasure is bad at the +time when he is suffering pain, even though he be the best of men; and +again, that he who has a feeling of pleasure, in so far as he is pleased at +the time when he is pleased, in that degree excels in virtue? + +PROTARCHUS: Nothing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this. + +SOCRATES: And now, having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let us +not appear to be too sparing of mind and knowledge: let us ring their +metal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part, until we have +found out what in them is of the purest nature; and then the truest +elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up for judgment. + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: Knowledge has two parts,--the one productive, and the other +educational? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And in the productive or handicraft arts, is not one part more +akin to knowledge, and the other less; and may not the one part be regarded +as the pure, and the other as the impure? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of +them. + +PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how do you separate them? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing be +taken away from any art, that which remains will not be much. + +PROTARCHUS: Not much, certainly. + +SOCRATES: The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of the +senses which is given by experience and practice, in addition to a certain +power of guessing, which is commonly called art, and is perfected by +attention and pains. + +PROTARCHUS: Nothing more, assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism; for sounds are +harmonized, not by measure, but by skilful conjecture; the music of the +flute is always trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating note, and is +therefore mixed up with much that is doubtful and has little which is +certain. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And the same will be found to hold good of medicine and +husbandry and piloting and generalship. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: The art of the builder, on the other hand, which uses a number +of measures and instruments, attains by their help to a greater degree of +accuracy than the other arts. + +PROTARCHUS: How is that? + +SOCRATES: In ship-building and house-building, and in other branches of +the art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, compass, line, +and a most ingenious machine for straightening wood. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then now let us divide the arts of which we were speaking into +two kinds,--the arts which, like music, are less exact in their results, +and those which, like carpentering, are more exact. + +PROTARCHUS: Let us make that division. + +SOCRATES: Of the latter class, the most exact of all are those which we +just now spoke of as primary. + +PROTARCHUS: I see that you mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of +weighing and measuring. + +SOCRATES: Certainly, Protarchus; but are not these also distinguishable +into two kinds? + +PROTARCHUS: What are the two kinds? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, arithmetic is of two kinds, one of which is +popular, and the other philosophical. + +PROTARCHUS: How would you distinguish them? + +SOCRATES: There is a wide difference between them, Protarchus; some +arithmeticians reckon unequal units; as for example, two armies, two oxen, +two very large things or two very small things. The party who are opposed +to them insist that every unit in ten thousand must be the same as every +other unit. + +PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly there is, as you say, a great difference among the +votaries of the science; and there may be reasonably supposed to be two +sorts of arithmetic. + +SOCRATES: And when we compare the art of mensuration which is used in +building with philosophical geometry, or the art of computation which is +used in trading with exact calculation, shall we say of either of the pairs +that it is one or two? + +PROTARCHUS: On the analogy of what has preceded, I should be of opinion +that they were severally two. + +SOCRATES: Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject? + +PROTARCHUS: I think so, but I should like to be told by you. + +SOCRATES: The argument has all along been seeking a parallel to pleasure, +and true to that original design, has gone on to ask whether one sort of +knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another. + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly; that was the intention. + +SOCRATES: And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown +that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of +certainty? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And just now did not the argument first designate a particular +art by a common term, thus making us believe in the unity of that art; and +then again, as if speaking of two different things, proceed to enquire +whether the art as pursed by philosophers, or as pursued by non- +philosophers, has more of certainty and purity? + +PROTARCHUS: That is the very question which the argument is asking. + +SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry? + +PROTARCHUS: O Socrates, we have reached a point at which the difference of +clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous. + +SOCRATES: Then the answer will be the easier. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly; and let us say in reply, that those arts into which +arithmetic and mensuration enter, far surpass all others; and that of these +the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure philosophic impulse are +infinitely superior in accuracy and truth. + +SOCRATES: Then this is your judgment; and this is the answer which, upon +your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of +misinterpretation? + +PROTARCHUS: What answer? + +SOCRATES: That there are two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration; +and also several other arts which in like manner have this double nature, +and yet only one name. + +PROTARCHUS: Let us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you +speak, Socrates, and hope for good luck. + +SOCRATES: We have explained what we term the most exact arts or sciences. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: And yet, Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us, if +we do not award to her the first place. + +PROTARCHUS: And pray, what is dialectic? + +SOCRATES: Clearly the science which has to do with all that knowledge of +which we are now speaking; for I am sure that all men who have a grain of +intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and +reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of all. +But how would you decide this question, Protarchus? + +PROTARCHUS: I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art of +persuasion far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far the best +of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their +own free will. Now, I should not like to quarrel either with you or with +him. + +SOCRATES: You mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were not +ashamed? + +PROTARCHUS: As you please. + +SOCRATES: May I not have led you into a misapprehension? + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: Dear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best or +usefullest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and accuracy, and +the greatest amount of truth, however humble and little useful an art. And +as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that his art has the advantage in +usefulness to mankind, he will not quarrel with you for saying that the +study of which I am speaking is superior in this particular of essential +truth; as in the comparison of white colours, a little whiteness, if that +little be only pure, was said to be superior in truth to a great mass which +is impure. And now let us give our best attention and consider well, not +the comparative use or reputation of the sciences, but the power or +faculty, if there be such, which the soul has of loving the truth, and of +doing all things for the sake of it; let us search into the pure element of +mind and intelligence, and then we shall be able to say whether the science +of which I have been speaking is most likely to possess the faculty, or +whether there be some other which has higher claims. + +PROTARCHUS: Well, I have been considering, and I can hardly think that any +other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this. + +SOCRATES: Do you say so because you observe that the arts in general and +those engaged in them make use of opinion, and are resolutely engaged in +the investigation of matters of opinion? Even he who supposes himself to +be occupied with nature is really occupied with the things of this world, +how created, how acting or acted upon. Is not this the sort of enquiry in +which his life is spent? + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: He is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things which +are becoming, or which will or have become. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor +have been nor will be unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule of truth +ever become certain? + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no +fixedness? + +PROTARCHUS: How indeed? + +SOCRATES: Then mind and science when employed about such changing things +do not attain the highest truth? + +PROTARCHUS: I should imagine not. + +SOCRATES: And now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or +Philebus or Gorgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single point. + +PROTARCHUS: What point? + +SOCRATES: Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has +to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or if +not, at any rate what is most akin to them has; and that all other things +are to be placed in a second or inferior class. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to +be given to the fairest things? + +PROTARCHUS: That is natural. + +SOCRATES: And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured +most? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And these names may be said to have their truest and most exact +application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of +pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Very true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: In the next place, as to the mixture, here are the ingredients, +pleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who have their +materials ready to their hands. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And now we must begin to mix them? + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our +memories? + +PROTARCHUS: Of what? + +SOCRATES: Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb, +that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is good. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I +believe to be a fair summary of the argument. + +PROTARCHUS: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living +beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief good +of all, and that the two names 'good' and 'pleasant' are correctly given to +one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins by denying +this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are two, and that +wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was not this +what we were saying, Protarchus? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And is there not and was there not a further point which was +conceded between us? + +PROTARCHUS: What was it? + +SOCRATES: That the good differs from all other things. + +PROTARCHUS: In what respect? + +SOCRATES: In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in +all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of +anything else. + +PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of +wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure +was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part +whatever in pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: We did. + +SOCRATES: And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take up +the enquiry again and set us right; and assuming memory and wisdom and +knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider +whether he would desire to possess or acquire,--I will not say pleasure, +however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that he is +pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection, +however momentary, of the feeling,--but would he desire to have anything at +all, if these faculties were wanting to him? And about wisdom I ask the +same question; can you conceive that any one would choose to have all +wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than with a certain degree of +pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than with a certain +degree of wisdom? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any +more? + +SOCRATES: Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good +cannot possibly be either of them? + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less +accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be duly +assigned. + +PROTARCHUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: Have we not found a road which leads towards the good? + +PROTARCHUS: What road? + +SOCRATES: Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover in +what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the discovery +of the man himself? + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning, that +we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in +the life which is well mixed than in that which is not? + +PROTARCHUS: Far greater. + +SOCRATES: Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up +a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who presides over +the ceremony of mingling. + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Are not we the cup-bearers? and here are two fountains which are +flowing at our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a fountain +of honey; the other, wisdom, a sober draught in which no wine mingles, is +of water unpleasant but healthful; out of these we must seek to make the +fairest of all possible mixtures. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Tell me first;--should we be most likely to succeed if we +mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom? + +PROTARCHUS: Perhaps we might. + +SOCRATES: But I should be afraid of the risk, and I think that I can show +a safer plan. + +PROTARCHUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and +one art to be more exact than another. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; some of +them regarding only the transient and perishing, and others the permanent +and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when judged by the +standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, were truer than the former. + +PROTARCHUS: Very good and right. + +SOCRATES: If, then, we were to begin by mingling the sections of each +class which have the most of truth, will not the union suffice to give us +the loveliest of lives, or shall we still want some elements of another +kind? + +PROTARCHUS: I think that we ought to do what you suggest. + +SOCRATES: Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and has reason as +well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other +things. + +PROTARCHUS: We will suppose such a man. + +SOCRATES: Will he have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only with +the divine circle and sphere, and knows nothing of our human spheres and +circles, but uses only divine circles and measures in the building of a +house? + +PROTARCHUS: The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is +ridiculous in man. + +SOCRATES: What do you mean? Do you mean that you are to throw into the +cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false measure +and the false circle? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, we must, if any of us is ever to find his way home. + +SOCRATES: And am I to include music, which, as I was saying just now, is +full of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, I think that you must, if human life is to be a life at +all. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper who +is pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door wide, and let knowledge +of every sort stream in, and the pure mingle with the impure? + +PROTARCHUS: I do not know, Socrates, that any great harm would come of +having them all, if only you have the first sort. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, shall I let them all flow into what Homer poetically +terms 'a meeting of the waters'? + +PROTARCHUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: There--I have let them in, and now I must return to the fountain +of pleasure. For we were not permitted to begin by mingling in a single +stream the true portions of both according to our original intention; but +the love of all knowledge constrained us to let all the sciences flow in +together before the pleasures. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And now the time has come for us to consider about the pleasures +also, whether we shall in like manner let them go all at once, or at first +only the true ones. + +PROTARCHUS: It will be by far the safer course to let flow the true ones +first. + +SOCRATES: Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary +pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle +them? + +PROTARCHUS: Yes; the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to +mingle. + +SOCRATES: The knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent and +useful always; and if we say of pleasures in like manner that all of them +are good and innocent for all of us at all times, we must let them all +mingle? + +PROTARCHUS: What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take? + +SOCRATES: Do not ask me, Protarchus; but ask the daughters of pleasure and +wisdom to answer for themselves. + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: Tell us, O beloved--shall we call you pleasures or by some other +name?--would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of opinion that +they would certainly answer as follows: + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: They would answer, as we said before, that for any single class +to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether +possible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with another +and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of things in +general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that may be, of ourselves +in every respect. + +PROTARCHUS: And our answer will be:--In that ye have spoken well. + +SOCRATES: Very true. And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and +mind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they will +reply:--'What pleasures do you mean?' + +PROTARCHUS: Likely enough. + +SOCRATES: And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have +the greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition to +the true ones? 'Why, Socrates,' they will say, 'how can we? seeing that +they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us; they trouble the +souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness; they prevent us +from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of the children which +are born to us, causing them to be forgotten and unheeded; but the true and +pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our family, and also +those pleasures which accompany health and temperance, and which every +Virtue, like a goddess, has in her train to follow her about wherever she +goes,--mingle these and not the others; there would be great want of sense +in any one who desires to see a fair and perfect mixture, and to find in it +what is the highest good in man and in the universe, and to divine what is +the true form of good--there would be great want of sense in his allowing +the pleasures, which are always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle +with mind in the cup.'--Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, +which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well as on the behalf of +memory and true opinion? + +PROTARCHUS: Most certainly. + +SOCRATES: And still there must be something more added, which is a +necessary ingredient in every mixture. + +PROTARCHUS: What is that? + +SOCRATES: Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be +created or subsist. + +PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: Quite impossible; and now you and Philebus must tell me whether +anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking the +argument is now completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which +is going to hold fair rule over a living body. + +PROTARCHUS: I agree with you, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule +of the habitation of the good? + +PROTARCHUS: I think that we are. + +SOCRATES: What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and +which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by +all? When we have discovered it, we will proceed to ask whether this +omnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge. + +SOCRATES: And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders any +mixture either of the highest value or of none at all. + +PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Every man knows it. + +PROTARCHUS: What? + +SOCRATES: He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture +whatever must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and to the +mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a confused medley which +brings confusion on the possessor of it. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the +beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world +over. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, +with three we may catch our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the three, +and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of the mixture, +and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion of them. + +PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + +SOCRATES: And now, Protarchus, any man could decide well enough whether +pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more honourable +among gods and men. + +PROTARCHUS: Clearly, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to +the end. + +SOCRATES: We must take each of them separately in their relation to +pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to which of +the two they are severally most akin. + +PROTARCHUS: You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after passing in review +mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to yourself--as to +whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth. + +PROTARCHUS: There is no need to pause, for the difference between them is +palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and it is said +that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest, perjury is +excused by the gods; for pleasures, like children, have not the least +particle of reason in them; whereas mind is either the same as truth, or +the most like truth, and the truest. + +SOCRATES: Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether +pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure? + +PROTARCHUS: Here is another question which may be easily answered; for I +imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of +pleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but there still remains the third test: Has mind a +greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer +of the two? + +PROTARCHUS: No one, Socrates, either awake or dreaming, ever saw or +imagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly, at any time, past, +present, or future. + +SOCRATES: Right. + +PROTARCHUS: But when we see some one indulging in pleasures, perhaps in +the greatest of pleasures, the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the +action makes us ashamed; and so we put them out of sight, and consign them +to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day. + +SOCRATES: Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere, by word of mouth +to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and wide, that +pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second, but that in +measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the like, the eternal nature +has been found. + +PROTARCHUS: Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said. + +SOCRATES: In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful +and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if you reckon in the third dass mind and wisdom, you will +not be far wrong, if I divine aright. + +PROTARCHUS: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we +were affirming to appertain specially to the soul--sciences and arts and +true opinions as we called them? These come after the third class, and +form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is. + +PROTARCHUS: Surely. + +SOCRATES: The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us as +painless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed them, +which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses. + +PROTARCHUS: Perhaps. + +SOCRATES: And now, as Orpheus says, + +'With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song.' + +Here, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to set +the crown on our discourse. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said, thus +offering the third libation to the saviour Zeus. + +PROTARCHUS: How? + +SOCRATES: Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely the +good. + +PROTARCHUS: I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you +spoke, meant a recapitulation. + +SOCRATES: Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just +been saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, which is maintained, +not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind was +far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than +pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: But, suspecting that there were other things which were also +better, I went on to say that if there was anything better than either, +then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure +would lose the second place as well as the first. + +PROTARCHUS: You did. + +SOCRATES: Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the +unsatisfactory nature of both of them. + +PROTARCHUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good +have been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both +wanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection. + +PROTARCHUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: But, though they must both resign in favour of another, mind is +ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror than +pleasure. + +PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And, according to the judgment which has now been given, +pleasure will rank fifth. + +PROTARCHUS: True. + +SOCRATES: But not first; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and +animals in the world by their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her to be so;-- +although the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, determine +that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts of animals to +be better witnesses than the inspirations of divine philosophy. + +PROTARCHUS: And now, Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you have +been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us. + +SOCRATES: And will you let me go? + +PROTARCHUS: There is a little which yet remains, and I will remind you of +it, for I am sure that you will not be the first to go away from an +argument. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Philebus by Plato + |